AMS Workshop

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Agenda

THIS INFORMATION IS EMBRAER PROPERTY AND CANNOT BE USED OR REPRODUCED WITHOUT WRITTEN AUTHORIZATION
Technical Workshop Items
Solutions Available - Overview
Investigation
• Low Pressure Check Valve
(LPCV)
• Ice Detector
Solution Development
• Cabin Temperature Control
• HPSOV-closed Messages
• Low Limit Valve
Solution Implementation
• E-190 Bleed Valve
Agenda

THIS INFORMATION IS EMBRAER PROPERTY AND CANNOT BE USED OR REPRODUCED WITHOUT WRITTEN AUTHORIZATION
Technical Workshop Items
Solutions Available - Overview
Investigation
• Low Pressure Check Valve
(LPCV)
• Ice Detector
Solution Development
• Cabin Temperature Control
• HPSOV-closed Messages
• Low Limit Valve
Solution Implementation
• E-190 Bleed Valve
Solutions Available - Overview
Related Commercial
Issue Follow up report Main Expected
Production cut-in Publication Condition & Efficacy Assessment
(Solution) (E-FORUM - FIP) Benefits
(Issuance Date) Parts Availability

Conclusion: Final analysis planned:

BLEED LEAK
ODS Installation at the Pylon
THIS INFORMATION IS EMBRAER PROPERTY AND CANNOT BE USED OR REPRODUCED WITHOUT WRITTEN AUTHORIZATION
Jun/2014
Efficacy: Reduction greater than
Make the ODS loops
75% in the number of the bleed leak
F170-36-013 SB 190-36-0019 FOC Active less susceptible to
190: SN 568 and on events on the pylon area with
(ATA 36 - Bleed Leak) (Aug/2012) (Exp. Sep/2014) vibrations at the pylon
evidence of failures of the ODS.
fwd area.
Current Status: Preliminary
analysis shows no cases on in-
factory incorported aircraft.

Conclusion: Final assessment:

New NAPRSOV Bleed Valve
PN suffix -5
Oct/2014
Efficacy: Increase MTBF at least
F190-36-007 Increases the reliability
53% and no failures related to the
(ATA 36 - Bleed Valve SB 190-36-0020 FOC Active of the bleed system,
190: SN 662 and on solutions implemented in the valve -
PN 1013952-1 (Dec/2013) (Exp. Dec/2015) preventing Bleed Fail
5.
Premature Failure ) and Overpress events.
Current Status: Successfuly in-
service evaluated (Jan-Dec/2013).
Solution implementation on-going.

Conclusion: Final assessment:

New Pack Outlet Ducts/Bellows
Oct/2014
Prevents the
Efficacy: Zero events of pack outlet
disconnection of the
F170-21-008 SB 170-21-0051 ducts disconnection.
170: SN 334 and on FOC pack outlet ducts, and
(ATA 21 - Pack Ducts SB 190-21-0037 Current Status: Early efficacy
190: SN 507 and on On-Attrition consequent total/partial
Disconnection) (Dec/2011) analysis done Jul/2013, considering
loss of air flow into the
post-mod aircraft mostly from the
aircraft.
prodution line, shows no events of
pack outlet ducts disconnection.

Conclusion: Rescheduled to
Apr/2014. New filters not properly
identified; contaminated the
F170-21-022
SB 170-21-0055 sampling.
PACK BYPASS VALVE (ATA 21 - Pack By-Pass 170: SN 356 and on Refer to SB for
SB 190-21-0043 Efficacy: Reduce at least 90% the
New Filters Valve PN 820914-6 Low 190: SN 595 and on conditions
(Dec/2012) rate of PBV removals caused by
Reliability)
Prevent valve failures contaminated air filters.
due to the premature Current Status: Solution
filter clogging. implementation on-going.

Prevent cabin/cockpit Conclusion: Rescheduled to

temperature control Apr/2014. New filters not properly
difficulties. identified; contaminated the
F170-36-016 SB 170-36-0021 sampling..
FAN-AIR VALVE 170: SN 356 and on Refer to SB for
(ATA 36 - Fan-Air Valve SB 190-36-0022 Efficacy: Reduce at least 90% the
New Filters 190: SN 595 and on conditions
Low Reliability) (Dec/2012) rate of FAV removals caused by
contaminated air filters.
Current Status: Solution
implementation on-going.

Prevent cabin/cockpit Conclusion: Proven efficacy.

New Air Conditioning System
Mixer Duct (H-DUCT)
F170-21-013
temperature control
(ATA 21 - Cabin/Cockpit SB 190-21-0039
190: SN 657 and on Chargeable difficulties by equalizing Current Status: Successfuly in-
Amb. Temp. Not Able to (Dec/2013)
the air flow throughout service evaluated (Mar/2013).
Control)
the passengers cabin. Solution implementation on-going.
Agenda

THIS INFORMATION IS EMBRAER PROPERTY AND CANNOT BE USED OR REPRODUCED WITHOUT WRITTEN AUTHORIZATION
Technical Workshop Items
Solutions Available - Overview
Investigation
• Low Pressure Check Valve
(LPCV)
• Ice Detector
Solution Development
• Cabin Temperature Control
• HPSOV-closed Messages
• Low Limit Valve
Solution Implementation
• E-190 Bleed Valve
Bleed Low Pressure Check Valve

Issue (E190)

THIS INFORMATION IS EMBRAER PROPERTY AND CANNOT BE USED OR REPRODUCED WITHOUT WRITTEN AUTHORIZATION
• Low Pressure Bleed Check valve (LPCV) PN 1001447-6 found with broken petals
• During the 3,000 FH inspections (MRB)
• Driven by 2 reports of valves logging 5,900FH, 5,450FH
• LPCV PN -6 cracks are unique to the E190
• LPCV PN -6 is the terminating action for in-effect AD 2006-11-01R4 (and
FAA AMOC) applicable to the E190
Bleed Low Pressure Check Valve

Investigation

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• Extensive fault tree established
• Materials analysis confirmed HCF as failure
mode
• Analysis characterized high stress conditions
during normal HP/LP switching and Type 1
oscillations
• Replicated crack in lab under high impact
velocities between 43K and 53K cycles at
worst case condition
• Crack location duplicated field failures
• FEA model correlated to lab data and
accurately predicted LPCV life when
subjected to Type 1 oscillations
Bleed Low Pressure Check Valve

Interim Solution

THIS INFORMATION IS EMBRAER PROPERTY AND CANNOT BE USED OR REPRODUCED WITHOUT WRITTEN AUTHORIZATION
• BL-13
• Already released via SB 190-21-0041 - Dec/2012
• Eliminates 'type 1' bleed pressure oscillations during climb/take-off
• SB 190-36-0023 (Jul/2013), replacement of LPCV PN -6 on E190 aircraft
• Requires the replacement of LPCV PN -6 valves between 5,800 and 6,200 FH concurrently
with BL-13
• ANAC and EASA 2004-02-01, and Transport Canada ADs have been issued with effective
date of Feb 24th 2014
• Required LPCV and seals to be replaced within 200hrs of effective date or 6,000 FH (whichever
is later)
• ANAC AMOC released on Mar/2014 - Extension of grace period to 600 FH, and extension of
time for valve replacement to 8,000 FH (ref. to AMOC for further details)
• Ref. Embraer REC 190/195-36-180 (Feb/2014), with an update with the AMOC on Mar/2014

Next Steps
• Root cause analysis conclusion
• UTAS and Embraer team performing flight tests to substantiate root cause analysis
• Previous tests, done on Apr/2014, inconclusive due to FTI misreadings
• Update expected by Jul/2014
Bleed Low Pressure Check Valve

Additional Information

THIS INFORMATION IS EMBRAER PROPERTY AND CANNOT BE USED OR REPRODUCED WITHOUT WRITTEN AUTHORIZATION
• LPCV Dimensional Inspection
• Revised inspection criteria provides a better measurement of wear on the valves key
structural components (hinge pin and petal holes)
• AMM was revised on July 2013 to incorporate same dimensional checks contained in CMM
• New inspection procedure requires new inspection fixture and fine tip micrometer (GSE)
• Each EMBRAER 190 operator received one new GSE
• UTAS Service Information Letter (SIL) 574 provides information about the dimensional
inspection requirements

CMM DIMENSION CHECKS, PRE (L) AND POST (R) JUL/2013

Agenda

THIS INFORMATION IS EMBRAER PROPERTY AND CANNOT BE USED OR REPRODUCED WITHOUT WRITTEN AUTHORIZATION
Technical Workshop Items
Solutions Available - Overview
Investigation
• Low Pressure Check Valve
(LPCV)
• Ice Detector
Solution Development
• Cabin Temperature Control
• HPSOV-closed Messages
• Low Limit Valve
Solution Implementation
• E-190 Bleed Valve
Ice Detector

Issue

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• Ice Detector Fail CAS messages

Investigation
• FIRST issue discussed on Jun/2013
• Included reports from 6 worldwide operators
• CMC data analysis from WWF shows that 80% of the Ice Detector CAS messages
are displayed during on ground operations and 50% are dual alarms (Ice Detector
1 + 2)
• MTBUR WWF
EMBRAER 190 >37,000 FH
• Shop findings show >70% NFF
rate, for both WWF and Chinese
operators (separately)
Ice Detector

Immediate Action

THIS INFORMATION IS EMBRAER PROPERTY AND CANNOT BE USED OR REPRODUCED WITHOUT WRITTEN AUTHORIZATION
• SNL 190-30-0014 to inform about the possibility of keeping the detectors in case
of messages on-ground
• No further comments from operators since the SNL release
• FIM, QRH and AOM (Ground Reset) already provide the recommended action

Next Steps
• Schedule for the study analysis of the events
• Update by Jan/2015
Agenda

THIS INFORMATION IS EMBRAER PROPERTY AND CANNOT BE USED OR REPRODUCED WITHOUT WRITTEN AUTHORIZATION
Technical Workshop Items
Solutions Available - Overview
Investigation
• Low Pressure Check Valve
(LPCV)
• Ice Detector
Solution Development
• Cabin Temperature Control
• HPSOV-closed Messages
• Low Limit Valve
Solution Implementation
• E-190 Bleed Valve
Cabin Temperature Control

Issue

THIS INFORMATION IS EMBRAER PROPERTY AND CANNOT BE USED OR REPRODUCED WITHOUT WRITTEN AUTHORIZATION
• Cabin temperature not being able to control
• Temperature variations in the cabin fwd and aft sections, under the same settings
• Temperature not achieving the set value
• Cabin too cold in the front, too hot in the back
• Single and dual-zone aircraft are equally affected
• Basic premise: aircraft has no hardware failure (ref. SNL 190-21-0028 - temp control)

Investigation
• Possible contributors for the cockpit/pax ambient temperature not being able to
be controlled
• Temperature misread by the temperature sensor
• Failure of parts that directly contributes for the temperature control
• Fan-air valve
• By-pass valve (and/or trim valve)
• Disconnected ducts
• Clogged ducts
Cabin Temperature Control

Investigation (cont’d)

THIS INFORMATION IS EMBRAER PROPERTY AND CANNOT BE USED OR REPRODUCED WITHOUT WRITTEN AUTHORIZATION
• Cabin temperature monitored in two operators
• Europe and Latin America
• Confirmed the temperatures variations during the flights
• Used wireless temperature sensors (i-buttons) along the cabin and cockpit
• Located on the overhead bins (sensors air intake level) and PSU (closest to pax)

TEMPERATURE SENSORS LOCATION

Cabin Temperature Control

Solution

THIS INFORMATION IS EMBRAER PROPERTY AND CANNOT BE USED OR REPRODUCED WITHOUT WRITTEN AUTHORIZATION
• New H-duct
• In-service evaluated on Mar/2013, via SB (limited effectivity)
• Better air flow distribution along the cabin
• Approximately 40% more mixing volume than current design
• Released to the WWF via SB 190-21-0039 (Dec/2013)
• Applicable to single and dual zone configurations
• Commercial condition: chargeable
• Estimated 15 MH to implement

POST-MOD
PRE-MOD
Cabin Temperature Control

Solution (cont’d)

THIS INFORMATION IS EMBRAER PROPERTY AND CANNOT BE USED OR REPRODUCED WITHOUT WRITTEN AUTHORIZATION
• New temperature sensor Venturi (ejector)
• In-service evaluated on Sep/2013, via SB (limited effectivity)
• Venturi geometry optimization to increase airflow to cabin temperature sensor, thus
contributing to temperatures closer to the set values
• To be released to the WWF by May/2014
• Applicable to single and dual zone configurations
• Commercial condition: chargeable
• Estimated 30 MH to implement (each cabin section, as applicable)

PRE-MOD

POST-MOD
Agenda

THIS INFORMATION IS EMBRAER PROPERTY AND CANNOT BE USED OR REPRODUCED WITHOUT WRITTEN AUTHORIZATION
Technical Workshop Items
Solutions Available - Overview
Investigation
• Low Pressure Check Valve
(LPCV)
• Ice Detector
Solution Development
• Cabin Temperature Control
• HPSOV-closed Messages
• Low Limit Valve
Solution Implementation
• E-190 Bleed Valve
HPSOV Closed Messages

Issue (E190)

THIS INFORMATION IS EMBRAER PROPERTY AND CANNOT BE USED OR REPRODUCED WITHOUT WRITTEN AUTHORIZATION
• LH/RH HPSOV (CLOSED) [C1/2]/WRG FAULT message on the CMC
• May correlate with a Bleed Fail or A-I Wing Fail CAS message
• Rate of messages increased after implementation of BL11
• Mostly affects the EMBRAER 190 fleet
• Message is latched

Investigation
• No BLEED FAIL CAS message issued to alert crew unless slat temperatures can’t be
met during Wing Anti Ice operation
• AI WING FAIL issued instead of a BLEED FAIL if opposite bleed also has a failed
closed HPSOV or is not available
• BL-11 logic is more conservative as compared to older BL versions
• There are instances when the alarmed HPSOV is still operational
HPSOV Closed Messages

Immediate Action

THIS INFORMATION IS EMBRAER PROPERTY AND CANNOT BE USED OR REPRODUCED WITHOUT WRITTEN AUTHORIZATION
• SNL 190-36-0023 to provide a test to verify if the valve is operational, despite of
the message

Solution
• New AMS processor software BL-14
• SB 190-21-0058, available since Apr/2014
• FOC
Agenda

THIS INFORMATION IS EMBRAER PROPERTY AND CANNOT BE USED OR REPRODUCED WITHOUT WRITTEN AUTHORIZATION
Technical Workshop Items
Solutions Available - Overview
Investigation
• Low Pressure Check Valve
(LPCV)
• Ice Detector
Solution Development
• Cabin Temperature Control
• HPSOV-closed Messages
• Low Limit Valve
Solution Implementation
• E-190 Bleed Valve
Low Limit Valve

Issue

THIS INFORMATION IS EMBRAER PROPERTY AND CANNOT BE USED OR REPRODUCED WITHOUT WRITTEN AUTHORIZATION
• Low Limit Valve (LLV) PN 1001250-3 being removed because of Pack Fail and/or
CMC messages
• LLV PN -3 is the upgrade of old PN -2

Investigation
• Known failure modes of PN 1001250-2
• Position switch fail detected during CMC BIT; caused by the valve’s position switch fail
• This failure mode produces an indication error, evidenced by the CMC message, but the valve
is still functional
• Actuator hardware failure; in these cases the valve is seized or electrically inoperative,
and the condenser inlet temperature may not be controlled to the proper temperature
• This failure mode produces a system failure, evidenced by the CAS message
• LLV PN 1001250-3 incorporates a new position switch
• However, shop findings analysis show that some of them are still subjected to failures
• UTAS confirms the root cause for LLV PN 1001250-3 messages are due to switch
indication failures
Low Limit Valve

Interim Solution

THIS INFORMATION IS EMBRAER PROPERTY AND CANNOT BE USED OR REPRODUCED WITHOUT WRITTEN AUTHORIZATION
• SNL 190-21-0030 r.01 released on Jun/2013
• On-wing procedure may be used to better determine the LLV conditions and help
operators to prioritize the valve removals

Solution
• UTAS is working on redesigning the actuator end-of-stroke indicating features
• UTAS to replace the valve actuator switch FOC during shop visits
• Solution expected by Dec/2014

CURRENT
2
DESIGN
SWITCHES

NEW
DESIGN
Agenda

THIS INFORMATION IS EMBRAER PROPERTY AND CANNOT BE USED OR REPRODUCED WITHOUT WRITTEN AUTHORIZATION
Technical Workshop Items
Solutions Available - Overview
Investigation
• Low Pressure Check Valve
(LPCV)
• Ice Detector
Solution Development
• Cabin Temperature Control
• HPSOV-closed Messages
• Low Limit Valve
Solution Implementation
• E-190 Bleed Valve
E190 Bleed Valve

Issue (E190)

THIS INFORMATION IS EMBRAER PROPERTY AND CANNOT BE USED OR REPRODUCED WITHOUT WRITTEN AUTHORIZATION
• BLEED FAIL events on aircraft with bleed valves
PN 1013952-1
• Correlated with a NAPRSOV-failed closed CMC message

Investigation
• Piston seal ring wear is the primary shop finding

RETURNED VALVES
EXHIBITED PREMATURE
WEAR

LOST MATERIAL
E190 Bleed Valve

Immediate Action

THIS INFORMATION IS EMBRAER PROPERTY AND CANNOT BE USED OR REPRODUCED WITHOUT WRITTEN AUTHORIZATION
• BL-13 (SB 190-21-0041, Dec/2012)
• Eliminates 'type 1' bleed pressure oscillations during climb/take-off
• SNL 190-36-0018 (rev.2, Dec/2011) with troubleshooting directions for bleed
failure events

Solution
• New E190 NAPRSOV PN suffix -5
• In-service evaluated in some operators
• Sampling campaign results showed improvement in piston ring wear
• SB 190-36-0020 rev. 01 released to the WWF on Dec/2013
• 83 units installed at 7 Operators (ref. Mar/2014)
• Tear down of the ISE valves showed no measurable wear
• Operational ISE effects
• Identified cases of bleed fluctuation during cruise
• Not similar to the “Type 1” bleed oscillations addressed with Black Label 13
• Such oscillations may also occur in aircraft with -1 valves
E190 Bleed Valve

Solution Effectiveness

THIS INFORMATION IS EMBRAER PROPERTY AND CANNOT BE USED OR REPRODUCED WITHOUT WRITTEN AUTHORIZATION
• Embraer and UTAS have already
registered removals from operators due
to bleed pressure oscillations during
cruise
• Most are initiated by transient system
condition
• Bleed pressure range ~ 8 – 50 psi
• May affect LH and/or RH
• Joint investigation with Embraer ongoing
• Focused on identifying conditions to test
in lab with returned hardware
• Retrofit will remain on-going during
investigation
• On attrition basis
• Ref. Embraer REC 190/195-36-183 EXAMPLE OF BLEED PRESSURE
(Apr/2014) OSCILLATION DURING CRUISE
E190 Bleed Valve

Solution Effectiveness (cont.)

THIS INFORMATION IS EMBRAER PROPERTY AND CANNOT BE USED OR REPRODUCED WITHOUT WRITTEN AUTHORIZATION
• Next Steps
• Evaluation of shop findings of removed valves
• No wear of the piston ring verified
• Further analysis expected by Jun/2014
• Flight test of 2 removed valves on the Embraer prototype (GPX)
• Flights done on May/2014 did not reproduce the bleed pressure oscillations
• New tests to be done until Jun/2014
• Rig test of various bleed system components from an affected brand new aircraft, at
UTAS-WLOX facilities
• Tests on-going
• Update expected by Jun/2014
• Development of a dedicated troubleshooting procedure
• To be released via SNL
• Expected by May/2014