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CORRUPTION,
INSTITUTIONS,
AND FRAGILE STATES
HANNA SAMIR KASSAB AND
JONATHAN D. ROSEN
 Corruption, Institutions, and Fragile States

“This book effectively demonstrates the severity of the threat posed by organized
crime to states across the globe. The authors show how, in the twenty-first cen-
tury, organized crime crosses borders and challenges not only state institutions
but also global security. Outstanding for its empirical depth and comparative
breadth, this book is a major contribution.”
—Cynthia McClintock, George Washington University, USA

“In this timely and ambitious volume, Hanna Samir Kassab and Jonathan D.
Rosen explore the corrosive effects of the transnational supply chains of organ-
ized crime networks. In so doing, they focus on corruption and weak state insti-
tutions in a regional context and make interesting and important cross-regional
comparisons.”
—Victor J. Hinojosa, Baylor University, USA

“In this important book, Hanna Samir Kassab and Jonathan D. Rosen integrate
the concepts of corruption, institutions and fragile states. The interplay between
corruption and deinstitutionalization, the weakening of states and the destabi-
lization of neighborhoods in which they exist, allowing ‘permissive space’ for
transnational criminal and terrorist organizations, present conceptual problems
engaged here in a unique multidisciplinary fashion. Cast as it is in global terms,
the analysis offered by Rosen and Kassab allows for comparative evaluation across
regions, highlighting common patterns by which ideations and structures meant
to ensure the integrity of institutions become compromised, contributing to the
insecurity known to so many areas of the world.”
—Bradford McGuinn, University of Miami, USA
Hanna Samir Kassab · Jonathan D. Rosen

Corruption,
Institutions,
and Fragile States
Hanna Samir Kassab Jonathan D. Rosen
Department of Political Science Holy Family University
East Carolina University Philadelphia, PA, USA
Greenville, NC, USA

ISBN 978-3-030-04311-7 ISBN 978-3-030-04312-4 (eBook)

https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-04312-4

Library of Congress Control Number: 2018962257

© The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer
Nature Switzerland AG, part of Springer Nature 2019
This work is subject to copyright. All rights are solely and exclusively licensed by the
Publisher, whether the whole or part of the material is concerned, specifically the rights
of translation, reprinting, reuse of illustrations, recitation, broadcasting, reproduction
on microfilms or in any other physical way, and transmission or information storage and
retrieval, electronic adaptation, computer software, or by similar or dissimilar methodology
now known or hereafter developed.
The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc. in this
publication does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such names are
exempt from the relevant protective laws and regulations and therefore free for general use.
The publisher, the authors and the editors are safe to assume that the advice and
information in this book are believed to be true and accurate at the date of publication.
Neither the publisher nor the authors or the editors give a warranty, express or implied,
with respect to the material contained herein or for any errors or omissions that may have
been made. The publisher remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published
maps and institutional affiliations.

Cover image: © Alexander Kirch/EyeEm/Getty Images

Cover design by Oscar Spigolon

This Palgrave Macmillan imprint is published by the registered company Springer Nature
Switzerland AG
The registered company address is: Gewerbestrasse 11, 6330 Cham, Switzerland
 To our wonderful siblings:
Lea Miladeh and Elias Samir Kassab and Mark and Elissa Rosen
Thanks for all your support
 Acknowledgements

We would like to thank the wonderful staff at Palgrave Macmillan for

this opportunity. It has been a pleasure working with the press.
In addition, we would like to thank the comments of two anonymous
peer reviewers.
Finally, a special thanks to our respective institutions: Holy Family
University and East Carolina University.

vii
 Contents

1 Introduction 1

2 Theory of Institutional Change 23

3 Latin America and Lebanon: A Comparative

Study of Fragility 43

4 Central Asia and Middle East 65

5 Africa 85

6 Mexico and Central America 105

7 South America 135

8 Russia and the International System 161

9 Conclusion: Police, Judicial, and Prison Reform 179

Selected Bibliography 197

Index 199

ix
 List of Figures

Fig. 5.1 Corruption perceptions index score (2017)

(Source “Corruption Perceptions Index 2017,”
Transparency International, February 21, 2018) 87
Fig. 5.2 Heroin seizures in West Africa (2006) (by kilograms)
(Source Created by authors with data from United Nations
Office on Drugs and Crime [UNODC], Drug Trafficking as
a Security Threat in West Africa [New York, NY: UNODC,
2008]; original data from UNODC Individual Seizures
Database) 88
Fig. 5.3 Destination of heroin seizures originating from West Africa
(2000–2007) (Source Created by authors with data from
United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime [UNODC],
Drug Trafficking as a Security Threat in West Africa
[New York, NY: UNODC, 2008]; original data from
UNODC Individual Seizures Database) 89
Fig. 5.4 Foreigners arrested in South Africa in 2005, by citizenship
(Source Created by authors with data from the United
Nations Office on Drugs and Crime [UNODC], Drug
Trafficking as a Security Threat in West Africa [New York,
NY: UNODC, 2008]) 91
Fig. 5.5 Global Boko Haram attacks (2011–2016) (Source Created
by authors with data from the Chicago Project on Security
& Threats) 92
Fig. 5.6 Trends in suicide terror attacks in Nigeria (2011–2016)
(Source Created by authors with data from the Chicago
Project on Security & Threats) 93

xi
xii    List of Figures

Fig. 6.1 Homicide rate per 100,000 (2016) (Mexican Cities)

(Source Created by authors with data from Kimberly Heinle,
Octavio Rodríguez Ferreira, and David A. Shirk, Drug
Violence in Mexico: Data and Analysis Through 2016 [San
Diego, CA: University of San Diego, 2017]; original data
from SNSP and CONAPO) 107
Fig. 6.2 Approval rating of President Peña Nieto handling the
following tasks (Source Margaret Vice and Hanyu Chwe,
“Poor Ratings for Peña Nieto, political parties,”
Pew Research Center, September 14, 2017) 109
Fig. 6.3 Percentage of population that believes the following issues
are big problems in Mexico (Source Created by authors with
data from Margaret Vice and Hanyu Chwe, “Mexicans are
Downbeat About Their Country’s Direction,” Pew Research
Center, September 14, 2017) 110
Fig. 6.4 Homicide rate per 100,000 (2016 and 2017) (Source Created
by authors with data from Tristan Clavel, “InSight Crime’s
2017 Homicide Round-Up,” InSight Crime, January 19,
2018; David Gagne, “InSight Crime’s 2016 Homicide
Round-up,” InSight Crime, January 16, 2017) 113
Fig. 6.5 Apprehensions unaccompanied children (by country).
Note FY is Fiscal Year. FYTD is from October 1, 2017, to
March 31, 2018 (Source Created by authors with data from
“U.S. Border Patrol Southwest Border Apprehensions
by Sector FY2018,” US Customs and Border Protection) 121
Fig. 6.6 Immigration and customs enforcement arrests (FY 2017)
(Source Created by authors with data from Kristen Bialik,
“ICE Arrests Went Up in 2017, with Biggest Increases in
Florida, Northern Texas, Oklahoma,” Pew Research Center,
February 8, 2018) 121
Fig. 7.1 Corruption perceptions index score (0–100) (Source Created
by authors with data from “Corruption Perceptions Index
2017,” Transparency International, February 21, 2018) 136
Fig. 7.2 Perceptions that more than half of every politician is corrupt
(Source Created by authors with data from Molllie J. Cohen,
Noam Lupu, and Elizabeth J. Zechmeister, The Political
Culture of Democracy in The Americas 2016/2017 [Nashville,
TN: Vanderbilt University, Latino Public Opinion Project,
2017]) 137
Fig. 7.3 Coca cultivation in Colombia (hectares) (Source Created by
authors with data from United Nations Office on Drugs and
 List of Figures    xiii

Crime [UNODC], Colombia: Monitoreo de territorios afectados

por cultivos ilícitos 2016 [Bogotá, CO: UNODC, 2017]) 140
Fig. 7.4 Potential cocaine production in Colombia (Source Created
by authors with data from Drug Enforcement Administration
[DEA], Colombian Cocaine Production Expansion Contributes
to Rise in Supply in the United States [Springfield, VA: DEA,
2017]; estimates are from the US government and the
Colombian Observatory on Drugs) 141
Fig. 7.5 Number of murders of human rights defenders (Colombia)
(Source Created by authors with data from “15th Anniversary
of Plan Colombia: Learning from Its Successes and Failures,”
Washington Office on Latin America, February 1, 2016;
original data from Somos Defensores) 143
Fig. 7.6 Extortion in Colombia (Source Created by authors with data
from “15th Anniversary of Plan Colombia: Learning from Its
Successes and Failures,” Washington Office on Latin America,
February 1, 2016; original data from the Ministry of Defense
of Colombia) 143
Fig. 7.7 “Armed Actions” by the FARC (Source Created by authors
with data from “15th Anniversary of Plan Colombia: Learning
from Its Successes and Failures,” Washington Office on Latin
America, February 1, 2016; original data from the Fundación
Paz y Reconciliación) 144
Fig. 7.8 Number of Venezuelans living in the United States
(Source Created by authors with data from “Origins and
Destinations of the World’s Migrants, 1990–2017,” Pew
Research Center, February 28, 2018) 147
Fig. 9.1 US prison population rate (per 100,000) (Source Created
by authors with data from “World Prison Brief,” Institute
for Criminal Policy Research) 184
Fig. 9.2 A comparison of prison population rates per 100,000 people
(Source Created by authors with data from “World Prison
Brief,” Institute for Criminal Policy Research) 185
Fig. 9.3 Prison population rates per 100,000 an assortment of
countries. Note Data from most recent years with available
information (Source Created by authors with data from,
“World Prison Brief,” Institute for Criminal Policy Research) 185
Fig. 9.4 Percentage of pre-trail detainees in prison. Note Data from
most recent years with available information
(Source Created by authors with data from, “World
Prison Brief,” Institute for Criminal Policy Research) 186
xiv    List of Figures

Fig. 9.5 Countries ranked with high levels of impunity. Note Zero
means impunity does not exist, while 100 signifies the
highest level of impunity (Source Juan Antonio Le Clercq
Ortega and Gerardo Rodríguez Sánchez Lara, Global
Impunity Dimensiones: GII-2017 Global Impunity Index
[Puebla, Mexico: University of the Americas Puebla, 2017]) 187
 List of Tables

Table 1.1 Development, corruption and regional insecurity 11

Table 4.1 Percentage of household making bribes 69

xv
 CHAPTER 1

Introduction

Fragile states and extractive institutions have a negative impact on under-

development, leading to corruption and the inevitable success of organ-
ized crime. Building on Daron Acemoglu and James A. Robinson, this
work argues that inclusive political institutions are necessary for states
to develop. Such institutions provide the confidence for people (both
within the state and without) to invest in themselves and in businesses.
Such investment hires people and creates tax revenue necessary to build
state infrastructure.1 However, in states and regions where corruption
is endemic and institutionalized due to the overwhelming presence of
organized crime, how is it possible to have institutional change? Further,
if organized crime is pervasive, how will it be possible to convince people
to move away from supplying illegal goods given the extravagant profit,
and simultaneously, lack of alternatives due to underdevelopment?2 This
book examines this challenge of institutional change and reform within
states and regions that suffer from endemic corruption and underdevel-
opment,3 creating fertile soil for organized crime and other non-state
actors to challenge the authority, legitimacy, sovereignty and ultimately,
the power of state actors.
This book seeks to understand corruption and organized crime
in a systemically way, looking at its spread across states, regions, and
­ultimately continents. Such a range illustrates the idea of systemic reach,
a non-state threat that is distributed across state is fundamental to this
study.4 Corruption is carried out by a number of actors. This book

© The Author(s) 2019 1

H. S. Kassab and J. D. Rosen,
Corruption, Institutions, and Fragile States,
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-04312-4_1
2 H. S. KASSAB AND J. D. ROSEN

focuses on the phenomenon of organized crime and the formation of

gang and drug-related violence. This work takes a comprehensive look
of the world, understanding the prime mechanisms and environments
that encourage and sustain the formation of these groups. If one state
becomes a haven for illicit activity, then one could expect corruption to
spread to neighboring states as organized criminal networks try to get
their product to target markets. Supplier markets are usually located
in the underdeveloped and developing world, in countries like Brazil,
Colombia, and Mexico. Yet major demand markets are located in more
developed, advanced industrialized states like the US and member
states of the European Union. Indeed, the USA is the largest consumer
market for drugs in the world.5 For cocaine to enter Chicago, Illinois
in the USA from Colombia, or for heroin to arrive from Afghanistan to
Paris, France, organized criminals must create illegal supply chains that
extend from production line locals to the consumer. In this sense, it is
important to note the power of organized criminal networks and corrup-
tion in the formulation of these supply chains, and the linkage industries
that spin-off from the development of these illicit markets.
Fragile states provide the necessary rich environment for organ-
ized crime. This is because fragile states are prone to corruption due
to the nature of political institutions as well as underdevelopment to
tackle organized crime as well as other non-state threats.6 Fragile states
are those that lack the ability to operate freely to neutralize internal or
external threats to sovereignty and autonomy.7 Threats may come from
other states and their militaries, but also from non-state actors like ter-
rorist networks and organized crime. They may be of the non-violent
variety (e.g., economic, environmental, or health-related issues).8 In
other words, fragile and weak states lack the capacity to be resilient in
face of these dangers. Hanna Samir Kassab argues that resilience is cru-
cial. Resilience is the ability to defeat threats of any variety to survive as a
unitary state actor.9 Weak and fragile units find it difficult to fend off the
influence of organized criminal networks due to mechanisms that cor-
rupt the state, its regime and its government. When one state is pene-
trated by an organized criminal network, its behavior will be determined,
not by the state itself, but by the leaders of those organized criminal
networks. This actively hurts the autonomy and sovereignty of the state,
making it fragile rather than effective, and in extreme cases, could lead to
potential state failure. A failed state is one that cannot provide any secu-
rity or services to its people and its geography is ultimately controlled by
 1 INTRODUCTION 3

members of organized criminal groups or terrorist networks. The cen-

tralized authority of that state is completely unable to establish control
or dispense justice, and cannot be relied upon to do this effectively given
its loss of legitimacy over non-state competitors.
Inevitably associated with fragile states is persistent economic under-
development due to extractive political institutions. The relationship
between these two phenomena cannot be studied separately.10 Extractive
political institutions are neither designed to distribute wealth equally
nor are they able to drive innovation, investment, and reinvestment.
These institutions allow for the enrichment of a minority of people at
the expense of others. With wealth floating to the top, persistent eco-
nomic underdevelopment becomes a pertinent issue. Hence, the main
desire of this book is to understand the impact that fragile states and
extractive institutions have on underdevelopment also noting the impact
of corruption in the success of organized crime. Existing research shows
that impoverished societies are prone to illegal activity.11 Moreover,
once organized crime penetrates a society, there will be further increases
in political instability which strains the ability of the state to survive. In
other words, organized crime promotes fragility as “drug production
helps weaken states, fuel civil conflicts; drug revenues support insurgents,
other armed non-state actors, and corrupt officials.”12 As a result, eco-
nomic underdevelopment complicates fragility further by opening the
society up to organized crime, which further corrupts the state, etc.
Building on previous work, Jonathan D. Rosen and Hanna S. Kassab
contend that economic development may “promote fragility due to a
lack of democratic political instability from corruption.”13 Consequently,
this book has two purposes: (1) to describe the difficulty of institutional
change given the power of organized criminal groups (2) highlight
their power to corrupt states and regions. This topic is of primary impor-
tance, as the wealthier these groups become, the more powerful they
become to challenge the state, its institutions, and those of surrounding
regions. Any attempt at pushback may lead to violent resistance as in the
example of the current Mexican state’s effort to neutralize the cartels or
Colombia in the 1990s.
This book will take a global look at this phenomenon, illustrating the
growing systemic importance of corruption as it affects state survival. It
highlights major trends and changes in hotspots around the world such
as Central and South America. In these regions, trade in illicit goods is
still remarkably robust in the face of state repression. The reason for this
4 H. S. KASSAB AND J. D. ROSEN

is the continued existence of fragile states and extractive institutions.

If these mechanisms remain, organized crime will continue to be resil-
ient in the face of repression. Organized crime remains as long as states
are easy to penetrate. Crime groups may move from one fragile state
to another like in the case of Mexican drug cartels moving to Central
America. We will also illustrate major developments in the Middle East
and Central Asia. In this region, the divide between terrorism and organ-
ized crime is increasingly blurred. Moreover, as the West and Russia con-
tinue its fight against Islamic fundamentalism through physical violence,
it does little to improve the state’s ability to fight corruption and procliv-
ity for illegality. These three regions pose a significant threat to the inter-
national system due to persistent fragility of states within these regions.
The hypothesis in this book suggests a causal relationship and general-
ize patterns of repeated behavior to underscore the relationship between
fragile states, and extractive political institutions, and corruption in our
contemporary international order.

Theoretical Framework:
Research Design and Hypothesis Testing
If corruption is endemic within a state and its political system, economic
development may ultimately suffer over time as organized criminal net-
works penetrate the state. This may cause further increases in structural
violence as well as other forms of violence, worsening state fragility.
Economic development looks at more equal distribution of wealth as
opposed to concentration by signifying improved living standard distrib-
uted across a state’s population.14 Corruption does not facilitate this as
those with the ability to bribe will be allowed to invest with little regula-
tion to guide them.15 Those that cannot afford will be competing on an
uneven playing field. States suffering from corruption may never actu-
ally enjoy economic development as corruption is a mechanism which
promotes non-growth.16 Due to this, the state could become prone to
gang violence or other forms of violence used to either protect an ille-
gal business and its supply chain, or to attack and ultimately destroy a
state. Worsening fragility leads to state failure which is detrimental to the
state’s citizens and those of the region.
A major consequence of one state’s corruption is its contagion effect.
The issues associated with organized crime and corruption may spread
to neighboring states within that region allowing for increased insecurity
 1 INTRODUCTION 5

across borders. As the wealth and power of organized crime networks

increase, the more likely such wealth and power will be used to pene-
trate state institutions. One major reason is that illicit products must
make it to a consumer market. For instance, cartels in Colombia have
been exporting cocaine to the US since the 1970s.17 However, there
production and refinement may occur elsewhere like Bolivia and Peru.18
Heroin travels from Afghanistan through several states (e.g., Russia or
the Balkans) until it arrives in Europe, its major consumer market. These
transhipment states all suffer from corruption as smugglers must, from
time to time, bribe officials to avoid imprisonment but also to move
their product to market.19 It is thus important to study the subject of
illicit activity, corruption and its effect on political institutions by taking
a regional approach. If one state’s institutions are affected by corrup-
tion and illicit activity, it is reasonable to assume surrounding states will
undergo similar outcomes.
The unit of study for this book is ultimately geographical regions.
As such, the book is divided into chapters that will illustrate the various
interconnected relationships between states as they serve as a geographic
point of transport for illegal products and payment. Therefore, illicit sup-
ply chains as they relate to these regional territories serve as the foun-
dation of this study. Illicit supply chains comprise any “activities such as
the procurement, production, transportation, sales, and distribution of
prohibited commodities, as well as specialized processes of transnational
smuggling, money laundering, and corrupting government officials are
central to the global flow of illegal goods and services.”20 From this defi-
nition, we can trace the method by which criminals use corruption to
control the stream of illegal goods to consumer countries and the result-
ing payment for products rendered.
The focus of the book is the study of corruption and its impact on
development. Many legitimate businesses engage in corruption (e.g.,
companies may bribe to win government contracts). However, this
book hopes to concentrate on illegal businesses and organized crime.
Organized crime is the major cause of corruption as corruption is a part
of the cost of doing illegal business.21 Organized crime is defined as:

the product of a self-perpetuating criminal conspiracy to wring exorbitant

profits from our society by any means – fair or foul, legal and illegal. It
survives on fear and corruption. By other means, it obtains a high degree
of immunity from the law. It is totalitarian in organization. A way of life, it
6 H. S. KASSAB AND J. D. ROSEN

imposes rigid discipline on underlings who do the dirty work while the top
men of organized crime are generally insulated from the criminal act and
the consequent danger of prosecution.22

Corruption can be understood and appreciated as part of the power

mechanism of organized crime. While the use of violence and fear is
another, the more implicit or hidden form of economic power of these
non-state actors may be considered a more successful tool for success in
the long term.
Given these illustrations, the hypothesis of the book is as follows:
If corruption is a tool used by organized crime to protect illicit supply
chains, then entire region’s political stability and economic develop-
ment may be threatened. The book’s recommendation suggests reforms
in three major areas encompassing political institutions: police reform,
judicial reform, and prison reform. This should be done to avoid a state
succumbing to organized criminals or terrorist networks, violent coups,
revolutions, or any other destructive form of replacing one government
or regime for another.

Variables and Aspects of Study

From this description, it is apparent that several variables will be studied
to fully appreciate the role of corruption and organized states on fragile
states, its institutions and underdevelopment. In an attempt at producing
a theoretical model that posits causality, this work isolates the issue of
corruption as it is used by organized criminals to protect their position
and project further wealth. This act influences levels of corruption in a
state, reducing the power and productivity of independent judicial sys-
tems of already weak or fragile states which inevitably contributes to the
worsening of fragile states given increased levels of poverty, underdevel-
opment, and ultimately further fragility leading to outright state failure.

Independent Variables
Weak Political Institutions, Corruption, and Organized Crime
The purpose of this book is to analyze the impact of corruption and
organized crime on the state and its status of development. For a state
to be prone to corruption, it must already suffer from weak politi-
cal institutions. Employing Josep H. Colomer’s definition, institutions
 1 INTRODUCTION 7

“shape actors’ strategies, and that the latter produce collective outcomes.
Institutions provide information, opportunities, incentives, and con-
straints for both citizens and leaders choosing certain strategies, and it is
only through the intermediation of actors’ strategic decisions that collec-
tive outcomes can be explained.”23 In other words, institutions encour-
age certain legitimate behaviors while discouraging others through the
promotion of the rule of law. Laws constrain all people within a state,
both members of government and civilians, and derive for us expected
behaviors that then facilitate equal opportunity, property rights, respect
for democratic procedures, especially during elections. If a state has weak
institutions, it must already be corrupt or suffer from a history of corrupt
practices; states must already be easy to bribe and debase.
There are a number of factors to consider why a state might possess
weak institutions. A state may have weak institutions if it has little expe-
rience with democracy and self-rule. In the case of newly democratic
countries, this is quite clear, illustrated in Transparency International’s
Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) that measures corruption across
states.24 Most authoritarian governments and newly independent coun-
tries find themselves ranked as highly corrupt. Pseudo-democratic states
(those with democratic practices but clearly authoritarian) also find
themselves ranked higher.
A state may also be prone to corruption if its institutions prevent
equal competition among citizens for positions in government. Samuel
Huntington describes any trade-off between wealth for power as cor-
rupt.25 This makes it easy for organized crime to infiltrate a government
as it is easier to bribe. The concept of extractive political institutions
defined by Acemoglu and Robinson underscores this study’s independ-
ent variable of weak institutional capacity and its relationship with cor-
ruption: “Extractive political institutions concentrate power in the hands
of a narrow elite and place few constraints on the exercise of this power.
Economic institutions are then often structured by this elite to extract
resources from the rest of the society. Extractive economic institutions
thus naturally accompany extractive political institutions. In fact, they
must inherently depend on extractive political institutions for their sur-
vival.”26 Weak institutions as described here may help create an informal
economy which may or not be of the illegal variety. When governments
cannot provide public goods or services, the state’s formal economy
will suffer. This will worsen the problem as tax revenues decrease, forc-
ing further budget cuts. To survive, people will turn to other means, not
only leading to illegality, but also to the formulation of gangs as police
8 H. S. KASSAB AND J. D. ROSEN

can no longer provide security.27 This may cause increasing violence over
time as gangs may try to best one another. It could also lead to further
corruption, as the state may face pressure from elites, other citizens as
well as governments to curb violence. For this book, institutional weak-
ness can be summarized as a fundamental lack of enforcement of the law
as well as changing such laws for political purposes to defend the position
of a person or party in a government.28
Extractive political institutions are antithetical to a more develop-
ment-friendly political institution referred to as inclusive political insti-
tutions. These institutions allow a level playing field and equal protection
under the law, public goods and services. To be considered inclusive, a state
must work to combat corruption rather than encourage it.29 Extractive and
weak political institutions, breed underdevelopment. The more underdevel-
oped the state, the more likely the state will suffer from organized criminal
activity as people turn to illicit markets to survive. The CPI observes the
deep connection between corruption and underdevelopment: “corruption
leads to an unequal distribution of power in society which, in turn, trans-
lates into an unequal distribution of wealth and opportunity.”30
The more corrupt a state, the more likely such practices will spread
if surrounding states themselves suffer from weak and corrupt institu-
tions. Corruption spreads as actors seek to defend illegal businesses as
they expand into other territories. It creates porous borders, allowing for
people and goods to pass with little resistance from law enforcement. In
the case of developing states, corruption is a necessary tool of the gov-
ernment as well. Governments of fragile states may cooperate with other
corrupt governments rather than to challenge organized crime. Doing
business with organized criminal networks may enrich government offi-
cials and preserve their lives rather than challenge or neutralize these
groups. Furthermore, once such arrangement is made with organized
criminal networks, the state may still pursue its goals such as survival and
development albeit with a serious internal challenge. The issue is wors-
ened if any attempt by an external actor, such as a consumer state, puts
pressure on the corrupt state to neutralize its corruption and organized
crime problem. This became quite clear in the cases of Colombia and
Mexico with US pressure against drug cartels. This creates problems
for the cartels but also for citizens as cartels will use violence to protect
themselves, their businesses, and their international supply chains.
As a result, corruption is altogether necessary to protect illicit busi-
nesses. Corruption assists in crafting “ties between criminal groups and
 1 INTRODUCTION 9

public officials play a crucial role in facilitating criminal activity and

creating a culture of impunity. Corrupt security forces can keep crimi-
nal groups informed, shield them from law enforcement operations,
and facilitate drug shipments, while ties to politicians and local elites
lend criminals a facade of legitimacy.”31 Illegal infrastructure listed here
bolsters the wealth and power of criminal groups and they may inevi-
tably seek to expand their business in bordering states. This is verified
by the CPI when broken down into regions. Northern hemispheres
with strong political institutions enjoy low levels of corruption while
regions in Africa, particularly areas clustered around heavily corrupt
states, suffer from high levels of corruption. For instance, Somalia, Libya,
Afghanistan, Venezuela, Russia, and Uganda are ranked in the “highly
corrupt” category. These states are all flanked by high to medium ranked
corrupted states.32 This is similar within the African continent. As a
result, this book will discuss major illicit commodities in every region:
drugs, humans/organs, counterfeit goods related to corruption and
weak institutions. This work is organized by region rather than by state
to highlight the systemic power of corruption on political institutions
which may begin in one state and then spread to other states. As a result,
there may ultimately be a negative impact on development.

Dependent Variables
Weak States, Fragile States and Failed States
and Regional Insecurity
State power is derived from economic development, the state’s ability
to produce wealth and use resources optimally. Structural Realists like
Fareed Zakaria argue that the wealthier the state, the more powerful
that state then becomes.33 The wealthier and more powerful the state,
the more effective it is in handling threats against itself, crime and cor-
ruption included. States like the US serve as an example. Amid fi ­ ghting
against the Italian Mafia, it initiated RICO (Racketeer Influenced and
Corrupt Organizations Act) to weaken and ultimately defeat them and
their efforts to defy institutional capacity, specifically law and order, in
the US. The opposite then follows: the less developed the state, the
less powerful it becomes. Weak states are those that lack the autonomy
to neutralize external and internal threats on their own.34 Those threats
may be economic, environmental, political (e.g., terrorism), criminal
10 H. S. KASSAB AND J. D. ROSEN

(e.g., organized crime), health, or otherwise. Weak states are vulnera-

ble to organized crime due to the lack of institutional power, whether it
be due to institutional inexperience from being recently independent or
recently authoritarian. They are easily infiltrated by non-state actors with
significant wealth and power behind them. For this reason, weak states,
due to their already weak nature, are easy prey to these non-state actors.
The more corrupt a state is the more institutionalized corruption
becomes and the more dominant criminal actors become. The more
institutionalized a weak state becomes, the less democratic it becomes,
and the less politically inclusive its institutions become. There may be
relationships between the state and criminal groups as they begin to
work together to pursue goals of mutual wealth. The effectiveness of a
state to solve issues such as creating a friendly investment environment
for legitimate enterprise will become more tenuous. Any attempt at
pursuing economic development may be crowded out by illegal invest-
ment. As a result, the well-being of citizens may suffer. Violence may
also spike as well, as organized criminal groups battle for supremacy, try-
ing to solve issues outside of the justice system. In other circumstances,
like in Mexico, state and criminal networks negotiated a way to coexist
and crackdowns led to extreme violence.35 In either situation, organized
crime leads to less development and less state effectiveness over time.
The weaker the state gets, the more fragile it becomes.
There is a certain degree of nuance between the terms weak states,
fragile states and failed states. This book considers fragile states as those
already penetrated by corruption and are sometimes on the edge of col-
lapse.36 While weak states still have a government and state regime in
place in their attempt to fight against competitors to authority, frag-
ile states experience more than one center of authority (including the
state).37 More than one source of power reduces the state’s capability to
regulate the activities within the geographic territory due to competing
sources of authority, whether organized crime networks, terrorist groups
or otherwise.38 Failed states are those that the state has capitulated in the
face of organized crime or terrorist groups. It is a situation where the
state is no longer in control of large swaths of territory. Citizens within
these areas are subject to the laws and regulation of criminal actors. Syria
and Iraq in the face of the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria are a prime
example of state failure.
A weak state may devolve into a fragile state given corruption or any
other form of attacks in an effort to make the state in question weaker
 1 INTRODUCTION 11

and subordinate to a non-state actor. A fragile state may devolve into a

fragile state given further attacks and infiltration. Regarding ­corruption,
there are varying degrees of relationships between the state and o ­ rganized
criminal groups that describe these categories of state typology. Peter
Lupsha summarizes three stages of corruption by relating it to the sta-
tus of state capacity: the predatory stage, the parasitical stage, and finally,
the symbiotic stage. The predatory stage describes the ability of a state’s
security apparatus to clamp down on criminal networks trying to engage
the political and economic system.39 However, as these illegal networks
become wealthier and more powerful, they may attempt to increase
their presence in the state to bolster and secure their position and sup-
ply chain. Lupsha calls this the parasitical stage given that the organized
criminal network may soon become as powerful as the state itself. They
may no longer be concerned about law enforcement as they do not fear
the state. In other words, their position is solidified in relation to the
state.40 The highest stage of corruption in a state is described as the sym-
biotic stage. The symbiotic stage illustrates that the state is no longer the
holder of the monopoly of the use of violence as criminal networks have
become the state: “the traditional tools of the state to enforce law will no
longer work, for organized crime has become a part of the state, a state
within the state”41 (see Table 1.1).
Corruption has a negative impact on economic development and thus
determines a state’s status as either effective, weak, fragile, or failed. The
weaker and more corrupt the state, the more fragile it becomes which
only increases its probability of failure.
Fragile states are those that are plagued by severe institutional weak-
ness and could be on the verge of state failure. Failed states present a
clear and present danger to regional security and ultimately interna-
tional security if nothing is done.42 State failure occurs when a state
becomes ungovernable, overrun by organized crime and other non-state

Table 1.1 Development, corruption and regional insecurity

State development Corruption type Regional danger

Weak Predatory Medium

Fragile Parasitical High
Failed Symbiotic Extreme

Source Created by authors

12 H. S. KASSAB AND J. D. ROSEN

actors (e.g., terrorist groups), then surrounding states will become vic-
tims especially if they themselves are already weak and vulnerable.43
Failed states “provide opportunities for actors outside the government
– whether religious fundamentalists, disaffected citizens, or merely
opportunists seeking power – to attempt to seize the state apparatus
by violent means.”44 Like Lebanon after 1975, contemporary Somalia,
Afghanistan, and possibly the future of Honduras among other failed
states in the developing world, non-state actors have the strength to
organize and compete directly with a state’s monopoly on the use of vio-
lence. When that state succumbs to these actors, it is altogether possible
that that state becomes a center for organized crime, terrorism and other
illicit activities.45 As a result, failed and fragile states present a real dan-
ger for all states within the international system. Even more serious is
the contagion effect weak, fragile, and failed states have on other already
weak and fragile states.
In summary, the causal yet mutually reinforcing mechanisms that
drive fragility and underdevelopment is corruption: The more corrupt
the state, the more likely that state is to be fragile and underdeveloped.
Fragile states are underdeveloped as they do not possess the capability
to combat challenges to sovereignty. The resources that allow this capa-
bility is derived from developmental capacity building. Economic devel-
opment encourages the use of resources that could very well build the
public goods necessary to provide a higher quality of life for citizens.
Corruption hinders economic development as resources are used for the
personal gain of those already wealthy persons in power rather than the
wider community. In this way, the state becomes impotent in the face of
actual challenges to sovereignty, encouraging crime, political, and eco-
nomic instability and general chaos. Said differently, the more corrupt
a state, the more likely is the state to be a haven for crime, furthering
disparities between rich and power and, as a result, eroding the ability of
that state to protect institutions providing law and order. Judicial institu-
tions are instead used to protect state-sponsored criminal enterprises.

Theory Building and Case Studies: Systemic Power

of Corruption Across Regions

This book’s major contribution is the expansion of corruption across

states emanating from already corrupt states. Each chapter will look at
one major region and how organized crime can spread. For instance,
Colombian cartels need to corrupt other states to get their product to
 1 INTRODUCTION 13

the US market. This causes institutions to be weak systemically, regard-

less of borders. In the book People, States and Fear, Barry Buzan con-
tends that a state’s security is entangled with its geographical region
referred to as a regional security complex. He coins the term Defense
Dilemma that conceptualizes contradictions in security. Things deemed
necessary for national security, or defense, can also be seen as an offen-
sive measure such as armies, tanks, or otherwise.46 Similarly, we can
understand the problem of terrorist networks operating in states in rela-
tion to the region. The occurrences in one state will affect the health and
welfare of the region. Corruption through organized crime may spread
from one state to another, as illicit supply chains develop, to get products
physically out to its target market. This book thus draws from interna-
tional relations theory while simultaneously opening the state to internal
mechanisms, studying domestic political institutions. Institutional break-
down is thus a systemic force that must be studied to appreciate national
security under globalization.
Under conditions of globalization, the wealth and power non-state
actors and state actors that are inherently corrupt (maligned by organ-
ized crime or terrorist networks) may potentially translate into systemic
reach. Systemic reach is the idea that systemic vulnerabilities and threats
emanating from failed states (also weak and fragile states) could breach
borders of other, more developed and more powerful states, ultimately
increasing insecurity regionally.47 States react and expend power to
deal with these issues, leading to further reprisals by those groups that
demonstrate irrepressible in the face of state opposition. Groups like the
Islamic State, Al Qaeda, the Taliban, and the mix of cartels in Central
and South America have all proved resilient in the face of opposition by
the domestic judicial system and great power backing. This book pos-
its that the institutionalization of corruption does assist in this resil-
ience. The power to bribe and to strike fear into the hearts of policy
makers are two factors that make corruption a successful strategy. The
Gramscian formulation for power has thus been adopted by corrupting
agents. Power can be used to either force actor behavior either through
coercion and consent. In other words, either the government official
takes the bribe or suffers death. In Colombia, this is referred to plata o
plomo, which is translated from Spanish into English as silver or lead.48
This practice has proved successful in the face of law enforcement and
acts to weaken a state’s institutions in favor of organized crime. As such,
the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) of the US defines organized
crime as “a self-perpetuating, structured and disciplined association
14 H. S. KASSAB AND J. D. ROSEN

of individuals or groups, combined together for the purpose of obtain-

ing monetary or commercial gains or profits, wholly or in part by ille-
gal means, while protecting their activities through a pattern of graft and
corruption.”49 The organizational element combined with power allows
these networks significant capability to build transnational networks.
The more corrupt that state becomes, the more powerful that non-state
group becomes, and this ultimately destabilizes the region. This theoreti-
cal model will be highlighted in each chapter.
The theoretical expectation of this book follows that under condi-
tions of globalization, the insecurity of one state will soon spread into
bordering states and, if not stopped, will become a global, systemic
force.50 If a weak or fragile state allows a growing threat of terrorism
or organized crime to grow in its borders, it will soon begin to branch
out. This book will thus argue that “the health of the [international]
system depends on the weakest units of the system.”51 The study
expects then states must work together to solve threats to their mutual
sovereignty. If the US is suffering from drug trafficking and organized
crime from Mexican drug cartels, some experts contend that the US
should help neutralize the threat, not simply destroying the cartel, but
assisting to bolster political institutions and economic development in
that country, specifically cooperating with the Mexican government
to reform and strengthen institutions (e.g., the judicial system). On
the other hand, critics contend that the US should focus on reducing
the demand for drugs and become involved in the internal politics of
another country.52

Prospective Reforms and International Cooperation

This book submits the following theoretical recommendation for regions
suffering from failed states and the consequences of state failure: cor-
ruption, organized crime, terrorism, any challenge to the authority,
legitimacy, and sovereignty of states. Since regions are at risk from one
of its states becoming failed, then it is certainly reasonable to argue for
regional cooperation to prevent state failure from occurring.53 Current
regional organizations, especially those in Latin America, are fail-
ing to curtail major violence occurring in Central and South America.
Moreover, human traffickers in Africa still have enormous success harp-
ing on the need to escape violence and poverty.
 1 INTRODUCTION 15

Regional organizations are altogether better for failed states, as these

institutions would have more say in how reforms should be carried out.
A regional organization, similar to that of Interpol, could guide these
reforms. Interpol provides the following services:

1. 
Serve as the worldwide information hub for law enforcement
cooperation
The exchange of police information lies at the core of
INTERPOL’s mandate. We manage secure communication chan-
nels that connect National Central Bureaus in all our member
countries, along with other authorized law enforcement agencies
and partners, and which give access to a range of criminal databases.
2. Deliver state-of-the-art policing capabilities that support member
countries to fight and prevent transnational crimes
A large number of policing capabilities—such as forensics and
training—underpin our three Global Programmes to fight crime
(Counter-terrorism, Cybercrime, and Organized and emerg-
ing crime). We seek to serve as the catalyst for efforts in global,
regional, and national law enforcement.
3. Lead globally innovative approaches to policing
We are committed to enhancing the tools and services we provide,
and to act as an incubator for the research, and development into
solutions, and standards for international policing.
4. 
Maximize INTERPOL’s role within the Global Security
Architecture
This goal aims to bridge information gaps in the Global Security
Architecture, strengthening cooperation between relevant sec-
tors and entities, and raising political awareness and support for
INTERPOL’s Programmes.
5. 
Consolidate resources and governance structures for enhanced
operational performance
In order to keep up with the evolving law enforcement landscape,
we will continue to modernize the Organization’s structures and
processes to ensure efficient delivery of our capabilities and services.
16 H. S. KASSAB AND J. D. ROSEN

INTERPOL will focus its efforts on implementing a sustainable

funding model for the Organization, addressing risks at the organ-
izational level, fostering change management, promoting a sustain-
able human resources strategy, and re-assessing our governance
framework.54

While corrupt politicians may hinder the reform process, it is altogether

possible for states with stronger institutions to successfully convey the
need for change. After all, the security of the region is at stake; their
position is at risk. Moreover, there may be the need to incentivize inde-
pendent judicial branch in governments across all states. An independent
judicial branch must protect an individual’s property rights, strengthen
law and order, and reduce practices of impunity, all of which may result
in increases in state stability and economic development. Thus, judicial
branches may assist in the correcting institutional weakness and allowing
for a greater degree of human freedom.

Book Overview
Chapter 2 provides the book with a theoretical framework applied to
cases. It explores contemporary conceptualizations of fragility, corrup-
tion, and institution building. Building on previously established lit-
erature then, the chapter explores why domestic institutions matter to
international stability, as corruption tends to spread from weaker states
to regional locations.
Chapter 3 underscores the importance of institutions, specifically the
constitution, on certain fragile states in Latin America and Lebanon. The
political culture in these areas encourages constitutional ineffectiveness,
whether the executive branch of government manipulates it to protect
itself like in Latin America, or, a static, unwritten agreement that solid-
ifies the power of patronage and clientelism as in Lebanon. The end
result is the same in these cases: the inability of the state to encourage
economic development and progress.
Chapter 4 illustrates the explanatory power of our theory expounded
on in Chapters 2 and 3. It explains proliferation of corruption, illicit traf-
ficking and terrorism in Central Asia and the Middle East. Beginning in
Afghanistan, narcotics trafficking spreads through corruption as traffick-
ers attempt to get their goods to market. Culture plays an important role
in the spread of corruption and this chapter takes time to illustrate this,
 1 INTRODUCTION 17

especially in the Middle East. Thus, dealing with corruption increases in

complexity, given the embedded normative system of the region.
Chapter 5 explores the case of Africa. The chapter begins with an
examination of the concept of the poverty trap, which seeks to explain
why some countries are stuck in a vicious cycle of poverty. The chap-
ter then turns to the issue of corruption, concentrating on some of
the major trends in corruption. Next, it explores the evolution of drug
trafficking and organized crime in Africa, focusing particularly on West
Africa. It then analyzes terrorist organizations operating in Africa, such
as Boko Haram, and their impact on regional security. Finally, the chap-
ter examines the issue of foreign aid, contending that it has not helped
Africa solve many of the underlying structural issues.
Chapter 6 examines the cases of Mexico and Central America. It
begins with an analysis of the issues of drug trafficking and organized
crime in Mexico, which have contributed to the high levels of corrup-
tion and violence within the country. The chapter focuses on President
Felipe Calderón’s drug war and the consequences of such policies. It
examines the underlying structural problems, focusing on the high lev-
els of corruption and impunity that the country faces. The chapter also
assesses the challenges that Mexico will likely continue to face in the
future and the impact on regional security. It then turns to corruption
and organized crime in Central America, focusing on the major trends in
El Salvador and Honduras. Finally, it highlights the issue of immigration,
focusing on the major trends as well as the current policies of the Trump
administration.
Chapter 7 explores various cases in South America. It begins by high-
lighting some of the trends in corruption, focusing on the lack of trust
in institutions. The chapter turns to the Odebrecht case, a major brib-
ery scandal, which demonstrates that power of companies to bribe lead-
ing politicians throughout the Americas. It then examines the case of
Colombia, which has been plagued by high levels of corruption, drug
trafficking, and organized crime. The chapter highlights some of the
major trends as well as challenges given the peace process between the
Colombian government and the largest guerrilla organization. After
exploring the evolution of organized crime and the state of the peace pro-
cess, the chapter then focuses on the case of Venezuela, which has been
plagued by an economic collapse, high levels of corruption, organized
crime, and violence. Next, it explores the case of Brazil, which has faced a
political crisis, including the impeachment of the previous president. The
Another random document with
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argumento que pueda
desbaratarla, la cual os quiero
poner en término que me podáis
responder á ella si hallareis qué
poder decir para confundirla.
Antonio.—Proponed, que yo iré
respondiendo como supiere,
aunque, según la habéis
encarecido, desde agora me
puedo dar por concluso; pero
todavía tengo creído que no
faltará respuesta, y mejor de la
que vos pensáis.
Albanio.—Decidme: si un
religioso reza sus horas
canónicas con mucho cuidado y
devoción, y un seglar hace lo
mismo y en la misma igualdad,
¿cuál de ellos merecerá mayor
premio y será digno de más
gloria?
Antonio.—Paréceme que el
religioso, porque assí como
tendría mayor pena y mayor
castigo no cumpliendo con la
obligación que tiene sobre sí, assí
es justo que se le dé mayor
premio por hacerlo que es
obligado; que de otra manera
sería notorio agravio el que
recibiese, y como Dios sea juez
tan justo, quiere que sean iguales
en la gloria y en la pena, para que
el que fuere digno de más crecida
pena también lo sea para llevar
más crescida la gloria.
Albanio.—Lo cierto habéis
respondido, y de vuestra
respuesta sale la razón que he
dicho, y así me responded á lo
que diré: ¿cuál es digno de mayor
infamia, uno que es de muy buen
linaje y hace alguna vileza ó cosa
fea de que pueda ser
reprehendido, ó uno que ha
alcanzado valor por su sola
persona y comete la misma vileza
haciendo lo que no debe?
Antonio.—El que ha ganado el
merecimiento y valor por su
persona.
Albanio.—Pues ¿cómo puede
ser esso, que vos mesmo os
contradecís, porque esta razón
tiene la mesma fuerza que la
pasada? Claro es y notorio á
todos que mayor obligación tiene
un bueno á obrar cosas buenas y
virtuosas que uno que no lo es
tanto, digo en la calidad y linaje, y
así por esta obligación que tiene
sobre sí merece mayor premio y
honra en ser bueno siguiendo la
virtud de sus pasados, que no el
que es de bajo y oscuro linaje;
porque éste no está tan obligado
á usar de aquella bondad, y así
como al bueno se le ha de dar
mayor premio por esto, es digno
de mayor infamia si se desvía del
camino que fundó el que dió
principio á su linaje y siguieron los
que dél han procedido, y si es
digno de mayor infamia faltando á
su obligación, justo será que se le
dé mayor honra sin contradicción
ninguna.
Antonio.—Hermosa y fuerte
razón es la que, señor Albanio,
habéis traído, y argumento muy
aparente, aunque no dexa de
tener respuesta bastante, porque,
como suelen decir, debaxo de la
buena razón á veces está el
engaño, y asi lo está debaxo
desto que vos habéis dicho
cuando quisiéredes bien
entenderlo, porque yo no niego
que al que es de buen linaje y hijo
de buenos padres se le debe
mayor honra, siendo bueno, que
al que es de humilde linaje
aunque sea bueno; pero esto se
entiende cuando son igualmente
buenos, que bien podría ser
bueno el que es de buen linaje y
tener mayor bondad el que es de
más bajo estado; y en este caso
todavía me afirmo en que es
digno de mayor honra el que
mayor bondad tuviere; esto
podréis mejor entender por lo que
agora diré. Notorio es que
muchos romanos de oscuros y
bajos linajes hicieron hechos tan
valerosos que por ellos
merecieron ser recebidos en
Roma con muy honrados y
sumptuosos triunfos, y á algunos
dellos se les pusieron públicas
estatuas en los lugares públicos y
fueron tenidos y estimados como
dioses que decian, héroes entre
los hombres. No faltaban
juntamente en Roma algunos
hombres de antiguos y claros
linajes, muy virtuosos y sin
mancilla que les pudiese
embarazar la honra; pero con no
igualar en los hechos, ni en la
fortaleza y virtud del ánimo con
los otros, no se igualaban con
ellos en la honra que se les hacía,
antes eran tenidos y estimados en
menos. El rey David, pastor fué
que guardaba ganado, y en su
tiempo muchos varones sanctos y
virtuosos hubo que descendían
de sangre de reyes, á los que no
les faltaba virtud ni fortaleza; pero
con no igualarse en ellas ni en las
hazañas tan valerosas,
principalmente cuando mató á
Golias, no fueron tan honrados ni
tan estimados de las gentes como
lo fué el rey David. Y así podría
traeros otros diversos exemplos,
los cuales dexo por la prolixidad y
porque entre nosotros lo vemos
cada día; que dos hijos de un
padre y de una madre igualmente
buenos, si á algunos dellos por
permisión y voluntad de Dios
ayuda y le favorece la industria en
poder acabar y salir con hechos
más hazañosos, le tenemos y
estimamos por más honrado que
al otro.
Jerónimo.—Desa manera al
acaecimiento se ha de atribuir la
honra de los hombres y en él está
darla á los unos y quitarla á los
otros.
Antonio.—Principalmente se ha
de atribuir á Dios, pues todas las
cossas se gobiernan por su
summo poder y voluntad. Pero
con esto permite que algunos
sean más bien empleados que
otros, y así cuando unos se
ensalzan, otros se humillan y
abaten, que no pueden estar
todos en una igualdad. Y así
resolviendo me digo, que cuando
dos hombres, el uno de buen
linaje y el otro de no tan bueno,
fueren igualmente buenos, que ha
de ser preferido y antepuesto en
la honra el de buen linaje al otro,
y si no son iguales, siendo mejor
en virtud y fortaleza el que es
inferior en linaje ha de ser más
estimado y preferido; y conforme
á esto se ha de entender el
decreto sobredicho, porque la
razón que habéis dicho de que
merece mayor pena el bueno,
haciendo lo que no debe, que el
que no es tal como él, yo os lo
confieso que así es digno de
mayor gloria. Pero (como en lo
que arriba he dicho bien á la clara
yo he probado) el que tiene más
virtud y valor, aunque sea
desigual en linaje, ya se ha hecho
tan bueno con ello como el otro, y
aun mejor. Y así está ya puesto
debajo de la mesma obligación de
usar la virtud y bondad, y obligado
á la mesma pena. Lo que
entenderéis por un ejemplo que
diré: Si un fraile ha que es fraile
cuarenta años, y otro no ha más
de uno que hizo proffesión, ¿no
estará éste obligado á los
preceptos de la orden como el
otro? ¿y no pecará igualmente?
Albanio.—Aunque en parte le
relevaría no estar tan habituado á
las observancias de la orden;
pero si no es pecado por
inorancia, eso no puede negarse.
Antonio.—Pues lo mesmo es en
lo que tratamos; que cuando uno
se ensalza y engrandece con
virtudes y hazañas, hace
profesión en la orden de la honra,
de manera que tan obligado
queda á guardar los preceptos
della y conservarla como aquel
que de antiguo tiempo tiene esta
obligación, pues que á todos nos
obliga la naturaleza igualmente á
ser virtuosos, no quiero decir en
un mesmo grado, sino que nos
obliga á todos sin excetar alguno,
dexando la puerta abierta para
que sea vicioso, y á lo mesmo la
verdadera ley christiana que
tenemos y seguimos nos obliga
juntamente á todos, y desta
manera, si bien lo consideramos,
no tenemos por qué decir que es
más obligado á sustentar la honra
de sus antepasados uno que
desciende de claro y antiguo
linaje que uno que por si mesmo
la ha ganado de nuevo.
Albanio.—En fin, la común
opinión es contraria de lo que
decís, porque tienen en tanto una
antigua y clara sangre, que el que
della participa, siempre es
juzgado digno de mayor honra.
Antonio.—No entendemos qué
cosa es ser buena y clara la
sangre, pues ya conocemos qué
cosa es ser antigua. Por cierto á
muchos juzgamos de buena
sangre que la tienen inficionada y
corrompida de malos humores, y
dexando de ser sangre se vuelve
en ponzoña que, bebiéndola,
bastaría á matar á cualquier
hombre, y algunos labradores hay
viles y que no sabiendo apenas
quiénes fueron sus padres tienen
una sangre tan buena y tan pura
que ninguna mácula hay en ella.
Esta manera de decir de buena
sangre es desatino y un impropio
hablar. Pero dexando esto, yo
estoy espantado de las
confusiones, novedades,
desatinos que cada día vemos en
el mundo acerca desto de los
linajes; pluguiesse á Dios que
tuviesse yo tantos ducados de
renta en su servicio para no vivir
pobre, como hoy hay hidalgos,
pecheros y villanos que no
pechan, que en esto hay algunos
que se saben dar tan buena
maña, que gozan del privilegio
que no tienen, y otros hay tan
apocados y tan pobres, que no
son bastantes á defender su
hidalguía cuando los
empadronan, y assí la pierden
para sí y para sus descendientes.
Y assí hemos visto dos hermanos
de padre y madre ser el uno
hidalgo y pechar el otro, y ser el
uno caballero y el otro no
alcanzar á ser hidalgo. Algunos
de los que son hidalgos no hallan
testigos que juren de padre y
agüelo, como la ley lo manda;
otros que no lo son, hallan cien
testigos falsos que por poco
interese juran. Y assí anda todo
revuelto y averiguada mal la
verdad en este caso.
Jerónimo.—Así es, señor
Antonio, como vos lo decís, que
muchas veces lo he considerado
y aun visto por experiencia. Pero
decidme, ¿qué diferencia hay
entre hidalgo y caballero, que yo
no lo alcanzo?
Antonio.--Yo os la diré. En los
tiempos antiguos, los reyes
hacían hidalgos algunos por
servicios que les hacían ó por
otros méritos que en ellos
hallaban; á otros armaban
caballeros, que era mayor
dignidad, porque gozaban de más
y mejores essenciones; pero esto
se entendía en sus vidas, porque
después sus descendientes no
gozaban de más de ser hidalgos.
Los que eran caballeros se
obligaban á cumplir ciertas cosas
cuando recebían la orden de
caballería, como aun agora
parece por algunas historias
antiguas, y en los libros de
historias fingidas, que tomaron
exemplo de lo verdadero, se trata
más copiosamente, y por esta
causa eran en más estimados.
Agora no se usa aquella orden de
caballería, y así hay muy pocos
caballeros á los cuales nuestro
emperador ha dado este
previlegio ó por sus virtudes ó por
otros respetos, y con ser la mayor
dignidad de todas en la milicia,
puede tanto la malicia de las
gentes, que si antes que
hubiessen la orden de caballería
no eran de buen linaje, los llaman
por despreciados caballeros
pardos ó hidalgos de privilegio,
paresciéndoles que por ser en
ellos más antigua la hidalguía
tiene mayor valor, y dexando de
guardar en esto la verdadera
orden que se ha de tener. A los
hidalgos ricos llaman caballeros, y
á lo que creo es porque tienen
más posibilidad para andar á
caballo, que yo no veo otra causa
que baste, porque tan hidalgo es
un hidalgo que no tiene un
maravedí de hacienda como un
señor que tiene veinte cuentos de
renta, si, como he dicho, no es
armado caballero; y hay tan
pocos caballeros en Castilla, que
aunque el rey ha dicho algunos,
no sería muy dificultoso el número
dellos, y con todo esto no veréis
otra cosa, ni oiréis entre los que
presumen sino á fe de caballero,
yo os prometo como caballero, sin
que tengan más parte con ser
caballeros que quien nunca lo fué
ni lo soñó ser, ó diremos que
toman este nombre en muy ancho
significado porque el vulgo tiene
por caballero que es hombre rico
que anda á caballo. Desta
manera son todas las otras cosas
que tocan á esto de la honra, que
ningún concierto ni orden hay en
ellas, sino que cada uno juzga y
defiende como le parece y como
más hace á su apetito.
Albanio.—¿Sabéis, Antonio, qué
veo? Que cuando comenzamos
esta materia prometisteis de no
sentenciar en ella, y á lo que he
visto, por más que sentenciar
tengo vuestras palabras, pues
ningún lugar habéis dejado con
ellas para ser más estimados los
herederos de la honra que los que
por sí la ganaron, y no os veo tan
desapasionado en esto que
queráis volver atrás de lo que
habéis dicho en ninguna cosa.
Antonio.—Yo digo lo que siento,
y no por esso dejo de pensar que
habrá otros que lo sientan
differentemente y de manera que
tengan otras muchas razones
contrarias para contradecir lo que
he dicho, y así me pongo debaxo
de la correción de los que más
sabios fueren y mejor lo
entendieren; pero esto ha de ser
no les yendo en ello su propio
interese, que desta manera
podrán ser buenos jueces, como
vemos que lo fué Salustio que
cuando competía con Marco
Tulio, porque le iba su propia
pasión, fué del parecer vulgar,
mas cuando habló desapasionado
y como filósofo moral en la batalla
que escrebió del rey Ingurta dice
asi:
Quanto vita majorum plæclarior
est,
tanto posterorum socordia flagitior
est.
que quiere decir: cuanto la vida
de los antepasados fué más
illustre, tanto la pereza de los
descendientes es más culpada.
Y pues que ya hemos dicho
brevemente todo lo que alcanza á
nuestros claros juicios, y yo he
cumplido lo que quedé mejor que
he sabido, justo será que nos
vamos, que ya el sol tiene tanta
fuerza que no basta el frescor de
la verdura para resistirla.
Jerónimo.—Es ya casi medio día
y con el gusto de la cuestión no
hemos sentido ir el tiempo.
Caminemos, porque no hagamos
falta, que ya el conde habrá
demandado la comida.

Finis.
 COLLOQUIO
PASTORIL

En que un pastor llamado

Torcuato cuenta á otros dos
pastores llamados Filonio y
Grisaldo los amores que tuvo
con una pastora llamada
Belisia. Va compuesto en
estilo apacible y gracioso y
contiene en sí avisos
provechosos para que las
gentes huyan de dexarse
vencer del Amor, tomando
enxemplo en el fin que
tuvieron estos amores y el
pago que dan á los que
ciegamente los siguen, como
se podrá ver en el proceso
deste colloquio.

Á LOS LECTORES DICE LAS

CAUSAS QUE LE
MOVIERON Á PONER ESTE
COLLOQUIO CON LOS
PASSADOS.
Bien cierto estoy que no faltarán
diferentes juicios para juzgar esta
obra, como los hay para todas las
otras que se escriben, y que
aunque haya algunos á quien les
parezca bien, habrá otros que
tendrán otro parecer diferente y
murmurarán diciendo que no fué
bien acertado mezclar con los
colloquios de veras uno de burlas,
como es el que se sigue, y que yo
debiera excusarlo assí, y quiero
decir los motivos que para ello
tuve y me parecieron bastantes,
en los cuales pude acertar y
también he podido engañarme,
que creo que habrá assimesmo
en esto diversos pareceres como
en lo pasado. Lo primero que me
movió, fué que, dirigiendo este
libro al Sr. D. Alonso Pimentel, y
estando su señoría en edad tan
tierna, cuando viniese á leer
cosas más pesadas que
apacibles, como son las que se
tratan en estos colloquios, que
por ventura se enfadaría dellas, y
convenía hallar en qué mudar el
gusto para tomar más sabor en lo
que se leyese, y así quise poner
por fruta de postre la que también
podrá servir en el medio cuando
entre manjar y manjar quisiere
gustar della; y demás desto, no
dexa de tener en sí este colloquio
muy buenos enxemplos y dotrina,
pues se podrá entender por él el
fin que se sigue de los amores
que se siguen con vanidad, y
cuán poca firmeza se suele hallar
en ellos. También en la segunda y
tercera parte se hallarán algunas
cosas que, considerándolas, se
sacará dellas muy gran provecho,
pues tienen más sentido en sí del
que en la letra parece; y sin estas
causas que he dado, parecióme
que podría yo hacer lo que otros
autores muy graves hicieron sin
ser reprehendidos por ello, y que
tenía escudo y amparo en su
enxemplo contra las lenguas de
los que de mí por esta causa
murmurar quisiessen.
El primero es el poeta Virgilio, que
con los libros de La Eneida,
siendo obra tan calificada, no le
pareció mal poner las Bucólicas,
que tratan cosas de amores, y los
Parvos, que son todos de burlas y
juegos. El poeta Ovidio también
mezcló con sus obras el de Arte
amandi y el de Remedio amoris.
Eneas Silvio, que después se
llamó el papa Pío, escribió cosas
muy encarecidas y con ellas los
Amores de Eurialo Franco y
Lucrecia Senesa. Luciano, autor
griego, con los colloquios de
veras mezcló algunos de burlas y
donaires, y también puso con
ellos los libros en que escribe el
Mundo nuevo de la luna,
fingiendo que hay en ella
ciudades y poblaciones de gentes
y otras cosas que van pareciendo
disparates. Petrarca muchas
obras escribió en que se mostró
muy gran teólogo y letrado, y no
por esto dexó de poner entre ellas
la que hizo sobre los amores que
tuvo con madona Laura, y así yo
pude escribir el colloquio que se
sigue con los pasados, teniendo
por mi parte tantos autores con
quien defenderme de lo que fuere
acusado. Y si estas razones y
excusas no bastaren, bastará
una, y es que á los que les
pareciere mal no lo lean y hagan
cuenta que aquí se acabaron los
colloquios, que para mí basta
solamente que á quien van
dirigidos se satisfaga de mi
intención, la cual ha sido de
acertar á servir en esto y en todo
lo que más pudiere hacerlo, como
soy obligado.
Torquemada.

COLLOQUIO PASTORIL

En que se tratan los amores de

un pastor llamado Torcato con
una pastora llamada Belisia: el
cual da cuenta dellos á otros
 dos pastores llamados Filonio
y Grisaldo, quexándose del
agravio que recibió de su
amiga. Va partido en tres
partes. La primera es del
proceso de los amores. La
segunda es un sueño. En la
tercera se trata la causa que
pudo haber para lo que Belisia
con Torcato hizo.

INTERLOCUTORES

Grisaldo.—Torcato.—Filonio.

Filonio.—¿Qué te parece,
Grisaldo, de las regocijadas y
apacibles fiestas que en estos
desposorios de Silveida en
nuestro lugar hemos tenido, y con
cuánto contento de todos se ha
regocijado? Que si bien miras en
ello, no se han visto en nuestros
tiempos bodas que con mayor
solemnidad se festejasen, ni en
que tantos zagales tan bien
adrezados ni tantas zagalas tan
hermosas y bien ataviadas y
compuestas se hayan en uno
juntado.
Grisaldo.—Razón tienes,
Filonio, en lo que dices, aunque
yo no venga del todo contento,
por algunos agravios que en ellas
se han recibido, que á mi ver han
sido en perjuicio de algunos
compañeros nuestros, que con
justa causa podrán quedar
sentidos de la sinrazón que
recibieron. Y porque no eres de
tan torpe entendimiento que tu
juicio no baste para haber
conocido lo que digo, dime, así
goces muchos años los amores
de Micenia y puedas romper en
su servicio el jubón colorado y
sayo verde con la caperuza azul y
zaragüelles que para los días de
fiesta tienes guardados, ¿no fué
mal juzgada la lucha entre
Palemón y Melibeo dándose la
ventaja á quien no la tenía y
poniendo la guirnalda á quien no
la había merecido; que si tuviste
atención no fué pequeña ventaja
la que tuvo el que dieron por
vencido al que por vencedor
señalaron?
Filonio.—Verdaderamente,
hermano Grisaldo, bien
desengañado estaba yo de que el
juicio fué hecho más con afición
que no con razón ni justicia;
porque puesto caso que Palemón
sobrepujase en fuerzas á
Melibeo, no por eso se le debía
atribuir la victoria, pues nunca le
dió caída en que ambos no
pareciesen juntamente en el
suelo, y demás desto, si bien
miraste la destreza de Melibeo en
echar los traspiés, el aviso en
armar las zancadillas, la buena
maña en dar los vaivenes,
juzgarás que no había zagal en
todas estas aldeas que en esto
pudiese sobrepujarlo; y cuando
Palemón con sus fuertes brazos
en alto lo levantaba, así como
dicen que Hércules hizo al
poderoso Anteo, al caer estaba
Melibeo tan mañoso que, apenas
con sus espaldas tocaba la tierra,
cuando en un punto tenía á
Palemón debaxo de sí, que quien
quiera que le viera más
dignamente le juzgara por
victorioso que por vencido. Pero
¿qué quieres que hiciese el buen
pastor Quiral, puesto por juez,
que por complacer á su amada
Floria le era forzado que, con
justicia ó sin ella, diese la
sentencia por Palemón su
hermano?
Grisaldo.—Si al amor pones de
por medio, pocas cosas justas
dexarán de tornar injustamente
hechas. Y dexando la lucha, no
fué menos de ver el juego de la
chueca, que tan reñido fué por
todas partes, en el cual se mostró
bien la desenvoltura y ligereza de
los zagales, que en todo un día
no pudieron acabar de ganarse el
precio que para los vencedores
estaba puesto; ni en la corrida del
bollo se acabó de determinar cuál
de los tres que llegaron á la par lo
había tocado más presto que los
otros, y en otras dos veces que
tomaron á correr, parecía que
siempre con igualdad habían
llegado.
Filonio.—Bien parece que con
faltar Torcato en estos regocijos y
fiestas, todos los pastores y
mancebos aldeanos pueden tener
presunción que cuando él
presente se hallaba, ninguno
había que con gran parte en
fuerzas y maña le igualase; todas
las joyas y preseas eran suyas,
porque mejor que todos lo
merecía y en tirar á mano ó con
una honda, en saltar y bailar á
todos sobrepujaba, en tañer y
cantar con flauta, rabel y
cherumbela, otro segundo dios
Pan parecía. No había zagala
hermosa en toda la comarca que
por él no se perdiese; todas
deseaban que las amase, y, en
fin, de todas las cosas de buen
pastor á todos los otros pastores
era preferido; mas agora yo no
puedo entender qué enfermedad
le trae tan fatigado y abatido, tan
diferente del que ser solía, que
apenas le conozco cuando le veo
su gesto, que en color blanca con
las mejillas coloradas á la blanca
leche cubierta de algunas hojas
de olorosos claveles semejaba,
agora flaco, amarillo, con ojos
sumidos, más figura de la mesma
muerte que de hombre que tiene