Monarchy and The Religious Actors in Morocco

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Monarchy and the Religious Actors in Morocco
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中東硏究 2016년 제35권 1호, 91-116
Monarchy and Religious Actors

in Morocco
1)
Mohamed El Bouchikhi*
목 차
Ⅰ. Introduction
Ⅱ. The Plurality of The Religious Actors
Ⅲ. The Religious Supremacy of the Monarchy
Ⅳ. Conclusion
* Research Professor at Sun Moon University

92 중동연구 제35권 1호
<Abstract>
모로코의 군주제와 종교단체
모하메드 엘 부쉬키
(선문대학교)
모로코 역사에서 이슬람교는 국가의 정체성을 형성시켜왔다. 이는 모

로코 국민을 형성하고 있는 아랍인, 이마지그인, 아프리카인들 등의 모든
인종의 종교 그룹에 대한 근원임을 의미한다. 이러한 구조는 모로코가
“이슬람교 주권국”이라는 것과 “이슬람교가 국교”(article 3)라는 것을 시
사하며, 이 구조에서 왕은 절대적인 종교적 권리를 갖는다. 즉 이 구조는
군주에게 정치-헌법상의 권위를 능가하는 절대적 권위를 부여함을 의미
한다. 군주가 절대적인 종교적 권위를 가짐으로 인해 이슬람교는 모로코
의 정치적 현장에서 강한 영향력을 행사하고 있다. 이슬람교는 군주의 적
법성에 대한 기원이 되며, 또한 이에 저항하는 그룹들을 제거하는 명분이
됨으로 인해 이념상의 종교기능 이상의 역할을 한다. 따라서 본 논문은
어떻게 군주가 다른 종교 기관 단체들 속에서 종교적인 지배권을 확보하
기 위해 노력했는가를 분석 연구하였다.
주제어 : 군주, 종교, 행위자(단체), 이슬람교, 적법성.
Ⅰ. Introduction
Late eighth century, an Arab descendant of the prophet fled to

Morocco from the Abassid Empire in Baghdad to establish the first
Muslim kingdom in Morocco. (Michel Abitbol 2009: 45) Since then,
Monarchy and Religious Actors in Morocco 93
Islam has become a crucial element in the political life of Morocco. It

was the source of legitimacy for the successive dynasties that ruled
the kingdom from both Arabs and Imazighen (Berbers).
The strong presence of Islam has brought multiple actors to
compete over the politico-religious legitimacy of the country. The
monarch, Ulama (Religious Scholars), Zawaya (Saints), and, later,
Political Islam Movements, compete to monopolize the religious
sphere. They sought to strengthen their position as the main
politico-religious actor in the country. In the pre-independence era,
the three traditional religious actors (Monarch, Ulama, and Zawaya)
allied against the French while they were competing over
monopolizing the religious legitimacy of the kingdom. However, after
independence in 1956, the king emerged as the supreme religious
leader after weakening and marginalizing the role of Ulama and
Zawaya. Ulama’s power reached its peak when they dethroned Sultan
Abdul Aziz and enthroned his brother in 1908, while Zawaya defeated
the sultan and almost overthrew his reign in 1820.
This paper aims to answer the main research question, how did the
monarchy manage to ensure its religious supremacy among other
religious actors? This paper argues that the monarchy plays a smart
balance between other religious actors by playing them against each
other. This paper will explore how the monarchy ensured its religious
supremacy through balancing and counter-balancing the religious
actors inside the kingdom. The Moroccan religious sphere is
characterized by the plurality of its actors; through which the
monarchy was playing them against each other.
Ⅱ. The Plurality of The Religious Actors
Historically, there were three traditional actors that dominated the

political scene in Morocco, monarchy, Ulama, and Zawaya, while
political Islam movements are the newest religious actors in the
Moroccan religious sphere.
1. The Monarch “Ameer Al Moomeneen”
The literal meaning of ‘Ameer Al Moomeneen’ is the Commander

of the Faithful. It is a title that dates back to Omar Ibn Al-Khattab,
the second Caliph of the Prophet Muhammad. He was the first Caliph
to acquire the tittle in order to avoid repeating the tittle ‘the Caliph
of the Caliph of the prophet’. In contemporary Morocco, King Hassan
II acquired the tittle in the first constitution of 1962 to end the
heated debate about shaping the national identity in post-
independence Morocco (Malika Zeghal 2003: 2).
The commandership of the Faithful (Imarat Al-Moomeneen) as the
main characteristic of the Moroccan political system “occupies a
central position both in the management of the religion and the
legitimacy of the political regime” (Mohamed Darif 2010: 13). The
successive constitutions of the kingdom included the supreme
position of the monarch as the “Commander of the Faithful, [who]
sees to the respect for the religion” (article 41). The constitution did
not specify any religion, which implies to the role of the monarch as
the Guarantor of the free exercise of cults, which includes Islam,
Judaism, and Christianity (Darif: 15).
The religious authority as the epicenter of the monarchy’s strength
lies on divers religious claims such as the Prophetic lineage, “the
possession of divine blessing (Baraka)” (Juan A. Macias-Amoretti
2014), and the commander of the faithful to fortify its political

authority (Mohamed Daadoui 2012). These sources of the religious
authority were the basis of the monarchy’s religious monopoly in the
aftermath of independence. They were codified in the constitution
and institutionalized in the political system, which gave the king a
political supremacy (Ibid). In Morocco where both religion and
politics are entangled, the monarch sees himself above all political
actors, and he is “the father of all, his party is the nation” (Daawat
Al-Haq 1998).
2. Ulama (Religious Scholars)
Ulama (sing. Aleem) are religious scholars with strong knowledge

of Islamic sacred law (Sharia) and theology, charged with preserving
the purity and integrity of the faith. Their mission is to ensure the
delivery of Islamic cultural heritage from one generation to another
(Edmund III. Burke 1978: 115). In the early age of Islam, Ulama did
not constitute an elite in the Islamic empire, however, across the
centuries they become an elite playing an important role in the
society.
Morocco is not different from other Muslim countries, where
Ulama were engaged in politics. For example, in mid nineteenth
century Sultan Sidi Mohammed ben Abdullah sought to regulate the
political activities of Ulama while monitoring them closely along with
Zawaya (Mohamed El Mansour 1992: 7). However, Ulama implicitly
agreed to distance themselves from politics and focus on education
and preaching. This implicit arrangement sought avoiding any
potential confrontation with the monarchy, because the two drew
their legitimacy from the religion and sought its guardianship.
Through education and preaching, Ulama had relatively a strong
position in the society due to their ability to shape the societal

identity and legitimize the existing social order. Moreover, Ulama still
play a minor role in politics through bay'a (Pledge of Allegiance)
upon the elevation of a new king (El Mansour: 8), among other
political and religious actors.
Historically, Ulama represented a conservative force in the political
history of Morocco. The peak of their involvement in the political life
was in the eve of the French protectorate, when they stood as
imminent opponent to the sultan Abdul Aziz between 1900 and 1908.
They perceived the reforms of his government as a threat to “their
position as the guardians of the interests and independent of the
kingdom” (Burke: 115). They ended up with dethroning the sultan
and elevating his brother in 1908. However, another religious actor
that was closer to the people and more sensitive to their needs and
aspirations than the intellectual elite overshadowed Ulama: Zawaya.
3. Zawaya
Zawaya (sing. Zawya) are religious lodges and mostly houses or

shrines of marabouts (saints) across North Africa (Dale F. Eickelman
1976: 5). In Morocco, Zawaya were originally a place for spreading
literacy and educating people. It was also a shelter for refugees as
well as lodges for feeding poor people and hosting stranded travelers.
As time went by, Zawaya had become an important element of the
society providing a balance between the social needs of people
(shelter and food) and the needs of government of ensuring political
stability (Mohamed El Mazouni 2011).
Historically, the establishment of Zawaya was connected with some
special historical, political, and social circumstances, such as in the
time of a political vacuum resulted from the absence or the weakness
of the state. Their role was seen it times of foreign invasion as well
as in the times of natural disasters, such as famine and floods. They
substituted government in defending the country, providing food and
shelter to the population (Abdullah Stitou). These developments
made Zawaya as a model of an “ideal state inside the state” (El
Mazouni).
However, the relation with the central government varied from
alliance to competition. They allied against foreign invasions and
competed over monopolizing the religious authority. Moreover,
Zawaya ensured the spread of state authority to remote areas that
were out of reach of the government. In the meantime, the state
provided Zawaya with its support to enjoy different privileges such
as collecting local taxes, and sometimes appointing Zawaya leaders as
state representatives in their respective areas (Ibid).
Historically, Zawaya played different roles in the society:
The Educational Role: Zawaya played an imminent role in spreading

education among youth and adults as well, besides providing advanced
education in religious sciences. They also sought to ensure the
delivery of religious sciences to the next generation filling the gap
that the central government was unable to fulfill. (El Mazouni)
The Social Role: Zawaya provided shelter and food for needy
people and stranded travels. Safe heaven was also provided to people
escaping government pressure. This function made Zawaya a ‘sacred’
lodge even the central government was not able to break it.
The Role of Arbitration: Marabouts (Saints) have an important

position in the Moroccan society due to their religious role and their
prophetic lineage. It gave them a moral authority among the
population to exercise mediation to solve conflicted issues. (El
Mazouni). Their prophetic ancestry permitted them to exercise

arbitration, which is a point of competition with the monarchy,
especially when Zawaya exercise it on a big scale among tribes.
Arbitration is one of the oldest prerogatives of the monarch that
ensured him a political supremacy (Mohamed Daadaoui 2011: 64).
The Role of defending the nation: Zawaya substituted the central

government in times of foreign invasion using its position to unite
and mobilize people to defend the nation when there is a weak or no
central government.
Zawaya are still active actors across the nation but their influence
lost its momentum after independence. A new politico-religious actor
appeared in the political horizon of Morocco overwhelming the
traditional actors and posing a real challenge to the monarchy:
Political Islam Movements.
4. Political Islam Movements
Political Islam can be simply defined as the usage of Islam in

politics. The common element between political Islam movements is
their Islamic reference, and the establishment of the Islamic
Caliphate is their main goal. The political Islam drew their political
legitimacy from the prophetic actions (Macias-Amoretti), rather than
the prophetic ancestry. Morocco witnessed the emergence of the
political Islam movements early 1970s, as a result of the failure of
the secular nationalism, pan-Arabism, and socialism (Haoues
Seniguer 2013: 112).
In 1969, the Islamic youth (IY) ‘Shabibia al-Islamiyya’ was
established and gained legal recognition in 1972. It was banned three
years later as it diverted to violence and assassinated the famous

political figure Omar Benjelloun in 1975 (Ibid). When IY diverted to
violence, a new movement appeared in the political horizon of
Morocco: Justice and Spirituality (JAS) ‘Jamaat al-Adl wa
al-Ihssan’. In 1974, Abdussalam Yassine sent an open letter to the
king Hassan II entitled ‘Islam or the deluge’ accusing him of political
despotism and posing a real challenge to the monarchy in
post-independence Morocco (Julie E. Pruzan-Jørgensen 2010: 6).
The two movements were severely prosecuted throughout the
decades of 1970s and 1980s.
JAS’s anti-regime rejectionist strategy drove its leader to jail and
later house arrest (Daadaoui 2012). Yassine’s letter was a brave
attempt to openly ask the king to repent his sins, dissolves political
parties, and install sharia law-ruled state. In the meantime, young
leaders who denounced violence and preached political participation
under the umbrella of the monarchy, established an offspring of the
Islamic Youth. The Islamic Community ‘Jamaa Islamiya’ that was the
nucleus of the current government ruling party Al-Adala wa-Tanmia
(Justice and Development, known as PJD) since 2011.
Beside JAS and PJD, Salafism is also playing an important role in
the Moroccan politico-religious life. It can be divided into three
categories of Salafism respectively national Salafism, Wahhabi
Salafism, and Jihadi Salafism (Pruzan-Jørgensen: 8). Islamic
reformers as Jamal Eddine al-Afghani and Mohammed Abdu inspired
the National Salafism. Their main goal was an Islamic renaissance
able to combine modern development and the practices of the
Prophet’s companions (Ibid: 8).
The National Salafists were behind the inclusion of the
Commander of the Faithful’s title in the first constitution (Zeghal).
The second category of Salafism is Wahhabism, which was imported
from Saudi Arabia early nineteenth century, but in 1970s, it was
encouraged and tolerated to spread across the nation. The third

category was Salafi Jihadists that chose violence and gave birth to
many groups namely the Moroccan Islamic Combat Group (GICM)
that carried the suicide bombings of Casablanca in 2003. GICM dates
back to early 1990s and can be understood as an unstructured group
of violent jihadists. It was established by Moroccans who fought in
Afghanistan in 1980 (Pruzan-Jørgensen: 9).
Throughout Moroccan history, monarchy has played a ‘smart’
balance between all religious actors to strengthen its position. It
imported Wahhabism early nineteenth century, to fight Zawaya, and
later to curb the influence of JAS and IY as well as other political
opponents in 1970s and 1980s (Kamal Elhachoumi 2006). In the age
of international terrorism, the long honeymoon between the monarchy
and Salafism came to an end in the eve of the 2003’s terrorist
attacks, while Sufism became one the tenets of the Moroccan
religious identity. Neutralization of religious forces has been a major
concern for the state, which was successful in controlling most, if not
all, of them.
Ⅲ. The Religious Supremacy of the Monarchy
Monarchy sought to neutralize the different religious actors and

curb their religious and political influence that challenges its religious
supremacy. To ensure its monopoly, monarchy played a smart balance
between other religious actors by neutralizing them and playing them
against each other.
1. Depoliticizing & Taming Ulama and Zawaya
Taming the traditional religious actors required depoliticizing Ulama

through an implicit arrangement, while the process depoliticizing
Zawaya varied from appeasement to direct confrontation.
A. Depoliticizing Ulama Implicitly

The state sought to depoliticize Ulama without marginalizing their
role in the society by entrusting them with education and preaching,
but distancing them from any political role in the society. Ulama
implicitly accepted the religious supremacy of the monarchy to avoid
any potential confrontation with it over the guardianship of the
religion. They were guaranteed with the role of supervising education
and preaching, which ensured them with the ability to shape the
societal identity and to legitimize the existing social order.
Nonetheless, the only political role of Ulama is clearly seen in the
bay'a (Pledge of Allegiance), where the proclamation of a new king
by the Ulama, which might be seen as a stamp of legitimacy.
However, they rose sometimes as a strong conservative force in the
political history of Morocco able of overthrowing sultans. Later, they
galvanized people against the French, which put them under the
spotlight as a potential competitor to the king in the post-
independence Morocco. Moreover, their conservatism towards any
western originated development would be an obstacle to the
modernization of the post-independence kingdom.
B. Zawaya Between Appeasement and Confrontation

Zawaya rose as a real threat to the religious authority of the
monarchy due to many similarities and common goals. They share the
same Sharifian lineage as descendants from the Prophet as a well as
acquiring a diving blessing ‘Baraka.’ The geographic position of

Morocco as the furthest point to the Middle East, the cradle of
human civilization and the land of monotheistic religions, made it land
of saints (Hicham Bensalek 2014). They posed a real threat to the
monarchy and its position inside the society with their common goal
of acquiring religious as well as political leadership. Another
important element shared between monarchy and Zawaya is their
arbitrational role in the society. Saints sought to solve conflicts
between individuals and tribes due to their religious position (El
Mazouni).
Zawaya intervened to solve disputes that occur between individuals
and between tribes substituting the role of the state that was unable
to reach certain areas mainly bilad siba (territory of dissidence),
which means areas outside the control of the government. The
relation between monarchy and Zawaya varied from cooperation to
confrontation. This relation sought to draw clear borders between the
role of Zawaya and the authorities of the state. The disputed relation
between monarchy and Zawaya is not limited the current dynasty.
The Saadi Dynasty (1554-1659) that started from Zawaya turned
against them later to halt their ambitions to seek power (El Mazouni
2011).
The Alaouite Dynasty’s relation with Zawaya also witnessed times
of turbulence. In 1818, when sultan Moulay Souliamane was defeated,
captured for few days, and lost his son in front of the Darkaouia
Zawya (Khalid Tahtah 2015). The Zawya also besieged the capital
city of Meknes, and made a failed attempt to overthrow the sultan
allying with the Ulama of Fes (Ibid). The sultan tolerated a major
incursion of Wahhabism as a counter-balance against the increasing
intrusion of Zawaya inside the society (Elhachoumi 2006).
Opening the doors for Wahhabism was an aspect of balancing the
power of Darkaouiya Zawya, and the other aspect was favoring
Tijaniya Zawya. Later, Darkaouia Zawya was able to take over

Tijanniya Zawya as the state’s favored Zawya, after penetrating the
elite of Sultan Abdurrahman and his son later (Tahtah). As Morocco
went under the French Protectorate in 1912, monarchy, Ulama, and
Zawaya allied against the foreign invasion while a strong competition
to monopolize the religious sphere was taking place.
2. Monarchy and the Balance Between Religious Actors
Diversifying the political actors is one of the characteristics of the

Moroccan politics. The king retains a supreme political position above
the in the religious sphere, the monarchy sought to ensure a smart
balance between different religious actors, political elite, which
allows him to exercise his long-standing prerogative of arbitration
(John Waterbury 1982). Throughout the past decades, monarchy
ensured its supreme religious position through balancing the existing
actors, participated in the creation of new actors, and encouraged and
tolerated others. The strategy of balancing the religious actors took
place in different periods in time according to the monarchy’s
religious supremacy challenges.
1.Marginalization of The Traditional Actors

In the aftermath of independence, monarchy rose as the victorious
actor from the fierce competition with the traditional actors prior to
independence over the religious monopoly. The position of Ulama was
marginalized inside the society by introducing new institutions and
procedures that substituted them, while the role of Zawaya was
limited to organizing Moussems (popular festivals).
A. Marginalization of Ulama
Historically, Ulama played a significant role in preserving religion
from heresies, and ensured its delivery from generation to another.
However, their interference with politics put them in a competitive
track with monarchy that considers monopolizing the religion is its
affair. In order to curb the influence of Ulama and prevent them from
intervening in politics, the state marginalized their role in the society
through three levels:
The First Level: The monarch adopted the title of the Commander
of the faithful in the first constitution after independence, which
clearly indicated that the king is the supreme religious leader. The
article 19 (41 since 2011) clearly expressed the role of the king as
the guardian of the religion, which includes Islam, Christianity, and
Judaism (Darif: 12). This title includes also all other religious actors
under the umbrella of the Commander of the Faithful, rather than
being his equal competitors.
The Second Level: Morocco inherited the French legal and juridical
system based on the positive law, with no vigorous presence of Islam
except in the family code. Moreover, Islam was not a source of
legislation rather it was only for cult (Darif 2010:15). Ulama lost
their footstep in the legal sphere and become unable to intervene as
the guardian of the sharia law. A new elite acknowledgeable of the
positive law pulled the rug beneath their feet.
The Third Level: Post independence Morocco inherited also secular

education system based on the French education system. Modern
schools were built across the nation instructed by French instructors
while French was the language of instruction until mid-1970s with
the Arabization of the education system. The role of Al-Qaraouiyeen
University was deteriorated after the introduction of Islamic studies

in the modern universities.
B. Marginalization of Zawaya
Marginalizing the role of Ulama in the society was mainly through
two levels:
The First Level: Post-colonial Morocco witnessed the birth of

political parties that substituted Zawaya in organizing people,
defending their interests, and represent them in the government. The
nucleus of the modern Moroccan political parties goes back to the
National Movement (Al-Haraka Al-Wataniya) that led the political
resistance for independence. It was a Salafi flavored political
movement that sought to unite Moroccans under the religious and
political supremacy of the monarch (Driss Kanbouri 2014).
The Second Level: The central government inherited a strong

security and judicial system that placed bilad siba (territory of
dissidence) under the control of the state. Spreading government
control over the nation stripped Zawaya of their main functions such
as arbitration, provision of food, shelter and safe heaven to criminals
and rebellions. Government also substituted Zawaya in disciplining
the disobeying tribes (Ibid).
The first post-independence period was characterized by the
marginalization of the traditional religious actors, namely Ulama and
Zawaya, and the emergence of the monarchy as the supreme religious
leader. However, the resurgence of political Islam movements early
1970s posed a serious challenge to the monarchy and required a new
strategy to confront them.
2. Counter-Balancing the Challenge of Islamism

The political Islam, as a homegrown ideology and a counter-
reaction (Peter Mansfield 2013: 423) to the failure of Arab
nationalism post Naksa (Arab Catastrophe), reached Morocco late
1960s. Islamic Youth was established in 1969 as the first political
Islam movement in Morocco, and was officially recognized in 1972 to
confront the penetration of Nasserism into the society (Darif: 38).
Externally, Morocco was engaged in a strategic alliance with Saudi
Arabia to establish an Islamic organization to counter the
pan-Arabism led by Egypt. However, the government was not able
to tame the Islamic Youth, which diverted to secrecy and political
assassination.
In 1974, Abdu-Salam Yassine, a former adherent of Boutchichya
Zawya, made an unexpected public appearance with his famous open
missive ‘Islam or the Deluge’ (Pruzan-Jørgensen: 8). His letter was
the first direct challenge to the monarch from a religious actor
criticizing his politico-religious authorities. He advocated an Islamic
state after the definitive transition from tyranny to the Caliphate,
which was a “tacit call for an end of the monarchy” (Macias-
Amoretti). The divergence of IY to clandestinity and violence, the
strong emergence of JAS, and the outbreak of the Iranian Revolution
1979, required a new strategy to face the new rising challenges.
3. Wahhabi Salafism & Ulama Versus Islamism

Wahhabi Salafism entered Morocco early nineteenth century to
confront the increasing influence of Zawaya, and it was encouraged
and tolerated in 1970s. The previous Minister of Endowment and
Religious Affairs Abdelkébir Alaoui Mdaghri, along with the infamous
Minister of Interior Driss Basri open the gates for Wahhabi Salafism.
It was the ‘right ally’ due to its open hostility with Shia and its
leader-obeying ideology as well as the pouring petro-dollar Saudi
assistance that was given to Islamic organization across the Muslim

World (Darif: 37).
The creation of many literature faculties where Islamic Studies
were introduced instead of Philosophy, and universities were urged to
integrate Moroccan graduates from Saudi universities as professors.
The aim was to open the gates for Wahhabism to flourish inside
universities (Ibid: 120). During 1980s and 1990s, universities
witnessed open confrontations between Islamists and Wahhabis.
Wahhabi Salafism and Ulama allied to delegitimize Islamists mainly
JAS, and they stood against the ideas of Yassine. They advocated
war on Sufism, as well as denouncing his preaching of civil
disobedience (Darif: 125).
The Islamic Revolution in Iran echoed in the Arab World raising
the potential of religion as a source of political destabilization. In
Morocco, the diversification and neutralization of religious actors was
a response to these domestic and international challenges. The High
Council of Ulama (HCU) was established in 1981 and was placed
under the direct control of the king. It was entrusted with appointing
Ulama to put them under the service of the state (James N. Sater
2007: 46). The creation of HCU integrated Ulama after a long
marginalization. It aimed to confront the challenge of Islamism and to
avoid any attempts of mobilizing people against the monarchy.
However, the role of HCU was to “supervise the religious
orthodoxy without becoming the guardians of the sharia” (Ibid: 46).
Ulama have become government officers receiving their salaries,
executing the state religious policy. However, they lost their
independence vis-à-vis the state. The reintegration of Ulama into
state institutions was a counter-balance against the rapprochement
with JAS. Yassine urged Ulama to turn against the state that
marginalized their role in the society. After the success of the Iranian
Revolution in 1979, Ulama saw their potential as political actors
capable of making change and shaking the monarchy’s iron fist over
the politico-religious sphere. (Darif: 56)
4. Justice & Development Party (PJD): A Model of State Islamism

An offspring of the Islamic Youth that preached non-violence
established the Jamaa Islamiya (Islamic Community) early 1980s and
sought a peaceful reform within the framework of the monarchy
(Seniguer: 113). The young leaders (Abelillah Benkiran and Abdellah
Baha) established an Arabic newspaper called ‘Al-Islash’ (Reform)
mid 1980s, which reflected their intention of reform as the core of
their ideology.
The Jamaa represented the role of state Islamism compared to
JAS’s ideology that denied working under state institutions. They
changed their name Al-Islah wa-Tajdid (Reform and Renewal) in
1992 to distance themselves from the Islamists of Algeria that
entered the black decade of civil war. (Pruzan-Jørgensen: 11). They
played an important role in promoting the official version of Islam,
which is based on the supremacy of the monarch as the Commander
of the Faithful (Darif: 81).
The state’s denial of their demand to establish a political party
revealed government’s fear of losing their popularity in favor of JAS
that continued its open hostility with the monarchy. However, they
joined the Popular Democratic and Constitutional Movement (MPDC)
in 1996, and changed their name to ‘Justice and Development Party
‘Al-Adala Wa-Tanmia’ (PJD) in 1998 (Ibid: 82).
The newly established party described itself as a political party
with Islamic reference rather than an Islamic party seeking to work
under the framework of the monarchy (Seniguer: 116). PJD
represents a model of state Islamism working under the framework of
the monarchy, defending the monarchy in the time of the Arab Spring
upheavals, and counterbalancing the presence of JAS in the society.
The party benefitted from the heavy demonstrations of the Arab

Spring to reach power through elections as the first Islamic
government in Morocco early 2012.
5. The New Role of Zawaya

In the age of international terrorism, Morocco was hit by
extremism, when multiple attacks hit the famous city of Casablanca
leaving 45 deaths. They came as a shock to Moroccans who always
claimed the exception of Morocco as land of religious moderation and
tolerance. Casablanca attacks inaugurated a new era of the relation
between the state and Zawaya. The king started his reign with the
appointment of a new minister of Endowments and Religious Affairs,
Ahmed Tawfik, who is a religious scholar and adherent of
Boutchichiya Zawaya.
In the meantime, Salafists were under the spotlight over their
moral responsibility of the attacks of Casablanca, which ended the
long honeymoon with the state. Morocco launched series of religious
reforms aimed promoting a national religious identity to overcome the
rising rate of extremism inside the society. The religious identity is
based on the religious supremacy of the monarchy and Sufism as one
of one of its pillars beside Maliki Madhab and Ash’ari theology. The
reforms gave Ulama great role by creating about 80 regional councils
of Ulama, entrusting them with educating Imams and preachers, as
well as issuing fatwas (Mohammed El-Katiri 2013: 57).
The state went even further, when it started exporting Moroccan
experience and expertise in fighting fundamentalism to other
countries that were hit by terrorism. New ideas such as national
development, national integration, love of the nation, and positive
productivity based on moderation and tolerance were generated as
way to fight fundamentalism (Darif: 179). The new role of Zawaya
was extended defending the monarchy, which was clearly seen during
the Arab Spring uprisings when the Zawaya stood against them. They
were also required to play and international role, defending the
interest of the kingdom, especially in the Sub-Saharan Africa where
millions of followers see the king (Commander of the Faithful) as
their spiritual leader.
6. All In The Service of His Majesty

Monarchy inaugurated years and years of balancing and
counter-balancing the religious actors by bringing all of them to its
side. After years in jail, Salafi-Jihadist leaders revised their
ideological beliefs concerning the denial of the modern form of the
nation state, democracy, and political parties. It was a sign of
reconciliation with the monarchy, admitting its religious supremacy
and accepting the secular model of the state. They even become
fierce supporters of the monarchy after revising their radical ideas.
Moreover, they are urging their followers to denounce violence and
to work through constitutional institutions, and preach political
participation (Vish Sakthivel 2013).
As the Arab Spring uprisings swept the region, Morocco witnessed
massive demonstration calling for political reform, chanting the same
slogans that demonstrators chanted in the Arab streets: freedom,
dignity, and social justice. The JAS led the demonstrations side by
side with the leftists. However, neither the Islamists nor the leftists
raised the demand of overthrowing the regime (Avi Spiegel 2011).
The balance strategy was successful in saving the nation from
drowning into political instability. The PJD stood against the
demonstrations preaching reform from within the regime and political
participation as the only way to achieve political reform. The king
responded positively to the demonstrations by introducing new
constitution and free elections that took the PJD to power.
The pullout of JAS from the streets can be seen as a result of
disagreement with the leftists and strategic tactics to avoid an

inevitable confrontation with state Islamists (PJD). Since then, JAS
kept low profile vis-à-vis the monarchy, which rose as a winner by
bringing all religious actors to its side recognizing his religious
leadership. The religious supremacy is a political tool that provides
the monarchy with absolute power towards political and religious
actors in the country. It is also a spiritual authority of the monarch
that goes beyond the borders through Sunni Muslims in Sub-Saharan
Africa who see him as their spiritual leader.
Ⅳ. Conclusion
In the post Arab Spring era, the Monarchy has successfully brought
all religious actors to its side. They recognized its religious
supremacy, and accepted to work under its framework. Even the JAS
has kept a low profile vis-à-vis the monarchy, downgrading its
demands to political reform as seen across the streets in 2011. In
the meantime, PJD, as a model of state Islamism, is leading the
government in the aftermath of the Arab Uprisings, while other
religious actors are working side by side to defend the monarchy.
The traditional religious actors are now strong defenders of the
Alaouite throne, while The Salafi Jihadists who advocated Islamic
Caliphate and called for overthrowing the monarchy are also fierce
supporters of the monarchy. All together have inaugurated the
Moroccan religious identity that is predominantly Sunni, inspired by
the Maliki Ash’ari theology, and characterized by a historic heritage
of strong adherence to Zawaya. The epicenter of the religious
identity is the supremacy of the monarchy. The centrality of the
monarchy in the religious sphere is only a tool for its political
supremacy, where it is counter-balancing both religious and political

actors to strengthen its position.
Key Words: Monarchy, Religious, Actors, Islam, and Legitimacy.

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▶ Mohamed El Bouchikhi
소 속 : 선문대학교
이메일 : elbouchikhi@gmail.com
투 고 일： 2016. 05. 02
심 사 일： 2016. 05. 15∼05. 31
게재확정일： 2016. 06. 08
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Monarchy and Religious Actors

* Research Professor at Sun Moon University

모로코의 군주제와 종교단체

모로코 역사에서 이슬람교는 국가의 정체성을 형성시켜왔다. 이는 모

주제어 : 군주, 종교, 행위자(단체), 이슬람교, 적법성.

Late eighth century, an Arab descendant of the prophet fled to

Islam has become a crucial element in the political life of Morocco. It

Ⅱ. The Plurality of The Religious Actors

Historically, there were three traditional actors that dominated the

1. The Monarch “Ameer Al Moomeneen”

The literal meaning of ‘Ameer Al Moomeneen’ is the Commander

2014), and the commander of the faithful to fortify its political

2. Ulama (Religious Scholars)

Ulama (sing. Aleem) are religious scholars with strong knowledge

position in the society due to their ability to shape the societal

Zawaya (sing. Zawya) are religious lodges and mostly houses or

The Educational Role: Zawaya played an imminent role in spreading

The Role of Arbitration: Marabouts (Saints) have an important

Mazouni). Their prophetic ancestry permitted them to exercise

The Role of defending the nation: Zawaya substituted the central

4. Political Islam Movements

Political Islam can be simply defined as the usage of Islam in

years later as it diverted to violence and assassinated the famous

encouraged and tolerated to spread across the nation. The third

Ⅲ. The Religious Supremacy of the Monarchy

Monarchy sought to neutralize the different religious actors and

1. Depoliticizing & Taming Ulama and Zawaya

Taming the traditional religious actors required depoliticizing Ulama

A. Depoliticizing Ulama Implicitly

B. Zawaya Between Appeasement and Confrontation

acquiring a diving blessing ‘Baraka.’ The geographic position of

Tijaniya Zawya. Later, Darkaouia Zawya was able to take over

2. Monarchy and the Balance Between Religious Actors

Diversifying the political actors is one of the characteristics of the

1.Marginalization of The Traditional Actors

The Third Level: Post independence Morocco inherited also secular

University was deteriorated after the introduction of Islamic studies

The First Level: Post-colonial Morocco witnessed the birth of

The Second Level: The central government inherited a strong

2. Counter-Balancing the Challenge of Islamism

3. Wahhabi Salafism & Ulama Versus Islamism

assistance that was given to Islamic organization across the Muslim

4. Justice & Development Party (PJD): A Model of State Islamism

The party benefitted from the heavy demonstrations of the Arab

5. The New Role of Zawaya

6. All In The Service of His Majesty

disagreement with the leftists and strategic tactics to avoid an

supremacy, where it is counter-balancing both religious and political

Key Words: Monarchy, Religious, Actors, Islam, and Legitimacy.

Abitbol Michel. (2009). Histoire Du Maroc. Paris. Perin.

Affairs: Religious Reform in Morocco. The Journal of North

Sakthivel Vish. (2013). “Are Morocco's Political Salafists Committed

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