Pluralisms in Truth and Logic Jeremy

Wyatt
Visit to download the full and correct content document:
https://textbookfull.com/product/pluralisms-in-truth-and-logic-jeremy-wyatt/
More products digital (pdf, epub, mobi) instant
download maybe you interests ...

The Nature of Truth second edition Classic and

Contemporary Perspectives Michael P Lynch Editor Jeremy
Wyatt Editor Junyeol Kim Editor Nathan Kellen Editor

https://textbookfull.com/product/the-nature-of-truth-second-
edition-classic-and-contemporary-perspectives-michael-p-lynch-
editor-jeremy-wyatt-editor-junyeol-kim-editor-nathan-kellen-
editor/

Before Truth Lonergan Aquinas and the Problem of Wisdom

Jeremy D Wilkins

https://textbookfull.com/product/before-truth-lonergan-aquinas-
and-the-problem-of-wisdom-jeremy-d-wilkins/

Epistemic friction : an essay on knowledge, truth, and

logic 1st Edition Sher

https://textbookfull.com/product/epistemic-friction-an-essay-on-
knowledge-truth-and-logic-1st-edition-sher/

Emergent Religious Pluralisms Jan-Jonathan Bock

https://textbookfull.com/product/emergent-religious-pluralisms-
jan-jonathan-bock/
The Historical and Philosophical Significance of Ayer’s
Language, Truth and Logic 1st Edition Adam Tamas Tuboly

https://textbookfull.com/product/the-historical-and-
philosophical-significance-of-ayers-language-truth-and-logic-1st-
edition-adam-tamas-tuboly/

Wyatt 1st Edition Ali Parker

https://textbookfull.com/product/wyatt-1st-edition-ali-parker/

Persuasion in Self-improvement Books Jeremy Koay

https://textbookfull.com/product/persuasion-in-self-improvement-
books-jeremy-koay/

The Scientific Truth, the Whole Truth and Nothing But

the Truth 1st Edition John R. Helliwell

https://textbookfull.com/product/the-scientific-truth-the-whole-
truth-and-nothing-but-the-truth-1st-edition-john-r-helliwell/

The Truth About Nature: Environmentalism In The Era Of

Post-truth Politics And Platform Capitalism Bram
Büscher

https://textbookfull.com/product/the-truth-about-nature-
environmentalism-in-the-era-of-post-truth-politics-and-platform-
capitalism-bram-buscher/
Pluralisms in Truth
and Logic
Edited by
Jeremy Wyatt
Nikolaj J. L. L. Pedersen
Nathan Kellen
Palgrave Innovations in Philosophy

Series Editors
Vincent Hendricks
University of Copenhagen
Copenhagen, Denmark

Duncan Pritchard
University of Edinburgh
Edinburgh, UK
Palgrave Innovations in Philosophy is a new series of monographs. Each
book in the series will constitute the ‘new wave’ of philosophy, both in
terms of its topic and the research profile of the author. The books will be
concerned with exciting new research topics of particular contemporary
interest, and will include topics at the intersection of Philosophy and
other research areas. They will be written by up-and-coming young phi-
losophers who have already established a strong research profile and who
are clearly going to be leading researchers of the future. Each monograph
in this series will provide an overview of the research area in question
while at the same time significantly advancing the debate on this topic
and giving the reader a sense of where this debate might be heading next.
The books in the series would be of interest to researchers and advanced
students within philosophy and its neighboring scientific environments.

More information about this series at

http://www.palgrave.com/gp/series/14689
 Jeremy Wyatt
Nikolaj J. L. L. Pedersen • Nathan Kellen
Editors

Pluralisms in Truth
and Logic
Editors
Jeremy Wyatt Nikolaj J. L. L. Pedersen
Underwood International College Underwood International College
Yonsei University Yonsei University
Incheon, South Korea Incheon, South Korea

Nathan Kellen
University of Connecticut,
Storrs, CT, USA

Palgrave Innovations in Philosophy

ISBN 978-3-319-98345-5    ISBN 978-3-319-98346-2 (eBook)
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-98346-2

Library of Congress Control Number: 2018963837

© The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s) 2018

This work is subject to copyright. All rights are solely and exclusively licensed by the Publisher, whether
the whole or part of the material is concerned, specifically the rights of translation, reprinting, reuse of
illustrations, recitation, broadcasting, reproduction on microfilms or in any other physical way, and trans-
mission or information storage and retrieval, electronic adaptation, computer software, or by similar or
dissimilar methodology now known or hereafter developed.
The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc. in this publication
does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such names are exempt from the relevant
protective laws and regulations and therefore free for general use.
The publisher, the authors and the editors are safe to assume that the advice and information in this book
are believed to be true and accurate at the date of publication. Neither the publisher nor the authors or
the editors give a warranty, express or implied, with respect to the material contained herein or for any
errors or omissions that may have been made. The publisher remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional
claims in published maps and institutional affiliations.

Cover illustration: Bashutskyy shutterstock.com

This Palgrave Macmillan imprint is published by the registered company Springer Nature Switzerland AG
The registered company address is: Gewerbestrasse 11, 6330 Cham, Switzerland
 Preface

Pluralism has made inroads into a number of areas in philosophy. This

edited collection brings together 18 state-of-the-art articles on pluralism
about truth and logic.
We first discussed the possibility of an edited collection shortly after
the Truth Pluralism and Logical Pluralism Conference, held at the
University of Connecticut in April of 2015. Following this conference,
several additional pluralism-related events took place, including three
workshops hosted by the Cogito Research Centre at the University of
Bologna in 2015 and 2016 and Pluralisms Week, hosted by the Pluralisms
Global Research Network and the Veritas Research Center at Yonsei
University in June of 2016. A fair number of contributors were given the
chance to present and discuss their work at one or several of these events.
The University of Connecticut, University of Bologna, and Yonsei
University all provided financial support. We gratefully acknowledge
their support. Two of the editors, Pedersen and Wyatt, would also like to
thank the National Research Foundation of Korea for support (grants no.
2013S1A2A2035514 and 2016S1A2A2911800).
We are grateful to many colleagues who share our interest in pluralism.
Their collegial, constructive ways of conducting research and discussions
are much appreciated. We are grateful to many people who, in some way
or another, have helped along the way. These include Jc Beall, Elke
Brendel, Colin Caret, Roy Cook, Douglas Edwards, Will Gamester,
v
vi Preface

Patrick Greenough, Sungil Han, Jinho Kang, Jiwon Kim, Junyeol Kim,
Seahwa Kim, Teresa Kouri Kissel, Kris McDaniel, Graham Priest, Agustín
Rayo, Greg Restall, Jisoo Seo, Stewart Shapiro, Gila Sher, Paul Simard
Smith, Erik Stei, Elena Tassoni, Pilar Terrés, Cory D. Wright, Crispin
Wright, Andy D. Yu, Luca Zanetti, and Elia Zardini. Special thanks go to
Filippo Ferrari, Michael P. Lynch, Sebastiano Moruzzi, and Joe Ulatowski.

Incheon, South Korea Jeremy Wyatt

 Nikolaj J. L. L. Pedersen
Storrs, CT, USA Nathan Kellen
 Contents

Part I Truth    1

Introduction  3
Nikolaj J. L. L. Pedersen, Jeremy Wyatt, and Nathan Kellen

Truth: One or Many or Both? 35

Dorit Bar-On and Keith Simmons

Truth Pluralism, Quasi-Realism, and the Problem of Double-­

Counting 63
Michael P. Lynch

The Metaphysics of Domains 85

Douglas Edwards

Strong Truth Pluralism107

Seahwa Kim and Nikolaj J. L. L. Pedersen

vii
viii Contents

Methodological Pluralism About Truth131

Nathan Kellen

Normative Alethic Pluralism145

Filippo Ferrari

Truth in English and Elsewhere: An Empirically-Informed

Functionalism169
Jeremy Wyatt

Part II Logic 197

Core Logic: A Conspectus199

Neil Tennant

Connective Meaning in Beall and Restall’s Logical Pluralism217

Teresa Kouri Kissel

Generalised Tarski’s Thesis Hits Substructure237

Elia Zardini

Logical Particularism277
Gillman Payette and Nicole Wyatt

Logical Nihilism301
Aaron J. Cotnoir

Varieties of Logical Consequence by Their Resistance to

Logical Nihilism331
Gillian Russell
 Contents ix

Part III Connections 363

Pluralism About Pluralisms365

Roy T. Cook

A Plea for Immodesty: Alethic Pluralism, Logical Pluralism,

and Mixed Inferences387
Chase B. Wrenn

Logic for Alethic, Logical, and Ontological Pluralists407

Andy D. Yu

Pluralisms: Logic, Truth and Domain-Specificity429

Rosanna Keefe

Aletheic and Logical Pluralism453

Kevin Scharp

Index473
 Notes on Contributors

Dorit Bar-On is Professor of Philosophy, Department of Philosophy, and

Director of the Expression, Communication, and the Origins of Meaning
Research Group, University of Connecticut. Bar-On is well known for her work
in philosophy of language, mind, and meta­ethics. She is author of Speaking My
Mind: Expression and Self­Knowledge (Clarendon Press, 2004) and has published
in journals such as The Journal of Philosophy, Mind & Language, Philosophy and
Phenomenological Research, Noûs, Synthese, and Philosophical Studies.
Roy T. Cook is Professor of Philosophy, Department of Philosophy, University
of Minnesota. Cook specializes in the philosophy of logic, philosophical logic,
philosophy of mathematics, and aesthetics. He is the author of Paradoxes (Polity,
2013) and The Yablo Paradox: An Essay on Circularity (OUP, 2014), as well as
many papers in journals such as Mind, Analysis, Journal of Symbolic Logic,
Philosophia Mathematica, and Australasian Journal of Philosophy.
Aaron J. Cotnoir is Senior Lecturer, Department of Philosophy, University of
St Andrews. Cotnoir’s work is centered around metaphysics and philosophical
logic. He is the editor of Composition as Identity (OUP, 2014, with Donald
Baxter) and co-author of Mereology (OUP, forthcoming). His articles have
appeared in Journal of Philosophy, Mind, Noûs, Australasian Journal of Philosophy,
and more.
Douglas Edwards is Assistant Professor of Philosophy, Department of
Philosophy, Utica College. Edwards’ research centers around metaphysics, the
philosophy of language, and metaethics. He is the author of Properties (Polity,

xi
xii Notes on Contributors

2014) and The Metaphysics of Truth (OUP, 2018) and the editor of Truth: A
Contemporary Reader (Bloomsbury, under contract). His articles have appeared
in a number of journals, including the Journal of Philosophy, Australasian Journal
of Philosophy, and Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, amongst others.
Filippo Ferrari is Postdoctoral Research Fellow at the Institute of Philosophy,
University of Bonn. His research focuses primarily on two clusters of topics: the
normative aspects of enquiry and the debate about the nature of truth. He has
published his work in journals such as Mind, Synthese, Analysis, and Philosophical
Quarterly.
Rosanna Keefe is Professor of Philosophy and Head, Department of
Philosophy, University of Sheffield. Keefe specializes in philosophy of logic, phi-
losophy of language, and metaphysics. She is the author of Theories of Vagueness
(Cambridge, 2000) and numerous articles in journals such as Mind, Analysis,
Philosophical Studies, Australasian Journal of Philosophy, and Synthese.
Nathan Kellen works at the Department of Philosophy, University of
Connecticut. Kellen’s work is on truth, the philosophy of logic, philosophy of
mathematics, and ethics. Currently his main research project is an investigation
of truth pluralism and logical pluralism. He explores both of these views indi-
vidually but likewise examines how they might be connected.
Seahwa Kim is Professor of Philosophy and Dean, Scranton College, Ewha
Womans University. Kim specializes in metaphysics and the philosophy of
mathematics. Her articles have appeared in journals such as Australasian Journal
of Philosophy, Philosophical Studies, and Erkenntnis.
Teresa Kouri Kissel is Assistant Professor, Department of Philosophy, Old
Dominion University. Kouri Kissel specializes in philosophy of logic, philoso-
phy of mathematics, and mathematical and philosophical logic. Her dissertation
develops a new, neo­Carnapian form of logical pluralism. Her articles have
appeared in Philosophia Mathematica, Erkenntnis, and Topoi.
Michael P. Lynch is Professor of Philosophy and Director, Humanities
Institute, University of Connecticut. Lynch’s work focuses on questions in meta-
physics, the philosophy of language, epistemology, and metaethics. He is author
of Truth in Context (MIT, 1998), True to Life (MIT, 2004), and Truth as One
and Many (OUP, 2009), as well as two books for popular audiences and a num-
ber of different articles in journals such as Philosophical Quarterly, Australasian
Journal of Philosophy, and Philosophical Studies.
 Notes on Contributors xiii

Gillman Payette is Postdoctoral Fellow at the University of British Columbia.

His main research interests are philosophical logic and the philosophy of logic.
He has published in journals such as Journal of Philosophical Logic, Australasian
Journal of Philosophy, Synthese, Logique et Analyse, and Notre Dame Journal of
Formal Logic.
Nikolaj J. L. L. Pedersen is Associate Professor of Philosophy and Director of
the UIC Research Institute and Veritas Research Center, Underwood
International College, Yonsei University. He has been the principal investigator
of several collaborative research projects. Pedersen’s main research areas are truth,
epistemology, and metaphysics. He has published in journals such as Noûs,
Analysis, Philosophical Quarterly, Synthese, Erkenntnis, and The Monist. He is a
co­editor of New Waves in Truth (Palgrave Macmillan, 2010), Truth and Pluralism:
Current Debates (Oxford University Press, 2013), Epistemic Pluralism (Palgrave
Macmillan, 2017), Epistemic Entitlement (Oxford University Press, 2019), and
The Routledge Handbook of Social Epistemology (2019).
Gillian Russell is Professor of Philosophy, Department of Philosophy,
University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill. Russell specializes on the philoso-
phy of language, philosophy of logic, and epistemology. She is the author of
Truth in Virtue of Meaning: A Defence of the Analytic/Synthetic Distinction (OUP,
2008) and her articles have appeared in journals such as Journal of Philosophical
Logic, Philosophical Studies, and Australasian Journal of Philosophy.
Kevin Scharp is Reader in Philosophy, Department of Philosophy and Director,
Arché Philosophical Research Centre, University of St Andrews. Scharp special-
izes in the philosophy of language, logic, metaphysics, philosophy of science,
and the history of analytic philosophy. He is the author of Replacing Truth (OUP,
2013) and numerous articles in journals such as The Philosophical Review,
Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, Erkenntnis, and Philosophical Studies.
Keith Simmons is Professor of Philosophy, Department of Philosophy,
University of Connecticut. Simmons specializes in logic, philosophy of lan-
guage, and metaphysics. He is the author of Universality and the Liar (OUP,
1993) and has had articles appear in Philosophical Studies, Philosophy and
Phenomenological Research, and Journal of Philosophical Logic, amongst other
journals.
Neil Tennant is Arts and Humanities Distinguished Professor of Philosophy,
Department of Philosophy, Ohio State University. Tennant specializes in logic,
philosophy of mathematics, and the philosophy of language. He is the author of
xiv Notes on Contributors

a number of books, including The Taming of the True (OUP, 2002) and Changes
of Mind: An Essay on Rational Belief Revision (OUP, 2012). His articles have
appeared in many journals, including Mind, Philosophia Mathematica, Review of
Symbolic Logic, and Noûs.
Chase B. Wrenn is Professor of Philosophy, Department of Philosophy,
University of Alabama. Wrenn’s research focuses on truth, epistemology, and the
philosophy of mind and cognitive science. He is the author of Truth (Polity,
2014) and has had articles appear in journals including Australasian Journal of
Philosophy, Erkenntnis, Synthese, and The Philosophical Quarterly.
Jeremy Wyatt is Assistant Professor of Philosophy, Underwood International
College, Yonsei University. Wyatt’s main research interests are the philosophy of
language, metaphysics, and truth. His articles have appeared in Philosophical
Studies, Philosophical Quarterly, American Philosophical Quarterly, and Inquiry.
Andy D. Yu is JD student, University of Toronto. Yu completed a D.Phil. the-
sis (Fragmented Truth) at the University of Oxford. He works on philosophical
logic, the philosophy of language, metaphysics, and epistemology. He has pub-
lished in the Journal of Philosophy, Philosophical Quarterly, and Thought.
Elia Zardini is Mid­Career FCT Fellow, LanCog Research Group, University of
Lisbon. Zardini specializes in logic and epistemology and has had articles appear
in many journals, including The Review of Symbolic Logic, Philosophical Studies,
Analysis, and Journal of Philosophical Logic. He is also the editor or co­editor of
Scepticism and Perceptual Justification (OUP, 2014), Substructural Approaches to
Paradox (special issue of Synthese, forthcoming), The Sorites Paradox (CUP, forth-
coming), and The A Priori: Its Significance, Grounds, and Extent (OUP,
forthcoming).
 List of Figures

Truth in English and Elsewhere: An Empirically-Informed

Functionalism
Fig. 1 Alethic functionalism 173
Fig. 2 Consistency of interlinguistic and intralinguistic pluralism 177
Fig. 3 Updated functionalism 184
Core Logic: A Conspectus
Fig. 1 From classical logic to core logic 203
Fig. 2 Important system containments 204
Varieties of Logical Consequence by Their Resistance to Logical
Nihilism
Fig. 1 A truth-table proof of Modus tollens 343
Fig. 2 A paraconsistent truth-table of Modus tollens 344

xv
Part I
Truth
 Introduction
Nikolaj J. L. L. Pedersen, Jeremy Wyatt,
and Nathan Kellen

1 Pluralisms
The history of philosophy displays little consensus or convergence when
it comes to the nature of truth. Radically different views have been pro-
posed and developed. Some have taken truth to be correspondence with
reality, while others have taken it to be coherence with a maximally coher-
ent set of beliefs. Yet others have taken truth to be what it is useful to
believe, or what would be believed at the end of enquiry.1 While these
views differ very significantly in terms of their specific philosophical com-
mitments, they all share two fundamental assumptions: monism and sub-
stantivism. The views all assume that truth is to be accounted for in the

N. J. L. L. Pedersen (*)
Underwood International College, Yonsei University, Incheon, South Korea
e-mail: nikolaj@yonsei.ac.kr
J. Wyatt
Underwood International College, Yonsei University, Incheon, South Korea
N. Kellen
University of Connecticut, Storrs, CT, USA

© The Author(s) 2018 3

J. Wyatt et al. (eds.), Pluralisms in Truth and Logic, Palgrave Innovations in Philosophy,
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-98346-2_1
4 N. J. L. L. Pedersen et al.

same way across the full range of truth-apt discourse (monism) and that
truth is a substantive property or relation (substantivism).
The deflationist reaction to the traditional debate is to reject substantiv-
ism and, in some cases, to endorse monism. Truth, if it has a nature at all,
has a uniform nature across all truth-apt discourse, but there is not much
to say about it. The traditional debate went off-track exactly because
truth theorists thought that there was a whole lot to say about truth—
that somehow it had a deep or underlying nature that could be uncovered
through philosophical theorizing. Instead, according to many deflation-
ists, the (non-paradoxical) instances of the disquotational schema (“p” is
true if and only p) or the equivalence schema (it is true that p if and only
if p) exhaust what there is to say about truth.2
The pluralist reaction to the traditional debate is to reject monism and
endorse substantivism. Truth pluralists, encouraged by the seminal work
of Crispin Wright and Michael Lynch, appeal to more than one property
in their account of truth. Propositions from different domains of dis-
course are true in different ways. The truth of propositions concerning
the empirical world (e.g., 〈There are mountains〉) might be accounted
for in terms of correspondence, while the truth of legal propositions (e.g.,
〈Speeding is illegal〉) might be accounted for in terms of coherence with
the body of law.3 This amounts to a rejection of monism. By contrast,
truth pluralists have traditionally endorsed substantivism. They have
appealed to properties or relations that are substantive in nature (where
this means, at least, that they directly explain certain facts entirely in
virtue of characteristics pertaining to their natures).4
The history of logic, like the history of truth, displays little consensus.
Advocates of classical logic, intuitionistic logic, and relevant logic, for
instance, have argued back and forth about the merits and demerits of their
preferred systems. Again, as in the case of truth, this seems to suggest a shared
underlying assumption of monism: there is a uniquely correct logic, and
advocates of different systems are disagreeing about which one it is. The plu-
ralist reaction—notably advocated by Jc Beall and Greg Restall (2006)—is
to reject monism and maintain that there are several equally correct logics.
Speaking more generally, pluralist views are becoming increasingly
prominent in different areas of philosophy. Pluralism about truth has been
extensively developed, defended, and critically discussed. The same goes
 Introduction 5

for pluralism about logic.5 Pluralism has also made inroads into ontology
where the idea that there are several ways of being has been defended, sup-
ported, and articulated in various ways. The work of Kris McDaniel is a
particularly rich source.6 In epistemology, a variety of pluralist theses can
likewise be found in the literature. The idea that there are several epistemi-
cally good-making features of belief can be found in different guises, as
pluralism about epistemic justification, warrant, desiderata, and value.
Prominent epistemologists such as Alvin Goldman, Tyler Burge, William
Alston, and Crispin Wright all endorse one of these forms of pluralism.7
These pluralist trends are philosophically significant. They go against a
one-size-fits-all conception of their relevant areas and invite a reconsid-
eration of the nature and character of some of the most fundamental
notions in core areas of philosophy—including truth, validity, being, and
justification. This volume takes as its focus two of kinds of pluralism:
pluralism about truth and pluralism about logic. It brings together 18
original, state-of-the-art essays. The essays are divided into three parts.
Part I is dedicated to truth pluralism, Part II to logical pluralism, and Part
III to the question as to what connections might exist between these two
kinds of pluralism.

2 Truth Pluralism (Part I)

In this section, we will briefly introduce a range of ideas and issues that
have served to shape and define the debate concerning truth pluralism.
We will then introduce the contributions to Part I of the volume.

Background

Truth pluralists are engaged in critical debates on two fronts—one exter-

nal and the other internal. On the external front, we find pluralists debat-
ing monists as to which of these views of truth is superior. The argument
most commonly deployed by pluralists is the scope problem. Pluralists argue
that monist theories do not have a scope that is sufficiently wide to plau-
sibly accommodate all truth-apt discourse. Perhaps the c­orrespondence
6 N. J. L. L. Pedersen et al.

theory can be plausibly applied to empirical discourse, accounting for the

truth of propositions such as 〈Mt. Everest is extended in space〉. However,
it cannot plausibly cover the truth of legal propositions such as 〈Breaking
and entering is illegal〉. Now, maybe coherence with the body of law can
plausibly be applied to legal discourse. However, coherence does not seem
easily extendable to the empirical domain. Pluralists take this point to
generalize and conclude that monism is unsatisfactory. Instead, they let
several theories of truth work in tandem, restricting their range of applica-
bility to certain domains.
In connection with the internal debate, we see advocates of so-called
strong pluralism and moderate pluralism pitched against one another. They
agree that truth pluralism is the right view, but disagree over the details.
According to strong pluralists, there is no single truth property that
applies to all true propositions. Rather, there is a range of properties that
reduce or constitute truth for different propositions belonging to differ-
ent domains. Thus, the truth of 〈There are mountains〉 may reduce to
this proposition’s corresponding to reality while the truth of 〈Speeding is
illegal〉 may reduce to this proposition’s cohering with the body of law.
Crucially, there is no single property that reduces or constitutes the truth
of every true proposition. Moderate pluralists, on the other hand, endorse
a single, generic truth property. This property is possessed by every true
proposition, so that for the moderate pluralist, truth itself is one. However,
moderate pluralists also think that instances of generic truth are grounded
by instances of different truth-relevant properties. In this sense, for the
moderate pluralist, truth is also many. Thus, according to moderate plu-
ralism, truth is both one and many.8
Despite their different views on how to best articulate truth pluralism,
strong and moderate pluralists share significant commitments. One such
commitment is the commitment to domains. Domains are a crucial com-
ponent of the theoretical framework of pluralism, as reflected by the fact
that the core pluralist thesis is that the nature of truth varies across
domains.
Domains also feature prominently in some of the main challenges
faced by truth pluralists. Problems concerning mixed discourse are cases in
point. Mixed discourse is discourse that cuts across domains. Such
­discourse occurs at three different levels: the levels of atomics, com-
pounds, and inferences. Consider the propositions that are expressed in:
 Introduction 7

(mix-atom) π is beautiful.

(mix-comp) Mt. Everest is extended in space and Bob’s drunk driving is

illegal.

(mix-inf ) If Mt. Everest is extended in space, then Bob’s drunk driv-

ing is illegal.
Mr. Everest is extended in space.
Bob’s drunk driving is illegal.

〈π is beautiful〉 is a mixed atomic proposition. It features a mathemati-

cal concept (π) and an aesthetic concept (beauty).9 However, in light of
this, should 〈π is beautiful〉 be classified as belonging to the mathemati-
cal domain, the aesthetic domain, both of these domains, or perhaps
some other domain? This question by no means seems to be a straight-
forward one to answer. However, there seems to be considerable pressure
on the pluralist to provide an answer. After all, for atomic propositions
such as 〈π is beautiful〉, the domain membership of the proposition is
meant to determine the property that is relevant to its truth. Hence,
absent a principled story about the domain membership of mixed atom-
ics, there would be a whole cluster of propositions whose truth would
remain unaccounted for. This is the problem of mixed atomics.
〈Mt. Everest is extended in space and Bob’s drunk driving is illegal〉 is
a mixed conjunction. Its first conjunct belongs to the empirical domain,
and its second conjunct to the legal domain. The conjunction is true, as
both of its conjuncts are. However, it is not clear what story the pluralist
is going to tell about this. We can suppose that correspondence to reality
and coherence with the body of law are, respectively, the truth-relevant
properties for the two conjuncts. However, neither correspondence nor
coherence seems like a plausible candidate when we try to account for the
truth of the conjunction itself. Now, if the truth-relevant property of
neither the first nor the second conjunct is the right property, the con-
junction must have some third property. However, what property would
that be? The problem of mixed compounds challenges pluralists to tell a
story about the truth of mixed compounds.
8 N. J. L. L. Pedersen et al.

The inference from 〈If Mt. Everest is extended in space, then Bob’s
drunk driving is illegal〉 and 〈Mr. Everest is extended in space〉 to 〈Bob’s
drunk driving is illegal〉 is a mixed inference. It is also a valid inference—
that is, necessarily, if the premises are true, then so is the conclusion. In
order to account for the validity of the inference, it would seem that there
must be some truth-relevant property that the premises and conclusion
all share which ensures that truth is preserved from premises to conclu-
sion. However, the pluralist seems to be unable to point to a property
that satisfies this constraint. For, as before, we can suppose that corre-
spondence to reality is the truth-relevant property for 〈Mr. Everest is
extended in space〉 and coherence with the body of law for 〈Bob’s drunk
driving is illegal〉. This means that one of the premises and the conclu-
sion have different truth-relevant properties. The problem of mixed infer-
ences challenges the pluralist to tell a story about the validity of mixed
inferences.10
Another fundamental problem confronting pluralists is what is some-
times called the “double-counting objection.” In essence, the objection is
that pluralists count two differences where only one is needed. They
endorse significant metaphysical differences regarding the nature of vari-
ous subject matters and, in addition, they endorse differences in the
nature of truth. However, in order to accommodate wide-ranging truth-­
aptitude, differences need only be countenanced at one level—at the level
of the things themselves (numbers, trees, moral properties, laws, etc.) or
at the level of the content associated with different domains (expressivist
content vs. representational content). Drawing distinctions at the level of
truth, the objection goes, is superfluous.11

The Contributions

Dorit Bar-On and Keith Simmons’ contribution “Truth: One or

Many?” runs a version of the double-counting objection. Prominent
pluralists such as Wright and Lynch claim that one motivation for
adopting truth pluralism is that it puts one in a position to make
sense of disputes between realists and anti-realists. Adopting the the-
sis that the nature of truth varies across domains, it is possible for the
 Introduction 9

pluralist to account for the “differential appeal of realist and anti-

realist intuitions” about them.12 Bar-On and Simmons counter by
arguing that truth pluralism offers no distinctive explanatory power
vis-à-vis the realism/anti-realism debate. Rather, all that is needed is a
plurality of kinds of worldly conditions that track metaphysical differ-
ences. Bar-On and Simmons’ version of the double-counting objec-
tion targets not only truth pluralists but also certain kinds of truth
monists—namely, those who think that a distinction between differ-
ent kinds of content or meaning offers explanatory power vis-à-vis the
realism/anti-realism debate. Bar-On and Simmons spell out in con-
siderable detail how their proposal differs from those of truth monists
who seek to accommodate realism/anti-realism disputes by appealing
to semantic differences.
Michael P. Lynch’s contribution “Truth Pluralism, Quasi-Realism and
the Problem of Double-Counting” offers a pluralist response to the dou-
ble-counting objection—in particular, as it might be pressed by quasi-
realists such as Simon Blackburn and global expressivists such as Huw
Price. Lynch argues that semantic diversity and cognitive unity are theses
that quasi-realists, global expressivists, and truth pluralists all seek to
accommodate and explain:

(SD) There are real differences in kind between the contents of our
beliefs and indicative statements.

(CU) All beliefs and indicative statements are subject to a single

type of cognitive normative assessment of correctness.

Blackburn proposes to accommodate semantic diversity by appealing to

two sorts of propositions or two sorts of truth-aptitude. Price proposes to
accommodate semantic diversity by appealing to two kinds of representa-
tion: i-representation and e-representation. A proposition i-represents in
virtue of its inferential or functional role, while e-representation is cashed
out in terms of co-variance with the environment. Lynch argues that, in
effect, both Blackburn’s proposal and Price’s proposal result in a form of
truth pluralism. Hence, when it comes to double-counting, truth plural-
ists turn out to be no worse off than quasi-realists or global expressivists.
10 N. J. L. L. Pedersen et al.

Douglas Edwards’ contribution “The Metaphysics of Domains” pro-

vides a systematic account of domains and thus addresses a major lacuna
in the theoretical framework of truth pluralism. Edwards distinguishes
between a semantic and a metaphysical aspect of domains. He accounts
for these via a discussion of, respectively, singular terms and predicates
and their metaphysical counterparts, objects and properties. Edwards
argues that his proposed notion of domain is not a commitment of
pluralists only—it is implicit in a number of philosophical views.
Edwards demonstrates the significance of his account of domains by
arguing that it delivers a solution to two major challenges to truth plu-
ralism: the problem of mixed atomics and the problem of mixed
compounds.
Seahwa Kim and Nikolaj Jang Lee Linding Pedersen’s contribution
“Strong Truth Pluralism” provides a pluralist solution to the problem of
mixed compounds. Kim and Pedersen offer their solution against the
background of a certain form of strong pluralism. They thus deny that
there is any generic truth property that applies across all domains.
Instead they think that an atomic proposition’s being true reduces to its
corresponding to reality, cohering, or having some other “base-level
truth property.” The truth of a compound reduces to its having a com-
pound-specific truth-reducing property. For example, the truth of the
mixed conjunction 〈Mt. Everest is extended in space and Bob’s drunk
driving is illegal〉 reduces to its being a conjunction with conjuncts that
have their respective truth-reducing properties. Note that in this regard
mixed conjunctions are no different from pure conjunctions. Hence,
Kim and Pedersen’s response to the problem of mixed compounds is
that there is nothing special or problematic about them. They are true
in the same way that their pure counterparts are.
The contributions by Nathan Kellen, Filippo Ferrari, and Jeremy
Wyatt explore different ways to reconfigure or add a new dimension to
the debate concerning truth pluralism.
Kellen’s contribution “Methodological Pluralism About Truth” introduces
a meta-­perspective on the truth pluralism debate. According to Kellen,
Wright takes anti-realism to be methodologically fundamental. He does so
in the sense that anti-realist truth is taken to be the default for all domains.
 Introduction 11

This is not to say that Wright is opposed to giving truth a “non-default”

treatment within some domains. However, in order for truth to receive
this kind of treatment, there must be reasons why, within that particular
domain, the default should be abandoned. Kellen likewise attributes a
thesis of methodological fundamentality to Edwards although, in con-
trast to Wright, the default is realist truth. Kellen proposes methodological
pluralism as an alternative to anti-realist and realist default forms of plu-
ralism. According to this methodological doctrine, the pluralist should
have no default for any domain but should remain neutral until reasons
have been given one way or the other.
Filippo Ferrari’s contribution “Normative Alethic Pluralism” articu-
lates a novel view concerning the normativity of truth—what he calls
“normative alethic pluralism.” He articulates this view against the back-
ground of a rejection of normative alethic monism, the view that truth’s
normative profile is uniform across all domains, and can be captured by
a single principle that connects truth and judgment. Ferrari targets nor-
mative alethic monism by employing a normative analogue of the scope
problem. By appealing to disagreements pertaining to different domains,
Ferrari argues that the normative profile of truth varies across domains. If
people disagree over whether, for example, oysters are tasty, there is no
strong sense of fault in play. On the other hand, if two parties disagree as
to whether abortion is a morally acceptable practice, there is a strong
sense of fault in play. This is reflected by each party’s tendency toward
condemnation of the other party. This normative variability cannot satis-
factorily be accommodated within the framework of normative alethic
monism. Hence, according to Ferrari, there is reason to adopt normative
alethic pluralism. There are several ways for truth to normatively regulate
judgment. Having motivated and articulated normative alethic plural-
ism, Ferrari discusses the issue of whether it might bear significant con-
nections to pluralism about truth. He concludes that the two kinds of
pluralism are compatible and may nicely complement one another. Yet,
one does not imply the other.
Jeremy Wyatt’s contribution “Truth in English and Elsewhere: An
Empirically-Informed Functionalism” presents a refined framework that
should help to shape future work on both pluralism and functionalism
12 N. J. L. L. Pedersen et al.

about truth. Wyatt argues that a proper defense of alethic functional-

ism—a view that was pioneered by Lynch—must be informed by empiri-
cal data. The alethic functionalist puts forward an account of the folk
theory of truth, which is meant to consist of the propositions about truth
that those who possess the folk concept of truth are ipso facto disposed to
believe upon reflection. The functionalist’s view on the folk theory of
truth is thus empirical in nature and should be evaluated using empirical
data. Wyatt discusses two kinds of existing data: data pertaining to alethic
vocabulary in English and preliminary data pertaining to the Ghanaian
language Akan. The English-related data suggest variation in the use of
alethic vocabulary among male and female English speakers. The prelimi-
nary data concerning Akan suggest that there are significant differences in
the alethic vocabulary that is used, respectively, by native Akan and native
English speakers. Wyatt argues that these lines of data lend support to
two kinds of pluralism regarding ordinary thought about truth—what he
calls intralinguistic and interlinguistic conceptual pluralism. In addition to
motivating these two sorts of pluralism, Wyatt shows how the functional-
ist, by adopting a more nuanced version of Lynch’s framework, can nicely
accommodate these pluralistic hypotheses.

3 Logical Pluralism (Part II)

Over the past decade, there has been a surge of interest in logical plural-
ism, one major factor being the publication of JC Beall and Greg Restall’s
Logical Pluralism.13 In this section, we will briefly introduce Beall and
Restall’s logical pluralism and the contributions to Part II of the volume.
In one way or another, most of these contributions engage with promi-
nent themes from Beall and Restall’s work.

Background

According to Beall and Restall, logic is plural in the sense that there are
several equally legitimate instances of what they call Generalized Tarski’s
Thesis (GTT):
 Introduction 13

(GTT) An argument is validx if and only if in every casex in which

the premises are true, so is the conclusion.

Beall and Restall argue that there are at least three equally legitimate ways
to construe casex in GTT: cases as (consistent and complete) possible
worlds, cases as (possibly incomplete) constructions, and cases as (possibly
inconsistent) situations. These three notions of case deliver different log-
ics—respectively classical logic, intuitionistic logic, and relevant logic.
To shed further light on the nature of Beall and Restall’s logical plural-
ism, let us highlight a number of key features of their view: legitimacy,
logical functionalism, logical generalism, logical relativism, meaning con-
stancy, and structural rules and properties.

Legitimacy The standard of legitimacy for cases is given by three features

that Beall and Restall call “necessity”, “formality”, and “normativity.”
Roughly stated, necessity is the idea that valid arguments must be neces-
sarily truth-preserving; formality is the idea that validity is neutral with
respect to content; and normativity is the idea that invalid arguments
must involve a kind of mistake or fault.

Logical Functionalism The network approach to conceptual analysis can

be regarded as a form of conceptual functionalism. A target concept C is
characterized by a set of principles that connect C to other concepts. In
this way, C is characterized through its role or function within a larger
conceptual network. Beall and Restall’s view can be regarded as an
instance of the network approach. Generalized Tarski’s Thesis and the
three constraints of necessity, formality, and normativity characterize the
concept of validity via its connection to other concepts such as case,
truth, necessity, formality, and normativity. In this way, validity
is characterized through its function or role within a larger conceptual
network, and for this reason Beall and Restall’s logical pluralism involves
a form of functionalism.

Logical Generalism To borrow a phrase from Hartry Field, Beall and

Restall’s logical pluralism is a pluralism about all-purpose logics.14 Their
view is not that classical logic, intuitionistic logic, and relevant logic are
14 N. J. L. L. Pedersen et al.

legitimate only when restricted to certain domains or when used for certain
purposes. Rather, their view is that classical logic, intuitionistic logic, and
relevant logic are equally legitimate across the board. This idea can be
regarded as a form of logical generalism. The legitimacy of the logics admit-
ted by (GTT) and the three constraints is meant to be completely general.

Logical Relativism Beall and Restall’s logical pluralism involves a form of

logical relativism: statements concerning the validity of arguments only
have a truth-value relative to a particular system.15 Thus, for example, as
far as logic is concerned, there is no absolute fact of the matter as to
whether double negation elimination is valid. Instead there are logic-­
relative facts: in classical logic, double negation elimination is valid while
in intuitionistic logic, it is not.16

Meaning Constancy Beall and Restall are pluralists about validity and
logical consequence. However, they maintain that the meaning of the
logical connectives is constant across the various logics that qualify as
legitimate. This view contrasts with a view often attributed to Carnap—
namely, that different logics have different connectives.17 According to
the latter view, the meaning of “and”, “not”, “or”, etc. changes from one
logic to another. By contrast, on Beall and Restall’s view, logical expres-
sions share the same—but incomplete—meaning across logics. However,
clauses that govern the connectives in different logics capture different
aspects of that shared meaning.

Structural Rules and Properties It is common to distinguish between the

operational rules and the structural rules of a system. Operational rules
and properties concern specific logical operations (e.g., negation).
Structural rules and properties of a logic capture general features that
hold purely in virtue of premises and conclusions being structures of
unstructured objects that can be manipulated in certain ways. The fol-
lowing list specifies five well-known structural rules:

(Reflexivity) ϕ⊨ϕ

(Monotonicity) If Γ ⊨ ϕ, then Γ, Δ ⊨ ϕ
 Introduction 15

(Transitivity) If Γ ⊨ ϕ and Δ, ϕ ⊨ ψ, then Δ, Γ ⊨ ψ

(Contraction) If Γ, ϕ, ϕ ⊨ ψ, then Γ, ϕ ⊨ ψ

(Commutativity) If Γ, ϕ, ψ, Δ ⊨ χ, then Γ, ψ, ϕ, Δ ⊨ χ

Reflexivity says that anything is a logical consequence of itself.

Monotonicity says that, if ϕ is a logical consequence of Γ, adding more
premises Δ does not change anything (i.e., ϕ is also logical of a conse-
quence of Γ, Δ). Transitivity says that, if ϕ is a logical consequence of Γ
and ψ is a logical consequence of Δ, ϕ, then ψ is a logical consequence of
just Δ, Γ. Contraction says that multiple occurrences of the same premise
can be cut to a single occurrence without impacting consequence.
Commutativity says that the order of premises does not matter: it can be
switched without impacting consequence. Any system that fails to accom-
modate any of the five structural rules listed above is a substructural logic.18

The Contributions

Neil Tennant’s contribution “Core Logic: A Conspectus” presents an

“absolutist pluralist” view on logic. It is absolutist in the sense that there is
a core to logic or deductive reasoning—core logic in Tennant’s terminology.
However, Tennant’s view is pluralist in that there are several legitimate
extensions of the core. Tennant is particularly interested in providing an
account of logic for mathematics. He wants to accommodate both con-
structive and non-constructive (or classical) mathematics, but argues that
all proofs should be “relevantized.” For this reason, core logic is relevant.
Thus, Tennant’s view is revisionist, as he thinks that the logics of construc-
tive and classical mathematics should be revised along relevantist lines.
The logic suitable for c­ onstructive mathematics is relevantized intuitionis-
tic logic (the core logic C) while the logic suitable for non-constructive (or
classical) mathematics is relevantized classical logic (the core logic C+).
Teresa Kouri Kissel’s contribution “Connective Meanings in Beall and
Restall’s Logical Pluralism” contests Beall and Restall’s meaning con-
stancy thesis, that is, their claim that logical expressions have the same
Another random document with
no related content on Scribd:
 Our visitors were really many of them very fine-looking fellows in
their long Tuareg bubus or mantles, with the red pocket on the
breast. Their naturally picturesque attitudes lent them a really regal
appearance, and they might very well have passed for proud, highly-
born nobles, when, leaning on their spears, they looked about them,
their great black eyes gleaming from the voluminous folds of their
veils. But when the distribution of presents began the glamour
disappeared, the haughty noble was gone, to be replaced by a
greedy, rapacious savage, until, his big pocket as full as it would
hold, he resumed his disdainful attitude.

OUR PALAVER AT SAKHIB’S CAMP.

All this is really very excusable. Imagine the effect in any

European country place, of the arrival of a wealthy nabob distributing
diamonds and other precious stones wherever he goes. I wager that
our own fellow-countrymen would not comport themselves in a more
worthy way than did these Tuaregs, and it must be borne in mind
that though our presents, such as pipes, small knives, bracelets and
rings, or white and coloured stuffs were of little intrinsic value, the
natives set as much store by them as we should by jewels.
Numerous as was the crowd, however, Sakhib was conspicuous
by his absence; neither did the women put in an appearance, a proof
that the Tuaregs were not quite sure of our good intentions. Only one
of the fair sex did we see, and she was a female blacksmith, who
said she was ill, and wanted the doctor to prescribe for her. Taburet
tried in vain to find out what was the matter with her, and my private
opinion is that her illness was only an excuse, that her motives in
visiting our camp were none of the best, and that she would be ready
to accept our hospitality for a night in return for a good fee.
We, however, with thoroughly British bashfulness, resisted the
blandishments of the siren, and when darkness fell all our visitors,
who had been less extortionate in their demands than Sakhaui’s
people, decided to withdraw.
Mohamed Uld Mbirikat alone remained on the beach with us, and
we talked together till far into the night. He really was a good fellow,
and it was no fault of his that we had not succeeded in seeing
Sakhib and Sakhaui, for he had put forth all his eloquence on our
behalf. His interests, moreover, are closely bound up with those of
the Igwadaren, amongst whom he lives without protection, buying
grain of them to sell it again in Timbuktu, so that any help he gave us
beyond a certain point would seriously compromise him. I gave him
a valuable present, and he in his turn presented me with a stock of
rice he owned at the village of Gungi on the islet of Autel Makhoren,
where we should be the next day.
After a quiet night we resumed our voyage, but the never-ceasing
enervating wind forced us to anchor soon, and we were presently
joined by a canoe in which was an unfortunate man in chains, a
brother of Sakhib, who had been out of his mind for five years. He is
quiet enough, they told me, when he is rendered powerless for harm
by being bound, but directly he is released he becomes furious, and
strikes and abuses every one about him. Taburet prescribed for him
as best he could, shower-baths and strait waistcoats being out of the
question in these parts. We passed the village of Agata, where lives
Hameit, a sheriff to whom we had a letter from Abiddin, and where
we saw some fifty canoes drawn up high and dry on the banks. In
the evening we halted near a little village on an islet, the chief of
which had had his arm broken by a blow from the spear of an
Igwadaren, whom he had refused to allow to carry off his store of
rice. There is no doubt that the natives on the right bank of the river
behave better than those on the left, and—which it is rather difficult
to understand—it is the negroes, that is to say the Songhay, who,
though more numerous and as well armed as their oppressors, allow
themselves to be ill-treated in this way without making any attempt at
defence. Their cowardice prevents me from feeling as much
sympathy as I otherwise should for their miserable condition.

THE VILLAGE OF GUNGI.

We started very early the next morning, but our guide got
confused, and did not know the way to Gungi. Some men in a canoe,
however, directed us, and we had to go up-stream again beyond
Agata, and get into another arm which we had passed on the left.
We then, though not without some difficulty, succeeded in reaching
the village, passing several artificial dykes, beyond which stretched
rice-fields now inundated. Gunga, a wretched little place, is peopled
by slaves taken in war by the sheriffs of Agata. Mohamed’s rice was
handed over to us, but it was all still in the husk, and it would take us
the whole of the next day to get it shelled.
During the night a Kel es Suk arrived, who, in a very important
manner, informed me that he had very serious news to
communicate. The whole of the tribes of the Sahara, he said, had
combined against the French, and were advancing upon Timbuktu.
Awellimiden, Hoggars and all the rest of them were up, and Madidu
himself was at Bamba at the head of his column. This was really too
big an invention, and the narrator overreached himself by going so
far. Without losing my sang-froid for a moment, I thanked my
informant, Father Hacquart acting as interpreter, for my visitor spoke
Arabic well, and begged him to take my best compliments to Madidu.
The old rogue then turned to the subject he really had most at heart,
and tried to make me give him a garment of some kind as a present,
but I was too deep for that, and sent him off empty-handed.
 OUR PEOPLE SHELLING OUR RICE AT GUNGI.

Directly we stopped we were inundated by visitors, all nearly as

worrying as the rain, which had been falling without ceasing since
the evening before. To begin with, on the morning of the 22nd came
messengers from Sakhaui to ask in his name for advice. The
Commandant of Timbuktu had sent him a letter announcing the
approaching arrival of Colonel de Trentinian, Governor of the French
Sudan. The Commandant ordered Sakhaui to go to Timbuktu, and
he was very much frightened. I did my best to reassure the
messenger, but I am very certain that Sakhaui does not mean to
budge. The message would, however, do us no end of harm, and
from my journal that day I perceive that I felt very indignant at the
policy pursued by our authorities in the Sudan. I find written there
—“We really are an extraordinary people, we seem to expect that the
Tuaregs will come and throw themselves into our arms of their own
accord, without our having employed any conciliatory or coercive
means to induce them to do so. But, good Heavens! if they could
send us to the Devil, from whom their marabouts tell them we come,
they would gladly do it. And really I don’t blame them, for I see well
enough what they have to lose by our presence in their land, though
I don’t quite see what they are to gain. Taking into account the
apathy with which commercial questions are treated, I do not yet
foresee the day when amends will be made for the imposts now
levied by force, by the granting of new rights of way, and the
supplying of new means of transport.”
Nor have I seen reason since to change my opinion, for to talk of
colonial questions in France is to preach in the desert. Nevertheless,
I am firmly convinced that then as now I wrote only the exact literal
truth.
It was now R’alli’s turn again. We had not seen the fellow for
some time, but I am willing to swear three times by Allah, that since
we treated him as we did at Zarhoi he had been our most faithful and
devoted adherent. He would never let us go anywhere without
preparing the way before us, so he had gone on in advance of our
barges now, and spread our fame amongst the sheriffs and other
idiots, who did not know us as he did, and who received his reports
by beating the tabala or war-drum; or, to speak with more strict
accuracy, he found the drum being beaten, and fearing that the
sound of that one instrument would lead to the beating of others, he
confiscated it at once. Then he, R’alli, having inquired what all the
noise meant, the owner of the drum replied that he was afraid the
white men were coming to take away his goods, his oxen, his sheep,
and so on. “Then,” added R’alli, with an air of extreme amiability, “to
show him he had nothing to fear, I took everything away from him.” I
began to shout at him—“And that is the way you make friends for
us!” “To give everything back when you have passed,” he went on
with a smile. If the story he told me is true, and I shouldn’t like to
swear that it was, I wouldn’t mind taking my oath that the poor sheriff
will not get all his property back. However, the unabashed R’alli
continued, “You ought to dress me now as you do your other
soldiers, for am not I now one of your troops?”
 SHERIFF’S HOUSE AT GUNGI.

I observed that I had already given him stuff enough to clothe his
whole family.
“But my bubu and breeches are dirty now!” he replied. “Well, go
and wash them, you wretch!” was the angry rejoinder. “What!” he
cried, “would you like a soldier under such a chief as you to demean
himself by such work as that?”
Sheriff Hameit, to whom I had sent Abiddin’s letter the evening
before, answered us very impolitely, declaring that his religion
forbade him to have anything to do with infidels.
I consoled myself for this fresh failure by having a chat with the
little Kunta Tahar, Mohamed’s companion, who had come on to
Gungi to see that the rice was duly handed over to us.
He told me of the death in 1890 near Saredina of Abiddin, the son
of Hamet Beckay, of whom he had been a faithful retainer when at
Gardio near Lake Debo.
 This Abiddin and his followers had come to make a pilgrimage to
the tomb of the great marabout, and also to try to win recruits against
the Toucouleurs of Massina, with whom Abiddin carried on the
struggle begun by his father. Two columns had marched forth
against them, one from Mopti, the other from Jenné, and surrounded
them. Abiddin was wounded and taken prisoner, but his faithful
Bambaras of Jenné, who had always followed his fortunes, rescued
him from the hands of the enemy. But, alas! no less than three
bullets hit the doomed man after this first escape, killing him on the
spot, and a great storm then arose which put an end to the battle,
only a few of those engaged in it escaping to tell the tale.
The wind, which was very violent and dry, whirled up such
quantities of sand that the corpse of Abiddin was buried beneath it,
and no one was ever able to discover the place where he lay, as if
Nature herself wished to protect his body from desecration and
insult.

WEAVERS AT GUNGI.
 Tornadoes play a great part in the histories of Kunta wars. Hamet
Beckay is supposed to have had the power of calling them up when
he liked, and to have by their means several times overwhelmed
armies sent to attack him, but that of Saredina came too late to save
his son.
Can it have been the story told to me by my friend the Kunta
which caused a tremendous tornado to sweep down upon us that
very evening, with thunder and lightning and torrents of rain all
complete, soaking everything and everybody on board?
Our rice shelled, put into bags, and stowed away in the hold, we
went on and anchored the next morning opposite Baruba to
breakfast there. The ancient town, the Kaaba of the Tuaregs, which
was still standing in the time of Barth, has since been destroyed, but
its site is marked by piles of rubbish such as are still characteristic of
the environs of Timbuktu, and from their vast extent prove that it was
a city of considerable importance.
The country round about is extremely picturesque. The
descendants of those who dwelt in the old city have moved a little
further down stream to a dune which is so completely surrounded
with water during inundations as to form an island. They bury their
dead beneath the shade of the thorny bush beyond their settlement.
At Baruba we saw some date trees which had reverted to the wild
state, and were very majestic looking. We visited the site of the old
town, and then anchored opposite its successor. Now that the waters
of the Niger were beginning to subside, and the island was becoming
a peninsula only, the inhabitants were losing their sense of security,
and talking of migrating to an islet in the river itself opposite their
present home. A few huts had already been put up on it, making
white spots amongst the dense green verdure.
There we received envoys from the chief named Abder Rhaman,
who brought us a letter in which we were informed that the reason
the writer did not come to see us was, that he was afraid we should
not understand each other, and bad results might ensue.
Then came a band of Kel-Owi, serfs of the Igwadaren, bringing
ten, twenty, or thirty sheep, which they informed us they meant to
give us. The number of animals seemed increasing at every
moment, and I at once feared there was some sinister intention
behind this unusual generosity. But no, I was wrong. They were
really good fellows these Kel-Owi, though the merit of their
munificence rather melts away when you examine closely into
motives. It was present for present, as of course they knew I should
not take their beasts without giving them something in exchange. I
had the greatest difficulty in making our visitors understand that our
boats were not sheep-pens, and that all I could do was to choose out
the five finest animals.

FATHER HACQUART AND HIS LITTLE

FRIEND.

All the imrads or serfs with whom I came in contact seemed to me

quiet, inoffensive folk, when one does not pick a quarrel with them, in
which they differ entirely from the Tuaregs of Algeria. They are of
much paler complexion than the nobles or Ihaggaren.
 In spite of what Abder Rhaman said in his letter, he decided to
come and see us. He was an Arma, or descendant of the old
conquerors from Morocco, with a proud, dignified bearing, and
seemed to be a good and energetic ruler.
We had a very friendly conversation with him, during which the
halt and lame, with all the sick people of the village, came to ask for
medical advice. The doctor really multiplied himself in an
extraordinary way, working miracles of healing.
During the night of the 23rd to the 24th of May we were roused by
a great commotion in the village, and prepared for every
contingency, but in the morning Abder Rhaman came to explain the
mystery, telling us that the Hoggars had made a raid on the
Igwadaren settlements. Sakhaui had sent ten men to reconnoitre,
one of whom was his brother. They had met the enemy, whose force
was superior to theirs, and had had to beat a retreat, with two of their
number wounded. Sakhaui’s brother had had his horse killed under
him.
On the rumour of the approach of the Hoggars, which had
reached Baruba, during the night, the village was deserted, every
one carrying off all the property he could, and the noise we had
heard was that made by the canoes taking over the wretched goods
and chattels of the poor people and the materials of their huts to the
point called Ansel Makkoren. They had not dared to warn us for fear
of being fired on by our sentry.
I greatly regret that I was not at Zarhoi when the news came of
the arrival of the Hoggars. We might have given Sakhaui timely aid
in repulsing them, and thus have aided to avenge the murder of
Flatters, whilst the danger he was in would very likely have driven
the Igwadaren chief into our arms.
Later, however, I had the satisfaction of hearing that the column of
Hoggars who had advanced towards Timbuktu had been surprised
and partly destroyed by the spahis of Captain Laperrine.
 LITTLE NEGROES AT EGUEDECHE.

A short march in the afternoon brought us to Eguedeche, where

we cast anchor opposite a little slave village on the very edge of the
river. At first the negroes all ran away, and when we landed we found
nothing but empty huts. Presently, however, a wail went up from
amongst the fugitives, for Father Hacquart made a sudden dash at
them, and emerged carrying a little boy of about a year old in his
arms, who screamed in terror, but was soon reassured by the
caresses of the father, and began playing with his long beard.
The little fellow’s parents were not far off, and they watched what
was going on from behind some dwarf palms, where they had taken
refuge with the rest of the villagers, and, their fears allayed, they now
came out followed by their comrades.
The large village of Eguedeche is some little distance from the
river, and is hidden behind a dune. The inhabitants, who are the
masters of the slaves in the little village near which we had
anchored, are Kuntas. They showed us the ruins of an earthen hut
which had belonged to Sidi el Amin, one of Hamet Beckay’s
brothers. The chief of Eguedeche came to meet us in person,
accompanied by one of his relations, who belonged to that part of
the tribe which was under the rule of Baba Hamet, a son of El
Beckay. I persuaded him to go back and tell his chief of our
approach, that I was the nephew of Abdul Kerim, and anxious to see
Baba Hamet and his brother Baye.
The news of the Hoggar raid was confirmed by the people here.
Though we were able to remain on pretty good terms with the
inhabitants of the left bank of the Niger, we felt that an obstinate
hostility to us was growing on the other side, and during the day of
the 25th an adventure occurred which proved that we were right.
We had to halt about 8 o’clock. The Aube was already anchored
at the base of a dune, and the Davoust was amongst the grass near
a village, the inhabitants of which had come to barter their eggs and
poultry for our glass beads. The wind had fallen, and I had already
given the signal to start, when from amongst a group of Tuaregs who
had been posted on the dune watching our boats without
approaching, a negro was sent to say they wished to speak to us.
In his hand the envoy held a red woollen coverlet which I had sent
from Rhergo to Mohamed Uld Mbirikat, and which he told me had
been taken from him partly by persuasion and partly by force by Abu,
a brother of Sakhib.
This coverlet, the messenger explained, was sent to prove that he
came from Abu, who exhorted us to keep away from the right bank
of the river, to go down stream if we liked, but to refrain from landing.
The Aube had already started, and on account of the tiresome
wind, which made us lose the best hours every day, we had very
little time to push on, so I resisted my desire to remain where I was
and see what Abu would do. I sent him an answer, however, to the
effect that I was going on, not because he ordered me to, but
because I wished to do so, as I had already made an arrangement
with his elder brother. I added, I had nothing at all to do with Abu,
and did not recognize him as having any authority whatever in the
country.
 In the evening we tried in vain to anchor near the village of
Moyadikoira, the weeds quite prevented our getting in, and we had
to content ourselves by stopping near a little island opposite to it. We
tried without success to attract the natives. They came, it is true, in
their canoes as far as the boundary of weeds and rushes, but they
would not land on our island. I was very anxious, however, to find out
what was in the wind among the Tuaregs, and also to buy some
wood for burning. In these parts, where weeds and grass often make
it impossible to land, the question of how to get fuel for cooking
purposes is often a very serious one, and we had to be very
economical with what we did succeed in obtaining. It is not that there
is not plenty of wood to be had, if there were not steam navigation
would be indeed difficult here; but in order to procure it, it is
necessary to go to the first line of dunes beyond the highest point of
the great inundations. There are plenty of gum trees there, and all
we have to do is to get the natives to cut them down, and carry the
wood to the boats. It throws out a great heat when burning.
On the 26th a canoe passed us in which were some people from
Bamba, who told us that the Tademeket Kel Burrum had met at
Dongoe with the intention of attacking us.
On hearing these tidings Sidi Hamet burst into tears, and in the
end he entreated me to let him leave us at Tosaye to go back to
Timbuktu.
Since we had passed through the Igwadaren districts, the
character of our guide had undergone a complete transformation,
which was anything but an improvement. I knew he had had a letter
from Timbuktu, but I did not know what was in it. I do know, however,
that the silly fellow is a great fool, and very jealous about his wife.
“She is such a beautiful woman,” he informed us one day, “and so
beautifully dressed. She carries the value of at least four bars of salt
on her back.” Is he afraid of the fate of the husband described by
Molière? Is his fear real or feigned? Anyhow he is, or pretends to be,
a constant prey to the greatest terrors. He who, till we reached
Kardieba, was always so gay and so bold, ready to carry out every
enterprise I entrusted to him, he, who had always expressed such
immovable confidence in the success of all our schemes of alliance
with the Awellimiden, could now only dwell on the melancholy fate
which awaited him and us: we should be murdered, he too of course,
and he should never see his dear wife again who has the value of
four bars of salt on her back, etc. I had tried by kindness and by
scolding to restore his moral tone, but it was no good, and feeling
how foolish it would be to place confidence in such a coward, who
was quite ready to deceive us if he could thus prevent us from going
further, I gave him the permission he asked for, seasoning my
compliance, however, with a few pretty severe remarks. This quieted
him for a bit, but he very soon recommenced his jeremiads on the
dangers he would incur on his way back to Timbuktu. To cut the
matter short, however, I at last forbid him ever to mention the matter
to me.
There was, however, some truth in all that Sidi Hamet said. The
natives we met grew more and more hostile. On the morning of the
27th we crossed the rocky pass known as Tinalschiden, and then
Dongoe, where rumour said we were to be attacked. We were, in
fact, followed on either bank by troops of mounted Tuaregs, some
thirty altogether, I should say, but this was not a very formidable
force, and after all they abstained from any hostile manifestation.
The wind compelled us to halt for a few minutes opposite Dongoe on
the left bank, and a horseman rode forward and hailed the Davoust. I
exchanged greetings with him, a necessary prelude to every
conversation, even if that conversation is to lead to a quarrel. I asked
him to give me the news of the country, and he told me I should get
them at Tosaye from Sala Uld Kara.
At about two o’clock we perceived in front of us two great masses
of rock. These were the Baror and Chalor mentioned by Barth, which
form land, or rather water-marks at the defile of Tosaye. A canoe at
once put out from the left bank, in which was a relation of Sala, who
came to offer his services as guide. The numbers of the Tuaregs on
the right bank now increased, and I wished to parley with them, but
our pilot prevented it. A few strokes of the oar soon brought us
opposite Sala’s town, known as Sala Koira or Tosaye. We landed.
TAKING ASTRONOMICAL OBSERVATIONS.
TOSAYE, WITH THE BAROR AND CHABAR ROCKS.
 CHAPTER IV

FROM TOSAYE TO FAFA

Tosaye is a village of sheriffs. They are as pacific and timid a set

of people as can possibly be imagined, but for all that, they gathered
on the beach on our arrival in warlike array, trying to make up for the
courage they lacked by being armed to the teeth. Each marabout
was really a walking arsenal. This made us feel inclined to laugh; but
what was a far more serious matter, was the fact that groups of
Tuaregs, who seemed to be waiting for us, had gathered behind the
village. Our guide, who had sprung ashore directly we landed, had
disappeared, and no one seemed anxious to enter into conversation
with us. I told Sidi Hamet to come down and take me to Chief Sala,
or to one of his representatives; but our political agent at first stoutly
refused to do so. We had to drag him from the boat almost by force,
and then he went up to one of the groups which appeared the least
hostile, entered a hut, and kept us waiting outside for his return for
half-an-hour.
He came at last, with a brother of Sala, bearing very bad news.
Sala by an unlucky chance had gone on a journey, and the people of
the village, fearing that we were going to fight with the Tuaregs,
would be very glad if we did not land here at all. This was succeeded
by a whole rigmarole of information—much of it contradictory, but all
alarming. A great gathering of Awellimiden, Tademeket Kuntas, etc.,
was massed at the Tosaye defile to oppose our passage, etc. Sala
himself was amongst the rest of our enemies.
What was to be done? We were in need of provisions, our reserve
stores were beginning to give out, and I wanted to lay in a stock of
grain, for who could tell what we might expect further down the river?
 I also wanted guides. Ever since we had left Timbuktu the
narrowness and difficulties of the Tosaye defile had been dinned into
our ears. Even Dr. Barth is not very reassuring in what he says about
it, for he asserts that a stone could be flung by a vigorous hand from
one bank to the other, and speaks of the probable existence of very
strong currents, perhaps even of rapids.
We were told that some twelve years ago an army of Toucouleurs
had tried to descend the Niger in canoes. They were, however,
completely annihilated at Tosaye, crushed beneath masses of rocks
which the natives rolled down on them from the top of the cliffs. Of
course I knew that allowance must be made for exaggeration, but for
all that I feared that we should be at very great disadvantage in the
narrow pass if we did have a conflict with the natives. We must
therefore put out all our diplomacy to avoid a struggle.
Without seeming to give any credence to the alarmist reports of
Sidi Hamet, or to be in the least disconcerted by them, I entered into
conversation with Sala’s brother, and very soon managed to
introduce the subject of Abdul Kerim.
I revealed my relationship to him, and as usual it produced the
anticipated effect. Sala was not aware that I was the nephew of
Barth; he must at once be told. As a mark of gratitude and a token
that I really was speaking the truth, I gave him the name of the cook
of his former leader, El Beckay. Her name was Diko.
No doubt when Barth, with his usual German precision, registered
the name of that humble but useful personage, the information did
not seem likely to be of very great importance to future generations.
He little knew the service he would render nearly half-a-century
afterwards to his pretended nephew.
With such a proof as this who could fail to believe that I really was
the nephew of my “uncle,” especially as Diko was not yet dead, but
was living at a camp in the interior? The result of my news was that
Sala had not, after all, gone on a journey, and would perhaps visit
us. His brother at once hastened to land to take the tidings to him,
his whole manner and expression completely transformed.
 He soon came back to report that Sala was not gone, but still in
the village, and when his brother had told him who I was he had
wept, for he saw in my arrival the fulfilment of a prophecy made by
his leader.
The fact was, that when Barth, accompanied by El Beckay,
arrived at Tosaye, the German explorer had no doubt been in more
danger than at any other time during his adventurous expedition.
The Tademeket Kel Burrum had resolved on his death, and all the
eloquence, all the religious influence of his protector could not soften
their feelings of animosity towards him.
At this crisis, and seeing that a terrible outbreak of hatred and
fanaticism was imminent, El Beckay, in the interests of his friend,
came to a weighty resolution. He told the Tuaregs that neither they
nor he were powerful enough to decide a matter so important as the
fate of Barth, and that El Khotab, head of the great confederation of
the Awellimiden, alone had the right to final judgment.
Leaving the banks of the river, El Beckay then went alone to El
Khotab, and persuaded him to give a safe-conduct to Barth, whom
he looked upon as his own protégé.
Barth never knew the danger he had run. In his book he merely
mentions that El Beckay was away for four days to fetch fresh
camels to take the place of their weary animals, which was of course
a mere pretext on the part of his protector, and is a fresh proof of the
delicate tact and consideration for the doctor shown by the great
Kunta marabout.
Now it so happened, that whilst he was discussing the matter with
the Tademeket, El Beckay was seized with one of his attacks of
prophetic delirium, and prophesied that some day the son of Abdul
Kerim would return with three boats.
We had three boats. I claimed, giving irrefragable proofs, to be the
nephew of Barth; it was impossible to deny that the prophecy was
fulfilled. We must add, to round off the story, that Madidu is the son
of the very El Khotab who saved my “uncle.”