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Globalization: An Agenda

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Globalization: An Agenda
‘Globalization’ is a ubiquitous term invoked
in academic and public discourses to explain,
justify and anticipate the rapid expansion and
intensification of social relations across
world-time and world-space (Steger, 2013).
Both the subjective awareness and the objec-
tive evidence of deepening global intercon-
nectedness give rise to people’s projections of
vastly different worlds: a world without con-
flict or poverty; a world without nation-states;
a world of opportunity; a world where technol-
ogy transcends culture and national politics to
hasten the formation of new communities and
identities released from the confines of geo-
graphical space. To even conceive of some-
thing like ‘globalization’, one must first
imagine the globe and acknowledge de facto
membership of a globally connected populace
(Lefebvre, 1991: 365; Robertson, 1992: 2).
Globalization is at once an accumulation of
transnational flows extended across the globe
and at the same time an intensely personal
practice. The personal and the global are no
01_Steger et al_Ch-01-Part-I.indd 1
PART I
Paul Battersby
longer separated by sharp national dividing
lines or held apart by the ideological controls
of modern nation-states. Globalization thus
involves multiple individual and collective
acts of becoming global in outlook, of becom-
ing globally networked, and globally engaged.
Global awareness however entails realization
that claims as to the ideational and material
manifestations of globalization are widely
questioned and, in many minds, rejected as
spurious in logic and evidence. The academic
study of globalization – global studies – is
premised on the claims that such complexity
can be meaningfully encapsulated within a
single programme of learning and that global
perspectives have major substantive relevance
on an interdependent planet.
The term ‘globalization’ burst on the scene
in the 1990s,, sparking the production of
extensive bibliographies, and a dizzying
range of interpretations, qualifications and
denunciations of the concept, the sheer vol-
ume of which belies its relative youth. Paul
2/26/2014 11:30:06 AM
 2 THE SAGE HANDBOOK OF GLOBALIZATION
Hirst and Grahame Thompson present the
most widely cited rejection of the liberal glo-
balization thesis, which they assert is a ‘myth’
(1997: 13–16[This is not cited in the
References. Please supply details so that it
can be listed.]). For them, the so-called global
economy is more an international economy of
independent states collectively regulated
through intergovernmental agencies but domi-
nated by the world’s largest economic actors in
North America, Europe and East Asia.
Globalization is not an ‘ungovernable’ phe-
nomenon but rather, as they argue, a set of
ideas that serves the interests of transnational
capital and to which policy makers have too
readily succumbed (Hirst and Thompson,
1997: 6–7, 200). The end to superpower con-
frontation between the United States and the
former Soviet Union in the 1990s gave rise to
heady predictions about the dawn of a new
era of liberal peace founded upon free trade,
but the foundations of liberal order rest on
shaky ground. John Gray, in False Dawn: the
Delusions of Global Capitalism, cautioned
that the institutional arrangements that made
global free trade possible were at best stagnat-
ing in the face of resurgent mercantilism
(Gray, 2002[This is not cited in the
References. Please supply details so that it
can be listed.]). The GFC (Global Financial
Crisis) and Eurozone crisis, while not ending
the globalist dream, ensure that its realization
is deferred, perhaps indefinitely.
Hirst and Thompson and Gray provide
rejoinders to Kenichi Ohmae’s claims as to the
‘end of the nation-state’ (Ohmae, 1995) and
Francis Fukuyama’s larger generalizations
about ‘the end of history’ (Fukuyama, 1992).
All of these studies represent the overwhelm-
ing popular concern with economic aspects of
globalization, which makes their analyses and
conclusions rather one-dimensional. While
acknowledging that global capital markets
have altered substantially in scale, complex-
ity and impact since the 1980s, David Held,
Anthony McGrew, David Goldblatt et al.
argue against purely economistic conceptions
of globalization (2000: 5). Much deeper and
extensive transformations are occurring that
01_Steger et al_Ch-01-Part-I.indd 2
can only be interpreted through the combined
analysis of transnational social, technologi-
cal and cultural patterns and processes. Some
market globalists too appreciate the cultural
nuances of global change. Globalization,
writes Kenichi Ohmae, is altering the ‘mind-
set’ of younger generations through ‘technol-
ogy-driven convergence’ that delivers the
cultural and commercial products of glo-
balizing markets to eager consumers of
global brands (Ohmae, 1996: 15). For liber-
als, culture is however subordinate to and
perpetually refashioned by market forces and
hence, following liberal market logic, cultures
will inevitably melt away in the hot dry winds
of global free trade.
Globalization is not a unidirectional pro-
cess in which the ‘West’ transmits values and
cultural practices to the ‘rest’. To borrow
from Zygmunt Bauman, we are caught in a
‘liquid modernity’, swirling with crosscur-
rents of change and resistance, multifaceted,
and unpredictable (Bauman, 2000). As
Anthony Giddens argues, globalization
entails multiple invasive processes that pen-
etrate our everyday worlds, our routines and
our sense of identity. In so doing, these glo-
balizing processes frequently engender local-
ized resistance and counter movements
(Giddens, 2000: 12–13) Differences are pro-
liferating undermining the ‘integrity’ of
nation-states, and of established discourses
of knowledge. Manfred Steger distinguishes
dyadic contests between forward-looking
‘market globalism’ and ‘justice globalism’ on
the one hand and the backward looking, pos-
sibly millennial ‘imperial globalism’ and
‘religious globalisms’ on the other, each bat-
tling for the ideological high ground at all
levels of global society (Steger, 2009, 2013).
Islamist jihadism is a reaction to adopted
secularism and pervasiveness of Western
culture, international institutions and the
larger non-governmental development agen-
cies. Alter-globalization protest movements
manifest resistance to the market globalism
promoted by transnational corporations,
global financial elites and policy makers.
The paradox here is that the act of resistance
2/26/2014 11:30:06 AM
 GLOBALIZATION: AN AGENDA
itself generates alternate forms of globaliza-
tion cohering around oppositional ideologies
and practices.
Radical critiques emphasize the hidden
power structures behind globalization that
perpetuate global inequalities and social
injustices. In this image of globalization, the
interests of capital are diametrically opposed
to those of the majority, but governments are
easily swayed with promises of investment
and short-term economic gain. Feminist
scholars draw attention to the dominant dis-
courses of power and competition central to
political realism and economic liberalism
respectively that endorse a masculinist read-
ing of globalization and banish alternative
logics, and women, to the side-lines (Enloe,
1990: 11–18; 2007). Even in those places
where women’s work is to an extent valued
as an economic resource, heavy societal
costs are imposed in return for a measure of
income security. Mexico’s Maquiladoras for
example are situated at the interstices of
transnational production networks where tra-
ditional societal norms dissolve exacerbating
the scourge of petty and organized crime,
major drug crime, domestic violence and
murder in an increasingly transient society.
Here women assemble to protect themselves
through local civic action to counter what
feminist writers, in Galtungian vein, interpret
as the structural violence of global capitalism
(Swanger, 2007). Globalization is thus
depicted as a destructive force, damaging the
well-being of working people especially
women and particularly, though not exclu-
sively, women in developing societies. The
sense of injustice arising from such violence
and exploitation is but one more motivating
force behind the formation of global move-
ments for social change.
For reasons outlined, the pursuit of a
global order founded on universal rules
extends beyond economics into the norma-
tive spheres of law, politics and justice.
Justice globalists claim universal principles
applicable to all societies irrespective of reli-
gion or ideology. Assertions of the ‘indivisi-
bility’ of rights carry the implicit message
01_Steger et al_Ch-01-Part-I.indd 3
3
that that all societies irrespective of religion,
language and tradition, share certain basic
human values and ideals. Universalists like
Robert E. Goodin claim an objective ‘univer-
sal morality’ – arising from a ‘convergence’
of solutions to common human problems
(Goodin, 2003: 72). The idea of a universal
moral order is not peculiar or specific to the
Western Judeo-Christian tradition. Each of
the world’s other major universal religions –
Islam, Hinduism, Buddhism, Taoism and the
philosophical teachings of Confucius –
assume a higher authority to the state. While
the language of rights evolved in the West,
parallel ideas to the principles upon which
Western rights thinking evolved can be traced
through the Qur’an, the Baghavad Gita, and
the teachings of various ancient Chinese
sages. For example, Confucius’s The Analects
contain many specific recommendations
against the arbitrary exercise of power, and
Confucius enjoins those in authority to culti-
vate their humanity, which, it is asserted, is
the source of durable political legitimacy
(Leys, 1997: 58–9). Such cosmic concerns
have a contemporary and cosmopolitan ring.
For justice to become globalized some
commensurability is needed between alter-
native and complementary ideas of what is
just, which in turn requires an openness of
mind – what David Held would term a cos-
mopolitan mind. Encapsulating ideas of a
higher moral order prior to the state first
expressed by ancient Greek philosophers and
Roman Stoics, cosmopolitanism was given
theological expression in St Augustine’s
‘glorious city of God’ (Augustine, 2012: 99).
Faith is supplanted by civic consciousness,
political imagination and civic action in the
new global cosmopolis. The ideation of this
planetary space encompasses not only tele-
ological ideas of ‘cultural convergence’ and
the arrival of a ‘global village’ but also the
ideal of cultural diversity and the possibility
of peaceful accommodation between people
of different cultures. Even among political
realists, there are those who, like Hedley
Bull, are willing to accept the possibility of
a future cosmopolitan order (Bull, 2002).
2/26/2014 11:30:06 AM
 4 THE SAGE HANDBOOK OF GLOBALIZATION
One test of the universality of justice might
be the willingness of rule-makers to crimi-
nalize war. While the crimes of war are well
established in international law, war how-
ever remains an institutionalized practice
within the interstate system (Simpson, 2008:
147–8).
Heated contemporary debates on global
civil society revolve around the capacities of
this civic sphere outside and above the state,
untainted by commercial or political ambi-
tion, cohering around globalized norms of
human rights, democracy, social justice, gen-
der equity, and environmental conservation
(Anheier, 2012: 198–205). Populated by
globally minded civic groups, ubiquitous
non-governmental organizations (NGOs),
moral entrepreneurs, voluntary associations
and the increasingly vocal digital populace,
global civic space is heterogeneous and frac-
tious. Campaigning on issues ranging from
deforestation to genetically modified foods to
human rights, new global movements are
identified by Richard Falk as part of a ‘global
dialectic’ in which the agents of ‘globalization
from below’ challenge the ‘predatory’ agents
of ‘globalization from above’ (Falk, 1999: 3).
For those who believe in the transformative
potential of international politics, from
radical thinkers like Falk to political liberals
like David Held, differences of perspective,
opinion, and culture, can be overcome, not
by passive submission to global economic
forces, but by actively seeking out common
ground. Held argues that states and interna-
tional organizations must and can be trans-
formed to become truly representative
of a global public; they can be made less
‘executive’ and more democratic, and thus
better equipped to govern in the interests of
humankind. Cosmopolitanism for Held is a
pursuit of deeper engagement across cultures
in support of global rules and a global moral
order (Held, 2003:168; 2010).
The extent to which these civic actors and
movements constitute a larger whole that
could potentially counter the realist ortho-
doxies of the interstate system is however a
matter for contention. For Andre Drainville
01_Steger et al_Ch-01-Part-I.indd 4
‘global social relations have barely begun to
take form … ‘ and consequently too much is
claimed by cosmopolitan thinkers (2004: 10).
What cosmopolitans see as harbingers of a
fabulous cosmopolis are, he asserts, possibly
little more than ‘ghosts’ and ‘spectres’, hence
the need for scepticism, but not cynicism.
There is a fragmentary ‘glocal’ dynamic
within globalization; generated by the crea-
tive destruction of spatial and social configu-
rations consolidated under industrial
capitalism (Castells, 2000: 3–4; Lefebvre,
1991: 365). Localism is one such fragmentary
vector, in part a demand for economic and
cultural autonomy cohering around localized
resistance to consumer capitalism and glo-
balized economic exchange (Sklair, 2002).
The retreat into religious communes,
Christian, Hindu, and Buddhist, parallels this
secular localism but with, in some cases, the
addition of disturbing apocalyptic manifestos.
A strand of constructive religious localism
predating is discussed in E.F. Schumacher’s
Small in Beautiful (1973), a precursor to late
twentieth century debates about sufficiency
and sustainability. Citing Buddhist principles,
Schumacher advocated the localization of
production and consumption, ecosystem sus-
tainability and the balanced interdependencies
of family, community, work and the natural
environment (Schumacher, 1973: 44–51). At
the other extreme of traditionalist and radical
reaction, the violent Islamist manifests at once
the rejection of global capitalism and the para-
doxical desire for a global community of
religious believers – in this life or the next.
Localism takes many forms, including a
qualified endorsement of various processes of
‘glocalization’, not all of which are hostile to
international or global cooperation but rather
the power of states and corporations to medi-
ate ‘distanciated’ social interactions. The
localist seeks to minimize their ecological
footprint and to maximize public participation
in the economic and political life of the com-
munity and the planet, albeit through vastly
different mechanisms. Localism is not there-
fore necessarily a demand for autarky. Along
the spectrum of localist ideas, renunciation of
2/26/2014 11:30:06 AM
 GLOBALIZATION: AN AGENDA
this world sits at one end while at the other we
find acceptance of modern social realities
combined with advocacy of government poli-
cies and practices that compel transnational
corporations to support local development
(Hines, 2000; Wiseman, 1999).
If the world is ‘running away’ from us, as
Giddens suggests, this reality merely increases
the urgency with which the academy must
recast both the curriculum and public debate
(Giddens, 2000). The study of globalization
can yield fresh insights into how the pro-
cesses of disempowerment might be arrested
through a differently conceived set of global
institutional arrangements. The challenge is
to avoid the extremes of the Hobbesian free-
for-all or some global ‘nocturnal’ or ‘night-
watchman’ state governed by policy experts,
surveilled and policed to eliminate all possi-
ble human failings. If the drivers of globaliza-
tion are primarily economic, without which
there can be no technological convergence
and hence no possibility of a negotiated
global civic consensus, then collective action
to promote global change might well be
futile. If the drivers are to a degree social,
cultural, technological, and intellectual, then
the scope for effecting meaningful change
through learning and debate is great.
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Baumann Z (2000) Liquid Modernity. Cambridge: Polity
Press.
Bull H (2002) The Anarchical Society: A Study of
Order in World Politics. New York: Columbia Uni­
versity Press.
Castells M (2000) The Information Age, Volume 1, The
Rise of the Network Society. Oxford: Blackwell.
Drainville AC (2004) Contesting Globalization: Space
and Place in the World Economy. London: Routledge.
Enloe C (1990) Bananas, Beaches and Bases: Making
Feminist Sense of International Politics. Berkeley:
University of California Press.
Enloe C (2007) Globalization and Militarism: Feminists
Make the Link. Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield.
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Falk R (1999) Predatory Globalization: A Critique.
Cambridge: Polity Press.
Fukuyama F (1992) The End of History and the Last
Man. London: Penguin.
Giddens A (2000) Runaway World: How Globalisation
is Reshaping our Lives. Oxford: Polity Press.
Goodin R (2003) Globalising justice. In: Held D and
Koenig-Archibugi M (eds) Taming Globalization: New
Frontiers of Governance. Cambridge: Polity Press.
Gray J (2002) False Dawn: The Delusions of Global
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Held D (2003) From executive to cosmopolitan multilat­
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Taming Globalization: Frontiers of governance.
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Held D (2010) Cosmopolitanism: Ideals and Realities.
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Simpson G (2008) War, Law and Crime: War Crimes
Trials and the Reinvention of International Law.
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Sklair L (2002) Globalization, Capitalism and its
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Steger M (2009) The Rise of the Global Imaginary:
Political Ideologies from the French Revolution to the
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duction. 3rd edn, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Swanger J (2007) Feminist community Bbuilding in
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01_Steger et al_Ch-01-Part-I.indd 6 2/26/2014 11:30:06 AM

Approaches to the Study of
Globalization
INTRODUCTION
Even after more than two decades of intense
scholarly scrutiny, ‘globalization’ has remained
a contested and slippery concept. In spite of
the remarkable proliferation of research pro-
grammes for the study of globalization, there
are many different approaches to the study of
globalization. Since the beginning of self-
conscious academic inquiries into multiple pro-
cess of globalization in the early 1990s, aca-
demics have remained divided on the utility of
various methodological approaches, the value
of available empirical evidence for gauging the
extent, impact, and direction of globalization,
and, of course, its normative implications. The
failure to arrive at a broad scholarly consensus
on the subject attests not only to the contentious
nature of academic inquiry in general, but also
reflects the retreat from generalizing initiated in
the 1980s by the influential ‘poststructuralist
turn’ away from ‘grand narratives’.
As FredricJameson (1998) astutely points
out, there seems to be little utility in forcing
such a complex set of social forces as globaliza-
tion into a single analytic framework. It seems
01_Steger et al_Ch-01-Part-I.indd 7
1
Manfred Steger
to make more sense to survey various approaches
to globalization by linking them to the debates
on the subject that have been taking place over
the last two decades in two separate but related
arenas. One battle has been mostly fought
within the narrow walls of academia, while the
other has been unfolding in the popular arena of
public discourse. Although there are some com-
mon themes and overlapping observations, the
academic debate differs from the more general
discussion in that its participants tend to focus
on the analytical rather than the normative or
ideological dimension of globalization.
Certainly, there has been an explosion in the
number of books and articles on the subject
published by both academic and trade outlets.
Consulting the electronic database Factiva,
which holds some 8,000 newspapers, maga-
zines, and reports worldwide, the global studies
scholar Nayan Chanda (2007) showed that the
number of items mentioning globalization grew
from a mere two in 1981 to a high of 57,235 in
2001. Since then, it has stabilized at an annual
average of about 45,000.
Many of the principal participants in the
academic debate reside and teach in the
2/26/2014 11:30:06 AM
 8 THE SAGE HANDBOOK OF GLOBALIZATION
wealthy countries of the northern hemi-
sphere, particularly the United States and the
United Kingdom. Their disproportionate
intellectual influence reflects not only exist-
ing power relations in the world, but also the
global dominance of Anglo-American ideas.
Although they share a common intellectual
framework, these scholars hold radically dif-
ferent views regarding the definition of glo-
balization, its scale, chronology, impact, and
policy outcomes. Part of the reason why
there is so much disagreement has to do with
the fact that globalization itself is a frag-
mented, incomplete, uneven, and contradic-
tory set of social processes. Rosenau (2003),
for example, has defined globalization in terms
of what he calls ‘fragmegrative dynamics’ to
‘underscore the contradictions, ambiguities,
complexities, and uncertainties that have
replaced the regularities of prior epochs’.
Academics often respond to the analytical
challenge by trying to take conceptual
possession of globalization – as though it
were something ‘out there’ to be captured by
the ‘correct’ analytical framework. Indeed, as
Rosow (2000) has pointed out, many
researchers approach globalization as if they
were dealing with a process or an object
without a meaning of its own prior to its con-
stitution as a conceptual ‘territory’. Moreover,
since it falls outside the boundaries of estab-
lished academic disciplines, the study of
globalization has invited armies of social
scientists, scholars in the humanities, and
even natural scientists to leave their mark on
an intellectual terra incognita.
As a result, various scholars have appro­
ached the concept of globalization by analys-
ing and describing a variety of changing
economic, political, and cultural processes
that are alleged to have accelerated since the
1970s. No generally accepted definition of
globalization has emerged, except for such
broad descriptions as ‘increasing global inter-
connectedness’, ‘the expansions and intensi-
fication of social relations across world-time
and world-space’, ‘the compression of time
and space’, ‘distant proximities’, ‘a complex
range of processes, driven by a mixture of
political and economic influences’, and ‘the
01_Steger et al_Ch-01-Part-I.indd 8
swift and relatively unimpeded flow of capi-
tal, people, and ideas across national borders’
(Giddens, 1990; Harvey, 1989; Held and
McGrew, 2007; Lechner and Boli, 2011;
Robertson, 1992; Steger, 2013; Waters,
2001). A number of researchers object to
those characterizations, some going so far as
to deny the existence of globalization alto-
gether. And yet, the last few years have also
seen some emerging areas of consensus as
well as the rise of the new transdisciplinary
field of ‘global studies’.
It is the purpose of this chapter to provide
a general overview of the principal academic
approaches to the subject proposed by lead-
ing global studies scholars since the 1990s.
These range from the suggestion that globali-
zation is little more than ‘globaloney’, to
conflicting interpretations of globalization as
economic, political, or cultural processes.
Although such different approaches are nec-
essary for gaining a better understanding of
globalization, I will ultimately argue that
these social-scientific approaches to the sub-
ject ought to be complemented by interpre-
tive explorations of the ideational and
normative dimensions of globalization.
GLOBALIZATION AS ‘GLOBALONEY’
A small and rapidly decreasing number of
scholars contend that existing accounts of
globalization are incorrect, imprecise, or
exaggerated. They note that just about every-
thing that can be linked to some transnational
process is cited as evidence for globalization
and its growing influence. Hence, they sus-
pect that such general observations often
amount to little more than ‘globaloney’ (Held
and McGrew, 2007; Rosenberg, 2000;
Veseth, 2010). The arguments of these glo-
balization critics fall into three broad catego-
ries. Representatives of the first group
dispute the usefulness of globalization as a
sufficiently precise analytical concept.
Members of the second group point to the
limited nature of globalizing processes,
emphasizing that the world is not nearly as
integrated as many globalization proponents
2/26/2014 11:30:06 AM
 APPROACHES TO THE STUDY OF GLOBALIZATION
believe. In their view, the term ‘globaliza-
tion’ does not constitute an accurate label for
the actual state of affairs. The third group of
critics disputes the novelty of the process
while acknowledging the existence of mod-
erate globalizing tendencies. They argue that
those who refer to globalization as a recent
process miss the bigger picture and fall prey
to their narrow historical framework. Let us
examine the respective arguments of these
three groups in more detail.
Rejectionists
Scholars who dismiss the utility of globalization
as an analytical concept typically advance their
arguments from within a larger criticism of
similarly vague words employed in academic
discourse. Besides globalization, another often-
cited example for such analytically impover-
ished concepts is the complex and ambiguous
phenomenon of nationalism. Craig Calhoun
(1993), for example, argues that nationalism
and its corollary terms ‘have proved notoriously
hard concepts to define’ because ‘nationalisms
are extremely varied phenomena’, and ‘any
definition will legitimate some claims and del-
egitimate others’. Writing in the same critical
vein, Susan Strange (1996) considers globaliza-
tion a prime example of such a vacuous term,
suggesting that it has been used in academic
discourse to refer to ‘anything from the Internet
to a hamburger’. See also Clark (1999: 34–40).
Similarly, Linda Weiss (1998) objects to the
term as ‘a big idea resting on slim foundations’.
Scholarly suggestions for improvement
point in two different directions. The first is to
challenge the academic community to provide
additional examples of how the term ‘globali-
zation’ obscures more than it enlightens. Such
empirically based accounts would serve as a
warning to extreme globalization proponents.
Ultimately, the task of more careful research-
ers should be to break the concept of globali-
zation into smaller, more manageable parts
that contain a higher analytical value because
they can be more easily associated with
empirical processes. This rationale underlies
Robert Holton’s (1998) suggestion to abandon
all general theoretical analyses in favour of
01_Steger et al_Ch-01-Part-I.indd 9
9
middle-range approaches that seek to provide
specific explanations of particulars.
The second avenue for improvement
involves my own suggestion to complement
the social-scientific enterprise of exploring
globalization as an objective process with more
interpretive studies of the ideological project of
globalism. Following this argument, the central
task for scholars working in the emerging field
of globalization studies would be to identify
and evaluate the ideological manoeuvres of
prominent proponents and opponents who have
filled the term with values and meanings that
bolster their respective political agendas.
Sceptics
The second group emphasizes the limited
nature of current globalizing processes. This
perspective is perhaps best reflected in the
writings of Wade (1996); and Hirst, Thompson
and Bromley (2009). See also Rugman
(2001). In their detailed historical analysis of
economic globalization, Hirst and Thompson
(2009) claim that the world economy is not a
truly global phenomenon, but one centred on
Europe, eastern Asia, and North America. The
authors emphasize that the majority of eco-
nomic activity around the world still remains
primarily national in origin and scope.
Presenting recent data on trade, foreign direct
investment, and financial flows, the authors
warn against drawing global conclusions
from increased levels of economic interaction
in advanced industrial countries. Hirst and
Thompson advance an argument against the
existence of economic globalization based on
empirical data in order to attack the general
misuse of the concept. Without a truly global
economic system, they insist, there can be no
such thing as globalization: ‘[A]s we pro-
ceeded [with our economic research] our
skepticism deepened until we became con-
vinced that globalization, as conceived by the
more extreme globalizers, is largely a myth.’
Doremus et al. (1998) and Zysman (1996)
reached a similar conclusion.
Buried under an avalanche of relevant
data, one can nonetheless detect a critical-
normative message in the Hirst–Thompson
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 10 THE SAGE HANDBOOK OF GLOBALIZATION
thesis: it is to show that exaggerated accounts
of an ‘iron logic of economic globalization’
tend to produce disempowering political
effects. For example, the authors convinc-
ingly demonstrate that certain political forces
have used the thesis of economic globalization
to propose national economic deregulation
and the reduction of welfare programmes. The
implementation of such policies stands to ben-
efit neo-liberal interests.
But there also remain a number of problems
with the Hirst–Thompson thesis. For example,
as several critics have pointed out, the authors
set overly high standards for the economy in
order to be counted as ‘fully globalized’. See,
for example, Held et al. (1999) and McGrew
and Held (2007). Moreover, their efforts to
construct an abstract model of a perfectly
globalized economy unnecessarily polarize the
topic by pressuring the reader to either com-
pletely embrace or entirely reject the concept of
globalization. Perhaps the most serious short-
coming of the Hirst–Thompson thesis lies in its
attempt to counteract neo-liberal economic
determinism with a good dose of Marxist eco-
nomic determinism. Their argument implicitly
assumes that globalization is primarily an eco-
nomic phenomenon. As a result, they portray
all other dimensions of globalization – culture,
politics, and ideology – as reflections of deeper
economic processes. While paying lip service
to the multidimensional character of globaliza-
tion, their own analysis ignores the logical
implications of this assertion. After all, if glo-
balization is truly a complex, multilevel phe-
nomenon, then economic relations constitute
only one among many globalizing tendencies.
It would therefore be entirely possible to argue
for the significance of globalization even if it
can be shown that increased transnational eco-
nomic activity appears to be limited to advanced
industrial countries.
Modifiers
The third and final group of globalization
critics disputes the novelty of the process,
implying that the label ‘globalization’ has
01_Steger et al_Ch-01-Part-I.indd 10
often been applied in a historically imprecise
manner. Robert Gilpin (2000), for example,
confirms the existence of globalizing tenden-
cies, but he also insists that many important
aspects of globalization are not novel devel-
opments. Citing relevant data collected by
the prominent American economist Paul
Krugman, Gilpin notes that the world econ-
omy in the late 1990s appeared to be even
less integrated in a number of important
respects than it was prior to the outbreak of
World War I. Even if one were to accept the
most optimistic assessment of the actual
volume of transnational economic activity,
the most one could say is that the post-war
international economy has simply restored
globalization to approximately the same
level that existed in 1913. Gilpin also points
to two additional factors that seem to sup-
port his position: the globalization of labour
was actually much greater prior to World
War I, and international migration declined
considerably after 1918. Hence, Gilpin
warns his readers against accepting the argu-
ments of ‘hyper-globalizers’. For a similar
assessment, see Burtless et al. (1998) and
Rodrik (1997).
Similar criticisms come from the propo-
nents of world-system theory. Pioneered by
neo-Marxist scholars such as Immanuel
Wallerstein (1979) and Andre Gunder Frank
(1998), world-system theorists argue that the
modern capitalist economy in which we live
today has been global since its inception five
centuries ago. See also Chase-Dunn (1998).
For a Gramscian neo-Marxist perspective,
see Rupert and Smith (2002). World-system
theorists reject, therefore, the use of the term
‘globalization’ as referring exclusively to
relatively recent phenomena. Instead, they
emphasize that globalizing tendencies have
been proceeding along the continuum of
modernization for a long time.
The greatest virtue of the world-system
critique of globalization lies in its historical
sensitivity. Any general discussion of globali-
zation should include the caution that cross-
regional transfers of resources, technology,
and culture did not start only in the last few
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 APPROACHES TO THE STUDY OF GLOBALIZATION
decades. Indeed, the origins of globalizing
tendencies can be traced back to the political
and cultural interactions that sustained the
ancient empires of Persia, China, and Rome.
On the downside, however, a world-system
approach to globalization suffers from the
same weaknesses as the Marxist economic-
determinist view pointed out above in my
discussion of the Hirst–Thompson thesis.
Wallerstein (1990) leaves little doubt that he
considers global integration to be a process
driven largely by economic forces whose
essence can be captured by economistic ana-
lytical models. Accordingly, he assigns to
culture and ideology merely a subordinate
role as ‘idea systems’ dependent on the ‘real’
movements of the capitalist world economy.
However, more recent studies produced by
world-system scholars (Amin, 1996; Carroll
et al., 1996; Robinson, 2004) acknowledge
that the pace of globalization has significantly
quickened in the last few decades of the twen-
tieth century. Ash Amin (1997), for example,
has suggested that much of the criticism of
globalization as a new phenomenon has been
based on quantitative analyses of trade and
output that neglect the qualitative shift in
social and political relations. This qualitative
difference in the globalizing process, he argues,
has resulted in the world-capitalist system’s
new configuration as a complex network of
international corporations, banks, and financial
flows. Hence, these global developments may
indeed warrant a new label. In their efforts to
gauge the nature of this qualitative difference,
world-system theorists like Barry K. Gills
(2002) have begun to focus more closely on
the interaction between dominant-class inter-
ests and cultural transnational practices. In so
doing, they have begun to raise important
normative questions, suggesting that the ele-
ments of the ‘ideological superstructure’ –
politics, ideas, values, and beliefs – may, at
times, neutralize or supersede economic forces.
Leslie Sklair (2002), for example, highlights
the importance of what he calls ‘the culture-
ideology of global consumerism’.
Overall, then, all three groups of globali-
zation critics make an important contribution
01_Steger et al_Ch-01-Part-I.indd 11
11
to academic approaches on the subject. Their
insistence on a more careful and precise
usage of the term forces the participants in
the debate to hone their analytical skills.
Moreover, their intervention serves as an
important reminder that some aspects of glo-
balization may neither constitute new devel-
opments nor reach to all corners of the earth.
However, by focusing too narrowly on
abstract issues of terminology, the globaliza-
tion critics tend to dismiss too easily the
significance and extent of today’s globaliz-
ing tendencies. Finally, the representatives of
these three groups show a clear inclination to
conceptualize globalization mostly along
economic lines, thereby often losing sight of
its multidimensional character.
GLOBALIZATION AS ECONOMIC
PROCESS
The widespread scholarly emphasis on the
economic dimension of globalization derives
partly from its historical development as a
subject of academic study. For various
accounts of economic globalization, see, for
example, Cohen (2006), Dicken (2001),
Rodrik (2007), Sassen (1998) and Stiglit
(2006). Some of the earliest writings on the
topic explore in much detail how the evolu-
tion of international markets and corpora-
tions led to an intensified form of global
interdependence. These studies point to the
growth of international institutions such as
the European Union, the North American
Free Trade Association, and other regional
trading blocs. The most comprehensive treat-
ment of this nature is Keohane (1984). For a
more recent update of his position on globali-
zation, see Keohane (2001, 2002) and
Keohane and Nye (2000). Economic accounts
of globalization convey the notion that the
essence of the phenomenon involves ‘the
increasing linkage of national economies
through trade, financial flows, and foreign
direct investment … by multinational firms’
(Gilpin, 2000: 299). Thus expanding economic
activity is identified as both the primary aspect
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 12 THE SAGE HANDBOOK OF GLOBALIZATION
of globalization and the engine behind its
rapid development.
Many scholars who share this economic
perspective consider globalization a real phe-
nomenon that signals an epochal transforma-
tion in world affairs. Their strong affirmation
of globalization culminates in the suggestion
that a quantum change in human affairs has
taken place as the flow of large quantities of
trade, investment, and technologies across
national borders has expanded from a trickle
to a flood (Gilpin, 2000: 19). They propose
that the study of globalization be moved to
the centre of social-scientific research.
According to this view, the central task of this
research agenda should be the close examina-
tion of the evolving structure of global eco-
nomic markets and their principal institutions.
Studies of economic globalization are usu-
ally embedded in thick historical narratives
that trace the gradual emergence of the new
post-war world economy to the 1944 Bretton
Woods Conference and its post-war evolu-
tion (Schaeffer, 2005). During its operation
for almost three decades, the Bretton Woods
system contributed greatly to the establish-
ment of what some observers have called the
‘golden age of controlled capitalism’
(Luttwak, 1999: xii, 27). According to this
interpretation, existing mechanisms of state
control over international capital movements
made possible full employment and the
expansion of the welfare state. Rising wages
and increased social services secured in the
wealthy countries of the global north a tem-
porary class compromise.
Most scholars of economic globalization
trace the accelerating integrationist tenden-
cies of the global economy to the collapse of
the Bretton Woods system in the early 1970s
and the rise of ‘neo-liberalism’ in the 1980s
and its ascendancy to dominance with the
1989–91 collapse of command-type econo-
mies in Eastern Europe. In addition to the
issue of free trade, perhaps the two most
important aspects of economic globalization
relate to the changing nature of the produc-
tion process and the liberalization and inter-
nationalization of financial transactions.
01_Steger et al_Ch-01-Part-I.indd 12
Indeed, many analysts consider the emer-
gence of a transnational financial system the
most fundamental economic feature of our
time. Its key components include the deregu-
lation of interest rates, the removal of credit
controls, and the privatization of govern-
ment-owned banks and financial institutions.
As sociologist Manuel Castells (2000: 53)
points out, the process of financial globaliza-
tion accelerated dramatically in the late
1980s as capital and securities markets in
Europe and the United States were deregu-
lated. The liberalization of financial trading
allowed for the increased mobility among
different segments of the financial industry,
with fewer restrictions and a global view of
investment opportunities.
Moreover, these scholars emphasize
advances in data processing and information
technology that contributed to the explosive
growth of tradable financial value. New sat-
ellite systems and fibre-optic cables provided
the nervous system of Internet-based tech-
nologies that further accelerated the liberali-
zation of financial transactions. Most of the
growth occurred in the purely money-dealing
currency and securities markets that trade
claims to draw profits from future produc-
tion. Aided by new communication technolo-
gies, global rentiers and speculators earned
spectacular incomes by taking advantage of
weak financial and banking regulations in the
emerging markets of developing countries.
However, since these international capital
flows can be reversed swiftly, they are capa-
ble of creating artificial boom-and-bust
cycles that endanger the social welfare of
entire regions. The 1997–8 Southeast Asia
crisis was one such economic disaster cre-
ated by unregulated speculative money
flows, followed by similar debacles in Russia
(1998), Brazil (1999), Argentina (2000–3),
and, most importantly, the Global Financial
Crisis (2008–9), which, in turn, contributed
greatly to the current European Debt Crisis.
While the creation of international finan-
cial markets represents a crucial aspect of
economic globalization, many scholars utiliz-
ing this approach point to another important
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 APPROACHES TO THE STUDY OF GLOBALIZATION
economic development of the last three dec-
ades that involves the changing nature of
global production: powerful transnational
corporations (TNCs) with subsidiaries in
several countries. Their numbers skyrock-
eted from 7,000 in 1970 to 80,000 in 2011.
Consolidating their global operations in an
increasingly deregulated global labour mar-
ket, enterprises like Wal-Mart, General
Motors, Exxon-Mobil, Mitsubishi, and
Siemens belong to the 200 largest TNCs,
which account for over half of the world’s
industrial output. The availability of cheap
labour, resources, and favourable production
conditions in the Third World enhanced both
the mobility and the profitability of TNCs.
Accounting for over 70 per cent of world
trade, these gigantic enterprises expanded
their global reach as their direct foreign
investments rose approximately 15 per cent
annually during the 1990s (Gilpin, 2000: 20).
Their ability to ‘outsource’ manufacturing
jobs – that is, to cut labour costs by dispers-
ing economic production processes into
many discrete phases carried out by low-
wage workers in the global south – is often
cited as one of the hallmarks of economic
globalization.
GLOBALIZATION AS POLITICAL
PROCESS
Economic perspectives on globalization can
hardly be discussed apart from an analysis of
political processes and institutions. Most of
the debate on political globalization involves
the weighing of conflicting evidence with
regard to the fate of the modern nation-state.
In particular, two questions have moved to
the top of the research agenda. First, what are
the political causes for the massive flows of
capital, money, and technology across terri-
torial boundaries? Second, do these flows
constitute a serious challenge to the power of
the nation-state? These questions imply that
economic globalization might be leading to
the reduced control of national governments
over economic policy. The latter question, in
01_Steger et al_Ch-01-Part-I.indd 13
13
particular, involves an important subset of
issues pertaining to the principle of state sov-
ereignty, the growing impact of intergovern-
mental organizations, and the prospects for
global governance.
An influential group of scholars considers
political globalization as a process intrinsi-
cally connected to the expansion of markets.
In particular, steady advances in computer
technology and communication systems such
as the World Wide Web are seen as the pri-
mary forces responsible for the creation of a
single global market. See, for example,
Bryan and Farrell (1996), Kurdle (1999),
Rao (1998) and Weiss (2011). As Richard
Langhorne (2001: 2) puts it, ‘Globalization
has happened because technological
advances have broken down many physical
barriers to worldwide communication which
used to limit how much connected or coop-
erative activity of any kind could happen
over long distances.’ According to even more
extreme technological-determinist explana-
tions, politics is rendered powerless in the face
of an unstoppable and irreversible techno-
economic juggernaut that will crush all gov-
ernmental attempts to reintroduce restrictive
policies and regulations. Economics is por-
trayed as possessing an inner logic apart
from and superior to politics. As Lowell
Bryan and Diana Farrell (1996: 187) assert,
the role of government will ultimately be
reduced to serving as ‘a superconductor for
global capitalism’.
Perhaps the most influential representative
of this view in the 1990s was Kenichi Ohmae
(1990, 1995, 2005). Projecting the rise of a
‘borderless world’ brought on by the irresist-
ible forces of capitalism, the Japanese busi-
ness strategist argues that, seen from the
perspective of real flows of economic activ-
ity, the nation-state has already lost its role as
a meaningful unit of participation in the
global economy. In the long run, the process
of political globalization will lead to the
decline of territory as a meaningful frame-
work for understanding political and social
change. No longer functioning along the
lines of discrete territorial units, the political
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 14 THE SAGE HANDBOOK OF GLOBALIZATION
order of the future will be one of regional
economies linked together in an almost
seamless global web that operates according
to free-market principles. For a more recent
example of the ‘end of the nation-state thesis’
from the opposite end of the ideological
spectrum, see Prem Shankar Jha (2006).
A second group of scholars disputes the
view that large-scale economic changes sim-
ply happen to societies in the manner of natu-
ral phenomena such as earthquakes and
hurricanes. Instead, they highlight the central
role of politics – especially the successful
mobilization of political power – in unleash-
ing the forces of globalization (see, for
example, Gowan, 1999; Kapstein, 1999;
Korten, 2001; Luttwak, 2000). Hence, this
group of scholars argues for the continued
relevance of conventional political units,
operating either in the form of modern
nation-states or ‘global cities’. Saskia
Sassen’s (1991, 2007, 2008) work empha-
sizes the key role played by global cities in
the organization and control of globally ori-
ented economic and social processes. See
also Amen et al. (2006) and Brenner (2006).
At the same time, most proponents of this
view understand that the development of the
last few decades has significantly constrained
the set of political options open to states,
particularly in developing countries.
Jan Aart Scholte (2005), for example,
points out that globalization refers to gradual
processes of ‘relative deterritorialization’
that facilitate the growth of ‘supraterritorial’
relations between people. Scholte empha-
sizes, however, that his concession to deter-
ritorialization does not necessarily mean that
nation-states are no longer the main organ-
izing forces in the world. Equipped with the
power to regulate economic activities within
their sphere of influence, states are far from
being impotent bystanders to the workings of
global forces. If concrete political decisions
were responsible for changing the interna-
tional context in the direction of deregulation,
privatization, and the globalization of the
world economy, then different political deci-
sions could reverse the trend in the opposite
01_Steger et al_Ch-01-Part-I.indd 14
direction. For an excellent exposition of this
argument, see Cohen (2001). See also Garrett
(1998), Helleiner (1994, 1996) and Panitch
(1996: 83–113). The core message of this
group of academics is loud and clear: politics
is the crucial category upon which rests a
proper understanding of globalization.
A third group of scholars suggests that
globalization is fuelled by a mixture of
political and technological factors. John
Gray (1998: 218), for example, presents glo-
balization as a long-term, technology-driven
process whose contemporary shape has been
politically determined by the world’s most
powerful nations. According to Gray, it is the
ultimate objective of the neo-liberal Anglo-
American initiative to engineer a global free
market. Predicting that the world economy
will fragment as its imbalances become
insupportable, Gray foresees a gloomy end-
ing to the current political efforts to establish
a single global market: ‘Trade wars will
make international cooperation more diffi-
cult. … As global laissez-faire breaks up, a
deepening international anarchy is the likely
human prospect.’
A far less pessimistic version of a perspec-
tive that combines technology and politics to
explain globalization can be found in
Castells’ (1996–8, vol. 3: 356) series of stud-
ies over nearly two decades focusing on the
‘network society’. The Spanish sociologist
separates the powerful forces fuelling glo-
balization into three independent processes:
‘The information technology revolution; the
economic crisis of both capitalism and stat-
ism, and their subsequent restructuring; and
the blooming of cultural social movements.’
For a more recent assessment, see Castells
(2009). Castells points to the rise of a new
‘informational capitalism’ based on informa-
tion technology as the indispensable tool for
the effective implementation of processes of
socioeconomic restructuring. In this context,
he acknowledges both the crisis of the
nation-state as a sovereign entity and the
devolution of power to regional and local
governments as well as to various suprana-
tional institutions. On the other hand, Castells
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 APPROACHES TO THE STUDY OF GLOBALIZATION
also emphasizes the continued relevance of
nation-states as crucial bargaining agencies
that influence the changing world of power
relationships. As new political actors emerge
and new public policies are implemented, the
role of culture increases. While pointing to
the potential for global economic and eco-
logical disasters brought on by globalization,
Castells (1996–8, vol. 3: 379) ends on a far
more positive note than Gray: ‘The dream of
the Enlightenment, that reason and science
would solve the problems of humankind, is
within reach.’
A fourth group of scholars approaches
political globalization primarily from the per-
spective of global governance. Represent­
atives of this group analyse the role of various
national and multilateral responses to the
fragmentation of economic and political sys-
tems and the transnational flows permeating
through national borders. See the various
essays collected in Wilkinson (2005). Some
researchers believe that political globaliza-
tion might facilitate the emergence of demo-
cratic transnational social forces emerging
from a thriving sphere of ‘global civil soci-
ety’. This topic is often connected to discus-
sions focused on the impact of globalization
on human rights and vice versa – see the
essays in Brysk (2002). For example, Martin
Shaw (2000: 16) emphasizes the role of
global political struggles in creating a ‘global
revolution’ that would give rise to an interna-
tionalized, rights-based Western state con-
glomerate symbolically linked to global
institutions. Thus, he raises the fascinating
prospect of ‘state formation beyond the
national level’. Democratic theorist John
Keane (2003: 98) has put forward a similar
model of what he calls ‘cosmocracy’ – a
messy and complex type of polity understood
as ‘a conglomeration of interlocking and
overlapping sub-state, state, and suprastate
institutions and multi-dimensional processes
that interact, and have political and social
effects, on a global scale’. In the aftermath of
9/11, however, both Shaw’s and Keane’s opti-
mistic vision of a post-imperial multilateralism
directed by a Western political conglomerate
01_Steger et al_Ch-01-Part-I.indd 15
15
seems to be out of step with the reality of a
unilateralist American Empire.
Political scientists such as David Held and
Anthony McGrew (Held et al. 1999) articu-
late in their writings the need for effective
global governance structures as a conse-
quence of various forces of globalization.
They portray globalization as diminishing
the sovereignty of national governance,
thereby reducing the relevance of the nation-
state. Much to their credit, Held and McGrew
are two of the most vociferous advocates for
moving the academic debate on globalization
in a more ideational and normative direction.
In Held’s view, neither the old Westphalian
system of sovereign nation-states nor the
post-war global system centred on the United
Nations offers a satisfactory solution to the
enormous challenges posed by political glo-
balization. Instead, he predicts the emergence
of a multilayered form of democratic govern-
ance based on Western cosmopolitan ideals,
international legal arrangements, and a web
of expanding linkages between various gov-
ernmental and non-governmental institutions.
Rejecting the charge of utopianism often
levelled against his vision, Held (1995:
96–120) provides empirical evidence for the
existence of a tendency inherent in the glo-
balization process that seems to favour the
strengthening of supranational bodies and the
rise of an international civil society. He pre-
dicts that democratic rights will ultimately
become detached from their narrow relation-
ship to discrete territorial units. If Held’s
perspective on political globalization is cor-
rect, then its final outcome might well be the
emergence of a ‘cosmopolitan democracy’
that would constitute the ‘constructive basis
for a plurality of identities to flourish within a
structure of mutual toleration and accounta-
bility’. For a more detailed elaboration of his
vision see Held (1995, 2006). In fact, even in
the post-9/11 context, Held refuses to aban-
don his hopes for restructuring world order
toward a ‘cosmopolitan social democracy’
characterized by ‘strong competent govern-
ance at all levels – local, national, regional,
and global (Held and McGrew, 2007: 131).
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 16 THE SAGE HANDBOOK OF GLOBALIZATION
A number of academic critics have chal-
lenged the idea that political globalization is
fuelling a development toward cosmopolitan
democracy. Most of their criticism boils
down to the charge that Held and McGrew
indulge in an abstract idealism that fails to
engage with current political developments
on the level of policy. Some critics argue that
the emergence of private authority has
increasingly become a factor in the post-Cold
War world. In their view, global collective
actors like religious terrorists and organized
criminals are not merely symptoms of the
weakening nation-state, but their actions also
dim the prospects for the rise of cosmopoli-
tan democracy. See, for example, Hall and
Biersteker (2002). Moreover, sceptics like
Robert Holton (2011: 202–3) raise the suspi-
cion that Held and McGrew do not explore in
sufficient detail the cultural feasibility of
global democracy. As cultural patterns
become increasingly interlinked through glo-
balization, critics argue, the possibility of
resistance, opposition, and violent clashes
becomes just as real as the cosmopolitan
vision of mutual accommodation and toler-
ance of differences.
GLOBALIZATION AS CULTURAL
PROCESS
Held and McGrew might respond to these
criticisms by arguing that one major strength
of their approach lies in viewing globalization
not as a one-dimensional phenomenon, but as
a multidimensional process involving diverse
domains of activity and interaction, including
the cultural sphere. Indeed, any analytical
account of globalization would be woefully
inadequate without an examination of its cul-
tural dimension. A number of prominent
scholars have emphasized the centrality of
culture to contemporary debates on globaliza-
tion. As sociologist John Tomlinson (1999: 1)
puts it, ‘Globalization lies at the heart of mod-
ern culture; cultural practices lie at the heart of
globalization.’ The thematic landscape tra-
versed by scholars of cultural globalization is
01_Steger et al_Ch-01-Part-I.indd 16
vast, and the questions they raise are too
numerous to be completely fleshed out in this
short survey. Rather than presenting a long
laundry list of relevant topics, this section
focuses on two central questions raised by
scholars of cultural globalization. First, does
globalization increase cultural homogeneity,
or does it lead to greater diversity and hetero-
geneity? Or, to put the matter into less aca-
demic terms, does globalization make people
more alike or more different? And second,
how does the dominant culture of consumer-
ism impact the natural environment?
Most commentators preface their response
to the first question with a general analysis of
the relationship between the globalization
process and contemporary cultural change.
Tomlinson (1999: 28), for example, defines
cultural globalization as a ‘densely growing
network of complex cultural interconnec-
tions and interdependencies that characterize
modern social life’. He emphasizes that
global cultural flows are directed by power-
ful international media corporations that uti-
lize new communication technologies to
shape societies and identities. As images and
ideas can be more easily and rapidly trans-
mitted from one place to another, they pro-
foundly impact the way people experience
their everyday lives. Culture no longer
remains tied to fixed localities such as town
and nation, but acquires new meanings that
reflect dominant themes emerging in a global
context. This interconnectivity caused by
cultural globalization challenges parochial
values and identities, because it undermines
the linkages that connect culture to fixity of
location.
A number of scholars argue that these pro-
cesses have facilitated the rise of an increas-
ingly homogenized global culture
underwritten by an Anglo-American value
system. Referring to the global diffusion of
American values, consumer goods, and life-
styles as ‘Americanization’, these authors
analyse the ways in which such forms of
‘cultural imperialism’ are overwhelming
more vulnerable cultures. The American soci-
ologist George Ritzer (1993), for example,
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 APPROACHES TO THE STUDY OF GLOBALIZATION
coined the term ‘McDonaldization’ to
describe the wide-ranging process by which
the principles of the fast-food restaurant are
coming to dominate more and more sectors of
American society, as well as the rest of the
world. On the surface, these principles appear
to be rational in their attempts to offer effi-
cient and predictable ways of serving peo-
ple’s needs. Only toward the end of his study
does Ritzer allow himself to address the nor-
mative ramifications of this process: when
rational systems serve to deny the expression
of human creativity and cultural difference,
they contribute to the rise of irrationality in
the world. In the long run, McDonaldization
leads to the eclipse of cultural diversity and
the dehumanization of social relations.
The American political theorist Benjamin
R. Barber (1996: 17) also enters the norma-
tive realm when he warns his readers against
the cultural imperialism of what he calls
‘McWorld’ – a soulless consumer capitalism
that is rapidly transforming the world’s
diverse population into a blandly uniform
market. For Barber, McWorld is a product of
a superficial American popular culture assem-
bled in the 1950s and 1960s and driven by
expansionist commercial interests: ‘Its tem-
plate is American, its form style … [m]usic,
video, theater, books, and theme parks … are
all constructed as image exports creating a
common taste around common logos, adver-
tising slogans, stars, songs, brand names, jin-
gles, and trademarks.’ For a more sceptical
assessment of the supposed ‘Americanness’
of globalization, see Marling (2006).
Barber’s account of cultural globalization
contains the important recognition that the
colonizing tendencies of McWorld provoke
cultural and political resistance in the form of
‘jihad’ – the parochial impulse to reject and
repel Western homogenization forces wher-
ever they can be found. Fuelled by the furies
of ethnonationalism and/or religious funda-
mentalism, jihad represents the dark side of
cultural particularism. Barber (1996: 19) sees
jihad as the ‘rabid response to colonialism and
imperialism and their economic children, cap-
italism and modernity’. Guided by opposing
01_Steger et al_Ch-01-Part-I.indd 17
17
visions of homogeneity, jihad and McWorld
are dialectically interlocked in a bitter cultural
struggle for popular allegiance. For a neo-
Marxist perspective on the rise of a global
capitalist monoculture, see Schiller (1995:
17–33). As might be expected, Barber’s dia-
lectical account received a lot of public atten-
tion after the events of 9/11. They also helped
to resurrect Samuel Huntington’s 1993 thesis
of a ‘clash of civilizations’ involving primarily
the West and Islam (Huntington, 1997:
26–7, 45–8).
It is one thing to acknowledge the powerful
cultural logic of global capitalism, but it is
quite another to assert that the cultural diver-
sity existing on our planet is destined to van-
ish. In fact, several influential academics
offer contrary assessments that link globaliza-
tion to new forms of cultural diversity. See
Appadurai (1996) and Hannerz (1992, 1996).
Berger and Huntington offer a highly unusual
version of this ‘pluralism thesis’. Emphasizing
that cultural globalization is ‘American in
origin and content’, they nonetheless allow
for ‘any variations and sub-globalizations’ on
the dominant US cultural theme in various
parts of the world (2002). Roland Robertson
(1995: 25–44) has famously argued that
global cultural flows often reinvigorate local
cultural niches. Contending that cultural glo-
balization always takes place in local con-
texts, Robertson predicts a pluralization of
the world as localities produce a variety of
unique cultural responses to global forces.
The result is not increasing cultural homoge-
nization, but ‘glocalization’ – a complex
interaction of the global and local character-
ized by cultural borrowing. These interac-
tions lead to a complex mixture of both
homogenizing and heterogenizing impulses.
Often referred to as ‘hybridization’ or ‘cre-
olization’, the processes of cultural mixing are
reflected in music, film, fashion, language, and
other forms of symbolic expression. Sociologist
Jan Nederveen Pieterse (2003: 117), for exam-
ple, argues that exploring ‘hybridity’ amounts
to ‘mapping no man’s land’. For Nederveen
Pieterse, the hybridity concept ‘does not pre-
clude struggle but yields a multifocus view on
2/26/2014 11:30:07 AM
 18 THE SAGE HANDBOOK OF GLOBALIZATION
struggle and by showing multiple identity on
both sides, transcends the “us versus them”
dualism that prevails in cultural and political
arenas’. Ulf Hannerz (1992: 96), too, empha-
sizes the complexity of an emerging ‘global
culture’ composed of new zones of hybridiza-
tion. See also Mendieta (2007).
In addition to addressing the question of
whether globalization leads to cultural homo-
geneity or heterogeneity, scholars like
Nederveen Pieterse, Hannerz, and Robertson
seek to expand the concept of globalization
by portraying it as a multidimensional ‘field’.
In their view, globalization is both a material
and a mental condition, constituted by com-
plex, often contradictory interactions of
global, local, and individual aspects of social
life. Cultural theorists such as Ulrich Beck
(2000: 102) and Arjun Appadurai (1996)
have refined this argument by contrasting
common interpretations of globalization as a
‘process’ with the less mechanical concept of
‘globality’, referring to ‘the experience of
living and acting across borders’.
Appadurai identifies five conceptual
dimensions or ‘landscapes’ that are consti-
tuted by global cultural flows: ethnoscapes
(shifting populations made up of tourists,
immigrants, refugees, and exiles), tech-
noscapes (development of technologies that
facilitate the rise of TNCs), finanscapes
(flows of global capital), mediascapes (elec-
tronic capabilities to produce and disseminate
information), and ideoscapes (ideologies of
states and social movements). Each of these
‘scapes’ contains the building blocks of the
new ‘imagined worlds’ that are assembled by
the historically situated imaginations of per-
sons and groups spread around the globe
(Appadurai, 1996: 33). Suspended in a global
web of cultural multiplicity, more and more
people become aware of the density of human
relations. Their enhanced ability to explore
and absorb new cultural symbols and mean-
ings coexists in uneasy tension with their
growing sense of ‘placelessness’. Focusing
on the changing forms of human perception
and consciousness brought on by global cul-
tural flows, Beck and Appadurai discuss
01_Steger et al_Ch-01-Part-I.indd 18
subjective forms of cultural globalization that
are often neglected in more common analyses
of ‘objective’ relations of interdependence.
To some extent, then, scholars of cultural
globalization have shown more willingness
to engage in sustained investigations of the
normative dimension of globalization than
their colleagues in political science or eco-
nomics. The same is true for those research-
ers who have explored the connection
between cultural globalization and the natu-
ral environment, especially in light of the
escalating problem of global climate change.
After all, how people view their natural envi-
ronment depends to a great extent on their
cultural milieu. For example, cultures steeped
in Taoist, Buddhist, and various animist reli-
gions often emphasize the interdependence
of all living beings – a perspective that calls
for a delicate balance between human wants
and ecological needs. Nature is not consid-
ered a mere ‘resource’ to be used instru-
mentally to fulfil human desires. The most
extreme manifestations of this anthropo-
centric paradigm are reflected in the domi-
nant values and beliefs of consumerism.
The US-dominated culture industry seeks
to convince its global audience that the
meaning and chief value of life can be
found in the limitless accumulation of
material possessions.
The two most ominous ecological prob-
lems connected to the global spread of con-
sumer culture are human-induced global
climate change, such as global warming, and
the worldwide destruction of biodiversity.
Indeed, the US Union of Concerned Scientists
has presented data suggesting that the global
average temperature increased from about
53.3oF in 1880 to 57.9oF in 2000. Further
increases in global temperatures could lead
to partial meltdowns of the polar ice caps,
causing global sea levels to rise by up to
three feet by 2100 – a catastrophic develop-
ment that would threaten the many coastal
regions of the world. The potential economic
and political ramifications of global climate
change are dire, particularly for people living
in developing countries in the global south.
2/26/2014 11:30:07 AM
 APPROACHES TO THE STUDY OF GLOBALIZATION
With regard to the loss of biodiversity, many
biologists today believe that we are now in
the midst of the fastest mass extinction of
living species in the 4.5-billion-year history
of the planet. Environmental sociologist
Franz Broswimmer (2002), for example,
fears that up to 50 per cent of all plant and
animal species – most of them in the global
south – will disappear by the end of this cen-
tury. For a comprehensive overview of facts
and data related to global climate change, see
Philander (2008). For a more readable
account, see Gore (2006).
An interesting crossover among economic,
political and ecological dimensions of glo-
balization is the use of market based policy
instruments to manage environmental prob-
lems. Initiatives such as carbon ‘taxes’, ‘trad-
ing’, and biodiversity ‘banks’ have emerged
in policy discussions at national and global
levels about approaches to global warming,
species extinction, and overpopulation.
Implicit in the use of these market-based
policy tools, however, is still the driving neo-
liberal ideological assumption that the mar-
ket can self-regulate and solve all problems,
that capitalist based consumerism is a sus-
tainable way to live, even an appropriate way
to address ecological problems created by
capitalist over-consumption in the first place.
CONCLUSION
This chapter introduced the main academic
approaches to the study of globalization by
linking them to the lively ongoing debate on
the subject. Still, this overview does not
encompass all topics of the ever-expanding
discourse on the subject. In addition to
exploring the economic, political, and cul-
tural dimensions of globalization, many
scholars have raised a number of additional
topics, such as the structure and direction of
transnational migration flows, the emergence
of transnational social movements such as
the women’s movement, the spread of global
pandemics, transnational crime, cyber crime,
and the globalization of warfare, military
01_Steger et al_Ch-01-Part-I.indd 19
19
operations, and military technology linked to
a transnationalization of defence production.
One of the most comprehensive surveys on
the subject can be found in Held et al. (2007).
But rather than providing a full account of
every conceivable aspect of the debate, the
purpose of this chapter has to show that there
exists a variety of approaches to the subject,
but no scholarly agreement on a single con-
ceptual framework for the study of globaliza-
tion. Moreover, it is important to bear in
mind that any overly objectivist approach to
globalization is bound to overlook the insight
that all social-scientific concepts are simulta-
neously analytical and normative. This dual
status of concepts means that they never merely
describe that to which they refer, but are also
necessarily engaged in a normative process of
meaning construction (Offe, 1996: 5). It is
virtually impossible for globalization schol-
ars to interpret the public discourse on the
subject apart from their own ideological and
political framework. Hence, as I have argued
in my work on the subject, it is important to
explore the ideological dimensions of glo-
balization by seeking to make sense of the
contemporary emergence of various new
‘globalisms’, as well as by taking into
account the various ideological commitments
of globalization researchers (Steger, 2008).
In spite of the obvious dangers inherent in
this move, the inclusion of one’s own beliefs
and values does not necessarily invalidate
one’s research project. As the German phi-
losopher Hans-Georg Gadamer (1975) has
pointed out, the motivations and prejudices
of the interpreter condition every act of
understanding.
Hence, it would be a mistake to consider
the researcher’s values and preconceptions
solely as a hindrance to a proper understand-
ing of social processes. In fact, the interpret-
er’s inescapable normative involvement
enables the very act of understanding. As
Alan Scott (1997: 2) notes, the separation of
analytical concerns from ideological and
normative matters harbours the danger that
the ethos of scientific detachment might
unintentionally serve politically motivated
2/26/2014 11:30:07 AM
 20 THE SAGE HANDBOOK OF GLOBALIZATION
attempts to provide ‘people with persuasive
arguments to the effect that little can be done
in the face of these enormous economic,
political and social developments’. Avoiding
this danger should remain a crucial impera-
tive guiding all approaches to the study of
globalization.
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