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i
Jihad as Grand Strategy

ii
iii
Jihad as Grand Strategy

Islamist Militancy, National
Security, and the Pakistani State
S. Paul Kapur
1
iv
1
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CIP data is on file at the Library of Congress

ISBN 978–0 –19–9 76852–3
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Printed by Sheridan Books, Inc., United States of America
v
CON T EN T S
1. Introduction 1
2. The Logic of a Militant Proxy Strategy 13
3. Partition and an Emerging Strategy 32
4. Pakistan’s Militant Strategy Evolves 51
5. Kashmir and Afghanistan Reprise 81
6. Jihad as Grand Strategy: An Assessment 111
7. The Future: Can Pakistan Abandon Jihad? 127
Notes 143
Index 173
vi
1
CHAP T ER 1
Introduction
T errorism’s ascendance as one of the world’s leading strategic dan-

gers has been a central development of the post–Cold War security
environment. Its effects have included a fundamental reorientation of the
United States’ grand strategy, de-emphasizing long-standing postures of
deterrence and containment in favor of prevention and preemption; the
launch of a global “war on terror”; and the initiation of wars in Afghanistan
and Iraq.1 Scholars and analysts have generated a voluminous literature
attempting to identify demographic, economic, psychological, ideo-
logical, strategic, and other patterns in terrorist violence.2 Although the
nature and prevalence of such patterns are a matter of vigorous debate,
one recurring theme concerning terrorism is strikingly clear: A dispro-
portionate amount of it has been linked to Islamist militants3 based in
Pakistan.4
For example, members of the team that attacked the United States on
September 11, 2001, received training from senior al-Qaeda operative
Khalid Shaikh Mohammed in Karachi. He later wired them funds to sup-
port their preparations for the attacks. Khalid Shaikh Mohammed was
subsequently arrested in a predawn raid on his safe house in Rawalpindi,
the twin city of the Pakistani capital of Islamabad and headquarters of
the Pakistan Army. 5 Al-Qaeda leader Osama bin Laden, the most hunted
terrorist in history, was discovered and killed in a Pakistani garrison town
crawling with security personnel, in the shadow of Pakistan’s military
academy. He apparently had been there, living in a large, custom-built
home, for over five years.6 The leader of the group that carried out the
July 2005 London bomb attacks had undergone paramilitary training
in Pakistan. In addition, the group received bomb-making instructions
over the telephone from a caller in Rawalpindi.7 And the perpetrators of
the Mumbai attacks in November 2008 were members of the Pakistani
2
( 2 ) Jihad as Grand Strateg y
militant group Lashkar-e-Taiba. They trained for their mission under

the tutelage of active and retired Pakistani army and intelligence officers
in Pakistan and Pakistani Kashmir, departed by sea for Mumbai from
Karachi, and were directed in real time during the operation by handlers
in Pakistan.8
Acts like these are important not only because they kill significant
numbers of people around the world but also because they undermine
international stability, instigating conflict that can ultimately result in far
more death and destruction than the acts of terror themselves. The 9/11
attacks drove the United States to launch two major wars, which are esti-
mated to have cost the United States between $4 trillion and $6 trillion9
and resulted in well over one hundred thousand deaths.10 At present,
Pakistan-linked militant attacks threaten to incite a large-scale Indo-
Pakistani conflict. Given India’s and Pakistan’s possession of nuclear
weapons, the outcome of such a confrontation could be catastrophic. The
detonation of a single 50-k iloton weapon over New Delhi or Islamabad
would likely kill more than five hundred thousand people and result in
more than one million casualties.11 The consequences of Pakistan-based
militancy thus reach far beyond particular acts of violence or even South
Asian regional politics—they severely damage stability and security
across the globe. Not surprisingly, Pakistan is widely viewed, in the words
of the Economist, as “the world’s most dangerous place.”12 A survey of
leading international relations experts by the journal Foreign Policy tied
Pakistan with Iran as the top security challenge facing the United States.
Indeed, more than twice the number of respondents identified Pakistan as
the United States’ leading security threat as chose China.13
This book seeks to understand the connection between Pakistan and
Islamist militancy. Where did the link between the Pakistani state and
Islamist militants come from? How did it evolve over time? What have
been its effects on Pakistani strategic interests? How has it affected
regional and international security? The book addresses these questions
by departing from standard approaches to militancy in Pakistan, which
treat it either as an inexorable sociological phenomenon, as a historical
accident, or as an obviously self-destructive policy devised by short-
sighted generals and self-interested politicians. Instead, the book explores
the Pakistani state’s use of militancy as a rational strategy, designed to
generate security for itself in the face of an extremely demanding domes-
tic and international environment. It argues that Pakistan’s use of Islamist
militancy is the latest incarnation of a sophisticated asymmetric warfare
campaign,14 deliberately developed and prosecuted since the Pakistani
state’s founding. From 1947 to the present day, Pakistan15 has used reli-
giously motivated nonstate actors as strategic tools to confront stronger
3
I n t r o d u c t i o n ( 3 )
adversaries and shape its strategic environment without the costs and
risks of direct combat, and to help promote internal cohesion to compen-
sate for Pakistan’s weak domestic political foundations.16
THE LITERATURE
The Pakistan–militant nexus has come under intense public scrutiny in

recent years. Most discussions of the problem, however, are of limited
utility in understanding its true nature. The popular press often charac-
terizes the Pakistan–militant relationship as the result simply of Pakistani
evildoing or paranoid bumbling, without identifying the strategic factors
that originally created the connection and continue to drive it today.17
More careful journalistic reporting on Pakistani militancy is often lim-
ited to discrete aspects of the problem, such as the agenda or leadership of
a given militant group, or the unfolding of a particular terrorist operation.
Even when broader in scope, such work is mainly descriptive and does not
explain the deeper causal forces underlying Pakistan’s militancy problem
and their impact on current Pakistani security policy.18
The scholarly literature on Islamist militancy in Pakistan, though less
extensive than popular commentary and reporting, is growing apace.
This work provides far more context and analysis than do discussions in
the popular press and offers valuable insights into the Pakistan–militant
problem. It consists of four main camps. They focus on in-depth empirical
documentation, sociopolitical variables, politico-military and organiza-
tional strategies, and broad historical narratives.
The first camp seeks to provide a careful empirical record of the
Pakistan–militant connection. Authors in this camp offer extremely
detailed discussions of Pakistan’s historical involvement with Islamist
militant groups, including fine-g rained accounts of Pakistani leaders’
decision-making processes and development of ongoing militant strate-
gies and relationships with the militants.19 Some authors in the empirical
camp focus their attention on particular militant organizations, such as
Lashkar-e-Taiba, or on the use of militants in specific conflicts, such as
Pakistan’s use of the Taliban in Afghanistan.20
The second camp in the scholarly literature emphasizes the role of
societal and political variables in causing Pakistan’s militancy problem. It
describes the processes of Islamization and militarization that have taken
place within Pakistan in recent decades and explains how they have cre-
ated an environment in which militancy could thrive. Works in this camp
focus on a wide range of specific causes, including the military dominance
of Pakistani society, the lack of experienced political leadership following
4
independence, the impact of the Iranian revolution and the anti–Soviet-

Afghan war, and the policies of Zia-u l-Haq.21
A third category of scholarship does not seek to link Pakistan-based
militancy to broad sociopolitical trends. Rather, it characterizes the phe-
nomenon as a politico-military and organizational tool that Pakistani
leaders have used to promote their personal and bureaucratic interests.
Advancing the Kashmir cause through support for jihad enables politi-
cal and military leaders to corner significant financial resources and to
bolster their legitimacy by burnishing their Islamic bona fides. It also
allows the army to advance its organizational agenda by maximizing its
share of state resources and dominating national policymaking. The army
also uses militancy in an effort to honor its ideological commitments,
protecting Pakistan’s Islamic identity by challenging India’s dominant
position in the region. This competitive behavior is enabled by Pakistan’s
generous strategic endowments, especially its important geographic posi-
tion, which reduces the incentives for Pakistani leaders to devise rational
domestic and foreign policies and produce the public goods needed to
undergird a modern, prosperous state.22
A final group of scholars discusses Pakistan-based militancy in the
context of broad narratives, which trace the arc of Pakistani political and
social history from independence to the present. Militancy is not the pri-
mary focus of these works; it is one subject among the many issues that
they address. These issues include the institutional history of the Pakistan
Army, in which emergent praetorianism facilitated the Pakistan Army’s
adoption of militancy as a central strategic tool; the troubled United
States–Pakistan relationship, which, by providing Pakistan with exten-
sive US military and development aid, has enabled Pakistan to support
militancy; and the regime of Zia-ul-Haq, whose Islamization policies
promoted the religious extremism that undergirds the Pakistan–militant
connection.23
Each scholarly camp makes important contributions to our under-
standing of Pakistan’s relationship with Islamist militancy. For exam-
ple, largely empirical, descriptive work offers more detailed and reliable
information than is readily available elsewhere. By examining the general
history of Pakistan’s relationship with militancy, the specific character-
istics of particular jihadist groups, and the use of militants in particular
conflicts, such work can significantly improve the quality of more con-
ceptually driven analyses of the Pakistan–militant connection. Such
studies are also especially useful from a policy perspective. For exam-
ple, detailed exposition of the characteristics of an important organiza-
tion like Lashkar-e-Taiba can improve policymakers’ understandings of
5
its motives, strengths, and weaknesses, and help to devise techniques of

more effectively combating it.
The sociopolitical camp in the literature explains the complex pro-
cesses by which the Islamization and militarization of Pakistani society
actually occurred. It also shows that, in the absence of these develop-
ments, Pakistan’s militant problem would probably never have emerged,
and almost certainly would not have reached its current level of urgency.
This strand of the literature thus demonstrates that societal trends can be
understood as a deep or permissive cause of Pakistan’s current difficulties
with Islamist militancy.
The politico-military and organizational strategy camp of the litera-
ture demonstrates that Pakistan’s use of militancy has been an extremely
important tool both in Pakistan’s broad security competition with India
and in its efforts to undo the territorial status quo in Kashmir. The strat-
egy has significantly attrited Indian military and economic resources and
has enabled Pakistan to keep open the possibility of redrawing Kashmiri
territorial boundaries. Supporting militancy also has played a significant
role in advancing the interests of individual Pakistani political figures. For
example, leaders as diverse as Zia-ul-Haq, Benazir Bhutto, Nawaz Sharif,
and Pervez Musharraf have bolstered their domestic political credentials
by publicly supporting the militants, whom they have referred to as “free-
dom fighters” capable of waging “one thousand years of war” with India.24
Instrumental military and political calculations such as these explain a
good deal of Pakistan’s close relationship with militancy. In addition, by
enabling it to continue to prosecute conflict with India, a militant strat-
egy has provided the Pakistan Army with a bureaucratic and ideological
raison d’être and ensured its status as the state’s most important institu-
tion. Pakistan’s geo-strategic endowments, meanwhile, insulate Pakistani
leaders from the need to rethink this approach. Consequently, they face
little pressure to devise new policies that de-emphasize competition with
India, provide their population with basic public goods, and enable their
country to move beyond militancy.
Finally, broad historical overviews, even if they do not focus specifi-
cally on militancy, put the problem in a larger chronological and politi-
cal context. In doing so, they can help to clarify militancy’s relationship
to important characteristics of the Pakistani state and turning points in
its trajectory. They also make important basic points about the militancy
problem, such as its links with the Pakistan Army, its inadvertent exacerba-
tion by outside benefactors such as the United States, and its close connec-
tion to the policies of General Zia. These points can significantly improve
the general reader’s understanding of the Pakistan–militant nexus.
6
Prior scholarship thus has made important contributions to our under-

standing of militancy in Pakistan. The existing approaches nonetheless
fall short in a number of ways. For example, the descriptive literature pro-
vides an important source of empirical evidence on militancy in Pakistan,
but it offers little accompanying analysis. Thus, it leaves a host of questions
regarding Pakistan’s connection with Islamist militancy unanswered.
How should we interpret the information about the Pakistan–militant
nexus that the descriptive literature provides? What was the underly-
ing logic of Pakistan’s use of militancy? How effectively did the strategy
advance Pakistani goals? What generalizable propositions about states’
strategic use of militancy can we derive from the Pakistan case? Because
they seek primarily to provide rich factual description, empirical works
generally do not attempt to answer such questions.
The sociopolitical camp of the literature often fails to capture the deliber-
ateness with which Pakistani leaders created and exploited the connections
between Islamist militants and Pakistan’s military and security services.
These works tend to imply that the Pakistan–militant connection was the
unfortunate result of inexorable social and political forces, rather than the
product of a carefully formulated and executed Pakistani security policy.25
In truth, Pakistani political and military leaders have not been idle specta-
tors to the growth of their country’s relationship with Islamist militancy;
they have actively nurtured and worked with the militants, in a variety of
operational contexts, since the founding of the Pakistani state. Indeed, the
sociopolitical forces to which this literature refers were often unleashed
by the Pakistani leadership’s efforts. A study of Pakistan’s problem with
Islamist militancy must convey the deliberate nature of this relationship and
the logic underlying it, as well as evaluate its impact on Pakistani security.
The politico-military and organizational strategy camp of the litera-
ture leaves a number of questions unanswered. Work in this camp char-
acterizing Pakistan’s use of militancy primarily as a tactic to support
the Kashmir insurgency or promote the interests of particular political
leaders cannot explain the longevity, geographical breadth, and political
diversity that characterize the Pakistan–militant nexus. Why is a tactic
designed to support the ongoing Kashmir insurgency actually decades
older than that uprising? Why is Pakistan closely involved with militants
not just in Kashmir, but also in other states such as Afghanistan? And if
the promotion of militancy was a tactic that particular Pakistani leaders
used to advance their own domestic political interests, why has Pakistan’s
use of militancy been consistent across a wide range of military and civil-
ian officials? This strand of the literature does not provide satisfactory
answers to these important questions. It also focuses primarily on the
7
effects that Pakistani state support has had on the interests and capabili-
ties of militant groups. This book, by contrast, is concerned mainly with
the impact that supporting militancy has had on the strategic interests of
the Pakistani state.
Work in the politico-military and organizational camp that focuses on
the bureaucratic interests and commitments of the Pakistan Army leaves
open the question of their source. From where do these interests and com-
mitments come? In fact, the army’s attachment to militancy is rooted in
a source even deeper than its own bureaucratic proclivities—namely, the
founding logic of the Pakistani state, which provides the ideological basis
for the military’s bureaucratic commitments.
Work in the politico-military and organizational camp stressing the
perverse impact of Pakistan’s strategic assets may overplay structure and
underplay the importance of preferences in driving Pakistani security
behavior. Why do other countries with resource endowments similar to
Pakistan’s not engage in similarly pathological security behaviors? The
difference in behavior results primarily from divergent leadership prefer-
ences, quite apart from structural similarities.
Finally, broad studies of Pakistani political history, which address
a diverse spectrum of issues in addition to the Pakistan–militant con-
nection, often provide overly simplified discussions of Pakistan’s use of
Islamist militancy. As a result, they can be misleading. For example, these
studies generally trace the roots of Pakistan’s militancy problem to the
Islamization of Pakistani society under General Zia. This Islamization
process, however, began earlier, under Prime Minister Zulfikar Ali
Bhutto. Bhutto attempted to deflect public anger over the failure of his
economic programs through pious public gestures, such as declaring the
minority Ahmadi sect to be non-Muslim and banning the consumption
of alcohol.26 These were the first steps in the Islamization policy that Zia
later adopted. Moreover, a number of other factors underlay Pakistan’s
use of Islamist militants, such as the lack of a coherent national found-
ing narrative and material weakness relative to India. Finally, Pakistan
did not adopt its militant strategy during the Zia era; the Pakistanis had
been using Islamist militants as strategic tools since achieving indepen-
dence, long before Zia’s emergence.27 Other works in the historical camp
avoid these shortcomings but pay little specific attention to the subject of
militancy.
Despite its many strengths, then, the current literature on Pakistan’s
connection with Islamist militancy falls short in a number of areas.
Although I draw upon it, this book differs from existing scholarship in
important ways.
8
The Argument
Pakistan’s support for Islamist militancy has not been a mere accident or
a short-term military or political tactic. It is a deliberate, long-r unning
policy as old as the Pakistani state. Indeed, supporting jihad has con-
stituted nothing less than a central pillar of Pakistani grand strategy. 28
Grand strategy is a state’s theory of how to produce national security. It
identifies the goals that the state should seek in the world and also speci-
fies the military instruments that it should use to achieve them.29
Pakistan has three main grand strategic tools: nuclear weapons, con-
ventional forces, and militant proxies. Nuclear weapons have played a
defensive role for Pakistan, deterring large-scale Indian attacks against the
Pakistani homeland. During the 1999 Kargil war and a 2001–02 milita-
rized standoff, for example, nuclear danger led the Indians to rule out any
offensive that could have threatened Pakistan with catastrophic defeat.
Nuclear weapons have thus helped to guarantee Pakistan’s survival even
in the face of confrontation with a militarily stronger India. They have not
by themselves enabled Pakistan offensively to alter the territorial or politi-
cal status quo in South Asia, however. 30
Pakistani conventional forces have served a combination of pur-
poses. In some cases, such as the 1947 and 1965 wars, they have joined
conflicts against India that militants had already launched. In one
instance, the 1971 Bangladesh conflict, they began and fought a war
essentially on their own. In other cases, such as the Kashmir insurgency
and the Afghan conflicts, they have avoided direct involvement, leav-
ing the fighting up to the militants. Although conventional military
forces have occasionally engaged in offensive action against India, since
the Bangladesh war their main purpose has been to provide Pakistan
with a robust defense against any Indian conventional attack. Prior to
Bangladesh, Pakistani leaders believed that their forces were inherently
superior to the Indians and would inevitably defeat them on the battle-
field, much as the subcontinent’s Muslim invaders had done to its Hindu
inhabitants centuries earlier. At the very least, a small, Muslim Pakistan
would be able to fight a larger Hindu India to a draw, as it had in 1947
and 1965. The 1971 war, which saw India vivisect its adversary and cre-
ate Bangladesh out of East Pakistan, disabused the Pakistanis of this
notion. They realized that, in the future, a direct conventional military
confrontation with India could have catastrophic consequences. Since
then, the Pakistanis have avoided such fights and used their conven-
tional forces in a primarily defensive role. 31
Militant forces, by contrast, have served as Pakistan’s primary offen-
sive tool. They have started conflicts in which conventional forces have
9
subsequently participated, such as the 1947 and 1965 wars. In addition,

Pakistan has used them to wage the Kashmir insurgency and shape the
Afghan security environment largely unassisted. In doing so, the militants
have enabled Pakistan to pursue its most cherished security goals: attrit-
ing Indian military resources, ejecting India from the disputed territory
of Kashmir, and gaining strategic depth through the installation of a
friendly regime in Afghanistan.
Pakistan is certainly not the only country to have used nonstate actors
as proxies. Many states have supported terrorists or militants to promote
their strategic agendas. Iran, for example, has long employed the terror
group Hizbollah to advance its interests in Lebanon. The Soviet Union
supported the operations of leftist organizations such as the Red Brigades
and Black September against Israel and Western Europe during the 1970s.
And the United States supplied the Afghan mujahideen with extensive
financial and military support in their battle against the Soviet Union
during the 1980s.32 The Pakistan case is unique, however, in the impor-
tance of the role that supporting militancy plays in its national security
policy. Support for militants has not simply been one among many tools
of Pakistani statecraft. Rather, the use of Islamist militants has been a pri-
mary component of Pakistani grand strategy.
How effective has Pakistan’s use of militants been? Has it helped
Pakistan to achieve its strategic goals? This question has not received
in-depth examination, 33 but most commentary on the issue is extremely
negative. Scholars and commentators characterize Pakistani policy as the
product of chronic misjudgment and careless decision making—“strate-
gic myopia,” in the words of one analysis. 34 As another puts it, Pakistani
leaders have “lacked imagination and vision” and been guilty of “a near-
total reliance on tactical opportunism.” As a result, Pakistan’s national
security policies, including its strategic use of Islamist militants, “[have]
not made Pakistan more secure.”35
To be fair, there is considerable truth in this negative characterization
of Pakistan’s militant strategy. Perhaps the strongest evidence of the inef-
fectiveness of Pakistani policy can be found in the current map of the
Indian subcontinent. Over six decades after independence and Pakistan’s
initial use of Islamist militancy in Kashmir, territorial boundaries in the
region remain largely unchanged, with India continuing to govern Jammu
and Kashmir State. Thus, Pakistan’s militant policy has failed to achieve
its most important goal. Meanwhile, support for militancy has taken a sig-
nificant human and financial toll on Pakistan, as well as contributed to
ongoing Indo-Pakistani tension, which could potentially lead to another
regional war. Thus, at first glance, the costs of Pakistan’s strategic use of
Islamist militancy seem to far outweigh its benefits.
10
Nonetheless, the reality of Pakistan’s militant policy is considerably

more complex than many scholars suggest. It has not been wholly disas-
trous. Rather, it has achieved a number of important domestic and inter-
national successes. The strategy has helped to promote internal political
cohesion, giving Pakistan a raison d’être in the absence of a coherent
founding narrative. By steadily attriting Indian military and financial
resources, it has also played a role in redressing Pakistani material weak-
ness vis-à-v is India. In addition, the strategy has enabled Pakistan to
continue to undermine Indian control of Kashmir and ensure that the
disputed territory remains a subject of international attention. Finally,
Pakistan’s militant strategy has enabled it to shape the strategic environ-
ment in Afghanistan, helping to install a friendly government on its criti-
cal western border.
Recently, however, these successes of Pakistan’s militant strategy have
given way to serious problems. The militant organizations that Pakistan
nurtured over the decades are increasingly exceeding its control. They
have begun behaving in ways that seriously undermine Pakistani inter-
ests, such as attacking Pakistani political leaders and security personnel,
adopting political agendas that far exceed those of their Pakistani spon-
sors, and launching operations that threaten to drag Pakistan into cata-
strophic conflicts. In addition, Pakistan’s militant strategy has diverted
scarce resources from pressing domestic projects, impeding the country’s
internal development. Finally, Pakistan’s militant campaign has led India
to undertake military improvements, such as a significant conventional
arms build-up and the formulation of an aggressive conventional military
doctrine. These developments seriously undermine Pakistani interests,
threatening to leave it less politically cohesive and externally secure than
it was before.
Pakistan thus suffers from a “jihad paradox.” Political and mate-
rial weakness originally made Pakistan’s militant policy attractive and
useful. Now, however, that same weakness makes Pakistan’s support
for militancy extremely dangerous. Thus, despite its past benefits, the
strategy has outlived its utility, and Pakistan will have to abandon it
to avoid catastrophe. Other weak states, which may also be tempted to
use nonstate actors as strategic tools, should take the Pakistani case as
a cautionary lesson. The political and material shortcomings that could
make such a strategy appealing also increase the likelihood that they
will lose control of their proxies, face painful developmental trade-offs,
and provoke stronger adversaries to adopt policies that further threaten
their security.
11
The Plan of the Book
The book proceeds as follows: Chapter 2 discusses the general logic of

using nonstate actors as strategic tools. I show that the use of nonstate
proxies enables relatively weak sponsor states to challenge stronger adver-
saries and shape the international strategic environment in ways that
would be too expensive and risky to attempt with conventional military
forces. It does so by lowering battlefield costs for the relatively weak state,
which does not have to commit its own soldiers to the fight; creating oper-
ational advantages by impeding potential target-state military responses
to weak-state provocations; and creating bargaining advantages for a weak
sponsor state, enabling the sponsor to demand a higher price for ending its
militant campaign than it would be able to extract if it were fighting alone.
Chapter 2’s next section explains that although a militant strategy offers
weak sponsors a number of potential advantages, it also involves serious
downside risks. Militant proxies can prove difficult for a weak sponsor to
control. This can enable the militants to provoke the sponsor’s adversaries
without authorization, triggering unwanted conflict; lead them to work
directly against sponsors; and create a competitive security environment,
forcing overinvestment in defense and hurting development. These prob-
lems with proxy strategies are likely to be particularly severe for weak
states and can ultimately outweigh such strategies’ advantages.
Chapter 2’s final section illustrates militant proxy logic by briefly consid-
ering historical evidence from South Asia stretching from 1947 to the present
day. It shows that, over the decades, Pakistan has consistently exploited the
cost, operational, and bargaining advantages inherent in its militant strategy.
With the passage of time, however, Pakistan’s strategy also has given rise to
damaging control problems and developmental opportunity costs.
Chapter 3 traces the origins of Pakistan’s militant strategy, showing
that it emerged in the wake of the partition of British India, out of the
new Pakistani state’s acute political and material weakness. To ameliorate
these problems, Pakistani leaders sought to seize the disputed territory of
Kashmir from India, without facing India in a direct military confronta-
tion. Pakistani leaders settled on a strategy using local militants to battle the
Maharaja of Kashmir—and Indian forces sent to rescue him—for control
of the territory. Although the Pakistanis’ militant strategy did not enable
them to capture Kashmir in 1947–48, Pakistani leaders did not view it as a
complete failure and believed that it could be successful in the future. The
strategy thus became a central component of Pakistani security policy, its
sophistication and importance increasing with each subsequent conflict.
12
Chapter 4 examines the evolution of Pakistan’s militant strategy from

the aftermath of the first Kashmir war through the 1965 Kashmir war,
the Bangladesh war, and the anti–Soviet-A fghan conflict of the 1980s.
It shows that Pakistan’s use of Islamist militants became more extensive
with each of these conflicts, progressing from the use of rag-tag local
militias following independence to the management of a complex inter-
national effort to support anti-Soviet mujahideen in Afghanistan during
the 1980s. The Pakistanis were eventually able to employ the resources
and expertise that they acquired over these years to support yet another
round of jihad in Kashmir, which has lasted from the late 1980s to the
present day.
Chapter 5 discusses Pakistan’s current use of its militant strategy in
Kashmir and Afghanistan. It shows how the strategy helped Pakistan to trig-
ger the Kashmir insurgency and to influence its subsequent character and
trajectory. It also shows how, in Afghanistan, Pakistan’s strategy made pos-
sible the rise of the Taliban, affording the Pakistanis a friendly regime and
increased strategic depth on their western border.
Chapter 6 evaluates the impact of Pakistan’s militant strategy on Pakistani
security interests. It shows that although the strategy is generally derided as
an unmitigated disaster, it has actually achieved important domestic and
international successes that have allowed it to strengthen its political foun-
dations and to continually challenge India and the South Asian status quo.
Recently, however, the militant strategy has given rise to control and devel-
opment problems that threaten to make Pakistan even less secure that it was
originally. What was once a useful strategy has thus become extremely dan-
gerous, threatening the very survival of the Pakistani state.
Chapter 7 discusses possible solutions to the problems associated with
Pakistan’s militant strategy. The chapter argues that Pakistan will truly have
to abandon militancy, ending support for all jihadist groups and taking con-
crete steps to crush those operating on its territory. This will be extremely
difficult because of Pakistan’s founding narrative, which necessarily makes
it an oppositional state, dedicated to combating India and revising territorial
boundaries in South Asia. Therefore, Pakistan will be able to renounce mili-
tancy only if it fundamentally transforms its national purpose and identity,
becoming a state that no longer defines itself in terms of opposition to India
and the current territorial status quo. In the absence of such a transforma-
tion, there is little reason to expect that Pakistan will ever renounce its strat-
egy of jihad.
13
CHAP T ER 2
The Logic of a Militant

Proxy Strategy
P akistan’s use of militancy is widely dismissed as being a foolish and

even irrational policy. Why, then, might a militant proxy strategy be
attractive to a state like Pakistan? What are its potential costs and ben-
efits? Is there a logic to the use of nonstate proxy forces?1 If so, Pakistan’s
militant policy might be more reasonable than many have suggested.2
Scholars and analysts have extensively examined nonstate actors’ own
motivations for engaging in violent behavior.3 They have also explored the
impact of relationships with sponsor states on nonstate actor interests.
They have focused less attention on the effects that nonstate proxy strate-
gies have on the national interests of state sponsors, however.4 The reason
is that international relations (IR) scholarship has been concerned pri-
marily with conflict between nation-states. For example, major IR theo-
ries such as realism and liberalism focus primarily on interstate relations.
Formal methodologies such as game theory typically model strategic
interactions between states. Common data sets have generally recorded
state-to-state disputes. 5 And scholarly discussions of proxy warfare have
often defined the phenomenon in state-centric terms, ignoring the pos-
sibility that nonstate entities could serve as proxies for sponsor countries.6
In the next section, I explore the effects that a militant proxy strategy
may have on the interests of state sponsors. I do so by examining the ways
in which such a strategy might operate in the case of a relatively weak
state using militants to challenge a stronger adversary.7 I do not claim that
every state in this position will experience all of the effects that I discuss.
Rather, I seek to identify potential advantages and disadvantages that
sponsor states may experience if they pursue a militant proxy strategy.
14
This can help to explain more clearly the Pakistani case, as well as illumi-
nate the incentives that other states in a similar position may face in the
future. As I explain, a proxy strategy can offer a sponsor attractive cost,
military, and bargaining benefits. It can also give rise to control and devel-
opmental problems, however, which over the long term make it extremely
costly and dangerous.
THE BENEFITS OF A MILITANT PROX Y STRATEGY
The first benefit of militant proxy strategies is straightforward: They are

relatively inexpensive. This is the case for two reasons. First, fielding
militant proxies is cheaper than fielding a conventional military force.
Militants will require some investment in recruitment and training, as
well as ongoing material and financial assistance. These requirements,
however, are likely to be considerably less extensive, sophisticated, and
costly than those for conventional military forces.8 For example, mili-
tants are unlikely to need expensive equipment like armor, ships, and
aircraft. Nor will they need the same level of personal support, such as sal-
ary, healthcare, and social benefits, as regular service members. Second,
by sending proxies into battle rather than a conventional army, the state
avoids risking its own personnel in a confrontation with its stronger
adversary. This increases the likelihood that the sponsor state’s military
will remain intact and undamaged, even if the operations that it supports
are defeated.
The relative cheapness of a militant proxy strategy could make it
appealing to a wide range of states; all else being equal, states are likely
to prefer policies that enable them to pursue their security interests at the
lowest possible cost. The cheapness of such a strategy would be especially
attractive, however, to a relatively weak state lacking in military capabili-
ties in comparison with its adversaries. By enabling it to field forces at a
low initial cost, and without risk of its own military subsequently suffer-
ing damage or defeat, the strategy could enable a weak state to engage
stronger opponents than it otherwise would be able to face.9
The ability to field forces inexpensively is important, but it is not the
only benefit that a state can realize by employing militant proxies. The
second main advantage of such a strategy is its ability to increase the diffi-
culty of the military responses open to an adversary. Although this benefit
could have broad appeal, it would again be especially attractive to weak
states, potentially allowing them to engage powerful opponents that they
would otherwise be unable to fight.10
15
Lo gi c o f a M ili ta n t P r o x y S t r at e g y ( 15 )
There are two main avenues of military response open to a strong

state facing a challenge from a weaker adversary: denial and punish-
ment. A denial-based response would seek to prevent the weak state from
achieving its aims by defeating its military operations. A punishment-
based response, by contrast, would not seek to defeat the weak state’s mili-
tary efforts. Rather, this response would impose costs on the weak state by
damaging targets that it values.11
Both of these strong-state options hold significant risks for a weaker
challenger.12 A weak state facing a denial campaign would probably lose
any battlefield confrontation with its stronger enemy. At the very least,
such a loss would result in the failure of the weak state’s military efforts.
The confrontation could also escalate, however, leading to a broader con-
flict extending beyond the confines of the weak state’s initial military
operation, perhaps even reaching its homeland. Material costs could
include lost personnel and equipment, civilian casualties, and damage to
or loss of home territory. Political costs could include significant harm
to the weak state’s leaders, whom domestic constituencies could vote out
or overthrow as punishment for perceived incompetence.13 If the strong
state seems likely to be able to wage a highly effective denial campaign, a
weak adversary contemplating an attack could decide against launching
it. In this case, the strong state would have achieved deterrence by denial.
A denial campaign, then, could protect a strong state against weak-state
attack either by thwarting the operation in the field or by deterring the
weak state from even trying to launch it.14
If a strong state decided to respond to the weak challenger’s provoca-
tions with a punishment campaign, the weak state would probably be
hard-pressed to stop it. A punishment campaign would result in poten-
tially extensive harm to the weak state’s homeland or other territories or
populations that its leadership values. Material costs could include dam-
age to infrastructure, natural resources, and cultural or historic sites, as
well as civilian casualties. As with denial, costs could also include signifi-
cant political harm to weak-state leaders.15 If a strong state seemed likely
to be able to wage a highly damaging punishment campaign, it could
achieve deterrence by punishment, convincing a weak state not to attack
because the costs of strong-state retaliation would outweigh the potential
benefits of weak-state battlefield success.
Both denial and punishment constitute powerful tools for a strong
state facing the possibility of weak-state attack. A weak state contemplat-
ing aggression against a stronger adversary will therefore need to devise a
means of undermining the strong state’s denial and punishment capabili-
ties. A militant proxy strategy can help a weak state to do exactly that.
16
On the denial side, weak-state use of militant proxies can make strong-
state defense considerably harder. A strong state could defeat an opera-
tion by the weak state’s proxy forces and achieve denial in three basic
ways. First, assuming that the weak state’s proxy forces were outside of
the strong state, the strong state could prevent the proxies from enter-
ing its territory. Second, if the weak state’s proxies were already inside
the strong state, the strong state could find the militants before they
launched their operation. Third, if the weak state’s proxies were already
in the strong state and the strong state was unable to find them before
they launched their operation, it could defeat the proxies’ attack once it
was already underway.
Unfortunately for strong states, each one of these denial options faces
formidable challenges when pitted against a militant proxy strategy. First,
preventing small groups of incognito militants from crossing interna-
tional boundaries and entering a strong state is an enormous task. The
only way for strong states wholly to stop them from entering their ter-
ritory is through flawless patrolling of extensive borders and coastlines,
and policing of multiple ports of entry. This is a virtually impossible chal-
lenge, even for the most capable of states. Indeed, large, powerful coun-
tries, which are likely to have relatively long borders and coastlines and
numerous ports of entry, may find this problem to be especially difficult.16
If militant forces do manage to evade detection at borders or ports and
infiltrate the strong state’s territory, preventing them from launching their
attack will be extremely difficult. Thwarting the militants will require the
strong state to locate and apprehend them before they can strike. The mili-
tants’ ability to operate in small groups that can blend into the local pop-
ulation, however, will make such detection and apprehension difficult,
particularly in the high-density urban centers in which they are likely to
launch their attacks.17 As a result, the strong state may be unable to find
and arrest the militants before they strike, even if it has some foreknowl-
edge of their plans and is actively searching for them. In this case, the
strong state’s last denial option would be to defeat the militants’ operation
by thwarting an attack once it was already underway.
Defeating an attack in progress is also likely to prove to be problem-
atic for the strong state. The strong state will probably have limited, if any,
warning of the attack, while the militants will have surprise and initia-
tive on their side. In addition, the attackers may not seek to escape, killing
themselves or fighting to the death instead. This can enable them to inflict
significant damage on their targets, thus making their operation costly to
the strong state even if they are quickly eliminated.18 The use of militant
proxy forces thus makes all three possible strong-state methods of denial
extremely difficult.
17
It is important to note that militant proxies do not undermine strong-

state denial efforts solely at the operational level. They can also make
denial politically difficult. For example, if the weak-state militant cam-
paign takes the form of a long-r unning insurgency, the defender will need
to hunt down fighters in its territory and thwart their operations. This can
be challenging if the insurgents are, or appear to be, native to the disputed
area. Such apparent indigeneity can give their efforts an air of legitimacy,
which would be absent if the weak state simply attacked the strong state
with its own, “outside” conventional military forces. This sense of legiti-
macy can make strong-state defensive measures seem undemocratic and
oppressive. This, in turn, can undermine support for strong-state counter-
insurgency efforts in the disputed area, among the strong state’s broader
population, and in the international community.19
We also should note that even if a weak sponsor initially fails in its
attempt to attack a stronger adversary through the use of militant proxies,
the weak state can keep trying. Given the limited number of personnel
and rudimentary materiel necessary to launch an attack, the cost of such
attempts is low; if one mission fails, another can be undertaken. Strong-
state denial capabilities will have to be perfect to prevent the weak state
from eventually succeeding. Over an extended period of time, such per-
fection is highly unlikely.20
This is not to argue that the aforementioned tasks will be easy for mili-
tant proxy forces to accomplish. The barriers to infiltration of a target
state, avoidance of detection once there, and successful execution of an
attack are formidable. Nonetheless, a weak state will be far more likely to
be able to accomplish these tasks with militants than with conventional
military forces. Conventional forces would have little chance even of pen-
etrating the strong state’s border, quite apart from moving to locations
deep within the strong-state homeland and launching successful attacks
against high-value targets there. Militant proxy forces stand a much better
chance of succeeding in these efforts, especially if they are able to attempt
them repeatedly.
In addition to undermining strong-state denial operations, a militant
proxy strategy can hinder strong-state efforts to punish a weaker chal-
lenger. The strategy can do so by creating uncertainty as to who is attack-
ing the strong state. Proxy-force sponsors generally do not announce their
relationship with militants and, in fact, often deny it.21 The militants,
for their part, do not wear uniforms and are unlikely to have any pub-
licly acknowledged connection to their weak-state patron. Consequently,
a strong state facing a proxy strategy may be unable to determine with
certainty the identity of its adversary.22 Even if the strong state is able
to identify the militant organizations or individual fighters carrying out
18
the attacks, it may still be unsure as to who is facilitating their activity by

means of financial, military, or other support.23
Knowledge of attacker or sponsor identity would be essential if the
strong state wished to respond to weak-state attacks with a punishment
campaign. For punishment to succeed, the strong state would have to
damage targets that the militants or their weak-state sponsor valued.24
Without knowing their identities, the strong state would be unable
to do so.
In addition to these operational issues, a strong-state punishment
campaign would require knowledge of an attacker’s identity for politi-
cal reasons. The strong state would have to justify to both domestic
and international audiences its infliction of harm on weak-state targets.
This could be a difficult task, since the strong state’s actions would not
be taken strictly in self-defense and would strike targets that were not
directly responsible for the attacks that the strong state suffered. To suc-
ceed, the strong state would need to make a convincing case that the weak
state facilitated the attacks against it. If it failed to do so, the strong state’s
actions could appear to be unwarranted. This could increase opposition
to the strong state in any disputed territories, undermine public support
for a punishment campaign within the strong state itself, and create inter-
national opposition to the strong state’s policy.
A strong-state punishment campaign thus requires clear knowledge of
the identity of attacking parties and their supporters. Without such knowl-
edge, the strong state may find itself unable to identify appropriate targets
or to justify its behavior to domestic and international audiences. A weak-
state militant proxy strategy, by obscuring this information, undermines
a key defensive option available to stronger adversaries.
In addition to the cost savings and military benefits outlined pre-
viously, a militant proxy strategy can offer a weak sponsor state a third
advantage. The use of militant proxies can enhance the sponsor’s bargain-
ing leverage during negotiations to end a conflict. This can potentially
enable the sponsor to secure a more favorable settlement with a strong
opponent than it could get if it were fighting alone.
Wars are settled when the antagonists strike a bargain resulting in
payoffs that each prefers to continued conflict. 25 A sponsor state uses
a militant proxy strategy to force its adversary to the negotiating table,
where the sponsor seeks payment in return for ending its militant cam-
paign. Proxies can be useful to the sponsor state in this bargaining pro-
cess because they can enable it to demand an especially high payment
from its adversary. The sponsor can demand such a payoff premium
because of the control problem associated with its use of third-party
19
proxies. Specifically, the state can claim that reining in its proxies will
be difficult and costly, requiring an especially large compensatory
payment.
This control issue is rooted in what is known as a principal–agent prob-
lem. A principal–agent problem arises where one party employs another
to carry out an assigned task. The hiring party, or principal, employs the
agent because the agent is better able to do the work in question, for rea-
sons such as cost, legitimacy, deniability, or expertise. After having been
hired, however, the agent may prove unwilling or unable to do the princi-
pal’s bidding. This failure may occur because, from the outset, the princi-
pal and agent’s interests were misaligned, or because the agent lacked the
capacity to carry out the assigned task. Alternatively, this failure could
result from the principal’s inability to devise mechanisms to ensure that
the agent is behaving properly while under its employ.26 Regardless of the
failure’s precise source, principal–agent relationships can be extremely
costly for the sponsor. Misbehaving agents can consume the principal’s
resources without delivering promised results, or even drag the principal
into an unwanted war.
Although scholars typically focus on principal–agent problems’ costs
to sponsor states, a sponsor’s lack of control over its proxies can actually
help it to negotiate a favorable settlement to a conflict. Limited control
increases the difficulty of the sponsor’s task of reining in proxy forces.
The sponsor can therefore demand higher payment from its adversary in
return for calling off the proxies than it could if it had firm control over
them.27 Even if the sponsor is able to exercise relatively good control over
its proxies, it can still probably demand a higher settlement price than it
could if it were fighting alone, in which case the task of reining in a third
party would not exist.28 In addition to helping a weak state initiate and
prosecute a conflict with a stronger adversary, then, the use of militant
proxies can help a weak state to end a conflict with a powerful opponent
on relatively favorable terms.
The use of militant proxies thus can hold significant cost, military,
and bargaining benefits for a weak state seeking to challenge a stron-
ger adversary. Such a strategy does not, however, offer a sponsor state
unmitigated advantages; the use of militant proxies can also subject a
sponsor to important costs. These include principal–agent problems,
costly trade-offs between security and development, and antagonism of
stronger adversaries. Next, I discuss each of these costs in turn. All of
them are heightened by the characteristic that is most likely to make
a militant strategy attractive to a state sponsor—t he weakness of the
sponsor state.
20
THE COSTS OF A MILITANT PROX Y STRATEGY
The benefits of a militant proxy strategy are likely to be particularly

attractive to weak states, which are unable to challenge stronger adver-
saries directly. Such weakness, however, can lead to a number of difficul-
ties for sponsor states. First, sponsor-state weakness can make proxies
difficult to control. This is the downside of the principal–agent relation-
ship that I discussed earlier. A degree of difficulty in controlling militant
proxy forces can create bargaining advantages for a sponsor. A sponsor
that experiences too much difficulty in controlling its proxies, however,
risks having them genuinely exceed its grasp. Adversaries may be unwill-
ing to negotiate with such a sponsor, as it may prove unable to call off
its proxies even if it wishes to do so.29 In addition, militant proxies may
take actions that directly harm a sponsor that is unable to control them.
For example, militants could adopt agendas more ambitious than those
of their sponsors. This could lead them to threaten, attack, or otherwise
challenge the sponsors’ stronger adversaries without approval.30 Such
aggressive behavior could provoke adversaries to undertake retaliatory
measures that threaten to damage the sponsor state and force it to divert
scarce resources away from domestic priorities to the defense sector. 31 If
a sponsor attempts to solve control problems by re-establishing authority
over errant proxies, the proxies could turn against it, attacking domestic
targets and even contesting control over portions of the sponsor state’s
territory.
Ironically, the more successful the sponsor state’s militant campaign
has been, the more likely these problems are to emerge. A successful cam-
paign is likely to be characterized by an able militant force and a signifi-
cantly damaged adversary. These characteristics increase the likelihood
that the militants will be able to exceed the sponsor’s control and that
the adversary will be highly motivated to inflict retaliatory harm on the
sponsor.
Maintaining control over militant proxies does not ensure that the
sponsor state will be able entirely to avoid these types of problems. Any
successful militant campaign, regardless of control issues, will antagonize
the sponsor state’s adversary, potentially leading it to respond militarily.
This could present the sponsor with challenges ranging from arms races
and painful resource trade-offs to outright conflict with the adversary.
Once again, the more successful the sponsor state’s campaign is, the
more motivated the adversary will be to respond in some manner, and
thus the more likely these problems are to emerge. The most dangerous
militant proxy campaign to a sponsor state, then, may also be the most
successful one.
21
The logic of a militant proxy strategy thus involves a complex mix of

potential benefits and challenges for a sponsor state. The strategy offers
a sponsor the possibility of significant cost, operational, and bargaining
benefits but also threatens to create serious control, resource, and exter-
nal security problems—problems that are exacerbated by the state weak-
ness that is likely to make a militant strategy attractive to a sponsor in the
first place. Next, I briefly discuss these benefits and problems of a militant
proxy strategy in the context of the Pakistani case, identifying some spe-
cific ways in which they have helped Pakistan to pursue its national secu-
rity goals, as well ways in which they have undermined Pakistani strategic
interests.
THE BENEFITS AND COSTS OF PAKISTAN’S

MILITANT STRATEGY
Pakistan’s use of Islamist militants has consistently exploited the cost,

operational, and bargaining advantages outlined previously. Let us first
examine the cost benefits of Pakistan’s militant strategy.
Cost: Employing a militant proxy strategy is cheaper for Pakistan than
fielding regular forces. This advantage is difficult to quantify. Pakistan
does not publicize the price of supporting the militant groups, and we do
not know how much it would cost Pakistan to launch conventional mili-
tary operations designed to achieve the same goals as their militant cam-
paign. Nonetheless, available evidence strongly suggests that a militant
proxy strategy is the cheaper of the two options.
Consider the cost to Pakistan of supporting the group Lashkar-e-Taiba
(LeT). LeT is the Pakistanis’ most dependable ally in Kashmir.32 The
group has an estimated annual budget of $50 million, of which $5 mil-
lion is reportedly dedicated to military operations. 33 LeT’s specific mil-
itary budget does not include a number of expenses associated with its
broad militant campaign, such as weapons and ammunition. And its
overall budget includes many costs not directly related to militancy, such
as preaching and education. 34 The amount of money needed to support
Lashkar-e-Taiba’s militant activities, then, is probably more than $5 mil-
lion and less than $50 million. Pakistan does not need to provide all of
this funding, as the group receives monies from a wide variety of sources,
including other foreign governments, an international network of charita-
ble organizations, legitimate business operations, and a range of criminal
activity. 35
Let us assume, however, that LeT’s militant activities cost the full
$50 million and that Pakistan is the group’s sole funder. In addition,
22
since Pakistan supports multiple militant organizations, let us assume

that Pakistan underwrites five Lashkar-e-Taiba equivalents annually. If
this is the case, the cost to Pakistan of fielding militant proxy forces is
approximately $250 million per year. 36 This is a tiny fraction—less than
4 percent—of Pakistan’s $6.3 billion defense budget. Yet the militants
surely account for far more than 4 percent of the value of Pakistan’s overall
strategic effort. The militants, it would appear, do offer Pakistan a strate-
gic bargain in comparison with conventional military forces.
Pakistan’s proxy strategy is relatively cheap not just in financial terms,
but in human and territorial terms as well; it has enabled Pakistan to
avoid risking its own forces and homeland in battle. Regular Pakistani
forces’ level of participation in operations against India has varied across
conflicts. In some cases, such as the first two Kashmir wars, militants
launched the conflict’s opening campaign and subsequently were joined
by the regular Pakistani military, which then assumed the primary com-
bat role. In other instances, such as the current Kashmir insurgency and
a series of conflicts in Afghanistan, the militants have worked primarily
on their own, without the regular Pakistan military’s active participation
in combat operations. 37 In all cases, the Pakistanis have been able to avoid
paying the full battlefield price that these operations would have entailed
if they had been executed only using regular Pakistani forces. As history
has shown, that price can be extremely high. During the 1971 Bangladesh
war, the only conflict in which Pakistan primarily utilized conventional
military forces, India vivisected Pakistan, cutting the country’s eastern
from its western wing, taking ninety-five thousand prisoners, and creat-
ing the state of Bangladesh. Not surprisingly, the Bangladesh conflict was
the last time that Pakistan engaged India in a full-fledged conventional
war. Since then, the Pakistanis have generally fought their battles with
India through the less risky strategy of using Islamist militants in place of
their own soldiers.
Military Responses: Pakistan’s use of militant proxies has made its
operations against targets in Kashmir and India proper extremely dif-
ficult to defeat. India has employed a host of denial measures, including
the stationing of several hundred thousand security forces in Kashmir,
many of which specialize in counterinsurgency warfare; the mainte-
nance of physical barriers along the Line of Control; and the deploy-
ment of domestic security forces ranging from local police forces to
federal antihostage units. 38 None of these measures have succeeded in
stopping militant forces from infiltrating Indian territory and launching
violent attacks, which have included bombings, assassinations, kidnap-
pings, and spectacular operations such as the November 2008 assault
on Mumbai.
Another random document with
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Rule 4. “They desire they may understand the wiles of Satan, and
grow out of love with his suggestions and temtations.”
Rule 5. “That they may fall upon some better course to improve
their time than formerly.”
Rule 15. “They will wear their haire comely, as the English do, and
whosoever shall offend herein shall pay four shillings.”
Rule 23. “They shall not disguise themselves in their mournings as
formerly, nor shall they keep a great noyse by howling.”
Rule 24. “The old ceremony of a maide walking alone and living
apart so many days, [fine] twenty shillings.”
Page 53, note 1. Shepard, p. 9.
Page 54, note 1. Wilson’s Letter, 1651.
Page 54, note 2. News from America, p. 22.
Page 54, note 3. Winthrop, vol. ii., p. 2.
Page 55, note 1. Hutchinson, vol. i., p. 90.
Page 55, note 5. Bulkeley’s Gospel Covenant, p. 209.
Page 56, note 1. Gospel Covenant, p. 301.
Page 57, note 1. Shattuck, p. 45.
Page 57, note 3. See his instructions from the Commissioners, his
narrative, and the Commissioners’ letter to him, in Hutchinson’s
Collection, pp. 261-270.
Page 58, note 1. Hutchinson’s History, vol. i., p. 254.
Page 58, note 2. Hubbard’s Indian Wars, p. 119, ed. 1801.
Mr. Charles H. Walcott, in his Concord in the Colonial Period
(Estes & Lauriat, Boston, 1884), gives a very interesting account of
the Brookfield fight.
Page 58, note 3. Hubbard, p. 201.
Page 60, note 1. Shattuck, p. 55.
Page 61, note 1. Neal’s History of New England, vol. i., p. 321.
Page 61, note 2. Mather, Magnalia Christi, vol. i., p. 363.
Page 61, note 3. “Tradition has handed down the following
anecdote. A consultation among the Indian chiefs took place about
this time on the high lands in Stow, and, as they cast their eyes
towards Sudbury and Concord, a question arose which they should
attack first. The decision was made to attack the former. One of the
principal chiefs said: ‘We no prosper if we go to Concord—the Great
Spirit love that people—the evil spirit tell us not to go—they have a
great man there—he great pray.’ The Rev. Edward Bulkeley was
then minister of the town, and his name and distinguished character
were known even to the red men of the forest.”—Shattuck’s History,
p. 59, note.
Page 61, note 4. On this occasion the name of Hoar, since
honored in Concord through several generations, came to the front.
John Hoar, the first practitioner of law in Concord, an outspoken man
of sturdy independence, who, for uttering complaints that justice was
denied him in the courts, had been made to give bonds for good
behavior and “disabled to plead any cases but his oune in this
jurisdiction,” who had been fined £10 for saying that “the Blessing
which his Master Bulkeley pronounced in dismissing the publique
Assembly was no more than vane babling,” and was twice fined for
non-attendance at public worship, proved to be the only man in town
who was willing to take charge of the Praying Indians of Nashobah,
whom the General Court ordered moved to Concord during Philip’s
War. The magistrates who had persecuted him had to turn to him,
and he made good provision on his own place for the comfort and
safe-keeping of these unfortunates, and their employment, when
public opinion was directed against them with the cruelty of fear.
Soon, however, Captain Mosley, who had been secretly sent for by
some citizens, came with soldiers into the meeting-house,
announced to the congregation that he had heard that “there were
some heathen in town committed to one Hoar, who, he was
informed, were a trouble and disquiet to them;” therefore, if the
people desired it, he would remove them to Boston. No one made
objection, so he went to Mr. Hoar’s house, counted the Indians and
set a guard, Hoar vigorously protesting. He came next day; Hoar
bravely refused to give them up, so Mosley removed them by
violence and carried the Indians to Deer Island, where they suffered
much during the winter. See Walcott’s Concord in the Colonial
Period.
Page 62, note 1. Sprague’s Centennial Ode.
Page 62, note 2. Shattuck, chap. iii. Walcott, chap. iii.
Page 63, note 1. Hutchinson’s Collection, p. 484.
Page 63, note 2. Hutchinson’s Collection, pp. 543, 548, 557, 566.
Page 63, note 3. Hutchinson’s History, vol. i., p. 336.
The month of April has been fateful for Concord, especially its
nineteenth day. On that day the military company under Lieutenant
Heald marched to Boston to take part in the uprising of the freemen
of the colony against Andros. On that same day, in 1775, the minute-
men and militia of Concord, promptly reinforced by the soldiers of
her daughter and sister towns, marched down to the guarded North
Bridge and returned the fire of the Royal troops in the opening battle
of the Revolution. Again on the nineteenth of April, 1861, the
“Concord Artillery” (so-called, although then a company of the Fifth
Infantry, M. V. M.) left the village for the front in the War of the
Rebellion; and yet again in the last days of April, 1898, the same
company, then, as now, attached to the Sixth Regiment, M. V. M.,
marched from the village green to bear its part in the Spanish War.
Page 64, note 1. Town Records.
Page 64, note 2. The following minutes from the Town Records in
1692 may serve as an example:—
“John Craggin, aged about 63 years, and Sarah his wife, aet.
about 63 years, do both testify upon oath that about 2 years ago
John Shepard, sen. of Concord, came to our house in Obourne, to
treat with us, and give us a visit, and carried the said Sary Craggin to
Concord with him, and there discoursed us in order to a marriage
between his son, John Shepard, jun. and our daughter, Eliz. Craggin,
and, for our incouragement, and before us, did promise that, upon
the consummation of the said marriage, he, the said John Shepard,
sen. would give to his son, John Shepard, jun. the one half of his
dwelling house, and the old barn, and the pasture before the barn;
the old plow-land, and the old horse, when his colt was fit to ride,
and his old oxen, when his steers were fit to work. All this he
promised upon marriage as above said, which marriage was
consummated upon March following, which is two years ago, come
next March. Dated Feb. 25, 1692. Taken on oath before me. Wm.
Johnson.”
Page 64, note 3. Town Records, July, 1698.
Page 64, note 4. Records, Nov. 1711.
Page 65, note 1. Records, May, 1712.
Page 66, note 1. Records, 1735.
Page 66, note 2. Whitfield in his journal wrote: “About noon I
reached Concord. Here I preached to some thousands in the open
air; and comfortable preaching it was. The hearers were sweetly
melted down.... The minister of the town being, I believe, a true child
of God, I chose to stay all night at his house that we might rejoice
together. The Lord was with us. The Spirit of the Lord came upon me
and God gave me to wrestle with him for my friends, especially those
then with me.... Brother B—s, the minister, broke into floods of tears,
and we had reason to cry out it was good for us to be here.”
Page 67, note 1. Church Records, July, 1792.
Page 67, note 2. The Rev. Daniel Bliss has left the name of having
been an earnest, good man, evidently emotional. His zealous and
impassioned preaching gave offence to some of the cooler and more
conservative clergy, and indeed bred discord in the church of
Concord. The “aggrieved brethren” withdrew, and, for want of a
church, held public worship at a tavern where was the sign of a black
horse, hence were called “the Black Horse Church.” Their complaints
preferred against Mr. Bliss resulted in councils which drew in most of
the churches of Middlesex into their widening vortex. Yet he
remained the honored pastor of the town until his death. His
daughter Phebe married the young William Emerson, his successor;
he was therefore Mr. Emerson’s great-grandfather.
Page 71, note 2. The spirited protest of this County Convention,
presided over by Hon. James Prescott of Groton, is given in full in
Shattuck’s History, pp. 82-87.
Page 72, note 1. General Gage, the Governor, having refused to
convene the General Court at Salem, the Provincial Congress of
delegates from the towns of Massachusetts was called by
conventions of the various counties to meet at Concord, October 11,
1774. The delegates assembled in the meeting-house, and
organized, with John Hancock as President, and Benjamin Lincoln
as Secretary. Called together to maintain the rights of the people,
this Congress assumed the government of the province, and by its
measures prepared the way for the Revolution.
Page 72, note 2. This eloquent sermon to the volunteers of 1775,
still preserved in MS., is very interesting. The young minister shows
them the dignity of their calling, warns them of the besetting sins of
New England soldiery, explains to them the invasion of their rights
and that they are not rebels, tells them that he believes their fathers
foresaw the evil day and did all in their power to guard the infant
state from encroachments of unconstitutional power, and implores
the sons to be true to their duty to their posterity. He fully admits the
utter gloom of the prospect, humanly considered: would Heaven hold
him innocent, he would counsel submission, but as an honest man
and servant of Heaven he dare not do so, and with great spirit bids
his injured countrymen “Arise! and plead even with the sword, the
firelock and the bayonet, the birthright of Englishmen ... and if God
does not help, it will be because your sins testify against you,
otherwise you may be assured.”
Page 74, note 1. Journal, July, 1835. “It is affecting to see the old
man’s [Thaddeus Blood] memory taxed for facts occurring 60 years
ago at Concord fight. ‘It is hard to bring them up;’ he says, ‘the truth
never will be known.’ The Doctor [Ripley], like a keen hunter,
unrelenting, follows him up and down, barricading him with
questions. Yet cares little for the facts the man can tell, but much for
the confirmation of the printed History. ‘Leave me, leave me to
repose.’”
Thaddeus Blood, who was only twenty years old at the time of
Concord fight, later became a schoolmaster, hence was always
known as “Master Blood.” He was one of the Concord company
stationed at Hull, in 1776, which took part in the capture of
Lieutenant-Colonel Campbell and his battalion of the 71st (Frazer)
Highlanders as they sailed into Boston Harbor, not being aware of
the evacuation of the town. They were confined at Concord until their
exchange. See Sir Archibald Campbell of Inverneill, sometime
Prisoner of War in the Jail at Concord, Massachusetts. By Charles
H. Walcott, Boston, 1898.
Page 74, note 2. In his poem in memory of his brother Edward,
written by the riverside near the battle-ground, Mr. Emerson alluded
to
Yon stern headstone,

Which more of pride than pity gave
To mark the Briton’s friendless grave.
Yet it is a stately tomb;
The grand return
Of eve and morn,
The year’s fresh bloom,
The silver cloud,
Might grace the dust that is most proud.
Page 76, note 1. Captain Miles commanded the Concord company

that joined the Northern Army at Ticonderoga in August, 1776, as
part of Colonel Reed’s regiment.
Page 77, note 1. Judge John S. Keyes, who clearly remembers
the incidents of this celebration, seen from a boy’s coign of vantage,
the top of one of the inner doors of the church, tells me that the ten
aged survivors of the battle, who sat in front of the pulpit, bowed in
recognition of this compliment by the orator, and then the audience
all bowed to them. The sanctity of the church forbade in those days
cheering or applause even at a civic festival.
Page 77, note 2. The following was Mr. Emerson’s note
concerning his authorities:—
“The importance which the skirmish at Concord Bridge derived
from subsequent events, has, of late years, attracted much notice to
the incidents of the day. There are, as might be expected, some
discrepancies in the different narratives of the fight. In the brief
summary in the text, I have relied mainly on the depositions taken by
order of the Provincial Congress within a few days after the action,
and on the other contemporary evidence. I have consulted the
English narrative in the Massachusetts Historical Collections, and in
the trial of Horne (Cases adjudged in King’s Bench; London, 1800,
vol. ii., p. 677); the inscription made by order of the legislature of
Massachusetts on the two field-pieces presented to the Concord
Artillery; Mr. Phinney’s History of the Battle at Lexington; Dr. Ripley’s
History of Concord Fight; Mr. Shattuck’s narrative in his History,
besides some oral and some manuscript evidence of eye-witnesses.
The following narrative, written by Rev. William Emerson, a spectator
of the action, has never been published. A part of it has been in my
possession for years: a part of it I discovered, only a few days since,
in a trunk of family papers:—
“‘1775, 19 April. This morning, between 1 and 2 o’clock, we
were alarmed by the ringing of the bell, and upon examination
found that the troops, to the number of 800, had stole their
march from Boston, in boats and barges, from the bottom of
the Common over to a point in Cambridge, near to Inman’s
Farm, and were at Lexington Meeting-house, half an hour
before sunrise, where they had fired upon a body of our men,
and (as we afterward heard) had killed several. This
intelligence was brought us at first by Dr. Samuel Prescott,
who narrowly escaped the guard that were sent before on
horses, purposely to prevent all posts and messengers from
giving us timely information. He, by the help of a very fleet
horse, crossing several walls and fences, arrived at Concord
at the time above mentioned; when several posts were
immediately despatched, that returning confirmed the account
of the regulars’ arrival at Lexington, and that they were on
their way to Concord. Upon this, a number of our minute-men
belonging to this town, and Acton, and Lyncoln, with several
others that were in readiness, marched out to meet them;
while the alarm company were preparing to receive them in
the town. Captain Minot, who commanded them, thought it
proper to take possession of the hill above the meeting-
house, as the most advantageous situation. No sooner had
our men gained it, than we were met by the companies that
were sent out to meet the troops, who informed us, that they
were just upon us, and that we must retreat, as their number
was more than treble ours. We then retreated from the hill
near the Liberty Pole, and took a new post back of the town
upon an eminence, where we formed into two battalions, and
waited the arrival of the enemy. Scarcely had we formed,
before we saw the British troops at the distance of a quarter
of a mile, glittering in arms, advancing towards us with the
greatest celerity. Some were for making a stand,
notwithstanding the superiority of their number; but others
more prudent thought best to retreat till our strength should be
equal to the enemy’s by recruits from neighboring towns that
were continually coming in to our assistance. Accordingly we
retreated over the bridge, when the troops came into the
town, set fire to several carriages for the artillery, destroyed
60 bbls. flour, rifled several houses, took possession of the
town-house, destroyed 500 lb. of balls, set a guard of 100
men at the North Bridge, and sent up a party to the house of
Colonel Barrett, where they were in expectation of finding a
quantity of warlike stores. But these were happily secured,
just before their arrival, by transportation into the woods and
other by-places. In the mean time, the guard set by the
enemy to secure the pass at the North Bridge were alarmed
by the approach of our people, who had retreated, as
mentioned before, and were now advancing with special
orders not to fire upon the troops unless fired upon. These
orders were so punctually observed that we received the fire
of the enemy in three several and separate discharges of their
pieces before it was returned by our commanding officer; the
firing then soon became general for several minutes, in which
skirmish two were killed on each side, and several of the
enemy wounded. It may here be observed, by the way, that
we were the more cautious to prevent beginning a rupture
with the King’s troops, as we were then uncertain what had
happened at Lexington, and knew [not][A] that they had began
the quarrel there by first firing upon our people, and killing
eight men upon the spot. The three companies of troops soon
quitted their post at the bridge, and retreated in the greatest
disorder and confusion to the main body, who were soon
upon the march to meet them. For half an hour, the enemy, by
their marches and counter-marches, discovered great
fickleness and inconstancy of mind, sometimes advancing,
sometimes returning to their former posts; till, at length they
quitted the town, and retreated by the way they came. In the
mean time, a party of our men (150) took the back way
through the Great Fields into the east quarter, and had placed
themselves to advantage, lying in ambush behind walls,
fences and buildings, ready to fire upon the enemy on their
retreat.’”
Page 78, note 1. Fifty years after his death the town erected a
cenotaph to the memory of its brave young minister, whose body lies
by the shore of Otter Creek, near Rutland, Vermont. On it they wrote:
—
“Enthusiastic, eloquent, affectionate and pious, he loved his family,
his people, his God and his Country, and to this last he yielded the
cheerful sacrifice of his life.”
Page 78, note 2. Town Records, Dec. 1775.
Page 79, note 1. These facts are recorded by Shattuck in his
History.
Page 79, note 2. Bradford’s History of Massachusetts, vol. ii., p.
113.
Page 79, note 3. Shattuck.
Page 80, note 1. Town Records, May 3, 1782.
Page 81, note 1. Town Records, Sept. 9, and Bradford’s History,
vol. i., p. 266.
Page 81, note 2. The Rev. Grindall Reynolds, late pastor of the
First Church in Concord, wrote an interesting account of Shays’s
Rebellion, and various papers concerning his adopted town which
are included in his Historical and Other Papers, published by his
daughter in 1895.
Page 81, note 3. Town Records, Oct. 21.
Page 82, note 1. Town Records, May 7.
Page 82, note 2. Town Records, 1834 and 1835. In 1903-4 the
town, with a population of about 5000, appropriated for public
purposes $65,752, the amount for school purposes being $28,000.
Page 82, note 3. The Unitarian and the “Orthodox” (as the
Trinitarian Congregationalist society has always been called in
Concord) churches have for a century been good neighbors, and for
many years have held union meetings on Thanksgiving Day. At the
time of Mr. Emerson’s discourse it is doubtful if Concord contained a
single Catholic or Episcopalian believer. The beginning of the
twentieth century finds a larger body of Catholic worshippers than
the four other societies contain. Yet all live in charity with one
another.
Page 83, note 1. Mr. Emerson’s honored kinsman, Rev. Ezra
Ripley, who sat in the pulpit that day, was eighty-four years old, and
when, six years later, he died, he had been pastor of the Concord
church for sixty-three years.
Page 83, note 2. Lemuel Shattuck, author of the excellent History
of Concord, which was published before the end of the year.
Page 85, note 1. In Mr. Emerson’s lecturing excursions during the
following thirty-five years, he found with pleasure and pride the sons
of his Concord neighbors important men in the building up the prairie
and river towns, or the making and operating the great highways of
emigration and trade.
LETTER TO PRESIDENT VAN BUREN

April 19, 1838, Mr. Emerson made this entry in his Journal:—
“This disaster of the Cherokees, brought to me by a sad friend to
blacken my days and nights! I can do nothing; why shriek? why
strike ineffectual blows? I stir in it for the sad reason that no other
mortal will move, and if I do not, why, it is left undone. The amount of
it, to be sure, is merely a scream; but sometimes a scream is better
than a thesis....
“Yesterday wrote the letter to Van Buren,—a letter hated of me, a
deliverance that does not deliver the soul. I write my journal, I read
my lecture with joy; but this stirring in the philanthropic mud gives me
no peace. I will let the republic alone until the republic comes to me. I
fully sympathize, be sure, with the sentiments I write; but I accept it
rather from my friends than dictate it. It is not my impulse to say it,
and therefore my genius deserts me; no muse befriends; no music of
thought or word accompanies.”
Yet his conscience then, and many a time later, brought him to do
the brave, distasteful duty.
ADDRESS ON EMANCIPATION IN THE BRITISH

WEST INDIES
The tenth anniversary of the emancipation by Act of Parliament of
all slaves in the insular possessions of Great Britain in the West
Indies was celebrated in Concord, in the year 1844, by citizens of
thirteen Massachusetts towns, and they invited Mr. Emerson to make
the Address. The Rev. Dr. Channing, on whose mind the wrongs of
the slave had weighed ever since he had seen them in Santa Cruz,
had spoken on Slavery in Faneuil Hall in 1837, had written on the
subject, and his last public work had been a speech on the
anniversary of the West Indian Emancipation in 1842, in the village
of Lenox. The public conscience was slowly becoming aroused,
especially among the country people, who had not the mercantile
and social relations with the Southerner which hampered the action
of many people in the cities. Yet even in Concord the religious
societies appear to have closed their doors against the
philanthropists who gathered to celebrate this anniversary in 1844,
but the energy of the young Thoreau, always a champion of
Freedom, secured the use of the Court-House, and he himself rang
the bell to call the people together.
It is said that Mr. Emerson, while minister of the Second Church in
Boston, had held his pulpit open to speakers on behalf of liberty, and
to his attitude in 1835 Harriet Martineau bears witness in her
Autobiography. After speaking of the temperamental unfitness of
these brother scholars, Charles and Waldo, to become active
workers in an Abolitionist organization, she says: “Yet they did that
which made me feel that I knew them through the very cause in
which they did not implicate themselves. At the time of the hubbub
against me in Boston, Charles Emerson stood alone in a large
company and declared that he would rather see Boston in ashes
than that I or anybody should be debarred in any way from perfectly
free speech. His brother Waldo invited me to be his guest in the
midst of my unpopularity, and during my visit told me his course
about this matter of slavery. He did not see that there was any
particular thing for him to do in it then; but when, in coaches or
steamboats or anywhere else, he saw people of color ill treated, or
heard bad doctrine or sentiment propounded, he did what he could,
and said what he thought. Since that date he has spoken more
abundantly and boldly, the more critical the times became; and he is
now, and has long been, identified with the Abolitionists in conviction
and sentiment, though it is out of his way to join himself to their
organization.”
Mr. Cabot in his Memoir[B] gives several pages of extracts from Mr.
Emerson’s journal showing his feelings at this time, before the slave
power, aggressive and advancing, left him, as a lover of Freedom,
no choice but to fight for her as he could, by tongue and pen, in
seasons of peril.
This Address was printed in England, as well as in America, the
autumn after its delivery here. In a letter to Carlyle written September
1, Mr. Emerson says he is sending proof to the London publisher.
“Chapman wrote to me by the last steamer, urging me to send him
some manuscript that had not yet been published in America [hoping
for copyright, and promising half profits].... The request was so
timely, since I was not only printing a book, but also a pamphlet, that
I came to town yesterday and hastened the printers, and have now
sent him proofs of all the Address, and of more than half of the
book.” He requests Carlyle to have an eye to its correct reproduction,
to which his friend faithfully attended.
Page 100, note 1. It was characteristic of Mr. Emerson that, as a
corrective to the flush of righteous wrath that man should be capable
of
laying hands on another

To coin his labor and sweat,
came his sense of justice, and the power of seeing the planter’s
side, born into such a social and political condition, by breeding and
climatic conditions unable to toil, and with his whole inheritance
vested in slaves. In a speech in New York in 1855, Mr. Emerson
urged emancipation with compensation to the owners, by general
sacrifices to this great end by old and young throughout the North,
not as the planters’ due, but as recognizing their need and losses.
Yet with all due consideration for the planters’ misfortune of
condition, he said, on the main question, “It is impossible to be a
gentleman and not be an abolitionist.”
Page 103, note 1.
Sole estate his sire bequeathed,—

Hapless sire to hapless son,—
Was the wailing song he breathed,
And his chain when life was done.
These lines from “Voluntaries” in the Poems, and the stanza which
there follows them, are recalled by this passage.
Page 106, note 1. Granville Sharp (1734-1813) was a broad-
minded scholar and determined philanthropist. He left the study of
law to go into the ordnance office, which he left, when the American
Revolution came on, disapproving of the course of the government.
In the case of one of the slaves whom he defended, the Lord Mayor
discharged the negro, but his master would not give him up. The
case then went before the Court of Kings Bench, and the twelve
judges decided in 1772 that a man could not be held in, or
transported from, England. In June, 1787, Sharp with Clarkson and
ten others, nine of whom were Quakers, formed a committee “for
effecting the abolition of the slave trade;” Sharp was chairman.
Defeated in Parliament in 1788 and 1789, they were joined by Pitt
and Fox in 1790. In 1793 the Commons passed an act for gradual
abolition of the trade, which was rejected by the Peers. This
occurred again in 1795 and 1804. In 1806, the Fox and Grenville
Ministry brought forward abolition of the trade as a government
measure. It was carried in 1807. Then the enemies of slavery began
to strive for its gradual abolition throughout the British dominions,
Clarkson, Wilberforce and Buxton being the principal leaders. The
course of events, however, showed that immediate emancipation
would be a better measure. The government brought this forward in
1823, modified by an apprenticeship system. The bill with this
feature and some compensation to owners was passed in 1833.
Page 108, note 1. In the essay on Self-Reliance Mr. Emerson said:
“An institution is the lengthened shadow of one man; as Monachism,
of the Hermit Antony; the Reformation, of Luther; Quakerism, of Fox;
Methodism, of Wesley; Abolition, of Clarkson.”
Page 112, note 1. The “prædials” seem to have been the slaves
born into captivity, as distinguished from imported slaves.
Page 115, note 1. Emancipation in the West Indies: A Six Months’
Tour in Antigua, Barbadoes and Jamaica, in the year 1837. J. A.
Thome and J. H. Kimball, New York, 1838.
Page 120, note 1. This was very soon after the coronation of the
young Queen Victoria, which occurred in the previous year.
Page 125, note 1. “All things are moral, and in their boundless
changes have an unceasing reference to spiritual nature. Therefore
is nature glorious with form, color and motion; that every globe in the
remotest heaven, every chemical change from the rudest crystal up
to the laws of life ... every animal function from the sponge up to
Hercules, shall hint or thunder to man the laws of right and wrong,
and echo the Ten Commandments.”—Nature, Addresses and
Lectures, p. 40. See also the last sentence in “Prudence,” Essays,
First Series.
Page 131, note 1. “For he [a ruler] is the minister of God to thee
for good. But if thou do that which is evil, be afraid; for he beareth
not the sword in vain: for he is the minister of God, a revenger to
execute wrath upon him that doeth evil.” Epistle to the Romans, xiii.
4.
Page 132, note 1. The cause for Mr. Emerson’s indignation was
great and recent. His honored townsman, Samuel Hoar, Esq., sent
by the State of Massachusetts as her commissioner to South
Carolina to investigate the seizures, imprisonments, punishments,
and even sale of colored citizens of Massachusetts who had
committed no crime, had been expelled with threats of violence from
the city of Charleston. (See “Samuel Hoar,” in Lectures and
Biographical Sketches.)
Page 133, note 1.
A union then of honest men,

Or union never more again.
“Boston,” Poems.
Page 134, note 1. John Quincy Adams, who, though disapproving,

as untimely, the legislation urged on Congress by the abolitionists,
yet fought strongly and persistently against the rules framed to check
their importunity, as inconsistent with the right of petition itself.
Page 144, note 1. Here comes in the doctrine of the Survival of the
Fittest that appears in the “Ode inscribed to W. H. Channing,” but,
even more than there, tempered by faith in the strength of humanity.
See the “Lecture on the Times,” given in 1841 (Nature, Addresses
and Lectures, p. 220), for considerations on slavery more coolly
philosophical than Mr. Emerson’s warm blood often admitted of,
during the strife for liberty in the period between the Mexican and
Civil Wars.
Page 145, note 1.
To-day unbind the captive,

So only are ye unbound;
Lift up a people from the dust,
Trump of their rescue, sound!
“Boston Hymn,” Poems.
Page 146, note 1. In the early version of the “Boston” poem were
these lines:—
O pity that I pause!

The song disdaining shuns
To name the noble sires, because
Of the unworthy sons.
...
Your town is full of gentle names,
By patriots once were watchwords made;
Those war-cry names are muffled shames
On recreant sons mislaid.
WAR
In the winter and early spring of 1838, the American Peace
Society held a course of lectures in Boston. This lecture was the
seventh in the course. Mr. Alcott wrote in his diary at that time:—
“I heard Emerson’s lecture on Peace, as the closing discourse of a
series delivered at the Odeon before the American Peace Society....
After the lecture I saw Mr. Garrison, who is at this time deeply
interested in the question of Peace, as are many of the meekest and
noblest souls amongst us. He expressed his great pleasure in the
stand taken by Mr. Emerson and his hopes in him as a man of the
new age. This great topic has been brought before the general mind
as a direct consequence of the agitation of the abolition of slavery.”
The lecture was printed in 1849 Æsthetic Papers, edited by Miss
Elizabeth P. Peabody.
Although the chronicles of the campaigns and acts of prowess of
the masterly soldiers were always attractive reading to Mr. Emerson,
—much more acts of patriotic devotion in the field,—and he was by
no means committed as a non-resistant, he saw that war had been a
part of evolution, and that its evils might pave the way for good, as
flowers spring up next year on a field of carnage. He knew that
evolution required an almost divine patience, yet his good hope was
strengthened by the signs of the times, and he desired to hasten the
great upward step in civilization.
It is evident from his words and course of action during the
outrages upon the peaceful settlers of Kansas, and when Sumter
was fired upon and Washington threatened, that he recognized that
the hour had not yet come. He subscribed lavishly from his limited
means for the furnishing Sharp’s rifles to the “Free State men.” In the
early days of the War of the Rebellion he visited Charlestown Navy-
Yard to see the preparations, and said, “Ah! sometimes gunpowder
smells good.” In the opening of his address at Tufts College, in July,
1861, he said, “The brute noise of cannon has a most poetic echo in
these days, as instrument of the primal sentiments of humanity.”
Several speeches included in this volume show that at that crisis his
feeling was, as he had said of the forefathers’ “deed of blood” at
Concord Bridge,—
Even the serene Reason says

It was well done.
But all this was only a postponement of hope.

Page 152, note 1. With regard to schooling a man’s courage for
whatever may befall, Mr. Emerson said: “Our culture therefore must
not omit the arming of the man. Let him hear in season that he is
born into the state of war, and that the commonwealth and his own
well-being require that he should not go dancing in the weeds of
peace, but warned, self-collected and neither defying nor dreading
the thunder, let him take both reputation and life in his hand, and with
perfect urbanity dare the gibbet and the mob by the absolute truth of
his speech and the rectitude of his behavior.”—“Heroism,” Essays,
First Series.
“A state of war or anarchy, in which law has little force, is so far
valuable that it puts every man on trial.”—“The Conservative,”
Nature, Addresses and Lectures.
Page 156, note 1. Mr. Emerson used to take pleasure in a story
illustrating this common foible of mankind. A returned Arctic explorer,
in a lecture, said, “In this wilderness among the ice-floes, I had the
fortune to see a terrible conflict between two Polar bears—” “Which
beat?” cried an excited voice from the audience.
Page 160, note 1. In his description of the Tower of London in the
journal of 1834, it appears that the suits of armor there set up
affected Mr. Emerson unpleasantly, suggesting half-human
destructive lobsters and crabs. It is, I believe, said that Benvenuto
Cellini learned to make the cunning joints in armor for men from
those of these marine warriors.
In the opening paragraphs of the essay on Inspiration Mr.
Emerson congratulates himself that the doleful experiences of the
aboriginal man were got through with long ago. “They combed his
mane, they pared his nails, cut off his tail, set him on end, sent him
to school and made him pay taxes, before he could begin to write his
sad story for the compassion or the repudiation of his descendants,
who are all but unanimous to disown him. We must take him as we
find him,” etc.
Page 162, note 1. In English Traits, at the end of the chapter on
Stonehenge, Mr. Emerson gave a humorous account of his setting
forth the faith or hope of the non-resistants and idealists in New
England, to the amazed and shocked ears of Carlyle and Arthur
Helps.
Page 164, note 1. “As the solidest rocks are made up of invisible
gases, as the world is made of thickened light and arrested
electricity, so men know that ideas are the parents of men and
things; there was never anything that did not proceed from a
thought.”—“The Scholar,” Lectures and Biographical Sketches.
Page 164, note 2. In “The Problem” he says of the Parthenon and
England’s abbeys that
out of Thought’s interior sphere

These wonders rose to upper air.
Page 167, note 1. Mr. Emerson in his conversation frankly showed

that he was not yet quite prepared to be a non-resistant. He would
have surely followed his own counsel where he says, “Go face the
burglar in your own house,” and he seemed to feel instinctive
sympathy with what Mr. Dexter, the counsel, said in the speech
which he used to read me from the Selfridge trial:—
“And may my arm drop powerless when it fails to defend my
honor!”
He exactly stated his own position in a later passage, where he
says that “in a given extreme event Nature and God will instruct him
in that hour.”
Page 172, note 1. Thoreau lived frankly and fearlessly up to this
standard.
Page 173, note 1. This same view is even more attractively set
forth in “Aristocracy” (Lectures and Biographical Sketches, pp. 36-
40).
Rev. Dr. Cyrus A. Bartol, in an interesting paper on “Emerson’s
Religion,”[C] gives, among other reminiscences, the following: “I
asked him if he approved of war. ‘Yes,’ he said, ‘in one born to fight.’”
THE FUGITIVE SLAVE LAW, CONCORD, 1851

The opening passages of this speech to his friends and neighbors
show how deeply Mr. Emerson was moved. He could no longer be
philosophical, as in the “Ode” inscribed to his friend William
Channing, and in earlier addresses. The time had come when he
might at any moment be summoned to help the marshal’s men seize
and return to bondage the poor fugitive who had almost reached the
safety of England’s protection. Such men were frequently passing
through Concord, concealed and helped by the good Bigelow, the
blacksmith, and his wife, the Thoreaus, Mrs. Brooks, and even once
at a critical moment by her husband, the law-abiding “’Squire”
himself.
Mr. Emerson instantly took his stand, and did not hesitate to run
atilt against the dark giant, once so honored. The question of
secession for conscience’ sake had come up among the
Abolitionists. Mr. Emerson had stood for Union, yet felt that there
could be nothing but shame in Union until the humiliating statute was
repealed. Meanwhile he fell back on the reserve-right of individual

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Jihad as grand strategy : Islamist

militancy, national security, and the

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Jihad & Co.: Black Markets and Islamist Power 1st

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Jihad as Grand Strategy

Jihad as Grand Strategy

Published in the United States of America by Oxford University Press

© Oxford University Press 2017

All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in

You must not circulate this work in any other form

CIP data is on file at the Library of Congress

T errorism’s ascendance as one of the world’s leading strategic dan-

( 2 ) Jihad as Grand Strateg y

militant group Lashkar-​e-​Taiba. They trained for their mission under

The Pakistan–​militant nexus has come under intense public scrutiny in

( 4 ) Jihad as Grand Strateg y

independence, the impact of the Iranian revolution and the anti–​Soviet-​

its motives, strengths, and weaknesses, and help to devise techniques of

( 6 ) Jihad as Grand Strateg y

Prior scholarship thus has made important contributions to our under-

( 8 ) Jihad as Grand Strateg y

subsequently participated, such as the 1947 and 1965 wars. In addition,

( 10 ) Jihad as Grand Strateg y

Nonetheless, the reality of Pakistan’s militant policy is considerably

The Plan of the Book

The book proceeds as follows: Chapter 2 discusses the general logic of

( 12 ) Jihad as Grand Strateg y

Chapter 4 examines the evolution of Pakistan’s militant strategy from

The Logic of a Militant

P akistan’s use of militancy is widely dismissed as being a foolish and

( 14 ) Jihad as Grand Strateg y

THE BENEFITS OF A MILITANT PROX Y STRATEGY

The first benefit of militant proxy strategies is straightforward: They are

There are two main avenues of military response open to a strong

( 16 ) Jihad as Grand Strateg y

It is important to note that militant proxies do not undermine strong-​

( 18 ) Jihad as Grand Strateg y

the attacks, it may still be unsure as to who is facilitating their activity by

( 20 ) Jihad as Grand Strateg y

THE COSTS OF A MILITANT PROX Y STRATEGY

The benefits of a militant proxy strategy are likely to be particularly

The logic of a militant proxy strategy thus involves a complex mix of

THE BENEFITS AND COSTS OF PAKISTAN’S

Pakistan’s use of Islamist militants has consistently exploited the cost,

( 22 ) Jihad as Grand Strateg y

since Pakistan supports multiple militant organizations, let us assume

Yon stern headstone,

Page 76, note 1. Captain Miles commanded the Concord company

LETTER TO PRESIDENT VAN BUREN

ADDRESS ON EMANCIPATION IN THE BRITISH

laying hands on another

Sole estate his sire bequeathed,—

A union then of honest men,

Page 134, note 1. John Quincy Adams, who, though disapproving,

To-day unbind the captive,

“Boston Hymn,” Poems.

O pity that I pause!

militant group Lashkar-e-Taiba. They trained for their mission under

The Pakistan–militant nexus has come under intense public scrutiny in

independence, the impact of the Iranian revolution and the anti–Soviet-

It is important to note that militant proxies do not undermine strong-