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This work bridges the gap between academic theory and “in the
trenches” reality. Simply put, if you create a salesforce that
understands agility and knows when to change approaches, you will
outperform the market . . . dramatically . . . and the research
contained in here proves it. This goes well beyond the typical
platitudes contained in most books on sales methodologies. It
provides tactical, actionable, and specific strategies for dealing with
nearly every sales scenario you are likely to encounter.
Sales is not for the faint of heart, and this book skillfully weaves an
incredible amount of innovative content to help sellers who are
committed to improvement and agility. Honestly, you’ve delivered the
trifecta of books with Cracking the Sales Management Code,
Crushing Quota, and now The Sales Agility Code. Well done!
This is the book that every sales and sales enablement leader should
read to tackle the problem of building high-performing sales
professionals. There’s recognition of the need for such an approach,
but there aren’t a lot of books available that provide practical
strategies, backed by research, to create a path to sales expertise
through a focus on developing sales agility. A brilliant follow-up to
Cracking the Sales Management Code and Crushing Quota.
At first, I was a bit skeptical about this approach because I’ve always
been a big fan of sales methodology. However, as I dug into the
book, I realized that agility is a methodology, just not one that is
rigid and procedural. Sales agility is one of our core competencies,
and it’s great to see a methodology centered around it!
This is the agile treasure chest sales teams have been awaiting for
years. The authors provide sales teams with a clear picture of what
it takes to implement the agile mindset and impact sales production
with a flair for customer centricity. This book clearly unpacks how to
put the customer at the center and focus on finding ways to increase
buyer confidence through customer-centric personalized “GPS”
approaches. I have no doubt by supplementing sales playbooks with
the situational agile treasure chest found in The Sales Agility Code,
you’ll exceed your sales goals this year!
What Michelle and Lisa have done is very smart and shows the
grown-up thinking of researchers versus the shrill claims of
generations of hacks! Your work is well documented, inclusive by
nature, and allows everyone a seat at the discussion table. How
refreshing in these times!
ISBN: 978-1-26-496965-4
MHID: 1-26-496965-1
The material in this eBook also appears in the print version of this
title: ISBN: 978-1-26-496582-3, MHID: 1-26-496582-6.
Title: The sales agility code : deploy situational fluency to win more
sales / Michelle V. Vazzana and Lisa Doyle.
TERMS OF USE
Acknowledgments
PART I
2 The Three Levels of Sales Agility and the Sales Agility Research
Journey
PART II
8 Situational Readiness
PART IV
PART V
Notes
Index
Acknowledgments
—MICHELLE VAZZANA
’d like to acknowledge my husband, Dan, and my children,
very sales author claims to share the “one best way” to sell that
E is far superior to all others. You’ve likely read at least one book
on consultative selling. Perhaps another on developing an
effective value proposition. Yet another on value selling. The
landscape of sales experts is vast. If you are reading this book, you
have most likely been through several sales training programs that
have claimed to be the best. You likely took something useful out of
each one, but none of them were revolutionary.
This search for the best way to sell has befuddled salespeople
and sales leaders for years. And now we know why: research has
revealed that a one-size-fits-all approach to selling is doomed to fail.
In fact, any given sales approach has been shown to be effective
approximately 25 percent of the time.1 The best salespeople do not
use one set path. They choose a path based on the buying situations
they face.
So, the question is, are you ready? Are you ready to consider
that one-size-fits-all selling is a myth? Or that today’s informed and
complex buying teams will not tolerate salespeople who try to force
fit a sales process onto their buyer’s journey? Are you ready to
demystify the complex job of selling and enjoy higher win rates and
more satisfied buyers? Are you ready to approach your sales job
with a growth mindset and rethink your approach? If so, let’s begin.
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never have been exposed to hostile criticism at all, but for the
metaphysical objections, already dismissed by us as fallacious,
founded upon the notion that the mechanical postulates with which
Interaction conflicts are ascertained truths about the actual structure
of the reality with which we are in touch in immediate experience.
It is clear that, from the nature of the problem to be solved, we
cannot be called upon to prove the actual occurrence of
psychophysical interaction. As a working hypothesis for the
interrelation of two sets of scientific abstractions, the theory is in
principle incapable of direct establishment by the “appeal to facts.”
All that is requisite for its justification is to show that it is (a) not in
principle at variance with any fundamental axiom of scientific
procedure, and (b) enables us to co-ordinate our scientific results in
the manner most suitable for the uses to which we propose to put
them. Both these conditions are fulfilled by the hypothesis of
Interaction, if our foregoing arguments are sound. We have seen the
fallacious nature of the objections brought against it on a priori
grounds of logical method, and have also seen that it is positively
demanded if we are at once to be faithful to the mechanical
postulates upon which physical science depends for its successes,
and to recognise in our psychological constructions that teleological
character of human action which is all-essential for History and
Ethics. In substance this is the whole case for the Interaction
hypothesis, and no further accession of strength would result from its
elaboration in detail.
It may be added that it is one great recommendation of the
hypothesis of Interaction, that it is quite consistent with the full
recognition of the relative usefulness of the alternative theories,
though they, as we have seen, are unable to do justice to those
aspects of fact which can only be expressed in terms of Interaction.
Thus the hypothesis of Interaction can readily afford to admit that, for
certain purposes and up to a certain point, it is possible to treat
physical or psychical processes as if they were determined solely by
physical or psychical conditions respectively, and even to treat some
physical processes as if the presence of their psychical concomitants
made no difference at all to their occurrence. The reason of this is,
that whereas a mechanical hypothesis can give no intelligible
account of a purposive process at all, a teleological hypothesis can
quite easily account for the apparently mechanical character of some
of the processes which fall under it. As we have seen (Book III. chap.
3, § 6), a purposive reaction, once established, approximates to
mechanical uniformity in the regularity with which it continues to be
repeated, while the conditions are unchanged, and the end of the
reaction is therefore still secured by its repetition.
Thus we can readily see that, even if we contented ourselves with
the attempt to translate into the language of psychological science
the processes which make up the life of an individual subject, many
of them would appear to be going on with routine uniformity. And
when we deliberately set ourselves to obtain uniformities by taking
an average result, derived from comparison of a multitude of
subjects, our results are, of course, always mechanical in
appearance, because the element of individual purpose and initiative
has been excluded by ourselves from our data in the very process of
taking the average. Hence we can understand how, on the
hypothesis of Interaction itself, all those mental processes which
consist in the repetition of an already established type of reaction
should come to appear mechanical, and thus to suggest that
mechanical conception of psychical processes which is common to
the epiphenomenalist and the parallelist view. Interaction, and
Interaction alone, is thus a hypothesis capable of being applied to
the whole field of psychological investigation.
I will conclude this chapter with some considerations on the
bearing of our result upon the special problems of Metaphysics. We
have explicitly defended Interaction as being no statement of actual
experienced fact, but a working hypothesis for the convenient
correlation of two scientific constructions, neither of which directly
corresponds to the actualities of experience. This means, of course,
that Interaction cannot possibly be the final truth for Metaphysics. It
cannot ultimately be the “fact” that “mind” and “body” are things
which react upon each other, because, as we have seen, neither
“mind” nor “body” is an actual datum of experience; for direct
experience and its social relations, the duality subsequently created
by the construction of a physical order simply has no existence. Nor
can it be maintained that this duality, though not directly given as a
datum, is a concept which has to be assumed in order to make
experience consistent with itself, and is therefore the truth. For the
concept of Interaction manifestly reposes upon the logically prior
conception of the physical as a rigidly mechanical system. It is
because we have first constructed the notion of the “body” on rigidly
mechanical lines that we have subsequently to devise the concept of
“mind” or “soul” as a means of recognising and symbolising in our
science the non-mechanical character of actual human life. And
since we have already seen that the mechanical, as such, cannot be
real, this whole scheme of a mechanical and a non-mechanical
system in causal relation with one another can only be an imperfect
substitute for the Reality it is intended to symbolise. In fact, we might
have drawn the same conclusion from the very fact that the
psychophysical hypothesis we have adopted is couched in terms of
Transeunt Causality, since we have already satisfied ourselves that
all forms of the causal postulate are more or less defective
appearance.
The proposition that the psychophysical theory of the “connection”
of “body” and “mind” is an artificial transformation, due to the needs
of empirical science, of the actual teleological unity of human
experience, is sometimes expressed by the statement that mind and
body are really one and the same thing. In its insistence upon the
absence of the psychophysical duality from actual experience, this
saying is correct enough, but it perhaps fails to express the truth with
sufficient precision. For, as it stands, the saying conveys no hint of
the very different levels on which the two concepts stand in respect
to the degree of truth with which they reproduce the purposive
teleological character of real human experience. It would perhaps be
nearer the mark to say that, while the physiologist’s object, the
“body,” and the psychologist’s object, the “mind,” are alike
conceptual symbols, substituted, from special causes, for the single
subject of actual life, and may both be therefore said to “mean” or
“stand for” the same thing, their actual content is different. For what
in the language of physiology I call my “body” includes only those
processes of actual life which approximate to the mechanical ideal
sufficiently closely to be capable of being successfully treated as
merely mechanical, and therefore brought under a scheme of
general “laws” of nature. Whereas what, as a psychologist, I call my
“mind” or “soul,” though it includes processes of an approximately
mechanical type, includes them only as subordinate to the initiation
of fresh individual reactions against environment which can only be
adequately expressed by teleological categories. Thus, though
“mind” and “body” in a sense mean the same actual thing, the one
stands for a fuller and clearer view of its true nature than the other. In
Dr. Stout’s terminology their intent may be the same, but their
content is different.[183]