SUAZO v. SUAZO
All
G.R. No. 164493 March 10, 2010
FACTS:
Angelito Suazo and Jocelyn Suazo were married when they were 16 years old only. Without any means to
support themselves, they lived with Angelito’s parents while Jocelyn took odd jobs and Angelito refused to
work and was most of the time drunk. Petitioner urged him to find work but this often resulted to violent
quarrels. A year after their marriage, Jocelyn left Angelito. Angelito thereafter found another woman with
whom he has since lived. 10 years later, she filed a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage under Art. 36
Psychological incapacity. Jocelyn testified on the alleged physical beating she received. The expert witness
corroborated parts of Jocelyn’s testimony. Both her psychological report and testimony concluded that
Angelito was psychologically incapacitated. However, B was not personally examined by the expert witness.
The RTC annulled the marriage on the ground that Angelito is unfit to comply with his marital obligation, such
as “immaturity, i.e., lack of an effective sense of rational judgment and responsibility, otherwise peculiar to
infants (like refusal of the husband to support the family or excessive dependence on parents or peer group
approval) and habitual alcoholism, or the condition by which a person lives for the next drink and the next
drinks” but the CA reversed it and held that the respondent may have failed to provide material support to the
family and has resorted to physical abuse, but it is still necessary to show that they were manifestations of a
deeper psychological malaise that was clinically or medically identified. The theory of the psychologist that
the respondent was suffering from an anti-social personality syndrome at the time of the marriage was not the
product of any adequate medical or clinical investigation. The evidence that she got from the petitioner,
anecdotal at best, could equally show that the behavior of the respondent was due simply to causes like
immaturity or irresponsibility which are not equivalent to psychological incapacity, or the failure or refusal to
work could have been the result of rebelliousness on the part of one who felt that he had been forced into a
loveless marriage.
ISSUE:
Whether or not there is a basis to nullify Jocelyn’s marriage with Angelito under Article 36 of the Family Code.
HELD:
The Court find the petition devoid of merit. The CA committed no reversible error of law in setting aside the
RTC decision, as no basis exists to declare Jocelyn’s marriage with Angelito a nullity under Article 36 of the
Family Code and its related jurisprudence.
Jocelyn’s evidence is insufficient to establish Angelito’s psychological incapacity. The psychologist evaluated
Angelito’s psychological condition only in an indirect manner – she derived all her conclusions from information
coming from Jocelyn whose bias for her cause cannot of course be doubted. The psychlologist, using meager
information coming from a directly interested party, could not have secured a complete personality profile and
could not have conclusively formed an objective opinion or diagnosis of Angelito’s psychological condition.
While the report or evaluation may be conclusive with respect to Jocelyn’s psychological condition, this is not
true for Angelito’s. The methodology employed simply cannot satisfy the required depth and
comprehensiveness of examination required to evaluate a party alleged to be suffering from a psychological
disorder. Both the psychologist’s report and testimony simply provided a general description of Angelito’s
purported anti-social personality disorder, supported by the characterization of this disorder as chronic, grave
and incurable. The psychologist was conspicuously silent, however, on the bases for her conclusion or the
particulars that gave rise to the characterization she gave. Jurisprudence holds that there must be evidence
showing a link, medical or the like, between the acts that manifest psychological incapacity and the
psychological disorder itself. A’s testimony regarding the habitual drunkenness, gambling and refusal to find a
job, while indicative of psychological incapacity, do not, by themselves, show psychological incapacity.
these simply indicate difficulty, neglect or mere refusal to perform marital obligations.
It is not enough that the respondent, alleged to be psychologically incapacitated, had difficulty in complying
with his marital obligations, or was unwilling to perform these obligations. Proof of a natal or supervening
disabling factor – an adverse integral element in the respondent’s personality structure that effectively
incapacitated him from complying with his essential marital obligations – must be shown. Mere difficulty,
refusal or neglect in the performance of marital obligations or ill will on the part of the spouse is different from
incapacity rooted in some debilitating psychological condition or illness; irreconcilable differences, sexual
infidelity or perversion, emotional immaturity and irresponsibility and the like, do not by themselves warrant a
finding of psychological incapacity under Article 36, as the same may only be due to a person’s refusal or
unwillingness to assume the essential obligations of marriage
Suazo vs Suazo
Facts:
Jocelyn and Angelito were 16 years old when they first met. After months of courtship, Jocelyn went to Manila
with Angelito and some friends... gone for three days... their parents sought Jocelyn and Angelito and... after
finding them, brought them back to Biñan, Laguna. Jocelyn and Angelito's marriage was arranged and they
were married on March 3, 1986 in a ceremony officiated by the Mayor of Biñan. Jocelyn and Angelito lived with
Angelito's parents after their marriage. They had by this time stopped schooling. Jocelyn took odd jobs and
worked for Angelito's relatives as household help. Angelito... refused to work... and was most of the time
drunk. Jocelyn urged Angelito to find work and violent quarrels often resulted because of Jocelyn's efforts.
Jocelyn left Angelito sometime in July 1987... found another woman with whom he has since lived. They now
have children. Ten years after their separation... or on October 8, 1997, Jocelyn filed with the RTC a petition for
declaration of nullity of marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code. Angelito was psychologically
incapacitated to comply with the essential... obligations of marriage... from the time of their marriage up to
their separation in July 1987... relationship had been marred with bitter quarrels which caused unbearable
physical and emotional pains on the part of the plaintiff because defendant inflicted physical injuries... main
reason for their quarrel was always the refusal of the defendant to work or his indolence and his excessive
drinking which makes him psychologically incapacitated to perform his marital obligations making life
unbearably bitter and intolerable to the... psychological incapacity of the defendant started from the time of
their marriage and became very apparent as time went and proves to be continuous, permanent and incurable
Angelito did not answer the petition/complaint. Neither did he submit himself to a psychological examination
with psychologist Nedy Tayag... case proceeded to trial on the merits after the trial court found that no
collusion existed between the parties, Jocelyn, her aunt Maryjane Serrano, and the psychologist testified at
the trial. The Office of the Solicitor General - representing the Republic of the Philippines - strongly opposed
the petition for declaration of nullity of the marriage... it argued that the psychologist failed to examine and
test Angelito; thus,... what she said about him was purely hearsay. RTC annulled the marriage under the
following reasoning:... there is no particular instance setforth (sic) in the law that a person may be considered
as psychologically incapacitated, there as (sic) some admitted grounds that would render a person to be unfit
to comply with his marital obligation... evidence presented by the petitioner and the testimony of the
petitioner and Dr. Tayag, points (sic) to one thing - that the petitioner failed to establish a harmonious family
life with the respondent... respondent has not shown love and respect to... the petitioner manifested by the
former's being irresponsible, immature, jobless, gambler, drunkard and worst of all - a wife beater...
petitioner... decided, after one year and four months of messy days,... to leave the respondent. petitioner was
able to prove that right from the start of her married life with the respondent, she already suffered from
maltreatment... she is a battered wife coupled with the fact that she served as a servant in his (sic) husband's...
family.
Applying the principles and the requisites of psychological incapacity enunciated by this Court in Santos v.
Court of Appeals,[7] the RTC concluded:
The above findings of the psychologist [referring to the psychologist' testimony quoted above] would only
tend to show that the respondent was, indeed, suffering from psychological incapacity which is not only grave
but also incurable.
applying the principles set forth in the case of Republic vs. Court of Appeals and Molina, 268 SCRA 198, wherein
the Supreme Court held that
The Court is satisfied that the evidence presented and the testimony of the petitioner and
Nedy Tayag... ttesting that there is psychological incapacity on the part of the... respondent to comply with
the essential marital obligations has been sufficiently and clearly proven and, therefore, petitioner is entitled
to the relief prayed for.
The CA reversed the RTC decision, ruling that:
True, as stated in
Marcos vs Marcos 343 SCRA 755, the guidelines set in Santos vs Court of Appeals and Republic vs Court of
Appeals do not require that a physician personally examine the person to be declared psychologically
incapacitated.
Supreme Court adopted... the totality of evidence approach which allows the fact of psychological incapacity
to be drawn from evidence that medically or clinically identify the root causes of the illness
Applied in Marcos, however, the aggregate testimony of the aggrieved spouse, children, relatives and the
social worker were not found to be sufficient to prove psychological incapacity, in... the absence of any
evaluation of the respondent himself, the person whose mental and psychological capacity was in question.
In the case at bench, there is much scarcer evidence to hold that the respondent was psychologically incapable
Only the wife gave first-hand... testimony on the behavior of the husband, and it is inconclusive... n Marcos,
the respondent may have failed to provide material support to the family and has resorted to physical abuse,
but it is still necessary to show that they were... manifestations of a deeper psychological malaise that was
clinically or medically identified
The theory of the psychologist that the respondent was suffering from an anti-social personality syndrome at
the time of the marriage was not the product of any adequate medical or... clinical investigation
Pesca vs Pesca 356
SCRA 588, or the failure or refusal to work could have been the result of rebelliousness on the part of one who
felt that he had been forced into a loveless marriage... the respondent was not under a permanent compulsion
because he had later on shown his ability to... engage in productive work and more stable relationships with
another
The element of permanence or incurability that is one of the defining characteristic of psychological incapacity
is not present.
the married life of the petitioner with the respondent was an unhappy one. But the marriage cannot for this
reason be extinguished.
Issues:
whether there is basis to nullify Jocelyn's marriage with Angelito under Article 36 of the Family Code.
Ruling:
We find the petition devoid of merit. The CA committed no reversible error of law in setting aside the RTC
decision
The Law, Molina and Te
Article 36 of the Family Code... feature of this law is its intended open-ended application
We must therefore apply the law based on how the concept of psychological incapacity was shaped and
developed in jurisprudence
Santos v. Court of Appeals... psychological incapacity must be characterized by (a) gravity; (b) juridical
antecedence; and (c) incurability
The Court laid down more definitive guidelines in the interpretation and application of the law in Republic v.
Court of Appeals[11] (Molina)
(1)
The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the plaintiff
Any doubt should be resolved in favor of the existence and continuation of the marriage and against its
dissolution and nullity
(2)
The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be (a) medically or clinically identified, (b) alleged in the
complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly explained in the decision
(3)
The incapacity must be proven to be existing at "the time of the celebration" of the marriage
(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable
(5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to assume the essential
obligations of marriage
(6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of the Family Code as
regards the husband and wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same Code in regard to parents and
their children. Such non-complied marital obligation(s) must... also be stated in the petition, proven by
evidence and included in the text of the decision.
(7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the
Philippines
(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor General to appear as counsel
for the state
A later case, Marcos v. Marcos,[14] further clarified that there is no requirement that the
defendant/respondent spouse should be personally examined by a physician or psychologist... under Article
36 of the Family Code if the totality of evidence shows that psychological incapacity exists and its gravity,
juridical... antecedence, and incurability can be duly established.
Pesca v. Pesca
Molina guidelines apply even to cases then already pending, under the reasoning that the court's
interpretation or construction establishes the contemporaneous legislative intent of the law
The complete facts should allege the physical manifestations, if any, as are indicative of psychological
incapacity at the time of the celebration of the marriage but expert opinion need not be alleged.
Te expressly stated that it is not suggesting the abandonment of Molina, but that, following Antonio v. Reyes
The need for the examination... of a party or parties by a psychiatrist or clinical psychologist and the
presentation of psychiatric experts shall now be determined by the court during the pre-trial conference.
Hernandez v. Court of Appeals... emphasizes the importance of presenting expert testimony to establish the
precise cause of a party's psychological incapacity, and to show that it existed at the inception of the marriage.
Ting v. Velez-Ting... gravity and incurability requisites
The Present Case... a. The Expert Opinion Evidence
Both the psychologist's testimony and the psychological report did not conclusively show the root cause,
gravity and incurability of Angelito's alleged psychological condition.
the psychologist evaluated Angelito's psychological... condition only in an indirect manner - she derived all her
conclusions from information coming from Jocelyn whose bias for her cause cannot of course be doubted...
finding is highly suspect, for it was based entirely on Jocelyn's assumed knowledge of Angelito's family
background and upbringing.
the psychologist merely generalized on the questions of why and to what extent was Angelito's personality
disorder grave and incurable, and on the effects of the disorder on Angelito's awareness of and his capability
to undertake the duties and responsibilities of... marriage.
b. Jocelyn's Testimony... we find Jocelyn's testimony to be insufficient
Jocelyn merely testified on Angelito's habitual drunkenness, gambling, refusal to seek employment and the
physical beatings she received from him - all of which occurred after the marriage
This is a clear evidentiary gap that materially... affects her cause, as the law and its related jurisprudence require
that the psychological incapacity must exist at the time of the celebration of the marriage.
All these simply indicate difficulty, neglect or mere refusal to perform marital obligations that, as the cited...
jurisprudence holds, cannot be considered to be constitutive of psychological incapacity in the absence of
proof that these are manifestations of an incapacity rooted in some debilitating psychological condition or
illness.
violence, standing alone, does not constitute psychological incapacity.
Jurisprudence holds that there must be evidence showing a link, medical or the like, between the acts that
manifest psychological incapacity and the psychological disorder itself
WHEREFORE, premises considered, we DENY the petition for lack of merit. We AFFIRM the appealed Decision
of the Court of Appeals.
BENJAMIN G. TING,
Petitioner,
- versus -
CARMEN M. VELEZ-TING,
Respondent.
G.R. No. 166562
March 31, 2009
Facts:
Benjamin Ting and Carmen Velez-Ting first met in 1972 while they were classmates in medical school. They fell
in love, and they were wed on July 26, 1975 in Cebu City when respondent was already pregnant with their first
child. On October 21, 1993, after being married for more than 18 years to petitioner and while their youngest
child was only two years old, Carmen filed a verified petition before the RTC of Cebu City praying for the
declaration of nullity of their marriage based on Article 36 of the Family Code. She claimed that Benjamin
suffered from psychological incapacity even at the time of the celebration of their marriage, which, however,
only became manifest thereafter.
Carmens allegations of Benjamins psychological incapacity consisted of the following manifestations:
1. Benjamins alcoholism, which adversely affected his family relationship and his profession;
2. Benjamins violent nature brought about by his excessive and regular drinking;
3. His compulsive gambling habit, as a result of which Benjamin found it necessary to sell the family car twice
and the property he inherited from his father in order to pay off his debts, because he no longer had money to
pay the same; and
4. Benjamins irresponsibility and immaturity as shown by his failure and refusal to give regular financial support
to his family.
In his answer, Benjamin denied being psychologically incapacitated. He maintained that he is a respectable
person, as his peers would confirm. He also pointed out that it was he who often comforted and took care of
their children, while Carmen played mahjong with her friends twice a week. Both presented expert witnesses
(psychiatrist) to refute each others claim. RTC ruled in favor of the respondent declaring the marriage null and
void.
Petitioner appealed to the CA. CA reversed RTC’s decision. Respondent filed a motion for reconsideration,
arguing that the Molina guidelines should not be applied to this case
Issues:
1. Whether the CA violated the rule on stare decisis when it refused to follow the guidelines set forth under the
Santos and Molina cases,
2. Whether or not the CA correctly ruled that the requirement of proof of psychological incapacity for the
declaration of absolute nullity of marriage based on Article 36 of the Family Code has been liberalized,
3. Whether the CAs decision declaring the marriage between petitioner and respondent null and void is in
accordance with law and jurisprudence.
Held:
1. No. respondent’s argument that the doctrinal guidelines prescribed in Santos and Molina should not be
applied retroactively for being contrary to the principle of stare decisis is no longer new.
2. The Case involving the application of Article 36 must be treated distinctly and judged not on the basis of a
priori assumptions, predilections or generalizations but according to its own attendant facts. Courts should
interpret the provision on a case-to-case basis, guided by experience, the findings of experts and researchers
in psychological disciplines, and by decisions of church tribunals.
3. There is no evidence that adduced by respondent insufficient to prove that petitioner is psychologically unfit
to discharge the duties expected of him as a husband, and more particularly, that he suffered from such
psychological incapacity as of the date of the marriage eighteen (18) years ago.
Ting v. Ting
G.R. No. 166562, 31 March 2009
FACTS:
Benjamin Ting and Carmen Velez met each other in medical school and they married each other after several
years. Years after, Benjamin became a full-fledged doctor and he practiced at the Velez Hospital owned by
Carmen’s family. Benjamin and Carmen had six children during their marriage. But after 18 years of marriage,
Carmen went to court to have their marriage be declared void on the ground that Benjamin was psychologically
incapacitated. She alleged that even before she married Benjamin, the latter was already a drunkard; that
Benjamin was a gambler, he was violent, and would rather spend on his expensive hobby; that he rarely stayed
home and even neglected his children and family obligations.
Carmen presented an expert witness, Dr. Oñate, to prove Benjamin’s psychological incapacity. However, Oñate
merely based her findings on the statement submitted by Benjamin. Oñate was not able to personally examine
Benjamin because at that time, Benjamin was already working as an anaesthesiologist in South Africa. On his
part, Benjamin opposed the petition. He also presented his own expert witness to disprove Carmen’s
allegations. Obra was not able to personally examine Benjamin but he also evaluated the same deposition
evaluated by Oñate. Also, Benjamin submitted himself for evaluation to a South African doctor (Dr. Pentz) and
the transcript of said evaluation was submitted to Obra and the latter also evaluated the same. Obra found
Benjamin not to be psychologically incapacitated.
The trial court, and eventually the Court of Appeals, ruled in favor of Carmen.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Benjamin Ting’s psychological incapacity was proven.
RULING:
No, the totality of evidence presented by respondent was insufficient to prove that petitioner is
psychologically unfit to discharge the duties expected of him as a husband, and more particularly, that he
suffered from such psychological incapacity as of the date of the marriage 18 years ago.
The intendment of the law has been to confine the application of Article 36 to the most serious cases of
personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an absolute insensitivity or inability to give meaning and
significance to the marriage. The psychological illness that must have afflicted a party at the inception of the
marriage should be a disorder so grave and permanent as to deprive one of awareness of the duties and
responsibilities of the matrimonial bond he or she is about to assume.
In this case, respondent failed to prove that petitioner’s defects were present at the time of the celebration of
their marriage. She merely cited that prior to their marriage, she already knew that petitioner would
occasionally drink and gamble with his friends; but such statement, by itself, is insufficient to prove any pre-
existing psychological defect on the part of her husband. Neither did the evidence presented prove such
defects to be incurable. The evaluation of the two psychiatrists should have been the significant evidence in
determining whether to declare the marriage between the parties null and void. Sadly, however, the Court was
not convinced that the opinions proiced by these experts strengthened respondent’s allegation of
psychological incapacity. The two provided absolutely contradicting psychological evaluations.
CAMACHO- REYES V. REYES
G.R. No. 185286, [August 18, 2010]
FACTS:
Petitioner Maria Socorro Camacho-Reyes met respondent Ramon Reyes at the University of the Philippines
(UP), Diliman, in 1972 when they were both nineteen (19) years old. The casual acquaintanceship quickly
developed into a boyfriend-girlfriend relationship.
At that time, respondent held a job in the family business, the Aristocrat Restaurant. Petitioner’s good
impression of the respondent was not diminished by the latter’s habit of cutting classes, not even by her
discovery that respondent was taking marijuana.
Not surprisingly, only petitioner finished university studies, obtaining a degree in AB Sociology from the UP. By
1974, respondent had dropped out of school on his third year, and just continued to work for the Aristocrat
Restaurant.
In 1976, the year following petitioner’s graduation and her father’s death, petitioner and respondent got
married. At that time, petitioner was already five (5) months pregnant and employed at the Population Center
Foundation. Thereafter, the newlyweds lived with the respondent’s family in Mandaluyong City. All living
expenses were shouldered by respondent’s parents, and the couple’s respective salaries were spent solely for
their personal needs. Initially, respondent gave petitioner a monthly allowance of P1,500.00 from his salary.
When their first child was born on March 22, 1977, financial difficulties started. Rearing a child entailed
expenses. A year into their marriage, the monthly allowance of P1,500.00 from respondent stopped. Further,
respondent no longer handed his salary to petitioner. When petitioner mustered enough courage to ask the
respondent about this, the latter told her that he had resigned due to slow advancement within the family
business. Respondent’s game plan was to venture into trading seafood in the province, supplying hotels and
restaurants, including the Aristocrat Restaurant. However, this new business took respondent away from his
young family for days on end without any communication. Petitioner simply endured the set up, hoping that
the situation will change. To prod respondent into assuming more responsibility, petitioner suggested that
they live separately from her in-laws. However, the new living arrangement engendered further financial
difficulty. While petitioner struggled to make ends meet as the single-income earner of the household,
respondent’s business floundered. Thereafter, another attempt at business, a fishpond in Mindoro, was
similarly unsuccessful. Respondent gave money to petitioner sporadically. Compounding the family’s financial
woes and further straining the parties’ relationship was the indifferent attitude of respondent towards his
family. That his business took him away from his family did not seem to bother respondent; he did not exert
any effort to remain in touch with them while he was away in Mindoro.
After two (2) years of struggling, the spouses transferred residence and, this time, moved in with petitioner’s
mother. But the new set up did not end their marital difficulties. In fact, the parties became more estranged.
Petitioner continued to carry the burden of supporting a family not just financially, but in most aspects as well.
In 1985, petitioner, who had previously suffered a miscarriage, gave birth to their third son. At that time,
respondent was in Mindoro and he did not even inquire on the health of either the petitioner or the newborn.
A week later, respondent arrived in Manila, acting nonchalantly while playing with the baby, with nary an
attempt to find out how the hospital bills were settled.
In 1989, due to financial reverses, respondent’s fishpond business stopped operations. Although without any
means to support his family, respondent refused to go back to work for the family business. Not surprisingly,
the relationship of the parties deteriorated.
Sometime in 1996, petitioner confirmed that respondent was having an extra-marital affair. Petitioner soon
realized that respondent was not only unable to provide financially for their family, but he was, more
importantly, remiss in his obligation to remain faithful to her and their family.
One of the last episodes that sealed the fate of the parties’ marriage was a surgical operation on petitioner for
the removal of a cyst. Although his wife was about to be operated on, respondent remained unconcerned and
unattentive; and simply read the newspaper, and played dumb when petitioner requested that he accompany
her as she was wheeled into the operating room. After the operation, petitioner felt that she had had enough
of respondent’s lack of concern, and asked her mother to order respondent to leave the recovery room.
Adolfo Reyes, respondent’s elder brother, and his spouse, Peregrina, members of a marriage encounter group,
invited and sponsored the parties to join the group. The elder couple scheduled counseling sessions with
petitioner and respondent, but these did not improve the parties’ relationship as respondent remained
uncooperative.
In 1997, Adolfo brought respondent to Dr. Natividad A. Dayan for a psychological assessment to “determine
benchmarks of current psychological functioning.” As with all other attempts to help him, respondent resisted
and did not continue with the clinical psychologist’s recommendation to undergo psychotherapy. At about this
time, petitioner, with the knowledge of respondent’s siblings, told respondent to move out of their house.
Respondent acquiesced to give space to petitioner. With the de facto separation, the relationship still did not
improve. Neither did respondent’s relationship with his children.
Finally, in 2001,5 petitioner filed (before the RTC) a petition for the declaration of nullity of her marriage with
the respondent, alleging the latter’s psychological incapacity to fulfill the essential marital obligations under
Article 36 of the Family Code.
Traversing the petition, respondent denied petitioner’s allegations that he was psychologically incapacitated.
After trial (where the testimonies of two clinical psychologists, Dr. Dayan and Dr. Estrella Magno, and a
psychiatrist, Dr. Cecilia Villegas, were presented in evidence), the RTC granted the petition and declared the
marriage between the parties null and void on the ground of their psychological incapacity. The CA reversed.
Hence, this appeal.
ISSUES/HELD:
Whether the respondent was suffering from psychological incapacity. –YES.
Whether the marriage should be declared null and void under Art. 36. –YES.
RATIO:
Taking into consideration the explicit guidelines in the determination of psychological incapacity in conjunction
to the totality of the evidence presented, with emphasis on the pervasive pattern of behaviors of the
respondent and outcome of the assessment/diagnos[is] of expert witnesses, Dra. Dayan, Dra. Mango and Dra.
Villegas on the psychological condition of the respondent, the Court finds that the marriage between the
parties from its inception has a congenital infirmity termed “psychological incapacity” which pertains to the
inability of the parties to effectively function emotionally, intellectually and socially towards each other in
relation to their essential duties to mutually observe love, fidelity and respect as well as to mutually render
help and support, (Art. 68 Family Code). In short, there was already a fixed niche in the psychological
constellation of respondent which created the death of his marriage. There is no reason to entertain any
slightest doubt on the truthfulness of the personality disorder of the respondent.
The three expert witnesses have spoken. They were unanimous in their findings that respondent is suffering
from personality disorder which psychologically incapacitated him to fulfill his basic duties to the marriage.
This psychological incapacity of the respondent, in the uniform words of said three (3) expert witnesses, is
serious, incurable and exists before his marriage and renders him a helpless victim of his structural
constellation. It is beyond the respondent’s impulse control. In short, he is weaponless or powerless to restrain
himself from his consistent behaviors simply because he did not consider the same as wrongful. This is clearly
manifested from his assertion that nothing was wrong in his marriage with the petitioner and considered their
relationship as a normal one. In fact, with this belief, he lent deaf ears to counseling and efforts extended to
them by his original family members to save his marriage. In short, he was blind and too insensitive to the
reality of his marital atmosphere. He totally disregarded the feelings of petitioner who appeared to have been
saturated already that she finally revealed her misfortunes to her sister-in-law and willingly submitted to
counseling to save their marriage. However, the hard position of the respondent finally constrained her to ask
respondent to leave the conjugal dwelling. Even the siblings of the respondent were unanimous that
separation is the remedy to the seriously ailing marriage of the parties. Respondent confirmed this stand of his
siblings. As previously adverted to, the three experts were one in diagnosing respondent with a personality
disorder, to wit:
1. Dra. Cecilia C. Villegas
Based on the clinical data presented, it is the opinion of the examiner, that [petitioner] manifested
inadequacies along her affective sphere, that made her less responsive to the emotional needs of her husband,
who needed a great amount of it, rendering her relatively psychologically incapacitated to perform the duties
and responsibilities of marriage. [Respondent], on the other hand, has manifested strong clinical evidences
(sic), that he is suffering from a Personality Disorder, of the antisocial type, associated with strong sense of
Inadequacy along masculine strivings and narcissistic features that renders him psychologically incapacitated
to perform the duties and responsibilities of marriage. This is characterized by his inability to conform to the
social norms that ordinarily govern many aspects of adolescent and adult behavior. His being a “free spirit”
associated with no remorse, no guilt feelings and no anxiety, is distinctive of this clinical condition. His
prolonged drug intake [marijuana] and maybe stronger drugs lately, are external factors to boost his ego.
The root cause of the above clinical conditions is due to his underlying defense mechanisms, or the unconscious
mental processes, that the ego uses to resolve conflicts. His prolonged and closed attachments to his mother
encouraged cross identification and developed a severe sense of inadequacy specifically along masculine
strivings. He therefore has to camouflage his weakness, in terms of authority, assertiveness, unilateral and
forceful decision making, aloofness and indifference, even if it resulted to antisocial acts. His narcissistic
supplies rendered by his mother was not resolved (sic).
It existed before marriage, but became manifest only after the celebration, due to marital demands and
stresses. It is considered as permanent in nature because it started early in his psychological development, and
therefore became so engrained into his personality structures (sic). It is considered as severe in degree,
because it hampered, interrupted and interfered with his normal functioning related to heterosexual
adjustments. (emphasis supplied)
2. Dr. Natividad A. Dayan
In his relationships with people, [respondent] is apt to project a reserved, aloof and detached attitude.
[Respondent] exhibits withdrawal patterns. He has deep feelings of inadequacy. Due to a low self-esteem, he
tends to feel inferior and to exclude himself from association with others. He feels that he is “different” and
as a result is prone to anticipate rejections. Because of the discomfort produced by these feelings, he is apt to
avoid personal and social involvement, which increases his preoccupation with himself and accentuates his
tendency to withdraw from interpersonal contact. [Respondent] is also apt to be the less dominant partner.
He feels better when he has to follow than when he has to take the lead. A self-contained
person[,] he does not really need to interact with others in order to enjoy life and to be able to move on. He
has a small need of companionship and is most comfortable alone. He, too[,] feels uncomfortable in expressing
his more tender feelings for fear of being hurt. Likewise, he maybe very angry within but he may choose to
repress this feeling. [Respondent’s] strong need for social approval, which could have stemmed from some
deep seated insecurities makes him submissive and over [compliant]. He tends to make extra effort to please
people. Although at times[, he] already feels victimized and taken advantage of, he still tolerates abusive
behavior for fear of interpersonal conflicts. Despite his [dis]illusion with people, he seeks to minimize dangers
of indifference and disapproval [of] others. Resentments are suppressed. This is likely to result in anger and
frustrations which is likewise apt to be repressed.
There are indications that [respondent] is[,] at the moment[,] experiencing considerable tension and anxiety.
He is prone to fits of apprehension and nervousness. Likewise, he is also entertaining feelings of hopelessness
and is preoccupied with negative thought. He feels that he is up in the air but with no sound foundation. He is
striving [for] goals which he knows he will never be able to attain. Feeling discouraged and distressed, he has
difficulty concentrating and focusing on things which he needs to prioritize. He has many plans but he can’t
accomplish anything because he is unable to see which path to take. This feeling of hopelessness is further
aggravated by the lack of support from significant others.
Diagnostic Impression
Axis I : Drug Dependence
Axis II : Mixed Personality Disorder
[Schizoid, Narcissistic and Antisocial Personality Disorder]
Axis III : None
Axis IV : Psychosocial and Environmental Problems:
Severe He seems to be very good at planning and starting things but is unable to accomplish anything; unable
to give priority to the needs of his family; in social relationships.
Axis V : Global Assessment of Functioning – Fair (Emphasis supplied)
3. Dr. Estrella T. Tiongson-Magno
Diagnosis for [petitioner]:
Axis I Partner Relational Problem
Axis II Obsessive Compulsive Personality Style with Self-Defeating features
Axis III No diagnosis
Axis IV Psychosocial Stressors-Pervasive Family Discord (spouse’s immaturity, drug abuse, and infidelity)
Severity: 4-severe
Diagnosis for [respondent]
Axis I Partner Relational Problem
Axis II Antisocial Personality Disorder with marked narcissistic, aggressive sadistic and dependent features
Axis III No diagnosis
Axis IV Psychosocial Stressors-Pervasive Family Discord (successful wife)
Severity: 4 (severe)
[Respondent], diagnosed with an antisocial personality disorder with marked narcissistic features and
aggressive sadistic and dependent features, is psychologically incapacitated to fulfill the essential obligations
of marriage: to love, respect and render support for his spouse and children. A personality disorder is not
curable as it is permanent and stable over time
From a psychological viewpoint, therefore, there is evidence that the marriage of [petitioner] and [respondent
is] null and void from the very beginning. (emphasis supplied)
The recent case of Lim v. Sta. Cruz-Lim, citing The Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, Fourth
Edition (DSM IV), instructs us on the general diagnostic criteria for personality disorders:
A. An enduring pattern of inner experience and behavior that deviates markedly from the expectations of the
individual’s culture. This pattern is manifested in two (2) or more of the following areas:
(1) cognition (i.e., ways of perceiving and interpreting self, other people, and events)
(2) affectivity (i.e., the range, intensity, liability, and appropriateness of emotional response)
(3) interpersonal functioning
(4) impulse control
B. The enduring pattern is inflexible and pervasive across a broad range of personal and social situations.
C. The enduring pattern leads to clinically significant distress or impairment in social, occupational or other
important areas of functioning.
D. The pattern is stable and of long duration, and its onset can be traced back at least to adolescence or early
adulthood.
E. The enduring pattern is not better accounted for as a manifestation or a consequence of another mental
disorder.
F. The enduring pattern is not due to the direct physiological effects of a substance (i.e., a drug of abuse, a
medication) or a general medical condition (e.g., head trauma).
Within their acknowledged field of expertise, doctors can diagnose the psychological make up of a person
based on a number of factors culled from various sources. A person afflicted with a personality disorder will
not necessarily have personal knowledge thereof. In this case, considering that a personality disorder is
manifested in a pattern of behavior, self-diagnosis by the respondent consisting only in his bare denial of the
doctors’ separate diagnoses, does not necessarily evoke credence and cannot trump the clinical findings of
experts.
In the case at bar, however, even without the experts’ conclusions, the factual antecedents (narrative of
events) alleged in the petition and established during trial, all point to the inevitable conclusion that
respondent is psychologically incapacitated to perform the essential marital obligations.
In the instant case, respondent’s pattern of behavior manifests an inability, nay, a psychological incapacity to
perform the essential marital obligations as shown by his:
(1) sporadic financial support; (2) extra-marital affairs; (3) substance abuse; (4) failed business attempts; (5)
unpaid money obligations; (6) inability to keep a job that is not connected with the family businesses; and (7)
criminal charges of estafa.
In fine, given the factual milieu of the present case and in light of the foregoing disquisition, we find ample
basis to conclude that respondent was psychologically incapacitated to perform the essential marital
obligations at the time of his marriage to the petitioner.
ANTONIO VS REYES
Facts:
Petitioner and respondent met in August 1989 when petitioner was 26 years old and respondent was 36 years
of age. Barely a year after their first meeting, they got married
Out of their union, a child was born on 19 April 1991, who sadly died five (5) months later.
On 8 March 1993,[7] petitioner filed a petition to have his marriage to respondent declared null and void. He
anchored his petition for nullity on Article 36 of the Family Code alleging that respondent was psychologically
incapacitated to comply with the... essential obligations of marriage. He asserted that respondent's incapacity
existed at the time their marriage was celebrated and still subsists up to the present.[8]
As manifestations of respondent's alleged psychological incapacity, petitioner claimed that respondent
persistently lied about herself, the people around her, her occupation, income, educational attainment and
other events or things,... (1) She concealed the fact that she previously gave birth to an illegitimate son,[10]
and instead introduced the boy to petitioner as the adopted child of her family.
(2) She fabricated a story that her brother-in-law, Edwin David, attempted to rape and kill her when in fact, no
such incident occurred.
(3) She misrepresented herself as a psychiatrist to her obstetrician... and told some of her friends that she
graduated with a degree in psychology, when she was neither.[13]
(4) She claimed to be a singer or a free-lance voice talent affiliated with Blackgold Recording Company
(Blackgold); yet, not a single member of her family ever witnessed her alleged singing activities with the group.
(5) She invented friends named Babes Santos and Via Marquez, and under those names, sent lengthy letters
to petitioner claiming to be from Blackgold and touting her as the "number one moneymaker" in the
commercial industry worth P2 million.
(6) She represented herself as a person of greater means, thus, she altered her payslip to make it appear that
she earned a higher income.
(7) She exhibited insecurities and jealousies over him to the extent of calling up his officemates to monitor his
whereabouts.
In support of his petition, petitioner presented
, a psychiatrist
, a clinical psychologist, who stated, based on the tests they conducted, that petitioner was essentially a
normal, introspective, shy and... conservative type of person.
On the other hand, they observed that respondent's persistent and constant lying to petitioner was abnormal
or pathological.
They further... asserted that respondent's extreme jealousy was also pathological.
After trial, the lower court gave credence to petitioner's evidence and held that respondent's propensity to
lying about almost anything-her occupation, state of health, singing abilities and her income, among others-
had been duly established. According to the trial court,... respondent's fantastic ability to invent and fabricate
stories and personalities enabled her to live in a world of make-believe. This made her psychologically
incapacitated as it rendered her incapable of giving meaning and significance to her marriage.[36]
The trial court thus declared the marriage between petitioner and respondent null and void.
While conceding that respondent may not have been completely honest with petitioner, the Court of Appeals
nevertheless held that the... totality of the evidence presented was insufficient to establish respondent's
psychological incapacity.
Taking exception to the appellate court's pronouncement, petitioner elevated the case to this Court. He
contends herein that the evidence conclusively establish respondent's psychological incapacity.
Issues:
petitioner has established his cause of action for declaration of nullity under Article 36 of the Family Code. The
RTC correctly ruled, and the Court of Appeals erred in reversing the trial court.
Ruling:
the factual findings of the RTC are now deemed binding on this Court, owing to the great weight accorded to
the opinion of the primary trier of facts, and the refusal of the Court of Appeals to dispute the veracity of these
facts. As such, it must be considered... that respondent had consistently lied about many material aspects as
to her character and personality. The question remains whether her pattern of fabrication sufficiently
establishes her psychological incapacity, consistent with Article 36 and generally, the Molina... guidelines
the present case sufficiently satisfies the guidelines in Molina.
First. Petitioner had sufficiently overcome his burden in proving the psychological incapacity of his spouse.
Apart from his own testimony, he presented witnesses who corroborated his allegations on his wife's
behavior, and certifications from Blackgold Records and... the Philippine Village Hotel Pavillon which disputed
respondent's claims pertinent to her alleged singing career.
Second. The root cause of respondent's psychological incapacity has been medically or clinically identified,
alleged in the complaint, sufficiently proven by experts, and clearly explained in the trial court's decision.
Third. Respondent's psychological incapacity was established to have clearly existed at the time of and even
before the celebration of marriage. She fabricated friends and made up letters from fictitious characters well
before she married petitioner. Likewise, she... kept petitioner in the dark about her natural child's real
parentage as she only confessed when the latter had found out the truth after their marriage.
Fourth. The gravity of respondent's psychological incapacity is sufficient to prove her disability to assume the
essential obligations of marriage. It is immediately discernible that the parties had shared only a little over a
year of cohabitation before the... exasperated petitioner left his wife.
Fifth. Respondent is evidently unable to comply with the essential marital obligations as embraced by Articles
68 to 71 of the Family Code. Article 68, in particular, enjoins the spouses to live together, observe mutual love,
respect and fidelity, and render mutual... help and support. As noted by the trial court, it is difficult to see how
an inveterate pathological liar would be able to commit to the basic tenets of relationship between spouses
based on love, trust and respect.
Sixth. The Court of Appeals clearly erred when it failed to take into consideration the fact that the marriage of
the parties was annulled by the Catholic Church.
Evidently, the conclusion of psychological incapacity was arrived at not only by the trial court, but also by
canonical bodies.
Seventh. The final point of contention is the requirement in Molina that such psychological incapacity be shown
to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable.
Petitioner points out that one month after he and his wife initially separated, he returned to her, desiring to
make their marriage work. However, respondent's aberrant behavior remained unchanged, as she continued
to lie, fabricate stories, and maintained her excessive... jealousy. From this fact, he draws the conclusion that
respondent's condition is incurable.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED.
G.R. No. 155800 March 10, 2006
Leonilo Antonio vs Marie Ivonne F. Reyes
FACTS:
Antonio and Reyes first got married at Manila City Hall and subsequently in church on December 8, 1990. A
child was born in April 1991 but died 5 months later. Antonio could no longer take her constant lying,
insecurities and jealousies over him so he separated from her in August 1991. He attempted reconciliation but
since her behavior did not change, he finally left her for good in November 1991. Only after their marriage that
he learned about her child with another man.
He then filed a petition in 1993 to have his marriage with Reyes declared null and void under Article 36 of the
Family Code.
The trial court gave credence to Antonio's evidence and thus declared the marriage null and void.
Court of Appeals reversed the trial court's decision. It held that the totality of evidence presented was
insufficient to establish Reyes' psychological incapacity. It declared that the requirements in the 1997 Molina
case had not been satisfied.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Antonio has established his cause of action for declaration of nullity under Article 36 of the
Family Code and, generally, under the Molina guidelines.
RULING:
Yes. The petitioner, aside from his own testimony, presented a psychiatrist and clinical psychologist who
attested that constant lying and extreme jealousy of Reyes is abnormal and pathological and corroborated his
allegations on his wife's behavior, which amounts to psychological incapacity.
The factual findings of the trial court are deemed binding on the SC, owing to the great weight accorded to
the opinion of the primary trier of facts. As such, it must be considered that respondent had consistently lied
about many material aspects as to her character and personality. Her fantastic ability to invent and fabricate
stories and personalities enabled her to live in a world of make-believe. This made her psychologically
incapacitated as it rendered her incapable of giving meaning and significance to her marriage.
The case sufficiently satisfies the Molina guidelines:
First, that Antonio had sufficiently overcome his burden in proving the psychological incapacity of his wife;
Second, that the root cause of Reyes' psychological incapacity has been medically or clinically identified that
was sufficiently proven by experts, and was clearly explained in the trial court's decision;
Third, that she fabricated friends and made up letters before she married him prove that her psychological
incapacity was have existed even before the celebration of marriage;
Fourth, that the gravity of Reyes' psychological incapacity was considered so grave that a restrictive clause
was appended to the sentence of nullity prohibited by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal from
contracting marriage without their consent;
Fifth, that she being an inveterate pathological liar makes her unable to commit the basic tenets of relationship
between spouses based on love, trust, and respect.
Sixth, that the CA clearly erred when it failed to take into consideration the fact that the marriage was annulled
by the Catholic Church. However, it is the factual findings of the judicial trier of facts, and not of the canonical
courts, that are accorded significant recognition by this Court.
Seventh, that Reyes' case is incurable considering that Antonio tried to reconcile with her but her behavior
remains unchanged.
Te v.Te, G.R. No. 161793, Feb. 13, 2009
FACTS: Edward Te first got a glimpse of respondent Rowena Ong Gutierrez Yu-Te in a gathering organized by
the Filipino-Chinese association in their college. Edward was then initially attracted to Rowena’s close friend;
but, as the latter already had a boyfriend, the young man decided to court Rowena. That was in January 1996,
when petitioner was a sophomore student and respondent, a freshman. In March 1996, or around three
months after their first meeting, Rowena asked Edward that they elope. At first, he refused, bickering that he
was young and jobless. Her persistence, however, made him relent. Thus, they left Manila and sailed to Cebu
that month; he, providing their travel money and she, purchasing the boat ticket. However, Edward’s
P80,000.00 lasted for only a month. In April 1996, they decided to go back to Manila. Rowena proceeded to
her uncle’s house and Edward to his parents’ home. As his family was abroad, and Rowena kept on telephoning
him, threatening him that she would commit suicide, Edward agreed to stay with Rowena at her uncle’s place.
On April 23, 1996, Rowena’s uncle brought the two to a court to get married. He was then 25 years old, and
she, 20. The two then continued to stay at her uncle’s place where Edward was treated like a prisoner—he was
not allowed to go out unaccompanied. Her uncle also showed Edward his guns and warned the latter not to
leave Rowena. After a month, Edward escaped from the house of Rowena’s uncle, and stayed with his parents.
His family then hid him from Rowena and her family whenever they telephoned to ask for him. In June 1996,
Edward was able to talk to Rowena. Unmoved by his persistence that they should live with his parents, she
said that it was better for them to live separate lives. They then parted ways. On January 18, 2000, Edward
filed a petition before the RTC for the annulment of his marriage to Rowena on the basis of her psychological
incapacity.
ISSUE: Whether the marriage contracted is void on the ground of psychological incapacity.
HELD: The parties’ whirlwind relationship lasted more or less six months. They met in January 1996, eloped in
March, exchanged marital vows in May, and parted ways in June. The psychologist who provided expert
testimony found both parties psychologically incapacitated. Petitioner’s behavioral pattern falls under the
classification of dependent personality disorder (to make everyday decisions without advice from others, and
allows others to make most of his important decisions), and respondent’s, that of the narcissistic and antisocial
personality disorder (her disregard in the rights of others, her abuse, mistreatment and control of others
without remorse, and her tendency to blame others, impulsive and domineering; she had no qualms in
manipulating petitioner with her threats of blackmail and of committing suicide). There is no requirement that
the person to be declared psychologically incapacitated be personally examined by a physician, if the totality
of evidence presented is enough to sustain a finding of psychological incapacity.
Te vs. Te
GR No. 161793, February 13, 2009
FACTS:
Petitioner Edward Te first met respondent Rowena Te in a gathering organized by the Filipino-Chinese
association in their college. Initially, he was attracted to Rowena’s close friend but, as the latter already had a
boyfriend, the young man decided to court Rowena, which happened in January 1996. It was Rowena who
asked that they elope but Edward refused bickering that he was young and jobless. Her persistence, however,
made him relent. They left Manila and sailed to Cebu that month; he, providing their travel money of P80,000
and she, purchasing the boat ticket.
They decided to go back to Manila in April 1996. Rowena proceeded to her uncle’s house and Edward to his
parents’ home. Eventually they got married but without a marriage license. Edward was prohibited from
getting out of the house unaccompanied and was threatened by Rowena and her uncle. After a month,
Edward escaped from the house, and stayed with his parents. Edward’s parents wanted them to stay at their
house but Rowena refused and demanded that they have a separate abode. In June 1996, she said that it was
better for them to live separate lives and they then parted ways.
After four years in January 2000, Edward filed a petition for the annulment of his marriage to Rowena on the
basis of the latter’s psychological incapacity.
ISSUE: Whether the marriage contracted is void on the ground of psychological incapacity.
HELD:
The parties’ whirlwind relationship lasted more or less six months. They met in January 1996, eloped in March,
exchanged marital vows in May, and parted ways in June. The psychologist who provided expert testimony
found both parties psychologically incapacitated. Petitioner’s behavioral pattern falls under the classification
of dependent personality disorder, and respondent’s, that of the narcissistic and antisocial personality disorder
There is no requirement that the person to be declared psychologically incapacitated be personally examined
by a physician, if the totality of evidence presented is enough to sustain a finding of psychological incapacity.
Verily, the evidence must show a link, medical or the like, between the acts that manifest psychological
incapacity and the psychological disorder itself.
The presentation of expert proof presupposes a thorough and in-depth assessment of the parties by the
psychologist or expert, for a conclusive diagnosis of a grave, severe and incurable presence of psychological
incapacity
Indeed, petitioner, afflicted with dependent personality disorder, cannot assume the essential marital
obligations of living together, observing love, respect and fidelity and rendering help and support, for he is
unable to make everyday decisions without advice from others, and allows others to make most of his
important decisions (such as where to live). As clearly shown in this case, petitioner followed everything
dictated to him by the persons around him. He is insecure, weak and gullible, has no sense of his identity as a
person, has no cohesive self to speak of, and has no goals and clear direction in life.
As for the respondent, her being afflicted with antisocial personality disorder makes her unable to assume the
essential marital obligations on account for her disregard in the rights of others, her abuse, mistreatment and
control of others without remorse, and her tendency to blame others. Moreover, as shown in this case,
respondent is impulsive and domineering; she had no qualms in manipulating petitioner with her threats of
blackmail and of committing suicide.
Both parties being afflicted with grave, severe and incurable psychological incapacity, the precipitous marriage
that they contracted on April 23, 1996 is thus, declared null and void.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 119190 January 16, 1997
CHI MING TSOI, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and GINA LAO-TSOI, respondents.
TORRES, JR., J.:
Man has not invented a reliable compass by which to steer a marriage in its journey over troubled waters. Laws
are seemingly inadequate. Over time, much reliance has been placed in the works of the unseen hand of Him
who created all things.
Who is to blame when a marriage fails?
This case was originally commenced by a distraught wife against her uncaring husband in the Regional Trial
Court of Quezon City (Branch 89) which decreed the annulment of the marriage on the ground of psychological
incapacity. Petitioner appealed the decision of the trial court to respondent Court of Appeals (CA-G.R. CV No.
42758) which affirmed the Trial Court's decision November 29, 1994 and correspondingly denied the motion
for reconsideration in a resolution dated February 14, 1995.
The statement of the case and of the facts made by the trial court and reproduced by the Court of Appeals1 its
decision are as follows:
From the evidence adduced, the following acts were preponderantly established:
Sometime on May 22, 1988, the plaintiff married the defendant at the Manila Cathedral, . . . Intramuros Manila,
as evidenced by their Marriage Contract. (Exh. "A")
After the celebration of their marriage and wedding reception at the South Villa, Makati, they went and
proceeded to the house of defendant's mother.
There, they slept together on the same bed in the same room for the first night of their married life.
It is the version of the plaintiff, that contrary to her expectations, that as newlyweds they were supposed to
enjoy making love, or having sexual intercourse, with each other, the defendant just went to bed, slept on one
side thereof, then turned his back and went to sleep . There was no sexual intercourse between them during
the first night. The same thing happened on the second, third and fourth nights.
In an effort to have their honeymoon in a private place where they can enjoy together during their first week
as husband and wife, they went to Baguio City. But, they did so together with her mother, an uncle, his mother
and his nephew. They were all invited by the defendant to join them. [T]hey stayed in Baguio City for four (4)
days. But, during this period, there was no sexual intercourse between them, since the defendant avoided her
by taking a long walk during siesta time or by just sleeping on a rocking chair located at the living room. They
slept together in the same room and on the same bed since May 22, 1988 until March 15, 1989. But during this
period, there was no attempt of sexual intercourse between them. [S]he claims, that she did not: even see her
husband's private parts nor did he see hers.
Because of this, they submitted themselves for medical examinations to Dr. Eufemio Macalalag, a urologist at
the Chinese General Hospital, on January 20, 1989.
The results of their physical examinations were that she is healthy, normal and still a virgin, while that of her
husband's examination was kept confidential up to this time. While no medicine was prescribed for her, the
doctor prescribed medications for her husband which was also kept confidential. No treatment was given to
her. For her husband, he was asked by the doctor to return but he never did.
The plaintiff claims, that the defendant is impotent, a closet homosexual as he did not show his penis. She said,
that she had observed the defendant using an eyebrow pencil and sometimes the cleansing cream of his
mother. And that, according to her, the defendant married her, a Filipino citizen, to acquire or maintain his
residency status here in the country and to publicly maintain the appearance of a normal man.
The plaintiff is not willing to reconcile with her husband.
On the other hand, it is the claim of the defendant that if their marriage shall be annulled by reason of
psychological incapacity, the fault lies with his wife.
But, he said that he does not want his marriage with his wife annulled for several reasons, viz: (1) that he loves
her very much; (2) that he has no defect on his part and he is physically and psychologically capable; and, (3)
since the relationship is still very young and if there is any differences between the two of them, it can still be
reconciled and that, according to him, if either one of them has some incapabilities, there is no certainty that
this will not be cured. He further claims, that if there is any defect, it can be cured by the intervention of medical
technology or science.
The defendant admitted that since their marriage on May 22, 1988, until their separation on March 15, 1989,
there was no sexual contact between them. But, the reason for this, according to the defendant, was that
everytime he wants to have sexual intercourse with his wife, she always avoided him and whenever he caresses
her private parts, she always removed his hands. The defendant claims, that he forced his wife to have sex with
him only once but he did not continue because she was shaking and she did not like it. So he stopped.
There are two (2) reasons, according to the defendant , why the plaintiff filed this case against him, and these
are: (1) that she is afraid that she will be forced to return the pieces of jewelry of his mother, and, (2) that her
husband, the defendant, will consummate their marriage.
The defendant insisted that their marriage will remain valid because they are still very young and there is still
a chance to overcome their differences.
The defendant submitted himself to a physical examination. His penis was examined by Dr. Sergio Alteza, Jr.,
for the purpose of finding out whether he is impotent . As a result thereof, Dr. Alteza submitted his Doctor's
Medical Report. (Exh. "2"). It is stated there, that there is no evidence of impotency (Exh. "2-B"), and he is
capable of erection. (Exh. "2-C")
The doctor said, that he asked the defendant to masturbate to find out whether or not he has an erection and
he found out that from the original size of two (2) inches, or five (5) centimeters, the penis of the defendant
lengthened by one (1) inch and one centimeter. Dr. Alteza said, that the defendant had only a soft erection
which is why his penis is not in its full length. But, still is capable of further erection, in that with his soft
erection, the defendant is capable of having sexual intercourse with a woman.
In open Court, the Trial Prosecutor manifested that there is no collusion between the parties and that the
evidence is not fabricated."2
After trial, the court rendered judgment, the dispositive portion of which reads:
ACCORDINGLY, judgment is hereby rendered declaring as VOID the marriage entered into by the plaintiff with
the defendant on May 22, 1988 at the Manila Cathedral, Basilica of the Immaculate Conception, Intramuros,
Manila, before the Rt. Rev. Msgr. Melencio de Vera. Without costs. Let a copy of this decision be furnished the
Local Civil Registrar of Quezon City. Let another copy be furnished the Local Civil Registrar of Manila.
SO ORDERED.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's decision.
Hence, the instant petition.
Petitioner alleges that the respondent Court of Appeals erred:
I
in affirming the conclusions of the lower court that there was no sexual intercourse between the parties
without making any findings of fact.
II
in holding that the refusal of private respondent to have sexual communion with petitioner is a psychological
incapacity inasmuch as proof thereof is totally absent.
III
in holding that the alleged refusal of both the petitioner and the private respondent to have sex with each
other constitutes psychological incapacity of both.
IV
in affirming the annulment of the marriage between the parties decreed by the lower court without fully
satisfying itself that there was no collusion between them.
We find the petition to be bereft of merit.
Petitioner contends that being the plaintiff in Civil Case No. Q-89-3141, private respondent has the burden of
proving the allegations in her complaint; that since there was no independent evidence to prove the alleged
non-coitus between the parties, there remains no other basis for the court's conclusion except the admission
of petitioner; that public policy should aid acts intended to validate marriage and should retard acts intended
to invalidate them; that the conclusion drawn by the trial court on the admissions and confessions of the
parties in their pleadings and in the course of the trial is misplaced since it could have been a product of
collusion; and that in actions for annulment of marriage, the material facts alleged in the complaint shall always
be proved.3
Section 1, Rule 19 of the Rules of Court reads:
Section 1. Judgment on the pleadings. — Where an answer fails to tender an issue, or otherwise admits the
material allegations of the adverse party's pleading, the court may, on motion of that party, direct judgment
on such pleading. But in actions for annulment of marriage or for legal separation the material facts alleged in
the complaint shall always be proved.
The foregoing provision pertains to a judgment on the pleadings. What said provision seeks to prevent is
annulment of marriage without trial. The assailed decision was not based on such a judgment on the pleadings.
When private respondent testified under oath before the trial court and was cross-examined by oath before
the trial court and was cross-examined by the adverse party, she thereby presented evidence in form of a
testimony. After such evidence was presented, it be came incumbent upon petitioner to present his side. He
admitted that since their marriage on May 22, 1988, until their separation on March 15, 1989, there was no
sexual intercourse between them.
To prevent collusion between the parties is the reason why, as stated by the petitioner, the Civil Code provides
that no judgment annulling a marriage shall be promulgated upon a stipulation of facts or by confession of
judgment (Arts. 88 and 101[par. 2]) and the Rules of Court prohibit such annulment without trial (Sec. 1, Rule
19).
The case has reached this Court because petitioner does not want their marriage to be annulled. This only
shows that there is no collusion between the parties. When petitioner admitted that he and his wife (private
respondent) have never had sexual contact with each other, he must have been only telling the truth. We are
reproducing the relevant portion of the challenged resolution denying petitioner's Motion for
Reconsideration, penned with magisterial lucidity by Associate Justice Minerva Gonzaga-Reyes, viz:
The judgment of the trial court which was affirmed by this Court is not based on a stipulation of facts. The issue
of whether or not the appellant is psychologically incapacitated to discharge a basic marital obligation was
resolved upon a review of both the documentary and testimonial evidence on record. Appellant admitted that
he did not have sexual relations with his wife after almost ten months of cohabitation, and it appears that he
is not suffering from any physical disability. Such abnormal reluctance or unwillingness to consummate his
marriage is strongly indicative of a serious personality disorder which to the mind of this Court clearly
demonstrates an 'utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage' within the
meaning of Article 36 of the Family Code (See Santos vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 112019, January 4, 1995).4
Petitioner further contends that respondent court erred in holding that the alleged refusal of both the
petitioner and the private respondent to have sex with each other constitutes psychological incapacity of both.
He points out as error the failure of the trial court to make "a categorical finding about the alleged
psychological incapacity and an in-depth analysis of the reasons for such refusal which may not be necessarily
due to physchological disorders" because there might have been other reasons, — i.e., physical disorders, such
as aches, pains or other discomforts, — why private respondent would not want to have sexual intercourse
from May 22, 1988 to March 15, 1989, in a short span of 10 months.
First, it must be stated that neither the trial court nor the respondent court made a finding on who between
petitioner and private respondent refuses to have sexual contact with the other. The fact remains, however,
that there has never been coitus between them. At any rate, since the action to declare the marriage void may
be filed by either party, i.e., even the psychologically incapacitated, the question of who refuses to have sex
with the other becomes immaterial.
Petitioner claims that there is no independent evidence on record to show that any of the parties is suffering
from phychological incapacity. Petitioner also claims that he wanted to have sex with private respondent; that
the reason for private respondent's refusal may not be psychological but physical disorder as stated above.
We do not agree. Assuming it to be so, petitioner could have discussed with private respondent or asked her
what is ailing her, and why she balks and avoids him everytime he wanted to have sexual intercourse with her.
He never did. At least, there is nothing in the record to show that he had tried to find out or discover what the
problem with his wife could be. What he presented in evidence is his doctor's Medical Report that there is no
evidence of his impotency and he is capable of erection.5 Since it is petitioner's claim that the reason is not
psychological but perhaps physical disorder on the part of private respondent, it became incumbent upon him
to prove such a claim.
If a spouse, although physically capable but simply refuses to perform his or her essential marriage obligations,
and the refusal is senseless and constant, Catholic marriage tribunals attribute the causes to psychological
incapacity than to stubborn refusal. Senseless and protracted refusal is equivalent to psychological incapacity.
Thus, the prolonged refusal of a spouse to have sexual intercourse with his or her spouse is considered a sign
of psychological incapacity.6
Evidently, one of the essential marital obligations under the Family Code is "To procreate children based on
the universal principle that procreation of children through sexual cooperation is the basic end of marriage."
Constant non- fulfillment of this obligation will finally destroy the integrity or wholeness of the marriage. In
the case at bar, the senseless and protracted refusal of one of the parties to fulfill the above marital obligation
is equivalent to psychological incapacity.
As aptly stated by the respondent court,
An examination of the evidence convinces Us that the husband's plea that the wife did not want carnal
intercourse with him does not inspire belief. Since he was not physically impotent, but he refrained from sexual
intercourse during the entire time (from May 22, 1988 to March 15, 1989) that he occupied the same bed with
his wife, purely out of symphaty for her feelings, he deserves to be doubted for not having asserted his right
seven though she balked (Tompkins vs. Tompkins, 111 Atl. 599, cited in I Paras, Civil Code, at p. 330). Besides, if
it were true that it is the wife was suffering from incapacity, the fact that defendant did not go to court and
seek the declaration of nullity weakens his claim. This case was instituted by the wife whose normal
expectations of her marriage were frustrated by her husband's inadequacy. Considering the innate modesty
of the Filipino woman, it is hard to believe that she would expose her private life to public scrutiny and fabricate
testimony against her husband if it were not necessary to put her life in order and put to rest her marital status.
We are not impressed by defendant's claim that what the evidence proved is the unwillingness or lack of
intention to perform the sexual act, which is not phychological incapacity, and which can be achieved "through
proper motivation." After almost ten months of cohabitation, the admission that the husband is reluctant or
unwilling to perform the sexual act with his wife whom he professes to love very dearly, and who has not
posed any insurmountable resistance to his alleged approaches, is indicative of a hopeless situation, and of a
serious personality disorder that constitutes psychological incapacity to discharge the basic marital covenants
within the contemplation of the Family Code.7
While the law provides that the husband and the wife are obliged to live together, observe mutual love, respect
and fidelity (Art. 68, Family Code), the sanction therefor is actually the "spontaneous, mutual affection
between husband and wife and not any legal mandate or court order" (Cuaderno vs. Cuaderno 120 Phil. 1298).
Love is useless unless it is shared with another. Indeed, no man is an island, the cruelest act of a partner in
marriage is to say "I could not have cared less." This is so because an ungiven self is an unfulfilled self. The
egoist has nothing but himself. In the natural order, it is sexual intimacy which brings spouses wholeness and
oneness. Sexual intimacy is a gift and a participation in the mystery of creation. It is a function which enlivens
the hope of procreation and ensures the continuation of family relations.
It appears that there is absence of empathy between petitioner and private respondent. That is — a shared
feeling which between husband and wife must be experienced not only by having spontaneous sexual intimacy
but a deep sense of spiritual communion. Marital union is a two-way process. An expressive interest in each
other's feelings at a time it is needed by the other can go a long way in deepening the marital relationship.
Marriage is definitely not for children but for two consenting adults who view the relationship with love amor
gignit amorem, respect, sacrifice and a continuing commitment to compromise, conscious of its value as a
sublime social institution.
This Court, finding the gravity of the failed relationship in which the parties found themselves trapped in its
mire of unfulfilled vows and unconsummated marital obligations, can do no less but sustain the studied
judgment of respondent appellate court.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING PREMISES , the assailed decision of the Court of Appeals dated November 29,
1994 is hereby AFFIRMED in all respects and the petition is hereby DENIED for lack of merit.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 158298
August 11, 2010
ISIDRO ABLAZA, Petitioner,
vs.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
DECISION
BERSAMIN, J.:
Whether a person may bring an action for the declaration of the absolute nullity of the marriage of his
deceased brother solemnized under the regime of the old Civil Code is the legal issue to be determined in this
appeal brought by the petitioner whose action for that purpose has been dismissed by the lower courts on the
ground that he, not being a party in the assailed marriage, had no right to bring the action.
Antecedents
On October 17, 2000, the petitioner filed in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Cataingan, Masbate a petition for
the declaration of the absolute nullity of the marriage contracted on December 26, 1949 between his late
brother Cresenciano Ablaza and Leonila Honato.1 The case was docketed as Special Case No. 117 entitled In Re:
Petition for Nullification of Marriage Contract between Cresenciano Ablaza and Leonila Honato; Isidro Ablaza,
petitioner.
The petitioner alleged that the marriage between Cresenciano and Leonila had been celebrated without a
marriage license, due to such license being issued only on January 9, 1950, thereby rendering the marriage void
ab initio for having been solemnized without a marriage license. He insisted that his being the surviving brother
of Cresenciano who had died without any issue entitled him to one-half of the real properties acquired by
Cresenciano before his death, thereby making him a real party in interest; and that any person, himself
included, could impugn the validity of the marriage between Cresenciano and Leonila at any time, even after
the death of Cresenciano, due to the marriage being void ab initio.2
Ruling of the RTC
On October 18, 2000, 3 the RTC dismissed the petition, stating:
Considering the petition for annulment of marriage filed, the Court hereby resolved to DISMISS the petition
for the following reasons: 1) petition is filed out of time (action had long prescribed) and 2) petitioner is not a
party to the marriage (contracted between Cresenciano Ablaza and Leonila Nonato on December 26, 1949 and
solemnized by Rev. Fr. Eusebio B. Calolot).
SO ORDERED.
The petitioner seasonably filed a motion for reconsideration, but the RTC denied the motion for
reconsideration on November 14, 2000.
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
The petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals (CA), assigning the lone error that:
The trial court erred in dismissing the petition for being filed out of time and that the petitioner is not a party
to the marriage.
In its decision dated January 30, 2003,4 however, the CA affirmed the dismissal order of the RTC, thus:
While an action to declare the nullity of a marriage considered void from the beginning does not prescribe, the
law nonetheless requires that the same action must be filed by the proper party, which in this case should be
filed by any of the parties to the marriage. In the instant case, the petition was filed by Isidro Ablaza, a brother
of the deceased-spouse, who is not a party to the marriage contracted by Cresenciano Ablaza and Leonila
Honato. The contention of petitioner-appellant that he is considered a real party in interest under Section 2,
Rule 3 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as he stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit,
is simply misplaced. Actions for annulment of marriage will not prosper if persons other than those specified
in the law file the case.
Certainly, a surviving brother of the deceased spouse is not the proper party to file the subject petition. More
so that the surviving wife, who stands to be prejudiced, was not even impleaded as a party to said case.
WHEREFORE, finding no reversible error therefrom, the Orders now on appeal are hereby AFFIRMED. Costs
against the petitioner-appellant.
SO ORDERED.5
Hence, this appeal.
Issues
The petitioner raises the following issues:
I.
WHETHER OR NOT THE DECISION OF THIS HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS IN CA-G.R. CV. NO. 69684
AFFIRMING THE ORDER OF DISMISSAL OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 49 AT CATAINGAN,
MASBATE IN SPECIAL PROCEEDING NO. 117 IS IN ACCORDANCE WITH APPLICABLE LAWS AND
JURISPRUDENCE;
II.
WHETHER OR NOT THE DECISION OF THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS IN CA-G.R. CV NO. 69684
(SHOULD) BE REVERSED BASED ON EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 209 AND EXISTING JURISPRUDENCE.
The issues, rephrased, boil down to whether the petitioner is a real party in interest in the action to seek the
declaration of nullity of the marriage of his deceased brother.
Ruling
The petition is meritorious.
A valid marriage is essential in order to create the relation of husband and wife and to give rise to the mutual
rights, duties, and liabilities arising out of such relation. The law prescribes the requisites of a valid marriage.
Hence, the validity of a marriage is tested according to the law in force at the time the marriage is contracted.6
As a general rule, the nature of the marriage already celebrated cannot be changed by a subsequent
amendment of the governing law.7 To illustrate, a marriage between a stepbrother and a stepsister was void
under the Civil Code, but is not anymore prohibited under the Family Code; yet, the intervening effectivity of
the Family Code does not affect the void nature of a marriage between a stepbrother and a stepsister
solemnized under the regime of the Civil Code. The Civil Code marriage remains void, considering that the
validity of a marriage is governed by the law in force at the time of the marriage ceremony.8
Before anything more, the Court has to clarify the impact to the issue posed herein of Administrative Matter
(A.M.) No. 02-11-10-SC (Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable
Marriages), which took effect on March 15, 2003.
Section 2, paragraph (a), of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC explicitly provides the limitation that a petition for declaration
of absolute nullity of void marriage may be filed solely by the husband or wife. Such limitation demarcates a
line to distinguish between marriages covered by the Family Code and those solemnized under the regime of
the Civil Code.9 Specifically, A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC extends only to marriages covered by the Family Code, which
took effect on August 3, 1988, but, being a procedural rule that is prospective in application, is confined only
to proceedings commenced after March 15, 2003.10
Based on Carlos v. Sandoval,11 the following actions for declaration of absolute nullity of a marriage are
excepted from the limitation, to wit:
1. Those commenced before March 15, 2003, the effectivity date of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC; and
2. Those filed vis-à-vis marriages celebrated during the effectivity of the Civil Code and, those celebrated under
the regime of the Family Code prior to March 15, 2003.
Considering that the marriage between Cresenciano and Leonila was contracted on December 26, 1949, the
applicable law was the old Civil Code, the law in effect at the time of the celebration of the marriage. Hence,
the rule on the exclusivity of the parties to the marriage as having the right to initiate the action for declaration
of nullity of the marriage under A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC had absolutely no application to the petitioner.
The old and new Civil Codes contain no provision on who can file a petition to declare the nullity of a marriage,
and when. Accordingly, in Niñal v. Bayadog,12 the children were allowed to file after the death of their father
a petition for the declaration of the nullity of their father’s marriage to their stepmother contracted on
December 11, 1986 due to lack of a marriage license. There, the Court distinguished between a void marriage
and a voidable one, and explained how and when each might be impugned, thuswise:
Jurisprudence under the Civil Code states that no judicial decree is necessary in order to establish the nullity of
a marriage. "A void marriage does not require a judicial decree to restore the parties to their original rights or
to make the marriage void but though no sentence of avoidance be absolutely necessary, yet as well for the
sake of good order of society as for the peace of mind of all concerned, it is expedient that the nullity of the
marriage should be ascertained and declared by the decree of a court of competent jurisdiction." "Under
ordinary circumstances, the effect of a void marriage, so far as concerns the conferring of legal rights upon the
parties, is as though no marriage had ever taken place. And therefore, being good for no legal purpose, its
invalidity can be maintained in any proceeding in which the fact of marriage may be material, either direct or
collateral, in any civil court between any parties at any time, whether before or after the death of either or
both the husband and the wife, and upon mere proof of the facts rendering such marriage void, it will be
disregarded or treated as non-existent by the courts." It is not like a voidable marriage which cannot be
collaterally attacked except in direct proceeding instituted during the lifetime of the parties so that on the
death of either, the marriage cannot be impeached, and is made good ab initio. But Article 40 of the Family
Code expressly provides that there must be a judicial declaration of the nullity of a previous marriage, though
void, before a party can enter into a second marriage and such absolute nullity can be based only on a final
judgment to that effect. For the same reason, the law makes either the action or defense for the declaration
of absolute nullity of marriage imprescriptible. Corollarily, if the death of either party would extinguish the
cause of action or the ground for defense, then the same cannot be considered imprescriptible.
However, other than for purposes of remarriage, no judicial action is necessary to declare a marriage an
absolute nullity. For other purposes, such as but not limited to determination of heirship, legitimacy or
illegitimacy of a child, settlement of estate, dissolution of property regime, or a criminal case for that matter,
the court may pass upon the validity of marriage even in a suit not directly instituted to question the same so
long as it is essential to the determination of the case. This is without prejudice to any issue that may arise in
the case. When such need arises, a final judgment of declaration of nullity is necessary even if the purpose is
other than to remarry. The clause "on the basis of a final judgment declaring such previous marriage void" in
Article 40 of the Family Code connotes that such final judgment need not be obtained only for purpose of
remarriage.13
It is clarified, however, that the absence of a provision in the old and new Civil Codes cannot be construed as
giving a license to just any person to bring an action to declare the absolute nullity of a marriage. According to
Carlos v. Sandoval,14 the plaintiff must still be the party who stands to be benefited by the suit, or the party
entitled to the avails of the suit, for it is basic in procedural law that every action must be prosecuted and
defended in the name of the real party in interest.15 Thus, only the party who can demonstrate a "proper
interest" can file the action.16Interest within the meaning of the rule means material interest, or an interest in
issue to be affected by the decree or judgment of the case, as distinguished from mere curiosity about the
question involved or a mere incidental interest. One having no material interest to protect cannot invoke the
jurisdiction of the court as plaintiff in an action. When the plaintiff is not the real party in interest, the case is
dismissible on the ground of lack of cause of action.17
Here, the petitioner alleged himself to be the late Cresenciano’s brother and surviving heir. Assuming that the
petitioner was as he claimed himself to be, then he has a material interest in the estate of Cresenciano that will
be adversely affected by any judgment in the suit. Indeed, a brother like the petitioner, albeit not a compulsory
heir under the laws of succession, has the right to succeed to the estate of a deceased brother under the
conditions stated in Article 1001 and Article 1003 of the Civil Code, as follows:
Article 1001. Should brothers and sisters or their children survive with the widow or widower, the latter shall
be entitled to one half of the inheritance and the brothers and sisters or their children to the other half.
Article 1003. If there are no descendants, ascendants, illegitimate children, or a surviving spouse, the collateral
relatives shall succeed to the entire estate of the deceased in accordance with the following articles.
Pursuant to these provisions, the presence of descendants, ascendants, or illegitimate children of the
deceased excludes collateral relatives like the petitioner from succeeding to the deceased’s estate.18
Necessarily, therefore, the right of the petitioner to bring the action hinges upon a prior determination of
whether Cresenciano had any descendants, ascendants, or children (legitimate or illegitimate), and of whether
the petitioner was the late Cresenciano’s surviving heir. Such prior determination must be made by the trial
court, for the inquiry thereon involves questions of fact.
As can be seen, both the RTC and the CA erroneously resolved the issue presented in this case. We reverse
their error, in order that the substantial right of the petitioner, if any, may not be prejudiced.
Nevertheless, we note that the petitioner did not implead Leonila, who, as the late Cresenciano’s surviving
wife,19stood to be benefited or prejudiced by the nullification of her own marriage. It is relevant to observe,
moreover, that not all marriages celebrated under the old Civil Code required
a marriage license for their validity;20 hence, her participation in this action is made all the more necessary in
order to shed light on whether the marriage had been celebrated without a marriage license and whether the
marriage might have been a marriage excepted from the requirement of a marriage license. She was truly an
indispensable party who must be joined herein:
xxx under any and all conditions, [her] presence being a sine qua non for the exercise of judicial power.1avvphi1
It is precisely "when an indispensable party is not before the court [that] the action should be dismissed." The
absence of an indispensable party renders all subsequent actions of the court null and void for want of
authority to act, not only as to the absent parties but even as to those present.21
We take note, too, that the petitioner and Leonila were parties in C.A.-G.R. CV No. 91025 entitled Heirs of
Cresenciano Ablaza, namely: Leonila G. Ablaza and Leila Ablaza Jasul v. Spouses Isidro and Casilda Ablaza, an
action to determine who between the parties were the legal owners of the property involved therein.
Apparently, C.A.-G.R. CV No. 91025 was decided on November 26, 2009, and the petitioner’s motion for
reconsideration was denied on June 23, 2010. As a defendant in that action, the petitioner is reasonably
presumed to have knowledge that the therein plaintiffs, Leonila and Leila, were the wife and daughter,
respectively, of the late Cresenciano. As such, Leila was another indispensable party whose substantial right
any judgment in this action will definitely affect. The petitioner should likewise implead Leila.
The omission to implead Leonila and Leila was not immediately fatal to the present action, however,
considering that Section 11,22 Rule 3, Rules of Court, states that neither misjoinder nor non-joinder of parties
is a ground for the dismissal of an action. The petitioner can still amend his initiatory pleading in order to
implead her, for under the same rule, such amendment to implead an indispensable party may be made "on
motion of any party or on (the trial court’s) own initiative at any stage of the action and on such terms as are
just."
WHEREFORE, the petition for review on certiorari is granted.
We reverse and set aside the decision dated January 30, 2003 rendered by the Court of Appeals.
Special Case No. 117 entitled In Re: Petition for Nullification of Marriage Contract between Cresenciano Ablaza
and Leonila Honato; Isidro Ablaza, petitioner, is reinstated, and its records are returned to the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 49, in Cataingan, Masbate, for further proceedings, with instructions to first require the
petitioner to amend his initiatory pleading in order to implead Leonila Honato and her daughter Leila Ablaza
Jasul as parties-defendants; then to determine whether the late Cresenciano Ablaza had any ascendants,
descendants, or children (legitimate or illegitimate) at the time of his death as well as whether the petitioner
was the brother and surviving heir of the late Cresenciano Ablaza entitled to succeed to the estate of said
deceased; and thereafter to proceed accordingly.
No costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 104818 September 17, 1993
ROBERTO DOMINGO, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and DELIA SOLEDAD AVERA represented by her Attorney-in-Fact MOISES R. AVERA,
respondents.
Jose P.O. Aliling IV for petitioner.
De Guzman, Meneses & Associates for private respondent.
ROMERO, J.:
The instant petition seeks the reversal of respondent court's ruling finding no grave abuse of discretion in the
lower court's order denying petitioner's motion to dismiss the petition for declaration of nullity of marriage
and separation of property.
On May 29, 1991, private respondent Delia Soledad A. Domingo filed a petition before the Regional Trial Court
of Pasig entitled "Declaration of Nullity of Marriage and Separation of Property" against petitioner Roberto
Domingo. The petition which was docketed as Special Proceedings No. 1989-J alleged among others that: they
were married on November 29, 1976 at the YMCA Youth Center Bldg., as evidenced by a Marriage Contract
Registry No. 1277K-76 with Marriage License No. 4999036 issued at Carmona, Cavite; unknown to her, he had
a previous marriage with one Emerlina dela Paz on April 25, 1969 which marriage is valid and still existing; she
came to know of the prior marriage only sometime in 1983 when Emerlina dela Paz sued them for bigamy; from
January 23 1979 up to the present, she has been working in Saudi Arabia and she used to come to the
Philippines only when she would avail of the one-month annual vacation leave granted by her foreign employer
since 1983 up to the present, he has been unemployed and completely dependent upon her for support and
subsistence; out of her personal earnings, she purchased real and personal properties with a total amount of
approximately P350,000.00, which are under the possession and administration of Roberto; sometime in June
1989, while on her one-month vacation, she discovered that he was cohabiting with another woman; she
further discovered that he had been disposing of some of her properties without her knowledge or consent;
she confronted him about this and thereafter appointed her brother Moises R. Avera as her attorney-in-fact to
take care of her properties; he failed and refused to turn over the possession and administration of said
properties to her brother/attorney-in-fact; and he is not authorized to administer and possess the same on
account of the nullity of their marriage. The petition prayed that a temporary restraining order or a writ of
preliminary injunction be issued enjoining Roberto from exercising any act of administration and ownership
over said properties; their marriage be declared null and void and of no force and effect; and Delia Soledad be
declared the sole and exclusive owner of all properties acquired at the time of their void marriage and such
properties be placed under the proper management and administration of the attorney-in-fact.
Petitioner filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground that the petition stated no cause of action. The marriage
being void ab initio, the petition for the declaration of its nullity is, therefore, superfluous and unnecessary. It
added that private respondent has no property which is in his possession.
On August 20, 1991, Judge Maria Alicia M. Austria issued an Order denying the motion to dismiss for lack of
merit. She explained:
Movant argues that a second marriage contracted after a first marriage by a man with another woman is illegal
and void (citing the case of Yap v. Court of Appeals, 145 SCRA 229) and no judicial decree is necessary to
establish the invalidity of a void marriage (citing the cases of People v. Aragon, 100 Phil. 1033; People v.
Mendoza, 95 Phil. 845). Indeed, under the Yap case there is no dispute that the second marriage contracted
by respondent with herein petitioner after a first marriage with another woman is illegal and void. However,
as to whether or not the second marriage should first be judicially declared a nullity is not an issue in said case.
In the case of Vda. de Consuegra v. GSIS, the Supreme Court ruled in explicit terms, thus:
And with respect to the right of the second wife, this Court observed that although the second marriage can
be presumed to be void ab initio as it was celebrated while the first marriage was still subsisting, still there is
need for judicial declaration of its nullity. (37 SCRA 316, 326)
The above ruling which is of later vintage deviated from the previous rulings of the Supreme Court in the
aforecited cases of Aragon and Mendoza.
Finally, the contention of respondent movant that petitioner has no property in his possession is an issue that
may be determined only after trial on the merits.1
A motion for reconsideration was filed stressing the erroneous application of Vda. de Consuegra v. GSIS2 and
the absence of justiciable controversy as to the nullity of the marriage. On September 11, 1991, Judge Austria
denied the motion for reconsideration and gave petitioner fifteen (15) days from receipt within which to file
his answer.
Instead of filing the required answer, petitioner filed a special civil action of certiorari and mandamus on the
ground that the lower court acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction in denying
the motion to dismiss.
On February 7, 1992, the Court of Appeals3 dismissed the petition. It explained that the case of Yap v. CA4 cited
by petitioner and that of Consuegra v. GSIS relied upon by the lower court do not have relevance in the case
at bar, there being no identity of facts because these cases dealt with the successional rights of the second
wife while the instant case prays for separation of property corollary with the declaration of nullity of marriage.
It observed that the separation and subsequent distribution of the properties acquired during the union can
be had only upon proper determination of the status of the marital relationship between said parties, whether
or not the validity of the first marriage is denied by petitioner. Furthermore, in order to avoid duplication and
multiplicity of suits, the declaration of nullity of marriage may be invoked in this proceeding together with the
partition and distribution of the properties involved. Citing Articles 48, 50 and 52 of the Family Code, it held
that private respondent's prayer for declaration of absolute nullity of their marriage may be raised together
with other incidents of their marriage such as the separation of their properties. Lastly, it noted that since the
Court has jurisdiction, the alleged error in refusing to grant the motion to dismiss is merely one of law for which
the remedy ordinarily would have been to file an answer, proceed with the trial and in case of an adverse
decision, reiterate the issue on appeal. The motion for reconsideration was subsequently denied for lack of
merit.5
Hence, this petition.
The two basic issues confronting the Court in the instant case are the following.
First, whether or not a petition for judicial declaration of a void marriage is necessary. If in the affirmative,
whether the same should be filed only for purposes of remarriage.
Second, whether or not SP No. 1989-J is the proper remedy of private respondent to recover certain real and
personal properties allegedly belonging to her exclusively.
Petitioner, invoking the ruling in People v. Aragon6 and People v. Mendoza,7 contends that SP. No. 1989-J for
Declaration of Nullity of Marriage and Separation of Property filed by private respondent must be dismissed
for being unnecessary and superfluous. Furthermore, under his own interpretation of Article 40 of the Family
Code, he submits that a petition for declaration of absolute nullity of marriage is required only for purposes of
remarriage. Since the petition in SP No. 1989-J contains no allegation of private respondent's intention to
remarry, said petition should therefore, be dismissed.
On the other hand, private respondent insists on the necessity of a judicial declaration of the nullity of their
marriage, not for purposes of remarriage, but in order to provide a basis for the separation and distribution of
the properties acquired during coverture.
There is no question that the marriage of petitioner and private respondent celebrated while the former's
previous marriage with one Emerlina de la Paz was still subsisting, is bigamous. As such, it is from the
beginning.8 Petitioner himself does not dispute the absolute nullity of their marriage.9
The cases of People v. Aragon and People v. Mendoza relied upon by petitioner are cases where the Court had
earlier ruled that no judicial decree is necessary to establish the invalidity of a void, bigamous marriage. It is
noteworthy to observe that Justice Alex Reyes, however, dissented on these occasions stating that:
Though the logician may say that where the former marriage was void there would be nothing to dissolve, still
it is not for the spouses to judge whether that marriage was void or not. That judgment is reserved to the
courts. . . . 10
This dissenting opinion was adopted as the majority position in subsequent cases involving the same issue.
Thus, in Gomez v. Lipana, 11 the Court abandoned its earlier ruling in the Aragon and Mendoza cases. In
reversing the lower court's order forfeiting the husband's share of the disputed property acquired during the
second marriage, the Court stated that "if the nullity, or annulment of the marriage is the basis for the
application of Article 1417, there is need for a judicial declaration thereof, which of course contemplates an
action for that purpose."
Citing Gomez v. Lipana, the Court subsequently held in Vda. de Consuegra v. Government Service Insurance
System, that "although the second marriage can be presumed to be void ab initio as it was celebrated while
the first marriage was still subsisting, still there is need for judicial declaration of such nullity."
In Tolentino v. Paras,12 however, the Court turned around and applied the Aragon and Mendoza ruling once
again. In granting the prayer of the first wife asking for a declaration as the lawful surviving spouse and the
correction of the death certificate of her deceased husband, it explained that "(t)he second marriage that he
contracted with private respondent during the lifetime of his first spouse is null and void from the beginning
and of no force and effect. No judicial decree is necessary to establish the invalidity of a void marriage."
However, in the more recent case of Wiegel v. Sempio-Diy 13 the Court reverted to the Consuegra case and
held that there was "no need of introducing evidence about the existing prior marriage of her first husband at
the time they married each other, for then such a marriage though void still needs according to this Court a
judicial declaration of such fact and for all legal intents and purposes she would still be regarded as a married
woman at the time she contracted her marriage with respondent Karl Heinz Wiegel."
Came the Family Code which settled once and for all the conflicting jurisprudence on the matter. A declaration
of the absolute nullity of a marriage is now explicitly required either as a cause of action or a ground for
defense. 14 Where the absolute nullity of a previous marriage is sought to be invoked for purposes of
contracting a second marriage, the sole basis acceptable in law for said projected marriage be free from legal
infirmity is a final judgment declaring the previous marriage void. 15
The Family Law Revision Committee and the Civil Code Revision Committee 16 which drafted what is now the
Family Code of the Philippines took the position that parties to a marriage should not be allowed to assume
that their marriage is void even if such be the fact but must first secure a judicial declaration of the nullity of
their marriage before they can be allowed to marry again. This is borne out by the following minutes of the
152nd Joint Meeting of the Civil Code and Family Law Committees where the present Article 40, then Art. 39,
was discussed.
B. Article 39. —
The absolute nullity of a marriage may be invoked only on the basis of a final judgment declaring the marriage
void, except as provided in Article 41.
Justice Caguioa remarked that the above provision should include not only void but also voidable marriages.
He then suggested that the above provision be modified as follows:
The validity of a marriage may be invoked only . . .
Justice Reyes (J.B.L. Reyes), however, proposed that they say:
The validity or invalidity of a marriage may be invoked
only . . .
On the other hand, Justice Puno suggested that they say:
The invalidity of a marriage may be invoked only . . .
Justice Caguioa explained that his idea is that one cannot determine for himself whether or not his marriage is
valid and that a court action is needed. Justice Puno accordingly proposed that the provision be modified to
read:
The invalidity of a marriage may be invoked only on the basis of a final judgment annulling the marriage or
declaring the marriage void, except as provided in Article 41.
Justice Caguioa remarked that in annulment, there is no question. Justice Puno, however, pointed out that,
even if it is a judgment of annulment, they still have to produce the judgment.
Justice Caguioa suggested that they say:
The invalidity of a marriage may be invoked only on the basis of a final judgment declaring the marriage invalid,
except as provided in Article 41.
Justice Puno raised the question: When a marriage is declared invalid, does it include the annulment of a
marriage and the declaration that the marriage is void? Justice Caguioa replied in the affirmative. Dean Gupit
added that in some judgments, even if the marriage is annulled, it is declared void. Justice Puno suggested that
this matter be made clear in the provision.
Prof. Baviera remarked that the original idea in the provision is to require first a judicial declaration of a void
marriage and not annullable marriages, with which the other members concurred. Judge Diy added that
annullable marriages are presumed valid until a direct action is filed to annul it, which the other members
affirmed. Justice Puno remarked that if this is so, then the phrase "absolute nullity" can stand since it might
result in confusion if they change the phrase to "invalidity" if what they are referring to in the provision is the
declaration that the marriage is void.
Prof. Bautista commented that they will be doing away with collateral defense as well as collateral attack.
Justice Caguioa explained that the idea in the provision is that there should be a final judgment declaring the
marriage void and a party should not declare for himself whether or not the marriage is void, while the other
members affirmed. Justice Caguioa added that they are, therefore, trying to avoid a collateral attack on that
point. Prof. Bautista stated that there are actions which are brought on the assumption that the marriage is
valid. He then asked: Are they depriving one of the right to raise the defense that he has no liability because
the basis of the liability is void? Prof. Bautista added that they cannot say that there will be no judgment on the
validity or invalidity of the marriage because it will be taken up in the same proceeding. It will not be a unilateral
declaration that, it is a void marriage. Justice Caguioa saw the point of Prof. Bautista and suggested that they
limit the provision to remarriage. He then proposed that Article 39 be reworded as follows:
The absolute nullity of a marriage for purposes of remarriage may be invoked only on the basis of final
judgment . . .
Justice Puno suggested that the above be modified as follows:
The absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked for purposes of establishing the validity of a
subsequent marriage only on the basis of a final judgment declaring such previous marriage void, except as
provided in Article 41.
Justice Puno later modified the above as follows:
For the purpose of establishing the validity of a subsequent marriage, the absolute nullity of a previous
marriage may only be invoked on the basis of a final judgment declaring such nullity, except as provided in
Article 41.
Justice Caguioa commented that the above provision is too broad and will not solve the objection of Prof.
Bautista. He proposed that they say:
For the purpose of entering into a subsequent marriage, the absolute nullity of a previous marriage may only
be invoked on the basis of a final judgment declaring such nullity, except as provided in Article 41.
Justice Caguioa explained that the idea in the above provision is that if one enters into a subsequent marriage
without obtaining a final judgment declaring the nullity of a previous marriage, said subsequent marriage is
void ab initio.
After further deliberation, Justice Puno suggested that they go back to the original wording of the provision
as follows:
The absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked for purposes of remarriage only on the basis of a
final judgment declaring such previous marriage void, except as provided in Article 41. 17
In fact, the requirement for a declaration of absolute nullity of a marriage is also for the protection of the
spouse who, believing that his or her marriage is illegal and void, marries again. With the judicial declaration of
the nullity of his or her first marriage, the person who marries again cannot be charged with bigamy. 18
Just over a year ago, the Court made the pronouncement that there is a necessity for a declaration of absolute
nullity of a prior subsisting marriage before contracting another in the recent case of Terre v. Terre. 19 The
Court, in turning down the defense of respondent Terre who was charged with grossly immoral conduct
consisting of contracting a second marriage and living with another woman other than complainant while his
prior marriage with the latter remained subsisting, said that "for purposes of determining whether a person is
legally free to contract a second marriage, a judicial declaration that the first marriage was null and void ab
initio is essential."
As regards the necessity for a judicial declaration of absolute nullity of marriage, petitioner submits that the
same can be maintained only if it is for the purpose of remarriage. Failure to allege this purpose, according to
petitioner's theory, will warrant dismissal of the same.
Article 40 of the Family Code provides:
Art. 40. The absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked for purposes of remarriage on the basis
solely of a final judgment declaring such previous marriage void. (n)
Crucial to the proper interpretation of Article 40 is the position in the provision of the word "solely." As it is
placed, the same shows that it is meant to qualify "final judgment declaring such previous marriage void."
Realizing the need for careful craftsmanship in conveying the precise intent of the Committee members, the
provision in question, as it finally emerged, did not state "The absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be
invoked solely for purposes of remarriage . . .," in which case "solely" would clearly qualify the phrase "for
purposes of remarriage." Had the phraseology been such, the interpretation of petitioner would have been
correct and, that is, that the absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked solely for purposes of
remarriage, thus rendering irrelevant the clause "on the basis solely of a final judgment declaring such previous
marriage void."
That Article 40 as finally formulated included the significant clause denotes that such final judgment declaring
the previous marriage void need not be obtained only for purposes of remarriage. Undoubtedly, one can
conceive of other instances where a party might well invoke the absolute nullity of a previous marriage for
purposes other than remarriage, such as in case of an action for liquidation, partition, distribution and
separation of property between the erstwhile spouses, as well as an action for the custody and support of
their common children and the delivery of the latters' presumptive legitimes. In such cases, evidence needs
must be adduced, testimonial or documentary, to prove the existence of grounds rendering such a previous
marriage an absolute nullity. These need not be limited solely to an earlier final judgment of a court declaring
such previous marriage void. Hence, in the instance where a party who has previously contracted a marriage
which remains subsisting desires to enter into another marriage which is legally unassailable, he is required by
law to prove that the previous one was an absolute nullity. But this he may do on the basis solely of a final
judgment declaring such previous marriage void.
This leads us to the question: Why the distinction? In other words, for purposes of remarriage, why should the
only legally acceptable basis for declaring a previous marriage an absolute nullity be a final judgment declaring
such previous marriage void? Whereas, for purposes other than remarriage, other evidence is acceptable?
Marriage, a sacrosanct institution, declared by the Constitution as an "inviolable social institution, is the
foundation of the family;" as such, it "shall be protected by the State."20 In more explicit terms, the Family
Code characterizes it as "a special contract of permanent union between a man and a woman entered into in
accordance with law for the establishment of conjugal, and family life." 21 So crucial are marriage and the family
to the stability and peace of the nation that their "nature, consequences, and incidents are governed by law
and not subject to stipulation . . ." 22 As a matter of policy, therefore, the nullification of a marriage for the
purpose of contracting another cannot be accomplished merely on the basis of the perception of both parties
or of one that their union is so defective with respect to the essential requisites of a contract of marriage as to
render it void ipso jure and with no legal effect — and nothing more. Were this so, this inviolable social
institution would be reduced to a mockery and would rest on very shaky foundations indeed. And the grounds
for nullifying marriage would be as diverse and far-ranging as human ingenuity and fancy could conceive. For
such a social significant institution, an official state pronouncement through the courts, and nothing less, will
satisfy the exacting norms of society. Not only would such an open and public declaration by the courts
definitively confirm the nullity of the contract of marriage, but the same would be easily verifiable through
records accessible to everyone.
That the law seeks to ensure that a prior marriage is no impediment to a second sought to be contracted by
one of the parties may be gleaned from new information required in the Family Code to be included in the
application for a marriage license, viz, "If previously married, how, when and where the previous marriage was
dissolved and annulled." 23
Reverting to the case before us, petitioner's interpretation of Art. 40 of the Family Code is, undoubtedly, quite
restrictive. Thus, his position that private respondent's failure to state in the petition that the same is filed to
enable her to remarry will result in the dismissal of SP No. 1989-J is untenable. His misconstruction of Art. 40
resulting from the misplaced emphasis on the term "solely" was in fact anticipated by the members of the
Committee.
Dean Gupit commented the word "only" may be misconstrued to refer to "for purposes of remarriage." Judge
Diy stated that "only" refers to "final judgment." Justice Puno suggested that they say "on the basis only of a
final judgment." Prof. Baviera suggested that they use the legal term "solely" instead of "only," which the
Committee approved. 24 (Emphasis supplied)
Pursuing his previous argument that the declaration for absolute nullity of marriage is unnecessary, petitioner
suggests that private respondent should have filed an ordinary civil action for the recovery of the properties
alleged to have been acquired during their union. In such an eventuality, the lower court would not be acting
as a mere special court but would be clothed with jurisdiction to rule on the issues of possession and
ownership. In addition, he pointed out that there is actually nothing to separate or partition as the petition
admits that all the properties were acquired with private respondent's money.
The Court of Appeals disregarded this argument and concluded that "the prayer for declaration of absolute
nullity of marriage may be raised together with the other incident of their marriage such as the separation of
their properties."
When a marriage is declared void ab initio, the law states that the final judgment therein shall provide for "the
liquidation, partition and distribution of the properties of the spouses, the custody and support of the common
children, and the delivery of their presumptive legitimes, unless such matters had been adjudicated in previous
judicial proceedings." 25 Other specific effects flowing therefrom, in proper cases, are the following:
Art. 43. xxx xxx xxx
(2) The absolute community of property or the conjugal partnership, as the case may be, shall be dissolved and
liquidated, but if either spouse contracted said marriage in bad faith, his or her share of the net profits of the
community property or conjugal partnership property shall be forfeited in favor of the common children or, if
there are none, the children of the guilty spouse by a previous marriage or, in default of children, the innocent
spouse;
(3) Donations by reason of marriage shall remain valid, except that if the donee contracted the marriage in bad
faith, such donations made to said donee are revoked by operation of law;
(4) The innocent spouse may revoke the designation of the other spouse who acted in bad faith as a beneficiary
in any insurance policy, even if such designation be stipulated as irrevocable; and
(5) The spouse who contracted the subsequent marriage in bad faith shall be disqualified to inherit from the
innocent spouse by testate and intestate succession. (n)
Art. 44. If both spouses of the subsequent marriage acted in bad faith, said marriage shall be void ab initio and
all donations by reason of marriage and testamentary disposition made by one in favor of the other are
revoked by operation of law. (n) 26
Based on the foregoing provisions, private respondent's ultimate prayer for separation of property will simply
be one of the necessary consequences of the judicial declaration of absolute nullity of their marriage. Thus,
petitioner's suggestion that in order for their properties to be separated, an ordinary civil action has to be
instituted for that purpose is baseless. The Family Code has clearly provided the effects of the declaration of
nullity of marriage, one of which is the separation of property according to the regime of property relations
governing them. It stands to reason that the lower court before whom the issue of nullity of a first marriage is
brought is likewise clothed with jurisdiction to decide the incidental questions regarding the couple's
properties. Accordingly, the respondent court committed no reversible error in finding that the lower court
committed no grave abuse of discretion in denying petitioner's motion to dismiss SP No. 1989-J.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby DENIED. The decision of respondent Court dated February 7, 1992
and the Resolution dated March 20, 1992 are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. L-53703 August 19, 1986
LILIA OLIVA WIEGEL, petitioner,
vs.
THE HONORABLE ALICIA V. SEMPIO-DIY (as presiding judge of the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court of
Caloocan City) and KARL HEINZ WIEGEL, respondents.
Dapucanta, Dulay & Associates for petitioner.
Siguion Reyna, Montecillo and Ongsiako Law Office for private respondent.
PARAS, J.:
In an action (Family Case No. 483) filed before the erstwhile Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court of Caloocan
City, herein respondent Karl Heinz Wiegel (plaintiff therein) asked for the declaration of Nullity of his marriage
(celebrated on July, 1978 at the Holy Catholic Apostolic Christian Church Branch in Makati, Metro Manila) with
herein petitioner Lilia Oliva Wiegel (Lilia, for short, and defendant therein) on the ground of Lilia's previous
existing marriage to one Eduardo A. Maxion, the ceremony having been performed on June 25, 1972 at our
Lady of Lourdes Church in Quezon City. Lilia, while admitting the existence of said prior subsisting marriage
claimed that said marriage was null and void, she and the first husband Eduardo A. Maxion having been
allegedly forced to enter said marital union. In the pre-trial that ensued, the issue agreed upon by both parties
was the status of the first marriage (assuming the presence of force exerted against both parties): was said
prior marriage void or was it merely voidable? Contesting the validity of the pre-trial order, Lilia asked the
respondent court for an opportunity to present evidence-
(1) that the first marriage was vitiated by force exercised upon both her and the first husband; and
(2) that the first husband was at the time of the marriage in 1972 already married to someone else.
Respondent judge ruled against the presentation of evidence because the existence of force exerted on both
parties of the first marriage had already been agreed upon. Hence, the present petition for certiorari assailing
the following Orders of therespondent Judge-
(1) the Order dated March 17, 1980 in which the parties were compelled to submit the case for resolution based
on "agreed facts;" and
(2) the Order dated April 14, 1980, denying petitioner's motion to allow her to present evidence in her favor.
We find the petition devoid of merit.
There is no need for petitioner to prove that her first marriage was vitiated by force committed against both
parties because assuming this to be so, the marriage will not be void but merely viodable (Art. 85, Civil Code),
and therefore valid until annulled. Since no annulment has yet been made, it is clear that when she married
respondent she was still validly married to her first husband, consequently, her marriage to respondent is VOID
(Art. 80, Civil Code).
There is likewise no need of introducing evidence about the existing prior marriage of her first husband at the
time they married each other, for then such a marriage though void still needs according to this Court a judicial
declaration 1 of such fact and for all legal intents and purposes she would still be regarded as a married woman
at the time she contracted her marriage with respondent Karl Heinz Wiegel); accordingly, the marriage of
petitioner and respondent would be regarded VOID under the law.
WHEREFORE, this petition is hereby DISMISSED, for lack of merit, and the Orders complained of are hereby
AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED