Empirical Foundations of the Common

Good: What Theology Can Learn from

Social Science 1st Edition Daniel K.
Finn
Visit to download the full and correct content document:
https://textbookfull.com/product/empirical-foundations-of-the-common-good-what-theo
logy-can-learn-from-social-science-1st-edition-daniel-k-finn/
More products digital (pdf, epub, mobi) instant
download maybe you interests ...

The Spartan Way What Modern Men Can Learn from Ancient
Warriors The Art Of Manliness

https://textbookfull.com/product/the-spartan-way-what-modern-men-
can-learn-from-ancient-warriors-the-art-of-manliness/

The Cosmic Common Good: Religious Grounds for

Ecological Ethics 1st Edition Daniel P. Scheid

https://textbookfull.com/product/the-cosmic-common-good-
religious-grounds-for-ecological-ethics-1st-edition-daniel-p-
scheid/

Why are there differences in the gospels? : what we can

learn from ancient biography 1st Edition Michael R.
Licona

https://textbookfull.com/product/why-are-there-differences-in-
the-gospels-what-we-can-learn-from-ancient-biography-1st-edition-
michael-r-licona/

Foundations of Earth Science, 9e Frederick K. Lutgens

https://textbookfull.com/product/foundations-of-earth-
science-9e-frederick-k-lutgens/
Faith Communities and the Fight for Racial Justice What
Has Worked What Hasn t and Lessons We Can Learn 1st
Edition Wuthnow

https://textbookfull.com/product/faith-communities-and-the-fight-
for-racial-justice-what-has-worked-what-hasn-t-and-lessons-we-
can-learn-1st-edition-wuthnow/

The Social Nature of Emotion Expression What Emotions

Can Tell Us About the World Ursula Hess

https://textbookfull.com/product/the-social-nature-of-emotion-
expression-what-emotions-can-tell-us-about-the-world-ursula-hess/

For the common good and their own well being social
estates in Imperial Russia 1st Edition Smith

https://textbookfull.com/product/for-the-common-good-and-their-
own-well-being-social-estates-in-imperial-russia-1st-edition-
smith/

Turning Psychology into a Social Science Exploring the

Environmental and Social Foundations of Human Behaviour
1st Edition Guerin

https://textbookfull.com/product/turning-psychology-into-a-
social-science-exploring-the-environmental-and-social-
foundations-of-human-behaviour-1st-edition-guerin/

Economics for the Common Good Jean Tirole

https://textbookfull.com/product/economics-for-the-common-good-
jean-tirole/
i

empiric al foundations
of the common good
ii
iii

empiric a l
foun dati o n s
of the
common
good
w h at theolog y
c a n le a rn fr om
soci a l s cience

edited by
d a niel k . finn

1
iv

3
Oxford University Press is a department of the University of Oxford. It furthers
the University’s objective of excellence in research, scholarship, and education
by publishing worldwide. Oxford is a registered trade mark of Oxford University
Press in the UK and certain other countries.

Published in the United States of America by Oxford University Press

198 Madison Avenue, New York, NY 10016, United States of America.

© Oxford University Press 2017

All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in

a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, without the
prior permission in writing of Oxford University Press, or as expressly permitted
by law, by license, or under terms agreed with the appropriate reproduction
rights organization. Inquiries concerning reproduction outside the scope of the
above should be sent to the Rights Department, Oxford University Press, at the
address above.

You must not circulate this work in any other form

and you must impose this same condition on any acquirer.

CIP data is on file at the Library of Congress

ISBN 978–​0 –​19–​067005–​4

1 3 5 7 9 8 6 4 2
Printed by Sheridan Books, Inc., United States of America
v

To James Heft, S.M.

Priest, visionary, and friend
vi
vi

cont ent s

Foreword ix
Acknowledgments xv
List of Contributors xvii

Introduction 1

1 .  Contributions of Contemporary Political Science

to an Understanding of the Common Good 7
M a t t h e w C a r n e s , S .J.

2 .  What Can Economists Contribute to the Common

Good Tradition? 36
A ndr ew M. Y uengert

3 .  Public Policy and the Common Good 64

M a ry Jo B a n e

4 .  The Contribution of Sociology to Catholic Social

Thought and the Common Good 91
D o u g l a s V. P o r p o r a

5.  Contributions of Economic Theory to an Understanding

of the Common Good in Catholic Social Thought 114
Ch a rles K. W ilber

6 .  Public Service, Public Goods, and the Common

Good: Argentina as a Case Study 142
Ger a rdo Sa nchis Muñoz
vi

con t e n ts

7.  What Can Social Science Teach Catholic Social

Thought About the Common Good? 170
D av i d C l o u t i e r

8 .  What Theology Should and Should Not Learn from

the Social Sciences About the Common Good 208
M a ry L. Hirschfeld

Index 241

viii
xi

fore word
john j. diiulio, jr.

In Catholic teaching, the common good is defined as “the sum total

of all those conditions of social life which enable individuals, fami-
lies, and organizations to achieve complete and effective fulfillment”;1
and it “presupposes respect for the person … requires social well-​
being and development … and requires peace, that is, the stability
and security of a just order.”2 Part theological insight and part moral
imperative, the Catholic idea of the common good is also part empiri-
cal theory and part political philosophy.
Although some conservative Catholics might beg to differ, thinking
about the common good by way of concepts, theories, and findings
from the contemporary social sciences (economics, sociology, and oth-
ers)—​academic disciplines that genuflect to no religious doctrines or
dogmas, old or new, East or West—​is perfectly consistent with what
the post–​Vatican II Church and its catechism teaches regarding faith,
reason, and the search for truth.3 Thinking or even rethinking the
common good is also just what a present-​day Church doctor might
order unto action-​oriented social science research focused on what
the catechism characterizes as “sinful inequalities,”4 what Pope John
Paul II wrote about as “serious forms of social and economic injus-
tice and political corruption,”5 what the Pontifical Academy of Social
Sciences has called “acute questions” regarding democratic develop-
ment and “the relationship between the development of values and
political regimes,”6 and what Pope Francis has termed “today’s many
geopolitical and economic crises” rooted in “unjust structures.”7
By the same token, some social science skeptics might doubt that
Catholic ideas regarding the common good are truly germane to their

ix
x

for e wor d

academic fields or could be made so if interpreted elastically in relation

to core disciplinary concerns, particular empirical research questions,
or specific public policy issues. To the editor’s and authors’ great credit,
such healthy skepticism is voiced throughout this volume. But, still
more to their credit, they offer no intellectual absolution to academic
cynics who dogmatically deny that something of real intellectual and
civic value either already exists or might yet be built by juxtaposing
and relating Catholic common good theology to the faith-​free social
sciences, and vice versa.
Matthew Carnes summarizes four turns in political science (inferen-
tial, quantitative, rational, and behavioral) that could be turned toward
“new opportunities for understanding the common good in a cross-​
disciplinary conversation between political science and theology.”
Writing as an economist, Andrew M. Yuengert thinks the fault with
Catholic common good thinking lies more in the direction of under-
playing “individualistic explanations” and rejecting out of hand any
“rational choice framework”; but economic analysis, he concludes,
“can enrich the common good tradition” with its arsenal of concepts
starting with classical notions of “economic agency” and extending to
“recent work on the logic of institutions and norms.”
Mary Jo Bane suggests that the policy sciences, drawing as they do
on several social science disciplines, offering both quantitative and
qualitative empirical analysis tools, and boasting sophisticated means
for objectively assessing trade-​offs among and between competing
values and benefits, could be a blessing to open-​minded Catholic
bishops.
Douglas V. Porpora acknowledges that “sociology has nothing
explicit to say about what constitutes the common good” and that
Catholic common good thinking about economic problems (extreme
poverty, non–​ living wages, persistent income inequality) generally
gives less weight to structural variables and the like than sociolo-
gists would deem appropriate; but he also emphasizes how sociologi-
cal “critical thinking” and “relationality” could deepen conventional
Catholic common good discourse.

x
xi

for e wor d

Charles K. Wilber strikes similar chords with respect to recent turns

in economic theory that point, as it were, beyond “easily monetizable
economic values” and that call forth new and more robust ways of
measuring economic well-​being and “human flourishing.”
Focusing on the governance problems experienced by post-​1960
Argentina, Gerardo Sanchis Muñoz echoes early social and political
science traditions in which good public administration was considered
a necessary, if insufficient, condition for translating democratic ide-
als into effective action, minimizing outright political corruption, and
blocking more insidious uses of public authority for private gain.
Arguing that contemporary Catholic common good teachings
overemphasize “individual human flourishing,” David Cloutier
harkens back to an earlier tradition in Catholic social thought. He
relates it to prudential insights supplied by the contemporary social
sciences and proposes a revised definition of the common good as
“the organization of contention and cooperation within and among
social institutions in ways that sustain the moral character and daily
life of persons and the relationships among them that constitute
shared human flourishing.”
Mary L. Hirschfeld observes that the social sciences, despite having
“emerged in the shadow of Machiavelli” and despite advances in their
expertise and knowledge that might leave one wondering “whether
theologians have anything left to contribute,” can yet learn much
through academic cross-​fertilization with theology and philosophy,
“the disciplines that encourage us to reason together about what con-
stitutes the good life.”
In sum, this ambitious volume offers multiple and competing per-
spectives and initiates spirited debates, regarding how much of real
intellectual and civic value is or might be found at the intersection
of Catholic social thought and the social sciences. Here is a prayer
that the novel discourse about the common good that this excel-
lent volume should serve to stimulate may continue in earnest and
enlist ever wider circles of scholars to the cause. Anything less would
be a sin.

xi
xi

for e wor d

Notes

1. Vatican Council II, “Gaudium et spes, Pastoral Constitution

on the Church in the Modern World, December 7, 1965,” in
Vatican II: Constitutions, Decrees, Declarations, ed. Austin
Flannery (Northport, NY: Costello Publishing Company; Dublin,
Ireland: Dominican Publications, 1996), 191.
2. “Catechism of the Catholic Church,” para. 1907 (all emphases in
the original), accessed July 16, 2016, http://​w ww.vatican.va/​archive/​
ccc_​css/​archive/​catechism/​p3s1c2a2.htm.
3. Ibid., para. 2293, http://​w ww.vatican.va/​archive/​ccc_​css/​archive/​
catechism/​p3s2c2a5.htm: “Basic scientific research, as well as
applied research, is a significant expression of man’s dominion over
creation. Science and technology are precious resources when placed
at the service of man and promote his integral development for the
benefit of all.”
4. Ibid, para. 1943–​ 1947, http://​w ww.vatican.va/​archive/​ccc_​css/​
archive/​catechism/​p3s1c2a3.htm: “Society ensures social justice by
providing the conditions that allow associations and individuals
to obtain their due. Respect for the human person considers the
other ‘another self’. … The equality of men concerns their dignity
as persons and the rights that flow from it… . The equal dignity of
human persons requires the effort to reduce excessive social and
economic inequalities. It gives urgency to the elimination of sinful
inequalities.”
5. John Paul II, The Splendor of Truth (Veritatis splendor), Encyclical
Letter (Boston: Daughters of St. Paul, 1993), 120.
6. Proceedings of the Fourth Plenary Session of the Pontifical
Academy of Social Sciences, Democracy: Some Acute Questions
(Vatican City, 1999), 24; see John J. DiIulio, Jr., “Three Questions
About Contemporary Democracy and the Catholic Church,” and
“Discussion,” 71–​87.
7. Pope Francis, “Visit to the Joint Session of the United States
Congress: Address of the Holy Father,” September 24, 2015,
accessed July 16, 2016, https://​w2.vatican.va/​content/​francesco/​en/​
speeches/​2 015/​september/​documents/​papa-​f rancesco_ ​2 0150924_​
usa-​us-​congress.html: “Our world is increasingly a place of violent
conflict… . We are asked to summon the courage and the intelligence

xii
xi

for e wor d

to resolve today’s many geopolitical and economic crises. Even in the

developed world, the effects of unjust structures are all too apparent.
Our efforts must aim at restoring hope, righting wrongs, maintain-
ing commitments, and thus promoting the well-​being of individuals
and of peoples.”

xiii
vxi
v
x

ac kno w l ed gment s

As editor, I am indebted to many people for the successful completion

of this volume. The authors of the various chapters have been gracious
in their revisions. Fr. James Heft, S.M., president of the Institute for
Advanced Catholic Studies, has provided leadership, encouragement,
and support throughout the process. Judy Shank, St. John’s University,
has worked diligently on the typescript for the text. Shelia Garrison
and the rest of the staff at the Institute made the arrangements for the
conference out of which this volume arises. Oxford University Press
editor Cynthia Read has been a delight to work with, as always. Copy
editor Andrew Pachuta was exceptionally discerning, and project
manager Sasirekka Gopalakrishnan made the production process an
easy one for me.
I remain deeply grateful for the inspiration of the late Paul Caron, in
conversation with whom the basic idea for the conference and volume
was developed.

xv
xvi
xvi

list of contributors

Mary Jo Bane is Thornton Bradshaw Professor of Public Policy and

Management, John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard
University. She has served as assistant secretary for Children and
Families at the US Department of Health and Human Services and as
commissioner of the New York State Department of Social Services.
Her publications include Lifting Up the Poor: A Dialogue on Religion,
Poverty, & Welfare Reform (coauthor), “Welfare Realities” (coauthor,
Journal of Economic Literature), and “The Catholic Puzzle: Parishes
and Civic Life,” in Taking Faith Seriously. B.S.F.S., Georgetown
University School of Foreign Service; M.A. and D.Ed., Harvard
University.
Fr. Matthew Carnes, S.J., is associate professor in the Department
of Government and the School of Foreign Service at Georgetown
University, where he currently serves as the director of Georgetown’s
Center for Latin American Studies. His research examines the political
dynamics of labor and social welfare policy in developing and middle-​
income countries. He is the author of Continuity Despite Change: The
Politics of Labor Regulation in Latin America as well as numerous
articles on the evolution of social policy programs in Latin America
and around the globe. B.A. and Ph.D., Stanford University; M.Div.,
Jesuit School of Theology at Santa Clara University; M.A., Fordham
University.
David Cloutier is associate professor of theology at the Catholic
University of America, Washington, DC. He is the author of The Vice
of Luxury and Walking God’s Earth: The Environment and Christian

xvii
xvii

l ist of con t r ibu tor s

Ethics. He is a coeditor of the Moral Traditions series, codirector of

the Catholic Conversation Project, and serves on the editorial board of
the Journal of Moral Theology. B.A., Carleton College; Ph.D., Duke
University.
John J. DiIulio, Jr., a Roman Catholic in the Jesuit tradition, is the
Frederic Fox Leadership Professor of Politics, Religion, and Civil
Society at the University of Pennsylvania, and a nonresident senior
fellow in governance studies at the Brookings Institution. His books
include Bring Back the Bureaucrats, Godly Republic, and American
Government: Institutions and Policies. In 2001–​2002 he served as
first director of the White House office dedicated to faith-​based ini-
tiatives, and in 2009–​2010 he assisted the Obama administration in
reconstituting that office. B.A. and M.A., University of Pennsylvania;
M.A. and Ph.D., Harvard University.
Daniel K. Finn is professor of theology and Clemens Professor of
Economics at St. John’s University, Collegeville, Minnesota. He is
a former president of the Catholic Theological Society of America,
the Association for Social Economics, and the Society of Christian
Ethics. He is the director of the True Wealth of Nations research
project at the Institute for Advanced Catholic Studies. His books
include Christian Economic Ethics: History and Implications and
The Moral Ecology of Markets: A Framework for Assessing Justice in
Economic Life. B.S., St. John Fisher College; M.A., Ph.D., University
of Chicago.
Mary L. Hirschfeld is an assistant professor of theology and econom-
ics in the Department of Humanities at Villanova University. She is
working on her book Toward a Humane Economy: Aquinas and the
Modern Economy, which focuses on the dialogue between economics
and theology, using Thomas Aquinas in order to construct a theologi-
cal economics that challenges neoclassical economics, while remaining
sympathetic to many of its best insights. Her work has been published
in the Journal for the Society of Christian Ethics, History of Political
Economy, Faith and Economics, the Journal of Economic Education,

xviii
xi

l ist of con t r ibu tor s

and the Review of Economics and Statistics. Ph.D. in economics,

Harvard University, 1989; Ph.D. in theology, University of Notre
Dame, 2013.
Douglas V. Porpora is a professor of sociology at Drexel University
in the Department of Culture and Communication. He has written
widely on social theory. Among his strong interests is the role of moral
emotions and moral reasoning in public discussion and behavior.
Among his books are Reconstructing Sociology: The Critical Realist
Approach and Landscapes of the Soul: The Loss of Moral Meaning
in American Life. B.S., Bucknell University; Ph.D., Temple University.
Gerardo Sanchis Muñoz is professor of economics and director of the
Center for Public Management at the Pontifical Catholic University
of Argentina in Buenos Aires and visiting professor at Pepperdine
University. His focus is on issues of governance, public management,
and the cultural and institutional issues related to economic develop-
ment. He has trained public officials in regional and local jurisdic-
tions throughout Latin America as well as in Ukraine, Japan, New
Zealand, Morocco, and France. He has worked with the World Bank,
USAID, UNESCO, UNDP, JICA, and NZAID. He graduated from
the École Nationale d’Administration, Strasbourg, France; is D.Phil.—​
P.R.S., University of Oxford; M.A. in Public Administration, Harvard
University.
Charles K. Wilber is emeritus professor of economics and fellow of the
Joan B. Kroc Institute for International Peace Studies at the University
of Notre Dame. Recent publications include New Directions in
Development Ethics, Catholics Spending and Acting Justly, and
Economics and Ethics: An Introduction. B.A., M.S., University of
Portland; Ph.D., University of Maryland.
Andrew M. Yuengert is Blanche Seaver Professor of Social Science and
professor of economics at Pepperdine University. His research addresses
questions on the boundaries of economics, ethics, and Catholic social
teaching. He has served as editor of the journal Faith & Economics

xix
x

l ist of con t r ibu tor s

and has authored three books: The Boundaries of Technique: Ordering

Positive and Normative Concerns in Economic Research, Inhabiting
the Land: The Case for the Right to Migrate, and Approximating
Prudence: Aristotelian Practical Wisdom and Economic Models of
Choice. B.A., University of Virginia; Ph.D., Yale University.

xx
xxi

empiric al foundations
of the common good
xx
ii
1

introduc tion

We have all had the experience of being unable to explain an idea to

someone else or, to put it in reverse, the experience of another person
being unable to understand something we understand well. It’s always
tempting to dismiss the other as the one at fault in a misunderstanding,
but this can be a sign of our own arrogance since the fault may lie in
our inability to communicate well. Yet after repeated sincere attempts
at mutual understanding, sometimes we reluctantly conclude that the
two of us simply can’t understand each other.
In conversation, scholars from different academic disciplines reg-
ularly face a similar situation. Raw intellectual capacity—​measured
by IQ scores—​is not the issue. Instead, scholars in any one discipline
typically share not simply preferred concepts, methods of inquiry, and
assumptions about adequate evidence but also habits of mind and pre-
sumptions about the world that scholars in some other disciplines don’t
share and may even reject outright. The problem is less important for
interactions between scholars in closely related disciplines, but deep
conversations between scientists and humanists are quite susceptible
to these sorts of difficulties, even between well-​intentioned scholars.
As Bernard Lonergan, S.J., put it, not everything “intrinsically know-
able” (knowable in principle) is “extrinsically knowable” (knowable
to me).1
Thus, good advice for overcoming the difficulties of interdisciplin-
ary dialogue might be summarized as follows: speak clearly, using
words that others outside my discipline can understand (i.e., avoid
our jargon), knowing that I cannot employ many of the more subtle

1
2

e m pi r ic a l fou n dat ions of t h e com mon g ood

distinctions we employ among ourselves—​in order that the most fun-

damental of our insights can be translated to others (“carry over” is
the meaning of the root Latin word for “translate”).
The idea of the common good has been part of standard discourse
in philosophy and theology for millennia, but most social scientists
never use the phrase. Thus, the conference held at the Institute for
Advanced Catholic Studies in Los Angeles in June 2014 asked much of
its participants. That gathering and this volume flowing from it were
designed to ask two questions: What do social scientists know about
the common good? And what can Catholic social thought learn from
those insights to improve its own understanding of the common good?
The first difficulty had to be faced by the social scientists: if my
discipline doesn’t even talk about the common good, what can I say
about it? It turns out that while the social sciences typically avoid the
phrase “the common good,” they do have some idea of what’s good for
people—​perhaps “what human flourishing entails”—​and most prac-
titioners share the belief that good work within their discipline will
eventually conduce to greater flourishing, a conviction held even by
many social scientists convinced that their own work is “value-​free.”
The second difficulty confronted the theologians when they were
invited to answer the following question: What might Catholic theology
learn in this conversation? Catholic social thought has long been appre-
ciative of social science as essential to applying its principles prudently in
practical decisions in the world, whether in public policy or in personal
life. Yet how should theology respond if the social scientists proposed
views of human flourishing or paths to human flourishing that conflict
with traditional theological perspectives? As the essays in this volume
make clear, challenges from social science can indeed improve theolo-
gy’s understanding of the common good, sometimes in surprising ways.
Political scientist Matthew Carnes, S.J., begins his contribution with
a description of four “turns” that have occurred in modern political
science. “While never losing touch with its normative wing,” he writes,
political science has moved toward “the positivist research tradition.”
The “inferential turn” leads the discipline to seek causal relationships
by careful proposal and testing of hypotheses. The “quantitative turn”

2
3

i n t roduc t ion

renders concepts empirically measurable. The “rational turn” attends

to the intentions of citizens and elected officials and their attempts
to accomplish their goals as well as possible. The “behavioral turn”
acknowledges the oversimplification of the rational turn and exam-
ines the ways people act in seemingly irrational ways. Catholic social
thought, he argues, would be well served by learning from these
approaches in political science. The most challenging insight Carnes
brings to theology from his discipline is the assertion that Catholic social
thought is overly irenic. Political science, he argues, understands that “a
self-​enforcing competitive balancing” among actors, organizations, or
nations is often the best way to move toward the common good.
Andrew Yuengert proposes a similar challenge from the perspective of
economics. Having written extensively on how the Aristotelian tradition
provides a much-​needed critique of contemporary economics, Yuengert’s
articulation of the insights of economics does not arise from a philo-
sophically naive defense of the discipline prevalent among many econo-
mists. “It is possible to make use of the insights of economics without
adopting its assumptions wholesale,” he argues, since the individualism
of economists that makes for an inadequate view of the common good
nonetheless “makes them aware of often-​overlooked social phenomena
which are crucial for the pursuit of the common good.” Economics has
a deep respect for personal agency, it explores the unintended order that
markets create, it provides insightful advice on the choice between pub-
lic and private provision of the goods essential to the common good,
and it helps articulate how institutions and norms work in economic life.
Importantly, Yuengert joins Carnes in proposing that Catholic social
thought would be better off incorporating the positive effects of competi-
tion and contention for the production of the common good.
Addressing the central question of this volume from the perspec-
tive of public policy analysis, Mary Jo Bane employs an unusual for-
mat: a letter to US Catholic bishops. In it, she encourages the bishops
to learn from the empirical cost–​benefit analysis so widely employed
in policy analysis, even though it seems to humanists “cold-​hearted
and materialistic.” She addresses in detail the problem of growing
economic inequality in the United States, looking carefully at not

3
4

e m pi r ic a l fou n dat ions of t h e com mon g ood

simply the poor but the middle class and the rich as well. She points
to “the fraying of social institutions” (e.g., the decline in marriage
and in religious affiliation) and provides sage advice for the bishops
or anyone else in moving from principles and concrete problems to
specific public policy.
Economist Charles Wilber begins with a reminder of the process
of “creative destruction,” which the distinguished economist Joseph
Schumpeter identified as playing a positive role in the achievement
of the common good. Wilber asks, “Can the destructive side of mar-
kets be mitigated while doing minimal damage to the creative side?”
He provides an economic view of human flourishing and argues that
economics does indeed have important contributions to make to any
understanding of the common good. Most helpful here are the econo-
mist’s understanding of market failure, including monopolies, exter-
nalities, public goods, and imperfect information. The analysis of
externalities, the unintended side effects of market activity, “holds out
the greatest hope for understanding between adherents of free mar-
kets and advocates of the common good philosophy.” The economic
implications of imperfect information and strategic behavior (such
as free-​riding and social traps) call, Wilber argues, for an embed-
ded moral code. Wilber ends with two concrete proposals for further
action: worker shared ownership and the development of alternative
measures of economic well-​being.
Sociologist Douglas Porpora articulates several contributions of his
discipline to the common good, beginning with the importance of crit-
ical thinking. Participants in this interdisciplinary conversation should
be ready to alter their views in response to “well-​taken criticism.” And
since the common good will require a consensus on just what is the
good, “each of us presumably will need to leave something partisan
of ourselves behind, something of our own doctrines.” Porpora pro-
poses an “epistemic humility” which generates doubt even about one’s
own convictions. This, he points out, may be a serious challenge for
Catholic social thought. He analyzes the tendency of every culture to
reify its views, to endow with reality categories and presuppositions
that have been culturally produced. Examples here include the very

4
5

i n t roduc t ion

notions of race and gender. Finally, Porpora addresses relationality as

fundamental to both the sociological viewpoint and Catholic social
thought and briefly examines problems that the market causes for an
authentic relationality.
Economist Gerardo Sanchis Muñoz focuses his attention on one
essential part of the common good: an efficient and responsive govern-
ment. He argues for the central importance of “a strong public service
ethos” for any adequate government and criticizes the growing use of
economic assumptions in evaluating civil servants. The problem here
is the assumption of mainstream economics that rationality entails the
maximizing of one’s own interests, a view employed more and more
by the World Bank and other international organizations in propos-
ing national policies aimed at improving government operations. On
the contrary, Sanchis argues that “the need today is not to persuade
the civil servants to become self-​interested rational maximizers. The
urgent need is to reinforce the ethos of public service, the merit system,
and the professional career.” He turns to Argentina as a case study,
noting that in 1940 Argentina was anticipated to be as wealthy as the
United States a half-​century later. Instead, the nation has been in a
period of “exceptional decadency,” entailing a strong patronage sys-
tem that undermines idoneidad, suitability for public service. The only
solution, he says, is the reestablishment of integrity, motivation, and
competence in all public offices, from the most local to the national.
Only if this occurs can the common good be served.
David Cloutier begins the theological reactions to the social sci-
ence chapters by arguing that premodern understandings of the
common good have an openness to the insights of social science
that dominant contemporary Catholic views of the common good
do not. The standard definition of the common good today comes
from Vatican II and focuses on “the social conditions” that allow
persons and groups to reach their fulfillment. The older approach,
represented in both Greco–​Roman philosophy and the Thomistic
tradition, is more “organic” and assumes, as Cloutier puts it, that
“individual flourishing depends on the proper relationship of the
parts in the social whole.” This provides an openness to the social

5
6

e m pi r ic a l fou n dat ions of t h e com mon g ood

scientific assertions that contention and competition—​ a nd the

unplanned order they can generate—​can be conducive to the com-
mon good if they occur within such a proper relationship between
parts and whole. He argues, in addition, that such structural rela-
tions can only be trusted when institutional design exists alongside
individual character formation, a challenge presented by the work of
Alastair MacIntyre. Cloutier ends with a new definition of the com-
mon good that can better incorporate the insights of social science
in the Catholic social thought.
The chapter by theologian and economist Mary Hirschfeld con-
cludes the volume. She reminds the reader that “the social sciences
emerged in the shadow of Machiavelli” and his prioritizing of “the
effectual truth”—​the way things actually work in the world—​over
“the imagination” of how things ought to work. This in turn has led
to social sciences that can be both quite helpful to Catholic social
thought in grounding it realistically in what is possible and quite
harmful when its focus on outcomes helps further shape a culture
that has lost the sense that true human happiness arises from vir-
tue, the seeking of goods in their proper order. She reviews Thomas
Aquinas’s account of the virtuous life and argues that such a more
authentic understanding of real fulfillment challenges the tendency
in social science to aim to alter behavior by incentives rather than
reasoning with people about both a better way to live and the char-
acter of the common good.
This volume holds out the promise that the reader will gain a bet-
ter idea of what religious thinking about the common good can learn
from the social sciences and a clear idea of just what theological reflec-
tion can provide that social science cannot.

note

1 Michael Vertin, “The Notion of a Lonergan Enterprise,” Method,

Journal of Lonergan Studies, n.s. 2.2 (2011): 76.

6
Another random document with
no related content on Scribd:
A nobler counsel breathes from the charter of our independence; a
happier province belongs to our republic. Peace we would extend,
but by persuasion and example,—the moral force, by which alone it
can prevail among the nations. Wars we may encounter, but it is in
the sacred character of the injured and the wronged; to raise the
trampled rights of humanity from the dust; to rescue the mild form
of liberty from her abode among the prisons and the scaffolds of the
elder world, and to seat her in the chair of state among her adoring
children; to give her beauty for ashes; a healthful action for her cruel
agony; to put at last a period to her warfare on earth; to tear her star-
spangled banner from the perilous ridges of battle, and plant it on
the rock of ages. There be it fixed for ever,—the power of a free
people slumbering in its folds, their peace reposing in its shade!
 Close of the Speech of Daniel Webster

On the Greek question, in the House of Representatives of the United

States, January, 1824.
The house had gone into committee of the whole, Mr. Taylor in the chair, on the
resolution offered by Mr. Webster, which is in the words following:
“Resolved, That provision ought to be made by law for defraying the expense
incident to the appointment of an agent, or commissioner, to Greece, whenever the
President shall deem it expedient to make such appointment.”
Mr. Chairman,—It may be asked, will this resolution do the
Greeks any good? Yes, it will do them much good. It will give them
courage and spirit, which is better than money. It will assure them of
the public sympathy, and will inspire them with fresh constancy. It
will teach them that they are not forgotten by the civilized world, and
to hope one day to occupy, in that world, an honorable station.
A farther question remains. Is this measure pacific? It has no other
character. It simply proposes to make a pecuniary provision for a
mission, when the president shall deem such mission expedient. It is
a mere reciprocation to the sentiments of his message; it imposes
upon him no new duty; it gives him no new power; it does not hasten
or urge him forward; it simply provides, in an open and avowed
manner, the means of doing, what would else be done out of the
contingent fund. It leaves him at the most perfect liberty, and it
reposes the whole matter in his sole discretion. He might do it
without this resolution, as he did in the case of South America,—but
it merely answers the query, whether on so great and interesting a
question as the condition of the Greeks, this house holds no opinion
which is worth expressing? But, suppose a commissioner is sent, the
measure is pacific still. Where is the breach of neutrality? Where a
just cause of offence? And besides, Mr. Chairman, is all the danger in
this matter on one side? may we not inquire, whose fleets cover the
Archipelago? may we not ask, what would be the result to our trade
should Smyrna be blockaded? A commissioner could at least procure
for us what we do not now possess—that is, authentic information of
the true state of things. The document on your table exhibits a
meagre appearance on this point—what does it contain? Letters of
Mr. Luriottis and paragraphs from a French paper. My personal
opinion is, that an agent ought immediately to be sent; but the
resolution I have offered by no means goes so far.
Do gentlemen fear the result of this resolution in embroiling us
with the Porte? Why, sir, how much is it ahead of the whole nation,
or rather let me ask how much is the nation ahead of it? Is not this
whole people already in a state of open and avowed excitement on
this subject? Does not the land ring from side to side with one
common sentiment of sympathy for Greece, and indignation toward
her oppressors? nay, more, sir—are we not giving money to this
cause? More still, sir—is not the secretary of state in open
correspondence with the president of the Greek committee in
London? The nation has gone as far as it can go, short of an official
act of hostility. This resolution adds nothing beyond what is already
done—nor can any of the European governments take offence at such
a measure. But if they would, should we be withheld from an honest
expression of liberal feelings in the cause of freedom, for fear of
giving umbrage to some member of the holy alliance? We are not,
surely, yet prepared to purchase their smiles by a sacrifice of every
manly principle. Dare any Christian prince even ask us not to
sympathize with a Christian nation struggling against Tartar
tyranny? We do not interfere—we break no engagements—we violate
no treaties; with the Porte we have none.
Mr. Chairman, there are some things which, to be well done, must
be promptly done. If we even determine to do the thing that is now
proposed, we may do it too late. Sir, I am not of those who are for
withholding aid when it is most urgently needed, and when the stress
is past, and the aid no longer necessary, overwhelming the sufferers
with caresses. I will not stand by and see my fellow man drowning
without stretching out a hand to help him, till he has by his own
efforts and presence of mind reached the shore in safety, and then
encumber him with aid. With suffering Greece now is the crisis of her
fate,—her great, it may be, her last struggle. Sir, while we sit here
deliberating, her destiny may be decided. The Greeks, contending
with ruthless oppressors, turn their eyes to us, and invoke us by their
ancestors, slaughtered wives and children, by their own blood,
poured out like water, by the hecatombs of dead they have heaped up
as it were to heaven, they invoke, they implore us for some cheering
sound, some look of sympathy, some token of compassionate regard.
They look to us as the great republic of the earth—and they ask us by
our common faith, whether we can forget that they are struggling, as
we once struggled, for what we now so happily enjoy? I cannot say,
sir, that they will succeed; that rests with heaven. But for myself, sir,
if I should to-morrow hear that they have failed—that their last
phalanx had sunk beneath the Turkish cimeter, that the flames of
their last city had sunk in its ashes, and that naught remained but the
wide melancholy waste where Greece once was, I should still reflect,
with the most heartfelt satisfaction, that I have asked you in the
name of seven millions of freemen, that you would give them at least
the cheering of one friendly voice.
 John Randolph on the other side of Same
Question.

Mr. Chairman,—It is with serious concern and alarm, that I have

heard doctrines broached in this debate, fraught with consequences
more disastrous to the best interests of this people than any that I
have ever heard advanced during the five-and-twenty years that I
have been honored with a seat on this floor. They imply, to my
apprehension, a total and fundamental change of the policy pursued
by this government, ab urbe condita—from the foundation of the
republic, to the present day. Are we, sir, to go on a crusade, in
another hemisphere, for the propagation of two objects—objects as
dear and delightful to my heart as to that of any gentleman in this, or
in any other assembly—liberty and religion—and, in the name of
these holy words—by this powerful spell, is this nation to be conjured
and persuaded out of the highway of heaven—out of its present
comparatively happy state, into all the disastrous conflicts arising
from the policy of European powers, with all the consequences which
flow from them?
Liberty and religion, sir! I believe that nothing similar to this
proposition is to be found in modern history, unless in the famous
decree of the French national assembly, which brought combined
Europe against them, with its united strength, and, after repeated
struggles, finally effected the downfall of the French power. Sir, I am
wrong—there is another example of like doctrine; and you find it
among that strange and peculiar people—in that mysterious book,
which is of the highest authority with them, (for it is at once their
gospel and their law,) the Koran, which enjoins it to be the duty of all
good Moslems to propagate its doctrines at the point of the sword—
by the edge of the cimeter. The character of that people is a peculiar
one: they differ from every other race. It has been said, here, that it is
four hundred years since they encamped in Europe. Sir, they were
encamped, on the spot where we now find them, before this country
was discovered, and their title to the country which they occupy is at
least as good as ours. They hold their possessions there by the same
title by which all other countries are held—possession, obtained at
first by a successful employment of force, confirmed by time, usage,
prescription—the best of all possible titles. Their policy has been not
tortuous, like that of other states of Europe, but straightforward:
they had invariably appealed to the sword, and they held by the
sword. The Russ had, indeed, made great encroachments on their
empire, but the ground had been contested inch by inch; and the
acquisitions of Russia on the side of Christian Europe—Livonia,
Ingria, Courland—Finland, to the Gulf of Bothnia—Poland!—had
been greater than that of the Mahometans. And, in consequence of
this straightforward policy to which I before referred, this peculiar
people could boast of being the only one of the continental Europe,
whose capital had never been insulted by the presence of a foreign
military force. It was a curious fact, well worthy of attention, that
Constantinople was the only capital in continental Europe—for
Moscow was the true capital of Russia—that had never been in
possession of an enemy. It is, indeed, true, that the Empress
Catharine did inscribe over the gate of one of the cities that she had
won in the Krimea, (Cherson, I think,) “the road to Byzantium;” but,
sir, it has proved—perhaps too low a word for the subject—but a
stumpy road for Russia. Who, at that day, would have been believed,
had he foretold to that august (for so she was) and illustrious woman
that her Cossacks of the Ukraine, and of the Don, would have
encamped in Paris before they reached Constantinople? Who would
have been believed, if he had foretold that a French invading force—
such as the world never saw before, and, I trust, will never again see
—would lay Moscow itself in ashes? These are considerations worthy
of attention, before we embark in the project proposed by this
resolution, the consequences of which no human eye can divine.
I would respectfully ask the gentleman from Massachusetts,
whether in his very able and masterly argument—and he has said all
that could be said upon the subject, and more than I supposed could
be said by any man in favor of his resolution—whether he himself has
not furnished an answer to his speech—I had not the happiness
myself to hear his speech, but a friend has read it to me. In one of the
arguments in that speech, toward the conclusion, I think, of his
speech, the gentleman lays down, from Puffendorf, in reference to
the honeyed words and pious professions of the holy alliance, that
these are all surplusage, because nations are always supposed to be
ready to do what justice and national law require. Well, sir, if this be
so, why may not the Greeks presume—why are they not, on this
principle, bound to presume, that this government is disposed to do
all, in reference to them, that they ought to do, without any formal
resolutions to that effect? I ask the gentleman from Massachusetts,
whether the doctrine of Puffendorf does not apply as strongly to the
resolution as to the declaration of the allies—that is, if the resolution
of the gentleman be indeed that almost nothing he would have us
suppose, if there be not something behind this nothing which divides
this house (not horizontally, as the gentleman has ludicrously said—
but vertically) into two unequal parties, one the advocate of a
splendid system of crusades, the other the friends of peace and
harmony; the advocates of a fireside policy—for, as had been truly
said, as long as all is right at the fireside, there cannot be much
wrong elsewhere—whether, I repeat, does not the doctrine of
Puffendorf apply as well to the words of the resolution as to the
words of the holy alliance?
But, sir, we have already done more than this. The president of the
United States, the only organ of communication which the people
have seen fit to establish between us and foreign powers, has already
expressed all, in reference to Greece, that the resolution goes to
express actum est—it is done—it is finished—there is an end. Not,
that I would have the house to infer, that I mean to express any
opinion as to the policy of such a declaration—the practice of
responding to presidential addresses and messages had gone out for,
now, these two or three-and-twenty years.
 Extract from Mr. Hayne’s Speech against the
Tariff Bill, in Congress,

January, 1832.
Mr. President,—The plain and seemingly obvious truth, that in a
fair and equal exchange of commodities all parties gained, is a noble
discovery of modern times. The contrary principle naturally led to
commercial rivalries, wars, and abuses of all sorts. The benefits of
commerce being regarded as a stake to be won, or an advantage to be
wrested from others by fraud or by force, governments naturally
strove to secure them to their own subjects; and when they once set
out in this wrong direction, it was quite natural that they should not
stop short till they ended in binding, in the bonds of restriction, not
only the whole country, but all of its parts. Thus we are told that
England first protected by her restrictive policy, her whole empire
against all the world, then Great Britain against the colonies, then
the British islands against each other, and ended by vainly
attempting to protect all the great interests and employment of the
state by balancing them against each other. Sir, such a system,
carried fully out, is not confined to rival nations, but protects one
town against another, considers villages, and even families as rivals;
and cannot stop short of “Robinson Crusoe in his goat skins.” It takes
but one step further to make every man his own lawyer, doctor,
farmer, and shoemaker—and, if I may be allowed an Irishism, his
own seamstress and washerwoman. The doctrine of free trade, on the
contrary, is founded on the true social system. It looks on all
mankind as children of a common parent—and the great family of
nations as linked together by mutual interests. Sir, as there is a
religion, so I believe there is a politics of nature. Cast your eyes over
this various earth—see its surface diversified by hills and valleys,
rocks, and fertile fields. Notice its different productions—its infinite
varieties of soil and climate. See the mighty rivers winding their way
to the very mountain’s base, and thence guiding man to the vast
ocean, dividing, yet connecting nations. Can any man who considers
these things with the eye of a philosopher, not read the design of the
great Creator (written legibly in his works) that his children should
be drawn together in a free commercial intercourse, and mutual
exchanges of the various gifts with which a bountiful Providence has
blessed them. Commerce, sir, restricted even as she has been, has
been the great source of civilization and refinement all over the
world. Next to the Christian religion, I consider free trade in its
largest sense as the greatest blessing that can be conferred upon any
people. Hear, sir, what Patrick Henry, the great orator of Virginia,
whose soul was the very temple of freedom, says on this subject:—
“Why should we fetter commerce? If a man is in chains, he droops and bows to
the earth, because his spirits are broken, but let him twist the fetters from his legs,
and he will stand erect. Fetter not commerce! Let her be as free as the air. She will
range the whole creation, and return on the four winds of heaven to bless the land
with plenty.”
But, it has been said, that free trade would do very well, if all
nations would adopt it; but as it is, every nation must protect itself
from the effect of restrictions by countervailing measures. I am
persuaded, sir, that this is a great, a most fatal error. If retaliation is
resorted to for the honest purpose of producing a redress of the
grievance, and while adhered to no longer than there is a hope of
success, it may, like war itself, be sometimes just and necessary. But
if it have no such object, “it is the unprofitable combat of seeing
which can do the other the most harm.” The case can hardly be
conceived in which permanent restrictions, as a measure of
retaliation, could be profitable. In every possible situation, a trade,
whether more or less restricted, is profitable, or it is not. This can
only be decided by experience, and if the trade be left to regulate
itself, water would not more naturally seek its level, than the
intercourse adjust itself to the true interest of the parties. Sir, as to
this idea of the regulation by government of the pursuits of men, I
consider it as a remnant of barbarism disgraceful to an enlightened
age, and inconsistent with the first principles of rational liberty. I
hold government to be utterly incapable, from its position, of
exercising such a power wisely, prudently, or justly. Are the rulers of
the world the depositories of its collected wisdom? Sir, can we forget
the advice of a great statesman to his son—“Go, see the world, my
son, that you may learn with how little wisdom mankind is
governed.” And is our own government an exception to this rule, or
do we not find here, as every where else, that
“Man, proud man,
Robed in a little brief authority,
Plays such fantastic tricks before high heaven,
As make the angels weep?”

The gentleman has appealed to the example of other nations. Sir,

they are all against him. They have had restrictions enough, to be
sure; but they are getting heartily sick of them, and in England,
particularly, would willingly get rid of them if they could. We have
been assured, by the declaration of a minister of the crown, from his
place in parliament, “that there is a growing conviction, among all
men of sense and reflection in that country, that the true policy of all
nations is to be found in unrestricted industry.” Sir, in England they
are now retracing their steps, and endeavoring to relieve themselves
of the system as fast as they can. Within a few years past, upwards of
three hundred statutes, imposing restrictions in that country, have
been repealed; and a case has recently occurred there, which seems
to leave no doubt that, if Great Britain has grown great, it is, as Mr.
Huskisson has declared, “not in consequence of, but in spite of their
restrictions.” The silk manufacture, protected by enormous bounties,
was found to be in such a declining condition, that the government
was obliged to do something to save it from total ruin. And what did
they do? They considerably reduced the duty on foreign silks, both
on the raw material and the manufactured article. The consequence
was the immediate revival of the silk manufacture, which has since
been nearly doubled.
Sir, the experience of France is equally decisive. Bonaparte’s effort
to introduce cotton and sugar has cost that country millions; and, but
the other day, a foolish attempt to protect the iron mines spread
devastation through half of France, and nearly ruined the wine trade,
on which one-fifth of her citizens depend for subsistence. As to
Spain, unhappy Spain, “fenced round with restrictions,” her
experience, one would suppose, would convince us, if anything could,
that the protecting system in politics, like bigotry in religion, was
utterly at war with sound principles and a liberal and enlightened
policy. Sir, I say, in the words of the philosophical statesman of
England, “leave a generous nation free to seek their own road to
perfection.” Thank God, the night is passing away, and we have lived
to see the dawn of a glorious day. The cause of free trade must and
will prosper, and finally triumph. The political economist is abroad;
light has come into the world; and, in this instance at least, men will
not “prefer darkness rather than light.” Sir, let it not be said, in after
times, that the statesmen of America were behind the age in which
they lived—that they initiated this young and vigorous country into
the enervating and corrupting practices of European nations—and
that, at the moment when the whole world were looking to us for an
example, we arrayed ourselves in the castoff follies and exploded
errors of the old world, and, by the introduction of a vile system of
artificial stimulants and political gambling, impaired the healthful
vigor of the body politic, and brought on a decrepitude and
premature dissolution.
 Mr. Clay’s Speech on his Public Lands Bill.

Mr. President,—Although I find myself borne down by the

severest affliction with which Providence has ever been pleased to
visit me, I have thought that my private griefs ought not longer to
prevent me from attempting, ill as I feel qualified, to discharge my
public duties. And I now rise, in pursuance of the notice which has
been given, to ask leave to introduce a bill to appropriate, for a
limited time, the proceeds of the sales of the public lands of the
United States, and for granting land to certain states.
I feel it incumbent on me to make a brief explanation of the highly
important measure which I have now the honor to propose. The bill
which I desire to introduce, provides for the distribution of the
proceeds of the public lands in the years 1833, 1834, 1835, 1836 and
1837, among the twenty-four states of the union, and conforms
substantially to that which passed in 1833. It is therefore of a
temporary character; but if it shall be found to have salutary
operation, it will be in the power of a future congress to give it an
indefinite continuance; and if otherwise, it will expire by its own
terms. In the event of war unfortunately breaking out with any
foreign power, the bill is to cease, and the fund which it distributes is
to be applied to the prosecution of the war. The bill directs that ten
per cent. of the net proceeds of the public lands sold within the limits
of the seven new states, shall be first set apart for them, in addition
to the five per cent. reserved by their several compacts with the
United States; and that the residue of the proceeds, whether from
sales made in the states or territories, shall be divided among the
twenty-four states in proportion to their respective federal
population. In this respect the bill conforms to that which was
introduced in 1832. For one, I should have been willing to have
allowed the new states twelve and a half instead of ten per cent.; but
as that was objected to by the president, in his veto message, and has
been opposed in other quarters, I thought it best to restrict the
allowance to the more moderate sum. The bill also contains large and
liberal grants of land to several of the new states, to place them upon
an equality with others to which the bounty of congress has been
heretofore extended, and provides that, when other new states shall
be admitted into the union, they shall receive their share of the
common fund.

Mr. President, I have ever regarded, with feelings of the

profoundest regret, the decision which the president of the United
States felt himself induced to make on the bill of 1833. If the bill had
passed, about twenty millions of dollars would have been, during the
last three years, in the hands of the several states, applicable by them
to the beneficent purposes of internal improvement, education or
colonization. What immense benefits might not have been diffused
throughout the land by the active employment of that large sum?
What new channels of commerce and communication might not have
been opened? What industry stimulated, what labor rewarded? How
many youthful minds might have received the blessings of education
and knowledge, and been rescued from ignorance, vice, and ruin?
How many descendants of Africa might have been transported from
a country where they never can enjoy political or social equality, to
the native land of their fathers, where no impediment exists to their
attainment of the highest degree of elevation, intellectual, social and
political! where they might have been successful instruments, in the
hands of God, to spread the religion of His Son, and to lay the
foundation of civil liberty.
But, although we have lost three precious years, the secretary of
the treasury tells us that the principal of this vast sum is yet safe; and
much good may still be achieved with it. The spirit of improvement
pervades the land in every variety of form, active, vigorous and
enterprising, wanting pecuniary aid as well as intelligent direction.
The states are strengthening the union by various lines of
communication thrown across and through the mountains. New
York has completed one great chain. Pennsylvania another, bolder in
conception and more arduous in the execution. Virginia has a similar
work in progress, worthy of all her enterprise and energy. A fourth,
further south, where the parts of the union are too loosely connected,
has been projected, and it can certainly be executed with the supplies
which this bill affords, and perhaps not without them.
This bill passed, and these and other similar undertakings
completed, we may indulge the patriotic hope that our union will be
bound by ties and interests that render it indissoluble. As the general
government withholds all direct agency from these truly national
works, and from all new objects of internal improvement, ought it
not to yield to the states, what is their own, the amount received
from the public lands? It would thus but execute faithfully a trust
expressly created by the original deeds of cession, or resulting from
the treaties of acquisition. With this ample resource, every desirable
object of improvement, in every part of our extensive country, may in
due time be accomplished.—Placing this exhaustless fund in the
hands of the several members of the confederacy, their common
federal head may address them in the glowing language of the British
bard, and,
Bid harbors open, public ways extend,
Bid temples worthier of the God ascend.
Bid the broad arch the dangerous flood contain,
The mole projecting break the roaring main.
Back to his bounds their subject sea command,
And roll obedient rivers through the land.

I confess I feel anxious for the fate of this measure, less on account
of any agency I have had in proposing it, as I hope and believe, than
from a firm, sincere and thorough conviction, that no one measure
ever presented to the councils of the nation, was fraught with so
much unmixed good, and could exert such powerful and enduring
influence in the preservation of the union itself and upon some of its
highest interests. If I can be instrumental, in any degree, in the
adoption of it, I shall enjoy, in that retirement into which I hope
shortly to enter, a heart-feeling satisfaction and a lasting consolation.
I shall carry there no regrets, no complaints, no reproaches on my
own account. When I look back upon my humble origin, left an
orphan too young to have been conscious of a father’s smiles and
caresses; with a widowed mother, surrounded by a numerous
offspring, in the midst of pecuniary embarrassments; without a
regular education, without fortune, without friends, without patrons,
I have reason to be satisfied with my public career. I ought to be
thankful for the high places and honors to which I have been called
by the favor and partiality of my countrymen, and I am thankful and
grateful. And I shall take with me the pleasing consciousness that in
whatever station I have been placed, I have earnestly and honestly
labored to justify their confidence by a faithful, fearless, and zealous
discharge of my public duties. Pardon these personal allusions.
 Speech of John C. Calhoun,

Against the Public Lands Bill, January 23, 1841.

“Whether the government can constitutionally distribute the
revenue from the public lands among the states must depend on the
fact whether they belong to them in their united federal character, or
individually and separately. If in the former, it is manifest that the
government, as their common agent or trustee, can have no right to
distribute among them, for their individual, separate use, a fund
derived from property held in their united and federal character,
without a special power for that purpose which is not pretended. A
position so clear of itself and resting on the established principles of
law, when applied to individuals holding property in like manner,
needs no illustration. If, on the contrary, they belong to the states in
their individual and separate character, then the government would
not only have the right but would be bound to apply the revenue to
the separate use of the states. So far is incontrovertible, which
presents the question: In which of the two characters are the lands
held by the state?
“To give a satisfactory answer to this question, it will be necessary
to distinguish between the lands that have been ceded by the states,
and those that have been purchased by the government out of the
common funds of the Union.
“The principal cessions were made by Virginia and Georgia. The
former of all the tract of country between the Ohio, the Mississippi,
and the lakes, including the states of Ohio, Indiana, Illinois, and
Michigan, and the territory of Wisconsin; and the latter, of the tract
included in Alabama and Mississippi. I shall begin with the cession
of Virginia, as it is on that the advocates for the distribution mainly
rely to establish the right.
“I hold in my hand an extract of all that portion of the Virginia
deed of cession which has any bearing on the point at issue, taken
from the volume lying on the table before me, with the place marked,
and to which any one desirous of examining the deed may refer. The
cession is ‘to the United States in Congress assembled, for the benefit
of said states.’ Every word implies the states in their united federal
character. That is the meaning of the phrase United States. It stands
in contradistinction to the states taken separately and individually;
and if there could be, by possibility, any doubt on that point, it would
be removed by the expression ‘in Congress assembled’—an
assemblage which constituted the very knot that united them. I
regard the execution of such a deed to the United States, so
assembled, so conclusive that the cession was to them in their united
and aggregate character, in contradistinction to their individual and
separate character, and, by necessary consequence, that the lands so
ceded belonged to them in their former and not in their latter
character, that I am at a loss for words to make it clearer. To deny it,
would be to deny that there is any truth in language.
“But strong as this is, it is not all. The deed proceeds and says, that
all the lands so ceded ‘shall be considered a common fund for the use
and benefit of such of the United States as have become, or shall
become, members of the confederation or federal alliance of said
states, Virginia inclusive,’ and concludes by saying, ‘and shall be
faithfully and bona fide disposed of for that purpose, and for no
other use or purpose whatever.’ If it were possible to raise a doubt
before, those full, clear, and explicit terms would dispel it. It is
impossible for language to be clearer. To be ‘considered a common
fund’ is an expression directly in contradistinction to separate or
individual, and is, by necessary implication, as clear a negative of the
latter as if it had been positively expressed. This common fund to ‘be
for the use and benefit of such of the United States as have become,
or shall become, members of the confederation or federal alliance.’
That is as clear as language can express it, for their common use in
their united federal character, Virginia being included as the grantor,
out of abundant caution.”
“The Senator from Kentucky (Mr. Clay), and, as I now understand,
the Senator from Massachusetts (Mr. Webster), agree, that the
revenue from taxes can be applied only to the objects specifically
enumerated in the Constitution. Thus repudiating the general
welfare principle, as applied to the money power, so far as the
revenue may be derived from that source. To this extent they profess
to be good State Rights Jeffersonian Republicans. Now, sir, I would
be happy to be informed by either of the able senators, by what
political alchemy the revenue from taxes, by being vested in land, or
other property, can, when again turned into revenue by sales, be
entirely freed from all the constitutional restrictions to which they
were liable before the investment, according to their own
confessions. A satisfactory explanation of so curious and apparently
incomprehensible a process would be a treat.
“When I look, Mr. President, to what induced the states, and
especially Virginia, to make this magnificent cession to the Union,
and the high and patriotic motives urged by the old Congress to
induce them to do it, and turn to what is now proposed, I am struck
with the contrast and the great mutation to which human affairs are
subject. The great and patriotic men of former times regarded it as
essential to the consummation of the Union and the preservation of
the public faith that the lands should be ceded as a common fund;
but now, men distinguished for their ability and influence are
striving with all their might to undo their holy work. Yes, sir;
distribution and cession are the very reverse, in character and effect;
the tendency of one is to union, and the other to disunion. The wisest
of modern statesmen, and who had the keenest and deepest glance
into futurity (Edmund Burke), truly said that the revenue is the state;
to which I add, that to distribute the revenue, in a confederated
community, amongst its members, is to dissolve the community—
that is, with us, the Union—as time will prove, if ever this fatal
measure should be adopted.”
 Speech of Hon. Robt. Y. Hayne

Senator from South Carolina, delivered in the Senate Chamber

January 21, 1830, on Mr. Foot’s resolution relating to the sales of
the public lands.
Mr. Hayne said, when he took occasion, two days ago, to throw out
some ideas with respect to the policy of the government, in relation
to the public lands, nothing certainly could have been further from
his thoughts, than that he should have been compelled again to
throw himself upon the indulgence of the Senate. Little did I expect,
said Mr. H., to be called upon to meet such an argument as was
yesterday urged by the gentleman from Massachusetts (Mr.
Webster.) Sir, I questioned no man’s opinions; I impeached no man’s
motives; I charged no party, or state, or section of country with
hostility to any other, but ventured, as I thought, in a becoming spirit
to put forth my own sentiments in relation to a great national
question of public policy. Such was my course. The gentleman from
Missouri, (Mr. Benton,) it is true, had charged upon the Eastern
States an early and continued hostility towards the west, and
referred to a number of historical facts and documents in support of
that charge. Now, sir, how have these different arguments been met?
The honorable gentleman from Massachusetts, after deliberating a
whole night upon his course, comes into this chamber to vindicate
New England; and instead of making up his issue with the gentleman
from Missouri, on the charges which he had preferred, chooses to
consider me as the author of those charges, and losing sight entirely
of that gentleman, selects me as his adversary, and pours out all the
vials of his mighty wrath upon my devoted head. Nor is he willing to
stop there. He goes on to assail the institutions and policy of the
south, and calls in question the principles and conduct of the state
which I have the honor to represent. When I find a gentleman of
mature age and experience, of acknowledged talents and profound
sagacity, pursuing a course like this, declining the contest offered
from the west, and making war upon the unoffending south, I must
believe, I am bound to believe, he has some object in view which he
has not ventured to disclose. Mr. President, why is this? Has the
gentleman discovered in former controversies with the gentleman
from Missouri, that he is overmatched by that senator? And does he
hope for an easy victory over a more feeble adversary? Has the
gentleman’s distempered fancy been disturbed by gloomy
forebodings of “new alliances to be formed,” at which he hinted? Has
the ghost of the murdered Coalition come back, like the ghost of
Banquo, to “sear the eyeballs of the gentleman,” and will it not down
at his bidding? Are dark visions of broken hopes, and honors lost
forever, still floating before his heated imagination? Sir, if it be his
object to thrust me between the gentleman from Missouri and
himself, in order to rescue the east from the contest it has provoked
with the west, he shall not be gratified. Sir, I will not be dragged into
the defence of my friend from Missouri. The south shall not be forced
into a conflict not its own. The gentleman from Missouri is able to
fight his own battles. The gallant west needs no aid from the south to
repel any attack which may be made on them from any quarter. Let
the gentleman from Massachusetts controvert the facts and
arguments of the gentleman from Missouri, if he can—and if he win
the victory, let him wear the honors; I shall not deprive him of his
laurels.
The gentleman from Massachusetts, in reply to my remarks on the
injurious operations of our land system on the prosperity of the west,
pronounced an extravagant eulogium on the paternal care which the
government had extended towards the west, to which he attributed
all that was great and excellent in the present condition of the new
states. The language of the gentleman on this topic fell upon my ears
like the almost forgotten tones of the tory leaders of the British
Parliament, at the commencement of the American revolution. They,
too, discovered that the colonies had grown great under the fostering
care of the mother country; and I must confess, while listening to the
gentleman, I thought the appropriate reply to his argument was to be
found in the remark of a celebrated orator, made on that occasion:
“They have grown great in spite of your protection.”