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Introduction to
Electronic Defense Systems
Third Edition
Filippo Neri
artechhouse.com
All rights reserved. Printed and bound in the United States of America. No part of
this book may be reproduced or utilized in any form or by any means, electronic or
mechanical, including photocopying, recording, or by any information storage and
retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publisher.
All terms mentioned in this book that are known to be trademarks or service marks
have been appropriately capitalized. Artech House cannot attest to the accuracy of this
information. Use of a term in this book should not be regarded as affecting the validity
of any trademark or service mark.
10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1
Foreword xiii
Preface xv
Acknowledgments xvii
CHAPTER 1
Electronic Defense 1
1.1 Introduction 1
1.2 Systems in Use in the Armed Forces 2
1.2.1 Air Force Assets and Operations 3
1.2.2 Navy Assets and Operations 10
1.2.3 Army Assets and Operations 16
1.2.4 UAVs 17
1.3 Main Weapon Systems 21
1.4 Objectives of Electronic Defense 22
1.4.1 Organization of Electronic Defense 22
1.5 Electronic Defense Systems and Their Operational Objective 23
1.5.1 SIGINT 23
1.5.2 ELINT 24
1.5.3 COMINT 24
1.5.4 Electronic Support 25
1.5.5 ESM-COM 26
1.5.6 Infrared Warning 26
1.5.7 Laser Warning Receivers 27
1.5.8 ECMs 27
1.5.9 ECM-COM 29
1.5.10 Infrared Countermeasures 29
1.5.11 ECM-Lasers 29
1.5.12 ECCMs 30
1.5.13 Command, Control, Communication, Computer and
Surveillance, and Reconnaissance 30
1.6 Information and Cyberspace 30
1.6.1 Information Operation 30
1.6.2 Information Warfare 31
1.6.3 Cyberspace and Cyber Warfare 31
1.6.4 Cyber Intelligence 33
1.6.5 Cyberattacks 34
vii
CHAPTER 2
Sensors 37
2.1 Introduction 37
2.2 Radar Sensors 38
2.2.1 Review of Electromagnetic Signal Transmission 38
2.2.2 Main Radar Components and the Radar Equation 43
2.2.3 Radar Equation in the Operational Environment 66
2.2.4 Radar Techniques 81
2.2.5 Search Radar 104
2.2.6 SAR 118
2.2.7 Tracking Radars 125
2.2.8 Airborne Radars (Interceptors) 152
2.2.9 Multifunction Radars 172
2.3 Infrared Sensors 185
2.3.1 Review of Radiant Energy 185
2.3.2 Infrared Radiation Produced by Targets of Interest 191
2.3.3 IR Range Equation 196
2.3.4 Suppression of Background Effects 201
2.3.5 IR Systems 201
References 203
CHAPTER 3
Weapon Systems 207
3.1 Introduction 207
3.2 Artillery Systems 208
3.2.1 Firing Accuracy 209
3.2.2 Susceptibility to Jamming of an Artillery System 212
3.3 Missile Systems 212
3.3.1 Command Missiles 214
3.3.2 Beam-Riding Missiles 215
3.3.3 Semiactive Homing Missiles 216
3.3.4 Active Homing Missiles 220
3.3.5 Track-Via-Missile Systems 221
3.3.6 Passive IR-Guided Missiles 221
3.3.7 Sea-Skimming Missiles 227
3.4 Passive Antiradiation Missiles 228
3.5 Laser Weapon Systems 231
3.5.1 The Laser 231
3.5.2 The Laser Equation 233
3.5.3 Laser Applications 233
3.6 Stealth Aircraft 234
CHAPTER 4
Electronic Intercept Systems 259
4.1 Introduction 259
4.2 RF Passive Systems 260
4.2.1 The Equation of RF Passive Systems 260
4.2.2 Radar Warning Receivers 262
4.2.3 ESM Systems 268
4.2.4 ELINT 301
4.2.5 Digital Receiver for Modern Intercept Systems 304
4.2.6 RWR/ESM Architectures with DRX 336
4.2.7 Typical Performances of a Modern Naval ESM System 347
4.2.8 Airborne Advanced Intercept Systems and Location
Techniques 351
4.2.9 Passive Surveillance System Networks 357
4.3 Infrared Intercept Systems 360
4.3.1 MLW/Missile Approach Warner 362
4.3.2 FLIRs 362
4.4 Communication ESM and COMINT 362
4.4.1 Communication ESM 363
4.4.2 COMINT 366
References 366
CHAPTER 5
Electronic Countermeasure Systems 369
5.1 Introduction 369
5.2 Onboard ECM Systems 369
5.2.1 Passive Systems 369
5.2.2 Active Onboard Systems 373
5.2.3 Jammer Equations 388
5.2.4 Digital Radio-Frequency Memory 394
CHAPTER 6
Electronic Counter-Countermeasures Systems 477
6.1 Introduction 477
6.2 Search Radar Counter-Countermeasures 477
6.2.1 Induced Counter-Countermeasures 478
6.2.2 Dedicated Counter-Countermeasures 486
6.3 Tracking Radar Counter-Countermeasures 491
6.3.1 Induced Counter-Countermeasures 491
CHAPTER 7
New Electronic Defense Techniques and Technologies 505
7.1 Introduction 505
7.2 ED Basic Technology Advances 506
7.2.1 MMIC Technology 506
7.2.2 Fast Digital Processing 510
7.3 New Electronic Defense and Radar Architectures 512
7.3.1 ESM Antennas 513
7.3.2 Wideband Front End and Digital Receiver 514
7.3.3 Deinterleaving and Processing 515
7.3.4 Artificial Intelligence and Machine-Learning Approaches 515
7.3.5 Display 519
7.3.6 Generation of Jamming Programs 520
7.3.7 ELINT from Space 520
7.3.8 Progress in Infrared Sensors and Systems 521
7.3.9 Improvements in Radar Technologies 523
7.4 Shared Apertures and Sensors Fusion 527
7.4.1 Shared Apertures 527
7.4.2 Sensor Fusion 531
7.5 HPM Weapons (RFDEW) 532
7.5.1 Introduction 532
7.5.2 Susceptibility of Electronic Systems 532
7.5.3 HPM Weapons 533
7.6 Anti-Antiradiation Missile Techniques 536
7.7 Antistealth Techniques 536
7.8 ED State of the Art and Perspectives 538
References 539
CHAPTER 8
Design and Evaluation Criteria 541
8.1 Introduction 541
8.2 Design Criteria 541
8.2.1 Generalities 541
8.2.2 System Objective 542
8.2.3 Analysis of the Operational Environment 542
In my long career as a radar expert, and for many years responsible for equipment
installation onboard Italian Navy ships, always I regarded electronic warfare with
a lot of skepticism—to a point where I became famous, at least in Italy, for my say-
ing, “EW systems deceive only the buyers . . .”
While reading the proof of this third edition of Introduction to Electronic
Defense Systems, by Filippo Neri, I had to admit that the technology advances in
both weapon sensors and EW systems changed my previous view: weapon sensors
are becoming more and more capable, but at the expense of higher complexity.
Therefore, weapon sensors are opening the way to be vulnerable to the sophisticated
jamming actions of advanced electronic defense systems.
Surely the passive section of electronic defense systems, the ESMs, can provide
real assistance in operations by providing a better scenario understanding (or situ-
ation awareness) of the battle between weapon sensors and intelligent jamming of
advanced electronic defense systems, which can be considered open.
Technological advances aside, my recommendation to weapon sensor and elec-
tronic defense designers is to consider the importance of achieving good perfor-
mances not only in laboratories, but essentially, once the equipment has been installed
onboard the relevant platform.
xiii
While I have to thank once again my friends at Elettronica, Chemring and FIAR
for their contributions provided in the second edition, for this third edition I need
to thank the managers and colleagues of Virtualabs, Candidoro Giannicchi, Lucio
Biccolini, Sandro Carnevale, Gianfranco Pelaggi, Gianfranco Broli, Giuseppe
Pinto, Julien Marini, and Francesco Macro for their support and assistance in the
book revision.
Special thanks to Luca Tripodi for his contribution on cyber war, Prof. Silvello
Betti on quantum radar, Isaia Tripodi for his contribution on artificial intelligence,
Marco Di Battista, Mauro Caruso, Virginia Marongiu, Emanuele Nanni, Bruno
Buccinnà, Arcangelo Lubrano, Federico Ricci, Emiliano Gabrielli, Valerio Bar-
chiesi, Gabriele Mariotti, and Micaela Contu for the many simulations and trials
performed for new radars and EW systems, and Giovanni Viglialoro for assistance
with this new edition.
In particular I have to thank Dr. Franco Lazzari and Dr. Eugenio Po of Rivista
Italiana Difesa (RID) for supplying most of the new photos.
Filippo Neri
Rome, Italy
September 2018
xvii
Electronic Defense
1.1 Introduction
With the passing of time, electronic technology has come to play an increasingly
important role in military operations. The electronic era, and with it the first steps
in the introduction of electronics into weapons, goes back to the time when radio
and the radio direction finder were first used to give the platform position. The
second step was the introduction of radar for the detection and location in angle
and in range of hostile platforms, and its subsequent use to increase the accuracy
of artillery. The last step, and probably the most lethal one, has been the use of
electronic devices for precision guidance of missiles (Figure 1.1).
The effectiveness of electronically guided weapon systems, expressed in terms
of kill probability, has risen to values very close to unity, thus leaving undefended
targets little hope of escape. Consequently, almost all effective weapons now employ
electronic guidance devices. However, the sophistication of today’s weapon systems
is such that they are rendered worthless should their electronic circuits not operate
correctly. As a result, it has become essential to develop counterelectronic systems
capable of reducing the effectiveness of weapon guidance devices.
The fruitfulness of these countermeasure techniques has quickly become appar-
ent. They have been developed to the point where they can seriously degrade the
performance of nearly all weapon systems (Figure 1.2).
The inevitable next step has been the development of counter-countermeasures
to try to restore the original effectiveness of the weapon sensors.
The techniques and technologies that lead to the construction of devices capable
of electronically countering a weapon system and to the development of counter-
countermeasures go under the name electronic warfare (EW). However, given the
basic harmlessness of these electronic systems—electrons don’t make holes, at least
as long as no directed-energy weapons are available—the name electronic defense
seems more appropriate. In conjunction with EW, the aspect of information, meant
as the domain of awkward communications between units with units and with the
main operation center, became a critical point in the complex analysis and evalu-
ation on the battlefield.
As we will see in Section 1.3, the act of managing information during an opera-
tion could be a large advantage in term of fast military response and coordination
of the different forces involved. On the other hand, it is also possible to image that
operations oriented to disturb or spy on an enemy’s information domain could affect
the entire mission result. With the advent of networking, the information domain
Figure 1.1 A missile system exploits radar signals to hit its targets with precision.
has traduced cyberspace, a more broad domain that permitted faster information
exchange but is also more likely to be intercepted or disturbed.
In every country, the armed forces have at their disposal a number of weapons sys-
tems, each with a different function. The following brief survey of the missions of
Figure 1.2 The aim of an electronic defense system is to incapacitate the enemy’s weapons
systems by generating electromagnetic jamming signals.
the navy, army, and air force will help to identify the main weapons systems against
which electronic defense must operate.
It should be emphasized that the aim of this survey is the identification of elec-
tronically guided weapon systems without reference to any specific military organi-
zation. Moreover, systems pertaining specifically to nuclear warfare are outside the
scope of this book; only systems used with conventional armaments will be discussed.
Generally speaking, the mission of an air force is the surveillance and defense
of the sky above national territory, the mission of a navy is the surveillance of the
seas surrounding national territory and protection of important sea routes, and the
mission of an army is the protection of the national territory itself.
Under hostile air attack, survival of important centers and attrition of the enemy
are achieved by combining the use of a surveillance (or search) radar network with
the deployment of air forces in the area where an incursion has been detected.
Such a combination is called an air defense network. Air defense search radars are
characterized by high sensitivity and can detect, giving early warning, the approach
of targets at long ranges. They are sometimes called early warning radars (EWRs)
and are characterized by high sophistication and reliability, as they must operate
continuously in different environments (e.g., in clear or natural clutter conditions).
Because of their sensitivity, they can give broad coverage of the national airspace.
Coordination of the data they provide and the correlation with other information
(data fusion) takes place in special command and control centers where operational
decisions are made. Here it is possible to demonstrate the importance of exchanging
the information acquired in a short time period during operations; the protection
of information is part of what today is called cyber operations (see Section 1.6).
In time of peace, upon the detection of a suspect aircraft (i.e., one that has not
spontaneously revealed its identity), the search centers warn an air unit, usually
consisting of two very fast and maneuverable fighter aircraft, and (with the help of
an appropriate communications system) guide it toward the position of the aircraft
that has to be identified. The interceptor fighters approach the target, identify it,
and either let it pass or force it to retrace its steps or to land (Figure 1.3).
In time of war, the procedure is different. As soon as the presence of an alien
aircraft has been discovered, the fighters (Figure 1.4) take to the air with quite dif-
ferent intentions. They are still guided from the coordination center and try to locate
the target as soon as possible with their own onboard radar. Identification is made
Figure 1.3 The air defense network detects and locates all aircraft penetrating into national air
space.
with the help of identification of friend or foe (IFF) equipment, devices for automatic
recognition of friendly and hostile platforms. If the result warrants it, they lock onto
the target and fire at it with their onboard weapons (usually air-to-air missiles). They
then try to make a kill assessment to determine the amount of damage suffered by
the target and finally make their way back to base. If the target is not immediately
Figure 1.4 The task of fighter aircraft is to ensure airspace superiority. The photograph shows
the European Fighter Aircraft (EFA). (Courtesy of RID.)
hit by a long- or medium-range missile, the fighters will have to approach closer to
the intruding aircraft, starting a series of dogfights either by launching short-range
missiles, usually infrared-guided, or by firing their onboard cannon.
Surveillance of airspace can be conducted directly by air patrols or by a network
of air defense radars.
The neutralization of military objectives of special importance on enemy terri-
tory is achieved by sending special strike aircraft (Figure 1.5) and bombers. Strike
aircraft make covert surprise attacks with a few units approaching the target at
very low altitude. Bomber tactics entail a powerful attack by many aircraft, aided
by fighters, with radar and electro-optic sensors employed to locate and identify
their ground targets.
In its air support role, the air force cooperates with ground forces to stop the
advance of enemy forces. It launches air raids against advancing enemy columns and
bombs their tanks and support services (the ground attack function). This function
is carried out by fighter-bombers (Figure 1.6), which are extremely maneuverable
aircraft fitted with a variety of air-to-surface weapons systems.
In addition, the air force will usually have to provide for the defense of its own
bases, airfields, and services.
To sum up, in order to be able to carry out the functions detailed above, the air
force will require the following systems:
Figure 1.5 Strike aircraft are entrusted with the task of hitting important military objectives on
enemy ground. The photograph shows a Tornado multirole aircraft. (Courtesy of RID.)
Figure 1.6 While in the past special fighter-bomber aircraft were required for ground attack,
modern multirole aircrafts allow for quick raids even against enemy ground forces. The
photographs show (a)the old AMX and (b)the F-35. (Courtesy of RID.)
• Airborne surveillance and search systems (Figure 1.8), which are similar to
the preceding ones but weigh less and can therefore be carried on board air-
craft having long-range capabilities without refueling. Such systems help to
solve the problem of intercepting low-level targets at adequate ranges. A very
Figure 1.7 Early detection of targets is ensured by search radars. The photograph shows the
AN/FPS-117 search radar for land-based installation. (Courtesy of RID.)
Figure 1.8 Airborne search radars permit detection of targets flying at low altitude. The
photograph shows an airborne warning and control system (AWACS). (Courtesy of RID.)
Besides all these, mention must be made of other aircraft assigned to the follow-
ing missions:
• Transportation;
• Patrolling;
• Training.
Figure 1.9 Military aircraft exploit sophisticated radars for accurate target detection and
weapon guidance. The photograph shows the AN/APG-81 AESA radar of an F-35. (Courtesy of
RID.)
Figure 1.10 Medium-range and short-range air-to-air missiles installed at the wing edges of an
F-16. (Courtesy of RID.)
The defense of important assets like airports or other important assets against
air attacks is generally performed by using surface-to-air missile (SAM) system or
antiaircraft artillery (AAA) systems:
• A SAM system can be long-range, for the defense of a zone or an area (area
defense) (Figure 1.11), or medium- to short-range for the defense of a site or a
Figure 1.11 Long-range SAM systems are frequently employed to defend huge areas of
territory. The photograph shows the SAM Patriot system. (Courtesy of RID.)
point (point defense) (Figure 1.12). A missile defense system usually consists
of a local search radar (sometimes called acquisition radar), which detects
incoming threats and points them out (a process known as target indication
(TI)), to the different sensors capable of tracking them one by one, to provide
guidance to different missiles against threatening platforms. A very much used
SAM system is the Russian S-300 that evolved into the S-400 (see Figure 1.13).
• Firing systems or artillery AAA systems equipped, as for point defense, with
search (acquisition) radar and with various tracking radars capable of direct-
ing the fire of the associated cannon and machine guns to designated targets
with great precision.
Figure 1.12 The defense of important sites is ensured by short- to medium-range SAM systems.
The photograph shows the SPADA missile system deployment. (Courtesy of RID.)