Ethics Morality and Business The Development of Modern Economic Systems Volume Ii Modern Civilizations 1St Edition Edition Dipak Basu Full Chapter

Ethics, Morality And Business: The
Development Of Modern Economic

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Civilizations 1st Edition Edition Dipak
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Dipak Basu · Victoria Miroshnik
Ethics, Morality and

Business: The
Development of
Modern Economic
Systems, Volume II
Modern Civilizations
Ethics, Morality and Business: The Development
of Modern Economic Systems, Volume II
Dipak Basu · Victoria Miroshnik
Ethics, Morality
and Business: The
Development
of Modern Economic
Systems, Volume II
Modern Civilizations
Dipak Basu Victoria Miroshnik
Nagasaki University Reitaku University
Nagasaki, Japan Chiba, Japan
ISBN 978-3-030-68066-4 ISBN 978-3-030-68067-1 (eBook)

https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-68067-1
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This book is dedicated to our uncle
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Deb Sahitya Kuthir,
who has stimulated us always.
Introduction
In this book, we have analyzed the modern ideas of ethical dimensions

in economics and business. The modern battle is between capitalism
and socialism, in which capitalism is winning now, after the destruction
of the Soviet Union and the resultant demise of Yugoslavia, Venezuela,
Libya, and Syria. In this book, we have discussed the ethical dimensions
of this conflict. Ethical justifications for capitalism were supported by
Adam Smith, Bentham, John Stuart Mill in the nineteenth century and by
Weber, Friedman, and Stigler in the twentieth century. Socialism was justi-
fied by Marx and Engels in the nineteenth century, and Lenin, Bukharin,
Trotsky in the twentieth century.
In this book, we have analyzed these issues along with the ethical
management as demonstrated by Japanese corporations and in Scan-
dinavian countries where socialist characters are implemented within a
capitalist economy.
Corrupt people prohibit the development of a country by using public
resources for personal gains. The moral suggestion to solve this problem
is that one must work solely for common good. The corrupt people
have their rationality but from the moral point of view, it is not justi-
fied. However, capitalism gave its justification, as Friedman justified the
state power to protect the drug dealers. Adam Smith justified the self-
ishness of individual traders in terms of creating utility for the society
through the invisible hands of the market. Utilitarian, like Bentham or
vii
viii INTRODUCTION
John Stuart Mill, justified colonialism, as they were all directors of the
East India Company who colonized India.
Socialism justified human goods in terms of developing and nourishing
essence of human nature. In that sense, Marx followed Kautilya, Aristotle,
Aquinas, and Spinoza in his avocations of workers freedom in terms of
achieving human essence. Inequality of distribution of resources impedes
the perfection of both rich and poor. In that sense, Pareto Optimality is
an impediment for the proper redistribution of resources in any society, as
redistribution can affect the rich adversely although it benefits the poor.
From the society’s point of view, moral values can be fully realized only in
a society in which each member is roughly equal in power and status with
the others. That was nearly achieved in the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia,
but both were destroyed because of human greed. Now Japan and Scan-
dinavian countries are trying to achieve that goal of a moral society by
reducing inequality.
If economics has to be useful, it should promote Rousseau’s idea of
a moral economy, in which the will of the society would prevail upon
the will of the individual. The challenge of the government should be
to enhance public and private welfare by creating conditions of equi-
tability and justice. That would create individuals into moral and respon-
sible subjects who would not be interested to accumulate fortune at the
expense of the people, which is the principle of the stock market led
economics.
Modern economics is now a useless economics, full of unnecessary
mathematics and statistical theories. It has to be rescued to include useful
mathematics and statistics to plan the economy to enhance morality in
social and economic affairs. That is the ethical duty of the new generations
of economists for whom this book is directed.
Contents
1 Ethics of Management 1
2 Ethics of Capitalism? 29
3 Marxist Ethics 57
4 Business Ethics and Ethical Leadership 95
5 Japanese Management System 139
6 Socialism in Yugoslavia and Sweden 173
Conclusion 193
Index 197
ix
List of Tables
Table 3.1 Analysis of economic growth rate (real GNP at 1987

price) 77
Table 3.2 Average growth rate in the EEC and CMEA (in % pa) 79
Table 3.3 Analysis of economic growth rates and labor productivity 80
Table 3.4 Investment ratio and investment efficiency 80
Table 3.5 A dynamic comparison of the Soviet and U.S. economies
(USSR as % of USA) 81
Table 3.6 USSR: growth rates of the GNP (av.annual rate) 81
Table 3.7 USSR: total trade, 1981–1990 (billion current U.S.
dollars) 88
Table 3.8 USSR: estimated hard currency balance of payments
(million current US dollars) 89
Table 3.9 USSR: estimated hard currency debt to the west (billion
current U.S. dollars) 90
Table 4.1 Ethical and unethical leadership The Ethical Leader 97
Table 4.2 Examples of final (personal and ethical–social) and
instrumental values (ethical–moral and values of
competition) 99
Table 4.3 Criteria for evaluation of ethical leadership 99
Table 5.1 Lean production system 142
xi
CHAPTER 1
Ethics of Management
There are two different views of ethics, as the discipline that deals with
morals. Ethics tries to describe the role morality plays in our everyday
lives, this is descriptive ethics. It may try to tell us what is morally right
and wrong. That is called normative ethics.
Descriptive ethics raises the question about the role of “morality” actu-
ally plays in the actual economy. We may say that business has nothing to
do with morality. However, morality has important roles in the efficiency
of any economic system. In an exchange economy, if there is no trust in
transactions, there cannot be any transaction (Bowie 2017; Abend 2014).
The concept of “Moral Economy” has a long history. It was mentioned
by Kautilya, Aristotle, Cicero, and Jesus. In recent years, the concept was
elaborated by Polanyi (1957), Thompson (1963), Schumacher (1963),
Sayer (2000), and Bowles (2016). The idea is that a pure exchange
economy is immoral unless it would be accompanied by concerns for the
people, would create harmony in the society or Ji-Hi, as in the pre-Meiji
economy of Japan (Hiroike 1928; Horide 2009) or Maurya Dynasty and
Pala Dynasty in ancient and medieval India (Mazumdar 1917).
There are issues that can undermine ethical norms. There can be nepo-
tism, and favoritism, which discriminate against outsiders. There can be
bribery, which discriminates those who play by the rules and creates
an atmosphere of fraud. There can be cartels and price fixing in which
© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature 1

Switzerland AG 2021
D. Basu and V. Miroshnik, Ethics, Morality and Business:
The Development of Modern Economic Systems, Volume II,
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-68067-1_1
2 D. BASU AND V. MIROSHNIK
companies form “oligopolies,” restricting competition to create exces-

sive profits. As a result, consumers and the country have to incur losses.
Prices can go up and there can be mal-distribution of wealth and assets.
Without morals and ethical behavior, efficient and legitimate business
cannot survive. Ethical–moral values refer to forms of conduct that one
has to live by in order to reach desired outcomes in the form of final values
(Bolton and Laaser 2013; Friberg and Gotz 2015; Gotz 2015; Gotz et al.
2020; Sayer 2004).
In recent decades, efforts have been made to implant capitalist
economic systems and impose capitalist structural reforms on countries
meant to induce some sort of self-sustaining economic growth. The
efficient functioning of economic institutions is not independent of its
cultural context. If economic theory itself is ignorant of that context it
will be irrelevant and could not produce any real effects. The success of an
economic system and its resultant institutions are very much contingent
on cultural factors and moral criteria (Abend 2014; Esterly 2002).
Moral norms make economic behavior more predictable and reliable.
Thus, they make economic transactions possible. Moral norms create an
important economic resource, called “social capital,” denoting intangible
resources that can be sustained via social relationships. Such moral norms
include (Wicks 2020; Sandel 2012):
• a commitment to honor contracts;

• relationships, inside and between organizations, built on loyalty, and
harmony with friendship, reciprocity, and cooperation;
• compliance with the moral laws.
Values
Values drive organizational culture (Schein 1992). A value can be defined
as “an enduring belief that a specific mode of conduct or end state of exis-
tence is personally or socially preferable to an opposite or converse mode
of conduct or end-state of existence” (Rockeach 1973). Values guide an
individual’s behavior, actions, and judgments (Rockeach 1973; Abend
2014).
Ethical values in an organizational setting are strengthened through
values-based leadership, that can be defined as a relationship between
1 ETHICS OF MANAGEMENT 3
leaders and co-workers, based on shared, internalized values, that are to

be implemented by the leader (Daft 2007) in an organization.
The leaders that demonstrate integrity are honest with themselves and
others, learn from mistakes and are constantly in the process of self-
improvement. Progressive companies increasingly incorporate numerous
strategic approaches, which go beyond narrow economic considerations.
Such companies supplement economic views of strategy and competi-
tion with a view that strong corporate values are essential components
of competitiveness and superior financial performance.
In society, values help to define people’s “core” feeling and related
thinking (Abend 2014; Hunt et al. 1989). In an organization, “values
serve to convey a sense of identity to its members, enhance the stability
of its social system, direct a manager’s attention to important issues,
guide subsequent decisions by managers, and facilitate commitment to
something larger than self” (Deal and Kennedy1982).
Ethical orientation of an organization is revealed through the formal
and explicit activities of business life on a daily basis. The basis of these
activities is provided by the enterprise’s accepted procedures and poli-
cies. Hood (2003) classifies values in terminal values (desirable end-states
of existence) and instrumental values (modes of behavior or means of
achieving the desirable end-states). He divides terminal values further into
social and personal values.
Instrumental values fall into morality-based and competency-based
values. Social values include items such as freedom, equality, and world at
peace, while morality-based values include items such as politeness, help-
fulness, affection, and forgiveness. Personal values include factors such
as self-respect, broad-mindedness, and courage. Competency-base values
include items such as logic and competence.
Ethical behavior depends on formal adoption and implementation of
organization’s ethical programs. Core values of every organization need
to reflect their ethical content. The core values, order, success, commu-
nity, and synergy are important and these are related to culture and
enterprise climate.
Characteristics of Values
1. Values represent an individual’s driving forces.
2. Values are forces affecting behavior.
3. Value depends on time.
4. Many values are relatively constant and durable.

5. It contains a judgment element.
6. Different individuals have different values.
Aristotle (2009) in Nicomachean Ethics proclaims happiness as an ethical

virtue, but happiness derived from wealth or pleasure is not part of virtue.
Striving for a life of pleasure is “a life for grazing animals” (p. 7). “The
money-maker’s life is, in a way, forced on him and clearly wealth is not
the good we are seeking, since it is useful, for some other end” (p. 8).
While profit is a measure of achievement, it is not a corporate value.
Corporate values allow employees to develop their mind, body, and soul,
creating an environment and culture, which supports the employee to
create personal growth. A corporate values system can effectively create a
sustainable competitive advantage.
Ethics
Ethics is the study of morality. It is the value that is worth pursuing
in life. It is honorable behavior. Ethics is relative. What is honorable
in one society may not be honorable in another. It depends on several
factors: world views, descriptive values, and moral values. It is a func-
tion of the environment. What one salesperson may consider being an
unethical marketing behavior, another salesperson may perceive it as an
aggressive marketing strategy.
Ethical Codes
Ethical codes state the major philosophical principles and values in
organizations and function as policy documents which define the respon-
sibilities of organizations to stakeholders. They spell out the conduct
expected of employees and articulate the acceptable ethical parameters
of behavior in the organization. Most large U.S. and multinational firms
today have a code. If utilized effectively and embraced, codes can be key
strategic documents in organizations for moderating employee behavior
and reducing unethical actions. To be effective they must be communi-
cated well and become a part of the culture of the organization (Wicks
2020).
Codes range in length from one paragraph to more than fifty pages
and are intended to impact employee behavior (Stevens 1994). Also
called codes of conduct, business principles, codes of ethics, and corporate
ethics statements, they typically contain open guidelines describing desir-
able behavior and restrictive language prohibiting other behaviors such as
bribery and conflict of interest (Nijhof et al. 2003).
Codes differ from mission statements by articulating the value system
and answering the question—with what ethical standards and values
should the mission be pursued? In contrast mission statements spell out
the objectives of a company and articulate organizational goals. Firms
frequently attempt to manage and articulate ethics through their codes,
which are designed for internal and external audiences.
An effective code enhances social responsibility and clarifies the norms
and values the organization seeks to uphold. It is visionary and transfor-
mational, providing guidance in difficult circumstances (Stevens 2008). It
sets the tone for the organization and can be the key corporate strategic
document upon which all decisions are based. Adherence to the code in
ethical organizations is a commitment an organization can undertake to
ensure a strong ethical climate. When codes are embedded in an organi-
zation’s climate and both leaders and employees embrace the codes with
words and actions, they can help create and maintain successful ethical
organizations.
Most large U.S. corporations today have an ethical code, after increas-
ingly adopting them in the 1980s and 1990s (Chonko et al. 2003;
Trevino et al. 1999) and they can found in about 53% of the largest
companies worldwide (Kaptein 2004). Most of these companies reflected
concern over unethical behaviors that could hurt profits (Cressey and
Moore 1983).
A content analysis performed by Mathews (1987) showed that firms
primarily emphasized avoiding illegal activities, employee misconduct and
placed little emphasis on the environment, product quality, or safety.
Another study confirmed that the most frequently mentioned topics in
codes were conflict of interest, gifts, and misuse of confidential informa-
tion (Pitt and Groskaufmanis 1990). A study by Stevens (1996) showed
that codes were primarily designed to defend organizational against egre-
gious behavior by employees and were lacking in ethical guidance and
vision. Snell and Herndon (2000) agreed, concluding that codes were
focused largely on corporate self-defense (Cressey and Moore 1983).
Kaptein and Schwartz (2008) reviewed sixty-seven code studies and

found codes positively affected behavior in many organizations. This
study added to the growing body of knowledge supporting the use of
codes and provided additional evidence that codes work. Codes can serve
as core foundational documents that give organizational members a sense
of shared values and commitment to ethical purposes (Stevens 2008).
A number of studies have yielded evidence that they work in deterring
unscrupulous behavior, but codes must be communicated effectively and
supported by the management team. Good communication is the first
requirement for effectiveness.
Companies professing a deep commitment to sustainable, ethical busi-
ness practices to help foster genuinely positive organizational culture must
understand that, where integrity is concerned, we must think beyond the
“business case.” Sometimes a company simply needs to walk away from a
lucrative opportunity that would contradict its core principles. The public
increasingly distrusts private sector rhetoric on ethical business, and there
is a pressing need for leaders that will take, and adhere to, clear decisions
about core values and priorities.
Corporate reputation reflects the organization’s strategy, culture, and
values. A good corporate reputation signifies trust in a firm; it creates an
emotional and intellectual bond with a number of stakeholders and acts
as the source of authority and credibility for all the company’s dealings
“ethics of strategy” (Verhezen 2002, 2016).
It is increasingly important for companies to deal with ethics as a
corporate strategy that, if uniquely implemented, could achieve compet-
itive advantage for the company rather than waiting to react to possible
ethical issues of importance to the targeted stakeholders. It is the necessity
of being ethically proactive company rather than being ethically reactive
company.
One of the oldest concepts of management, business ethics is a form
of applied ethics. It includes not only the analysis of moral norms and
moral values, but also attempts to apply conclusions of this analysis to
that assortment of institutions, technologies, transactions, activities, and
pursuits that we call a business (Verhezen 2002, 2016).
It is clear in this definition that business ethics is related to moral norms
and values. At this point, it is necessary to ask if companies have moral
norms and values as individuals do. Verhezen (2002, 2016) argues that
companies do have moral duties in a secondary sense. By saying that,
Verhezen (2016) implies that the codes constitute the business ethics of
that company. This is why companies now provide ethical codes or codes
of conduct and expect workers of all levels to obey these codes when
they make a decision as a part of their jobs. According to the code of
conduct of most companies, employees are not allowed to accept any
gifts of substantial value from partners. Thus, this code provides an idea
as to what is right and wrong in the offices of Facebook. As a result,
business ethics is not only moral obligations to its stakeholders but ethical
behaviors expected from employees.
By taking the definitions above into consideration, it can be argued
that corporate governance, social responsibility, and business ethics
concepts have some shared characteristics and that all these three concepts
are interrelated. Corporate governance demands that executives make
their companies more transparent and accountable; social responsibility
demands that companies support society with their activities, and business
ethics clarifies moral norms for employees.
Business ethics can help a manager make his/her company more
accountable and transparent. Similarly, when a company adopts corporate
governance principles, it also has to meet the expectations of its stake-
holders. Corporate governance principles include principles related to
business ethics and social responsibility. However, some scholars (Heath
and Norman 2004) believe a coherent theory of CSR cannot be created
without corporate governance. In any case, it is logical to conclude
that all these three concepts are interrelated and they are imposed upon
companies by shareholders and stakeholders (Scott 2007).
Thus, we simply argue that companies take corporate governance,
social responsibility, and business ethics concepts into consideration in
order to gain legitimacy though they do not care about their poten-
tial impact on corporate performance or strategy. From this point,
these concepts can be dealt with as institutional pressures, which force
companies to isomorphism (DeMaggio and Powell 1983). Obviously,
companies have to adapt to their institutional environments in order
to gain legitimacy and to survive even if this adaption harms corporate
performance.
One of the fervent opponents of this idea was Nobel laureate
economist Milton Friedman (1970). In 1970, Friedman gave an inter-
view to the New York Times Magazine (http://www.colorado.edu/
studentgroups/libertarians/issues/friedman-soc-resp-business.html,
retrieved 8.3.2013) and in this interview, he explains his opinions about
social responsibility with these words:
In a free-enterprise, private-property system, a corporate executive is an

employee of the owners of the business. He has direct responsibility to his
employers. That responsibility is to conduct the business in accordance with
their desires, which generally will be to make as much money as possible while
conforming to the basic rules of the society, both those embodied in law and
those embodied in ethical custom.
If Friedman and others who think like him are right, it is logical to believe
that bending to these social advantages since acquiescing makes additional
costs inevitable. In fact, early studies that focused on the relationship
between corporate governance, social responsibility, business ethics, and
the financial performance of a company reported that these concepts had
a negative impact on profits, returns on investment, and stock prices.
Researchers who found this negative impact had a simple explanation:
social responsibility involves certain costs that fall on the bottom line, but
its potential positive impact on corporate performance is simply uncertain
(Gulati et al. 2013). However, a significant amount of recent research has
documented the exact opposite. For example, Ergin and Onder (2012)
found that corporate governance rankings and sub-components of corpo-
rate governance had a significant positive impact on the stock prices of
publicly owned Turkish companies. Rehman et al. (2012) reported that
also for Pakistan.
Ethical Climate
Ethical climate concepts remain popular as a means of understanding
the right-brain-based ethical atmosphere in enterprises. For the purpose
of our discussion, we will use ethical climates as identified by Victor
and Cullen (1988). In their opinion, an institutional normative system
can be considered as an element of culture, although enterprise culture
is more comprehensive and includes the patterns of behavior, artifacts,
ceremonies, and special language.
Victor and Cullen (1988) describe the enterprise climate as perceptions
that “are psychologically meaningful moral descriptions that people can
agree and characterize a system’s practices and procedures.” Further on,
the authors argue that the prevailing perceptions of typical organizational
practices and procedures that have ethical content constitute the ethical
work climate.
Ethical climate, therefore, influences members of the organization what

they can do on the treatment of other members. According to these
authors, climate types represent the perceived norms of an organization
based on ethics. These perceived norms have their origin in the socializa-
tion process within the organization (Casell and Smith 1997). Enterprise
members may be forced by peers or superiors, to conform. In this way,
informal social norms create social order of the organization (Adam and
Rachman-Moore 2004).
On the other hand, the example set by the managers may be the tool
advocated by the philosophy of the organization. “The role model” is the
roles that managers are expected to demonstrate, for “proper and desir-
able behavior” for their employees to observe. Top management creates
appropriate strategy for the implementation of the vision, mission, and
goals to be an ethical organization. The long-term success of organiza-
tions depends on successful satisfaction of interest of the stakeholders
(Orlikoff and Totten 2004). If the organization’s vision and policy are not
in the interest of all stakeholders, they will not take part in the business
activities in future.
Psychology and Ethics

Psychology’s contribution to ethics comes from two sources. One is
the literature of humanistic psychology. That literature is based on the
concept of a hierarchy of wants. Pioneered by Abraham Maslow (1943,
1954) the concept hypothesizes that human wants are organized in a
hierarchy and that lower ranking wants in the hierarchy must be mini-
mally satisfied before higher ranking wants have any motivational effect.
One version of the hierarchy orders the wants in the following ascending
order:
1. Physiological Needs
2. Safety and Security Needs
3. Belongingness Needs (love, affection, acceptance)
4. Esteem Needs (self-esteem, esteem by others)
5. Self-Actualization Needs (meaningfulness, aesthetics, perfection,
justice, service, truth, love).
The Maslovian hierarchy suggests that those individuals who have satisfied
their lower ranking wants may, indeed, be driven by a need to be ethical.
The next relevant portion of the literature of psychology is Kohlberg’s
extensive research into the development of ethical standards among chil-
dren (Kohlberg 1984). That work suggests that most individuals are
subjected to intensive ethical brainwashing in their childhood. Parents,
schools, churches, and the media all conspire to make society’s generally
accepted ethical standards part of the young person’s internal makeup.
The result is that over one-half of American young people grow up with
an internal standard of ethics somewhere between the ethic of justice and
altruism. They judge themselves by that standard, feeling good when they
meet it, and experiencing pangs of guilt when they do not. The remaining
youth manage to overcome the socialization and choose their own ethical
standards independently of society’s dictates. The adoption of a code of
business ethics can be viewed as an investment on the part of the busi-
ness leader. Just as investments in plant, equipment or education have
a “payoff,” so the business leader’s investment in an ethical code has a
potential payoff. In fact, there are at least three types of payoff (Kaptein
and Wempe 2002).
The ethical standards a person uses in dealing with others will influ-
ence the way those others respond. The literature on business excellence
suggests that through the use of the right ethical standards a busi-
ness leader can increase consumer demand, boost employee productivity,
improve the terms offered by suppliers, reduce the cost of investment
funds, lessen the attacks of competitors, and generate community support.
If such a cornucopia of payoffs does exist, then ethics could become a
major management tool. There are three possible explanations for this
asserted positive payoff to the right standard of ethics. They are:
a. implicit contracts
b. transaction costs
c. multiple valued transaction benefits.
The implicit contract explanation views the business leader as offering to

raise the standard of ethics in return for greater cooperation from the
other party. The transaction cost explanation says that by raising the level
of ethics, the business leader reduces the transaction costs required by the
other party (to protect his or her self-interest).
The multiple valued transaction benefit explanation interprets the

exchanges between the business leader and another economic agent as
involving both the goods and services being exchanged and an affirma-
tion or negation of the other agent’s worth. The higher the level of
ethics practiced by the leader, the greater the degree of affirmation of the
other agent’s worth. Because having self-esteem is a benefit, the agent
will accept less in the way of financial remuneration or give more in the
way of effort than would otherwise be the case.
An example of the self-worth phenomenon would be the case of the
degree of respect shown by an employer toward an employee. When the
employer gives an order to an employee, it makes a difference whether
or not the message is conveyed in a tone of respect. Shown respect, the
employee’s feeling of self-worth is strengthened and the employee is more
likely to perform in the spirit of the order. Shown disrespect, the employee
is more likely to violate both the spirit and the letter of the order.
The second payoff to the selection of the right code of business ethics
is psychological. Kohlberg’s research (1958) and humanistic psychology
suggest that a majority of business leaders will derive sensations of plea-
sure from acting in accord with the higher ethical standards and will expe-
rience feelings of guilt if they behave unethically. The psychological basis
of those feelings may be the conditioning process discovered by Kohlberg
(1958) or it may be the “free choice” of the self-actualizing person
envisioned by Maslow. In the Maslovian case (1954) the lower level
needs would have been satisfied and the higher ones would have become
dominant. It would be consistent with the literatures of psychology,
philosophy, and religion to hypothesize that adherence to high ethical
standards would be a dominant need for some such persons. For such
individuals, the payoff to a high standard of ethics in business would
be the personal satisfaction of living up to the ideal (Tomaskova and
Kanovska 2019).
The nearly universal approach is to assume that economic agents
receive pleasure from the happiness of others. That is, the utility of other
parties is an argument in the utility function of the economic agent. This
psychological phenomenon would be another reason for arguing that
the business leader might, ceteris paribus, act in a highly ethical manner
because of the pleasure, which he or she feels from doing so.
A major reason for expecting diminishing returns to the investment
in ethical behavior is the likelihood that the intended beneficiary will
experience diminishing marginal utility to successive increments of ethics.
When the business leader employs honesty, courtesy, friendliness, loyalty,

fairness, or helpfulness, the recipient customer or employee (or other
agent) gains utility. However, the marginal gain to successive doses will
eventually go down.
At some point, satiation may occur. In other words, a customer
or other agent can only take pleasure from the consumption of so
much honesty, or friendliness, or other ethical duty. Beyond that point,
additional doses of ethics might actually provide disutility.
Additional information will not be wanted either because the customer
is not willing to invest the time to learn or because the customer does
not have the sensory capacity to absorb any more information. Dimin-
ishing returns can also be expected because of the fixed factor of the
business leader’s cognitive and communication capacities. In order to raise
the level of ethical behavior exhibited toward another agent, the business
leader needs to learn more about how the intended beneficiary thinks and
feels. The time needed to gain each additional bit of information probably
increases beyond some point. The time needed to utilize the additional
information probably increases as the new bits of information add to the
complexity of the decision process.
Philosophy and Business

Philosophy of Business refers to an understanding of the moral and ethical
basis of business as an area of knowledge. Just as medicine is an area
of knowledge, business is an area of knowledge. Philosophy deals with
knowledge. It answers the question of what the role of a business is and as
to what is the ethical basis of judgment of whether it is fulfilling its role or
not. To draw an analogy if the role of medicine is to cure the question is
as to whether it is right for medicine to produce artificial genetic material
(genomic varieties of new forms of life, new species)? Therefore, while
business philosophy is a part of business policy or strategy the philosophy
of business is a part of applied philosophy. Since applied philosophy is
different for each applied discipline, business ethics is a “separate” study
and needs to be so.
Good Governance: The corporations are formed on the basis of divi-
sion of ownership and control, in which, the investor or owner relies
on the manager i.e., CEO to manage the business on his behalf, which
implies that a principal agent relationship exists between investor and
manager. That causes the room for asymmetric information i.e., there
is always a gap between the information possessed by the manager vis-

à-vis the investors. This situation calls for a good governance, corporate
governance means transparency. The shareholders must have full and true
information. There should be transparency in processes, so that the agent
(manager) cannot mismanage or take the advantage of the asymmetric
information. The objective of good governance is to have such a system
of controlling and managing so that the interest of the owner may be
protected. For this to be successful, whatever hurdles are there in the
processes are to be removed.
The processes are necessary to prohibit the manager to push their own
agenda or self-interest, i.e., the manager as working in the capacity of
agent, might have their own individual goals to pursue which are not
in line with organizational goals. Such processes are to be institution-
alized which protect the interest of the owner i.e., profit maximization
and wealth maximization. Therefore, ethical structure has the implica-
tion for good governance, which means better profits. It is important to
make profits within ethical framework. There is a shift in the psychology
of investors, they are not only curious to know how much profit the
company has booked but also how this profit has been earned, i.e., ethi-
cally or unethically. Therefore, business has to be done ethically, the
profits are to be taken seriously, if not, it would be interpreted as if the
business is not indulging into good governance.
Culture, the Basis for Business Ethics

There is common agreement that a country’s culture is directly related
to the ethical behavior of its managers. The behavior is exhibited in two
main ways: first, by overt actions such as public or corporate statements
and actions about ethical behavior; second, by the collection of the group
of ethical attitudes and values.
One problem in dealing with culture is that it is difficult to define
universally. It represents the values and patterns of thinking, feeling, and
acting in an identifiable group. While many nations possess the infrastruc-
ture of modern, developed civilization, culture represents how people in
the civilization interact with one another.
A view that may help understand the culture is to look at its levels
(Schein 1985). Schein (1985) proposed that culture has three levels.
The most obvious concerns the works of culture, its artifacts. These are
apparent and portray some of the values of the culture. Public works,
works of art, museums, hospitals, and universities can reveal the value
that the culture places on the arts and sciences. The Coliseum, in ancient
Rome, and its purpose in entertaining the public revealed how Romans
valued individual human life.
A deeper and less obvious level comprises those things which individ-
uals hold dear and which guide their behavior. They serve as rules of
conduct and can be important guidelines for how individuals should or
ought to behave.
The Japanese elevation of politeness in behavior may reflect the limited
physical space in the island nation. However, politeness to others is clearly
how the Japanese should behave toward one another. Violations of the
norm cause others surprise and anger and sometimes lead to sanctions
against the offender.
The third and hidden level represents values, and specifically represents
the assumptions we use to perceive and deal with reality. For example,
some cultures perceive people as essentially good while others tend to
take a more pessimistic view. It is difficult to separate the lower two
levels since attitudes and values tend to overlap. However, they form the
underpinnings of individual and business interactions.
Types of ethical conflict managers like clear guidelines to aid their
decision-making. A list of rules citing prohibitions and allowed prac-
tices is often helpful. Unfortunately, such lists are too simple to guide
cross-cultural ethical interaction. For example, gift-giving is not usually
prohibited in most cultures.
However, in a given culture, giving a gift may be ethical or unethical.
In some societies, like China, presentation of a small, carefully chosen
business gift conveys a great deal of respect and is a sign that the business
relationship is valued by the giver. If there is a problem, it may rest with
the receiver who may not trust the giver’s motives. In this case, the issue
can be understood as one of business etiquette.
Conversely, gifts whose purpose is to influence a decision-maker’s
judgment is actually or essentially a bribe. They are more universally
recognized as such. This leads to a second issue involving basic values.
What is the proper place of a bribe in the business context? In Western
cultures, bribes are usually not considered “right” or fair and are often
against the law. In this case, the conflict deals with fundamental standards
of fairness (Kohls and Buller 1994).
There is a continuum of ethical conflict ranging from simple, rather
innocuous practices like giving token gifts to serious issues like employing
sweatshop or political prisoner labor. Judging the seriousness of the differ-

ences requires a look at the aspects of both the American and Chinese
cultures.
The Cultural Foundation of American Ethics

To understand the impact of differences in ethical attitudes toward the
conduct of business between the USA and China we should start with
the ethical foundations in the USA. There are several key questions to
address:
• What constitutes ethics in business?

• What issues and behaviors are important?
• What constitutes the ethical standards of business conduct?
Answers to these questions are important to our ability to reconcile differ-

ences in the way business agents in each country think and act. Ethical
roots in the USA date back to the country’s Puritan origins. They tend
to be based on a foundation of traditional Judeo-Christian and Western
socio-theological laws and principles. Underlying this system is the belief
in an intrinsic underlying truth. This belief is central to the biblical system
of ethics and morality. Here, moral and ethical bases are provided through
the decrees of a sovereign moral authority, God. As a sovereign, God
declares right and wrong, providing a general moral and legal framework
for organizing a society (Ziff 1969).
Separately, enlightenment philosophers reached similar conclusions.
While Christianity was the predominant religion among the nation’s
founders, enlightenment philosophy and its focus on “natural law” led
to their affirmation of an individual’s “inalienable rights.” The founders
identified three basic “self-evident” truths regarding the “inalienable”
rights of mankind to:
1. life;
2. liberty; and
3. the pursuit of happiness; exercised in an environment in which
people are equal under the law.
Equality under the law does not imply equality in the endowment of
natural talents, intelligence, and abilities. Rather, it means that there exist
no a priori claims, against one’s life, liberty, and/or ability to dispose of
one’s personal property in the pursuit of his or her personal life goals
and activities. Limits on such freedom of choice are imposed only in two
important cases. The first is when the individual voluntarily agrees to be
bound by such a claim as part of a voluntary contract.
The second case involves criminal or civil activity resulting in the harm
to another’s life, liberty, or property. That activity has led to the imposi-
tion of legal penalties as a result of a claim enforced under due process of
law. As a result, the USA has become a place where the individual’s rights
are emphasized, contracts are important, and order in society is a goal.
The importance of an individual’s right to choice is the foundation of
the belief that competitive markets are the best way by which the economy
can be organized.
The economy’s role is to provide the greatest degree of satisfaction to
the needs and desires of society. Laws enabling this process to function
are designed to deny others the opportunity to deprive an individual of
his/her freedoms of choice and property rights via the use of fraud or
force. In the absence of fraud and force, any “heads-up” transaction in
which property or time is exchanged is perfectly legal if not ethical.
The functioning free market economy has often been described as a
“nexus of contracts,” whereby individual and corporate economic agents
voluntarily agree to exchange money, time, resources, and other goods
and services in the pursuit of their own economic well-being. Since indi-
vidual and corporate agents are principally responsible for their own
well–being, they play the role of an advocate whose motivation and
behavior are self-interested.
There are both benefits and costs to such a system.
The principal benefits of the market system are that resources are allo-
cated in an “optimal” fashion. The principal cost of this system is that it is
designed to best satisfy the needs of the overall society, but not necessarily
the specific needs of any given individual or group within that society.
Adam Smith (1759/2009), who is given credit for contributing to the
design of this system, argued that, while it was important to allow the
market economy to function freely, other social mechanisms would need
to function in such a way as to make up for its deficiencies. In his book
The Theory of Moral Sentiments, Smith outlined the importance of the
role played by “institutional society,” which is, in essence, charged with
the responsibility to teach and encourage the practice of civic virtue in

society. While the behavior in the market economy is dictated by self-
interest, in the civic society that should be driven by the principle of self-
control. The three main elements of institutional society (Ziff 1969):
1. home;
2. church; and
3. school;
are thereby responsible for instilling principles of ethical behavior in

society, seeing to it that the practice of such behavior is socially rewarded.
Self-controlled behavior in civic society may serve to mitigate the adverse
effects of self-interested behavior in the commercial markets (Mueller
2003).
The integration of behavioral and ethical codes taught within civic
and commercial society serves to make the overall society “decent.” In
the ideal setting, the civic virtue of self-control will influence commercial
transactions in such a way as to maintain a high degree of ethical standards
of conduct.
While individuals acting out of self-interest in commercial transac-
tions will play the part of advocates, transactions will be negotiated in
an environment in which participants will be bound by the truth, and will
represent themselves “in good faith.” This brings us back to the impor-
tance of the traditional ethical foundations of the USA and the way in
which transactions are negotiated and completed.
In the USA, business transactions revolve around the contract. The
contract, most often a written document, spells out the nature of the
business relationship and the obligations of each party to the busi-
ness transaction(s) covered by the contract. While many transactions are
conducted on an informal or non-contractual basis, virtually any signifi-
cant transaction will be based on a fairly detailed contract to which and
by which the parties are bound both legally and ethically. Contracts are
negotiated in between parties acting as advocates but in good faith. It is
generally accepted that commitments made will be honored to the letter if
not the spirit of the agreement. The contract becomes the a priori vehicle
for resolving disputes.
If the parties to the contract cannot reach an agreement, an arbitrator
or other third party may be called on to interpret the contract. In either
case, however, the contract becomes the principal document governing

the relationship.
The importance of the absolute nature of the truth and its role in
commercial transactions governed by contracts can be seen in some of
the teachings of the Judeo-Christian tradition. Once an agent freely enters
into a contract he/she satisfy needs of overall Society Nature of business
relationship agrees to be bound by its points. This is not only a legal
but a socially ethical commitment made by the individual to other parties
involved in the contract.
Ethically speaking, individuals are bound to negotiate in the context of
the truth, “saying what they mean” and “meaning what they say.”
To summarize the impact of this ethical context on the conduct of
commercial transactions, business agents in the USA can be expected to
act as personal (or corporate) advocates, attempting to engage in trans-
actions that maximize their own well-being. The process of negotiation,
however, is intended to be in good faith, where the truth is represented
in the words and actions of those participating. Once agreements are
reached in this context, the participants are both legally and ethically
bound to carry out their obligations and commitments as outlined in
the contract. While this type of behavior can, if followed to the letter,
be predatory in certain cases, the teaching of the value of self-control
in institutional society will moderate the adverse effects of self-interested
behavior in the environment where the terms of the transaction are carried
out (Trevino and Weaver 2003).
Business Ethics as Competitive Advantage

Business ethics should become part of corporate codes, and if imple-
mented in the line of business as a corporate philosophy it should help to
achieve a competitive advantage for the firm. While short-term competi-
tive advantage is obtained by appealing to customers in targeted external
markets (in the context of globalization), long-term sustainable compet-
itive advantage is the result of exploiting an enduring core of relevant
capability differentials cultivated by responsible management of tangible
and intangible internal skills and assets (Petrick and Quinn 2001).
Business ethics of a firm has been defined as one of the invaluable
intangible assets for competing. In general, intangible assets are assuming
increasingly competitive significance in rapidly changing domestic and
global markets. As the speed of comparable tangible assets acquisition
accelerates and the pace of imitation quickens, firms that want to sustain
distinctive global competitive advantages need to protect, exploit, and
enhance their unique intangible assets, particularly integrity (building
firms of integrity is the hidden logic of business ethics).
Sustainable global competitive advantage occurs when a company
implements a value-creating strategy which other companies are unable to
imitate. For example, a company with superior business leadership skills in
enhancing integrity capacity increases its reputation capital with multiple
stakeholders and positions itself for competitive advantage relative to
companies without comparable leadership performance. Companies could
perceives stakeholder interdependence, demonstrate ethical awareness,
and respond effectively to moral issues, management creates a position
of a competitive advantage in comparison to other companies who are
without those resources, by providing a more comprehensive list of ethics
(Petrick and Quinn 2001; Mulej and Bohnic 2021).
International organizational leaders can and should be held account-
able for enhancing the intangible strategic asset of integrity capacity
in order to advance global organizational excellence. The marketplace
with globalization is becoming increasingly aware of, and increasingly
discriminating against, corporations that fail to meet the criteria of ethical
business operations and ethical management principles (Svensson and
Wood 2004).
Furthermore, sustaining advantage requires change. It demands that a
corporation should utilize and exploit industry trends on business ethics.
It also demands that a company invest to close off the avenues along
which competitors could attack (Porter and Kramer 2006).
Business ethics as competitive advantage involves effective building of
relationships with a company’s stakeholders based on its integrity that
maintains such relationships. Business relationships, like personal ones, are
built on trust and mutual respect (Boatright 2005; White 2006; Carter
2012).
Successful business must treat the parties affected by the corpora-
tion’s actions as constituents to be consulted rather than spectators to
be ignored. Doing so was just smart business. This was a novel step in
that it was among the first attempts to characterize the impact of ethical
behavior on a company’s financial performance. As Henry Ford, Sr. once
said: “For a long time people believed that the only purpose of industry
is to make a profit – They are wrong. Its purpose is to serve the general
welfare” (Harting et al. 2006).
Appendix 1: Lehman and the Investment Bank Crisis

Lehman Brothers, Inc., a 158-year-old investment bank, closed its doors
in September 2008. Its shares plummeted shortly after announcing a $2.8
billion loss in the third quarter of 2008. Lehman was widely exposed to
toxic subprime mortgages and the Federal Government declined to rescue
the bank, citing its size and lesser impact on the economy. Like those at
several other investment banks, managers at Lehman did not consider
the risks of defaulted subprime loans or a downturn in the economy, yet
both occurred simultaneously. They were audited by Ernst and Young
who also failed to weigh in the risks (Richard 2008). The company filed
for bankruptcy on September 15, 2008 and its New York operation was
purchased by Barclay’s Bank. Other investment banks also needed emer-
gency assistance. Bank of America bought Merrill Lynch for $50 billion.
Bears Stearns was subsumed by JP Morgan Chase which also bought
the bankrupt Washington Mutual Bank, whose collapse represented the
largest bank failure in U.S. history.
The Lehman Brothers Code of Ethics (Lehman 2007) is a five-page
document outlining the behaviors that were expected from its employees.
Its first page is an introduction stating that all employees must comply
with the code. Four pages of the body then follow. Page one states
that the code is meant to be read along with Lehman’s internal Code
of Conduct, which is also discussed in this paper. These two documents
comprise Lehman’s position on its corporate values.
Paragraphs three and four contain strong statements about trust (p. 1,
Lehman Brothers Code of Ethics). The code emphasizes that strong
client relations have been built over the years with the statement, “The
lynchpins of that trust are our ethical standards and behavior. We must
always do business in a manner that protects and promotes the interest
of our clients” (p. 1). Paragraph four takes a stronger position stating
that “Ethical business practices are the product of more than a fear of
legal ramifications.” Then follows “Ethical business practices entail a clear
understanding of right and wrong, and a motivation on the part of our
directors and employees to act at all times in a manner of which they can
be proud” (p. 1, para. 4). These sentences have transformational aspects
to them as they can be described as insightful, mind stretching, and
visionary. They outline the philosophy of ethics and the language used is
not a reflection of the opposite concept on the model—rigorous, precise,
and controlled. So in this passage, one finds transformational elements.
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Title: The stereoscope

its history, theory, and construction, with its application
to the fine and useful arts and to education
Author: David Brewster
Release date: August 24, 2023 [eBook #71483]
Language: English
Original publication: London: John Murray, 1856
Credits: deaurider and the Online Distributed Proofreading Team

at https://www.pgdp.net (This file was produced from
images generously made available by The Internet
Archive)
*** START OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK THE

STEREOSCOPE ***
THE STEREOSCOPE
ITS HISTORY, THEORY, AND
CONSTRUCTION
WITH ITS APPLICATION TO THE FINE AND
USEFUL ARTS
AND TO EDUCATION.
BY
SIR DAVID BREWSTER,
K.H., D.C.L., F.R.S., M.R.I.A.,
VICE-PRESIDENT OF THE ROYAL SOCIETY OF EDINBURGH,
ONE OF THE EIGHT
ASSOCIATES OF THE IMPERIAL INSTITUTE OF FRANCE,
OFFICER OF THE
LEGION OF HONOUR, CHEVALIER OF THE PRUSSIAN ORDER
OF MERIT,
HONORARY OR CORRESPONDING MEMBER OF THE
ACADEMIES
OF PETERSBURGH, VIENNA, BERLIN, COPENHAGEN,
STOCKHOLM, BRUSSELS, GÖTTINGEN, MODENA,
AND OF THE NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF
WASHINGTON, ETC.
WITH FIFTY WOOD ENGRAVINGS.

LONDON:
JOHN MURRAY, ALBEMARLE STREET.
1856.
[The Right of Translation is reserved.]
EDINBURGH:
T. CONSTABLE, PRINTER TO HER MAJESTY.
CONTENTS
Page
Introduction, 1
Chap. I.—History of the Stereoscope, 5
II.—On Monocular Vision, or Vision with One Eye, 38
III.—On Binocular Vision, or Vision with Two Eyes, 47
IV.—Description of the Ocular, Reflecting,
and Lenticular Stereoscopes, 53
V.—On the Theory of the Stereoscopic Vision, 76
VI.—On the Union of Similar Pictures in Binocular Vision 90
VII.—Description of different Stereoscopes, 107
VIII.—Method of taking Pictures for the Stereoscope, 131
IX.—On the Adaptation of the Pictures to the Stereoscope.
—Their Size, Position, and Illumination 159
X.—Application of the Stereoscope to Painting, 166
XI.—Application of the Stereoscope to Sculpture,
Architecture, and Engineering, 183
XII.—Application of the Stereoscope to Natural History, 189
XIII.—Application of the Stereoscope to Educational Purposes, 193
XIV.—Application of the Stereoscope to Purposes of Amusement, 204
XV.—On the Production of Stereoscopic Pictures
from a Single Picture, 211
XVI.—On certain Fallacies of Sight in theVision of Solid Bodies, 216
XVII.—On certain Difficulties experienced in the Use of
the Stereoscope, 231
ON THE STEREOSCOPE.
INTRODUCTION.
The Stereoscope, a word derived from στέρεος, solid, and
σκόπειν, to see, is an optical instrument, of modern invention, for
representing, in apparent relief and solidity, all natural objects and all
groups or combinations of objects, by uniting into one image two
plane representations of these objects or groups as seen by each
eye separately. In its most general form the Stereoscope is a
binocular instrument, that is, is applied to both eyes; but in two of its
forms it is monocular, or applied only to one eye, though the use of
the other eye, without any instrumental aid, is necessary in the
combination of the two plane pictures, or of one plane picture and its
reflected image. The Stereoscope, therefore, cannot, like the
telescope and microscope, be used by persons who have lost the
use of one eye, and its remarkable effects cannot be properly
appreciated by those whose eyes are not equally good.
When the artist represents living objects, or groups of them, and
delineates buildings or landscapes, or when he copies from statues
or models, he produces apparent solidity, and difference of distance
from the eye, by light and shade, by the diminished size of known
objects as regulated by the principles of geometrical perspective,
and by those variations in distinctness and colour which constitute
what has been called aerial perspective. But when all these
appliances have been used in the most skilful manner, and art has
exhausted its powers, we seldom, if ever, mistake the plane picture
for the solid which it represents. The two eyes scan its surface, and
by their distance-giving power indicate to the observer that every
point of the picture is nearly at the same distance from his eye. But if
the observer closes one eye, and thus deprives himself of the power
of determining differences of distance by the convergency of the
optical axes, the relief of the picture is increased. When the pictures
are truthful photographs, in which the variations of light and shade
are perfectly represented, a very considerable degree of relief and
solidity is thus obtained; and when we have practised for a while this
species of monocular vision, the drawing, whether it be of a statue, a
living figure, or a building, will appear to rise in its different parts from
the canvas, though only to a limited extent.
In these observations we refer chiefly to ordinary drawings held in
the hand, or to portraits and landscapes hung in rooms and galleries,
where the proximity of the observer, and lights from various
directions, reveal the surface of the paper or the canvas; for in
panoramic and dioramic representations, where the light, concealed
from the observer, is introduced in an oblique direction, and where
the distance of the picture is such that the convergency of the optic
axes loses much of its distance-giving power, the illusion is very
perfect, especially when aided by correct geometrical and aerial
perspective. But when the panorama is illuminated by light from
various directions, and the slightest motion imparted to the canvas,
its surface becomes distinctly visible, and the illusion instantly
disappears.
The effects of stereoscopic representation are of a very different
kind, and are produced by a very different cause. The singular relief
which it imparts is independent of light and shade, and of
geometrical as well as of aerial perspective. These important
accessories, so necessary in the visual perception of the drawings in
plano, avail nothing in the evolution of their relievo, or third
dimension. They add, doubtless, to the beauty of the binocular
pictures; but the stereoscopic creation is due solely to the
superposition of the two plane pictures by the optical apparatus
employed, and to the distinct and instantaneous perception of
distance by the convergency of the optic axes upon the similar points
of the two pictures which the stereoscope has united.
If we close one eye while looking at photographic pictures in the
stereoscope, the perception of relief is still considerable, and
approximates to the binocular representation; but when the pictures
are mere diagrams consisting of white lines upon a black ground, or
black lines upon a white ground, the relief is instantly lost by the
shutting of the eye, and it is only with such binocular pictures that we
see the true power of the stereoscope.
As an amusing and useful instrument the stereoscope derives
much of its value from photography. The most skilful artist would
have been incapable of delineating two equal representations of a
figure or a landscape as seen by two eyes, or as viewed from two
different points of sight; but the binocular camera, when rightly
constructed, enables us to produce and to multiply photographically
the pictures which we require, with all the perfection of that
interesting art. With this instrument, indeed, even before the
invention of the Daguerreotype and the Talbotype, we might have
exhibited temporarily upon ground-glass, or suspended in the air, the
most perfect stereoscopic creations, by placing a Stereoscope
behind the two dissimilar pictures formed by the camera.
CHAPTER I.
HISTORY OF THE STEREOSCOPE.
When we look with both eyes open at a sphere, or any other solid
object, we see it by uniting into one two pictures, one as seen by the
right, and the other as seen by the left eye. If we hold up a thin book
perpendicularly, and midway between both eyes, we see distinctly
the back of it and both sides with the eyes open. When we shut the
right eye we see with the left eye the back of the book and the left
side of it, and when we shut the left eye we see with the right eye the
back of it and the right side. The picture of the book, therefore, which
we see with both eyes, consists of two dissimilar pictures united,
namely, a picture of the back and the left side of the book as seen by
the left eye, and a picture of the back and right side of the book as
seen by the right eye.
In this experiment with the book, and in all cases where the
object is near the eye, we not only see different pictures of the same
object, but we see different things with each eye. Those who wear
spectacles see only the left-hand spectacle-glass with the left eye,
on the left side of the face, while with the right eye they see only the
right-hand spectacle-glass on the right side of the face, both glasses
of the spectacles being seen united midway between the eyes, or
above the nose, when both eyes are open. It is, therefore, a fact well
known to every person of common sagacity that the pictures of
bodies seen by both eyes are formed by the union of two dissimilar
pictures formed by each.
This palpable truth was known and published by ancient
mathematicians. Euclid knew it more than two thousand years ago,
as may be seen in the 26th, 27th, and 28th theorems of his Treatise
on Optics.[1] In these theorems he shews that the part of a sphere
seen by both eyes, and having its diameter equal to, or greater or
less than the distance between the eyes, is equal to, and greater or
less than a hemisphere; and having previously shewn in the 23d and
24th theorems how to find the part of any sphere that is seen by one
eye at different distances, it follows, from constructing his figure, that
each eye sees different portions of the sphere, and that it is seen by
both eyes by the union of these two dissimilar pictures.
More than fifteen hundred years ago, the celebrated physician
Galen treated the subject of binocular vision more fully than Euclid.
In the twelfth chapter of the tenth book of his work, On the use of the
different parts of the Human Body, he has described with great
minuteness the various phenomena which are seen when we look at
bodies with both eyes, and alternately with the right and the left. He
shews, by diagrams, that dissimilar pictures of a body are seen in
each of these three modes of viewing it; and, after finishing his
demonstration, he adds,—
“But if any person does not understand these
demonstrations by means of lines, he will finally give
his assent to them when he has made the following
experiment:—Standing near a column, and shutting
each of the eyes in succession;—when the right eye is
shut, some of those parts of the column which were
previously seen by the right eye on the right side of the
column, will not now be seen by the left eye; and when
the left eye is shut, some of those parts which were
formerly seen by the left eye on the left side of the
column, will not now be seen by the right eye. But
when we, at the same time, open both eyes, both
these will be seen, for a greater part is concealed
when we look with either of the two eyes, than when
we look with both at the same time.”[2]
In such distinct and unambiguous terms, intelligible to the
meanest capacity, does this illustrious writer announce the
fundamental law of binocular vision—the grand principle of the
Stereoscope, namely, that the picture of the solid column which we
see with both eyes is composed of two dissimilar pictures, as seen
by each eye separately. As the vision of the solid column, therefore,
was obtained by the union of these dissimilar pictures, an instrument
only was wanted to take such pictures, and another to combine
them. The Binocular Photographic Camera was the one instrument,
and the Stereoscope the other.
The subject of binocular vision was studied by various optical
writers who have flourished since the time of Galen. Baptista Porta,
one of the most eminent of them, repeats, in his work On Refraction,
the propositions of Euclid on the vision of a sphere with one and both
eyes, and he cites from Galen the very passage which we have
given above on the dissimilarity of the three pictures seen by each
eye and by both. Believing that we see only with one eye at a time,
he denies the accuracy of Euclid’s theorems, and while he admits
the correctness of the observations of Galen, he endeavours to
explain them upon other principles.
Fig. 1.
In illustrating the views of Galen on the dissimilarity of the three
pictures which are requisite in binocular vision, he employs a much
more distinct diagram than that which is given by the Greek
physician. “Let a,” he says, “be the pupil of the right eye, b that of the
left, and dc the body to be seen. When we look at the object with
both eyes we see dc, while with the left eye we see ef, and with the
right eye gh. But if it is seen with one eye, it will be seen otherwise,
for when the left eye b is shut, the body cd, on the left side, will be
seen in hg; but when the right eye is shut, the body cd will be seen
in fe, whereas, when both eyes are opened at the same time, it will
be seen in cd.” These results are then explained by copying the
passage from Galen, in which he supposes the observer to repeat
these experiments when he is looking at a solid column.
In looking at this diagram, we recognise at once not only the
principle, but the construction of the stereoscope. The double
stereoscopic picture or slide is represented by he; the right-hand
picture, or the one seen by the right eye, by hf; the left-hand picture,
or the one seen by the left eye, by ge; and the picture of the solid
column in full relief by dc, as produced midway between the other
two dissimilar pictures, hf and ge, by their union, precisely as in the
stereoscope.[3]
Galen, therefore, and the Neapolitan philosopher, who has
employed a more distinct diagram, certainly knew and adopted the
fundamental principle of the stereoscope; and nothing more was
required, for producing pictures in full relief, than a simple instrument
for uniting hf and ge, the right and left hand dissimilar pictures of the
column.
Fig. 2.
In the treatise on painting which he left behind him in MS.,[4]
Leonardo da Vinci has made a distinct reference to the dissimilarity
of the pictures seen by each eye as the reason why “a painting,
though conducted with the greatest art, and finished to the last
perfection, both with regard to its contours, its lights, its shadows,
and its colours, can never shew a relievo equal to that of the natural
objects, unless these be viewed at a distance and with a single
eye,”[5] which he thus demonstrates. “If an object c be viewed by a
single eye at a, all objects in the space behind it—included, as it
were, in a shadow ecf, cast by a candle at a—are invisible to an eye
at a; but when the other eye at b is opened, part of these objects
become visible to it; those only being hid from both eyes that are
included, as it were, in the double shadow cd, cast by two lights at a
and b and terminated in d; the angular space edg, beyond d, being
always visible to both eyes. And the hidden space cd is so much the
shorter as the object c is smaller and nearer to the eyes. Thus he
observes that the object c, seen with both eyes, becomes, as it
were, transparent, according to the usual definition of a transparent
thing, namely, that which hides nothing beyond it. But this cannot
happen when an object, whose breadth is bigger than that of the
pupil, is viewed by a single eye. The truth of this observation is,
therefore, evident, because a painted figure intercepts all the space
behind its apparent place, so as to preclude the eyes from the sight
of every part of the imaginary ground behind it. Hence,” continues
Dr. Smith, “we have one help to distinguish the place of a near object
more accurately with both eyes than with one, inasmuch as we see it
more detached from other objects beyond it, and more of its own
surface, especially if it be roundish.”
We have quoted this passage, not from its proving that Leonardo
da Vinci was acquainted with the fact that each eye, a, b, sees
dissimilar pictures of the sphere c, but because it has been referred
to by Mr. Wheatstone as the only remark on the subject of binocular
vision which he could find “after looking over the works of many
authors who might be expected to have made them.” We think it
quite clear, however, that the Italian artist knew as well as his
commentator Dr. Smith, that each eye, a and b, sees dissimilar parts
of the sphere c. It was not his purpose to treat of the binocular
pictures of c, but his figure proves their dissimilarity.
The subject of binocular vision was successfully studied by
Francis Aguillon or Aguilonius,[6] a learned Jesuit, who published his
Optics in 1613. In the first book of his work, where he is treating of
the vision of solids of all forms, (de genere illorum quæ τὰ στέρεα [ta
sterea] nuncupantur,) he has some difficulty in explaining, and fails
to do it, why the two dissimilar pictures of a solid, seen by each eye,
do not, when united, give a confused and imperfect view of it. This
discussion is appended to the demonstration of the theorem, “that
when an object is seen with two eyes, two optical pyramids are
formed whose common base is the object itself, and whose vertices
are in the eyes,”[7] and is as follows:—
“When one object is seen with two eyes, the angles at the
vertices of the optical pyramids (namely, haf, gbe, Fig. 1) are not
always equal, for beside the direct view in which the pyramids ought
to be equal, into whatever direction both eyes are turned, they
receive pictures of the object under inequal angles, the greatest of
which is that which is terminated at the nearer eye, and the lesser
that which regards the remoter eye. This, I think, is perfectly evident;
but I consider it as worthy of admiration, how it happens that bodies
seen by both eyes are not all confused and shapeless, though we
view them by the optical axes fixed on the bodies themselves. For
greater bodies, seen under greater angles, appear lesser bodies
under lesser angles. If, therefore, one and the same body which is in
reality greater with one eye, is seen less on account of the inequality
of the angles in which the pyramids are terminated, (namely, haf,
gbe,[8]) the body itself must assuredly be seen greater or less at the
same time, and to the same person that views it; and, therefore,
since the images in each eye are dissimilar (minime sibi congruunt)
the representation of the object must appear confused and disturbed
(confusa ac perturbata) to the primary sense.”
“This view of the subject,” he continues, “is certainly consistent
with reason, but, what is truly wonderful is, that it is not correct, for
bodies are seen clearly and distinctly with both eyes when the optic
axes are converged upon them. The reason of this, I think, is, that
the bodies do not appear to be single, because the apparent images,
which are formed from each of them in separate eyes, exactly
coalesce, (sibi mutuo exacte congruunt,) but because the common
sense imparts its aid equally to each eye, exerting its own power
equally in the same manner as the eyes are converged by means of
their optical axes. Whatever body, therefore, each eye sees with the
eyes conjoined, the common sense makes a single notion, not
composed of the two which belong to each eye, but belonging and
accommodated to the imaginative faculty to which it (the common
sense) assigns it. Though, therefore, the angles of the optical
pyramids which proceed from the same object to the two eyes,
viewing it obliquely, are inequal, and though the object appears
greater to one eye and less to the other, yet the same difference
does not pass into the primary sense if the vision is made only by the
axes, as we have said, but if the axes are converged on this side or
on the other side of the body, the image of the same body will be
seen double, as we shall shew in Book iv., on the fallacies of vision,
and the one image will appear greater and the other less on account
of the inequality of the angles under which they are seen.”[9]
Such is Aguilonius’s theory of binocular vision, and of the union
of the two dissimilar pictures in each eye by which a solid body is
seen. It is obviously more correct than that of Dr. Whewell and Mr.
Wheatstone. Aguilonius affirms it to be contrary to reason that two
dissimilar pictures can be united into a clear and distinct picture, as
they are actually found to be, and he is therefore driven to call in the
aid of what does not exist, a common sense, which rectifies the
picture. Dr. Whewell and Mr. Wheatstone have cut the Gordian knot
by maintaining what is impossible, that in binocular and stereoscopic
vision a long line is made to coincide with a short one, and a large
surface with a small one; and in place of conceiving this to be done
by a common sense overruling optical laws, as Aguilonius supposes,
they give to the tender and pulpy retina, the recipient of ocular
pictures, the strange power of contracting or expanding itself in order
to equalize inequal lines and inequal surfaces!
Fig. 3.
In his fourth and very interesting book, on the fallacies of
distance, magnitude, position, and figure, Aguilonius resumes the
subject of the vision of solid bodies. He repeats the theorems of
Euclid and Gassendi on the vision of the sphere, shewing how much
of it is seen by each eye, and by both, whatever be the size of the
sphere, and the distance of the observer. At the end of the theorems,
in which he demonstrates that when the diameter of the sphere is
equal to the distance between the eyes we see exactly a
hemisphere, he gives the annexed drawing of the mode in which the
sphere is seen by each eye, and by both. In this diagram e is the
right eye and d the left, chfi the section of that part of the sphere bc
which is seen by the right eye e, bhga the section of the part which
is seen by the left eye d, and blc the half of the great circle which is
the section of the sphere as seen by both eyes.[10] These three
pictures of the solids are all dissimilar. The right eye e does not see
the part blcif of the sphere; the left eye does not see the part
blcga, while the part seen with both eyes is the hemisphere blcgf,
the dissimilar segments bfg, cgf being united in its vision.[11]
After demonstrating his theorems on the vision of spheres with
one and both eyes,[12] Aguilonius informs us, before he proceeds to
the vision of cylinders, that it is agreed upon that it is not merely true
with the sphere, but also with the cylinder, the cone, and all bodies
whatever, that the part which is seen is comprehended by tangent
rays, such as eb, ec for the right eye, in Fig. 3. “For,” says he, “since
these tangent lines are the outermost of all those which can be
drawn to the proposed body from the same point, namely, that in
which the eye is understood to be placed, it clearly follows that the
part of the body which is seen must be contained by the rays
touching it on all sides. For in this part no point can be found from
which a right line cannot be drawn to the eye, by which the correct
visible form is brought out.”[13]
Optical writers who lived after the time of Aguilonius seem to
have considered the subject of binocular vision as exhausted in his
admirable work. Gassendi,[14] though he treats the subject very
slightly, and without any figures, tells us that we see the left side of
the nose with the left eye, and the right side of it with the right eye,—
two pictures sufficiently dissimilar. Andrew Tacquet,[15] though he
quotes Aguilonius and Gassendi on the subject of seeing distances
with both eyes, says nothing on the binocular vision of solids; and
Smith, Harris, and Porterfield, only touch upon the subject
incidentally. In commenting on the passage which we have already
quoted from Leonardo da Vinci, Dr. Smith says, “Hence we have one
help to distinguish the place of a near object more accurately with
both eyes than with one, inasmuch as we see it more detached from
other objects beyond it, and more of its own surface, especially if it
be roundish.”[16] If any farther evidence were required that Dr. Smith
was acquainted with the dissimilarity of the images of a solid seen by
each eye, it will be found in his experiment with a “long ruler placed
between the eyebrows, and extended directly forward with its flat
sides, respecting the right hand and the left.” “By directing the eyes
to a remote object,” he adds, “the right side of the ruler seen by the
right eye will appear on the left hand, and the left side on the right
hand, as represented in the figure.”[17]
In his Treatise on Optics, published in 1775, Mr. Harris, when
speaking of the visible or apparent figures of objects, observes, that
“we have other helps for distinguishing prominences of small parts
besides those by which we distinguish distances in general, as their
degrees of light and shade, and the prospect we have round them.”
And by the parallax, on account of the distance betwixt our eyes, we
can distinguish besides the front part of the two sides of a near
object not thicker than the said distance, and this gives a visible
relievo to such objects, which helps greatly to raise or detach them
from the plane in which they lie. Thus the nose on a face is the more
remarkably raised by our seeing both sides of it at once.“[18] That is,
the relievo is produced by the combination of the two dissimilar
pictures given by each eye.
Without referring to a figure given by Dr. Porterfield, in which he
actually gives drawings of an object as seen by each eye in
binocular vision,[19] the one exhibiting the object as seen endwise by
the right eye, and the other the same object as seen laterally by the
left eye, we may appeal to the experience of every optical, or even of
every ordinary observer, in support of the fact, that the dissimilarity of
the pictures in each eye, by which we see solid objects, is known to
those who have never read it in Galen, Porta, or Aguilonius. Who
has not observed the fact mentioned by Gassendi and Harris, that
their left eye sees only the left side of their nose, and their right eye
the right side, two pictures sufficiently dissimilar? Who has not
noticed, as well as Dr. Smith, that when they look at any thin, flat
body, such as a thin book, they see both sides of it—the left eye only
the left side of it, and the right eye only the right side, while the back,
or the part nearest the face, is seen by each eye, and both the sides
and the back by both the eyes? What student of perspective is there
—master or pupil, male or female—who does not know, as certainly
as he knows his alphabet, that the picture of a chair or table, or
anything else, drawn from one point of sight, or as seen by one eye
placed in that point, is necessarily dissimilar to another drawing of
the same object taken from another point of sight, or as seen by the
other eye placed in a point 2½ inches distant from the first? If such a
person is to be found, we might then admit that the dissimilarity of
the pictures in each eye was not known to every student of
perspective.[20]
Such was the state of our knowledge of binocular vision when
two individuals, Mr. Wheatstone, and Mr. Elliot, now Teacher of
Mathematics in Edinburgh, were directing their attention to the
subject. Mr. Wheatstone communicated an important paper on the
Physiology of Vision to the British Association at Newcastle in
August 1838, and exhibited an instrument called a Stereoscope, by
which he united the two dissimilar pictures of solid bodies, the τὰ
στέρεα, (ta sterea of Aguilonius,) and thus reproduced, as it were,
the bodies themselves. Mr. Wheatstone’s paper on the subject,
which had been previously read at the Royal Society on the 21st of
June, was printed in their Transactions for 1838.[21]
Mr. Elliot was led to the study of binocular vision in consequence
of having written an Essay, so early as 1823, for the Class of Logic in
the University of Edinburgh, “On the means by which we obtain our
knowledge of distances by the Eye.” Ever since that date he was
familiar with the idea, that the relief of solid bodies seen by the eye
was produced by the union of the dissimilar pictures of them in each
eye, but he never imagined that this idea was his own, believing that
it was known to every student of vision. Previous to or during the
year 1834, he had resolved to construct an instrument for uniting two
dissimilar pictures, or of constructing a stereoscope; but he delayed
doing this till the year 1839, when he was requested to prepare an
original communication for the Polytechnic Society, which had been
recently established in Liverpool. He was thus induced to construct
the instrument which he had projected, and he exhibited it to his
friends, Mr. Richard Adie, optician, and Mr. George Hamilton,
lecturer on chemistry in Liverpool, who bear testimony to its
existence at that date. This simple stereoscope, without lenses or
mirrors, consisted of a wooden box 18 inches long, 7 broad, and 4½
deep, and at the bottom of it, or rather its farther end, was placed a
slide containing two dissimilar pictures of a landscape as seen by
each eye. Photography did not then exist, to enable Mr. Elliot to
procure two views of the same scene, as seen by each eye, but he
drew the transparency of a landscape with three distances. The first
and most remote was the moon and the sky, and a stream of water
from which the moon was reflected, the two moons being placed
nearly at the distance of the two eyes, or 2½ inches, and the two
reflected moons at the same distance. The second distance was
marked by an old cross about a hundred feet off; and the third
distance by the withered branch of a tree, thirty feet from the
observer. In the right-hand picture, one arm of the cross just touched
the disc of the moon, while, in the left-hand one, it projected over
one-third of the disc. The branch of the tree touched the outline of a
distant hill in the one picture, but was “a full moon’s-breadth” from it
on the other. When these dissimilar pictures were united by the eyes,
a landscape, certainly a very imperfect one, was seen in relief,
composed of three distances.
Owing, no doubt, to the difficulty of procuring good binocular
pictures, Mr. Elliot did not see that his contrivance would be very
popular, and therefore carried it no farther. He had never heard of
Mr. Wheatstone’s stereoscope till he saw his paper on Vision
reprinted in the Philosophical Magazine for March 1852, and having
perused it, he was convinced not only that Mr. Wheatstone’s theory
of the instrument was incorrect, but that his claim to the discovery of
the dissimilarity of the images in each eye had no foundation. He
was, therefore, led to communicate to the same journal the fact of
his having himself, thirteen years before, constructed and used a
stereoscope, which was still in his possession. In making this claim,
Mr. Elliot had no intention of depriving Mr. Wheatstone of the credit
which was justly due to him; and as the claim has been publicly
made, we have described the nature of it as a part of scientific
history.
In Mr. Wheatstone’s ingenious paper of 1838, the subject of
binocular vision is treated at considerable length. He gives an
account of the opinions of previous writers, referring repeatedly to
the works of Aguilonius, Gassendi, and Baptista Porta, in the last of
which the views of Galen are given and explained. In citing the
passage which we have already quoted from Leonardo da Vinci, and
inserting the figure which illustrates it, he maintains that Leonardo da
Vinci was not aware “that the object (c in Fig. 2) presented a
different appearance to each eye.” “He failed,” he adds, “to observe
this, and no subsequent writer, to my knowledge, has supplied the
omission. The projection of two obviously dissimilar pictures on the
two retinæ, when a single object is viewed, while the optic axes
converge, must therefore be regarded as a new fact in the theory of
vision.” Now, although Leonardo da Vinci does not state in so many
words that he was aware of the dissimilarity of the two pictures, the
fact is obvious in his own figure, and he was not led by his subject to
state the fact at all. But even if the fact had not stared him in the face
he must have known it from the Optics of Euclid and the writings of
Galen, with which he could not fail to have been well acquainted.
That the dissimilarity of the two pictures is not a new fact we have
already placed beyond a doubt. The fact is expressed in words, and
delineated in drawings, by Aguilonius and Baptista Porta. It was
obviously known to Dr. Smith, Mr. Harris, Dr. Porterfield, and Mr.
Elliot, before it was known to Mr. Wheatstone, and we cannot
understand how he failed to observe it in works which he has so
often quoted, and in which he professes to have searched for it.
This remarkable property of binocular vision being thus clearly
established by preceding writers, and admitted by himself, as the
cause of the vision of solidity or distance, Mr. Wheatstone, as Mr.
Elliot had done before him, thought of an instrument for uniting the
two dissimilar pictures optically, so as to produce the same result
that is obtained by the convergence of the optical axes. Mr. Elliot
thought of doing this by the eyes alone; but Mr. Wheatstone adopted
a much better method of doing it by reflexion. He was thus led to
construct an apparatus, to be afterwards described, consisting of two
plane mirrors, placed at an angle of 90°, to which he gave the name
of stereoscope, anticipating Mr. Elliot both in the construction and
publication of his invention, but not in the general conception of a
stereoscope.
After describing his apparatus, Mr. Wheatstone proceeds to
consider (in a section entitled, “Binocular vision of objects of different
magnitudes”) “what effects will result from presenting similar images,
differing only in magnitude, to analogous parts of the retina.” “For
this purpose,” he says, “two squares or circles, differing obviously
but not extravagantly in size, may be drawn on two separate pieces
of paper, and placed in the stereoscope, so that the reflected image
of each shall be equally distant from the eye by which it is regarded.
It will then be seen that notwithstanding this difference they coalesce
and occasion a single resultant perception.” The fact of coalescence
being supposed to be perfect, the author next seeks to determine the
difference between the length of two lines which the eye can force
into coalescence, or “the limits within which the single appearance
subsists.” He, therefore, unites two images of equal magnitude, by
making one of them visually less from distance, and he states that,
“by this experiment, the single appearance of two images of different
size is demonstrated.” Not satisfied with these erroneous assertions,
he proceeds to give a sort of rule or law for ascertaining the relative
size of the two unequal pictures which the eyes can force into
coincidence. The inequality, he concludes, must not exceed the
difference “between the projections of the same object when seen in
the most oblique position of the eyes (i.e., both turned to the extreme
right or the extreme left) ordinarily employed.” Now, this rule, taken in
the sense in which it is meant, is simply a truism. It merely states
that the difference of the pictures which the eyes can make to
coalesce is equal to the difference of the pictures which the eyes do
make to coalesce in their most oblique position; but though a truism
it is not a truth, first, because no real coincidence ever can take
place, and, secondly, because no apparent coincidence is effected
when the difference of the picture is greater than what is above
stated.
From these principles, which will afterwards be shewn to be
erroneous, Mr. Wheatstone proceeds “to examine why two dissimilar
pictures projected on the two retinæ give rise to the perception of an
object in relief.” “I will not attempt,” he says, “at present to give the
complete solution of this question, which is far from being so easy as
at first glance it may appear to be, and is, indeed, one of great
complexity. I shall, in this case, merely consider the most obvious
explanations which might be offered, and shew their insufficiency to
explain the whole of the phenomena.
“It may be supposed that we see only one point of a field of view
distinctly at the same instant, the one, namely, to which the optic
axes are directed, while all other points are seen so indistinctly that
the mind does not recognise them to be either single or double, and
that the figure is appreciated by successively directing the point of
convergence of the optic axes successively to a sufficient number of
its points to enable us to judge accurately of its form.
“That there is a degree of indistinctness in those parts of the field
of view to which the eyes are not immediately directed, and which
increases with the distance from that point, cannot be doubted; and it
is also true that the objects there obscurely seen are frequently
doubled. In ordinary vision, it may be said, this indistinctness and
duplicity are not attended to, because the eyes shifting continually
from point to point, every part of the object is successively rendered
distinct, and the perception of the object is not the consequence of a
single glance, during which a small part of it only is seen distinctly,
but is formed from a comparison of all the pictures successively
seen, while the eyes were changing from one point of an object to
another.
“All this is in some degree true, but were it entirely so no
appearance of relief should present itself when the eyes remain
intently fixed on one point of a binocular image in the stereoscope.
But in performing the experiment carefully, it will be found, provided
the picture do not extend far beyond the centres of distinct vision,
that the image is still seen single, and in relief, when in this
condition.”[22]
In this passage the author makes a distinction between ordinary
binocular vision, and binocular vision through the stereoscope,
whereas in reality there is none. The theory of both is exactly the
same. The muscles of the two eyes unite the two dissimilar pictures,
and exhibit the solid, in ordinary vision; whereas in stereoscopic
vision the images are united by reflexion or refraction, the eyes in
both cases obtaining the vision of different distances by rapid and
successive convergences of the optical axes. Mr. Wheatstone
notices the degree of indistinctness in the parts of the picture to
which the eyes are not immediately directed; but he does not notice
the “confusion and incongruity” which Aguilonius says ought to exist,
in consequence of some parts of the resulting relievo being seen of
one size by the left eye alone,—other parts of a different size by the
right eye alone, and other parts by both eyes. This confusion,
however, Aguilonius, as we have seen, found not to exist, and he
ascribes it to the influence of a common sense overruling the
operation of physical laws. Erroneous as this explanation is, it is still
better than that of Mr. Wheatstone, which we shall now proceed to
explain.
In order to disprove the theory referred to in the preceding
extract, Mr. Wheatstone describes two experiments, which he says
are equally decisive against it, the first of them only being subject to
rigorous examination. With this view he draws “two lines about two
inches long, and inclined towards each other, on a sheet of paper,
and having caused them to coincide by converging the optic axes to
a point nearer than the paper, he looks intently on the upper end of
the resultant line without allowing the eyes to wander from it for a
moment. The entire line will appear single, and in its proper relief,
&c.... The eyes,” he continues, “sometimes become fatigued, which
causes the line to become double at those parts to which the optic
axes are not fixed, but in such case all appearance of relief
vanishes. The same experiment may be tried with small complex
figures, but the pictures should not extend too far beyond the centre
of the retinæ.”
Now these experiments, if rightly made and interpreted, are not
decisive against the theory. It is not true that the entire line appears
single when the axes are converged upon the upper end of the
resultant line, and it is not true that the disappearance of the relief
when it does disappear arises from the eye being fatigued. In the
combination of more complex figures, such as two similar rectilineal
figures contained by lines of unequal length, neither the inequalities
nor the entire figure will appear single when the axes are converged
upon any one point of it.
In the different passages which we have quoted from Mr.
Wheatstone’s paper, and in the other parts of it which relate to
binocular vision, he is obviously halting between truth and error,
between theories which he partly believes, and ill-observed facts
which he cannot reconcile with them. According to him, certain truths
“may be supposed” to be true, and other truths may be “in some
degree true,” but “not entirely so;” and thus, as he confesses, the
problem of binocular and stereoscopic vision “is indeed one of great
complexity,” of which “he will not attempt at present to give the
complete solution.” If he had placed a proper reliance on the law of
visible direction which he acknowledges I have established, and
“with which,” he says, “the laws of visible direction for binocular
vision ought to contain nothing inconsistent,” he would have seen the
impossibility of the two eyes uniting two lines of inequal length; and
had he believed in the law of distinct vision he would have seen the
impossibility of the two eyes obtaining single vision of any more than
one point of an object at a time. These laws of vision are as
rigorously true as any other physical laws,—as completely
demonstrated as the law of gravity in Astronomy, or the law of the
Sines in Optics; and the moment we allow them to be tampered with
to obtain an explanation of physical puzzles, we convert science into
legerdemain, and philosophers into conjurors.
Such was the state of our stereoscopic knowledge in 1838, after
the publication of Mr. Wheatstone’s interesting and important paper.
Previous to this I communicated to the British Association at
Newcastle, in August 1838, a paper, in which I established the law of
visible direction already mentioned, which, though it had been
maintained by preceding writers, had been proved by the illustrious
D’Alembert to be incompatible with observation, and the admitted
anatomy of the human eye. At the same meeting Mr. Wheatstone
exhibited his stereoscopic apparatus, which gave rise to an animated
discussion on the theory of the instrument. Dr. Whewell maintained
that the retina, in uniting, or causing to coalesce into a single
resultant impression two lines of different lengths, had the power
either of contracting the longest, or lengthening the shortest, or what
might have been suggested in order to give the retina only half the
trouble, that it contracted the long line as much as it expanded the
short one, and thus caused them to combine with a less exertion of
muscular power! In opposition to these views, I maintained that the
retina, a soft pulpy membrane which the smallest force tears in
pieces, had no such power,—that a hypothesis so gratuitous was not
required, and that the law of visible direction afforded the most
perfect explanation of all the stereoscopic phenomena.
In consequence of this discussion, I was led to repeat my
experiments, and to inquire whether or not the eyes in stereoscopic
vision did actually unite the two lines of different lengths, or of
different apparent magnitudes. I found that they did not, and that no
such union was required to convert by the stereoscope two plane
pictures into the apparent whole from which they were taken as seen
by each eye. These views were made public in the lectures on the
Philosophy of the Senses, which I occasionally delivered in the
College of St. Salvator and St. Leonard, St. Andrews, and the
different stereoscopes which I had invented were also exhibited and
explained.
In examining Dr. Berkeley’s celebrated Theory of Vision, I saw
the vast importance of establishing the law of visible direction, and of
proving by the aid of binocular phenomena, and in opposition to the
opinion of the most distinguished metaphysicians, that we actually
see a third dimension in space, I therefore submitted to the Royal
Society of Edinburgh, in January 1843, a paper On the law of visible
position in single and binocular vision, and on the representation of
solid figures by the union of dissimilar plane pictures on the retina.
More than twelve years have now elapsed since this paper was
read, and neither Mr. Wheatstone nor Dr. Whewell have made any
attempt to defend the views which it refutes.
In continuing my researches, I communicated to the Royal
Society of Edinburgh, in April 1844, a paper On the knowledge of
distance as given by binocular vision, in which I described several
interesting phenomena produced by the union of similar pictures,
such as those which form the patterns of carpets and paper-
hangings. In carrying on these inquiries I found the reflecting
stereoscope of little service, and ill fitted, not only for popular use,
but for the application of the instrument to various useful purposes. I
was thus led to the construction of several new stereoscopes, but
particularly to the Lenticular Stereoscope, now in universal use. They
were constructed in St. Andrews and Dundee, of various materials,
such as wood, tin-plate, brass, and of all sizes, from that now
generally adopted, to a microscopic variety which could be carried in
the pocket. New geometrical drawings were executed for them, and
binocular pictures taken by the sun were lithographed by Mr.
Schenck of Edinburgh. Stereoscopes of the lenticular form were
made by Mr. Loudon, optician, in Dundee, and sent to several of the
nobility in London, and in other places, and an account of these
stereoscopes, and of a binocular camera for taking portraits, and
copying statues, was communicated to the Royal Scottish Society of
Arts, and published in their Transactions.
It had never been proposed to apply the reflecting stereoscope to
portraiture or sculpture, or, indeed, to any useful purpose; but it was
very obvious, after the discovery of the Daguerreotype and
Talbotype, that binocular drawings could be taken with such
accuracy as to exhibit in the stereoscope excellent representations in
relief, both of living persons, buildings, landscape scenery, and every
variety of sculpture. In order to shew its application to the most
interesting of these purposes, Dr. Adamson of St. Andrews, at my
request, executed two binocular portraits of himself, which were
generally circulated and greatly admired. This successful application
of the principle to portraiture was communicated to the public, and
recommended as an art of great domestic interest.

Ethics Morality and Business The Development of Modern Economic Systems Volume Ii Modern Civilizations 1St Edition Edition Dipak Basu Full Chapter

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Ethics, Morality And Business: The

Development Of Modern Economic

Ethics, Morality and

ISBN 978-3-030-68066-4 ISBN 978-3-030-68067-1 (eBook)

In this book, we have analyzed the modern ideas of ethical dimensions

Table 3.1 Analysis of economic growth rate (real GNP at 1987

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature 1

companies form “oligopolies,” restricting competition to create exces-

• a commitment to honor contracts;

leaders and co-workers, based on shared, internalized values, that are to

4. Many values are relatively constant and durable.

Aristotle (2009) in Nicomachean Ethics proclaims happiness as an ethical

Kaptein and Schwartz (2008) reviewed sixty-seven code studies and

In a free-enterprise, private-property system, a corporate executive is an

Ethical climate, therefore, influences members of the organization what

Psychology and Ethics

The implicit contract explanation views the business leader as offering to

The multiple valued transaction benefit explanation interprets the

When the business leader employs honesty, courtesy, friendliness, loyalty,

Philosophy and Business

is always a gap between the information possessed by the manager vis-

Culture, the Basis for Business Ethics

sweatshop or political prisoner labor. Judging the seriousness of the differ-

The Cultural Foundation of American Ethics

• What constitutes ethics in business?

Answers to these questions are important to our ability to reconcile differ-

the responsibility to teach and encourage the practice of civic virtue in

are thereby responsible for instilling principles of ethical behavior in

case, however, the contract becomes the principal document governing

Business Ethics as Competitive Advantage

Appendix 1: Lehman and the Investment Bank Crisis

Title: The stereoscope

Author: David Brewster

Release date: August 24, 2023 [eBook #71483]

Original publication: London: John Murray, 1856

Credits: deaurider and the Online Distributed Proofreading Team

*** START OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK THE

WITH FIFTY WOOD ENGRAVINGS.

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