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i

Developing the Virtues

ii
iii

Developing the Virtues

Integrating Perspectives

E D I T E D B Y J U L I A A N N A S , DA R C I A N A R VA E Z
and
N A NC Y E . S NOW

1
iv

1
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the University’s objective of excellence in research, scholarship, and education
by publishing worldwide. Oxford is a registered trade mark of Oxford University
Press in the UK and certain other countries.

Published in the United States of America by Oxford University Press

198 Madison Avenue, New York, NY 10016, United States of America.

© Oxford University Press 2016

All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in

a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, without the
prior permission in writing of Oxford University Press, or as expressly permitted
by law, by license, or under terms agreed with the appropriate reproduction
rights organization. Inquiries concerning reproduction outside the scope of the
above should be sent to the Rights Department, Oxford University Press, at the
address above.

You must not circulate this work in any other form

and you must impose this same condition on any acquirer.

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Names: Annas, Julia, editor.
Title: Developing the virtues : integrating perspectives / edited by Julia
Annas, Darcia Narvaez, and Nancy E. Snow.
Description: New York : Oxford University Press, 2016. | Includes
bibliographical references and index.
Identifiers: LCCN 2016005778| ISBN 9780190271466 (hardcover : alk. paper) |
ISBN 9780190271473 (ebook (updf)) | ISBN 9780190630546 (ebook (epub)) |
ISBN 9780190271480 (online content)
Subjects: LCSH: Virtue. | Conduct of life. | Virtues.
Classification: LCC BJ1521 .D48 2016 | DDC 179/.9—dc23 LC record available
at https://lccn.loc.gov/2016005778

1 3 5 7 9 8 6 4 2
Printed by Sheridan Books, Inc., United States of America
v

CONTENTS

Acknowledgments vii
Contributors ix

Introduction 1
N a n c y E . S n o w, D a r c i a N a r va e z , a n d J u l i a A n n a s

1. Baselines for Virtue 14

D a r c i a N a r va e z

2. Moral Self-​Identity and the Social-​Cognitive Theory of Virtue 34

Da n i e l L a psl e y

3. From a Baby Smiling: Reflections on Virtues in Development 69

Robert N. E m de

4. The Development of Virtuous Character: Automatic

and Reflective Dispositions 95
R o s s A . T h o m p s o n a n d A b b y S . L av i n e

5. Developmental Virtue Ethics 116

C h r i s t i n e S wa n t o n

6. How Habits Make Us Virtuous 135

Na nc y E. Snow

7. Virtue Cultivation in Light of Situationism 157

Chr istian B. Miller

v
vi

vi Contents

8. Becoming Good: Narrow Dispositions and the Stability

of Virtue 184
R ach a na K a mtek a r

9. The Role of Motivation and Wisdom in Virtues as Skills 204

M att Stichter

10. Learning Virtue Rules: The Issue of Thick Concepts 224

Julia Annas

11. Guilt and Shame in the Development of Virtue 235

Jennifer A. Herdt

12. Benevolence in a Justice-​Based World: The Power of Sentiments

(and Reasoning) in Predicting Prosocial Behaviors 255
G u s t av o C a r l o a n d A l e x a n d r a N . D av i s

13. Norms of Justice in Development 273

Mark LeBar

Index 295
vii

ACK NOW L EDG M EN TS

The editors extend their gratitude to the University of Notre Dame’s Institute
for Scholarship in the Liberal Arts and departments of psychology and philos-
ophy for supporting the symposium in May 2014 that brought together many
of the book’s contributors. Editors Snow and Narvaez also wish to acknowl-
edge the support of the Templeton Religion Trust, under the Self, Motivation,
and Virtue grant project, for book preparation. Snow also gratefully acknowl-
edges assistance from the John Templeton Foundation. All three editors grate-
fully acknowledge the editorial assistance of Jennifer Marra.

vii
viii
ix

CONTR I BU TOR S

Julia Annas is Regents Professor in Philosophy at the University of Arizona,

having also taught at Oxford. She was the founding editor of Oxford Studies
in Ancient Philosophy, and is a member of the American Academy of Arts and
Sciences and the American Philosophical Society. She is a past President of
the Pacific Division of the American Philosophical Association. She has been
both a junior and senior member of the Society for Hellenic Studies. She has
published many books and articles in ancient philosophy, particularly ancient
ethics, and more recently in contemporary virtue ethics.
Gustavo Carlo is the Millsap Endowed Professor of Diversity and
Multicultural Studies in the Department of Human Development and Family
Science at the University of Missouri. His research interest is in prosocial
and moral behaviors in children and adolescents, particularly focused on
the personality, parenting, and sociocultural correlates of prosocial behav-
iors. Dr. Carlo has authored over 150 articles research journals and co-​edited
several books, including Moral Development through the Life Span, Health
Disparities among Ethnic Minority Families and Youth, Handbook of U.S. Latino
Psychology, and his two recent books, Prosocial Behaviors: A Multidimensional
Approach and Rural Ethnic Minority Families and Youth in the United States.
He has served as Associate Editor and as an editorial board member for sev-
eral journals and has served on grant review panels. His research has been
supported by grants from NICHD and NSF, and he is a Fellow of the APA
and APS.
Alexandra N. Davis is a doctoral candidate in the Department of Human
Development and Family Science at the University of Missouri. Her research
interests focus on stress, risk and resilience, and prosocial development in low
socioeconomic status, marginalized, and racial/​ethnic minority children and
adolescents.

ix
x

x Contributors

Robert N. Emde Emeritus Professor of Psychiatry at the University of

Colorado, School of Medicine, and at the Centers for American Health, has
a CV that lists over 300 publications in the fields of early socio-​emotional
development, sleep research, infant mental health, diagnostic classification,
early moral development, evaluation of early childhood intervention, psy-
choanalysis, behavioral genetics, and research education. He graduated from
Dartmouth College, and then from Columbia’s College of Physicians and
Surgeons (M.D. 1960), completing his residency in psychiatry and his psy-
choanalytic training at the University of Colorado School of Medicine where
he continued on the faculty. He has lectured in 23 countries and received
awards from the World Association for Infant Mental Health, the American
Psychoanalytic Association, the American College of Psychoanalysts, the
Colorado Psychiatric Society, and the Colorado Association for Infant
Mental Health. He has been designated as Honorary President of the World
Association for Infant Mental Health.
Jennifer A. Herdt is the Gilbert L. Stark Professor of Christian Ethics and
Senior Associate Dean for Academic Affairs at Yale Divinity School. She is the
author of Putting On Virtue: The Legacy of the Splendid Vices, and Religion and
Faction in Hume’s Moral Philosophy, and has served as guest editor for special
issues of the Journal of Religious Ethics and the Journal of Medieval and Early
Modern Studies. The recipient of a Mellon Fellowship in the Humanities and
an Alexander von Humboldt research fellowship, she has served on the board
of directors of the Society of Christian Ethics and is a member of the editorial
board of the Journal of Religious Ethics.
Rachana Kamtekar is Associate Professor of Philosophy at the University of
Arizona. Her specialization is in ancient Greek and Roman philosophy, espe-
cially ancient ethics, politics, and moral psychology. She has published many
articles on Plato, Aristotle, the Stoics, and virtue ethics, both ancient and con-
temporary. She is currently writing a book entitled Desire and the Good: An
Essay on Plato’s Moral Psychology.
Daniel Lapsley is the Alliance for Catholic Education Collegiate Professor
and Chair of the Department of Psychology. He also holds an appointment
with Notre Dame’s Alliance for Catholic Education. He is the editor or author
of seven books, including Moral Psychology (1996, Westview Press) and Identity,
Personality and Character: Explorations in Moral Psychology (2009, Cambridge
University Press), a volume he edited with Darcia Narvaez. He studies the
moral dimensions of personality and other topics in moral psychology, and has
written extensively on moral and character education, along with numerous
articles and chapters on various topics in child and adolescent development.
xi

Contributors xi

Abby S. Lavine is a graduate student in the Department of Psychology at the

University of California-​Davis. She works on developmental research in the
Social and Emotional Development Lab, where her interests focus on young
children’s prosocial motivation and their social understanding of moral merit
and deservingness.
Mark LeBar is Professor of Philosophy at Florida State University, in
Tallahassee, FL. He works in moral, social, and political philosophy. His book,
The Value of Living Well (Oxford University Press, 2013), is a development of
contemporary eudaimonist moral theory. He is also co-​editor of Equality and
Public Policy (Cambridge University Press, 2014), and is editing a forthcoming
collection on justice as a virtue of individuals. He is working on an account of
personal justice as at the intersection of eudaimonist virtue ethics and recent
work on social norms.
Christian B. Miller is Professor of Philosophy at Wake Forest University and
Director of the Character Project (www.thecharacterproject.com), which was
funded by $5.6 million in grants from the John Templeton Foundation and
Templeton World Charity Foundation. He is the author of over 65 papers as
well as two books with Oxford University Press, Moral Character: An Empirical
Theory (2013) and Character and Moral Psychology (2014). He is also the editor
or co-​editor of Essays in the Philosophy of Religion (Oxford University Press),
Character: New Directions from Philosophy, Psychology, and Theology (Oxford
University Press), Moral Psychology, Volume V: Virtue and Happiness (MIT
Press), and The Continuum Companion to Ethics (Continuum Press).
Darcia Narvaez is Professor of Psychology at the University of Notre Dame.
She brings evolutionary theory, neurobiology, and positive psychology to con-
siderations of well-​being, morality, and wisdom across the lifespan, includ-
ing early life, childhood, and adulthood and in multiple contexts (parenting,
schooling). She has published over 140 articles and chapters and is author or
editor of 13 books, which include Moral Postconventional Moral Thinking (with
Rest, Bebeau, Thoma, Erlbaum, 1999); Evolution, Early Experience and Human
Development (ed. With Panksepp, Schore & Gleason, Oxford University
Press, 2013); Neurobiology and the Development of Human Morality: Evolution,
Culture and Wisdom (Norton, 2014); Embodied Morality: Protectionism,
Engagement and Imagination (Palgrave-MacMillan, 2016). She is a fellow of the
American Psychological Association and the American Educational Research
Association. She is executive editor of the Journal of Moral Education. She also
writes a popular blog for Psychology Today (“Moral Landscapes”).
Nancy E. Snow is Professor and Director of the Institute for the Study of
Human Flourishing at the University of Oklahoma. With Darcia Narvaez, she
xii

xii Contributors

is the co-​d irector of the three-​year project “The Self, Motivation, and Virtue,”
funded by $2.6 million from the Templeton Religion Trust. She is the author
of over thirty papers and one monograph and has edited or co-​edited five vol-
umes. She is currently revising a monograph on hope, writing one on virtue
ethics and virtue epistemology, and coauthoring a book on virtue measure-
ment. She is the Associate Editor for Ethics and Philosophy of The Journal of
Moral Education.
Matt Stichter is Associate Professor of Philosophy at Washington State
University. He obtained his Ph.D. in Philosophy from Bowling Green State
University in 2007. His research specializes in ethical theory, applied ethics,
moral psychology, and the philosophy of expertise. He has written extensively
on the “virtue as skill” thesis, which is the idea that the acquisition of virtue,
and therefore moral development, is centrally a process of acquiring practical
skills. He is currently finishing a book on this topic, entitled Ethical Expertise
and Virtuous Skills. His publications also include work in the areas of animal
ethics and the philosophy of punishment.
Christine Swanton is at the Philosophy Department University of Auckland
New Zealand. Her most recent book, The Virtue Ethics of Hume and Nietzsche,
was published with Wiley-​Blackwell in 2015. She is also working on a virtue
ethical view of love, the metaphysics of virtue ethics, and a virtue ethical theory
of role ethics. Her book on virtue ethics, Virtue Ethics: A Pluralistic View, was
published with Oxford University Press (2003, paper 2005).
Ross A. Thompson is Distinguished Professor of Psychology at the University
of California-​Davis. As a developmental psychologist, his research centers
on the early foundations of the development of moral motivation in studies
of emotion understanding, conscience, prosocial behavior, and parent-​child
relationships. He also works on the applications of this work to issues such as
character development, school readiness, and moral education. His books in-
clude Preventing Child Maltreatment through Social Support: A Critical Analysis
(Sage, 1995), The Postdivorce Family (Sage, 1999), Toward a Child-​Centered,
Neighborhood-​Based Child Protection System (Praeger, 2002), Socioemotional
Development (Nebraska Symposium on Motivation; University of Nebraska
Press, 1990), and Infant-​Mother Attachment (Erlbaum, 1985), and he is cur-
rently working on Early Brain Development, the Media, and Public Policy.
xiii

Developing the Virtues

xiv
1

Introduction
Na nc y E . S now, Da rc i a Na rva ez , a n d J u l i a A n na s

Virtue is by nature an interdisciplinary affair. One does not become virtuous

without appropriate experience, a psychological concern, yet defining what
virtue is requires philosophical wherewithal. Theology too has its definitions
of virtue and prescriptions about how to bring virtue about. At the same time,
scholars often do not communicate across disciplinary fences, staying siloed in
their focus. In an effort to move forward scholarship on virtue generally, this
volume challenges disciplinary isolation and brings together scholars from
philosophy, psychology, and theology to address concerns and findings from
the other disciplines and seed new insights and pathways forward.
The last thirty years has seen a resurgence of interest in virtue among phi-
losophers. Virtue ethics, an approach to normative theory that focuses on the
character of the agent, has established itself as a working alternative to conse-
quentialism and deontology.1 A focus on character and virtue has also led to
revival of philosophical interest in the ideas of happiness and flourishing as the
aim of the virtuous life, and in the relation of these to philosophical and psy-
chological studies of well-​being. The situationist critique of virtue ethics has
adduced evidence from empirical social psychology to contest the idea that
people have global or robust character traits, thus challenging the empirical
viability of virtue ethics at its core.2 This has prompted a robust literature in
response, some of which defends virtue on empirical grounds. 3 A second wave
of situationist objections to virtue ethics concentrates on the role of reasoning
in acquiring and exercising virtue;4 counterarguments from the side of virtue
are in the works. Work has also been done on conceptions of virtue within
the Kantian and utilitarian traditions. 5 Mainstream research in virtue ethics
is neo-​A ristotelian, but work has been done on virtue and virtue ethics from
other perspectives6 and in other traditions, such as Kant7 and utilitarianism.8

1
2

2 Introduction

Interest in virtue is also evident in developmental psychology. The preoccu-

pation with the Kohlbergian paradigm and justice reasoning, which held sway
during much of the twentieth century, has given way to a resurgence in the study
of virtue within the broad context of self, personality, and development.9 Topics
such as moral personality, moral selfhood and identity, and the study of virtues
and of character now have prominent places in the landscape of developmental
psychology.10 Formal education also takes the development of moral character as
one of its traditional aims and purposes.11 Indeed, the number of titles published
on the problems of character and its role in private and public life has increased
dramatically over the past decades. So have curricula and guidelines for teaching
the virtues in both schools and homes.
In addition, empirical work being done by philosophers and psychologists
working together on virtue is on the rise. Several initiatives funded by the John
Templeton Foundation have fostered such collaborations, for example the
Science of Virtue Project at the University of Chicago, the Character Project
at Wake Forest University, the Happiness and Well-​Being Project at St. Louis
University, and the Institute for the Study of Human Flourishing at the University
of Oklahoma. The Templeton Religion Trust has funded the Self, Motivation,
and Virtue Project at the University of Oklahoma, which sponsored this volume,
and the Beacon Project at Wake Forest University. Finally, the Jubilee Centre for
Character and Virtue at the University of Birmingham in Great Britain is now
publishing collaborative studies on virtue in medicine, law, and other areas.
The purpose of this volume is to stimulate the emergence of a new area of multi-
disciplinary study: virtue development studies. An initial foray into this field is the
collection Cultivating Virtue: Perspectives from Philosophy, Psychology, and Theology,
edited by Nancy E. Snow. In that volume, scholars at the top of their fields gave
overviews of virtue development from three disciplinary perspectives and a va-
riety of philosophical and religious traditions. Our volume proposes advanced
work in this area by showcasing more focused essays from scholars in a range of
disciplines. Indeed, the impetus for this volume was the recently convened “Notre
Dame Symposium on Virtue and Its Development,” which brought together over a
dozen renowned scholars representing the fields of moral philosophy, psychology,
and theology, as well as doing applied work in cultivating virtue. These scholars
and other invited participants wrestled with questions such as the following:

• How does the other field inform the work in my field?

• How should we understand virtue as a dimension of human personality?
• What is the developmental foundation of virtue?
• What are the evolutionary aspects of virtue and its development?
• What models of virtue are adequate for conceptualizing the dispositions
proper to virtuous functioning?
3

Introduction 3

• How is virtue fostered?

• How is virtue exemplified in behavior and action?
• How is our conception of virtue influenced by context? By developmental
and social experiences?
• How do recent advances in affective and social neuroscience influence our
understanding of virtue?
• What are the tensions, impediments, and prospects for an integrative field
of virtue study?

Thus, the aim of the Notre Dame Symposium, and now of this volume, is to
carve out space for deeply integrative work on virtue development across mul-
tiple domains, including, but not limited to, those represented by contributors
to the volume. Although the volume illustrates an impressive diversity of theo-
retical perspectives and methodologies, as well as genuine, and we hope, fruit-
ful, disagreement, it also paves the way for promising integrative possibilities.

Plan of the Book

Our volume is unified by five interlocking themes. The themes are (1) gen-
eral questions of how virtue development might begin in early childhood and
continue in the adult years; (2) questions of how extensive virtue is (global
or local), what obstacles must be overcome to extend virtue, and how the
development of virtue is best approached; (3) the nature of virtue and how
concepts and language affect how we think about and develop virtue; (4) how
early caregiving, the development of emotion, embodiment, and communities
impact virtue development; and (5) the development of two specific virtues
long thought to be in tension: justice and benevolence.
We have chosen Darcia Narvaez’s essay “Baselines for Virtue” as the lead
chapter because it offers an example of and sets the tone for the kind of inter-
disciplinary work we hope to encourage with this volume. Narvaez argues that
virtue development is biosocial—​that social dispositions are hardwired into
infants, but precursors to virtue develop well or poorly during the crucially for-
mative early period of parent-​child interactions. Moreover, she argues that our
baselines for what count as acceptable moral development have been obscured
and skewed by negative aspects of modern human culture. Anthropology
shows that, contrary to some recent views, caregiver-​child interactions that
facilitate virtue development are part of human evolutionary history. The inter-
active processes of virtue development, which Narvaez calls the “evolved de-
velopmental niche” (EDN), are apparent in present-​day societies such as small
hunter-​gatherer bands. The EDN provides the context and set of supportive
4

4 Introduction

caregiving relationships for the child to develop a robust neurobiology and

sociality that undergird virtue. Characterized by caring, responsive relation-
ships that develop between caregiver and child, the EDN is a dynamic system
in which many adults contribute to the nurturing of children through playful
and affectionate interaction, children are integrated into the rituals and tasks
of daily life, and both children and adults view themselves as sharing their
sense of self with nonhuman nature. EDN-​consistent care, Narvaez contends,
nurtures an “affective core” that is the starting point for the development of
future virtue. She supports this contention with empirical studies from her
own lab; additionally, the notion of an early “affective core” fits well with the
findings of Emde, and Thompson and Lavine, also discussed in this volume.
Narvaez critiques contemporary culture for child raising practices that instill
fear and a desire for safety in the child, thereby encouraging the formation of a
narrow, reactive “protectionist self,” and supports her criticisms with research
findings. She concludes by offering advice for changing current childrearing
practices and recovering, in contemporary societies, the more positive, com-
munal approach to self and virtue found in societies that provide the EDN.
Chapter 2, “Moral Self-​Identity and the Social-​Cognitive Theory of Virtue,”
by Daniel Lapsley, begins with a brief overview of trends in moral psychology
from behaviorism to the present. Lapsley goes on to discuss the metaphor of
the “mending wall” from a poem by Robert Frost. A wall or fence exists to keep
people apart, yet, despite the old adage that “good fences make good neigh-
bors,” Lapsley reminds us that the gist of Frost’s poem is that we often want
fences to come down as we pursue common aims and projects. In like manner,
work by psychologists and humanists can be brought together in the shared
project of understanding moral identity and character. In this vein, Lapsley
offers a social-​cognitive conception of moral character. To set the stage for
this, he examines psychologist Augusto Blasi’s conception of moral self-​
identity and its philosophical underpinnings in the work of Harry Frankfurt
and Charles Taylor. Despite the richness of this work, Blasi’s conception has
come under fire. Lapsley reviews key criticisms and extracts three central cri-
teria that a conception of moral self-​identity should satisfy: the centrality of
morality to self-​identity, a strong cognitive component, and the recognition
of individual and personality differences. These criteria must be sensitive to
evidence of situational variability, allow roles for emotion and tacit and au-
tomatic cognitive processes, and have developmental implications. Lapsley
argues that social-​cognitive theory is able to deliver a conception of moral
identity that satisfies these requirements, and goes on to describe work by a
number of psychologists so as to present this conception in depth and detail.
The result is a theoretically robust and empirically grounded conception of
moral identity that has considerable explanatory reach and is the centerpiece
5

Introduction 5

of what Lapsley calls a “progressive” research agenda. Research inspired by the

social-​cognitive theory of moral identity is progressive in the Lakatosian sense
that it can account for deficiencies in other conceptions of moral identity and
predict new and surprising facts about moral life. Lapsley concludes by raising
questions for further exploration.
Chapters 3 through 6 illustrate different approaches to the first theme: ques-
tions about how virtue development begins in early childhood and contin-
ues through the adult years. Chapter 3, by Robert N. Emde, “From a Baby
Smiling: Reflections on Virtues in Development,” mines the findings of fifty
years of psychological studies of development and their implications for the
growth of virtue. Emde begins by noting that not only do parents desire that
their children be virtuous—​an aspiration that shapes the life of the child early
on—​but also that topics of long-​term interest to him, namely, emotional avail-
ability, the social self, and dynamic systems in developmental psychology,
are relevant to virtue. After defining what he means by “virtue” and “devel-
opment,” Emde goes on to explain emotional availability, the social self, and
the dynamic systems that support and shape early moral development. Key to
the formation of the social self are the universal “REV” functions: reciproc-
ity, empathy, and valuation. Examples of reciprocity include turn-​taking, fair-
ness, and acting according to the Golden Rule; of empathy, emotional com-
munication and compassion; and of valuation, the internalization of rules
and standards. Each of these elements of early moral development should be
supported by parental regulation, yet each has a “dark side,” ways in which it
can go wrong. The successful shaping of the REV functions depends on a va-
riety of dynamic systems that support them. Emde believes that regulation is
a foundational principle, and identifies several respects in which regulation is
a dynamic force that shapes the infant’s development. Emde argues that the
universal REV functions can be viewed as “proto-​v irtues,” and identifies ques-
tions and research challenges to understanding them as pathways to the devel-
opment of virtues in individuals.
Ross A. Thompson and Abby S. Lavine probe complexities of moral devel-
opment from a different angle in ­chapter 4, “The Development of Virtuous
Character: Automatic and Reflective Dispositions.” The chapter builds on ear-
lier work by Thompson proposing that young children develop a “premoral sen-
sibility” based on their early, nonegocentric awareness of the effects of people’s
behavior on another’s feelings, goals, and needs. This premoral awareness, he
maintained, is then refined in parent-​child interaction into a network of moral
values and the child’s self-​awareness as a moral agent. The chapter continues
this exploration by investigating the development of character through non-
conscious and conscious processing, or what the authors call “automatic” and
“reflective” dispositions. Conscious processing occurs when one is aware of
6

6 Introduction

what one is doing, as when I choose a new outfit. Automatic processing occurs
outside the level of conscious awareness, as when I do not need to think about
how to place my fingers on the keyboard when I type. Thompson and Lavine
ask about the influences that shape the development of these capacities and
their effects on character. They offer a bioevolutionary-​developmental account
of automatic processes and identify, on the basis of empirical research, factors
that can shape these processes, sometimes in detrimental ways.
Chronic stress and the security of parental attachments, for example, can
both profoundly affect a child’s behavioral and biological reactivity, thereby
underscoring the importance of a safe and stable environment and reliable,
affectively positive caregiving for early moral development. The authors then
provide a social-​cognitivist account of reflective dispositions, foregrounding
again the importance of multiple types of parental influence, especially for the
development of the child’s premoral sensitivity, which they believe is shaped
by parent-​child interactions into moral awareness and the internalization of
values. Their essay highlights the complexity of factors that affect the develop-
ment of virtue, even in very young children.
Chapter 5, by Christine Swanton, “Developmental Virtue Ethics,” begins
by noting that, unlike psychology, philosophical approaches to virtue ethics
have not addressed issues of development in a thorough way, nor mined
the resources of post-​Kohlbergian moral psychology. Her chapter seeks to
remedy that gap by outlining a developmental perspective on virtue ethics.
Developmental virtue ethics, she maintains, is interdisciplinary, recognizes
that humans change through various stages of maturation and decline, and
adapts perspectives on virtue accordingly. Swanton considers the roots of
virtue in babies and prosocial behavior, and addresses their relation to virtue,
virtue in children, and virtue in mature agents improving in virtue. Central
to her account is the notion of a basic virtue, which is a minimalist concep-
tion of virtue: “A virtue is a good quality of character, more specifically a dis-
position to respond to, or acknowledge, items within its field or fields in an
excellent or good enough way” (Swanton, this volume, p. 118), and the idea
of “differentiated” virtue, which, for her purposes in this chapter, is virtue
relative to a stage of life. She makes the case that children can have virtues,
though in a differentiated sense.
Children do not have the mature virtues of an adult, but they can have
virtues appropriate for their life stage. Swanton also discusses the virtues of
the elderly or incapacitated, as well as mature virtue and the virtue of self-​
improvement. The latter, indicative of a self that is being shaped or in transi-
tion, has implications for how we view the relative importance of some virtues,
such as patience, and emotional states, such as inner turmoil.
7

Introduction 7

In c­ hapter 6, “How Habits Make Us Virtuous,” Nancy E. Snow responds to

the situationist challenge that cognitive processes are too fragmented to allow
for fully integrated virtuous character. In particular, situationists argue, non-
conscious processes frequently cause us to behave in ways opposed to those we
normatively endorse. Snow seeks to show this is an unduly pessimistic view of
the prospects for integrated character by examining three ways in which habits
can create virtuous dispositions: what she calls the “habits of the folk,” which
is how ordinary people acquire virtue without directly intending to do so; in-
telligent virtue, as developed by Julia Annas12 and amplified by Narvaez and
Lapsley;13 and the Confucian tradition of training and study to become a junzi,
or enlightened person. Each form of habituation involves a different blend of
nonconscious and conscious processing. “Ordinary folk” often develop virtu-
ous habits through goal pursuit, following practical advice, and imitating others.
Though they do not directly or consciously aim at becoming virtuous, they can
do so, Snow argues, indirectly and largely nonconsciously in these ways. Annas
as well as Narvaez and Lapsley outline pathways by means of which virtue can
be directly and consciously inculcated; and Confucius’ account stresses an even
larger share of conscious and direct cultivation of virtue, though none of these
views preclude ways in which virtue can be nonconsciously acquired. These
three theories of virtuous habituation show, Snow contends, that situationists
are too quick to dismiss the possibility of robust character integration.
Our second theme follows naturally from the first. Given that virtue de-
velopment is possible, how extensive are the virtues we can aim to have, and
what are the problems that prevent us from developing them to the fullest? In
­chapter 7, “Virtue Cultivation in Light of Situationism,” Christian B. Miller
explores implications of the situationist debate for virtue development. After
a brief review of the main points of this debate, he goes on to examine what
he takes to be its most important implication: that situational factors activate
nonconscious dispositions that can derail virtuous action. Miller calls these
“surprising dispositions.” There are many such dispositions, he contends, and
examples include beliefs and desires concerned with harming others in order
to maintain a positive opinion of myself; beliefs and desires concerned with
harming others in order to obey instructions from a legitimate authority; and
beliefs and desires concerned with helping others when this will contribute
to my good mood. What is surprising about these dispositions, Miller con-
tends, is not their mere existence but their extensive impact on our behavior.
He believes these dispositions give us good reason to think that most people
do not possess traditional virtues such as honesty and compassion. His ques-
tion then is as follows: In light of these surprising dispositions, what are the
most promising strategies for cultivating virtue? He assesses four different
8

8 Introduction

strategies: cultivating global from local virtues, virtue cultivation through

labeling, selecting the situations we encounter, and “getting the word out,”
or informing people about surprising dispositions so they can bring them to
conscious awareness and mitigate their influence. Getting the word out is the
most promising strategy, yet questions remain. In conclusion, Miller avers
that a multifaceted strategy for virtue cultivation in light of the surprising dis-
positions is likely to be most effective, but asks the crucial question of why
people should be motivated to do this. This question, he suggests, remains
unanswered.
Chapter 8, “Becoming Good: Narrow Dispositions and the Stability of
Virtue,” by Rachana Kamtekar, also deals with the question of how people
should seek to acquire virtue in light of situationist findings. If, as those find-
ings suggest, rational processes of which we are aware have little, if anything,
to do with directing nonconscious processes, how can we be sure of being or
becoming virtuous? Kamtekar divides responders to this question into two
general camps—​A ristotelians, who believe nonconscious processes can be
guided by rational reflection, and “nudgers,” who argue that nonconscious pro-
cesses are best directed by external factors that “nudge” us in desirable ways,
often without our knowing it. Kamtekar declines to take sides on this, but,
instead, calls attention to three issues that have been neglected in contempo-
rary discussions. She first argues that our interest in becoming good should
be uncoupled from an interest in being better than others or better than the
norm. We should not conceive of virtue as a means of distinguishing some
people from others, but instead, as a means of correcting our tendencies. If we
take that tack, she cautions, we should be careful about the bearing of some
experimental psychology on the discussion, since this literature assumes that
virtue is distinctive.
She next examines and raises problems for and alternatives to the notion
that virtue can be developed from situation-​specific dispositions through gen-
eralization and integration with other such dispositions. She concludes with
the intriguing suggestion that we should not look for general strategies for de-
veloping virtue, but instead should focus on the sources of stability or insta-
bility for virtues one by one. Thus, she thinks, we should attend to the reasons
why desirable dispositions are stable or not.
Kamtekar’s essay forcefully makes the point that how we think about virtue
matters. This suggests our third theme, the nature of virtue and how con-
cepts and language affect our thinking about virtue and the development of
virtue. The philosophers Matt Stichter and Julia Annas explore these themes.
Chapter 9, by Stichter, provides an inquiry into the very nature of virtue, asking
a question that taken up by ancient as well as contemporary philosophers: Is
virtue a skill, or only like a skill? In “The Role of Motivation and Wisdom in
9

Introduction 9

Virtues as Skills,” Stichter argues in favor of the skill model of virtue, main-
taining that virtue is indeed a kind of moral skill.
He tackles two key objections to that view, namely, that virtue requires
moral motivation and practical wisdom, whereas skills do not. Drawing on the
expertise literature from psychology to flesh out the respects in which virtue is
a skill, he also mines insights from psychologist Darcia Narvaez and philoso-
pher Gary Watson to argue that virtues conceived of as skills can indeed have
a component of moral motivation.14 We can see this by focusing not on the
performance, but on the performer. Performers who lack motivation can be
criticized for halfhearted performances; similarly, one who fails to be morally
motivated can be criticized on the skill model of virtue. What about practical
wisdom or phronesis? Can the skill model of virtue incorporate that feature
of the neo-​A ristotelian conception of virtue? Though there are many respects
in which it can, one important aspect of practical wisdom eludes capture on
the skill model: the fact that we use it to reason about the value of ends, and
not only about the value of means to ends. Stichter continues with an inter-
esting discussion of whether practical wisdom is itself a skill, then concludes
by noting that, because of the connection between virtues and morality that
other skills lack, we can understand virtues as skills with the added element of
practical wisdom.
In ­chapter 10, “Learning Virtue Rules: The Issue of Thick Concepts,” Julia
Annas explores problems that allegedly arise for learning virtue concepts
through virtue rules. Virtue concepts, such as “courage” and “generosity,” are
commonly thought to be “thick” as opposed to “thin,” that is, content-​r ich as
opposed to content-​poor. Contrary to a commonly held philosophical view,
she argues that “good,” like the virtue concepts, is thick as opposed to thin,
and that “good” plus the virtue concepts should be contrasted with thin de-
ontic concepts, such as “right” and “ought.” “Good,” she argues, is descriptive,
evaluative, and action-​g uiding. That is, “good” always implies content. We
see this once we realize that something can be called “good” only if it satisfies
criteria for goodness which are context-​dependent. Attempts to separate the
descriptive from the evaluative content of virtue concepts and “good,” Annas
believes, are doomed to failure. She goes on to discuss two objections to thick
virtue concepts, namely, difficulties in taking on evaluative points of view, and
shapelessness. Regarding the former, it has been argued that disentangling the
descriptive from the evaluative components of virtue concepts is essential if
we are to critique evaluative uses of those concepts. Similarly, the “shapeless-
ness” hypothesis claims there is no way of separating the evaluative from the
descriptive content of virtue concepts that allows us to identify all and only in-
stances of the use of the evaluative concept. Consequently, the argument goes,
virtue concepts pick out no definite descriptive “shapes.” Annas argues that
10

10 Introduction

taking a developmental perspective on virtue defeats these objections. There

thus is no need to engage in the doomed project of disentanglement.
Our fourth theme turns from the realm of concepts and language to ques-
tions of the influences of early caregiving, emotional development, and com-
munities on virtue development. Chapter 11, by theologian Jennifer A. Herdt,
in effect asks the provocative question: What’s good about guilt? In “Guilt and
Shame in the Development of Virtue,” Herdt revisits roles for guilt in the ac-
quisition of virtue, arguing that guilt can have more positive roles than have
hitherto been recognized. She begins by reviewing work from philosophy and
recent psychological studies that show that guilt is not the kind of motive we
typically associate with virtuous behavior. When someone acts virtuously, he
does so for the sake of the other. Guilt, however, is a negative feeling arising
from having failed to do one’s duty or fulfill one’s obligation. Empirical studies
indicate that guilt is self-​referential; one helps another, for example, in order to
relieve one’s self of the negative feeling of guilt, not for the sake of the other.
Thus, guilt seems ill-​suited to a virtue ethical outlook on two counts: its asso-
ciation with impersonal deontic concepts such as duty and obligation, instead
of aretaic concepts such as virtue; and its self-​regarding, as opposed to other-​
regarding, orientation. In a rich and wide-​ranging discussion, Herdt challenges
this view. She draws on psychological studies indicating that guilt correlates
positively with other-​regarding empathy, whereas shame disrupts empathy. In
addition to impersonal senses of duty and obligation, she maintains that there
is a place for more personalized duties and obligations within the psycholog-
ical landscape of imperfectly virtuous people. Feeling guilty when we fail in
these duties and obligations invites self-​reflection, enables us to take respon-
sibility for our agency, and through guilt’s correlation with empathy, reorients
us in the kinds of responsiveness to others required for virtue. She concludes
by urging that scholars use psychological and philosophical work on guilt and
shame to revisit roles for guilt and shame in Christian theological doctrines of
justification and sanctification.
The fifth and final theme of the volume is the exploration of two specific
virtues long thought to be in tension: justice and benevolence. In ­chapter 12,
“Benevolence in a Justice-​ Based World: The Power of Sentiments (and
Reasoning) in Predicting Prosocial Behaviors,” psychologists Gustavo Carlo
and Alexandra N. Davis explore the extent to which sentiments predict proso-
cial behaviors. They first contrast justice-​and benevolence-​based perspectives
on morality, then propose a conceptual distinction between principle-​based
and compassion-​based altruistic behavior so as to advance our understanding
of the role of benevolence in morality.
They review empirical evidence on the relative value of thoughts and sen-
timents in predicting altruistic behavior, and make a case that benevolent
11

Introduction 11

sentiments ultimately determine what is good and just. Although the authors
reject the Kohlbergian paradigm according to which cognition has primacy in
moral behavior, they also eschew Jonathan Haidt’s recent intuitionist model,
according to which sentiments displace cognition in predicting moral behav-
ior. The authors offer what they call a “tempered alternative” to views that
stress the primacy of moral emotions. Though they highlight the importance
of benevolent sentiments in predicting altruistic behavior, they also acknowl-
edge roles for cognitive processes. Their view thus offers an attractive middle
ground between Kohlberg’s and Haidt’s approaches—​one which empirically
supports roles for both reasoning and sentiment in our moral lives, while fo-
cusing on the importance of the latter.
We conclude the volume with an essay on the perennial question “What
is it to be just?,” taken up by philosopher Mark LeBar in c­ hapter 13, “Norms
of Justice in Development.” LeBar surveys key features of Kohlberg’s work
in Section I and exposes some philosophical problems with it in Section II.
A major flaw in Kohlberg’s work, he argues, is the failure to explain how we de-
velop as just beings, and how principles of justice themselves develop. LeBar
provides an alternative to Kohlberg that addresses these questions. Drawing
on the work of Friedrich Hayek, he sketches an evolutionary account that pur-
ports to explain how norms of justice emerge. On this view, norms of justice
emerge spontaneously over time by facilitating cooperation and coordination,
thereby ensuring a peaceable and productive society. The same factors that
produce norms of justice within societies apply across societies. Norms of jus-
tice that emerge in this way allow for “selective advantage,” that is, they favor
the success of those who abide by them. The norms are not objects of conscious
choice or reflective deliberation, but are causally efficacious in ensuring that
those who live by them survive and thrive. Though Hayek’s account is better
than Kohlberg’s inasmuch as it provides us with an explanation of how norms
of justice emerge, it has a crucial blind spot. It cannot ensure that emergent
norms are those we can recognize and endorse as just. LeBar addresses this
deficit by outlining the development of human cognitive capacities for reflec-
tion on normativity, and arguing that the natural product of this trajectory is
Aristotelian virtue theory. He then addresses the development of justice and
offers suggestions for a research program for developmental psychology.
We believe that the essays showcased in this volume, which vigorously
engage with work from other disciplines, are harbingers of the shape of things
to come. The most reliable way of increasing our knowledge of virtue and how
it develops, we believe, is through robust interdisciplinary interactions. We
invite readers to follow suit in their own work and engage with the insights of
those in other disciplines as we continue to explore topics of mutual interest
and importance.
12

12 Introduction

Notes
1. E.g., R. Hursthouse, On Virtue Ethics (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999); M.
Slote, Morals from Motives (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001); C. Swanton, Virtue
Ethics: A Pluralistic View (New York: Oxford University Press, 2003); J. Annas, Intelligent
Virtue (New York: Oxford University Press, 2011).
2. E.g., J. M. Doris, Lack of Character: Personality and Moral Behavior (New York: Cambridge
University Press, 2002); J. M. Doris and the Moral Psychology Research Group, The
Moral Psychology Handbook (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010); G. Harman, “Moral
Philosophy Meets Social Psychology: Virtue Ethics and the Fundamental Attribution
Error,” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 99 (1999): 315–​332.
3. N. Snow, Virtue as Social Intelligence: An Empirically Grounded Theory (New York:
Routledge, 2010); D. Russell, Practical Intelligence and the Virtues (New York: Oxford
University Press, 2009); C. Miller, “Social Psychology and Virtue Ethics,” The Journal of
Ethics 7 (2003): 365–​392; D. Narvaez, “Integrative Ethical Education,” in Handbook of
Moral Development, ed. M. Killen and J. Smetana (Mahwah, NJ: Erlbaum, 2006): 703–​733.
4. Maria Merritt, John Doris, and Gilbert Harman, “Character,” in The Moral Psychology
Handbook, ed. J. Doris and the Moral Psychology Research Group (New York: Oxford
University Press, 2010): 355–​4 01.
5. J. Webber, “Virtue, Character and Situation,” Journal of Moral Philosophy 3 (2)
(2006): 193–​213; J. Driver, Uneasy Virtue (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2001).
6. E.g. Swanton, Virtue Ethics; L. Zagzebski, Divine Motivation Theory (Cambridge University
Press, 2004).
7. Webber, “Virtue”; L. Jost and J. Wuerth, editors. Perfecting Virtue: New Essays on Kantian
Ethics and Virtue Ethics (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2011).
8. Driver, Uneasy Virtue.
9. D. K. Lapsley and D. Narvaez, editors. Moral Development, Self and Identity (Mahwah,
NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, 2004); D. Narvaez and D. K. Lapsley, editors. Personality,
Identity, and Character: Explorations in Moral Psychology (New York: Cambridge
University Press, 2009).
10. D. K. Lapsley, “Moral Stage Theory,” in Handbook of Moral Development, ed. M. Killen
and J. Smetana (Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, 2005): 37–​6 6; D. K. Lapsley
and D. Narvaez, “Character Education,” in Handbook of Child Psychology, Volume 4, ed. A.
Renninger and I. Siegel (New York: Wiley, 2006): 248–​296.
11. Lapsley and Narvaez, Character Psychology; Narvaez, “Integrative Ethical Education.”
12. Annas, Intelligent Virtue.
13. Darcia Narvaez and Daniel K. Lapsley, “The Psychological Foundations of Everyday
Morality and Moral Expertise,” in Character Psychology and Character Education, ed.
Daniel K. Lapsley and F. Clark Power (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press,
2005): 140–​165.
14. Darcia Narvaez, “Integrative Ethical Education,” and philosopher Gary Watson, “Two
Faces of Responsibility,” in Agency and Answerability (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
2004): 260–​2 88.

Bibliography
Annas, J. Intelligent Virtue. New York: Oxford University Press, 2011.
Doris, J. M. Lack of Character: Personality and Moral Behavior. New York: Cambridge
University Press, 2002.
Doris, J. M., and the Moral Psychology Research Group. The Moral Psychology Handbook.
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010.
Driver, J. Uneasy Virtue. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2001.
13

Introduction 13

Harman, G. “Moral Philosophy Meets Social Psychology: Virtue Ethics and the Fundamental
Attribution Error.” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 99 (1999): 315–​332.
Hursthouse, R. On Virtue Ethics. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999.
Jost, L., and J. Wuerth, editors. Perfecting Virtue: New Essays on Kantian Ethics and Virtue
Ethics. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2011.
Killen, M., and J. Smetana, editors. Handbook of Moral Development, 2nd edition.
New York: Psychology Press, 2014.
Lapsley, D. K. “Moral Stage Theory.” In Handbook of Moral Development, edited by M. Killen
and J. Smetana, pp. 37–​6 6. Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, 2005.
Lapsley, D. K., and D. Narvaez. “Character Education.” In Handbook of Child Psychology,
Volume 4, edited by A. Renninger and I. Siegel, pp. 248–​296. New York: Wiley, 2006.
Lapsley, D. K., and D. Narvaez, editors. Moral Development, Self and Identity. Mahwah,
NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, 2004.
Lapsley, D. K., and F. C. Power, editors. Character Psychology and Character Education. Notre
Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 2005.
Merritt, Maria, John Doris, and Gilbert Harman. “Character.” In The Moral Psychology
Handbook, edited by J. Doris and the Moral Psychology Research Group, pp. 355–​4 01.
New York: Oxford University Press, 2010.
Miller, C. “Social Psychology and Virtue Ethics.” The Journal of Ethics 7 (2003): 365–​392.
Narvaez, D. “Integrative Ethical Education.” In Handbook of Moral Development, edited by M.
Killen and J. Smetana, pp. 703–​733. Mahwah, NJ: Erlbaum, 2006.
Narvaez, D., and D. K. Lapsley, editors. Personality, Identity, and Character: Explorations in
Moral Psychology. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2009.
Narvaez, Darcia, and Daniel K. Lapsley. “The Psychological Foundations of Everyday Morality
and Moral Expertise.” In Character Psychology and Character Education, edited by Daniel
K. Lapsley and F. Clark Power, pp. 140–​165. Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame
Press, 2005.
Nucci, L., D. Narvaez, and T. Krettenauer, editors. Handbook of Moral and Character Education,
2nd ed. New York: Routledge, 2013.
Russell, D. Practical Intelligence and the Virtues. New York: Oxford University Press, 2009.
Slote, M. Morals from Motives. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001.
Snow N. Virtue as Social Intelligence: An Empirically Grounded Theory. New York:
Routledge, 2010.
Snow, N., J. Annas, and D. Narvaez, editors. Cultivating Virtue: Perspectives from Philosophy,
Psychology, and Theology. New York: Oxford University Press, 2015.
Swanton, C. Virtue Ethics: A Pluralistic View. New York: Oxford University Press, 2003.
Watson, G. “Two Faces of Responsibility.” In Agency and Answerability, by G. Watson, pp. 260–​
288. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004.
Webber, J. “Virtue, Character and Situation.” Journal of Moral Philosophy 3 (2) (2006): 193–​213.
Zagzebski, L. Divine Motivation Theory. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2004.
14

Baselines for Virtue

Da rc i a Na rva ez

Our screens and newspapers are filled with human violence, aggression,
mental illness, and abuse. Some yawn and think this is “normal” for humans
and even argue that social life is much better than it used to be in humanity’s
distant past.1 Such a view represents the tyranny of the contemporary, a fallacy
that does not fit the data about the past nor the characteristics humans accu-
mulated through their emergence through the tree of life. When we look at
the data carefully, we can see that when humans are properly developed, they
are more like the peaceful bonobos (who French kiss and have sex frontally
like humans) than male chimpanzees, whose violent (so-​called selfish gene)
tendencies are cited as a justification for human violence.2
It is my contention that in this last 1% of human genus existence, many
humans have forgotten what humans are and what they can be. 3 We have for-
gotten many things, including human origins, what humans need for typical
development, and what experiences bring about positive development and
optimal functioning. As a result, we have experienced a slippage in baseline
assumptions, a common problem across disciplines as scholars tend to make
contemporary experience a baseline for gauging what is normal.4 I’d like to re-
direct attention to a longstanding baseline and re-​examine human potential,
an aim typical for virtue theories. 5
What is virtue? People often look back to the ancient Greeks like Aristotle,
whose writings about virtue are extant. But the purview for virtue among
the Greeks and by scholars today typically includes only humans, and “civi-
lized” humans at that. In my view, extracting a baseline from the last 1% of
human genus existence (the last 15,000 years or so since “civilization” began)
is misleading. Discussions of virtue often skip over what humanity in the 1%
has done, often intentionally, to the rest of the natural world since the be-
ginning of totalitarian agriculture and at an increasingly accelerated pace in
the last millennium.6 The cultures that became dominant during this period

14
Another random document with
no related content on Scribd:
patrizii, sempre però con espressione allegorica. Ho già pur detto
che in seguito, nell’epoca del risorgimento, Italia predominò tutte le
altre nazioni nella perfezione di quest’arte. Impiegavasi questa
principalmente nel lavoro di anelli e sigilli, de’ quali, come dissi in
questa mia opera, usavasi moltissimo e però di pompejani se ne
hanno molti: e la glittica poi conta inoltre fra’ suoi capolavori una
maravigliosa coppa nel Museo napolitano summentovato.
 Gneo Pompeo. Vol. II Cap. XVIII. Belle Arti.

Finchè si provò allora la influenza greca, l’arte romana grandeggiò;

mano mano che scemava, amenenciva contemporaneamente di sua
degnità, e, abbandonata a sè, ricadde nel fare pesante, secco e
freddo.
Così ritengonsi di greci artefici i musaici, ai quali ho riserbato le
ultime parole in questo capitolo dell’Arti, e dei quali Pompei ne largì
di superbi, anzi il più superbo che si conti fra quanti si hanno
dell’antichità, nella Battaglia d’Arbela o di Isso, come dovrebbesi per
mio avviso più propriamente dire, ed a cui consacrerò peculiare
discorso.
Ma prima si conceda che rapidi cenni io fornisca intorno a quest’arte.
Ne derivano la denominazione da Musa; quasi il suo lavoro
ingegnoso fosse invenzione ispirata dalle figlie di Mnemosine, o
forse perchè se ne decorasse dapprima un tempio delle Muse. Ciò
che più importa sapere si è com’essa unicamente consista
nell’accozzamento di pietruzze, o pezzetti di marmo, di silice, di
materie vetrificate e colorate, adattate con istucco o mastice sopra
stucco e levigandone la superficie. Si chiamò dapprima pavimentum
barbaricum, quando del musaico si valse per coprire aree alle quali
si volle togliere umidità. Poi si disposero a disegni semplici, come a
quadrelli di scacchiere, onde si venne al tesselatum, che era formato
di pietre riquadrate. Progredendo l’artificio, ne seguì la specie del
sectile, formato di figure regolari combinate insieme, che è quel
lavoro che noi chiamiamo a commesso od a compartimento. Poi con
frammenti orizzontali di forme diverse si giunse a piegare l’artificio a
tutte le idee, capricci e disegni, come greche, festoni, ghirigori, ed a
tutto quanto insomma costituisce ciò che chiamavasi opus
vermiculatum, come si trova ricordato dal verso di Lucilio:

Arte pavimento, atque emblemata vermiculato

E qui piacemi avvertire come tutto questo processo non abbiasi a

confondere con quello che dicevasi opus signinum, nome dato ad
una peculiare sorta di materiale adoperato pure a far pavimenti,
consistente in tegole poste in minuzzoli e mescolate con cemento,
quindi ridotte in una sostanza solida colla mazzeranga. Ebbero
questi lavori il qualificativo di signini, dalla città di Signia, ora Segni,
famosa per la fabbricazione delle tegole e che prima introdusse
questo genere di pavimentazione.
Tutti questi primitivi saggi non erano ancora il musaicum
propriamente detto, ma quel che i Greci chiamavano litostrato; per
giungere al musivum opus, che rappresenta oggetti d’ogni natura,
emblemata, non bastavano per avventura i marmi e ciottoli:
convenne fabbricare de’ piccoli cubi di cristalli artifiziali colorati.
Tornò facile il connettere le asarota, ossia musaici rappresentanti
ossa e reliquie di banchetto, o un pavimento scopato, che con tanta
naturalezza fu imitato, da ingannare chiunque.
Così, avanti ogni altro paese, in Grecia si spiegò il lusso de’
pavimenti e, prima di ogni altra città, presso gli effeminati sovrani di
Pergamo. Citansi di poi i musaici del secondo piano della nave di
Gerone II, che in tanti quadretti di meravigliosa esecuzione
rappresentava i fatti principali dell’Iliade, tutti condotti a musaico;
quindi i lavori eguali del magnifico palazzo in Atene di Demetrio
Falereo.
È probabile che similmente si lavorasse a Roma coll’introdursi
dell’arte greca; e quanto si rinvenne in Pompei potrebbe essere
irrecusabile prova, se già noi non sapessimo come in questa città usi
e costumanze vi fossero eziandio speciali e dedotti da Grecia, e
come di colà vi si rendessero agevolmente artisti. Tuttavia dal
seguente passo di Plinio, pare che ai giorni di Tito imperatore, ne’
quali Ercolano e Pompei toccarono l’estrema rovina, questa del
musaico fosse nuova importazione, e che appena facesse capolino
in Roma verso il tempo di Vespasiano.
Plinio adunque, dopo aver detto che i terrazzi grecanici a musaico
vennero da’ Romani adottati al tempo di Silla e citato ad esempio il
tempio della Fortuna a Preneste, dove quel dittatore vi fece fare il
pavimento con piccole pietruzze; così sostiene che l’introduzione de’
pavimenti di musaico nelle camere con pezzetti di vetro fosse affatto
recente: Pulsa deinde ex humo pavimenta in cameras transiere, e
vitro: novitium et inventum. Agrippa certe in Thermis, quas Romæ
fecit, figlinum opus encausto pinxit: in reliquis albaria adornavit: non
dubio vitreas facturus cameras, si prius inventum id fuisset, aut a
parietibus scenæ, ut diximus, Scauri pervenisset in cameras [342].
Checchè ne sia, se recente consideravasi a’ tempi di Plinio il
Vecchio l’introduzione in Italia del musaico, questo si presenta
nondimeno fiorentissimo d’un tratto e grande nelle opere pompejane.
Gli scavi offrirono saggi appartenenti a tutte le epoche di progresso
di quest’arte, e in ognuno si manifesta una prodigiosa fecondità
d’invenzione negli artisti della Magna Grecia, e chi si assunse di
riprodurli con disegni ne ammanì interessantissimi volumi.
Non è possibile dunque occuparmene qui per ricordarli tutti; solo mi
restringerò a dire de’ più importanti.
Un musaico quadrato di circa cinque piedi e tre pollici, fu rinvenuto
nella casa detta di Pane, rappresentante un genio alato che a
cavalcion d’un leone si inebbria. L’espressione del fanciullo è
mirabile, come mirabile è la mossa del leone: la cornice a foglie, a
frutti ed a maschere teatrali compiono la perfetta esecuzione.
Un altro di forma circolare, di sette piedi di diametro, trovato nella
casa appellata del Centauro, rappresenta allegoricamente la Forza
domata dall’Amore, in un leone ricinto da alati amori che gli
intrecciano di fiori la fulva chioma. Nella parte superiore del musaico
vedesi una sacerdotessa che fa una libazione; nella parte inferiore
stanno l’una di fronte all’altra due donne sedute. Se non il disegno,
che lascerebbe desiderj, l’esecuzione e l’effetto de’ colori sono
sorprendenti.
Nella casa detta di Omero, nel tablinum si trovò un musaico istoriato
raffigurante un choragium, o luogo in cui si facevano le prove
teatrali, come già sa il lettore, per quel che ne ho detto nei capitoli
intorno ai Teatri. Sono diverse figure in piedi, attori che stanno
intorno al corago, o direttore, che li sta istruendo, il manoscritto della
commedia alla mano. Un tibicine soffia nelle tibie, come
accompagnando la recitazione del corago, perocchè paja veramente
che ogni teatrale rappresentazione fosse dal suon delle tibie
secondata. Vi hanno maschere disposte per gli attori e uno sfondo
pure interessante: il tutto condotto con una rara maestria.
Nella stessa casa detta di Omero, sulla soglia si vide un musaico
rappresentante un cane incatenato colla leggenda cave canem. Si
raccoglie da tal lavoro artistico come all’usanza comune presso i
Latini di tenere alla porta della casa un vero cane, quasi a custodia
di essa, si fosse sostituito in tempi più civili una pittura del cane,
eseguita in musaico e collocata, varcato appena il limitare, sul suolo
colla suddetta leggenda; o altre parole, composte pure in musaico,
bastassero, come salve, giusta quanto si vede nella casa delle
Vestali, o salve lvcrv, ecc. consuetudine quest’ultima che vediamo
copiata in molte case signorili de’ nostri giorni.
Ma eccoci alla casa del Fauno. In essa, ove già trovammo sorgere
dal mezzo dell’impluvium la stupenda statuetta in bronzo che forma
altra delle opere più preziose degli scavi, si rinveniva altresì nel
tablinum un musaico quadrato incorniciato da una greca assai
corretta e dipinta a svariati colori, nel cui mezzo è un leone, che in
uno stupendo scorcio, sembra stia per islanciarsi, così da incutere
spavento a chi lo guarda. È a rimpiangere che sia assai
danneggiato.
Nella stessa casa v’ha inoltre la maraviglia di quest’arte del musaico,
la giustamente famosa Battaglia d’Arbela, o di Isso, o il passaggio
del Granico che si voglia ritenere, che per grandezza, invenzione ed
esecuzione sorpassa quanti musaici si conoscano finora. Mette
conto che qui ne dica più largamente che non degli altri.
Anzitutto noto che esso misura un’altezza di otto piedi e mezzo, e
una larghezza di sedici piedi e due pollici, senza calcolare il fregio,
che a mo’ di cornice circonda il soggetto; onde hassi a ragione a
proclamarlo per il più grande musaico conosciuto.
Ora eccone la descrizione.
A manca di chi riguarda, che è anche la parte più guasta, vedesi su
d’un corsiero un giovane guerriero, che tosto distinguesi per il posto
concessogli di fronte al capo dell’esercito nemico, come il capo esso
pure dell’una delle armate. Ha la lorica di finissimo lavoro al petto e
la purpurea clamide agli omeri ondeggiante. Ha scoperto il capo,
perocchè il cimiero gli sia nel calor della mischia caduto, e stringe
nella destra la lancia, che sembra aver egli appena ritratta dal fianco
d’un guerriero, cui è caduto sotto il cavallo ferito di strale che gli
rimase confitto. L’agonia di questo infelice guerriero è espressa con
toccante verità. Dietro di lui ve n’ha un altro, che comunque ei pur
vulnerato, combatte tuttavia: ambi formanti intoppo a suntuosa
quadriga, i cui cavalli veggonsi disordinati, ma che indubbiamente
traggono altro importante personaggio, il qual rivolge l’attenzione sui
due feriti e intima a’ suoi di venir loro in aiuto; mentre un soldato
tiengli presso un corsiero in resta, su cui potrà quel personaggio
montare appena ei ne abbia l’opportunità e pigliar diversa parte
all’azione. Lo scorcio di questo cavallo è d’una prodigiosa bellezza.
Tutto il resto dello spazio a destra non è che una scena di
desolazione e scompiglio, comunque una selva di picche accenni
che l’impeto de’ combattenti da ambe le parti prosegue.
Quanti studiarono la composizione di questo musaico, ne inferirono
che le assise de’ guerrieri vinti, come la forma della quadriga, esser
non possano che d’un esercito persiano, avendo tutti la tiara, propria
di questo popolo, come si vede in altri antichi monumenti, e più
ancora si distinguano per Persiani ai grifi ricamati sopra le anassiridi,
o calzoni come essi portano, e sopra le selle.
Se dunque il guerriero vittorioso e feritore vestito alla greca, per la
somiglianza al tipo assegnatogli da statue e medaglie è Alessandro il
Grande: il capo de’ Persiani non può essere allora di necessità che
Dario, perchè avente la tiara diritta, che solo aveva diritto il re di così
portare [343]; com’egli solo la candice, o mantello di porpora, e la
tunica listata di bianco [344] ed egli solo l’arco di sì straordinaria
grandezza, ond’ebbero que’ della sua dinastia il nomignolo di
Cojanidi, cioè arcieri.
Constatati i due capi principali degli eserciti nel musaico raffigurati,
nelle persone dei due re, Alessandro e Dario, il soggetto allora deve
rappresentare la Battaglia di Isso, non il passaggio del Granico, nè il
combattimento di Arbela. Imperocchè il primo fu operato in estate; i
Persiani in esso si servirono di carri falcati, che qui non si veggono,
nè i due re si trovarono a fronte, e nulla poi indichi l’esistenza di un
fiume, ciò che dall’artista non si sarebbe negletto di riprodurre a
segnalare quel fatto, s’egli avesse inteso d’esprimere il passaggio
del Granico. Egualmente la battaglia di Arbela fu combattuta ai primi
di ottobre; v’ebbero pure carri falcati ed Alessandro incontro a Dario
non si valse della lancia, come vedesi nel mosaico, ma dell’arco con
cui uccise l’auriga del re. Ora l’albero, che qui si vede tutto privo di
foglie, esclude inoltre che non si potesse essere nè in estate, nè in
ottobre, mentre in Assiria tutto un tal mese gli alberi serbino intatto
l’onore delle frondi; ma nel verno, venendo anche da Plutarco
ricordato che la battaglia di Isso fosse combattuta in dicembre,
quando le piante dovevano essere, come nel musaico, prive di
foglie. Diodoro Siculo e Quinto Curzio narrano per di più che a tal
battaglia assistessero i dorifori, o guerrieri armati di lance, scelti per
la guardia del re fra i dieci mila immortali, coi loro abiti ricamati d’oro
e coi loro monili, e qui li vediamo appunto.
Tutte queste particolarità si raccolgono dai Cenni publicati dal dotto
cav. Bernardo Quaranta [345], ravvicinandovi altresì i particolari storici
che spiegano ognor meglio la composizione del musaico.
Dario tentò dapprima di decidere il combattimento d’Isso con l’ajuto
della cavalleria; e già i Macedoni si vedevano accerchiati,
allorquando Alessandro chiamò a sè Parmenione con la cavalleria
tessala. Allora la mischia divenne terribile: Alessandro, scorto da
lunge il re di Persia che incoraggiava i suoi dall’alto del suo carro ed
alla testa della sua cavalleria, combatte egli come semplice soldato,
per penetrare fino a colui che riguardava come suo nemico
personale e sperava la gloria di ucciderlo di sua mano. Ma ecco che
offresi una scena sublime di coraggio e di devozione. Osoatre,
fratello del re di Persia, vedendo il Macedone ostinato a cogliere
Dario, spinge il suo cavallo dinnanzi la reale quadriga e trascina
sopra tal punto la cavalleria scelta che egli comanda: ivi segue una
spaventevole carnificina; ivi mordono la polve Atiziete e Reomitrete e
Sabacete, Alessandro stesso vi è ferito nella coscia. Finalmente
Dario prende la fuga, abbandonando la candice e l’arco reale.
Io plaudo e convengo pertanto col dotto illustratore, credendo sia qui
veramente trattata la Battaglia d’Isso, e non altro combattimento
d’Alessandro il Grande.
Tutto poi, per quanto riguarda esecuzione, è in questo musaico
stupendamente trattato. Il guerriero che spira, cogli intestini lacerati,
è di una verità insuperabile: i cavalli non potrebbero essere più belli
e animati. Correzione di disegno, espressione di teste, movenza di
figure, disposizione di gruppi, sapienza di scorci, colorito ed ombre,
tutto vi è con una incredibile superiorità trattato.
«Or bene, conchiude un illustratore di questa insuperata opera, tutte
siffatte bellezze non sono che quelle d’una copia: quei vivi lumi sono
soltanto riflessi, perocchè il musaico fu imitato certamente da un
quadro. Che dobbiamo dunque pensare dell’originale? A chi
attribuirlo? A Nicia, a Protogene, ad Eufranore, che dipinsero
Alessandro? o piuttosto a quel Filosseno di Eretria, discepolo di
Nicomaco, la pittura del quale, superiore a tutte le altre, a detta di
Plinio, e fatta pel re Cassandro, rappresentava il combattimento di
Alessandro e di Dario? Non si andrebbe per avventura più d’accosto
al verisimile, pensando al divo Apelle stesso, che accompagnò
Alessandro nella sua spedizione, e che solo ottenne in seguito il
dritto di pingere il suo ritratto, come Lisippo quello si ebbe di gittarlo
in bronzo, e Pergotele di scolpirlo sopra pietre preziose.»
Dopo ciò, mi trovo in debito di avvertire che il disegno che ho
procurato per questa edizione del rinomatissimo musaico, appare
completato dal lato sinistro, — che, come ho già avvertito, fu non so
dire se dall’ultimo cataclisma toccato a Pompei, o dal precedente, o
fors’anco dall’incuria di chi lo sbarazzò dalle rovine, come or si vede
al Museo Nazionale, guasto, — per opera del ch. pittore napolitano
Maldarelli padre, da un acquarello del quale, fornitomi dal mio
eccellente amico Adolfo Doria, l’ho fatto ricavare perchè il lettore
avesse un’idea esatta della maravigliosa composizione.
Non tenni conto più sopra, onde non interrompere il corso della
storia dell’arti, delle botteghe o studj di scultura, che emersero dagli
scavi di Pompei: trovi qui il cenno di essi il proprio posto.
Nell’uscire dalla nuova Fullonica, e discosto di poco dalla medesima,
designata dal N. 5, fu scoperto uno studio di scultura, riconosciutosi
tale dalla esistenza di più un blocco di marmo, già digrossato e
abozzato, e diversi arnesi atti appunto a lavorare il marmo e
condurre oggetti d’arte.
Ma uno studio di scultura, anzi tutta una dimora, più interessante
all’epoca di sua scoperta, che fu verso la fine del passato secolo
(1795-98), perocchè adesso lo si ravvisi nel più deplorevole stato di
abbandono e di rovina, sorgeva nella casa presso il tempio di Giove
e di Giunone, nella via di Stabia. Ivi pure, nell’atrio della casa, si
raccolsero statue appena abozzate, talune presso ad essere
compite, elegantissime anfore di bronzo, blocchi di marmo, fra i quali
uno appena segato colla sega vicina ed altri utensili artistici. Vi si
trovò pure un orologio solare, un uovo di marmo da collocarsi nel
pollajo, per correggere la chiocciola onde non rompa i suoi, un
bacino e un vaso di bronzo, con basso rilievo.
In una città come Pompei, nella quale, se non al pari di Ercolano,
certo nondimeno in modo non dubbio le Arti erano in onore, così che
ci avvenne trovarne capolavori nelle più umili dimore, doveva essere
impossibile che gli scavi non ci additassero magazzeni e studj di
scultura; nè è presumere troppo il pronosticare che pur ne’ futuri
sterramenti se ne troveranno altri.
La città si risvegliava da quel mortale letargo, in cui l’aveva gittata il
terremuoto del 63, e sgomberando le rovine e rimettendosi a nuovo,
era naturale che artisti giungessero, chiamati d’ogni dove ed
aprissero studj e botteghe per tanto lavoro.

FINE DEL VOLUME SECONDO.

 INDICE

CAPITOLO XII. — I Teatri — Teatro Comico

— Passione degli antichi pel teatro —
Cause — Istrioni — Teatro Comico od
Odeum di Pompei — Descrizione —
Cavea, præcinctiones, scalæ, vomitoria —
Posti assegnati alle varie classi —
Orchestra — Podii o tribune — Scena,
proscenio, pulpitum — Il sipario — Chi
tirasse il sipario — Postscenium —
Capacità dell’Odeum pompejano — Echea
o vasi sonori — Tessere d’ingresso al teatro
— Origine del nome piccionaja al luogo
destinato alla plebe — Se gli spettacoli
fossero sempre gratuiti — Origine de’ teatri,
teatri di legno, teatri di pietra — Il teatro
Comico latino — Origini — Sature e
Atellane — Arlecchino e Pulcinella —
Riatone, Andronico ed Ennio — Plauto e
Terenzio — Giudizio contemporaneo dei
poeti comici — Diversi generi di commedia:
togatæ, palliatæ, trabeatæ, tunicatæ,
tabernariæ — Le commedie di Plauto e di
Terenzio materiali di storia — Se in Pompei
si recitassero commedie greche — Mimi e
Mimiambi — Le maschere, origine e scopo
— Introduzione in Roma — Pregiudizj
contro le persone da teatro — Leggi teatrali
repressive — Dimostrazioni politiche in
teatro — Talia musa della Commedia Pag. 5
CAPITOLO XIII. — I Teatri — Teatro Tragico
— Origini del teatro tragico — Tespi ed
Eraclide Pontico — Etimologia di tragedia e
ragioni del nome — Caratteri — Epigene,
Eschilo e Cherillo — Della maschera
tragica — L’attor tragico Polo —
Venticinque specie di maschere —
Maschere trovate in Pompei — Palla o
Syrma — Coturno — Istrioni —
Accompagnamento musicale — Le tibie e i
tibicini — Melpomene, musa della Tragedia
— Il teatro tragico in Pompei — L’architetto
Martorio Primo — Invenzione del velario —
Biasimata in Roma — Ricchissimi velarii di
Cesare e di Nerone — Sparsiones o
pioggie artificiali in teatro — Adacquamento
delle vie — Le lacernæ, o mantelli da teatro
— Descrizione del Teatro Tragico — Gli
Olconj — Thimele — Aulæum — La Porta
regia e le porte hospitalia della scena —
Tragici latini: Andronico, Pacuvio, Accio,
Nevio, Cassio Severo, Varo, Turanno
Graccula, Asinio Pollione — Ovidio tragico
— Vario, Lucio Anneo Seneca, Mecenate
— Perchè Roma non abbia avuto tragedie
— Tragedie greche in Pompei — Tessera
teatrale — Attori e Attrici — Batillo, Pilade,
Esopo e Roscio — Dionisio — Stipendj
esorbitanti — Un manicaretto di perle —
Applausi e fischi — La claque, la clique e la
Consorteria — Il suggeritore — Se l’Odeo
di Pompei fosse attinenza del Gran Teatro 53

CAPITOLO XIV. — I Teatri — L’Anfiteatro — 103

Introduzione in Italia dei giuochi circensi —
Giuochi trojani — Panem et circenses —
Un circo romano — Origine romana degli
Anfiteatri — Cajo Curione fabbrica il primo
in legno — Altro di Giulio Cesare — Statilio
Tauro erige il primo di pietra — Il Colosseo
— Data dell’Anfiteatro pompejano —
Architettura sua — I Pansa — Criptoportico
— Arena — Eco — Le iscrizioni del Podio
— Prima Cavea — I locarii — Seconda
Cavea — Somma Cavea — Cattedre
femminili — I Velarii — Porta Libitinense —
Lo Spoliario — I cataboli — Il triclinio e il
banchetto libero — Corse di cocchi e di
cavalli — Giuochi olimpici in Grecia —
Quando introdotti in Roma — Le fazioni
degli Auriganti — Giuochi Gladiatorj —
Ludo Gladiatorio in Pompei — Ludi
gladiatorj in Roma — Origine dei Gladiatori
— Impiegati nei funerali — Estesi a
divertimento — I Gladiatori al lago Fùcino
— Gladiatori forzati — Gladiatori volontarj
— Giuramento de’ gladiatori auctorati —
Lorarii — Classi gladiatorie: secutores,
retiarii, myrmillones, thraces, samnites,
hoplomachi, essedarii, andabati,
dimachæri, laquearii, supposititii,
pegmares, meridiani — Gladiatori Cavalieri
e Senatori, nani e pigmei, donne e matrone
— Il Gladiatore di Ravenna di Halm — Il
colpo e il diritto di grazia — Deludiæ — Il
Gladiatore morente di Ctesilao e Byron —
Lo Spoliario e la Porta Libitinense — Premj
ai Gladiatori — Le ambubaje — Le Ludie —
I giuochi Floreali e Catone — Naumachie
— Le Venationes o caccie — Di quante
 sorta fossero — Caccia data da Pompeo —
Caccie di leoni ed elefanti — Proteste degli
elefanti contro la mancata fede — Caccia
data da Giulio Cesare — Un elefante
funambolo — L’Aquila e il fanciullo — I
Bestiarii e le donne bestiariæ — La legge
Petronia — Il supplizio di Laureolo —
Prostituzione negli anfiteatri — Meretrici
appaltatrici di spettacoli — Il Cristianesimo
abolisce i ludi gladiatorj — Telemaco
monaco — Missilia e Sparsiones

CAPITOLO XV. — Le Terme — Etimologia —

Thermæ, Balineæ, Balineum, Lavatrinæ —
Uso antico de’ Bagni — Ragioni — Abuso
— Bagni pensili — Balineæ più famose —
Ricchezze profuse ne’ bagni publici —
Estensione delle terme — Edificj contenuti
in esse — Terme estive e jemali — Aperte
anche di notte — Terme principali — Opere
d’arte rinvenute in esse — Terme di
Caracalla — Ninfei — Serbatoi e
Acquedotti — Agrippa edile — Inservienti
alle acque — Publici e privati — Terme in
Pompei — Terme di M. Crasso Frugio —
Terme publiche e private — Bagni rustici —
Terme Stabiane — Palestra e Ginnasio —
Ginnasio in Pompei — Bagno degli uomini
— Destrictorium — L’Imperatore Adriano
nel bagno de’ poveri — Bagni delle donne
— Balineum di M. Arrio Diomede —
Fontane publiche e private — Provenienza
delle acque — Il Sarno e altre acque —
Distribuzione per la città — Acquedotti 183
CAPITOLO XVI. — Le Scuole — Etimologia 231
— Scuola di Verna in Pompei — Scuola di
Valentino — Orbilio e la ferula — Storia de’
primordj della coltura in Italia — Numa e
Pitagora — Etruria, Magna Grecia e Grecia
— Ennio e Andronico — Gioventù romana
in Grecia — Orazio e Bruto — Secolo d’oro
— Letteratura — Giurisprudenza —
Matematiche — Storia naturale —
Economia rurale — Geografia — Filosofia
romana — Non è vero che fosse ucciditrice
di libertà — Biblioteche — Cesare incarica
Varrone di una biblioteca publica — Modo
di scrivere, volumi, profumazione delle
carte — Medicina empirica — Medici e
chirurghi — La Casa del Chirurgo in
Pompei — Stromenti di chirurgia rinvenuti
in essa — Prodotti chimici —
Pharmacopolæ, Seplasarii, Sagæ —
Fabbrica di prodotti chimici in Pompei —
Bottega di Seplasarius — Scuole private

CAPITOLO XVII. — Le Tabernæ — Istinti dei 271

Romani — Soldati per forza — Agricoltori
— Poca importanza del commercio
coll’estero — Commercio marittimo di
Pompei — Commercio marittimo di Roma
— Ignoranza della nautica — Commercio
d’importazione — Modo di bilancio —
Ragioni di decadimento della grandezza
romana — Industria — Da chi esercitata —
Mensarii ed Argentarii — Usura — Artigiani
distinti in categorie — Commercio al minuto
— Commercio delle botteghe —
Commercio della strada — Fori nundinari o
 venali — Il Portorium o tassa delle derrate
portate al mercato — Le tabernæ e loro
costruzione — Institores — Mostre o
insegne — Popinæ, thermopolia, cauponæ,
œnopolia — Mercanti ambulanti —
Cerretani — Grande e piccolo commercio
in Pompei — Foro nundinario di Pompei —
Tabernæ — Le insegne delle botteghe —
Alberghi dì Albino, di Giulio Polibio e Agato
Vajo, dell’Elefante o di Sittio e della Via
delle Tombe — Thermopolia — Pistrini,
Pistores, Siliginari — Plauto, Terenzio,
Cleante e Pittaco Re, mugnai — Le mole di
Pompei — Pistrini diversi — Paquio
Proculo, fornaio, duumviro di giustizia —
Ritratto di lui e di sua moglie — Venditorio
d’olio — Ganeum — Lattivendolo —
Fruttajuolo — Macellai — Myropolium,
profumi e profumieri — Tonstrina, o
barbieria — Sarti — Magazzeno di tele e di
stofe — Lavanderie — La Ninfa Eco — Il
Conciapelli — Calzoleria e Selleria —
Tintori — Arte Fullonica — Fulloniche di
Pompei — Fabbriche di Sapone — Orefici
— Fabbri e falegnami — Præfectus
fabrorum — Vasaj e vetrai — Vasi vinarj —
Salve Lucru

CAPITOLO XVIII. — Belle Arti — Opere sulle 345

Arti in Pompei — Contraffazioni —
Aneddoto — Primordj delle Arti in Italia —
Architettura etrusca — Architetti romani —
Scrittori — Templi — Architettura
pompejana — Angustia delle case —
Monumenti grandiosi in Roma — Archi —
Magnificenza nelle architetture private —
Prezzo delle case di Cicerone e di Clodio
— Discipline edilizie — Pittura — Pittura
architettonica — Taberna o venditorio di
colori in Pompei — Discredito delle arti in
Roma — Pittura parietaria — A fresco —
All’acquarello — All’encausto — Encaustica
— Dipinti su tavole, su tela e sul marmo —
Pittori romani — Arellio — Accio Prisco —
Figure isolate — Ritratti — Pittura di
genere: Origine — Dipinti bottegai —
Pittura di fiori — Scultura — Prima e
seconda maniera di statuaria in Etruria —
Maniera greca — Prima scultura romana —
Esposizione d’oggetti d’arte — Colonne —
Statue, tripodaneæ, sigillæ — Immagini de’
maggiori — Artisti greci in Roma — Cajo
Verre — Sue rapine — La Glittica — La
scultura al tempo dell’Impero — In Ercolano
e Pompei — Opere principali — I Busti —
Gemme pompejane — Del Musaico — Sua
origine e progresso — Pavimentum
barbaricum, tesselatum, vermiculatum —
Opus signinum — Musivum opus —
Asarota — Introduzione del musaico in
Roma — Principali musaici pompejani — I
Musaici della Casa del Fauno — Il Leone
— La Battaglia di Isso — Ragioni perchè si
dichiari così il soggetto — A chi appartenga
la composizione — Studj di scultura in
Pompei
 NOTE:

1. Lib. VII c. 2.

2. Cajo Quinzio Valgo, figlio di Cajo, e Marco Porcio, figlio di Marco,

duumviri, hanno, per decreto dei duumviri, fatto fare il teatro coperto e i
medesimi lo hanno collaudato.

3. «L’Odeo che s’incontra a sinistra nell’uscire dal teatro.»

4. Apologia c. VI. Ne hieme voluptas impudica frigeret.

5. Cap. XLIV.

6. Trad. di Vincenzo Lancetti.

7. Marco Oculazio Vero, figlio di Marco, duumviro sopra i giuochi —

Bréton, pel contrario, constatando essersi qui scritto Olconius e non
Holconius, come più spesso altrove, ne fa maraviglia; ma maggiore in
me avrebbe a fare vedendo che, ammonito pure da ciò, non volle
leggere, come altri lessero, invece di Olconius, Oculatius.

8. Svet. Nero, c. 12; Juven. Sat., II. v. 147.

9. Lib. V. c. 7.

10.

Tal se ’l teatro il ricco arazzo adorna,

Mentre s’innalza al ciel la seta e l’opra,
Delle varie figure, ond’ella è adorna,
Prima lascia apparir la testa sopra;
Poi, secondo che al panno alzan le corna
Le corde, fa che il busto si discopra:
Come poi giugne al segno, ivi si vede
D’ogni effigie ogni membro insino al piede.

Trad. di Gio. Andrea Dell’Anguillara, Lib. X, ott. 37.

11. Diz. delle Antich. alla voce Aulæa.

12. Epist. II. I. 189.

13. Metam. lib. III.

14. «Calato sotto l’auleo, e ripiegati i siparii, si disporrà la scena.» Lib. X.

Discorre Apulejo di ciò, come se avesse luogo nella rappresentazione
d’un balletto pantomimico, il cui soggetto era il Giudizio di Paride.

15. Georgica 3. 24:

Come volte le fronti a un tratto muti

Nel teatro la scena ed i Britanni
Tolgan gli auléi purpurei, in cui ritratti
Appajon essi.

Lo che significa che sui scenarj fossero tessute le vittorie, tra cui quelle
singolarmente di Giulio Cesare nella Britannia, da cui i diversi schiavi o
mancipi venuti di colà erano stati applicati a’ teatrali uffici.

16. C. IV. v. 1186.

17. Lib. V. c. 3 e 5. De Theatri vasis.

18. «Turbato dallo schiamazzo che nel mezzo della notte facevano coloro
che avevano ad occupare nel Circo i posti gratuiti.»

19.

Non assediin gli schiavi i posti ond’essi

Per i liberi sien, a men che ognuno
Paghi un asse per testa e, ove non l’abbia,
Ritorni a casa.

Così nel prologo della commedia.

20. «Sorgon in luogo eletto i tre teatri.»

21.

Sovente assisi sulla molle erbetta,

Lungo il margin d’un rivo e al rezzo amico
D’un’arbore frondosa, allegramente
Senza dispendi avean essi riposo,