iFluids Training Academy

Hazop Training

Intermediate Course
 • What is a HAZOP Study?
• Definition of basic terms
• Risk matrix/ALARP principle
• When to Perform a HAZOP Study
• Different stages of Hazop study and
relevant Data requirement
• HAZOP STUDY - TEAM COMPOSITION
Course contents • Generally accepted rules of HAZOP
• Overall HAZOP Methodology
• Layers of protection/Safeguard
• Hierarchy of controls (with simple example)
• HAZOP Study-Example
• Relation between HAZOP and LOPA
• Brief introduction to LOPA
HAZARD AND OPERABILITY STUDY

Brainstorming,
Structured Using Guide
Multidisciplinary Team
Words
Approach

Problem Identifying Cost Effective

 Basic terms definitions

Any thing which has

potential to cause
HAZARD harm to people, asset,
Environment or/and
reputation
 Risk= Frequency *
consequence

Frequency= Probability
Risk of Event occurring

consequence= extent of
effect on people, asset,
Environment, reputation
 Consequence

Multiple fatalities / constant breach of regulatory limits / plant outage more than a month(>
5
Rs. 10 crore) / International impact
Single fatality / short term breaches of reglatory limits / 1 week to 1 month for the unit (< Rs.
4
10 crore) / Major Impact. On National TV/National Press
More than one MTC or LTI or Health Effect/Localized Effect Has significant Impact on
3
Environment but no
one LTI or MTC or Health Effect for One Person / Minor Effect. Has Impact on Environment but
2
no permanent effect / 12 hrs to 48 hrs
Minor injury (First Aid Case) or Health Effect/Slight Effect. 100% Cleanup possible/Less than
1
12 hour outage for single section (within 1
 more than 100 years (never
A
heard of the incident)
once in 100 years (heard of the
B
incident in the industry)
Likelihood/Frequency once in 20 years (incident has
C
occured in the company)
once in 4 years (happened
D
several times in the company)
Happens more than two times
E
per year.
RISK ASSESSMENT MATRIX (RAM)
CONSEQUENCE LIKELIHOOD
A B C D E

Environment
Production

Reputation
Equipment
Severity

damage
People
Rating

More than100 Once in 100 Once in 20 Once in 4 years

loss
years (Never years (Heard of years (Incident (Happened More than once
heard of the Incident in has occurred in several times in in a year
incident) Industry) Our Company) the Company)

Multiple worker Extensive More than a Massive effect over International impact.
Catastrophic

fatalities / damage, month of outage a large area or Adverse attention in

permanent total prolonged loss of for one unit constant breach of International media
5 5A 5B 5C 5D 5E
disabilities or single production or > regulatory limits
public fatality Rs. 10 Crore
Intolerable
Single worker Major damage, More than one Major Effect, Short Major Impact. On
fatality / Permanent disruption to week to one term breaches of National TV /
Demonstrate Zone
Major

disability or serious operations or < month outage regulatory limits National Press
4A
4
injury to public Rs. 10 Crore for one unit ALARP4B 4C 4D 4E

More than one LTI Local damage, 48 hrs. to one Localized effect. Considerable
unit shutdown or week outage for Has significant impact. Major
Serious

< Rs. 1 Crore one unit impact on concern in National

3 3A 3B 3C 3D 3E
Environment but no Press / Local TV
permanent effect

One Loss Time Minor damage or 24 hrs. to 48 Minor effect, has Limited impact.
Incident (LTI) < Rs. 50 Lakhs hrs. outage for impact on Public concern in Incorporate Risk
Minor

2 one unit Environment but no neighborhood. 2A 2B Reduction 2D

2C 2E
permanent effect Reported in local Manage for
newspaper Measures
Slight injuries (First Slight damage or Less than 24 Slight effect; 100% Slight impact, Public
Continuous
Notable

aid case) / Short < Rs. 10 Lakhs hours cleanup possible awareness exists, no Improvement
1 term effect public concern 1A 1B 1C 1D 1E
ALARP PRINCIPLE
“As Low As Reasonably Practicable”
▪ Involves weighing risk against the
trouble, time and money to control
▪ Describes level to which workplace risk
is to be controlled.
▪ Not prescriptive
▪ Challenging because it requires
employers to exercise judgment.

What is Acceptable Risk?

We accept/ tolerate risk when:

1. We don’t know that it exists

2. The Risk is insignificantly low
3. When it’s worth the Risk (?)
 Tools for Process Hazard Identification

What if
HAZOP FMEA ETA
Analysis?

Safety Compliance
FTA
Audit Audit
HAZARD AND OPERABILITY STUDY

Brainstorming, Structured Using Guide Problem Identifying Cost Effective

Multidisciplinary Team Words
Approach
 HAZOP STUDY - TEAM COMPOSITION
A Team Leader, an expert in the HAZOP Technique
Technical Members, for example

New Design Existing Plant

Design or Project Engineer Plant Superintendent
Process Engineer Process Supervisor (Foreman)
Commissioning Manager Maintenance Engineer
Instrument Design Engineer Instrument Engineer
Chemist Technical Engineer
• Process description • Process flow • Operating • P&IDs (base study
diagrams (PFDs) manuals/procedures document)

Arrange for system or Recording technique

Verification of as-built Line segment
process briefings for (computer program or
conditions shown on boundaries set;
team before work data sheet)
the P&IDs markup of P&IDs
begins. determination

HAZOP PREPLANNING ISSUES

Preplanning issues addressed in a typical refinery unit HAZOP include the

following:
Golden Rules of HAZOP
• HAZOP does not challenge the design for normal operating conditions. All equipments are assumed to be well
designed, manufactured and properly inspected. Plant are well maintained in accordance with the standard.
• Deviations resulting from two or more independent events that occur concurrently were generally not considered
unless one of the events had a high probability rating and the consequences of the resulting event was high
• All of the valves and Blinds are assumed to be in correct position.
• shown in the P&IDs as open or closed are normally in the position shown
• Non process causes are not reviewed in HAZOP (e.g. storm, hurricane, Dropped Objects, external impacts /
Sabotage)
• Consequences are reviewed without any safeguards (No human response, No SIF, No mechanical barrier).
• Consequences are described at least up to the initial physical event (leakage, LOC, Off spec, etc.)
Golden Rules of HAZOP
• In each scenario where various degrees of severity are possible, such as the failure of a pump seal, the
maximum consequence of the event was used to determine both the likelihood and consequence.
• No escalation assessment is reviewed during the HAZOP (No F&G review, Layout, Safety distances etc.
• Manual Valve closure / Opening due to operator error should not be considered as credible
scenario.(The operator error frequency rates assume that the processes are operated by trained
operators and written instructions are followed where they are available.)
• Credit can be given to (Alarm & Operator response) only for Normal operating task.
• Credit cannot be given to (Alarm & Operator Response) for emergency response.
• Single check valve is adequate unless reverse flow may cause pressure to exceed test pressure.
• Mechanical Protection devices such as PSV / RD are expected to work.
• Operating instruction and operating manuals shall be considered as effective safeguard.
Defining the Nodes

• A NODE is the selection of one or more items of equipment as a focal point of study.
• A node could be as small as a line, a pump, a vessel or a heat exchanger or as large as an entire
process plant.

In the early method of assigning node, each of the lines entering and leaving the vessel was treated as a
separate node. The vessel itself was not treated as a separate node because it was considered to be
adequately addressed by applying deviations to the entry and exit lines.
The method of defining nodes at present day is to define compound nodes. For example, Feed piping
from a feed vessel, a centrifugal pump, a control valve set and a heat exchanger supplying a reactor
vessel would be considered as a single node.
Defining the Nodes

Greater the familiarity and confidence are with the HAZOP methodology; the node size can be
increased to include more equipment. Just as small node sizes are inefficient, very large node sizes may
also be inefficient. In general, the optimum node size can include multiple items of equipment,
provided, that they share a common function
HAZOP Methodology
Guide Word – Parameter Pairs
LOPA ONION-
SAFE GUARDS
PFDs for IPLs adapted from CCPS
 Control
Measures
priority
What is the consequence ???
RISK ASSESSMENT MATRIX (RAM)
CONSEQUENCE LIKELIHOOD
A B C D E

Environment
Production

Reputation
Equipment
Severity

damage
People
Rating

More than100 Once in 100 Once in 20 Once in 4 years

loss
years (Never years (Heard of years (Incident (Happened More than once
heard of the Incident in has occurred in several times in in a year
incident) Industry) Our Company) the Company)

Multiple worker Extensive More than a Massive effect over International impact.
Catastrophic

fatalities / damage, month of outage a large area or Adverse attention in

permanent total prolonged loss of for one unit constant breach of International media
5 5A 5B 5C 5D 5E
disabilities or single production or > regulatory limits
public fatality Rs. 10 Crore
Intolerable
Single worker Major damage, More than one Major Effect, Short Major Impact. On
fatality / Permanent disruption to week to one term breaches of National TV /
Demonstrate Zone
Major

disability or serious operations or < month outage regulatory limits National Press
4A
4
injury to public Rs. 10 Crore for one unit ALARP4B 4C 4D 4E

More than one LTI Local damage, 48 hrs. to one Localized effect. Considerable
unit shutdown or week outage for Has significant impact. Major
Serious

< Rs. 1 Crore one unit impact on concern in National

3 3A 3B 3C 3D 3E
Environment but no Press / Local TV
permanent effect

One Loss Time Minor damage or 24 hrs. to 48 Minor effect, has Limited impact.
Incident (LTI) < Rs. 50 Lakhs hrs. outage for impact on Public concern in Incorporate Risk
Minor

2 one unit Environment but no neighborhood. 2A 2B Reduction 2D

2C 2E
permanent effect Reported in local Manage for
newspaper Measures
Slight injuries (First Slight damage or Less than 24 Slight effect; 100% Slight impact, Public
Continuous
Notable

aid case) / Short < Rs. 10 Lakhs hours cleanup possible awareness exists, no Improvement
1 term effect public concern 1A 1B 1C 1D 1E
 Additional PT’s with
2oo3 Logic closing XV-
100 and PV-200

XV-100

Discrepancy alarm
Low and High alarm in
Each PT’s
Hazop Example
HAZOP Planning and Execution
CLOSE OUT
Record/File
Completed
Actions
TRACK
ACTIONS
HAZOP
Review
Meeting
REPORT
Action List
HAZOP
Report
TEAM
System
Assessment
Team Activity
PLAN
Select Team
Examine System
Keywords

58
Relation between HAZOP and LOPA
LOPA ONION-
SAFE GUARDS
Training Academy
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