Professional Documents
Culture Documents
‘Mr. William Fittock, Mayor of St Mawes, in Cornwall, An[no] 1741 . . . being the fourth
time of his Serving that Office & never betray’d his Trust but refus’d Extraordinary
Bribes’ [BM Prints and Drawings, 1873,0712.686]. A rare positive image of an official
praised for being not corrupt.
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M A R K K N IG H T S
1
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1
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‘Mr. William Fittock, Mayor of St Mawes, in Cornwall, An[no] 1741 . . . being the fourth
time of his Serving that Office & never betray’d his Trust but refus’d Extraordinary
Bribes’ [BM Prints and Drawings, 1873,0712.686]. A rare positive image of an official
praised for being not corrupt.
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Preface
vi
to compensate for this by occasionally plumbing in depth but I have sought patterns
across time and place that would be impossible through highly detailed case studies.
I nevertheless envisage a companion volume that details some of the rich stories
that have inevitably been squeezed out here for reasons of space.
Because this book covers a large number of times and spaces, each with a con-
siderable secondary literature, and also draws on insights from non-historical
material, footnotes have been kept to a minimum but readers will find much
more guidance in the bibliography. Particular attention is paid there to non-
historical material that might be of interest to historians—this body of material
has largely been excluded from the chapters but the bibliography will show how
some of the book’s thinking is indebted to modern discussions. Although this is a
book for historians, it is also designed to be of interest to social scientists, public
administrators, lawyers, anthropologists, and sociologists, on whose work many
of the sections draw. Both corruption and office are topics that cannot be neatly
defined within a single disciplinary boundary; so any treatment of them should
have a multi-disciplinary framework and have something to say to each of the
cognate fields. Footnotes will nevertheless generally give information about pri-
mary and secondary material directly cited in the text; the bibliography gives a
more expansive treatment for each theme. The exceptions to this approach are
Chapters 3 and 4, which are themselves partly overviews of secondary literature.
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Acknowledgements
I owe a special and great debt of thanks to Mark Philp, with whom I have had
many productive and enjoyable conversations. He read many of the chapters,
providing very helpful advice and encouragement, and it has been a great pleasure
to have had him as a colleague. I dedicate the book both to him and to the late
Colin Davis, for conversations about corruption that encouraged me to think of
this as a worthwhile project.
I also thank my friends and family—especially Emma, Sam, and Caitlin, but
also my parents, siblings, and wider kin—for listening to countless tales of cor-
ruption over a lengthy period; they will be relieved in all sorts of ways to see the
book finally in print.
I have presented versions of chapters at a number of conferences and seminars
in Amsterdam, Brighton, Cambridge, Chicago, Keele, London, Los Angeles,
Madrid, Milan, Oxford, Paris, Pavia, Reading, Sheffield, Stratford-upon-Avon,
Venice, Yale and Warwick, where many colleagues have kindly provided much
useful feedback, so thank you to everyone who participated and asked questions.
I am also grateful to Stephen Alford, Andreas Bågenholm, Robert Barrington,
Monika Bauhr, Trevor Burnard, Christian Burset, Emanuela Ceva, Penelope
Corfield, Margot Finn, Aaron Graham, Philip Harling, Lisa Herzog, Daniel
Hulsebosch, Joanna Innes, Ronald Kroeze, Simon Middleton, Steve Pincus, David
Chan Smith, Charles Walton, Callie Wilkinson, and Nick Wilson for answering
questions, reading chapters, providing references, supporting funding applica-
tions, and stimulating discussions. The book was started with the aid of an AHRC
Leadership Fellowship and concluded with the help of a Leverhulme Research
Fellowship, and I am very grateful to both funds for their support. The University
of Warwick also generously covered the costs of the images. Thanks also to Lucy
Sparks and her colleagues at Lear Fitness who worked wonders on the pains
resulting from being too long in front of a PC.
A shorter version of Chapter 5 appeared as ‘Corruption as the Abuse of
Entrusted Power’, in Nicoletta Parisi, Gian Luca Potesta, and Dino Rinoldi (eds.),
Prevenire la Corruzione (Naples, 2018).
I publish an occasional blog about corruption past and present at https://blogs.
warwick.ac.uk/historyofcorruption/
I wrote a report for Transparency International which is free to download at
https://www.transparency.org.uk/publications/old-corruption-what-british-
history-can-tell-us-about-corruption-today/
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Some spellings have been silently modernised—vv has become w, and v become
u, for example. Contractions in early printed works have also been silently
expanded.
The Text Creation Partnership has now transcribed over 44,000 texts published
before 1700; and a group of corpus linguists at Lancaster have fed these into a
database of almost 1.2 billion words [https://cqpweb.lancs.ac.uk/]. This also has
tools for the analysis of the corpus that take account of the fluctuations in the
quantity of print published at any time, so that a ‘frequency’ can be determined
that is relational to total output. This mitigates any data that automatically show a
rise for any term in the 1640s, for example, when print production suddenly
increased dramatically. I am very grateful to the Lancaster team for granting me
access to the database. We do not have such sensitive data for the eighteenth
century as for the pre-1700 period, since digitised post-1700 printed material
relies on OCR technology which is far less accurate than hand-entered data.
Searches of digitised newspapers from the later eighteenth century onwards can
also offer some useful data. So linguistic analysis has been based on all these
different platforms and tools.
Currency issues are fraught because values changed over time. The following
might be helpful guides. There were about 8 rupees to the pound sterling in 1770
[The True Alarm, 73]. A lakh = 100,000 (usually of rupees); 100 lakh made 1 crore.
A pagoda was a coin made of gold or half-gold, varying in value but worth about
3.5 rupees. To gain an idea of the present-day value of old sterling over time, see
https://www.nationalarchives.gov.uk/currency-converter/
Indian correspondence sometimes uses Presidencies for locations. Fort William
was in Calcutta for the regional governance of Bengal. This was the base of the
Governor-General. Fort St George was in Madras for the regional governance of
southern India. I use pre-modern names for other places. I use ‘East Indiaman’ to
refer to people rather than, as is more usual, to ships.
Where no name is given before a publication, it was anonymous. Names in
square brackets are possible or probable authors. Place of publication in the
footnotes and bibliography is London unless otherwise stated.
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Contents
Bibliography 437
Index 475
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List of Illustrations
List of Abbreviations
Pepys Diary The Diary of Samuel Pepys, ed. Robert Latham and William
Matthews (UCLA, 1983)
PP Parliamentary Papers
RAC Royal Africa Company
SPG Society for the Propagation of the Gospel
State Trials William Cobbett (ed.), Cobbett’s Complete Collection of State Trials
(33 vols., 1809). Later volumes were edited by Thomas Howell and
David Jardine
TNA The National Archives
TRHS Transactions of the Royal Historical Society
Wraxall, Memoirs The Historical and Posthumous Memoirs of Sir Nathaniel William
Wraxall, 1772–1784, ed. Henry B. Wheatley (5 vols., 1884)
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1
Introduction
In 1600 corruption was primarily seen in religious terms, meaning original sin or
sinful behaviour. It did have other connotations: for example, political corruption
meant the decay of the polity, largely as the result of a lack of individual and soci-
etal virtue that made the state vulnerable to the corrupting influences of luxury,
ambition, and vested interests. Corruption of the judiciary, through bribery, was
also a concern, as was the corruption of discourse and the corruption of sexual
morality.² These meanings did not entirely fade and some, such as sexual corrup-
tion, persisted; but over time some newer strands of meaning became important.
By 1850 corruption tended to mean financial and political corruption, embezzle-
ment or abuse of public funds, venality, the abuse of office for private gain, breach
of trust. Corruption had acquired a more specific sense, closely related to office.
The concept and purpose of office also shifted, so that we might even talk of the
‘invention of public office’. Over the period under consideration, office evolved
from being something that was considered a piece of property with extensive per-
sonal privileges to something that was public with very restricted and defined
forms of enrichment. This important reconceptualisation reflected the rise of ‘the
public’ as well as of the state as a conceptual entity with agency and identity. The
shift away from thinking of office as personal property meant that it was not
the officer’s to sell; that it should be rewarded formally by a salary; that the officer
should not receive gifts; that it was a public trust; that the officer should be
accountable to the state or corporation or public; and that conflicts of interest
between the individual holder and the public or employing institution should be
avoided. Over a long period of time a change is discernible, producing not so
much an impersonal, bureaucratic state as a ‘jealous’ state that had gradually
appropriated the rights and privileges once associated with individual officers.
This is therefore a study of moving targets: corruption and office were both
evolving as concepts and practices. Neither ‘corruption’ nor ‘office’ were
¹ The Spectator, 28 Aug. 1712. This chapter is deliberately lightly footnoted, but please see the bibli-
ography for relevant material.
² There was also corruption of the body or natural material, which provided a metaphor for other
types of corruption.
Trust and Distrust: Corruption in Office in Britain and its Empire, 1600–1850. Mark Knights, Oxford University Press.
© Mark Knights 2021. DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780198796244.003.0001
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³ Mark Knights, ‘Explaining Away Corruption in Pre-Modern Britain’, Social Philosophy & Policy
35:2 (2019), 94–117.
⁴ ‘The Champion of the People’ (1784) depicted Charles James Fox cutting off ‘Corruption’ from a
hydra that has other heads labelled ‘Tyranny’, ‘Despotism’, ‘Oppression’, ‘Secret Influence’,
‘Dependency’, and ‘Assumed Prerogative’. For other images associating a hydra and corruption, see
‘Britannia Excisa’ (1733); ‘The Champion of Oakhampton, Attacking the Hydra of Gloucester Place’
(1809); ‘The Champions of Reform Destroying the Monster of Corruption’ (1831). The idea that ‘cor-
ruption’ was variously constructed through different configurations is very usefully explored in
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Fig. 1.1 A detail from Thomas Rowlandson, ‘A Rough Sketch of the Times as
deleniated [sic] by Sir Francis Burdett’ (1819), BM Sat. 11553. See Fig. 8.2 for the full
version. The ‘Monster of Corruption’ is a composite creation, having a large ‘Eye to
Interest’, ‘Legs of Luxury’, ‘Hands of Extortion’, and personal characteristics such as
‘A Mouth of Guile’ and a ‘Cringing Soul’. The monster’s head also has anti-Semitic
features.
Michael Johnston’s Syndromes of Corruption: Wealth, Power and Democracy (Cambridge, 2005). See
bibliography for analysis of Johnston’s important contribution.
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been half the knave every one is supposed by the patriots of England to be’, he
wrote in 1784, ‘I might have secured [£]40,000 or 50,000 per annum for the last
four years’.⁵ Shore was a religious man guided by his conscience; but how were
others to judge the moral line? What constituted ‘excessive private gain’ varied
according to time and place, in the same way as a ‘just profit’ or ‘sufficient’ fortune
(what contemporaries such as Lord Cornwallis, Governor-General of India, called
a ‘competency’⁶) varied according to time and place. In India in the mid-eighteenth
century, at the height of gains there, Harry Verelst thought £25,000–30,000 ‘sufficient
to set down with myself and also to serve my friends’ but others there thought
even more was necessary: George Vansittart put his own wants in 1774 at £50,000
and advised his nephew in 1786 to get £60,000.⁷ But these returns were much
higher than in Britain where Adam Smith thought 8 or 10 per cent a good profit;
indeed it was this disparity that made East Indian fortunes so glaring.
Remuneration was, for much of this period, a mixture of the formal and semi-
formal. Salaries in the state and companies were low, compensated for by fees,
perquisites, ‘favours’, and in the East India Company (EIC), from the late seven-
teenth century, permission to engage in private trade. There was a logic to such
accumulation since there was almost no system of pension for old age, so that
officers had to accumulate sufficient sums to provide for life out of post. Such a
system had the advantage for the state and companies that it kept operating costs
very low and hence also reduced the tax burden.⁸ But it also meant that the divid-
ing line between licit and illicit remuneration was blurred and increased the
temptation to maximise the informal revenue for the officeholder. The earl of
Sandwich told his client, Samuel Pepys, at the outset of his career in 1660 ‘that it
was not the salary of any place that did make a man rich, but the opportunities
of getting money while he is in the place’.⁹ One experienced customs official noted
in 1782 that a tidewaiter in the Customs earned so little that his ‘place wont
maintain a man, so he is forct to be a rogue against his will or he and his family
will starve’.¹⁰
Over time there was an increase in salaries for both state and company officers,
with an associated shift away from the informal rewards of the old system. Reform
⁵ Charles Shore, Lord Teignmouth (ed.), Memoir of the Life and Correspondence of John, Lord
Teignmouth, 2 vols. (1843), i. 75.
⁶ Arthur Aspinall, Cornwallis in Bengal: The Administrative and Judicial Reforms of Lord Cornwallis
in Bengal (Manchester, 1931), 38.
⁷ Peter Marshall, East Indian Fortunes: The British in Bengal in the Eighteenth Century (1976),
216–217.
⁸ Joel Hurstfield, The Queen’s Wards: Wardship and Marriage under Elizabeth (1958), 345–349.
Aylmer rightly doubted whether this was the result of an intentional policy and noted that the infor-
mal system was a form of indirect taxation [Aylmer, ‘Office Holding’, 234].
⁹ Pepys Diary, 16 Aug. 1660.
¹⁰ Arthur Lyon Cross, Eighteenth Century Documents Relating to the Royal Forests, the Sheriffs and
Smuggling: Selected from the Shelburne Manuscripts in the William L. Clements Library (New York,
1928), 250.
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along this line was suggested in the 1780s, both in Britain and in India, where
Lord Cornwallis found that low salaries were a ‘false economy’ and encouraged
corruption.¹¹ This trend was further fostered by Utilitarians. Jeremy Bentham laid
out the maxim: ‘Integrity is more easily preserved in public offices in which there
are no fees, than in those where they are allowed. A lawful right often serves as a
pretext for extortion.’¹² Indeed, one of his ‘rules’ was that
The definition of corruption at any time and place was determined by those
who had a vision of what an uncorrupt polity might look like. ‘Anti-corruption’
thus shaped ‘corruption’. Their interaction was also intrinsic to the evolution of
the state and corporation. Abuse of office was like grit in an oyster, at once ‘dam-
aging’ but also having a creative and innovative effect. The perception of corrup-
tion in office fostered reforms that often extended the reach of the state; but as the
state grew, it also opened up new scope for abuses of office, leading to further
attempts at reform. Calls for retrenchment included anti-corruption measures
that sought to make the state more efficient and more legitimate. Corruption and
anti-corruption are, then, two sides of the same coin: iterative opposites locked in
a dynamic process of interaction. So when examining allegations of corruption in
office we need to ask why they were made (in terms of motivation, timing, and
function), who benefited from them, and with what result. As James Scott put it,
‘one must ask of corruption the same questions one asks of any other political
process: who gets what, when and how?’¹⁶ Anti-corruption has to be analysed just
as much as the alleged corruption. Anti-corruption was political, serving a num-
ber of purposes at individual, group, and state level. The accusation of corruption
was one that could delegitimise, undermine, or even destroy a rival; it could
engender a sense of moral superiority and feed outrage; it could be used by par-
tisans to gain advantage; and it could strengthen and legitimise the market, state,
or imperial project. Anti-corruption was an inherently politicised process, often
driven by partisan rivalries and diverging ideologies, even if, ironically, one of its
consequences was the ideal of an impartial civil servant.
The shifting concept of corruption, the birth of public office, the development
of the state and empire, and the redrawing of public and private were all contested
processes. Differing visions, ideals, and practices were offered by individuals,
groups, and institutions. These contests were intensified by processes of moral
reform and fiscal retrenchment (especially after war), as well as processes of scan-
dal and popular pressure, creating a national debate that helped to delineate the
boundaries of acceptable and unacceptable behaviour in office. Moments of crisis
thus offer insights into shifting norms and processes; but the battle between con-
tending versions of corruption, office, the state, the corporation, and the public or
private was an ongoing one.
There were some key features of both corruption and office that endured across
time and space. Corrupt acts were nearly always seen as breaches of a moral code
(sometimes, though not always, embedded in law) to the damage of the public or
of an institution. But there was disagreement about what breached acceptable
boundaries. Although corruption implied a moral crime, in many instances those
alleged to be corrupt argued they were doing what others did, or what custom
allowed, or what was justifiable because they sought to combine their own gain
with that of the state or corporation for which they worked. Contemporaries dif-
fered about what constituted a breach or abuse; what the moral code was or
should be; what discretionary powers an officer enjoyed; who the public was,
what role it should play, and how far individual interests could advance the public
good; as well as who empowered officers, and on what basis and with what
powers. Those disagreements loom large in the following pages, involving the
officials themselves but also the state, corporations, and the wider public. Yet it
was through the contests over what constituted corrupt behaviour in an officer
that these concepts changed meaning. Modern anti-corruption policy has tended
to seek universal solutions to impose, top-down, on corrupt countries; but the
British story suggests that solutions were worked out in the national context
through a prolonged engagement between the state, corporations, citizens, and
officers. That engagement took place within the departments of the state, within
corporations, in the public sphere, in artistic culture, in the courtrooms, in
churches, in imperial contexts, and indeed almost anywhere where concepts of
public duty and public ethics played a part.
The definition of both corruption and office was greatly influenced by the
notion of trust—and its inverse, distrust. Trust, as the fiduciary concept of
entrusting power to an agent, became a key way of thinking about office, from the
mid-seventeenth century onwards. It moved from being a legal tool applicable to
private estate law to one applied to public office holding, a shift that was largely
the result of ideological battles in the 1640s and 1650s which had an enduring
legacy both at home and in the empire. When an officer was entrusted with cer-
tain duties and powers, he was expected to perform well, in the interests of the
entruster and the public. Thinking of office as a legal trust helped to develop
ideals of integrity, disinterestedness, and accountability. The fiduciary trust was
different to a contract, which specified exactly how an agent was to perform; a
trust carried discretionary powers to act in the best interests of the entruster or
beneficiary. Trust in officers, that they would perform their duty wholly in the
interest of the entrusting power, was thus an important commodity. Some of the
trustworthiness of an officer stemmed from the institution in which he operated;
but some of it was more personal, resting on the relationship between the agent
and the entruster and on the integrity of the agent. Entrusted power, with its level
of discretionary action and reliance on an agent who almost certainly had his
own interests, was always open to abuse at both the institutional and personal
level. Whilst the trust implied a confidence that abuse of the entrusted power
would not happen, it could not guarantee this. Moreover, although social, inter-
personal trust between officers and the wider world was often consolidated by
practices of friendship, gift giving, and patronage, these were highly vulnerable to
allegations of corruption.
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of administering justice and fighting wars. The South Sea Company is another
example of private subscribers forming a corporation (with officers) that sought
to absorb the national debt in return for advancing huge amounts of money to the
Treasury.¹⁷
Other hybrid institutions included the Bank of England, founded in 1694,
which pooled private investments in order to loan to the government; and work-
houses and debtors’ prisons, which housed the poor and public offenders on
behalf of the state but banked their labour and drew fees from inmates.¹⁸ Even
apparently public departments, such as the Exchequer and courts of law, operated
on a system of semi-private fees payable to the individual officer. And the ‘private’
in turn had public functions. The early seventeenth-century divine William
Gouge, even as he insisted on the subordination of women within the household,
thought that the latter was nevertheless ‘a little commonwealth’ and hence a con-
scientious performance of household duties ‘may be accounted publicke worke’
and that those who were diligent in their ‘private callings . . . shall be as well
accepted of the Lord as if they had publike offices’.¹⁹ The boundary between ‘pub-
lic’ and ‘private’ office was thus permeable and in evolution over the early modern
period; and this was necessarily so, since the categories of public and private were
also in evolution and interdependent rather than being static and independent of
each other. In addition, the distinction between political and administrative office
was also blurred: political office gave control over many administrative ones;
Parliament and corporations exercised many state-like functions; and adminis-
trative functions were often highly political. The pre-modern state was thus a
hybrid, combining the public and the private, the formal and the informal.
Indeed, the idea of a neat separation of the state and the private sector came
closest to existing for only a short period in the late nineteenth century. In the
period under study, no one was advocating the creation of a large bureaucracy—
quite the reverse: retrenchment of administrative posts was frequently desired
and implemented, often by those who feared the corrupting influence of the
patronage such posts gave the Crown and ministry. It is also true that the state
was in a sense created through the tension between private and public interests.
The impartial, functionary, sovereign state with uncorrupt politicians and uncor-
rupt administrators was not suddenly born into existence. It had a long gestation
through conflicts over the extent to which private interests could legitimately
penetrate and control public interests and resources. Private individuals and
groups appealed to the concept of the public and to the umpire of the state to gain
¹⁷ In 1720, outbidding the Bank of England, the EIC proposed to convert 60 per cent of national
debt into shares in return for £7.5 million.
¹⁸ R. A. Houston, ‘Fraud in the Scottish Linen Industry: Edinburgh’s Charity Workhouse, 1745–58’,
Archives 21:91 (1994), 43–56. This details allegations against William Henderson, the clerk, who sys-
tematically defrauded employers, extorted from employees, and embezzled money.
¹⁹ William Gouge, Of Domesticall Duties (1622), 18–19.
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advantage over each other, and in doing so they inevitably fostered and legitimised
both the public and the state. Anti-corruption’s redefinition of the private and the
public was part of a process of state and corporation formation. Early modern
historians have reconceptualised the state as one in which personal relations were
of fundamental importance in the construction of authority (and the same could
be said of the early modern corporation); but the challenge is to explain how this
personalised state and corporation became less personalised whilst still success-
fully yoking the private to the public.
Public and private were, like corruption and anti-corruption, mutually consti-
tutive. ‘Is not the publique involved in the private, and the private in the pub-
lique?’ asked Edward Misselden in 1623.²⁰ Yet there was an emerging distinction
between what constituted the public realm and what counted as a legitimate pri-
vate interest. The boundary between public and private was extremely blurred in
1600, reflecting a lack of clarity about the difference between a gift and a bribe,
about the legitimacy of a self-interest, and about the rules for private use of public
money. As a result of a series of scandals and public deliberations about them
over the next 250 years, the line between what was licit and illicit became sharper.
The public emerged as a category in its own right, with expectations about how
tax revenues were handled, about its capacity to scrutinise officials and the obliga-
tions that officials owed it. At the purist, moralistic, and republican end of the
scale, the public was always to be put before the private, which therefore ought to
be constrained and subordinated. At the pragmatic or liberal end of the scale,
private interest was, by the eighteenth century, recognised as a potentially pro-
ductive driver of the public interest and should be as little curtailed as possible.²¹
Much of the debate about corruption and abuse of office occurred in a grey zone
between these end-points of the spectrum. The debate was particularly relevant to
institutions that sought to reconcile public and private interests such as the cor-
poration: whether town councils or international trading bodies, these hybrid
bodies represented themselves as achieving the common profit or common weal
of their members. Office was based on a tension: on the one hand office was self-
regarding, because it was a route to money, status, and/or power, and on the other
it was public-regarding, offering a service of benefit to the corporation, commu-
nity, and/or monarch or state.
A vigorous debate occurred at the levels of both political philosophy and
everyday practice about the justifiability of self-interest. While many see the pur-
suit of private interest as fundamental to a modern economy, and group interest
as a legitimate basis for voting, the pre-modern period took neither of these for
granted and was inherently suspicious of private interest as a corrupting factor.
The influence of religious teachings, which stressed the abnegation of the self, and
classical influences, which stressed ideals of putting the public good above all
other considerations, shaped a mentality that was distrustful of self-interest. Yet
growing commercial success at home and abroad was increasingly at odds with
this, and merchants and traders argued that self-interest was not only compatible
with the public interest but also essential to promote it. This viewpoint was
famously codified by Adam Smith in 1776 but it was prevalent long before then.
The legitimisation of private interest therefore posed a significant challenge to
older ways of thinking and also needed new regulatory frameworks if it was not
to become untrammelled greed at the expense of others. Yet the new economic
thinking also undermined the state and corporate structures that offered such
regulation, placing more stress on a need for a personal ethics or national ‘charac-
ter’ that restrained abuse of office.
An important part of the debate about public and private concerned personal
morality. Was abuse of office the result of moral failings of an individual, in which
case the remedy needed to be limited to his removal and the reform of personal
character? Or was it the result of institutional or even systemic societal failings, in
which case institutional, structural, and societal reform was necessary? This book
suggests that these questions pose something of a false choice, since personal,
institutional, and systemic measures were all necessary to reform office. Of these,
institutional reform was the easier both to chart and to put into practice, whereas
ensuring that officers implemented the rules and regulations, or worked within
the institutional limitations, was harder because it required a personal set of val-
ues to guide behaviour and often involved wider socio-cultural norms that
changed slowly. In the pre-modern world, such values were shaped by religious
culture, a tradition of civic humanism, oaths, professional bodies, and institu-
tional cultures; but they were also the results of reflections on the history of earl-
ier polities and of debate about scandals. So reflecting on our past and thinking
through the dilemmas posed by the challenges facing pre-modern officers may in
itself be a useful mechanism today to advance integrity in office.²²
The book considers domestic and imperial office alongside each other because
they were intertwined: domestic attitudes and practices shaped colonial ones, but
in turn, colonial attitudes and practices shaped domestic ones or exposed ten-
sions and ambiguities in the national character. The domestic and imperial ‘state’
took shape out of a monarchical polity, a process that required officers to carve
out new roles in politics and administration, and begin a process of a gradual
(if very incomplete) separation of the powers of its officers into political, execu-
tive, and judicial spheres. In 1600 the ‘state’ was a relatively novel concept and its
early history was one of a participatory, dispersed form of authority in which
Wallace informs us that the great majority of the species of the Amazon
valley frequent the shady groves of the virgin forest. In many cases the
sexes are extremely different in appearance and habits, and are but
rarely found together in one spot. The genus Ornithoptera is closely
allied to Papilio, and contains some of the most remarkable of
butterflies, the homes of the species being the islands of the Malay
Archipelago, and outlying groups of islands, there being a smaller
number of species in the neighbouring continents. The females are of
great size, and are so excessively different from their consorts of the
other sex, as to arouse in the student a feeling of surprise, and a strong
desire to fathom the mysteries involved.
Fig. 184—Ornithoptera (Schoenbergia) paradisea, female. × 1. (The wings, on the
right side, detached, showing the under surface. Colours, black, white, and gray.)
There is great difference among the members of the family, and some
of them possess a very high development of the powers of locomotion,
with a correspondingly perfect structure of the thoracic region, so that,
after inspection of these parts, we can quite believe Wallace's
statement that the larger and strong-bodied kinds are remarkable for
the excessive rapidity of their flight, which, indeed, he was inclined to
consider surpassed that of any other Insects. "The eye cannot follow
them as they dart past; and the air, forcibly divided, gives out a deep
sound louder than that produced by the humming-bird itself. If power of
wing and rapidity of flight could place them in that rank, they should be
considered the most highly organised of butterflies." It was probably to
the genera Pyrrhopyge, Erycides, etc., that Mr. Wallace alluded in the
above remarks. Although the Hesperiidae are not as a rule beautifully
coloured, yet many of these higher forms are most tastefully
ornamented; parts of the wings, wing-fringes, and even the bodies
being set with bright but agreeable colours. We mention these facts
because it is a fashion to attribute a lowly organisation to the family, and
to place it as ancestral to other butterflies. Some of them have
crepuscular habits, but this is also the case with a variety of other
Rhopalocera in the tropics.
Simultaneously with the works above alluded to, Mr. Meyrick has
given[233] a new classification of the Order. We allude, in other pages,
to various points in Mr. Meyrick's classification, which is made to appear
more revolutionary than it really is, in consequence of the radical
changes in nomenclature combined with it.
N.B.—This table is not simply dichotomic; three contrasted categories are used
in the case of the primary divisions, A, B, C, and the secondary divisions, I,
II, III.
A. Fore wing with nervule 5 coming from the middle of the discocellulars, or
nearer 6 than 4 (Categories I, II, III = 1-18).
I. Frenulum rudimentary. .......... Fam. 38. Epicopeiidae, see p. 418.
II. Frenulum absent (Categories 1-8).
1. Proboscis present, legs with spurs (Cat. 2-5).
2. Hind wing with nervule 8 remote from 7 (Cat. 3 and 4).
3. Fore wing with nervule 6 and 7 stalked .......... Fam. 39. Uraniidae,
see p. 419.
4. Fore wing with nervules 6 and 7 not stalked .......... Fam. 5.
Ceratocampidae, see p. 375.
5. Hind wing with nervule 8 nearly touching 7 beyond end of cell ..........
Fam. 4. Brahmaeidae, see p. 374.
6. Proboscis absent, legs without spurs (Cat. 7 and 8).
7. Hind wing with one internal nervure .......... Fam. 3. Saturniidae, see
p. 372.
8. Hind wing with two or three internal nervures .......... Fam. 6.
Bombycidae, see p. 375.
III. Frenulum present (Cat. 9-18).
9. Antennae fusiform [spindle-shaped] .......... Fam. 9. Sphingidae, see
p. 380.
10. Antennae not fusiform (Cat. 11-18).
11. Proboscis absent .......... Fam. 7. Eupterotidae, see p. 376.
12. Proboscis present (Cat. 13-18).
13. Hind wing with nervule 8 curved and almost touching 7 after end of
cell; nervure 1a reaching anal angle .......... Fam. 12.
Cymatophoridae, see p. 386.
14. Hind wing with nervule 8 remote from 7 after end of cell (Cat. 15-
18).
15. Tarsi as short as tibia, hairy; stoutly built moths .......... Fam. 11.
Notodontidae,[237] see p. 383.
16. Tarsi long and naked; slightly built moths (Cat. 17 and 18)
17. Fore wing with nervule 7 remote from 8, and generally stalked
with 6 .......... Fam. 40. Epiplemidae, see p. 420.
18. Fore wing with nervule 7 given off from 8; hind wing with
nervure 1a short or absent .......... Fam. 36. Geometridae, see
p. 411.
B. Fore wing with nervule 5 coming from lower angle of cell or nearer 4 than 6
[see figures 161 and 162, pp. 318, 319] (Categories 19-58).
19. Hind wing with more than 8 nervules (Cat. 20, 21).
20. Proboscis absent, no mandibles nor ligula; size not very small ..........
Fam. 23. Hepialidae, see p. 396.
21. Mandibles, long palpi and ligula present; size very small .......... Fam.
47. Micropterygidae, see p. 435.
22. Hind wing with not more than 8 nervules (Cat. 23-58).
23. Hind wing with nervule 8 remote from 7 after origin of nervules 6 and 7
(Cat. 24-51).
24. Frenulum absent (Cat. 25-29).
25. Hind wing with one internal nervure; nervule 8 with a precostal spur
.......... Fam. 31. Pterothysanidae, see p. 406.
26. Hind wing with two internal nervures (Cat. 27 and 28).
27. Hind wing with a bar between nervules 7 and 8 near the base;
nervure 1a directed to middle of inner margin .......... Fam. 30.
Endromidae, see p. 406.
28. Hind wing with no bar between nervules 7 and 8; nervure 1a
directed to anal angle .......... Fam. 29. Lasiocampidae, see
p. 405.
29. Hind wing with three internal nervures .......... Fam. 21. Arbelidae,
see p. 396.
30. Frenulum present (Cat. 31-51).
31. Hind wing with nervule 8 aborted .......... Fam. 15. Syntomidae,
see p. 388.
32. Hind wing with nervule 8 present (Cat. 33-51).
33. Antennae knobbed .......... Fam. 1. Castniidae, see p. 371.
34. Antennae filiform, or (rarely) dilated a little towards the tip (Cat.
35-51).
35. Fore wing with nervure 1c present (Cat. 36-43).
36. Hind wing with nervule 8 free from the base or connected
with 7 by a bar (Cat. 37-42).
37. Proboscis present .......... Fam. 16. Zygaenidae, see
p. 390.
38. Proboscis absent (Cat. 39-42).
39. Palpi rarely absent; ♀ winged; larvae wood-borers ..........
Fam. 20. Cossidae, see p. 395.
40. Palpi absent; ♀ apterous (Cat. 41, 42).
41. ♀ rarely with legs; ♀ and larvae case-dwellers ..........
Fam. 19. Psychidae, see p. 392.
42. ♀ and larvae free[238] .......... Fam. 18. Heterogynidae,
see p. 392.
43. Hind wing with nervule 8 anastomosing shortly with 7 ..........
Fam. 26. Limacodidae, see. p. 401.
44. Fore wing with nervure 1c absent (Cat. 45-51).
45. Hind wing with nervule 8 rising out of 7 .......... Fam. 34.
Arctiidae, see p. 408.
46. Hind wing with nervule 8 connected with 7 by a bar, or
touching it near middle of cell (Cat. 47, 48).
47. Palpi with the third joint naked and reaching far above
vertex of head; proboscis present .......... Fam. 33.
Hypsidae, see p. 408.
48. Palpi not reaching above vertex of head; proboscis absent
or very minute .......... Fam. 32. Lymantriidae, see p. 406.
49. Hind wing with nervule 8 anastomosing shortly with 7 near
the base; proboscis well developed (Cat. 50, 51).
50. Antennae more or less thick towards tip .......... Fam. 35.
Agaristidae, see p. 410.
51. Antennae filiform .......... Fam. 37. Noctuidae, see p. 414.
52. Hind wing with nervule 8 curved and nearly or quite touching nervure 7,
or anastomosing with it after origin of nervules 6 and 7 (Cat. 53-58).
53. Hind wing with nervure 1c absent (Cat. 54-57).
54. Hind wing with nervule 8 with a precostal spur .......... Fam. 24.
Callidulidae, see p. 400.
55. Hind wing with nervule 8 with no precostal spur (Cat. 56, 57).
56. Hind wing with nervure 1a absent or very short .......... Fam. 25.
Drepanidae, see p. 400.
57. Hind wing with nervure 1a almost or quite reaching anal angle
.......... Fam. 28. Thyrididae, see p. 404.
58. Hind wing with nervure 1c present .......... Fam. 41. Pyralidae, see
p. 420.
C. Fore wing with 4 nervules arising from the cell at almost even distances
apart (Cat. 59-66).
59. Wings not divided into plumes (Cat. 60-63).
60. Hind wing with nervule 8 coincident with 7 .......... Fam. 13. Sesiidae,
see p. 386.
61. Hind wing with nervule 8 free (Cat. 62, 63).
62. Fore wing with nervure 1b simple or with a very minute fork at base
.......... Fam. 14. Tinaegeriidae, see p. 387.
63. Fore wing with nervure 1a forming a large fork with 1b at base ..........
Fam. 45. Tineidae, see p. 428.
64. Wings divided into plumes (Cat. 65, 66).
65. Fore wing divided into at most two, hind wing into three plumes ..........
Fam. 42. Pterophoridae, see p. 426.
66. Fore wing and hind wing each divided into three plumes .......... Fam.
43. Alucitidae (= Orneodidae), see p. 426.
The species are apparently great, lovers of heat and can tolerate a very
dry atmosphere.[240] The transformations of very few have been
observed; so far as is known the larvae feed in stems; and somewhat
resemble those of Goat-moths or Leopard-moths (Cossidae); the
caterpillar of C. therapon lives in the stems of Brazilian orchids, and as
a consequence has been brought to Europe, and the moth there
disclosed. The pupae are in general structure of the incomplete
character, and have transverse rows of spines, as is the case with other
moths of different families, but having larvae with similar habits.[241]
Castnia eudesmia forms a large cocoon of fragments of vegetable
matter knitted together with silk. These Insects are rare in collections;
they do not ever appear in numbers, and are generally very difficult to
capture.
About seventy genera and several hundred species are already known
of this interesting family. They are widely distributed on the globe,
though there are but few in Australia. Our only British species, the
Emperor moth, Saturnia pavonia, is by no means rare, and its larva is a
beautiful object; bright green with conspicuous tubercles of a rosy, or
yellow, colour. It affects an unusual variety of food-plants, sloe and
heather being favourites; the writer has found it at Wicken flourishing on
the leaves of the yellow water-lily. Although the Emperor moth is one of
the largest of our native Lepidopterous Insects, it is one of the smallest
of the Saturniidae.
The larvae of other forms have the habit of forming dense webs, more
or less baglike, for common habitation by a great number of caterpillars,
and they afterwards spin their cocoons inside these receptacles. This
has been ascertained to occur in the case of several species of the
genus Anaphe, as has been described and illustrated by Dr. Fischer,
[246] Lord Walsingham,[247] and Dr. Holland.[248] The structures are
said to be conspicuous objects on trees in some parts of Africa. The
common dwelling of this kind formed by the caterpillars of Hypsoides
radama in Madagascar is said to be several feet in length; but the
structures of most of the other species are of much smaller size.
The larvae of the South American genus Palustra, though hairy like
other Eupterotid caterpillars, are aquatic in their habits, and swim by
coiling themselves and making movements of extension; the hair on the
back is in the form of dense brushes, but at the sides of the body it is
longer and more remote; when the creatures come to the surface—
which is but rarely—the dorsal brushes are quite dry, while the lateral
hairs are wet. The stigmata are extremely small, and the mode of
respiration is not fully known. It was noticed that when taken out of the
water, and walking in the open air, these caterpillars have but little
power of maintaining their equilibrium. They pupate beneath the water
in a singular manner: a first one having formed its cocoon, others come
successively and add theirs to it so as to form a mass.[249] Another
species of Palustra, P. burmeisteri, Berg,[250] is also believed to breathe
by means of air entangled in its long clothing; it comes to the surface
occasionally, to renew the supply; the hairs of the shorter brushes are
each swollen at the extremity, but whether this may be in connexion
with respiration is not known. This species pupates out of the water,
between the leaves of plants.