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SPRINGER BRIEFS IN MATHEMATICS
OF PLANET EARTH WEATHER, CLIMATE, OCEANS
Jean-François Chassagneux
Hinesh Chotai
Mirabelle Muûls
A Forward-Backward
SDEs Approach
to Pricing in
Carbon Markets
SpringerBriefs in Mathematics of
Planet Earth • Weather, Climate, Oceans
Series Editors
C. Cotter, London, UK
J. Broecker, Reading, UK
T. Shepherd, Reading, UK
S. Reich, Potsdam, Germany
V. Lucarini, Hamburg, Germany
SpringerBriefs present concise summaries of cutting-edge research and practical
applications across a wide spectrum of fields. Featuring compact volumes of 50
to 125 pages, the series covers a range of content from professional to academic.
Briefs are characterized by fast, global electronic dissemination, standard publish-
ing contracts, standardized manuscript preparation and formatting guidelines, and
expedited production schedules.
A Forward-Backward SDEs
Approach to Pricing
in Carbon Markets
123
Jean-François Chassagneux Mirabelle Muûls
U.F.R. de Mathématiques Grantham Institute
Université Paris Diderot, LPMA Imperial College
Paris London
France UK
Hinesh Chotai
Department of Mathematics
Imperial College
London
UK
v
vi Contents
Climate change is a term widely used in the academic, policy and business spheres.
Here we briefly explain its significance by describing the current scientific under-
standing of the earth’s atmosphere and why its recent evolution is a source of concern.
The climate system is driven by energy brought to the planet by the sun’s radiation.
Some of the gases in the atmosphere, the so-called greenhouse gases, allow sunlight
to reach the surface of the earth, but trap the heat that is embedded in infrared radia-
tion. The main greenhouse gases (GHGs) are carbon dioxide (CO2 ) and water vapour
[9]. Other GHGs are nitrous oxide and methane. Thanks to this natural greenhouse
effect, the average surface temperature is 33 ◦ C warmer than what it would be without
it [2]. However, since the industrial revolution, human activity has been releasing
CO2 and other GHGs into the atmosphere through the burning of fossil fuels (such
as coal, oil and gas), manufacturing, agriculture and land use changes such as defor-
estation [9]. The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) has reported
that the atmospheric carbon dioxide levels increased in the last 150 years from 280
parts per million to 400 parts per million [5]. The IPCC, which includes more than
1300 scientists from around the globe, regularly produces reports based on scientific
peer-reviewed research on the causes, evidence and effects of climate change, on
mitigation and adaptation. In addition to the evidence on GHG concentrations, the
earth’s average temperature is increasing at a rate that is unmatched in the past 1300
years [5]. The IPCC [5] states that:
It is extremely likely that human influence has been the dominant cause of the observed
warming since the mid-20th century.
Research shows that 97.2% of researchers agree with this assertion, according to
[3]. There is high confidence among scientists that temperatures will continue to rise
in the coming decades, with the effects of such warming likely to be different in
different regions of the world and at different times according to the IPCC, as the
different economic and environmental systems will react and adapt differently. Even
if some regions could benefit from increases in global mean temperature, the net
annual costs will increase over time, see [6], due to a long list of negative impacts
for humans, economies and ecosystems. More details are summarised here: https://
climate.nasa.gov/effects/. These conclusions lead to two necessary areas for action.
First, society will need to adapt in many dimensions so as to minimise the negative
consequences of climate change. Second, the economy needs to change so as to
ensure that GHG emissions are significantly reduced at a rate that is sufficient to
reduce the risk of dangerous climate change. Mitigation of GHGs requires technical
and behavioural change, innovation and effective policy. This brief focuses on one
particular policy instrument that seeks to lead to effective mitigation. The difficulty of
achieving meaningful and rapid mitigation is due to the so-called “public bad” nature
of GHG emissions: the cost of decreasing GHG emissions is borne by individuals
or countries who are unlikely to reap all the benefits this might lead to. Indeed, not
only will the reduced impacts benefit future generations, but also societies in many
countries, regardless of whether they mitigated strongly or not. This is why policy
makers and governments have been discussing the problem of climate change for
several decades.
Although the potential problem of GHG emissions and climate change had long
been put forward by scientists, it was only in 1992 that governments responded with
the creation of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change. A
few years later, in December 1997, the UNFCCC established the Kyoto protocol,
an international agreement requiring worldwide reductions in emissions by 2012 of
about 5% on average compared with 1990 levels. Developed countries were each
allocated a target on emissions abatement while developing countries, including
emerging economies such as China, were given no targets. Although the protocol
came into force in 2005, it never met its objectives because the US never ratified it and
it did not include a more global effort agreement. As a consequence, countries started
negotiating through annual meetings, or Conference of Parties (COP), an agreement
to replace the Kyoto Protocol and achieve a more ambitious plan for dealing with
the risk of dangerous climate change. Despite a failed attempt at the Copenhagen
based COP, a momentous and significant agreement was achieved in Paris at the
21st COP in December 2015. 195 countries adopted a universal and legally binding
global climate deal to keep the increase in global average temperature to well below
2 ◦ C above pre-industrial levels, by ensuring that global emissions peak as soon as
1.2 Policy Developments and the Paris Agreement 3
possible and are then rapidly reduced. It came into force in November 2016, once
the threshold number of ratifications was achieved. Each country now has to
prepare, communicate and maintain successive nationally determined contributions (NDCs)
that it intends to achieve [and it will] pursue domestic mitigation measures, with the aim of
achieving the objectives of such contributions.
[11]. NDCs are the reductions of GHG emissions that each country agrees to cut,
as a contribution to the global mitigation levels needed to limit the risk of climate
change. As an example, the EU’s NDC proposes an overall 40% reduction in GHG
emissions by 2030 from 1990 levels. When adding all NDCs put forward so far around
the world, these proposal are unfortunately not consistent with limiting warming to
below 2 ◦ C. Even so, fixing and meeting these targets will involve different costs
and commitments by each country. As per the agreement, in order to achieve the
reductions agreed to in their NDCs, governments need to put in place a consistent
list of measures. Carbon markets are one of the domestic mitigation measures that can
be implemented nationally, regionally or internationally. The next section explains
its principles.
An alternative policy instrument to carbon markets that governments can use are
carbon taxes. Figure 1.1 illustrates how, with perfect information, a tax and a carbon
market are equivalent. A given country or jurisdiction will face damages per tonne
1 An externality refers to the consequence that an economic activity has on others that is not reflected
in market prices. In this context, emissions negatively affect future generations by causing climate
change, but emitters do not pay for the harm they generate and it is therefore not integrated into
prices.
4 1 A Description of the Carbon Markets and Their Role in Climate Change Mitigation
The second important element is that market participants can trade their allowances.
There are likely to be some companies for which abating is very costly, and others
where there are “low-hanging fruits”: ways to reduce their emissions at zero or
negative cost. The carbon market means that those who can reduce at low cost will
do so, and therefore have an excess of allowances that they will be willing to sell
on the market at a given price. Participants will reduce their emissions up until the
point at which they are indifferent between buying one permit at the market price
and paying the cost of reducing emissions by one additional ton of carbon. This cost
is called the marginal abatement cost. This can be illustrated with a simple model of
the firm’s decision making process. The equation
Π1 (E 1 ) = a + bE 1 − E 12 − θ E 1 + A1 (1.1)
defines firm 1’s profit. The first linear term is increasing in emissions E 1 because
a higher production, which we assume will generate emissions, will increase its
revenue. The third term represents the cost of production, which we assume to be
quadratic in production levels which are directly correlated with emissions. Theta is
the carbon price and market participants will need to buy permits for their level of
emissions. Finally, A1 is the allocation of permits which is added as a lump sum to
the profit. When maximising profit, the firm chooses its emissions as a function of
its production parameters and the price of EUAs. The maximisation problem can be
written as
∂Π1 (E 1 )
= b − 2E 1 − θ = 0. (1.2)
∂ E1
If there are more producers on the market, they each face similar profit constraints.
In equilibrium, the total level of emissions, or cap, is determined by the regulator.
Assume there are only two market players. In this case,
E1 + E2 = E ∗, (1.3)
where E ∗ is the cap. In this case, if both players are similar except that the b that
enters the production function of company 1 will be c for company 2, then
b−θ c−θ
+ = E ∗, (1.4)
2 2
b+c
θ= − E ∗. (1.5)
2
Equation (1.5) determines the carbon price at a point where the market will be in
equilibrium and the marginal cost and marginal damages from emissions are equated.
6 1 A Description of the Carbon Markets and Their Role in Climate Change Mitigation
From the signing of the Kyoto Protocol in 1996 the European Union took a strong
stance on climate policy and started running in 2005 a carbon market—the EU
Emissions Trading System (EU ETS)—governing the greenhouse gas emissions from
12,000 power and manufacturing plants in 31 countries. These account for around
45% of the EU’s greenhouse gas emissions or 5% of global emissions. The EU ETS
is administrated by the European Commission. The EU ETS Directive (2003/87/EC)
was further amended in 2009 by the amending EU ETS Directive (2009/29/EC).
These are detailed and explained in [12].
The EU ETS has been designed in three phases so far. Phase 1 was three years
long, from 2005 to 2008, and can be considered as a pilot period. Phase 2 ran from
2008–2012, with an increase in the number of countries and sectors covered. Phase
3 is scheduled to end in 2020 and negotiations are under way for the design of the
next phase. At the start of Phase 3, the upper limit on total emissions was set and
is now declining at a rate of 1.74% per year up until 2020 and 2.2% per year until
2030. As a result, EU emissions will be 43% less in 2030 than they were in 2005.
Improvements to the policy have been proposed by a variety of stakeholders, see
[7]. Phase 1 of the EU ETS was centred on power generation and energy-intensive
manufacturing industries, with an emphasis on CO2 emissions. All plants exceed-
ing 20MWh of energy use, including conventional power plants, had to participate.
Large emissions-intensive plants such as mineral oil refineries, coke ovens, iron and
steel, and factories producing cement, glass, lime, bricks, ceramics, and pulp and
paper were included. The following two phases extended the sectoral coverage to
include airlines, aluminium and ammonia manufacturing plants. Other greenhouse
gas emissions such as nitrous oxide and perfluorocarbons were also added to the
system. In practice, plants included in the EU ETS need to surrender one GHG per-
mit, known as an EU allowance (EUA), for each metric ton of CO2 (tCO2 e) emitted.
Permits can either be distributed to companies for free, or through an auction. By
imposing an EU-wide carbon price, the EU ETS sets for all participants in the market
the opportunity cost of emitting CO2 . As described above, if permits are scarce their
price increases and vice versa.
1.4 The European Union Emissions Trading System 7
Fig. 1.2 Evolution of the EU ETS prices between 2005 and 2016
Looking back at the price on the EU ETS since its inception as in Fig. 1.2, there have
been considerable variations in it. The initial expectation was for the price of EUAs
to be in the range of e5−10/tCO2 e, and the trades in early 2005 on the new market is
consistent with this. The price rose at first. When a number of member states reported
their levels of emissions in April 2006, they were lower than expected. The price fell
to less than a Euro as it became increasingly apparent that Phase 1 emissions would
be lower than the cap [4].
The reasons for the price collapse are twofold. First, market participants were not
allowed to bank their permits from Phase 1 for use in Phase 2. This means that if
they had excess permits in Phase 1, they would be worth nothing in Phase 2 and they
would therefore be keen to sell them during Phase 1. Second, all plants had enough
permits to produce their desired level with no constraint, so that there was no demand
for additional permits. Phase 2 saw a modification of the rules, such that the price of
EUAs increased to over e20, reaching almost e30. The great recession in 2008 led
to a significant reduction of the EUA price to around e15. This price reduction, in
contrast to the 2005 movement, was not due to any flaws in the system’s allocation
of permits, but rather to the reduced economic activity and, hence, emissions due to
the recession. The price recovered in 2009, followed by a two-year period of stability
with a price close to e15. In the summer of 2011, the EUA price fell to e7–8 before
reaching around e4 at the start of Phase 3. An interesting observation is that, despite
concerns that it could reach zero, the price has stayed positive since. Comparing the
price of EUAs and the numbers of surplus permits at the ends of Phases 1 and 2,
as implied in Fig. 1.2, shows how important the possibility to bank allowances is.
8 1 A Description of the Carbon Markets and Their Role in Climate Change Mitigation
Looking at the evolution of the price in recent years also reflects how sensitive it is
to policy-related events rather than the underlying mechanisms. In the future, with
more stable policy and the possibility of linking different markets around the world,
the price is likely to reflect more clearly the economic elements behind it and display
features of a well-functioning and efficient market. In such conditions, an improved
knowledge of carbon markets and price formation is needed. This is the subject of
this brief.
There is increasing evidence that the EU ETS led to significant emission reductions
and increases in clean innovation, and that this was not at the expense of a loss in
competitiveness. See [8] for a review of the evidence in the economics literature.
This is particularly interesting given that critics will argue that having more stringent
and unilateral climate change policies in the EU will lead to competitiveness losses
in global markets and no real impact on global emissions.
New carbon markets are being implemented worldwide: so far, 39 national and
23 sub-national jurisdictions have or are about to implement pricing instruments,
either cap-and-trade or carbon taxes. Together, such schemes are valued at around
$50 billion globally and represent close to 12% of global GHG emissions. This is a
perpetually evolving figure, and the latest numbers are regularly updated by the World
Bank. For example, in China, the world’s biggest GHG emitter, a national carbon
market is due to start by 2020. Pilots are already being implemented in seven different
pilot trading schemes: Chongqing, Shenzhen, Shanghai, Beijing, Guangdong, Hubei
and Tianjin. When the national market is started, there will be a significant increase
in the percentage of total global emissions covered by ETSs. Given the urgency of
the problem described at the start of this chapter, in the medium term one could
expect that such instruments will become increasingly common. As advocated by
many [10], a global market would lead to the most gains in efficiency. There are
many hurdles to pass before reaching such a result, and a global carbon market
was neither included nor discussed at the Paris COP21. A better understanding of
the pricing mechanisms of carbon permits is however needed, whether for local,
national or global markets, as it will ensure that both corporations and regulators can
act as rational market participants, so that it generates the highest efficiency gains
and emissions reductions. The complexity of determining the price of an emission
allowance on a carbon market, taking the EU ETS as an example, is presented and
approached in the following chapters.
References 9
References
1. Coase, Ronald H. 1960. The problem of social cost. The Journal of Law and Economics 3:
1–44.
2. Committee on Climate Change. 2010. The fourth carbon budget – reducing emissions through
the 2020s.
3. Cook, John, Naomi Oreskes, Peter T. Doran, William R.L. Anderegg, Bart Verheggen, Ed W.
Maibach, J. Stuart Carlton, Stephan Lewandowsky, Andrew G. Skuce, Sarah A. Green, Dana
Nuccitelli, Peter Jacobs, Mark Richardson, Bärbel Winkler, Rob Painting, and Ken Rice. 2016.
Consensus on consensus: a synthesis of consensus estimates on human-caused global warming.
Environmental Research Letters 11 (4): 048002.
4. Ellerman, A.Denny, and Barbara K. Buchner. 2008. Over-allocation or abatement? A prelimi-
nary analysis of the EU ETS based on the 2005–06 emissions data. Environmental and Resource
Economics 41 (2): 267–287.
5. IPCC. 2013. The physical science basis. Contribution of working group I to the fifth assessment
report of the intergovernmental panel on climate change.
6. IPCC. 2014. Summary for policymakers. In Climate change 2014: impacts, adaptation, and
vulnerability.
7. Martin, Ralf, Mirabelle Muûls, Laure B. de Preux, and Ulrich J. Wagner. 2014. On the empirical
content of carbon leakage criteria in the EU emissions trading scheme. Ecological Economics
105: 78–88.
8. Martin, Ralf, Mirabelle Muûls, and Ulrich J. Wagner. 2016. The impact of the European Union
Emissions Trading Scheme on regulated firms: What is the evidence after ten years? Review of
Environmental Economics and Policy 10 (1): 129–148.
9. Royal Society. 2010. Climate change: a summary of the science.
10. Stern, Nicholas. 2008. Key elements of a global deal on climate change. London, UK: London
School of Economics and Political Science.
11. United Nations. Framework convention on climate change. 2015. Adoption of the Paris agree-
ment. In 21st conference of the parties.
12. Woerdman, E. 2015. The EU greenhouse gas emissions trading scheme. In Essential EU climate
law. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar.
Chapter 2
Introduction to Forward-Backward
Stochastic Differential Equations
1 Pardoux and Peng counts more than 2000 citations as of March 2017.
For a prescribed terminal time T > 0, the solution of a backward stochastic differ-
ential equation is a pair (Y, Z ) satisfying on [0, T ]
dYt = − f (t, Yt , Z t )dt + Z t dWt ,
YT = ξ,
for some progressively measurable random function f , called the driver, and a termi-
nal condition ξ which is a FT -measurable random variable. It is reasonable to assume
that a solution satisfies some conditions so that the various integrals appearing above
make sense, and this will be discussed below.
The first peculiarity of BSDEs is that contrary to (forward) SDEs, the solution
is not known at the initial time 0 but at the terminal time T . The second difference
with forward SDEs comes from the fact that the solution is a pair (Y, Z ). Before
giving some general existence and uniqueness results and stating precisely some
assumptions on the coefficients, we will comment on the shape of the equation and
give some hints on the extra process Z .
The simplest example is f ≡ 0 and ξ ∈ L 2 (FT ), where for t ∈ [0, T ], L 2 (Ft )
stands for the set of square integrable Ft measurable random variables. Then, the
natural solution to the differential equation dY
dt
t
= 0 and YT = ξ is Yt = ξ , which is
generally not adapted (unless ξ is deterministic). The best approximation—say in
L 2 —is given by the martingale Yt = E[ξ | Ft ]. Using the martingale representation
theorem, we introduce a Z -process which is square integrable
t
Yt = E[ξ | Ft ] = E[ξ ] + Z s dWs ,
0
leading to
T
Yt = ξ − Z s dWs , i.e. − dYt = −Z t dWt , with YT = ξ.
t
Here we present results in the Lipschitz setting, which were first studied in [41],
see also [25]. This setting allows us to present the theory in a quite advanced and
useful form without encountering too many complications. Moreover, this is the main
framework generally adopted for numerical studies.
In order to state precisely the main existence and uniqueness result for BSDEs in
the Lipschitz framework, we have to introduce some notation and assumptions.
• We denote by S 2 (Rk ) the vector space of RCLL2 adapted processes Y , with values
in Rk , and such that:
Y S 2 := E sup |Yt | < ∞,
2 2
0≤t≤T
2. Integrability condition:
T
E |ξ |2 + | f (r, 0, 0)|2 dr < ∞.
0
Theorem 2.1 Under (H 1), there exists a unique solution (Y, Z ) ∈ Sc2 × H 2 to
T T
Yt = ξ + f (s, Ys , Z s )ds − Z s dWs , 0 ≤ t ≤ T. (2.1)
t t
We skip the proof of the above theorem, which is based on a contraction mapping
argument, see the proof of Theorem 2.1 in [25]. We will give a proof, using essentially
the same arguments, for an existence and uniqueness result in a (slightly) more
involved setting below, see Theorem 2.6.
We first study linear BSDEs for which we can give an almost explicit solution. For
this section, we set k = 1: Y is then real-valued and Z a d-dimensional row vector.
Using Doob’s inequality, we easily see that Γ ∈ Sc2 , as b is bounded. It is also clear
that there is a unique solution to (2.1): define f (t, y, z) = at y + zbt + ct , which
obviously satisfies (H 1), and we know that Y ∈ Sc2 .
Using the product formula, we compute
t
showing that Γt Yt + 0 cr Γr dr is a local martingale, which is, in fact, a martingale
as c ∈ H 2 and Γ , Y are in S 2 . Then,
t T
Γt Yt + cr Γr dr = E ΓT YT + cr Γr dr Ft ,
0 0
Linear BSDEs play an important role in the theory as outlined by the results
below, especially via the Comparison Theorem. They were also the first BSDEs
to be introduced by Bismut in [3] to study the quadratic-linear stochastic control
problem. They appear there as the adjoint process in the variational characterisation
of an optimal control.
This section presents the “comparison theorem”, which allows us to compare two
solutions of two BSDEs (in R) as soon as we can compare the terminal conditions
and the drivers of the BSDEs.
Theorem 2.2 Let k = 1 and assume that (ξ , f ) satisfies (H 1), the solution to
the associated BSDE is denoted (Y , Z ). Let (Y, Z ) be a solution of a BSDE with
T
parameters (ξ, f ) and satisfying 0 f (t, Yt , Z t )dt ∈ L 2 (FT ). We also assume that
P a.s. ξ ≤ ξ and f (t, Yt , Z t ) ≤ f (t, Yt , Z t ) λ ⊗ P-a.e. (λ denoting the Lebesgue
measure). Then,
We observe that
For 0 ≤ i ≤ d, we consider the vector Z r(i) whose last d − i components are those
of Z r and the first i components are those of Z r . For 1 ≤ i ≤ d, we set
f r, Yr , Z r(i−1) − f r, Yr , Z r(i)
bri = 1{Vri =0} .
Vri
with, for 0 ≤ r ≤ T ,
r r r
1
Γr = exp bu dWu − |bu |2 du + au du .
0 2 0 0
Following Remark 2.1, we get that Ut ≥ 0, which proves the first statement of the
theorem.
Moreover, if U0 = 0 then we have
T
0 = E ζ ΓT + cr Γr dr ,
0
and the random variable is non-negative. Then, it is equal to zero P a.s., which implies
ζ = 0 and cr = 0, concluding the proof of the theorem.
introduce some imperfection in the market and show that the option price is still
given by a BSDE but with a non-linear Lipschitz driver [25].
The market, in its simplest setting, is consists of two assets: a non-risky asset (bank
account) delivering an interest rate r , which is a deterministic quantity, and a risky
asset (a stock) whose price at any time t is given by St . The stochastic process S has
the following Black–Scholes type dynamics:
t t
St = S0 + r Ss ds + Ss σs dWs , S0 ∈ (0, ∞).
0 0
The random coefficient σ is essentially bounded and satisfies σs ≥ ε > 0 for all
s ∈ [0, T ]. The fact that the drift is r S implies that the dynamics of asset price is
already written under the risk neutral probability.
We study the price of a contingent claim that has maturity T and random payoff
ξ , with ξ belonging to L 2 (FT ). The goal is to construct an asset portfolio that will
perfectly replicate the random payoff ξ . In our setting, a portfolio is described by a
stochastic process (α, φ) where
• α is the amount of money in the bank account;
• φ is the amount invested in the risky asset.
At time t, its value is given by
Vt = αt + φt . (2.4)
On an infinitesimal time interval dt, the variation in value of the bank account is
given by αt r dt and the variation in value due to the risky asset is given by φStt dSt (due
to price change). The stochastic process (α, β) is a strategy that controls the value of
the portfolio, but not all strategies can be used. For modelling purposes, one restricts
the set of strategies to self-financing strategies, i.e. strategies such that the change in
value of the portfolio is given by
φt
dVt = r αt dt + dSt . (2.5)
St
In other words, the change in value of the portfolio is only due to a change in value
of the assets. We then compute, using (2.4), that
t t
Vt = V0 + r Vs ds + φs σs dWs .
0 0
18 2 Introduction to Forward-Backward Stochastic Differential Equations
We observe that the value of V only depends on φ and V0 . We also need to impose
t
some technical conditions on φ and we will assume that E 0 |φs |2 ds < ∞ so that
the stochastic integral is a martingale.
The super-replication problem is to find a strategy that will hedge the terminal
payoff with the minimal initial cost
v,φ
p := inf G0 with G0 = {v ∈ R|∃φ ∈ H 2 , VT ≥g(ST )} . (2.6)
Proof 1. The existence and uniqueness of the solution to (2.7) has already been
Y ,φ ∗
discussed above. It is straightforwardly seen that Yt = Vt 0 for all t ∈ [0, T ]
Y ,φ ∗
and then that VT 0 = ξ . This proves that Y0 ≥ p and that G0 is non-empty.
v,φ
2. Now, let v ∈ G0 and φ ∈ H 2 such that VT ≥ ξ . A simple application of Itô’s
−r t v,φ
Formula shows that (e Vt )t∈[0,T ] is a martingale. In particular, we have that
v = E e−r T VT ≥ E e−r T ξ = Y0 ,
v,φ
the last equality coming from (2.3). This yields that for all v ∈ G0 , v ≥ Y0 . The
proof is then concluded by taking the infimum on G0 .
Remark 2.2 The price at any date t ∈ [0, T ] is given by Yt = E er (T −t) ξ | Ft .
We now consider a case of market imperfection: We work with two different rates
for borrowing (R) and lending (r) with R > r .
We want to price a European contingent claim in this market following a hedging
strategy. The main difference now is that the cash dynamics is given by
The super hedging problem is still given by (2.6), only the dynamics of V has
changed.
Theorem 2.3 Let (Y, Z ) be the solution to the following non-linear BSDE
T T
Zt
Ys = ξ − r Yt + (r − R)[Yt − ]− dt − Z t dWt . (2.9)
s σt s
The link between mathematical finance and BSDE theory is very fruitful, see e.g.
[25]. For example, recently, Crepey [16, 17] has studied counterparty risk in the
framework of BSDEs.
We illustrate in this section how BSDEs can be used to solve stochastic control prob-
lems. We present here a direct approach and we refer to Sect. 2.3.1 for a variational
approach related to the stochastic maximum principle.
Let us consider an R-valued process X which is given under P as the solution of
the following differential equation:
d X t = σ (X t )dWt , (2.10)
is well defined as a Lipschitz continuous function of (x, z). Let us then introduce
The function H above is called the Hamiltonian of the system, and H ∗ is its optimal
value. We then have the following result.
Theorem 2.4 In the above setting, the control problem (2.12) has a solution Y0∗
given by the initial value of the following BSDE
T T
Yt∗ = g(X T ) + H ∗ (X s , Z s∗ )ds − Z s∗ dWs , (2.15)
t t
Proof In this restrictive setting, H ∗ is Lipschitz continuous and (2.15) has a unique
solution. For α ∈ U , we consider the solution (Y α , Z α ) of the following BSDE
T T
Ytα = g(X T ) + h(X s , αs )ds − Z sα dWsα , (2.16)
t t
observing that Y0α = J (α). Then, rewriting the above dynamics under P, we obtain
2.1 Backward Stochastic Differential Equations 21
T T
Ytα = g(X T ) + H (X s , Z sα , αs )ds − Z sα dWs . (2.17)
t t
We now use the Comparison Theorem 2.2, recalling the definition of H ∗ in (2.14),
to obtain that
∗
Y0α ≥ Y0∗ = Y α ,
2.1.4 Extensions
The theory of BSDEs is rich and powerful. It has attracted a lot of interest in the
past 25 years. In this section, we report briefly on some extensions to the Lipschitz
setting and the basic shape of Eq. (2.1). Note that we still present the case of Brownian
filtrations but, of course, BSDEs have been studied in relation to jump processes as
well, see e.g. [2]. Nor are we going to delve into the study of second-order BSDEs
[48]. As already remarked, BSDE theory is still an active field of research and we
do not aim to be exhaustive in the list we give below.
The solution is now a triple (Y, Z , K ) and, obviously, some other conditions are
needed to guarantee uniqueness, depending on the applications.
In the one-dimensional setting, RBSDEs are linked, in their simplest form, to optimal
stopping problems and the pricing of American options in non-linear markets [24].
If the exercise price of the option is given by a process (L t )0≤t≤T , then (Yt )0≤t≤T ,
22 2 Introduction to Forward-Backward Stochastic Differential Equations
BSDEs with constraints on the Z -process have been introduced in [19]. The minimal
solution to (2.18) is found such that Z ∈ D. In this case, BSDEs are linked to the
pricing of European Options when some investment constraints are present on the
market.
The Lipschitz setting has been extended in various ways, but then existence and
uniqueness results are much more difficult to obtain, when available. The first exten-
sion concerns coefficients with the monotonic property in y only, see [20], where
the case of random terminal time is also treated. Let us mention the application to
stochastic homogenisation [40]. The notion of generalised BSDEs has been intro-
duced in [45], where the driver involves integration with respect to a finite variation
process. This allows us to represent solutions of non-linear PDEs with generalised
Neumann boundary condition. See Sect. 2.2.2 for an account of the link between
PDEs and FBSDEs.
An important generalisation for applications comes from the introduction of
quadratic growth in the component Z . This has been introduced for utility max-
imisation problems in [30, 47] and recently to principal-agent problems [23]. The
one-dimensional case (for Y ) is now well understood, see e.g. [30, 32]. The article
[49] is the first to give an existence and uniqueness result for multi-dimensional
BSDEs with quadratic growth. The general case is known to be difficult [26] albeit
with recent progress [29, 50].
2.1 Backward Stochastic Differential Equations 23
BSDEs with only continuous coefficients but with linear growth are considered
in a multi-dimensional setting in [28] with an important application to non-zero sum
games.
Recently, BSDEs have been introduced to study large population stochastic control
problems. These are control problems of the type (2.11) and (2.12) but involving
many interacting agents. A classical example is the following. Consider N agents,
whose personal state is given by (for player i)
Note that the players interact via μn only. Games with a large number of player are
difficult to solve. The hope here is to obtain an asymptotic (N → ∞) description of
the equilibrium, hopefully “easier” to handle.
The notion of equilibrium is then fundamental as it yields to different limiting
equations. Individualistic, i.e. Nash-like, equilibria were first considered by Lasry
and Lions [35], who coined them Mean Field Games. They were introduced at
the same time by Caines, Huang and Malhamé [31]. Cooperative equilibrium leads
to the control of McKean–Vlasov SDEs [11]. For a comparison between the two
approaches, we mention [12]. The probabilistic approach to studying such problems
has been developed by Carmona and Delarue [6, 10, 11], see the references therein
for early works, and leads to the study of the following system
t t
X t = ξ + 0 b(X s , Ys , Z s , P(X s ,Ys ,) )ds + 0 σ (X s , Ys , P(X s ,Ys ,) )dWs ,
T T
Yt = g(X T , P X T ) + t f (X s , Ys , Z s , P(X s ,Ys ,) )ds − t Z s dWs .
The main peculiarity, besides the coupling between the two equations, is the fact
that the coefficients depend upon the law of the solution. These McKean–Vlasov
FBSDEs have been linked to some non-linear PDEs written on the Wassertein space
[8, 13]. Let us mention finally that the very difficult question of the convergence of
the controlled particle system to the mean-field limit has been studied recently in [5].
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peptic ferment in, 16
Foam structure, 6
Folliculina, 137;
tube of, 152
Food, 35 f. (see also Ingestion);
of Higher Animals, 38;
absorption of, by Plants, 38;
in relation to life-cycle of Ciliata, 147 f.;
of Sponges, 237;
of Hydra, 256 and n.;
of Millepora, 261;
of Siphonophora, 304;
of Charybdea, 319;
of Alcyonium, 339;
of Zoantharia, 373;
of Asterias rubens, 439;
of Ophiothrix fragilis, 486;
of Ophiolepididae, 496;
of Echinus esculentus, 516;
of Echinarachnius parma, 546;
of Echinocardium cordatum, 552;
of Holothuria nigra, 561;
of Dendrochirota, 572;
of Synapta inhaerens, 577;
of Antedon rosacea, 583
Food-vacuole, of Actinosphaerium eichornii, 72;
of Ciliata, 145 f.;
of Carchesium, 146
Foot-plate, of young Pentacrinidae, 592;
of larva of Antedon rosacea, 619
Foraminifera, 40, 49, 50, 58 f.;
relations of, 49;
shell of, 49, 59 f., 60, 61, 63, 65;
habitat of, 59 f.;
literature of, 58 n.;
marine, 60 f.;
nuclei of, 62, 67 f.;
nutrition of, 40, 62;
streaming of granules in, 17;
chromidia of, 62, 68 f.;
collection of, 62;
dimorphism of, 66, 67;
reproduction of, 67 f.;
economic uses of, 69 f.;
palaeontology of, 69 f.
Forbes, 338
Force, dual, of dividing-cell, 26 n.
Forcepia, 223
Forceps, 222
Forcipulata, 462, 473 f.
Forcipulate pedicellaria, 456, 473
Formative vacuole of contractile vacuole, in Flagellata, 110, 115;
in Ciliata, 143
Fossil, Foraminifera, 69 f.;
Radiolaria, 87 f.;
Dinoflagellata, 132;
Peridinium, 132;
Sponges, 192 f., 207 f., 215, 241;
Coelenterates, 270, 281 f., 343 f., 346, 393 f., 406;
Asteroidea, 475 f.;
Ophiuroidea, 501 f.;
Echinoidea, 556 f.;
Crinoidea, 594 f.;
Thecoidea, 596;
Carpoidea, 596 f.;
Cystoidea, 597 f.;
Blastoidea, 599 f.
Fowler, 293 n., 382, 400, 404
Framboesia, 121 n.
France, epidemic of pébrine in, 107
Francé, on structure of funnel of Choanoflagellates, 115 n., 121 n.;
monograph of Choanoflagellates, 123, 182 n.;
on Polytomeae, 119 n.
Freetown, prophylaxis of malaria at, 106
Fringing reef, 390 f.
Frog's blood, Lankesterella in, 102
Frondicularia, 59, 63
Fructification, of Mycetozoa, 90 f.;
of Acrasieae, 90;
of Myxomycetes, 49, 91 f.
Fry, E. and A., on Myxomycetes, 93 n.
Fuligo, 90;
F. varians, 92 f.;
pepsin in, 16
Fungacea, 402
Fungi, cell connexions in, 37 f.;
in relation to Protista, 40;
Gasteromycetous, 91
Fungia, 403;
asexual reproduction of, 388, 389;
F. crassitentaculata, 403
Fungiidae, 403
Funiculina, 359, 362;
F. quadrangularis, 362
Funiculinidae, 362
Funnel, of Craspedomonadidae or Choanoflagellates, 111, 121, 122,
182;
of Phalausteridae, 111;
of choanocytes of Sponges, 171
Fusion of larval Sponges, 174
Fusion-nucleus of Ciliata, 150
—see also Reproduction, Syngamy, Zygotonucleus
Fusulina, 59
Galaxea, 400;
G. esperi, 400
Galeolaria, 307;
G. biloba, 304
Galeolarinae, 307
Galerites, 558
Gamble, 312 n.;
and Keeble, 175 n.
Gametes, 33 f.;
of Trichosphaerium, 54;
of certain Protomastigaceae, 116 n.;
of Volvocidae, 127 f.;
of Pandorina (of three sizes), 128, 129
Gametocyte of Acystosporidae, 104 f.
Gametogonium (= parent-cell of gametes), male, of Acystosporidae,
105
Gametonuclei (= nuclei capable of syngamous fusion), 34
Ganeria, 464
Ganeriidae, 454, 464
Gardiner, 345, 370, 375, 392 n., 404
Garveia, 270
Gasteromycetous fungi, 91
Gastral layer, 171
Gastralia, 201
Gastropores, 257, 258
Gastrozooids, of Millepora, 259, 260;
of Hydractinia, 264;
of Siphonophora, 299;
of Antipatharia, 408
Gastrula, definition of, 603
Gaule, misinterpretation of nature of Haemosporidae, 102
Gegenbaur, 302
Gellius 217, 223;
G. varius, development, 172 f., 173, 174
Gemmantes, 400
Gemmaria, 405
Gemination = Budding, q.v.
Gemmiform, pedicellariae, of Echinus esculentus, 506;
of E. acutus, 509;
of E. elegans, 510;
of Cidaridae, 534;
of Echinarachnius parma, 544;
of Echinocardium cordatum, 550
Gemmule, 177, 178, 179, 230
Generation, spontaneous, 42 f.
Generations, alternation of, 44, 250
Genital base of Holothuria nigra, 567
Genital bursa, of Ophiothrix fragilis, 485
compared with hydrospires of Blastoidea, 600
Genital canal of Antedon rosacea, 586
Genital organs (including ducts), of Asterias rubens, 451 f.;
of Ophiothrix fragilis, 490;
of Ophiarachna, 491;
of Ophiuroidea, 494;
of Amphiura squamata, 494;
of Echinus esculentus, 528;
of Echinocardium cordatum, 552;
of Hemiaster philippi, 552;
of Holothuria nigra, 567;
of Antedon rosacea, 586
Genital plate, of Ophiothrix fragilis, 485;
of Echinus esculentus, 512, 513
Genital rachis, of Asterias rubens, 452;
of Ophiothrix fragilis, 490;
of Echinus esculentus, 528;
of Antedon rosacea, 586
Genital scale of Ophiothrix fragilis, 485
Genital stolon, of Asterias rubens, 451;
of Ophiothrix fragilis, 489;
of Echinus esculentus, 528;
of Holothuria nigra, 567;
of Antedon rosacea, 585, 586;
of larva of A. rosacea, 619
Geodia, 211
Geographical distribution of Protozoa, 47
Geotaxy (= barotaxy), 20
Gephyra dohrnii, 382, 408
Gephyrea, 577
Gerarde, 167
Gerardia savalia, 406
Gerbillus indicus infested by a Haemosporidian, 102 n.
Germinal spot (= nucleole of ovum), 7
Germinal vesicle (= nucleus of ovum), 7
Germination, 32;
of Myxosporidian spores, 107
Germ-plasm, 28 f.;
continuity of, 172
Germ theory, 44
Germs, invisible air-borne, 43
Geryonia, 290, 295
Gilchrist, 338
Gill of Echinus, 514, 527
Gill-cleft, of Echinus, 514;
of Sphaerechinus, 540 f.;
of Strongylocentrotus, 541
Ginkgo, spermatozoa of, 38
Glaucoma, 137, 153;
G. scintillans, rate of fission of, 147 f.
Glauconite, 70
Globiceps, 272
Globiferae of Centrostephanus longispinosus, 532
Globigerina, 59, 63, 242;
spines of, 61, 66;
-ooze, 61 f.;
G. bulloides, 68, 69
Glossina morsitans, intermediate host of Trypanosoma brucei, 119;
G. palpalis, intermediate host of T. gambiense, 120
Glossograptus, 282
Glycerin, 15
Glycogen, of Ciliata, 144;
-vesicles of Pelomyxa palustris, 53
Gnat (Anopheles), intermediate host of Haemamoeba and
Laverania, 103 f.;
(Culex) intermediate host of Haemoproteus, 103;
of Trypanosoma, 120
Golgi, on relation of Acystosporidian life-cycle and stages of
intermittent fever, 103
Gonactinia, 371, 372, 377
Gonangium, 276
Goniaster, 471;
fossil, 475
Goniastraea, 375, 401
Goniocidaris, 534;
G. canaliculata, 535
Gonionema, 288, 291;
G. murbachii, 232, 290, 291, 292
Gonium, 111
Gonophore, of Gymnoblastea, 265;
of Calyptoblastea, 277;
of Stylasterina, 284;
of Siphonophora, 302
Gonotheca, 276, 281
Gonozooids, of Siphonophora, 302;
of Antipatharia, 408
Gorgonacea, 350 f.
Gorgonella, 357;
spicule, 336
Gorgonellidae, 337, 357
Gorgonia, 356;
G. cavolinii, 340;
G. flabellum, 357;
G. verrucosa, 356
Gorgoniidae, 334, 337, 356
Gorgonocephalus, 491, 501
Gosse, 273
Goto, 291, 293;
on development of Bipinnaria, 612
Grammaria, 278
Granatocrinus, 599;
G. norwoodi, 600
Grant, 167
Grantiidae, 192
Grantiopsis, 191
Granular disintegration of Protista, 14 f.
Granules, in protoplasm, 6;
excretory, 6, 144;
aleurone, 37;
basal, of cilia, etc., 138 n., 141 (see also Blepharoplast);
proteid, of Suctoria, 161
Graphiohexaster, 203
Graptolitoidea, 281
Grassi, on malarial parasites, 103
Gravity, stimulus of, 19 f.
Greasy film, outer clear layer of protoplasm behaves like, 17
Greeff, on Protozoa, 46
Green Flagellates, relations of, 48
Greensand, 70;
Cambridge, 208
Green water often due to Euglena viridis, 124
Greenwood, M., on peptic digestion in Protozoa, 16;
on feeding of Carchesium polypinum, 45 f., 146 f.
Gregarina, 97, 98, 99;
G. blattarum, 98
Gregarines, habitat, 99;
syngamy, 99
Gregarinidaceae, 95 f., 97 f.
Gregory, 346
Grew, 166
Grey chalk, 61
Gromia, 52;
G. oviformis, 59 n.
—see also Allogromia
Grooves, longitudinal and transverse, of Dinoflagellata, 110, 130,
131, 132;
of Peridinium, 131;
of Polykrikos, 132;
oral, of Noctiluca, 133
Grosvenor, 249 n.
Growth, 19 f.;
Spencer's limit of, 23, 31
Gruber, on regeneration in Protozoa, 35 n.;
on diffused nucleus in marine Ciliata, 144 n.;
on tubicolous marine Ciliata, 152
Gruppe, deposit of Radiolaria, 87
Guinea Coast, 106
Gullet (= pharynx) of Paramecium caudatum, 151
Gut, supposed, of Ciliata, 145
—see also Alimentary canal
Gutter, oral, of Vorticellidae, 156, 158
Gymnamoebae, 51 n.
Gymnasteridae, 471
Gymnoblastea, 262 f.
Gymnodinium, 110;
G. pulvisculus, parasitic in Appendicularia, 132
Gymnomyxa, 49 n.
Gymnophrys, 58
Gymnosphaera, 70, 73
Gymnostomaceae, 137;
predaceous, trichocysts of, 143;
mouth and pharynx of, 145;
noteworthy members of, 152
Gyractis, 380
Ianthella, 220
Ichthyophtheirius, 137;
noxious parasite of fish, 152
Iciligorgia, 351
Idioplasm, 29
Ijima, 199, 206, 231, 234
Ileonema, 137, 152
Ilyanthus mitchellii, 380
Ilyodaemon, 571, 572;
I. maculatus, 571
Imperforate, Foraminifera, 58 f.;
Corals, 371
Inadunata, 595
Incurrent canal, 170
India, diseases of Trypanosomic origin, 119 f.
Induction shocks, action on Protozoa, 7, 22
Infero-marginal ossicle of Asteroidea, 436
Inflammation, 8
Infra-basal plate, of Crinoidea, 588;
of fossil Crinoidea, 594;
of larval Antedon rosacea, 619
Infundibulum, 415
Infusions, appearance of organisms in, 42 f.;
organisms of, 136
Infusoria, 40, 48, 50, 136 f.;
specific gravity of, 13 n.;
zygote does not encyst, 34.
Ingestion, of food, by Amoeba limax, 9;
by Choanoflagellates, 122;
by Dinoflagellates, 131;
by Carchesium, 146;
by Coleps, 150
—vacuole of, in Flagellates, 113;
in Oikomonas, 112;
in Choanoflagellates, 122
Inner perihaemal ring-canal, of Asterias rubens, 448;
development of, in Asterina gibbosa, 612
Inoculation of malarial fever in man through a mosquito, 105 f.
Insectivorous plants, 38
Insects, metamorphoses of, 44;
as hosts of Trichonymphidae, 123
Interambulacral area, of Echinarachnius parma, 544;
of Echinocardium cordatum, 550
Interambulacral plate, of Echinus esculentus, 511;
of Cidaridae, 533 f.;
of Echinarachnius parma, 544 f.
Interbrachial septa—see Interradial septa
Interchanges between cell and medium, 14
Intermediate dorsal process of ciliated band of Auricularia, 608
Intermediate (= supplemental) skeleton of Perforate Foraminiferal
shell, 63, 66
Intermittent fever, malarial, produced by Acystosporidae, 103 f.
Internal budding of Suctoria, 160 f., 162;
of Ephydatia, 177
Internal gills—see Stewart's organs
Internal movements of protoplasm, 17
Interradial plates, of calcareous ring of Holothuria nigra, 566;
of Holothuroidea, 569;
of Synaptida, 569;
of Dendrochirota, 569;
of calyx of Crinoidea, 589;
of Thaumatocrinus, 589;
of Hyocrinus, 590;
of Rhizocrinidae, 591;
of corona of Echinoidea—see Interambulacral plate
Interradial septa, of Asterias rubens, 437;
of Heliasteridae, 474;
absent in Brisingidae, 475
Interradius, 428;
of Asterias rubens, 434;
of Echinus esculentus, 504;
of Holothuria nigra, 562
Interstitial growth, 10
Intestine, 415;
of Echinus esculentus, 516;
of Holothuria nigra, 563;
of Antedon rosacea, 583;
of Actinometra, 589;
of Dipleurula, 605;
of Protocoelomata, 616
Intracapsular protoplasm of Radiolaria, 80 f.
Intramolecular respiration, 14 n.
Intranuclear spindle of Euylypha, 29
Invertebrata, hosts of Gregarines, 97 f.
Iodine, 239
Iophon, 223
Iridogorgia, 355
Isaurus, 405
Ischadites, 207
Ischikawa, on syngamy of Cystoflagellates, 135;
on structure of Ephelota, 162
Isidae, 337, 353
Isidella, 354
Isis, 353
Ismailia, prophylaxis of malaria at, 106
Isochela (a chela divisible by each of two planes into two equal
parts, the two ends being equally developed), 222
Isocrinus—see Pentacrinus
Isogamy, 33 f.;
of Rhizopoda, 56 f.;
of Stephanosphaera, 128
—see also Syngamy
Isospores, 85;
of Radiolaria, 76;
of Collozoum inerme, 76
Karyogamy, 34 n.
—see also Syngamy of Ciliata
Karyokinesis, 25, 26, 27;
function of, 28 f.;
of micronuclei of Ciliata, 144 f.
—see also Mitosis
Karyolysus, 97
Karyosome, 24
Keeble, 175 n.
Keller, 233
Kemna, on stylopodium of Foraminifera, 60
Kent, Saville, on Choanoflagellates, 122 f., 182;
on Infusoria and Flagellates, 136 n.
Keroeides, 351
Kerona, 138;
K. polyporum, 158 n.
Kieselguhr, 87
Kirkpatrick, 215
Kishinouye, 313 n., 321 n., 333, 352
Klebs, on Flagellates, 119;
on Dinoflagellates, 130
Koch, von, on methods of cultivation of lower organisms, 44;
on malarial parasites, 103
Kölliker, on Sporozoa, 94 f.
Kophobelemnon, 362
Kophobelemnonidae, 362
Köppen, on Sticholonche and its parasite, Amoebophrya, 87 n.
Korethraster, 453, 463
Kowalevsky, 341, 422
Krukenberg, on pepsin in a Myxomycete, 16
Kükenthal, 363