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Textbook Equilibrium Models in Economics Purposes and Critical Limitations 1St Edition Lawrence A Boland Ebook All Chapter PDF
Textbook Equilibrium Models in Economics Purposes and Critical Limitations 1St Edition Lawrence A Boland Ebook All Chapter PDF
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Equilibrium Models in Economics
Equilibrium Models
in Economics
Purposes and Critical Limitations
xwx
Lawrence A. Boland, frsc
1
1
Oxford University Press is a department of the University of Oxford. It furthers
the University’s objective of excellence in research, scholarship, and education
by publishing worldwide. Oxford is a registered trade mark of Oxford University
Press in the UK and certain other countries.
1 3 5 7 9 8 6 4 2
Paperback printed by WebCom, Inc., Canada
Hardback printed by Bridgeport National Bindery, Inc., United States of America
In memory of my former student and long-time friend: the
late Dr. Stanley Wong
CON T E N T S
Preface xiii
Acknowledgements xvii
( vii )
( viii ) Contents
Bibliography 237
Names Index 249
Subject Index 253
PR E FAC E
( xiii )
( xiv ) Preface
economics. One includes those who learned about the concept of equilibrium
before, let us say, 1950, and the other includes those like me and my fellow
high-tech PhD students in the 1960s. For us, equilibrium was a property of a
mathematical model and we had only a vague idea that it was also supposed to
be something about the real world we could see out our windows. For the pre-
1950 culture –which was dominated by Marshallian economics –equilibrium
was thought to be a claim about what we eventually would or should see in the
real world. And the difficulty with all this is that these two cultures both talk
about or criticize theoretical states of equilibrium but they are not really talk-
ing about the same thing. One of my tasks in this book is to sort these things
out so that we can all benefit from each others’ criticism.
In my 2014 book on economic model building, I addressed a different
schism, the one between today’s model builders and those of us who learned
decades ago about model building as I did when I was a graduate student. In
that book I explained that models and theories were seen as two different
things –specifically, we thought that the purpose for a mathematical model
was to represent some given economic theory and thereby possibly provide
some logical rigour to the theory. When I began working on that book I talked
about model building with my colleagues, some young and some old. What
I quickly learned was that the young colleagues did not see models as I did.
For them the idea of a model was interchangeable with the idea of a theory.
By means of a short survey I determined that roughly the year 1980 divided
the younger view from my older view. My 2014 book was directed at trying
to bridge these two cultures concerning what constitutes a model in econom-
ics. Interestingly, for that schism between the older and younger views of the
relationship between theories and models, I was a member of the older side.
But in the present book, which will be addressing the schism that Roy identi-
fied concerning the concept of an equilibrium, thanks to my training in the
high-tech graduate program, I became a trained member of the younger side
of Roy’s schism.
Ironically, despite the best efforts of my graduate instructors, once I began
teaching the ubiquitous Economics 101 class I realized how useless my gradu-
ate training was when it came to understanding the real world so that I could
teach about it. Early on I deviated from my training and began teaching my stu-
dents about equilibrium as something about the real world much like the older
side of Roy’s schism did. In the process I discovered Joan Robinson and read
many of her criticisms of the work of the newer side of Roy’s schism. When
I later got to teach the fourth-year advanced microeconomics theory seminar
I started looking at some interesting articles that were about how the concept
of an equilibrium was problematic in economic explanations. As it turned out,
these critical articles were all addressing problems with formal equilibrium
models. Moreover, thanks to many of my critical students I learned a lot about
economics and economic model building by later teaching an advanced micro
Preface ( xv )
theory seminar and then even more when I began teaching a graduate micro
class. I think what I learned in those classes I should have learned in graduate
school. As a result, I have decided that this book will be about what I learned
with my students about equilibrium concepts and equilibrium models.
This book will be addressing recognized problems with equilibrium models
particularly from the perspective of standard economics textbooks that use
equilibrium models as a basis for explaining prices or forming economic poli-
cies and especially in teaching beginning students the virtues of the competi-
tive market. Of particular concern will be how economics textbooks almost
always fail to recognize any problems with equilibrium models even though
these problems fundamentally distort realistic economic explanations. So, as I
go along and whenever possible, I will try to point out ideas and criticisms that
are relevant today but have their origin in the ideas published by economic
model builders decades ago. While my main interest is in what we teach stu-
dents, eventually what will be considered here might also enable us to explain
why most governments’ policy makers are failing to provide effective help
dealing with real world economies. After all, most governmental economic
policy makers likely were once students in an Economics 101 class.
In 1986 I published a methodology book that was also about what I learned
teaching both advanced and graduate microeconomics theory classes. That
book proposed to offer a new methodological perspective for addressing some
fundamental problems with common microeconomic models. Unfortunately,
almost all of the problems I discussed there still seem to persist in microeco-
nomic model building today, particularly with those that rely on using the
analytical properties of equilibrium states. While in this book I will be drop-
ping most of the methodological concerns of that book, I will be returning
to many of the theoretical problems I discussed then, but this time by focus-
ing instead on recognized problems involved in building equilibrium models.
While methodology will play a much lesser role than it did in the 1986 book, it
will be addressed briefly in Chapter 6 and a bit more in Part III, where I discuss
how common methodological presumptions constrain any attempts to solve
the problems I discussed in Parts I and II.
I have written this book for readers interested in learning about the main
tool economists use to help understand the economy. Such readers include
undergraduate and graduate students, of course. But I also hope readers who
may not have taken the proverbial Economics 101 –or, if they did, do not re-
member much from that class –will still find this book useful. For these read-
ers I will occasionally add footnotes to help with the usual economists’ jargon
that one would have learned in that class. And most important, it is this group
of readers in which we will find people employed as governmental advisors
and policy makers –in particular, people who should be asking economists
about the assumptions that were used to reach the advice they are giving advi-
sors and policy makers.
AC K N O W L E D G E M E N T S
( xvii )
Equilibrium Models in Economics
Prologue
Problems with modelling equilibrium attainment
(1)
( 2 ) Equilibrium Models in Economics
Price
S
Pe
Qe Quantity
demand and supply curves is required within one’s model. But, as Arrow also
recognized, a stable arrangement is not enough because with the usual text-
book models we are never told how any market participant, say the supplier,
knows the market’s demand curve or at least knows when to lower the price
and by how much. Similarly, how does the demander know when to bid up
the price or know by how much? Textbooks just rely on some vague form of
allowance of a sufficient amount of time but never say how much time this
would take. As to how the price was determined within the model, Arrow sug-
gested one possible solution for this problem of adequate explanation was to
recognize that the usual textbook discussion of an imperfect competitor does
involve at least a supplier setting the price1 –but, of course, this would require
recognizing the supplier’s knowledge, and learning or at least identifying the
available information needed to make such a decision.
Ironically, in 1959 Robert Clower published an equilibrium model about
a different problem but one that in effect directly addressed Arrow’s sugges-
tion.2 Clower’s model was of an ‘ignorant’ monopolist for which allowance is
made for the obvious fact that the monopolist could not possibly know the
whole market demand curve it faces but instead would have to make assump-
tions about it. For Clower, the ignorant monopolist would at least have to
1. For those unfamiliar with economics jargon, perfect competition refers to a type
of market in which no individual has a significant role or effect on the determination of
the equilibrium price and imperfect competition means that individuals can affect the
price. Textbooks distinguish between these two types of competition by claiming that
perfect competition will exist whenever there are too many participants for any one to
have an effect and competition is imperfect whenever the number or buyers or sellers
is small enough that every participant can have an effect because any change in their
behaviour affects either the market’s demand or the market’s supply. This distinction
plays a big role in textbooks’ definition of markets and market behaviour.
2. I say ‘ironically’ because I asked Arrow (in January 2014) if he was aware of
Clower’s article in 1959 and he said he was not.
P r ol o g u e ( 3 )
make assumptions about the shape and position of the market’s demand
curve. Based on those assumptions, Clower’s monopolist would send a chosen
supply quantity (presumed to be a profit-maximizing quantity) to the market
and wait to see what market-clearing price is obtained.3 If the assumptions
about the nature of the demand curve are true –such that the implied mar-
ginal4 revenue for the supplied quantity would be equal to the marginal cost
for that quantity –there would be no problem.5 But there is no reason to think
the monopolistic supplier has the required knowledge to assure that the as-
sumptions made about the market’s demand curve are true. As will be ex-
plained in Chapter 3, the result is a model in which an apparent equilibrium
price may be reached but it is one at which the monopolist is not actually
maximizing profit even though the monopolist is erroneously thinking it is.
And again ironically in 1959, George Richardson presented a model of the
competitive market where it would seem that the only way to guarantee the
attainment of a market’s equilibrium price is to introduce some form of col-
lusion.6 As will be explained in Chapter 4, if Richardson is right, then this
necessity would obviously fundamentally challenge what is commonly taught
in ‘Economics 101’ class.7
Richardson recognized that Friedrich Hayek in a 1937 article had already
raised concerns about the knowledge requirements for the achievement of a
market’s equilibrium. It turns out this was preceded by a 1933 lecture in which
Hayek suggested there was an even more fundamental problem concerning
the information available to an investor.8 Hayek was concerned that it is too
3. For those readers who have never taken an economics class or do not remember
much from of what they heard in their economics class, maximizing profit just means
maximizing sales revenue net of production costs.
4. For those not remembering economics jargon, the word ‘marginal’ is just jargon
for the following idea. If one is deciding about increasing the amount to produce of
some commodity, marginal refers to the consequences of an increase of one unit of
that commodity. In the case of revenue, it is how much more revenue is obtained if one
sells one more unit of the commodity in question. Marginal cost would then similarly
be about the change in total production cost if one more unit is produced.
5. Again, for those not remembering their economics jargon, this equality is just
a matter of whether profit (sales revenue net of production costs) is maximized. For
it to be at maximum, calculus textbooks tell us there must be an equality of marginal
revenue and marginal cost. If they are not equal, then a gain in net revenue is possible
by producing either more or less depending on whether the difference between them
is positive or negative.
6. I also asked Arrow if he was aware of Richardson’s article when he wrote his
own article and again he said he was not. So then I asked Richardson (through his son
Graham) if he was aware of either of the articles by Arrow or Clower and he said he
was not.
7. This is the jargon name given to the usual beginning economic principles class
offered in university and college programs.
8. Hayek delivered this lecture on December 7, 1933, in the Sozialökonomisk Samfund
in Copenhagen and which was first published (in German) in the Nationalökonomisk
( 4 ) Equilibrium Models in Economics
Tidsskrift, vol. 73, no. 3, 1935, and later (in French) in the Revue de Science Economique,
Liège, October 1935.
9. Perhaps it should be noted that the going interest rate in a state of long-run or
general equilibrium is sometimes seen to indicate the equilibrium growth rate of the
economy –see John von Neuman [1937/45].
P r ol o g u e ( 5 )
10. Usually, textbooks will say reaching an equilibrium state means reaching a
state in which variables such as prices or demand and supply quantities are no longer
changing.
11. Or who may not have benefited from taking such a class.
12. Here I am talking about variables. There are other possible ingredients which
are called parameters or coefficients that are the resulting properties of how a model
builder chooses to represent the behavioural equations in the model. Let me leave
them alone for now as here I will focus only on observable variables recognized within
the model. Parameters and coefficients are not usually observable.
13. For those who have never taken Economics 101, L represents labour and K
represents physical capital like machines.
( 6 ) Equilibrium Models in Economics
any such small economic system claims to describe the determination of the
following endogenous variables:14
14. The subscripts indicate to whom or what the variable refers to.
15. For those unfamiliar with today’s textbooks, ‘utility’ is often referred to as a
measure of a consumer’s satisfaction –and as such being ‘more’ or ‘less’. But this un-
fortunately suggests that we can measure our utility or assign any level with a cardinal
number (e.g., 22 ‘utils’ vs. 20 ‘utils’) as one would assign ‘degrees’ to a temperature.
But, the terms ‘more’ and ‘less’ only refer to a relative measurement and nothing
more –no cardinal number intended. And for this reason, textbooks that wish to make
clear that they are not referring to maximizing cardinal utility usually refer to someone
maximizing satisfaction –as if satisfaction could not be assigned a cardinal number.
All that is intended is that it is still an exact level of satisfaction being sensed by the
individual even though he or she cannot put a number on it –and for that reason it
is just a matter of more or less. Most importantly, textbooks always presume that all
individuals simply know when they are better off.
16. Technically, textbooks at this point ignore the matter of not being able to
assign cardinal numbers and thereby let marginal rates of substitution refer to ratios
of respective ‘marginal utilities’ (the ratios of the additional ‘amounts’ of utility or
satisfaction from consuming one more unit of each of the two goods being consumed).
17. This is the name given to the ratio of ‘marginal productivities’ (the ratio that
the additional amounts of the output would change from using one more unit of each
of the two inputs). The problem of measurability is obviously not an issue here.
18. It should be allowed that when textbooks distinguish between short-run and
long-run equilibria, they might treat an endogenous variable whose equilibrium value
is determined only in a long-run equilibrium model as a static ‘given’ in the determina-
tion of the short-run equilibrium. Typically, the available amount of physical capital
P r ol o g u e ( 7 )
relating all the variables and givens, one can show that each of the above 26
variables have particular values (and this is usually accomplished by solving
for the values of the set of the endogenous variables using a model consisting
of a system of ‘simultaneous’ equations with which the endogenous and exog-
enous variables are represented).
If the world implied by the model is in a state of general equilibrium, how
could anyone claim that it is not an optimum world, that is, claim that it is not
a ‘best of all possible worlds’ since it is also assumed that in the model everyone
is personally maximizing? If we were to claim that it is not, then we would be
saying that we know better than the market participants themselves –that
is, we would have to claim that at least one individual is not maximizing even
though he or she may think otherwise. Unless we have access to some extra
variables which are not already recognized and represented in this model’s
general equilibrium world, there is no way for us to know more than any in-
dividual participant. And such extra variables cannot be among the endog-
enous variables since the latter are already determined by the interaction of
all of the model’s individuals. Thus, the extra variables must be exogenous. If
we were participants in the market, we would be in a position to gain by our
privileged access. Such a potential gain would mean that the model’s market
was not actually in a state of equilibrium. Even if one has to be outside the
world created by the model to be able to claim that a given general equilibrium
is not an optimum, the given equilibrium may still be the best of all ‘possible’
worlds –that is, the equilibrium may be possible for the model’s individuals
acting without outside help.
The question of the social optimality in any given model of general equi-
librium also connects the optimum for the model’s whole economy with the
numerous personal optima of all of the model’s independent and autono-
mous individuals separately. For example, if all of the model’s individuals are
maximizing, the (linear) sum of their maxima is itself a maximum. Whenever
each individual is at a point for which being at any other point means non-
optimality, the aggregate of all individuals’ choices will also be an optimum.19
In this case, a general equilibrium in this model’s world is a social welfare
optimum, in the sense that should any individual deviate from his or her
personal optimum, the aggregate welfare will be reduced. And again, for us
to say that it is not the ‘global’ optimum requires us to have an outside per-
spective that is precluded by definition of the model’s world of autonomous
individuals.
All this is quite consistent with the idea of a market equilibrium pre-
sented in textbooks, such as the equilibrium illustrated in Figure P.1. In the
is such a variable because it is usually assumed that such capital takes more time to
produce than those variables being explained in the short-run model.
19. See Koopmans [1957, pp. 50–1].
( 8 ) Equilibrium Models in Economics
20. This is just the usual name given by historians of economic thought to what is
taught in Economics 101. Classical economics usually refers to late eighteenth century
economics and neoclassical to the economics developed in the late nineteenth century.
Both include what I identified with the three ideas (1) to (3) at the top of this section.
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