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LIST OF CONTRIBUTORS
D. Dunning
University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, MI, United States
D. Fetchenhauer
University of Cologne, Cologne, Germany
A. Fishbach
University of Chicago, Chicago, IL, United States
G.H.E. Gendolla
University of Geneva, Geneva, Switzerland
E. Harmon-Jones
The University of New South Wales, Sydney, NSW, Australia
J.K. Maner
Northwestern University, Evanston, IL, United States
T.F. Price
Aberdeen Proving Ground, Aberdeen, MD, United States
M. Richter
Liverpool John Moores University, Liverpool, United Kingdom
E.T. Rolls
Oxford Centre for Computational Neuroscience, Oxford, United Kingdom
T. Schlösser
J. Steinmetz
University of Chicago, Chicago, IL, United States
Y. Tu
University of Florida, Gainesville, FL, United States
R.A. Wright
University of North Texas, Denton, TX, United States
vii j
CHAPTER ONE
The Psychology of Respect:

A Case Study of How Behavioral
Norms Regulate Human Action
D. Dunning*, 1, D. Fetchenhauerx and T. Schlo
€ sserx
*University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, MI, United States
x
1
Corresponding author: E-mail: ddunning@umich.edu
Contents
1. The Mystery of Trust 5
2. The Role of Respect 8
2.1 Role in Trust Behavior 9
2.2 Other Social Behaviors 10
2.2.1 Conflict of Interest 10
2.2.2 Reactions to Apologies 12
3. But Is Respect Disrespected? 12
3.1 Interpersonal Confrontation 13
3.2 Help-Seeking 13
4. The Psychological Anatomy of Respect 15
4.1 Preferences 15
4.2 Want Versus Should 17
4.3 Emotional Profile 17
4.4 Managing Actions Versus Outcomes 19
4.5 Approach Versus Avoidance 22
4.6 Social Versus Moral Norm 23
4.7 Summary 24
5. Issues for Future Research 25
5.1 How Aware Are People of the Norm? 25
5.2 Is There a Norm to Be Respectable? 26
5.3 How Far Is the Reach of Underlying Mechanisms? 27
5.4 What Are the Underlying Neural Mechanisms? 27
5.5 What Are the Other Rules of Social Conduct? 28
6. Concluding Remarks 29
References 29
Advances in Motivation Science, Volume 3

© 2016 Elsevier Inc.
j
ISSN 2215-0919
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/bs.adms.2015.12.003 All rights reserved. 1
2 D. Dunning et al.
Abstract
For any organization or society to thrive, it must possess a behavioral code that tempers
self-interest, promoting instead coordinated, cooperative, and self-sacrificing action
among its members. In this chapter, we examine respect as a case study of such behav-
ioral codes or norms. By respect, we mean that people are impelled to treat each other as
individuals of goodwill and competence, even if they do not privately believe it. This
norm explains why people, including strangers, trust each other much more than the
underlying rational economic analysis would suggest. It also explains a host of other inter-
personal behaviors, such as helping and avoiding confrontation. The anatomy of respect
is complex. It works often against a person’s underlying preferences rather than for them,
constitutes what people think they should do rather than what they want to do, is driven
by anxiety, focuses on regulating actions rather than their outcomes, comprises avoid-
ance motivation rather than approach motivation, and is more moral (ie, private and per-
sonal) than social (ie, honored only because it is actively enforced by others) in nature.
Despite the range and power of its influence, the norm of respect itself receives too little
respect, in that people commonly underestimate its impact on human behavior.
Arguably, the central collective project of the human species is taking the self-
interest inherent in each of its members and tempering it enough so that all can
live with one another in some semblance of peace and harmony. Self-interest is
essential for each member of the species to survive, but if individuals take their
selfishness too far, they interfere with the livelihood of all their peers. According
to Hobbes (1660/1997), this need for social harmony is the fundamental
reason why human societies create powerful governments, formal institutions
designed to regulate the conduct of its citizens, so that the evils that people
would visit upon each other in a state of nature are reduced, contained, or
eradicated. For example, under American jurisprudence, a person is perfectly
free to swing his or her fist in the air as much as he or she wants. This right, as
famously observed by Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., ends just as soon as
another person’s nose begins. Severe sanctions are in place for anyone who
violates that constraint on behavior. This theme of a social contract, a set of
institutional rules, to govern human behavior is one that threads throughout
Western philosophy, occupying such thinkers as Grotius (1625/2012), Locke
(1689/2014), and J. Rousseau (1762/2014).
A careful student of human nature, however, soon realizes that our joint
civil project goes much deeper than the creation of governments and formal
legal systems. People also live by, and enforce, a web of informal and unwrit-
ten rules also in place to make sure that selfishness is constrained. Human life
is made even less nasty, brutish, and short by applying an etiquette that com-
pels people to coordinate and cooperate with each other, and even at times
to sacrifice for one another, without resorting to formal government or a
The Psychology of Respect 3
legal code. Recent philosophers such as Rawls (1971) and Gauthier (1986)
have argued for the necessity of informal rules between individuals to main-
tain a harmonious and benign society. Recent behavioral scientists have also
argued that such a grammar of coordination and cooperation is essential for
any culture to thrive and expand (Henrich, 2006; Henrich et al., 2010). Such
rules can cover principles that allow people to coordinate their actions in or-
der to avoid chaosdsuch as making sure to drive one’s car on the right side
of the road (except for those 35% of countries that flip the rule to the left).
They can also address codes of etiquette, such as saying “thank you” to
someone who has extended a favor. Such rules extend all the way to
behavior that is deeply moral, such as “thou shall not steal” or “murder”
(Anderson & Dunning, 2014).
In this article, we begin by observing that people display remarkable
expertise in following and applying these rules of civil engagement in their
everyday life, but that formal scholarly study of these rules lags in under-
standing their properties and structure. In this, students of human behavior
are somewhat like their colleagues in linguistics. Language, like social
behavior, is an activity that virtually all people master in their everyday lives.
To participate in a language community, people must learn a complex web
of rules about how to form sounds into syllables and then into words and
sentences. They also have to learn rules of verbal engagementdhow to
end an utterance and signal that another person can begin. People, however,
may not be able to articulate and explicate consciously the rules they follow
to execute a coordinated conversation. Moreover, even after decades of
study, linguists have yet to complete their task of formally understanding
how people manage the complex and nuanced activity of language (Traxler,
2011; Warren, 2012).
We submit that students of human behavior are even further behind in
articulating the grammar of social action and habit that most members of
modern societies must learn and master to successfully navigate their
everyday world. To be sure, people may be quite adept in knowing how
and when to apply social rules in their day-to-day life. It is just that their
formal understanding of those rules may lag. As an example, consider the
following scenario (from Kahneman, Knetsch, & Thaler, 1986):
A small photocopying shop has one employee who has worked in the shop for six
months and earns $9 per hour. Business continues to be satisfactory, but a factory
in the area has closed and unemployment has increased. Other small shops have
now hired reliable workers at $7 an hour to perform jobs similar to those done by
the photocopy shop employee.
4 D. Dunning et al.
The story goes on to say: “The current employee leaves, and the owner
decides to pay a replacement $7 an hour.” Of 125 respondents asked, a full
73% judged the shop owner’s decision to be appropriate. But let’s imagine
instead that the employee does not leave, and instead that: “The owner of
the photocopying shop reduces the employee’s wage to $7.” Of nearly
100 respondents, only 17% felt this was appropriate.
We presume that readers mostly share the opinions expressed by
respondents in this study, doing so automatically, without much thought
and reflection but with much decisiveness and certainty. But what rule
differentiates the two scenarios? They both share the same economic
outcomes. Unemployment is up. The current market wage is $7 for
employees. The supposed profit margin would be the same for the shop
owner under both scenariosdbut why is it okay to offer a new employee
a lower wage but not to lower the wage of a current one? The original
authors of the scenarios noted that respondents felt the first scenario was
“fair” and that the second was “unfair”dbut that only supplies a vague
label to people’s opinions rather than a clear and precise rule that specifies
what makes the two situations different when it comes to “fairness”
(Kahneman et al., 1986).
We will not spend time on this specific scenario and rule, but bring up
the example only to show that people live their lives by unwritten social
rules that inform and constrain their behavior. For lack of a better
description, these rules motivate the specific actions that people take. What
these rules specifically motivate is behavior that is coordinated and
cooperative. These rules motivate collective action that benefit individuals
engaged in social interaction, as well as the society that they comprise.
The ambition of this chapter is not to enumerate and structure all of the rules
that might impinge on social behavior. Scholarship on norms already
identifies 17 different categories of such rules (Anderson & Dunning,
2014), and the task of organizing the rules into a taxonomy would already
be a difficult and complex task (Bicchieri, 2006; Dubreuil & Grégoire,
2013).
Instead, the ambition of this chapter is to focus on one specific type of
social behavior that has been studied extensively in our labsda behavior
that turns out to be crucial for maintaining a civil and rewarding society
yet is a mystery for why it occurs. We discuss a societal rule that appears
to support this behavior, as implicated by data, and then unpack all the
theoretical questions and issues that follow from the appearance of this
rule and how it operates.
In doing so, we hope to lay out a possible agenda for studying society and
its rules. Such a project involves not only uncovering the rules that regulate
human behavior, it also entails identifying the mechanisms within the hu-
man organism that allow those rules to succeed in that regulation. What is
it within the organism that allows rules that exist between individuals to steer
what actions that organism will choose?
1. THE MYSTERY OF TRUST

More specifically, we wish to focus on a case study of one type of
behavior that profits those who partake in it, even though it does so at
some risk. More importantly, that behavior seems to be supported by the
operation of at least one interpersonal rule.
The behavior in question is trust, which we define as allowing oneself to
be vulnerable to exploitation by another person in order to achieve some
benefit or reward. Trust is a ubiquitous aspect of human life (Balliet &
Van Lange, 2013; Holmes & Rempel, 1989; Miller & Rempel, 2004;
Ostrom & Walker, 2003; see Simpson, 2007; Van Lange, 2015; Wilson &
Eckel, 2011; for recent reviews). People divulge secrets to intimate acquain-
tances, entrusting them to keep their confidences. People buy food at a
supermarket trusting strangers who prepared it to ensure that it is fresh
and healthy. People hand over our money to banks assuming that the insti-
tution will make that money available, with promised interest, when they
want it back.
Indeed, it is hard to imagine any interpersonal relationship working
smoothly without trust. It is difficult to think of any marriage thriving, or
even surviving, without trust among its partners (Deutsch, 1958; Simpson,
2007). Any organization without trust would have a difficult time succeed-
ing in its business (Kramer, 1998; Kreps, 1990). Democracy functions only
to the extent that citizens trust the intentions of the officeholders they elect
(Fukuyama, 1995; Sullivan & Transue, 1999). Economies blossom only to
the degree that its members extend trust to others and have that trust recip-
rocated (Fetchenhauer & Van der Vegt, 2001; Knack & Keefer, 1997;
Putnam, 1993). People truly profit from trust, even down to the level of
their income: People who hold more cynical attitudes toward their peers
tend to attain lower financial incomes than those who are more trusting
about human nature (Stavrova & Ehlebracht, in press). Trust in others, as
well, is connected to greater degrees of happiness (Oishi, Kesebir, & Diener,
2011).
6 D. Dunning et al.
But trust presents a mystery. It may be essential in everyday human life,

but it also should not happendespecially if people are rational actors con-
cerned in their own material self-interest. As philosophers like Hobbes
(1660/1997) and Machiavelli (1515/2003) noted, any individual receiving
a person’s trust will surely violate that trust just as soon as it is in his or
her interest to do so. Thus, rationally, no one should extend one’s trust in
the first place. Contemporary economic treatments of trust agree: People
will surely violate our trust out of their own self-interest, so why make
ourselves vulnerable to that inevitable exploitation (Berg, Dickhaut, &
McCabe, 1995)?
As an example of why people should not trust, consider the following
economic game we present to participants in the lab. In that game, partic-
ipants are brought into the lab in large groups and we confront them each
with a decision about what to do with $5 that we have just given them
(or V5 when we do the experiment in Europe). They can either keep the
$5 or give it to another person in the room that we have assigned to
them. However, they will never know who that other person is, nor will
that person ever know who they are. The two will remain mutually anon-
ymous strangers. Now, if the initial participant keeps the $5, the interaction
is over. However, if he or she gives the $5 to the other person, that $5 will be
inflated to $20, and the other person will have his or her own decision to
make. That person can keep the entire $20, or he or she can give $10
back to the original participant. We should note that participants at times
bring their own $5, but that does not change what happens next in our
experiment.
This $5/$20 interaction is known as the trust or investment game (Berg
et al., 1995; Johnson & Mislin, 2012, 2011) and is designed to mimic the
types of circumstances people find themselves in when they have to decide
whether to trust another person. That is, they must make a decision whether
to play it safe or make themselves vulnerable to exploitation at the hand of
another person in order to potentially obtain a benefit (Rousseau, Sitkin,
Burt, & Camerer, 1998).
One can readily see that under a strict economic analysis, in which
every person acts out of material self-interest, no one should ever trust
and give the $5. Being rational and anonymous, the second person faces
no penalty for keeping the entire $20, and so that is what he or she will
do. Given this inevitable logic, the initial participant should keep the $5.
It is the best outcome possible. However, people do know that other
people are often much too human and much less rational. They are kind
and giving, and so some percentage of participants in the second

position will give money back. Thus, rationally, if the initial participant
is optimistic enough about his or her chances of getting money back,
that person should trust.
However, in our $5/$20 game, we find that very few people should trust
even if they believe that some people will give money backdif they
approached the decision strictly like an economist. That is, on average, peo-
ple think that only about 45% of their peers would return $10, with the rest
keeping the entire $20. And, elsewhere, they indicate that they require
roughly a 66% chance of winning to induce them to gamble $5 in order
to win $10 in a lottery. Thus, only a minority of participants, around
30%, has enough optimism about human nature to make giving the $5 to
their assigned stranger an economically rational decision. That is, their esti-
mate that they would receive $10 back from the stranger is equal to or
higher than the probability they require to gamble $5 in a lottery (Dunning,
Anderson, Schl€ osser, Ehlebracht, & Fetchenhauer, 2014; Fetchenhauer &
Dunning, 2009, 2010, 2012).
However, when it comes time to decide whether to trust the other
person, we find that a full 50e75% of people decide to give up the $5,
far higher than the 30% rate suggested by the economic analysis (Dunning
et al., 2014; Fetchenhauer & Dunning, 2009; Schl€ osser, Mensching,
Dunning, & Fetchenhauer, 2015). Indeed, in a separate study, we explicitly
told peopledtruthfullydthat the chance their partner would return $10
back was only 46%. A full 55% of participants still decided to gamble on
that partner’s decision, although only 28% of them agree to gamble on a lot-
tery that presented the same payoffs and odds (Fetchenhauer & Dunning,
2012).
Thus, our studies of trust behavior leave us with a vexing mystery
(Fetchenhauer, Dunning, & Schl€ osser, 2015). Why do so many of our par-
ticipants gamble on the trustworthiness of their peers when they would not
accept the same odds if the bet involved a lottery instead? What psycholog-
ical dynamic supports such high levels of trust that fail to make sense
economically?
Over the years, we have ruled out many possible explanations for this
anomalous behavior. It is not that people are being altruistic (Batson,
1991), or trying to expand the pie of wealth for everyone even if they fail
to share in it (Andreoni & Miller, 2002; Charness & Rabin, 2002). They
are not trying to prove to themselves that they are nice, nor are they worried
about their reputation in the eyes of the stranger (see Dunning et al., 2014;
8 D. Dunning et al.
Fetchenhauer & Dunning, 2009; Schl€ osser, Fetchenhauer, & Dunning, in

press; Schl€
osser, Mensching, 2015).
2. THE ROLE OF RESPECT

Instead, participants in our studies appear to trust due to a behavioral
ruleda normdthat supplies the impetus supporting those trust rates, and
which in general would make life more pleasant, and profitable, for those
facing decisions to trust. Curiously, the power of this norm is largely under-
appreciated among psychological researchers formally investigating human
behavior as well as laypeople trying to navigate the complexity of human
behavior in their everyday lives.
That norm, for lack of a better term, is respect. In dealings with other peo-
ple, one must respect the character, goodwill, and honor of those people.
One must communicate that the other person is an individual of social
worth and dignity. One must not call the integrity, prestige, or status of
that other person into question, or insult him or her. The key is not one’s
internal beliefs. One can believe that Jerry, for example, is a cad and an
idiotdbut in one’s dealings with Jerry one must not let those opinions
leak through to public awareness. Instead, one must be polite. One must
maintain the pretense that Jerry is an intelligent human being of admirable
honor.
It is hardly a novel observation that what we say to people’s faces may not
match what we say about them behind their back. Goffman (1958, 1967,
1971), in his classic sociological treatment of everyday interaction, discussed
just how much people hide their true opinions, instead providing an actor’s
performance to maintain other people’s “definition of the situation”
(Thomas, 1923), a major part of which is the set of beliefs and identities
that people claim for themselves. To violate the other person’s definition,
to question it, is to run the risk of causing a breakdown in smooth and
harmonious social coordination, to heighten the threat of interpersonal
conflict.
Linguists, through their work of analyzing the ways in which people
speak, find themselves in agreement with Goffman (1958) concerning just
how much effort people exert to maintain the face of the people they are
surrounded by (see Brown & Levinson, 1987; Brown & Gilman, 1989;
Holtgraves, 1992). Disagreement is muted; agreement is accentuated. Peo-
ple are quick with compliments but rapidly censor insults, even truthful
ones, before they emerge (Bavelas, Black, Chovil, & Mullett, 1990). If a
disagreeable statement is made, those engaged in the conversation may
ignore it and pretend it never happened. For example, DePaulo and Bell
(1996) asked participants to rate several paintings according to which
one they liked or disliked. Some participants then discovered they would
be discussing the paintings they disliked with the artist who had created
them. Participants shaded and lied about their true opinion of the paintings,
particularly when they believed that the artist was emotionally invested in
the work. Often, they said not much at all about the painting, not wanting
to deceive but also not willing to offend the painter.
In doing so, people maintain the face of others in two distinct ways
(Brown & Levinson, 1987). First, they work to maintain the other person’s
positive face, that is, the overall positive impression that they believe other
people hold of themselves. They work to suggest that the other person
has desirable qualities, and overall receives nothing but social approval
from others. Second, people expend effort to maintain negative face, or rather
the belief that the other person is an autonomous being whose free will is not
being impinged upon. This is the reason why people avoid ordering other
people around. At the dinner table, for example, people do not merely
grumble “pass the salt.” Instead, they wrap the request in a question that bol-
sters the other person’s autonomy, asking whether the person can pass the
salt. Naturally, the other person will concede to do so, but by asking the
question, instead of stating a direct request, people maintain the pretense
that the other person is free to do whatever her or she wants.
2.1 Role in Trust Behavior

In our work, we have found that respect not only influences what people say
to one another but also how they behavedeven behavior that at the surface
looks like it should have more to do with economics and calculation than
with social and moral dynamics. Although participants hold a cynical view
of human nature, they cannot act on that dim view. Instead, they must
act as though their partner is a person of good faith and intentions. That
means in our trust game giving that partner the $5. To keep it would be
to be insult the character of the partner.
How do we know this? We tested this idea by comparing the standard
version of our $5/$20 trust game against a variant. In that variant, the partner
was compelled to flip a coin to make a decision about what to do with the
$20dheads meant giving $10 back, tails meant keeping the $20. This, of
course, maintained the probability that the original participant would get
10 D. Dunning et al.
$10 back. However, it also removed the issue of the partner’s character from
the equation, and whether the original participants’ decision to trust was a
comment on that character. In this coin flip game, deciding to trust the part-
ner would not compliment his or her character, nor would deciding against
trust provide an insult. Thus, the decision to trust was no longer an issue of
respect. Consistent with an account centering on respect, trust rates
collapsed. Significantly fewer participants decided to give the $5 in the
coin flip variant than they did in the original trust game (Dunning et al.,
2014; Study 5).
In a pointed follow-up, we ran yet another variant of the trust game in
which original participants were given three options to consider. They could
keep the $5, give it to the stranger to decide whether to give back $10, or
give the $5 but force the stranger to flip a coin to reach a decision. Again,
participants were rather pessimistic about what their peers would do in
the role of the stranger. They thought the chances they would get money
back was higher if they forced the stranger to flip the coin rather than let
him or her make a free decision. Yet, when it came time to decide, 54%
decided to give up the $5 and let the stranger decide. Only 22% opted for
forcing the stranger to flip the coin, with the remainder deciding to keep
the $5 (Dunning et al., 2014). In short, participants opted for the respectful
option even though it decreased the odds that they would benefit from any
transaction with their assigned stranger.
2.2 Other Social Behaviors

Respect, however, is not only evident in trust behavior. It appears to be a
norm influencing human thought and action in other areas of life. Consider
the following examples from contemporary research.
2.2.1 Conflict of Interest

In today’s complex world, people often find that they must go to experts to
seek out advice, whether the issue is about financial planning, maintaining
health, or making a consequential purchase such as buying a house. People
go to experts for honest and accurate advice, but sometimes those experts
work under a conflict of interest. A financial planner, for example, may
receive a bonus for selling stock in a specific company, or a doctor may
receive a referral fee for enrolling a patient in a clinical trial involving a
new drug. According to ethical guidelines in most professions, an expert
must disclose to a client when he or she has a conflict of interest in order
to allow the client to appropriately weigh the expert’s advice. Doing so

should release the client from the influence of the conflict.
But does disclosure work? Recent evidence suggests it does not. Experts
who disclose their conflicts may subsequently feel licensed to give more
biased, self-interested advice, particularly because they assume their clients
will heavily discount it (Cain, Loewenstein, & Moore, 2005, 2011). This
has been shown in an experiment in which participants were asked to guess
the total value of coins that had been stuffed into six jars, after receiving
advice from an “expert” who had been given a chance to closely scrutinize
the containers (Cain et al., 2005). Some experts were given incentives to
provide accurate advice to their “client” participants. Others, however,
were given incentives to lead their clients to overestimate the value of the
coins. Having this last group of experts to disclose this conflict of interest
prompted them to give their clients coin-value estimates that were not
only much higher ($24.16) than reality ($18.16), but significantly higher
than experts who did not disclose their conflict ($20.16).
The problem, however, is that disclosure of a financial conflict of interest
did not lead clients to appropriately discount their expert’s advice. Clients
who knew about their expert’s conflict provided higher estimates of coin-
value ($18.14) than did those for whom the conflict was left hidden
($16.31)dan effect that has been repeatedly demonstrated in the literature
(Cain et al., 2005, 2011). The norm of respect provides an explanation
for this lack of discounting. To discount the advice is to suggest that the
expert is less than honorable in his or her transactions. How is it possible
to do so when the expert has gone out of his or her way to point out a
potential conflict?
Indeed, recent evidence more directly suggests that issues of respect not
only lead clients to discount expert advice less, it can also lead them to accept
that conflicted advice more. Divulging a conflict leads clients to perceive
advice as a request for a favor. To deny that favor is to disrespectfully
communicate that it is unreasonable, a violation of positive face known as
the panhandler effect (Sah, Loewenstein, & Cain, 2013). Other work shows
that disclosure leads clients to view any disagreement with advice to be a
signal of distrust, a signal they are quite reluctant to send. Also consistent
with an account focusing on respect, clients do reject conflicted advice if
they can avoid insulting the expert who gave it. This occurs when clients
have learned about the conflict from some other source, the disclosure is
not mutual knowledge between client and expert, or the client can make
a decision in complete privacy (Sah et al., 2013). In each of these cases,
the client can refuse the advice without signaling a belief that the expert is
inappropriately influenced by a financial interest. No signal of disrespect is
sent.
2.2.2 Reactions to Apologies

Respect may also underlie why people accept apologies from other people,
even those they think are insincere and illegitimate. Across several studies,
Risen and Gilovich (2007) had confederates purportedly insult other partic-
ipants in the study. Sometimes, the confederate insulted the participant
directly. At other times, the participant saw the confederate insult someone
else. Of key interest, the confederate either apologized spontaneously for the
insult he or she had made or apologized only after being coerced to do so by
some other participant. Participants who merely observed the insult as a
third-party rated the confederate more favorably when that confederate
made a spontaneous apology rather than only after being coerced. They
also stated that they preferred to work with the confederate making the
spontaneous apology and rated that confederate as more remorseful.
However, the responses of participants who were the original target of
the insult differed. Arguably because they were constrained by the dictates
of respect, they rated the coerced apologies just as much remorseful and
authentic as spontaneous ones. They also stated equal willingness to work
with confederates who had offered coerced versus spontaneous apologies.
In short, despite the inferences made by peers merely observing but not
involved in the original insult, the inferences made by targets of the insult
appeared to respect the putative sincerity and remorse behind the apology
(Risen & Gilovich, 2007).
3. BUT IS RESPECT DISRESPECTED?

In sum, people honor the norm of respect innumerable times as they
navigate their typical day. But, still, it may be a norm that people misunder-
stand and underestimate. In essence, as a norm, respect does not receive,
perhaps, the respect it deserves.
Respect is truly a powerful influence on people’s lives, and even some
deaths. Between 1968 and 1994, the National Transportation and Safety
Board (1994) found 16 fatal plane crashes in which members of the cockpit
crew knew they were in serious danger but failed to intervene with the pilot.
In a survey sponsored by the American Association of Critical-Care Nurses,
researchers found that only 10% of respondents spoke up when they spotted
colleagues violating procedures or putting patients in danger (Maxfield,

Grenny, McMillan, Patterson, & Switzler, 2005).
But in ongoing research, psychological scholars find that people directly
underestimate the impact of respect on the behavior of others. Consider the
following examples.
3.1 Interpersonal Confrontation

People believe they will confront other people who act in objectionable
ways. However, when actually confronted with offensive behavior, people
respond mostly by avoiding committing offense themselves. That is, they
appear to follow Goffman (1967) rules toward respect and politeness.
In 1999, Swim and Hyer published a study in which they asked women
how they would handle a man who made outrageously sexists remarks.
Respondents were introduced to a role-play in which a mixed group of
men and women worked on a complex social problemdselecting candi-
dates most likely to survive on a desert island. During the role-play, one
of the male group members started making clear sexists remarks, such as
more women were needed on the island “to keep the men satisfied.” In
the role-play, a full 81% of the women said that they would confront this
group member directly after such an offensive remark. However, when
an equivalent group of women was actually placed in an identical group dis-
cussion they thought was real, only 16% confronted the sexist group mem-
ber. In fact, only 45% even acknowledged his remarks.
A similar outcome arose in a role-play involving a job interview in
which a male interviewer asked inappropriate questions, such as Do people
find you desirable? When asked to consider the interview hypothetically, a
full 68% of women stated they would refuse to answer at least one question,
with 16% saying they would walk out. However, when another group of
women were asked the questions in an interview they thought was for a
research assistant position, no one walked out and no question was refused
(Woodzicka & LaFrance, 2001). That said, interviewees at times did ask
why suspect questions were being asked, or asked the interviewer to clarify
the question, but they avoided direct confrontations that would have placed
the positive face of the interviewer and the social harmony of the interview
into question.
3.2 Help-Seeking
This lack of appreciation of respect’s power to influence behavior is also
evident in a growing literature on help-seeking. People underestimate
how much other people will accede to requests for help. Presumably, people
respect requests for help as reasonable and thus are more likely to honor the
request more than people anticipate.
A classic experiment by Stanley Milgram demonstrates this most directly
(Milgram & Sabini, 1978). To begin, a panel of 16 New York City citizens
was asked to estimate what percentage of subway passengers would give up
their seat if requested to do so. The average estimate was 16%. Subsequently,
Milgram sent 10 graduate student research assistants to the subways of
New York City to actually ask passengers for their seats. In the simplest con-
dition, in which requesters gave no justification for their asking, 56% of pas-
sengers gave up their seat with an additional 12% shifting to make room for
the research assistant.
Further data suggested that respectdthat is, assuming the assistant’s request
was a reasonable onedwas at least partially responsible for passenger’s altru-
istic responses. In a condition in which the assistant added instead a trivial
and inappropriate justification for their request (eg, we can’t read our book
standing up), the percentage of passengers acceding to the request slid
down to 37% (with only an addition 5% otherwise making room for the as-
sistant). That is, with the presumption of reasonableness pierced, people were
much more empowered to refuse the request (Milgram & Sabini, 1978).
Flynn and Lake (2008) discovered a similar surprising tendency for peo-
ple to consent to requests for help. College students were asked to approach
other students on the Columbia University campus and ask them to com-
plete a two-page questionnaire. Half of the participants were asked to pre-
dict how many people they would have to approach to obtain five
completed questionnaires. On average, they thought would have to
approach just over 20 people. In reality, they had to ask only just over 10.
In a follow-up experiment, participants approached strangers and asked to
use their cell phones. On average, participants forecast that they would
have to approach 10 strangers to succeed three times at the task. In reality,
the number was only six. A subsequent field study involving a real nonprofit
group affirmed this pattern of underestimation in a naturally occurring
experiment. The typical volunteer in the group thought he or she would
have to ask roughly 210 people for donations to achieve his or her desig-
nated fund-raising goal. The real figure on average was much smaller,
only 122 people.
What is true of altruistic behavior, however, is also true of less admirable
human pursuits: People underestimate how easy it is to instigate others to
perform unethical acts. Bohns and colleagues had college students ask their
peers to sign a form indicating that the student had described a new course to
them when they, in fact, had not. Students predicted they would have to
approach 8.5 peers to get three to sign the form with the fake claim. In re-
ality, they had to approach on average of only 4.5. In a follow-up, partici-
pants asked their peers to vandalize a library book (ie, writing “pickle” in the
margins of the book). They thought it would take nearly 11 requests to get
three people to perform the act. In reality, they needed on average to make
fewer than 5 (Bohns, Roghanizad, & Xu, 2014).
4. THE PSYCHOLOGICAL ANATOMY OF RESPECT

Construed through the lens of respect, the actions of trust, helping
others, acceding to their requests, accepting apologies, and overlooking
another person’s conflict of interest bring several questions into sharp focus.
But to focus on the norm of respect is to provide only a partial answer as to
why people respond magnanimously in these situations. How exactly does
the norm of respect operate?
Respect appears to have a complex anatomy, and a close examination of
that anatomy reveals a number of issues that have to be addressed to fully
understand its influence on human behavior. As such, it provides an illustra-
tive example of the potentially weltering array of theoretical questions a
researcher must consider before understanding just how any norm works.
Consider the following questions still left open in the case of respect.
4.1 Preferences
The simplest presumption people have of their peers is that those peers
ultimately do what they want to dodthat choosing to trust, for example, re-
flects some underlying preference or goal that attracts a person to that
choice. People choose to give their partner the $5 in the trust game, for
example, because they really want to get $10 back. If not that, then they
are attracted to creating more wealthd$20 rather than the initial $5
(Andreoni & Miller, 2002; Charness & Rabin, 2002). Or, they seek a pos-
itive connection with another person (Fehr, 2004), or the “warm glow” of
doing something good (Dunn, Akin, & Norton, 2008). Or, they have a
“taste” for fairness in human interaction (Rabin, 1993).
Work on trust, however, and the norm of respect that supports
it suggest that people do not act out of some underlying preference or
goal that attracts them. Left to their own devices, trust is a behavior they
would largely wish to avoiddif they could just evade or dodge the decision
to trust altogether. To be sure, if the decision whether to trust is forced upon
them, they will trust. But if given a chance to avoid the situation containing
the decision altogether, they will take the chance. As some scholars have
termed it, prosocial behavior is often not an issue of “giving” but rather
one of “giving in” (Cain, Dana, & Newman, 2014). People succumb to
social pressures that they should be kind and giving, but only if directly con-
fronted with a decision that they cannot escape. If that opportunity can be
avoided, people will favor the avoidance (Dana, Cain, & Dawes, 2006;
Dana, Weber, & Kuang, 2007; DellaVigna, List, & Malmendier, 2012;
Lazear, Malmendier, & Weber, 2012; List, 2007).
That is, if people are given a choice about whether to play a trust game or
some alternative, they would show no attraction to either the game or to the
decision to trust. We have shown this in an experiment in which participants
were asked whether they wanted to play the trust game, as described above,
or enter a lottery. Roughly 60% chose the lottery, with only 28% choosing
to play the trust game and then to give the $5. If anything, the overall pref-
erence of participants was to choose the lottery but then not to risk their $5,
which 44% chose (Anderson, Dunning, Fetchenhauer, & Schl€ osser, 2015).
These choices are in stark contrast to a second condition where partici-
pants, again, were given a choice between playing the trust game or taking
part in a lottery. However, to get to the lottery, participants had to confront
the trust game. That is, they had to play the trust game, indicate that they
would keep the $5, and then signal that they wanted to move ahead to
play the lottery. In this case, fewer than 40% chose the lottery. Instead, a
full 59% decided to hand over their money in the trust game (Anderson
et al., 2015). In short, confronted with a decision to trust, a majority of peo-
ple did. But, instead, if they had to pursue a decision to trust, people showed
no preference for doing so.
This finding is reminiscent of a field study taking advantage of the
traditional Salvation Army holiday fund-raising drive taking place at a
Boston-area department store. In the control condition that mimicked the
traditional Salvation Army method, volunteers dressed as Santa Claus stood
outside the department store entrances, ringing a bell next to buckets where
people could leave donations. In the treatment condition, the Santa volun-
teers were more active, looking people in the eye and asking them directly if
they could donate. Squarely confronted with the request, one they had to
answer, people donated 70% more money. But that was not the only effect
of the direct request. The percentage of people leaving the department store
through other Santa-less exits also increased by 30% (Andreoni, Rao, &
Trachtman, 2011).
This theme of direct confrontation also emerges in the literature on help-
seeking. People accede to requests for help to a surprising degree only when
they are directly confronted with the request to do so. For example, Flynn
and Lake (2008, Study 6) deputized Columbia students to ask peers around
campus to fill out a questionnaire. Participants were told to ask either by
directly speaking to people or by handing people a flyer containing a written
request and then walking away. Participants, again, overestimated the num-
ber of people they had to approach in order to get someone to complete the
questionnairedbut only when the request was a direct, spoken one. When
the request was indirect, participants instead underestimated the number of
people they would have to approach to find someone who complied.
Other work echoes that acceding to help is not a preference people have
if they can avoid it. In the Milgram and Sabini (1978) subway studies, if rid-
ers overheard a confederate talking to another confederate about asking
someone for a seat, thus giving them enough time to come up with an
excuse not to give up theirs, they did so. Forewarned, only 37% gave up
their seat or slid over to the side to give the confederate space.
4.2 Want Versus Should

In short, people give money, in both the trust game and at the department
store, not necessarily because of something they want to do. Left with com-
plete freedom, they frequently avoid the chance to give money. But directly
confronted with the choice they cannot avoid, people opt for the prosocial
alternative. This suggests that people give because they sense it is something
they should do rather than something they want to do. And, indeed, we have
found that when we ask people what they want to do versus what they think
they should do in the trust game, they show little preference for giving
versus keeping the moneydif couched in terms of what they want to do.
That is, many people want to keep the money, many want to give it. How-
ever, people overwhelmingly think they should give the money, and this
strong tilt toward thinking they ought to give their partner the $5 explains,
at least in part, why people trust even though they are so pessimistic about
their trust being rewarded.
4.3 Emotional Profile

The fact that people trust out of a belief of what they should do is affirmed
by the emotions that surround the decision to trust. Typically, theorists assert
that people choose prosocial actions to achieve a “warm glow” of happiness.

Being nice feels nice, and so people pursue altruistic behaviors, taking a ma-
terial loss, in order to achieve an emotional gain (Andreoni, 1990; Dunn
et al., 2008; Zaki & Mitchell, 2013). The trust decision fails to follow this
emotional logic. To be sure, people say they would feel more pleasant, con-
tent, and happier to give the $5 to their partnerdand these feelings do
correlate with decisions to trust. The link between contentment and trust,
however, are weak at best (Dunning et al., 2014).
Instead, trust seems to be a decision infused not by the pursuit of happi-
ness but rather the avoidance of anxiety. In a conventional gamble, say
deciding whether to gamble $5 on a coin flip to potentially win $10,
most people report feeling more tense and anxious about taking the gamble
rather than standing pat. As a consequence, most keep the $5 and spurn the
gamble (Schl€ osser, Dunning, & Fetchenhauer, 2013). That reverses in the
trust game: People feel more anxious, tense, remorseful, and guilty about keep-
ing the money rather than handing it to the partner. And those feelings
matter, in that they strongly predict who will trust the partner with the
$5. Indeed, making people more agitated leads them to trust another person
more, taking a risk, even though such agitation leads people to gamble less in
general (Kugler, Connolly, & Ord ~ez, 2012). Such discomfort has also
on
been implicated in people’s surprising willingness to accede to requests for
help (Bohns & Flynn, 2010).
Anxiety’s central role in trust fits well with the idea that people trust in
order to fulfill an obligation, a duty, or adhere to a norm. Higgins (1987,
1989), in his self-discrepancy theory, asserted that people are not only con-
cerned with the “self” they are in reality, but also with two other selves they
wish to be. One is the ideal self, which is the person they want to be. For
example, if a person wishes to be smart, getting an “A” on an exam is an
evidence that a person is moving toward an ideal self. When people perceive
such development, they feel happiness and pride. When they perceive
instead a growing discrepancy between actual and ideal selves, such as failing
a test, they feel dejected, sad, or depressed.
This pattern of emotions is very different to discrepancies related to the
ought self, which focuses on the self an individual should be rather than wants
to be. This is the self that fulfills duties and social obligations, such as being a
good adult son or daughter who calls his or her parents every week. Fulfilling
such duties brings a person satisfaction and calm, transgressing against them
causes a person to feel agitationdthat is, tense, nervous, and uneasy (Higgins,
Bond, Klein, & Strauman, 1986; Higgins, Shah, & Friedman, 1997).
Thus, trust decisions appear to be driven exactly by the emotions that

indicate people are focusing on what they should rather than want to do.
Other interpersonal behaviors, as described above, also project a similar
emotional profile. In conflict of interest situations, clients follow the advice
of conflicted advisors because they feel “insinuation anxiety,” a tension pro-
duced whenever they think about refusing the advice of the conflicted
expert. That tension arises because rejecting the expert’s advice insinuates
a suspicion that the expert’s intentions are less than honorable, a clear viola-
tion of positive face (Sah, Loewenstein, & Cain, 2011).
This agitation is also a major feature in help-seeking behavior, explaining
why people help so much, but only when the request for help is a direct one.
Flynn and Lake (2008) asked a collection of New York City residents to
imagine scenarios in which people on the street asked them for help, such
as helping a woman carry a baby stroller down some steps to a subway plat-
form. Respondents stated they would feel more awkward, embarrassed, and
uncomfortable if they refused to help, and predicted that more people
would agree to help if asked directly. Interestingly, participants who imag-
ined instead that they were the person asking for help did not agree that a
direct request would elicit more helpfulness. They had little insight into
how difficult it is for other people to turn down a direct request.
4.4 Managing Actions Versus Outcomes

The central role played by anxiety and agitation suggests two additional is-
sues about the regulation of social behavior. The first is whether people
make choices because they are primarily concerned about the potential out-
comes of those choices, or whether it is the choice itself that people are pri-
marily concerned about.
Classic theories of trust behavior assume that people are primarily
focused on the outcomes of their decisions. People do not trust for trust’s
sake, but rather because they are optimistic enough that their trust will
result in a reward. Once again, at the heart of this theorizing is people’s
expectations: People trust if they hold favorable expectations about
whether other people will reciprocate that trust (Simpson, 2007). As
such, major theories of trust can be categorized as instrumental and consequen-
tialist (Dunning & Fetchenhauer, 2013). By instrumental, we mean that
trust is not an end in itself but merely a means to an enddan action
designed to produce some potential benefit. By consequentialist, we
mean that decisions to trust are based on the potential outcomes those de-
cisions might bring aboutdthe size of that potential benefit plus the
probability of its fruition. Economic theorists, following a rational actor

model, are explicitly instrumental and consequentialist (Berg et al., 1995;
Wilson & Eckel, 2011), and many psychological theories follow suit by
assuming that people trust because of their beliefs about the potential out-
comes of that trust (for a review, see Simpson, 2007).
Our work, however, suggests that trust cannot be entirely instrumental
and consequentialist. People trust even when they expect not a profit but a
negative return if they trust another person (Berg et al., 1995; Dunning et al.,
2014; Fetchenhauer & Dunning, 2009, 2012). As such, it cannot be the
outcome that matters but rather something about the action of trusting itself.
In terms of sociology, this suggests that trust behavior is expressive rather than
instrumental and consequentialist (Baron, 1994; Dunning & Fetchenhauer,
2013). People do, indeed, trust for trust’s sake, or rather the immediate out-
comes that are guaranteed merely upon trusting another person, instead of
more downstream rewards, such as getting $10 back, that depend on the
other person’s actions. For example, trusting someone lifts the threat of anx-
iety that a person might feel about committing a social or ethical transgres-
sion (Dunning et al., 2014; Schl€ osser, Fetchenhauer, et al., in press). As such,
the action itself becomes the reward. The potential monetary outcomes
down the line are not important.
Thought of in this way, our research on trust resonates with current
work suggesting how people regulate their moral behavior. Do they focus
on the consequences of their moral behavior, or on the behavior itself?
Many theories of morality are much like economic theories in that they sug-
gest that people confronting a moral dilemma construct a mental model of
all possible choices and outcomes, and then pick the choice that maximizes
moral worth among all the possible outcomes, or at least avoids the biggest
degree of moral transgression (Cushman, 2013; Miller & Cushman, 2013).
At the heart of this approach is a mental simulation that it focuses on
outcomes. For example, consider the classic moral problem in which a large
trolley is careening down the tracks toward five workmen who are unaware
of the fatal danger bearing down on them (Foot, 1978; Thomson, 1976).
You, as an engineer, are aware of the danger, and can save the five workers
by pulling a switch diverting the trolley to a different trackdone that un-
fortunately has one vulnerable workman on it. Do you pull the switch, thus
exchanging one life for five, or do you do nothing? Most people make the
difficult but ultimately life-saving choice to pull the switch, due to the less
tragic outcome (one life lost rather than five) that this action produces.
However, people’s choices famously change in the trolley scenario if the

details are changed, even though the outcomes in play stay untouched. For
example, if instead of pulling a switch, people must push a worker onto the
tracks to stop the train, killing him but stopping the trolley before it hits the
other five workers, people largely refuse to sacrifice that worker’s life
(Thomson, 1976). The consequentialist calculus remains the same,
exchanging one life for five, but an exact opposite decision is reached by
a majority of people. Thus, it must be something about the action itself
(pulling a switch versus pushing a person) and not potential outcomes that
largely determines the decision that is made.
Work in moral judgment suggests that many moral choices are like this
trolley problem. People seem concerned more with the actions involved
rather than with their possible outcomes. For example, Cushman and col-
leagues asked people to role-play certain immoral actions such as pointing
a toy gun at the experimenter’s face and pretending to shoot. Performing
these actions caused people to report spikes of negative effect and physiolog-
ical stress, including significant vasoconstriction in their circulatory system
(Cushman, Gray, Gaffey, & Mendes, 2012).
Further comparisons showed that it was the performance of these ac-
tions, rather than their imagined consequences, that caused these emotional
and physiological responses. Watching another person perform the behavior
failed to produce the same profound effects, suggesting that it was experi-
encing the action, not confronting the outcome that caused people to feel
stressed (Miller & Cushman, 2013). Performing similar actions that were
identical in execution but not in meaning (eg, shooting a person with a
water pistol) also failed to produce profound changes in stress (Cushman
et al., 2012). In a similar vein, Navarete, McDonald, Mott, and Asher
(2012) placed participants in a virtual reality world in which they confronted
the trolley problem. In one variation, participants had to pull the switch to
save the five workers, even though one alternative worker was killed. In
another, they instead had to do nothing for the trolley to switch away
from the five workers but toward the alternative worker. Participants
exhibited more autonomic arousal in the first case, in which they had to
act to save lives, than they did in the second, where saving lives required
no action. Essentially, although the consequences were the same (ie, one
life was sacrificed in order to save five), the action getting to that conse-
quences mattered: Taking an action to gain that outcome was more upset-
ting than mere inaction leading to the same outcome.
One last piece of data suggests that it is action, and not the outcome of
the action, that is central to how people regulate their moral choices and
judgments. Cushman and colleagues asked participants for their moral reac-
tions to actions that led to no outcome, or outcomes that involved no action.
An example of an action without consequence is asking people how upset
they would feel about “stabbing a fellow actor in the neck using a fake stage
knife as part of a play.” An example of an outcome without action is asking
people how badly they would feel about “seeing a football player break his
leg during a game.” Participants were then given a number of moral di-
lemmas to consider, such as the trolley problem. Although imagining con-
sequences prompted participants to feel more empathy for people who
suffered in moral dilemmas, the personal aversion they felt to performing
immoral actions (carrying no outcomes) better predicted how much they
condemned the behaviors of those who transgressed in the moral dilemmas,
relative to any aversion attached to abhorrent outcomes (involving no
action). That is, it was reaction to action, not to consequences, that seem
to inform people’s reactions to moral behavior (Miller, Hannikainen, &
Cushman, 2014).
Regulation by action, rather than by a fuller contemplation of outcomes,
makes sense from a psychological point of view. People are formed to a great
extent by the history of rewards and punishments they have experienced
throughout their lives. It is a central tenant of behaviorism that people
perform behaviors that are positively reinforced and avoid behaviors that
lead to punishment. The key is that it is action, not outcome, that is the focus
of all this reinforcement (Baum, 2005).
As a consequence, actions become their own rewards or punishments
(Rescorla & Wagner, 1972). Some actions make people feel good; other ac-
tions are avoided because they lead to aversive emotiondsuch as anxiety
and guilt. This attachment of emotion to action becomes an efficient, albeit
somewhat crude, mechanism to steer people toward behavior that benefits
them while avoiding those that harms them. By quickly reacting to the emo-
tions that various actions inspire, people are also able to quickly choose ac-
tions in the social world, rather than be mired in inaction that can be harmful
in of itself (Sutton, 1988).
4.5 Approach Versus Avoidance

An additional issue regarding regulation has to do with whether it is primar-
ily fixated on approach or on avoidance. People often think of prosocial
behavior as being motivated by approach. People are rewarded for acting
in a prosocial waydthey experience, for example, a warm glow of giving

(Andreoni, 1990; Dunn et al., 2008; Zaki & Mitchell, 2013). Or, as they
grow up, they learn that certain actions are rewarded and others are pun-
ished, and they find themselves attracted more to the former than to the
latter (Cushman, 2013).
Our work on trust, however, suggests that much prosocial behavior may
not be inspired by approach as much as it is by avoidance. People do not
wish to reward themselves. Rather, they merely act mostly to avoid the pun-
ishment of making a social transgression. The literatures on conflict of inter-
est, help-seeking, and dealing with apologies are also consistent with this
perspective. Mostly, people help because they feel uncomfortable not help-
ing. If there is any “glow,” the glow is to avoid feeling guilty and remorseful.
This logic again echoes the Higgins (1987, 1989) distinction between ideal
selves and ought selves. Recall that ought selves are focused on fulfilling so-
cial duties and obligations. As such, according to the Higgins framework,
people adopt a prevention (avoidant) focus over a promotion (approach) one.
They are more worried about avoiding mistakes, indiscretions, and social
sins than they are about promoting any affirmative case. They wish to avoid
loss, not make gains.
4.6 Social Versus Moral Norm

The discussion contained in this article has centered on norms, and even
though those norms center on rules of social conduct, we have been careful
not to label these norms as “social.” The reason is that although the conse-
quences of these norms may be social, the norms themselves are not social in
nature. Rather, they are more internally regulated. These norms represent
private and personal codes of behavior, and would be adhered to even
without any pressure from the outside world. Examples of such norms
would include avoiding cannibalism and incest: People are very unlikely
to commit either act, or even contemplate them, even if they have oppor-
tunities to do so in private (Haidt, 2001). As such, these behavioral codes are
termed moral or personal norms. The fact that adhering to the norm of respect
is triggered by feelings of agitation and anxiety suggests that it falls into this
category of norm (Anderson & Dunning, 2014; Bicchieri, 2006; Dubreuil &
Grégoire, 2013; Elster, 2007, 2009).
To be a social norm, according to contemporary scholarship in anthro-
pology, philosophy, economics, and sociology, the norm would have to
be actively imposed from the outside community. That can mean even
punishment from other people if the individual fails to adhere to the
norm (Fehr, Fischbacher, & G€achter, 2002; Henrich, 2006; Henrich et al.,
2010). Further, people would have to know of the existence of the social
norm, and believe that they would be stigmatized or sanctioned if they
violated it. Absent those beliefs or active enforcement, the norm would
not be social in nature (Bicchieri, 2006; Elster, 2007, 2009).
Our work on trust suggests that people trust at such high rates due to
internal moral norms rather than social ones. The central role played by
anxiety and agitation emotions suggests this. Further, if there is a social
norm for trust, people seem not to be aware of it. They believe that only
a minority of people would choose trust, and fail to believe that their friends
and peers would think any less of them if they refused to trust (their parents,
tellingly, are another matter). More importantly, making their decisions
public, and thus open to social scrutiny and pressure, does nothing to in-
crease trust rates (Dunning et al., 2014; Study 4). As such, trust behavior fails
to follow the rules associated with contemporary definitions of social
norms. That said, even if being trustful is not a social norm, reciprocating
that trust is a social norm. Although people do not think they would be
sanctioned for forgoing trust, they do think they would be sanctioned if
they failed to honor any trust given to them (Bicchieri, Xiao, & Muldoon,
2011).
4.7 Summary
In sum, a case study on trust behavior suggests that this essential but myste-
rious social behavior is supported by a norm, respect, that has a complex but
understandable anatomy. Respect is not a personal preference per se, in that
people will avoid acting to show it if given a chance to evade situations in
which they must respect another person at some cost to themselves. The
norm constitutes what people think they should do when confronted
with a decision they must face, rather than what they want to do if given
more freedom, which is affirmed by the types of emotions associated with
adhering to the norm. People adhere to the norm to avoid the anxiety
that goes with potentially insulting the other person rather than to achieve
a warm glow of beneficence, suggesting that respect is primarily an avoid-
ance motivation rather than an approach one. Further, in regulating them-
selves, people appear to be focused more on controlling their actions than on
managing potential outcomes that may follow from those actions. Finally,
the norm appears to be a personal and private one not influenced by any
social pressure from other people.
5. ISSUES FOR FUTURE RESEARCH

In short, in this one case study of a behavior (trust) and a behavioral
rule (respect) supporting it, we find a phenomenon that data paint as a
complicated and nuanced one. However, not all its complications have
been thoroughly studied. The norm of respect still presents a host of issues
that have yet to be fully addressed to provide a complete portrait of this
important aspect of human life. Consider the following list.
5.1 How Aware Are People of the Norm?

Some of the questions have to do with the degree to which people are aware
of just how impactful social and moral norms are. At some level, people must
be aware of it, in that they actively avoid situations that will require them to
give to others (eg, Andreoni et al., 2011). However, they also seem unaware
of the power the norm can exert over their behavior and that of others.
When it comes to trust decisions, people overwhelmingly underestimate
the percentage of peers who will trust, thinking only a minority (from
37% to 48%, depending on the study) will make themselves vulnerable to
another person when, in fact, clear majorities do (Dunning et al., 2014).
In helping behavior, people similarly underestimate the discomfort others
will feel turning down a request, and thus how much they will be willing
to help (Flynn & Lake, 2008).
One can speculate just how far this lack of awareness runs. In general,
people fail to appreciate social pressures, underrating just how much, for
example, they will conform to what most people do (Cialdini, 2007; Pronin,
Berger, & Molouki, 2007), or how much their own behavior can influence
that of other people (Flynn & Lake, 2008; Bohns et al., 2014), so it does
make sense that people will fail to identify the impact interpersonal norms
have. Even in the case of trust, people seem to underestimate the power
of a reciprocity norm to influence the trustworthiness of others (Dunning
et al., 2014; Fetchenhauer & Dunning, 2009, 2010). Giving their partner
$5 prompts roughly 80% of them to return the favor and hand $10 back.
This is in striking contrast to the only 45% who are expected to do so.
But, could it be the case that some people have more awareness of the
impact of interpersonal norms? Work in cultural psychology suggests that
the answer is “yes.” Members of collectivist cultures, who are more attuned
to social duties and pressures, may have deeper and more accurate insight
into such social influences than members of individualist cultures, which
emphasize instead a person’s mastery and agency over the world. In help-
seeking, collectivist respondents do show greater insight. In one study,
citizens of New York City, an individualist setting, and Beijing, China, a
collectivist one, were asked to go out into the streets and get five people
to fill out a short questionnaire. On average, New York City citizens pre-
dicted they would have to approach 16 individuals to obtain the requisite
number of respondents, but took in reality only 8.3. Again, they underesti-
mated the likelihood that other people would help. In contrast, Beijing cit-
izens were more accurate in their predictions, thinking they would have to
approach nearly 11 respondents when the actual number was only a little
under 7 (Bohns et al., 2011).
In a similar vein, Asian (collectivist) and European (individualist) students
at Cornell University were asked the percentage of their peers who would
sign a petition supporting breast cancer research. European respondents
thought that only 37% of their European peers would sign the petition,
but 80% actually did. Asian respondents thought 64% of their peers would
sign, a figure significantly closer to the percentage who did: 77% (Balcetis,
Dunning, & Miller, 2008).
5.2 Is There a Norm to Be Respectable?

Another specific issue has to do with the other side of respect: being respect-
able. The extant literature suggests that one scenario that makes people even
more anxious than being asked for help is to be the person doing the asking.
One sees this in the number of participants who refuse to take part in help-
seeking studies when requested to ask others for assistance, such as asking a
stranger to use their cell phone. In the first two studies of this type, a total of
16% and 26% of potential participants refused to take part in the experiment,
failed to complete the task once started, or just walked away after reading the
instructions (Flynn & Lake, 2008). One can presume that it was aversive for
participants to seek help, and so many simply refused.
In addition, in their classic study on asking for seats in a subway, Milgram
and Sabini (1968) found that a distinct pattern of anxiety infused asking for
help. As they report:
Most students reported extreme difficulty in carrying out the assignment. Students
reported that when standing in front of a subject, they felt anxious, tense, and
embarrassed. Frequently, they were unable to vocalize the request for a seat
and had to withdraw. They sometimes feared that they were the center of atten-
tion of the car and were often unable to look directly at the subject. Once having
made the request and received a seat, they sometimes felt a need to enact
behavior that would make the request appear justified (eg, mimicking illness;
some even felt faint). (p. 37)
Apparently, the requirement that the help-seeker be respectable has just

as much, if not more, emotional punch as the one that the person being
asked for help show respect. People seeking help must have an appropriate
reason for their request. Failing that, they are consumed with the anxiety of
failing normal and appropriate social behavior. And if they succeed, they
must “validate” the respectability of their behavior by sometimes faking
need. Milgram himself, in his subway studies, took multiple attempts to
summon the courage to ask for a seat, and when he finally succeeded in
making the request, he reported:
Taking the man’s seat, I was overwhelmed by the need to behave in a way that
would justify my request . My head sank between my knees, and I could feel my
face blanching. I was not role-playing. I actually felt as if I were going to perish.
Luo, 2004, p. B8
5.3 How Far Is the Reach of Underlying Mechanisms?

Another set of questions yet to be addressed focuses on the reach and power
of the emotional mechanism underlying and supporting the norm of respect.
We have found that people respect others because they feel they should, and
they experience significant tension and anxiety upon contemplating doing
otherwise (Dunning et al., 2014). Other people have found bouts of stress
to lie similarly at the heart of moral behavior, such as physically harming
another person (Cushman et al., 2012; Navarette et al., 2012).
One can wonder what range of behavior this anxiety-driven mechanism
might influence beyond trust and morality. In fact, we have found that it
appears to have a wide range, operating for completely nonsocial decisions
as well. That is, we have found that people feel more anxious, tense, and
guilty about gambling $5 on the flip of a coin rather than playing it safe
(Schl€osser et al., 2013; Schl€
osser, Fetchenhauer, et al., in press). When asked,
they say that although they want to gamble, they feel they should refuse to do
so (Schl€osser, Mensching, et al., 2015). As a consequence, they keep the $5.
Thus, this anxiety mechanism might be a general one that regulates human
behavior in both social and nonsocial realms.
5.4 What Are the Underlying Neural Mechanisms?

We can also wonder about the neuroscience underlying the norm that we
have described here. There is, of course, an active community in the
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donna pas aux chrétiens la confiance de se montrer au grand jour:
ils sentaient qu'elle lui était arrachée par la crainte; et déja une fois
trompés, ils ne comptaient plus sur ces apparences de douceur.
D'ailleurs on remarquait une différence sensible entre l'édit de
Constantin et celui de Maximin: le premier permettait expressément
aux chrétiens de s'assembler, de bâtir des églises et de célébrer
publiquement toutes les cérémonies de leur religion; Maximin, sans
dire un mot de cette permission, se contentait de défendre qu'on leur
fît aucun mal. Ainsi ils demeurèrent cachés, et attendirent leur liberté
du souverain maître des empereurs et des empires.
Maximin depuis la mort de Galérius n'avait
reconnu d'autres consuls que lui-même, et son An 313.
grand-trésorier Peucétius. Il le choisit encore pour
collègue au commencement de l'année 313. xxxii. Consulats
Constantin se déclara consul avec Licinius: ils de cette année.
l'étaient tous deux pour la troisième fois. Soit qu'il
fût à Rome le 18 de janvier, soit qu'il en fût parti
quelque temps auparavant, il fit une loi très- Idat. chron.
équitable, donnée ou affichée à Rome ce jour-là:
elle remédiait aux injustices des greffiers des Euseb. hist.
tailles, qui déchargeaient les riches aux dépens eccl. l. 9, c. 11.
des pauvres.
Licinius n'avait pris aucune part à la guerre contre Cod. Th. l. 13,
Maxence. Cependant Constantin se crut obligé tit. 10, leg. 1, et
d'exécuter la promesse qu'il lui avait faite, de lui ibi Cod.
donner sa sœur Constantia en mariage. Les deux
empereurs se rendirent à Milan, où les noces xxxiii. Mariage
furent célébrées. Ils y invitèrent Dioclétien. Ce de Licinius.
prince s'étant excusé sur son grand âge, ils lui
écrivirent une lettre menaçante, dans laquelle ils Lact. de mort.
l'accusaient d'avoir été attaché à Maxence, et de persec. c. 45.
l'être encore à Maximin leur ennemi caché.
Ces reproches portèrent un coup mortel à Baluzius, in
Dioclétien, dont les forces déja épuisées par des Lact. p. 337.
chagrins amers plus encore que par les accès
redoublés de sa maladie, ne se soutenaient qu'à peine. Il avait
vivement ressenti l'affront fait à sa personne,
quand on avait renversé ses statues avec celles Baudri, in Lact.
de Maximien. Les malheurs de sa fille Valéria, dont p. 739 et 748.
il avait inutilement demandé la liberté à Maximin,
obstiné à persécuter cette princesse, aigrirent Zos. l. 2, c. 17.
encore ses douleurs. Enfin les menaces des deux
empereurs achevèrent de l'abattre. Il se condamna
lui-même à la mort; et le peu de temps qu'il vécut Anony. Vales.
encore, se passa dans des agitations cruelles.
Cette funeste mélancolie ne lui laissait pas prendre Vict. epit. p.
de sommeil: soupirer, gémir, pleurer, se rouler 223.
tantôt sur son lit, tantôt sur la terre, c'était ainsi
qu'il passait les nuits: les jours n'étaient pas plus xxxiv. Mort de
tranquilles. Il alla jusqu'à se retrancher la Dioclétien.
nourriture, et se fit mourir de faim; quelques-uns
disent de poison. Telle fut la fin d'un prince, dont la
vieillesse eût été plus heureuse, et la mémoire Lact. de mort.
persec. c. 42.
plus honorée, s'il n'eût terni le lustre de ses
grandes qualités par le sanglant édit qui fit périr
tant de chrétiens. On ne sait pas au juste le Baluzius, in
nombre d'années qu'il vécut: Victor ne lui en donne Lact. p. 334.
que soixante et huit; on ne peut, comme le font
quelques anciens et beaucoup de modernes, Cuper, in Lact.
prolonger sa vie au-delà de l'an 313, sans p. 494.
démentir Eusèbe et Lactance, qui disent en termes
exprès, que Maximin, qui mourut en 313, resta le Euseb. hist.
dernier des persécuteurs. Mais il faut dire que eccl. l. 9, c. 11.
Dioclétien a passé le premier de mai, pour trouver
les neuf ans, du moins commencés, que met Victor
entre son abdication et sa mort. Il mourut dans son Eutrop. l. 9.
palais de Spalatro à une lieue de Salone, où M.
Spon, en 1675, vit encore des restes de la Vict. epit. p.
magnificence de ce prince[23]. Il fut mis au nombre 221.
des dieux, apparemment par Maximin, peut-être
même par Licinius[24]. Spon, Voy. t. i,
p. 61.
[23] Depuis Spon ces ruines ont été visitées et décrites par
plusieurs voyageurs.—S.-M.
[24] Aucun monument authentique ne prouve qu'on ait
décerné à Dioclétien les honneurs de l'apothéose.—S.-M. Pag. in Baron.
Quoique ce dernier prince n'ait jamais fait an 304.
profession du christianisme, sa liaison avec
Constantin, et sa haine contre Maximin, le Till. note 20 sur
disposait alors à favoriser la religion chrétienne. Il Dioclétien.
se joignit donc volontiers à Constantin pour
dresser une déclaration qui fut publiée à Milan le xxxv. Édit de
12 mars, et envoyée dans tous les états des deux Milan.
empereurs. Elle confirmait et étendait l'édit qui
avait été donné à Rome quelques mois
auparavant: elle accordait aux chrétiens une liberté Lact. de mort.
persec.
entière et absolue pour l'exercice de leur culte
public, et levait toutes les conditions par lesquelles
cette permission avait été auparavant limitée; elle Euseb. hist.
ordonnait qu'on leur rendît sans délai, et sans eccl. l. 10, c. 5.
exiger d'eux aucun remboursement ni
dédommagement, tous les lieux d'assemblée ou Cod. Just. l. 2,
autres fonds appartenant aux églises, et promettait tit. 13, leg. 21.
d'indemniser aux dépens des deux empereurs
ceux qui en étaient actuellement possesseurs à
Noris, de num.
titre légitime. Elle donnait aussi sans exception à Lic. c. 2 et 5.
tous ceux qui professaient quelque religion que ce
fût, la liberté de la suivre selon leur conscience, et d'en faire
l'exercice public, sans être inquiétés de personne. Il n'était pas
encore temps d'imposer silence à l'idolâtrie: révérée depuis tant de
siècles, ses cris séditieux auraient soulevé tout l'empire. C'était
assez d'ouvrir la bouche à la véritable religion, et de la mettre en état
de confondre sa rivale par la sagesse de ses dogmes, et par la
pureté de sa morale. Avant que de sortir de Milan, Constantin, pour
ménager la modestie d'un sexe auquel il ne sied pas de s'aguerrir au
tumulte des affaires et des jugements, fit une loi qui permet aux
maris de poursuivre en justice les droits de leurs femmes, même
sans procuration.
Il partit ensuite, et prit le chemin de la Germanie
inférieure. Il avait appris que les Francs, ennuyés xxxvi. Guerre
contre les
de la paix, s'approchaient du Rhin avec l'élite de Francs.
leur jeunesse, pour se jeter dans les Gaules. Il
courut à leur rencontre, et sa présence les Incert. Pan. c.
empêcha de tenter le passage. Constantin, qui 21 et seq.
voulait les attirer en-deçà pour les vaincre, fit
répandre le bruit que les Allemans faisaient encore
de plus grands efforts du côté de la Germanie Zos. l. 2, c. 17.
supérieure, et se mit en marche comme pour aller
les repousser. Il laissa en même temps de bonnes Vorburg, Hist.
troupes commandées par des officiers Rom. Germ. t.
expérimentés qui avaient ordre de se mettre en 2, p. 154.
embuscade, et de charger les Francs dès qu'ils
auraient passé le fleuve. Tout réussit selon ses desseins: les Francs
furent battus; l'empereur les poursuivit au-delà du Rhin, et fit un si
horrible dégât sur leurs terres, qu'il semblait que la nation fût
exterminée. Il revint à Trèves en triomphe; il y entendit un
panégyrique que nous avons encore, et dont l'auteur est inconnu. La
liberté que le prince laissait aux idolâtres, paraît évidemment dans
cette pièce; elle respire le paganisme. La gloire de cette victoire fut
encore ternie par le spectacle inhumain d'une multitude de
prisonniers, qui furent exposés aux bêtes, et qui périrent avec cette
intrépidité naturelle à la nation.
Constantin demeura à Trèves le reste de cette
année et une partie de la suivante, occupé xxxvii.
principalement à procurer de nouveaux avantages Constantin
à la religion qu'il avait embrassée. Ses premiers comble de
bienfaits l'église
regards se portèrent sur l'église d'Afrique, qui
d'Afrique.
s'était le plus ressentie des rigueurs de la
persécution, et qui était encore déchirée par le
nouveau schisme des donatistes. La lettre de Euseb. hist.
l'empereur à Cécilien, évêque de Carthage, mérite eccl. l. 10, c. 6.
d'être rapportée. La voici telle qu'Eusèbe nous l'a
donnée. Optat. de
schism. Donat.
«Constantin Auguste à Cécilien évêque de l. 1, c. 18.
Carthage: Dans le dessein que nous avons de
donner à certains ministres de la religion catholique, cette religion
sainte et légitime, dans les provinces d'Afrique, de Numidie et de
Mauritanie, de quoi fournir aux dépenses, nous avons envoyé ordre
à Ursus receveur-général de l'Afrique, de vous remettre trois mille
bourses. Vous aurez soin de les faire distribuer à ceux qui vous
seront indiqués par le rôle que vous adressera Osius. Si la somme
ne vous paraît pas suffisante pour satisfaire à notre zèle, demandez
sans hésiter à Héraclide, intendant de nos domaines, tout ce que
vous jugerez nécessaire: il a ordre de ne vous rien refuser. Et
comme nous avons appris que des hommes inquiets et turbulents
s'efforcent de corrompre le peuple de l'église sainte et catholique,
par des insinuations fausses et perverses; sachez que nous avons
recommandé de vive voix à Anulinus proconsul, et à Patricius vicaire
des préfets, de remédier à ces désordres avec toute leur vigilance.
Si donc vous vous apercevez que ces gens persistent dans leur
folie, adressez-vous aussitôt aux juges que nous venons de vous
indiquer, et faites-leur votre rapport, afin qu'ils les châtient selon
l'ordre que nous leur en avons donné. Que le grand dieu vous
conserve pendant longues années.»
Il paraît que cet argent était destiné à l'entretien des églises, et à la
décoration du culte divin. La somme passait cent mille écus de notre
monnaie. Osius dont il est parlé dans cette lettre, était le célèbre
évêque de Cordoue, qui connaissait parfaitement les besoins de
l'église d'Afrique, et à qui Constantin s'en rapportait pour la
distribution de ses aumônes, et pour les affaires les plus importantes
de la religion. On voit ici que ce prince était déja instruit des cabales
des donatistes, et qu'il songeait à étouffer ce schisme naissant. Ce
qui mérite encore d'être observé, c'est qu'Annius Anulinus,
personnage des plus illustres de l'empire, qui sous Dioclétien avait
été un des plus violents persécuteurs de l'église d'Afrique, est ici
employé à donner à cette même église un nouveau lustre; soit qu'il
eût changé de religion avec l'empereur, soit qu'étant demeuré païen,
il se vît obligé par obéissance de réparer les maux qu'il avait faits lui-
même.
Constantin lui adressa à peu près dans le même
temps une lettre, dans laquelle après avoir relevé xxxviii.
le mérite de la religion chrétienne, il lui déclare qu'il Exemption des
entend que les ministres de l'église catholique, fonctions
dont Cécilien est le chef, et qui sont appelés municipales
clercs, soient exempts de toutes fonctions accordée aux
clercs.
municipales; de peur, dit-il, qu'ils ne soient distraits
du service de la Divinité, ce qui serait une espèce
de sacrilége: car, ajoute-t-il, l'hommage qu'ils Euseb. Hist.
rendent à Dieu est la principale source de la eccl. l. 10, c. 7.
prospérité de notre empire. Anulinus exécuta
fidèlement ses ordres, et lui en rendit compte par S. Aug. ep. 88.
une lettre, où il lui marque, qu'en notifiant à t. II, p. 214.
Cécilien et à ses clercs le bienfait de l'empereur, il
en a pris occasion de les exhorter à réunir tous les Soz. l. 1, c. 9.
esprits pour observer la sainteté de leur loi, et
s'occuper du culte divin avec le respect
convenable. Il lui envoie en même temps les Cod. Th. lib. 16,
plaintes des donatistes, dont je parlerai dans la tit. 2 et tit. 5.
suite. Ces schismatiques qui ne participaient pas à
l'exemption, et peut-être aussi les autres habitants God. ad cod.
par un effet de jalousie, s'efforcèrent plusieurs fois Th. lib. 11, tit. 1,
d'anéantir ce privilége par des chicanes. Les l. 1.
fonctions municipales étaient onéreuses, et
l'immunité des uns devenait une surcharge pour les autres. Aussi
dès cette même année Constantin fut obligé de réitérer ses ordres à
ce sujet par une loi du dernier d'octobre. Sozomène dit que cette
exemption fut ensuite étendue à tous les clercs dans toutes les
provinces de l'empire; et son témoignage est confirmé par une loi
faite pour la Lucanie, et le pays des Brutiens. L'empereur lui-même
déclare dans une loi de l'an 330, qu'il avait établi cet usage dans tout
l'Orient, sans doute après la défaite de Licinius. Mais ce privilége ne
fut nulle part accordé qu'aux ministres de l'église catholique; les
hérétiques et les schismatiques qui prétendaient y participer, en sont
exclus en termes exprès par une loi de l'an 326. Constantin en
exemptant les clercs des charges personnelles, ne les exempta pas
des tributs. Ils continuèrent de les payer à proportion de leurs biens
patrimoniaux. Mais il en déchargea les biens des églises: ce qui ne
subsista pas même sous ses successeurs, quand l'église fut
devenue assez opulente, pour partager sans incommodité les
charges de l'état, dont ses ministres font partie.
Ces avantages accordés aux clercs furent comme
un signal, qui appela au service de l'église tous xxxix. Abus
ceux qui voulaient se soustraire à des dépenses occasionés par
auxquelles les particuliers ne se prêtent qu'à ces exemptions
regret, quoiqu'ils en recueillent les fruits. On se et corrigés par
Constantin.
pressait d'entrer dans la cléricature; les fonctions
municipales allaient être abandonnées faute de
sujets; la cupidité appauvrissait l'état sans enrichir Cod. Th. lib. 16,
l'église qu'elle peuplait de ministres intéressés. tit. 2.
L'empereur pour empêcher tout à la fois la trop
grande multiplication des ecclésiastiques, et la désertion des
fonctions nécessaires à l'état, ordonna en 320 qu'à l'avenir et sans
rien changer pour le passé, on ne ferait des clercs qu'à la place de
ceux qui mourraient, et qu'on ne choisirait que des gens à qui leur
pauvreté donnait déja l'immunité. Il renouvela cette ordonnance six
ans après, en déclarant que les riches devaient porter les fardeaux
du siècle, et que les biens de l'église ne devaient servir qu'à la
subsistance des pauvres. Il ordonnait même que si entre les clercs
déja reçus, il s'en trouvait quelqu'un qui par sa naissance ou par sa
fortune fût propre à soutenir les charges municipales, il serait retiré
du service ecclésiastique et rendu à celui de l'état. Mais il paraît que
les donatistes toujours jaloux des avantages de la vraie église,
abusèrent de cette loi dans la Numidie, où ils étaient les plus
puissants, et qu'ils arrachaient à l'église des clercs qui n'étaient pas
dans le cas de l'ordonnance. Ce fut apparemment ce qui donna lieu
à Constantin d'adresser en 330 à Valentinus, gouverneur de
Numidie, une autre loi, dont le sens me paraît être que ceux qui
seront une fois entrés dans la cléricature, ne seront plus sujets à un
second examen de leurs facultés, mais qu'ils jouiront sans trouble de
l'immunité cléricale.
En s'occupant de l'honneur et de l'avantage de
l'église, il ne perdait pas de vue le gouvernement xl. Lois sur le
civil. Il fit dans son séjour à Trèves plusieurs lois gouvernement
fort sages, pour prévenir les surprises qu'on civil.
pourrait faire à sa religion par de faux exposés, et
pour empêcher les juges de précipiter la Cod. Just. lib. 1,
condamnation des accusés avant une conviction t. 22, leg. 3.
pleine et entière. Voulant décourager les
accusations des crimes qu'on appelait alors de Cod. Th. lib. 9,
lèse-majesté, et qui s'étendaient fort loin, il soumit tit. 40.
à la torture les accusateurs qui n'administraient
pas de preuves manifestes, aussi-bien que ceux
Ibid. tit. 5.
qui les auraient excités à intenter l'accusation; et il
ordonna de punir du supplice de la croix, même
sans être entendus, les esclaves et les affranchis Ibid. lib. 12, tit.
qui oseraient dénoncer leurs maîtres et leurs 11.
patrons. Les villes avaient des fonds qu'elles
faisaient valoir entre les mains des particuliers: il fit Ibid. lib. 3, tit.
des réglements pour assurer ces rentes, et 19.
empêcher que les fonds ne fussent dissipés par la
négligence des magistrats chargés des
Ibid. lib. 4, tit. 9.
recouvrements. Il mit les mineurs à couvert de la
mauvaise foi de leurs tuteurs et curateurs. Pour
conserver l'honnêteté publique, il renouvela l'arrêt Ibid. lib. 5, tit. 6.
du sénat fait du temps de Claude, par lequel une
femme de condition libre, qui s'abandonnait à un Cod. Just. lib.
esclave, perdait sa liberté. Il fut pourtant obligé 12, tit. 1.
d'adoucir cette loi dans la suite, ce qui prouve la
corruption des mœurs de ce siècle. Sous le règne
Ibid. lib. 7, tit.
de Maxence, beaucoup de sujets indignes étaient 22.
parvenus aux charges, et d'honnêtes citoyens
avaient perdu leur liberté: dans l'horrible famine qui
désola alors la ville de Rome, ils s'étaient vendus Ibid. lib. 6, tit. 1.
eux-mêmes, ou avaient vendu leurs enfants. Il
remédia par deux lois à ce double désordre: par Ibid. lib. 3, tit. 1.
l'une il déclara incapables de posséder aucune
charge tous les hommes infâmes et notés pour
leurs crimes ou leurs déréglements; par l'autre il C. T. lib. 4, tit. 8.
ordonna sous de grosses peines de remettre en
liberté, sans attendre la contrainte du magistrat, C. J. lib. 1, tit.
tous ceux qui étaient devenus esclaves sous la 14; lib. 8, tit. 53.
tyrannie de Maxence; il étendit même cette punition sur ceux qui,
bien instruits qu'un homme était né libre, dissimuleraient et le
laisseraient dans l'esclavage. Il déclara encore qu'il ne pouvait y
avoir de prescription contre la liberté, et qu'un homme libre ne
perdait rien de ses droits, même après soixante ans de servitude;
mais en même temps il soumit à des peines très-sévères les
esclaves fugitifs. Plusieurs réglements qu'il fit encore dans la suite
montrent son inclination à favoriser les droits de la liberté, sans
blesser ceux de la justice. Quelques-unes de ses lois renferment de
belles maximes de morale. Nous pensons, dit-il dans une, qu'on doit
avoir plus d'égard à l'équité et à la justice naturelle, qu'au droit positif
et rigoureux. Mais il réserva au prince la décision des questions où
le droit positif paraîtrait en contradiction avec l'équité. Il déclara
ailleurs que la coutume ne doit pas prescrire contre la raison ni
contre la loi.
Dès cette année et dans toute la suite de son
règne, il paraît avoir donné une attention xli. Lois pour la
particulière à deux objets importants: à la perception des
perception des impôts, et à l'administration de la tributs.
justice. Il prit tous les moyens que lui suggéra sa
prudence pour assurer les contributions Cod. Th. lib. 11,
qu'exigeaient les besoins de l'état, et pour les tit. 1.
rendre moins onéreuses à ses sujets. Il voulut que
les rôles des impositions fussent signés de la main Ibid. tit. 7.
des gouverneurs des provinces. Pour accélérer les
paiements, il ordonna que les biens de ceux qui
par mauvaise volonté différeraient de payer, Ibid. lib. 8, tit.
fussent vendus sans retour. Mais aussi il réprima 10.
par des peines rigoureuses les concussions des
officiers, et permit de les prendre à partie; il Ibid. lib. 10, tit.
défendit de dédommager le fisc des non-valeurs, 15.
en les reprenant sur les gens solvables; de mettre
en prison les débiteurs du fisc, ou de leur imposer C. T. lib. 10, tit.
aucune punition corporelle: La prison, dit-il, n'est 1; lib. 4, tit. 13.
faite que pour les criminels ou pour les officiers du
fisc qui excèdent leur pouvoir; quant à ceux qui refusent de payer
leur part des contributions, on se contentera de leur envoyer
garnison; ou s'ils persistent, de vendre leurs biens. Celui qui
poursuivait les dettes du fisc, s'appelait l'avocat du fisc: Constantin
veut que cet emploi soit exercé par des gens intègres,
désintéressés, instruits; et il les avertit qu'ils seront également punis
pour fermer les yeux sur les dettes qu'ils doivent poursuivre, et pour
les poursuivre par des chicanes: L'intérêt de nos sujets, dit-il dans
une de ses lois, nous est plus précieux que l'intérêt de notre trésor. Il
suivit exactement cette belle maxime: on voit par plusieurs de ses
lois qu'il ne donna au fisc aucun privilége, qu'il le réduisit au droit
commun, et qu'il laissa aux particuliers plusieurs ressources pour se
défendre contre les prétentions du domaine.
Pour ce qui regarde l'administration de la justice,
on ne peut assez louer le soin qu'il prit d'en bannir xlii. Lois pour
les longueurs, la mauvaise foi et les chicanes tant l'administration
de la part des juges que de la part des plaideurs. de la justice.
Se regardant comme le lieutenant immédiat de
Dieu même dans la fonction de juger ses peuples, Cod. Th. lib. 11.
il permit aux juges d'avoir recours à lui pour le tit. 29.
consulter avant que de prononcer, quand ils
seraient embarrassés sur le jugement d'une Ibid. tit. 30.
affaire: mais il les avertit aussi de ne s'adresser à
lui que rarement et dans les cas qui n'étaient pas
clairement décidés par les lois, pour ne pas Ibid. tit. 36.
interrompre ses autres occupations; d'autant plus
que celui qui se trouverait lésé, avait la ressource Ibid. lib. 2, tit. 7.
de l'appel. De peur que ces rapports envoyés au
prince ne servissent de prétexte pour prolonger les
affaires, il y prescrit un terme fort court; il en règle Ibid. lib. 9, tit.
10.
la forme et écarte tous les obstacles qui pourraient
en retarder l'effet. Comme les juges inférieurs, mécontents des
appels qu'on interjetait de leurs sentences, faisaient quelquefois
ressentir aux appelants leur mauvaise humeur, il censure par
plusieurs lois ce procédé arrogant, et les menace de punition. Il
recommande aux juges des tribunaux supérieurs la diligence dans
l'expédition des causes d'appel. Il prévient les abus qui peuvent se
glisser dans les appels, dans les évocations, dans les délais des
jugements. Il déclare qu'on peut appeler de tous les tribunaux,
excepté de celui des préfets du prétoire, qui sont proprement les
représentants du prince dans l'exercice de la justice. Il ne permet
pas d'appeler de la condamnation des crimes d'homicide, de
maléfice, d'adultère, d'empoisonnement, quand la conviction est
complète: à l'occasion des lois que fit Constantin dans son séjour à
Trèves, j'ai rassemblé sous le même point de vue toutes celles de ce
prince qui ont eu le même objet, quoiqu'elles aient été faites ensuite
et en différentes années; et je continuerai d'en user de cette manière
pour éviter les longueurs et les répétitions ennuyeuses, à moins que
quelque circonstance particulière ne m'oblige d'interrompre cet
ordre.
Tandis que Constantin à Trèves s'appliquait à
régler les affaires de l'état, Maximin profitant de xliii. Maximin
son éloignement entreprit d'exécuter le dessein commence la
qu'il méditait depuis long-temps, de se rendre seul guerre contre
maître de tout l'empire. Cet homme fier et hautain, Licinius.
plus ancien César que les deux autres empereurs,
ne pouvait souffrir leur supériorité qu'il regardait Euseb. Hist.
comme usurpée: il se donnait le premier rang dans eccl. l. 9, c. 10.
ses titres; et comme il restait seul des deux
Augustes et des deux Césars que Dioclétien et Lact. de mort.
Maximien avaient nommés en quittant l'empire, il persec. c. 45.
se portait pour légitime héritier de toute leur
puissance. Plein de ces idées ambitieuses, il prit le temps que les
deux empereurs célébraient à Milan les noces de Constantia, et
quoique ce fût dans le fort de l'hiver, il mit ses troupes en campagne;
et doublant les marches, il arriva bientôt de Syrie en Bithynie; mais
ce fut aux dépens d'une grande partie de ses forces: il laissa sur les
chemins presque toutes ses bêtes de charge, que les pluies, les
neiges, la fange, le froid et les marches forcées faisaient périr.
Parvenu au rivage du Bosphore, qui servait de borne à son empire, il
passa le détroit, et s'approcha de Byzance, où il n'y avait qu'une
faible garnison. Ayant en vain tenté de la corrompre, il attaqua la
ville; elle se rendit après onze jours de résistance. De là il marcha à
Héraclée, autrement nommée Périnthe, qui l'arrêta encore plusieurs
jours.
Ces délais donnèrent le temps de dépêcher des
courriers à Licinius, qui, s'étant séparé de xliv. Licinius
Constantin au sortir de Milan, était revenu en vient à sa
Illyrie. Ce prince, à la tête d'une poignée de soldats rencontre.
accourt en diligence, arrive à Andrinople
[Hadrianopolis] lorsque Périnthe venait de se rendre; et ayant
rassemblé ce qu'il peut trouver de troupes dans le voisinage, il
s'avance jusqu'à dix-huit milles de Maximin campé à une égale
distance de Périnthe. L'intention de Licinius était d'arrêter l'ennemi,
mais sans le combattre: il n'avait pas trente mille hommes, contre
soixante et dix mille. Maximin, par la raison contraire résolu
d'engager une action, fit vœu à Jupiter d'exterminer le nom chrétien,
s'il était vainqueur. Lactance rapporte que pendant la nuit Licinius
eut une vision miraculeuse: il songea qu'il voyait un ange qui lui
ordonnait de se lever sur l'heure, et de prier avec toute son armée le
Dieu souverain, lui promettant la victoire s'il obéissait; qu'à cet ordre
il se levait aussitôt, et que l'ange l'instruisait d'une prière qu'il devait
faire prononcer à ses soldats. Il faut avouer que la vérité de ce
miracle n'est fondée que sur la bonne foi de Licinius, que la suite de
sa vie rend sur ce point infiniment suspecte. Licinius à son réveil fit
appeler un secrétaire, et lui dicta la formule de prière dont il disait
avoir la mémoire toute récente. Elle était conçue en ces termes:
Nous vous prions, Dieu souverain; Dieu saint, nous vous prions:
nous vous recommandons notre salut et notre empire: c'est de vous
que nous tenons la vie, la félicité, la victoire: Dieu suprême, Dieu
saint, exaucez-nous; nous tendons les bras vers vous; exaucez-
nous, Dieu saint, Dieu souverain. Il distribua aux préfets et aux
tribuns plusieurs copies de cette prière, pour la faire apprendre à
leurs soldats. Ceux-ci assurés d'une victoire, dont le ciel même se
rendait garant, s'enflamment d'un nouveau courage. Licinius voulait
livrer bataille le 1er de mai, pour flétrir par la destruction de son
ennemi le jour même où ce prince avait été créé César, et pour
mettre encore cette conformité entre la défaite de Maxence et celle
de Maximin. Mais celui-ci se hâta de combattre dès la veille, pour
honorer par les réjouissances de la victoire l'anniversaire de son
élévation. Ainsi le dernier d'avril dès le point du jour il rangea ses
troupes en bataille. Celles de Licinius prennent aussitôt les armes et
marchent à l'ennemi. Entre les deux camps s'étendait une plaine
stérile et toute nue, qu'on appelait le Champ serein. Déja les deux
armées étaient en présence; les soldats de Licinius posent à terre
leurs boucliers, ôtent leurs casques, et à l'exemple de leurs officiers,
ils lèvent les bras au ciel, et prononcent après l'empereur la prière
qu'ils avaient apprise. Après l'avoir trois fois répétée, ils reprennent
leurs casques et leurs boucliers. Ces mouvements et ce murmure
étonnent l'armée ennemie. Les deux empereurs confèrent
ensemble, mais inutilement: Maximin ne voulait point de paix; il
méprisait son rival. Comme il répandait l'argent à pleines mains, et
que Licinius n'était rien moins que libéral, il s'attendait que celui-ci
allait être abandonné de ses troupes; et que les deux armées
réunies sous ses étendards marcheraient aussitôt pour aller
accabler Constantin. C'était dans cette confiance qu'il avait entrepris
la guerre.
On s'approche, on sonne la charge. Les troupes
de Licinius commencent l'attaque; selon Zosime xlv. Bataille
elles furent d'abord repoussées: Lactance dit au entre Licinius et
contraire, que leurs ennemis, glacés de frayeur, Maximin.
n'eurent pas le courage de tirer l'épée ni de lancer
leurs traits. Maximin courait à cheval autour de Zos. l. 2, c. 17.
l'armée de Licinius, mettant en usage et les prières
et les promesses: au lieu de l'écouter, on le charge
Euseb. Hist.
lui-même, et il est obligé de regagner le gros de eccl. l. 9, c. 10.
ses troupes. Elles se laissaient égorger presque et Vit. Const. l.
sans résistance par des ennemis très-inférieurs en 1, c. 58.
nombre: la plaine était jonchée de morts; la moitié
de l'armée était taillée en pièces; les autres ou se
rendaient ou prenaient la fuite: les gardes de Lact. de mort.
persec. c. 47.
Maximin l'abandonnent; il s'abandonne lui-même,
et jetant bas la pourpre impériale, couvert d'un habit d'esclave, il se
mêle dans la troupe des fuyards et repasse le détroit. Emporté par
sa terreur, il arrive la nuit du lendemain à Nicomédie, à cent soixante
milles du champ de bataille. Il y prend avec lui sa femme, ses
enfants, un petit nombre de ses officiers, et continue sa fuite vers
l'Orient. Enfin après avoir échappé à bien des périls, se cachant
dans les campagnes et dans les villages, il gagne la Cappadoce, où
ayant rallié ce qui lui restait de troupes, il s'arrêta et reprit la pourpre.
Licinius, après avoir incorporé dans son armée les
ennemis qui s'étaient rendus, passa le Bosphore; xlvi. Licinius à
et peu de jours après la bataille entra dans Nicomédie.
Nicomédie, rendit graces à Dieu comme à l'auteur
de sa victoire, et laissa reposer ses troupes. Dès le Lact. de mort.
premier jour de juin il fit un acte de souveraineté persec. c. 48.
en faveur de la Lycie et de la Pamphylie: il
exempta par une loi le petit peuple des villes de
Cod. Th. lib. 13,
ces provinces, de payer capitation pour les biens tit. 10, leg. 2.
qu'il possédait à la campagne. C'était un nouveau
joug, dont les simples particuliers habitants des
villes avaient toujours été exempts, et que Maximin God. ad hanc
apparemment leur avait imposé. Le 13 du même legem.
mois il fit afficher l'édit qu'il avait dressé à Milan de
concert avec Constantin, pour rendre à l'église une entière
tranquillité. Il exhorta même de vive voix les chrétiens à faire
librement l'exercice de leur religion. On peut placer ici la fin de cette
persécution cruelle, qui, commencée en cette même ville le 23
février de l'an 303, avait pendant dix ans multiplié le christianisme en
faisant périr des milliers de chrétiens.
Maximin, couvert de honte et plein de désespoir,
déchargea sa première fureur sur les prêtres de xlvii. Mort de
ses dieux, qui par des oracles imposteurs l'avaient Maximin.
assuré du succès de ses armes. Il les fit tous
massacrer. Ensuite apprenant que Licinius venait à Lact. de mort.
lui avec toutes ses forces, il gagna les défilés du persec. c. 49.
mont Taurus, et essaya de les défendre par des
barricades et des forts qu'il fit élever à la hâte.
Euseb. Hist.
Enfin, comme le vainqueur forçait tous les eccl. l. 9, c. 10
passages, il se renferma dans la ville de Tarse, à et 11 et Vit.
dessein de se sauver en Égypte pour y réparer ses Const. l. 1, c. 58
pertes. Eusèbe dit qu'il y eut un second combat, et 59.]
auquel Maximin ne se trouva pas, et que, caché
dans la ville dont il n'osait sortir, il fut dans le temps Zos. l. 2, c. 17.
même de la bataille frappé de la maladie dont il
mourut. Selon Lactance, ce prince assiégé dans Tarse, sans
espérance de secours, et sans autre ressource que la mort, s'il
voulait ne pas tomber entre les mains d'un rival cruel et irrité, se
remplit pour la dernière fois de vin et de viandes, et avala ensuite un
breuvage mortel. Mais la quantité de nourriture dont il s'était chargé,
amortit la force du poison, qui, au lieu de lui ôter la vie sur-le-champ,
le jeta dans une longue et douloureuse agonie. Dans cet état il
reconnut le bras de Dieu qui le frappait; il força sa bouche impie à
louer celui à qui il avait fait une guerre sacrilége; il fit en faveur des
chrétiens un édit, dans lequel ce prince malheureux, sous la main de
Dieu qui l'écrase, veut encore conserver la fierté du trône, et pallier
par un préambule imposant la mauvaise foi de ses édits précédents.
Au reste, il accorde sans réserve aux chrétiens tout ce que
Constantin leur avait donné dans ses états, c'est-à-dire, la
permission de relever leurs temples, et de rentrer en possession de
tous les biens des églises, de quelque manière qu'ils eussent été
aliénés. Un repentir si forcé et si imparfait ne désarma pas la colère
de Dieu. Pendant quatre jours il fut en proie aux plus affreuses
douleurs. Il se roulait sur la terre, il l'arrachait à pleines mains, et la
dévorait. Ses entrailles étaient embrasées par un feu intérieur, qui ne
lui laissa au-dehors que les os desséchés. A force de se frapper la
tête contre les murailles, il se fit sortir les yeux de leur orbite. Les
chrétiens regardèrent cet horrible accident comme une punition de la
cruauté exercée sur tant de martyrs, à qui il avait fait crever les yeux.
Alors tout aveugle qu'il était, il croyait voir le Dieu des chrétiens,
environné de ses ministres, et l'entendre prononcer son jugement: il
s'écriait comme un criminel à la torture; il s'excusait sur ses perfides
conseillers; il avouait ses crimes, implorait Jésus-Christ, lui
demandait en pleurant miséricorde. Enfin au milieu de ces
hurlements, aussi affreux que s'il eût été dans les flammes, il expira
par une mort plus terrible encore que celle de Galérius, qu'il avait
surpassé en impiété et en barbarie. Il était dans la neuvième année
de son règne, à compter du temps où il avait été fait César, et dans
la sixième depuis qu'il avait pris le titre d'Auguste. Il avait plusieurs
enfants, déja associés à l'empire, et dont on ignore les noms.
La mort de Maximin ne fut pas la dernière punition
qu'exerça sur lui la vengeance divine; elle s'étendit xlviii. Suites de
sur sa mémoire, sur ses officiers, sur toute sa cette mort.
famille. Il fut déclaré ennemi public par des arrêts
infamants, où il était qualifié de tyran impie, Euseb. Hist.
détestable, ennemi de Dieu. Ses images et ses eccl. l. 9, c. 11.
statues, ainsi que celles de ses enfants,
auparavant honorées dans toutes les villes de ses
états, furent les unes mises en pièces, les autres Vales. ibid.
noircies, défigurées et abandonnées à toutes les
insultes de la populace, qui dès qu'elle cesse de S. Gregorius
trembler triomphe des tyrans avec insolence. On Naz. advers.
mutila ses statues; on prit un plaisir inhumain à les Julian. or. 3. t. i,
transformer dans l'état horrible où l'avait mis la p. 92.
maladie. S. Grégoire de Nazianze, plus de cinquante ans après, dit
qu'elles portaient encore les marques de son châtiment. Licinius ôta
toutes les charges aux ennemis du christianisme. Ceux qui s'étaient
fait un mérite de tourmenter les chrétiens, et que le tyran avait en
récompense comblés de faveur, furent mis à mort. Peucétius trois
fois consul avec Maximin, et surintendant de ses finances; Culcianus
honoré de plusieurs commandements, et qui étant gouverneur de la
Thébaïde, avait fait grand nombre de martyrs, furent punis des
cruautés dont ils avaient été les conseillers et les ministres.
Théotecnus, ce scélérat dont nous avons parlé, n'évita pas le
supplice qu'il méritait. Maximin avait récompensé ses fourberies, par
le gouvernement de la Syrie. Licinius, étant venu à Antioche, fit faire
la recherche de ceux qui avaient abusé de la crédulité du prince; et
entre les autres il fit mettre à la torture les prophètes et les prêtres
de Jupiter Philius: il voulut s'instruire des supercheries dont ils
s'étaient servis pour faire parler ce nouvel oracle. La force des
tourments leur arracha l'aveu de toute l'imposture. Théotecnus en
était l'artisan; ils furent tous punis de mort, et on commença par
Théotecnus. La femme de Maximin fut noyée dans l'Oronte, où elle
avait souvent fait précipiter des femmes chrétiennes. Licinius était
sanguinaire: jusque-là il n'avait puni que des coupables; il y joignit
des innocents, qu'il immola à sa cruauté. Il fit massacrer le fils aîné
de Maximin qui n'avait que huit ans, et sa fille âgée de sept, et déja
fiancée à Candidianus. Sévérianus fils du malheureux Sévère s'était
retiré après la mort de Galérius, dans les états de Maximin. Fidèle à
ce prince, il ne l'avait pas abandonné dans son désastre. Licinius le
fit mourir, sous prétexte qu'après la mort de Maximin, il avait voulu
prendre la pourpre. Candidianus eut le même sort: mais son histoire
est mêlée avec celle de Valéria, dont je vais raconter les infortunes.
Elle était veuve de Galérius. Étant stérile, elle avait
eu pour son mari la complaisance d'adopter xlix. Aventures
Candidianus né d'une concubine, et que son père de Valéria, de
aimait au point de le destiner à l'empire. Ce prince Prisca et de
en mourant avait remis sa femme et ce fils entre Candidianus.
les mains de Licinius, en le priant de leur servir de
protecteur et de père. Prisca femme de Dioclétien Lact. de mort.
et mère de Valéria accompagna sa fille; elle s'était persec. c. 15,
attachée à sa fortune; elle la suivit jusque sur 39, 40, 41, 50 et
l'échafaud. L'histoire ne nous dit point pourquoi 51.
elle vécut séparée de son mari, depuis qu'il eut
quitté la puissance souveraine. Peut-être moins Baluzius, in
philosophe que Dioclétien, préféra-t-elle la cour de Lact. p. 298.
Galérius aux jardins de Salone, et voulut-elle
rester du moins auprès du trône, dont elle était Cuper, in Lact.
descendue à regret. Il paraît d'un autre côté que p. 508.
son mari l'oublia avec l'empire; et dans les
traverses qu'essuyèrent ensemble ces deux princesses, l'histoire ne
donne des larmes à Dioclétien que pour sa fille.
Licinius ne se vit pas plus tôt maître du sort de
Valéria, qu'il lui proposa de l'épouser: c'était un l. Valéria fuit
prince esclave de la volupté et de l'avarice. Valéria Licinius, et est
était belle, et elle donnait à un second mari de persécutée par
grands droits sur l'héritage du premier. Mais Maximin.
insensible à l'amour, et trop fière pour choquer la bienséance qui ne
permettait pas aux impératrices de passer à des secondes noces,
elle se déroba de la cour de Licinius avec Prisca et Candidianus.
Elle crut se mettre à l'abri d'une poursuite importune en se réfugiant
auprès de Maximin. Celui-ci avait une femme et des enfants:
d'ailleurs comme il était fils adoptif de Galérius, il avait jusqu'alors
regardé Valéria comme sa mère. Mais c'était une ame brutale et
emportée, qui prit feu aussitôt avec beaucoup plus de violence que
Licinius. Valéria était encore dans l'année de son deuil: il la fait
solliciter par ses confidents; il lui déclare qu'il est prêt à répudier sa
femme, si elle consent à en prendre la place. Elle répond avec
liberté, qu'encore enveloppée d'habits de deuil, elle ne peut songer
au mariage: que Maximin devait se souvenir que le mari de Valéria
était son père, dont les cendres n'étaient pas encore refroidies: qu'il
ne pouvait sans une cruelle injustice répudier une épouse dont il
était aimé, et qu'elle ne pourrait se flatter elle-même d'un meilleur
traitement: qu'enfin ce serait une démarche déshonorante et sans
exemple, qu'une femme de son rang s'engageât dans un second
mariage. Cette réponse ferme et généreuse, portée à Maximin, le
mit en fureur. Il proscrit Valéria, s'empare de ses biens, lui ôte tous
ses officiers, fait mourir ses eunuques dans les tourments, la bannit
avec sa mère, la promène d'exil en exil; et pour ajouter l'insulte à la
persécution, il fait condamner à mort, sous une fausse accusation
d'adultère, plusieurs dames de la cour, liées d'amitié avec Prisca et
Valéria.
Il y en avait une très-distinguée par sa naissance
et d'un âge avancé. Valéria la respectait comme li. Supplice de
une seconde mère. C'était à ses conseils que trois dames
Maximin attribuait le refus qui le désespérait. Il innocentes.
charge le président Eratinéus, de lui faire subir une
mort déshonorante. Il en joignit à celle-là deux autres, également
nobles, dont l'une avait sa fille à Rome entre les vestales, l'autre
était femme d'un sénateur. Ces deux dernières avaient eu le
malheur de plaire à Maximin par leur beauté; il les punissait de leur
résistance. On les traîna toutes trois devant un tribunal, où leur
condamnation était déja arrêtée. On n'avait trouvé pour se prêter à
cette accusation qu'un juif accusé lui-même d'autres crimes, et qui
se laissa suborner par la promesse de l'impunité. C'était à Nicée que
se jouait cette sanglante tragédie. Le juge qui craignait l'indignation
du peuple se transporta hors de la ville avec une nombreuse escorte
de soldats, de peur d'être lapidé. On met l'accusateur à la torture; il
persiste comme il en était convenu. Les accusées voulaient
répondre; les bourreaux leur ferment la bouche à grands coups de
poing; la sentence est prononcée; on les conduit au supplice entre
deux haies d'archers: tout retentissait de sanglots et de
gémissements; et ce qui redoublait la compassion et les larmes des
assistants, c'était la vue du sénateur dont je viens de parler. Bien
instruit de la fidélité de sa femme, qui en était la malheureuse
victime, il eut la généreuse fermeté de l'assister au supplice, et de
recueillir ses derniers soupirs. Après qu'on leur eut tranché la tête,
on voulait les laisser sans sépulture, mais leurs amis enlevèrent
leurs corps pendant la nuit; on ne tint pas la parole donnée à ce
misérable juif, qui les avait accusées; ayant été mis en croix, par une
perfidie dont la sienne était digne, il révéla à haute voix tout ce
mystère d'iniquité, et mourut en protestant de leur innocence.
Cependant Valéria reléguée dans les déserts de
Syrie, trouva moyen d'instruire de ses malheurs lii. Dioclétien
Dioclétien son père qui vivait encore. Il envoie redemande
aussitôt des exprès à Maximin pour le prier de lui Valéria.
rendre sa fille. On ne l'écoute pas: il redouble ses
instances à plusieurs reprises, et toujours inutilement. Enfin il
dépêche un de ses parents, officier considérable, pour rappeler à
Maximin tout ce qu'il devait à Dioclétien, et lui demander cette justice
comme un effet de sa reconnaissance. Cet officier ne peut rien
obtenir. Ce fut alors que le malheureux père succomba à sa douleur,
comme je l'ai déja raconté.
Maximin ne cessa point de persécuter Valéria.
Cependant, même après sa défaite, lorsqu'il voyait liii. Mort de
sa perte inévitable, et que sa rage n'épargnait pas Candidianus, de
jusqu'aux prêtres de ses dieux, il n'osa lui ôter la Prisca, et de
vie. Candidianus s'était séparé d'elle pour quelque Valéria.
raison qu'on ignore: elle le crut mort pendant quelque temps. Mais
ayant appris qu'il était vivant, et que Licinius était dans Nicomédie,
elle vint avec sa mère rejoindre ce jeune prince; et, sans se faire
connaître, les deux princesses sous un habit déguisé se mêlèrent
parmi les domestiques de Candidianus, pour attendre ce que la
révolution nouvelle produirait dans sa fortune. Candidianus, alors
âgé de seize ans, s'étant présenté devant Licinius à Nicomédie,
donna de la jalousie à ce vieillard défiant, qui crut s'apercevoir que le
fils de Galérius s'attirait trop de considération, et le fit secrètement
assassiner. Valéria prit aussitôt la fuite; le reste de sa vie ne fut
qu'une course continuelle. Errante pendant quinze mois en diverses
provinces, dans l'habillement le plus propre à cacher sa condition,
elle fut enfin reconnue à Thessalonique vers le commencement de
l'an 315, et arrêtée avec sa mère. Ces deux infortunées princesses,
qui n'avaient d'autre crime que leur condition et la chasteté de
Valéria, furent condamnées à mort par les ordres de l'injuste et
impitoyable Licinius; et conduites au supplice au milieu des larmes
inutiles de tout un peuple, elles eurent la tête tranchée: leurs corps
furent jetés dans la mer. Quelques auteurs ont prétendu qu'elles
étaient chrétiennes, et que Dioclétien les avait contraintes d'offrir de
l'encens aux idoles: si cette opinion, qui n'a rien d'assuré, est
véritable, leur religion a été pour elles la plus solide consolation dans
leurs malheurs, comme leurs malheurs ont pu être le moyen le plus
efficace pour expier la faiblesse avec laquelle elles avaient trahi leur
religion.
La révolution des jeux séculaires tombait sur cette
année: c'était la cent dixième depuis qu'ils avaient liv. Jeux
été célébrés par Sévère sous le consulat de Cilon séculaires
et de Libon en 204. Ceux de l'empereur Philippe négligés par
n'avaient été qu'une fête extraordinaire pour Constantin.
solenniser la millième année depuis la fondation
de Rome. L'ordre des cent dix ans anciennement Zos. l. 2, c. 1.
établi subsistait toujours. Constantin laissa passer
le temps de cette cérémonie superstitieuse sans la renouveler.
Zosime en fait de grandes plaintes; il attribue à cette omission la
décadence de l'empire, dont la prospérité, dit-il, était attachée à la
célébration de ces jeux.
La mort de Maximin ne laissait plus de prince
ennemi du christianisme. Les églises s'élevaient, le lv. Paix
culte divin se célébrait en liberté, et la piété libérale universelle de
de Constantin y ajoutait l'éclat et la magnificence. l'église.
Les païens jaloux de cette gloire firent courir un
prétendu oracle en vers grecs, qui portait que la Euseb. hist.
religion chrétienne ne durerait que trois cent

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The Psychology of Respect:

Advances in Motivation Science, Volume 3

1. THE MYSTERY OF TRUST

But trust presents a mystery. It may be essential in everyday human life,

and giving, and so some percentage of participants in the second

Fetchenhauer & Dunning, 2009; Schl€ osser, Fetchenhauer, & Dunning, in

2. THE ROLE OF RESPECT

2.1 Role in Trust Behavior

2.2 Other Social Behaviors

2.2.1 Conﬂict of Interest

to allow the client to appropriately weigh the expert’s advice. Doing so

2.2.2 Reactions to Apologies

3. BUT IS RESPECT DISRESPECTED?

colleagues violating procedures or putting patients in danger (Maxﬁeld,

3.1 Interpersonal Confrontation

4. THE PSYCHOLOGICAL ANATOMY OF RESPECT

4.2 Want Versus Should

4.3 Emotional Proﬁle

that people choose prosocial actions to achieve a “warm glow” of happiness.

Thus, trust decisions appear to be driven exactly by the emotions that

4.4 Managing Actions Versus Outcomes

probability of its fruition. Economic theorists, following a rational actor

However, people’s choices famously change in the trolley scenario if the

4.5 Approach Versus Avoidance

in a prosocial waydthey experience, for example, a warm glow of giving

4.6 Social Versus Moral Norm

5. ISSUES FOR FUTURE RESEARCH

5.1 How Aware Are People of the Norm?

5.2 Is There a Norm to Be Respectable?

Apparently, the requirement that the help-seeker be respectable has just

5.3 How Far Is the Reach of Underlying Mechanisms?

5.4 What Are the Underlying Neural Mechanisms?

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