Spinning Yarns: Bengal Textile Industry

in the Backdrop of John Taylor’s Report

on ‘Dacca Cloth Production’ (1801)
Sushil Chaudhury
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 SPINNING YARNS

Since time immemorial Indian textiles, especially textiles from Bengal,

were in great demand and exported to different parts of the world.
Textiles from Bengal were appreciated by the Romans as early as first
century ad. Numerous foreign travellers including Chinese, Portuguese,
Arab and Persian, have mentioned the delicacy and beauty of Bengal
textiles. From the mid-seventeenth century, there was a massive spurt
in demand of cloth manufactured in Bengal, but after the British
conquest of Bengal in 1757 this industry started to decline. This
monograph traces the journey of Bengal textiles till its decline. Among
the topics covered include accounts of the admiration for Bengal
textiles from far and wide, the different types of textiles that were
manufactured in Bengal, the major exporters, the major centres of
production, the production system, the Dhaka muslin and the silk
industry in Bengal, the procuring system that was adopted by the
European / Asian merchants, the condition of the artisans who were
the chief pillars of the textile industry and lastly the reasons behind
the decline of the Bengal textile industry.
This monograph is the first comprehensive volume on Bengal
textile industry. It is the outcome of the author’s four and a half
decades of work on various aspects of Indian Ocean trade, the activities
of the European companies and their impact on Indian / Bengal’s
economy.

Sushil Chaudhury, who passed away in December 2018, was a

former University Chair Professor of Islamic History and Culture,
Calcutta University, and a National Research Fellow, Indian Council
of Historical Research, New Delhi (January 2014-December 2015).
He did his Ph.D. from the University of London as a Commonwealth
Scholar. Since 2002 he was a Fellow of the Royal Historical Society,
UK.
SPINNING YARNS
Bengal Textile Industry in the
Backdrop of John Taylor’s Report
on ‘Dacca Cloth Production’ (1801)

S U S H I L C H AU D H U RY

MANOHAR
2020
First published 2020
by Routledge
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© 2020 Sushil Chaudhury and Manohar Publishers & Distributors
The right of Sushil Chaudhury to be identified as author of this work has been
asserted by him in accordance with sections 77 and 78 of the Copyright, Designs
and Patents Act 1988.
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ISBN: 978-0-367-51113-5 (hbk)
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 Contents

List of Illustrations 7

List of Tables 8

1. Prologue 11

2. Historical Perspective 19

3. Bengal’s Advantages over other Regions of India 24

4. Production Organization 36

5. The Dhaka Muslin Industry 51

6. Silk Textiles 70

7. Procurement of Textiles for Export 76

8. Role of the European Companies in

Bengal’s Export Trade 89

9. Asian Merchants and Textile Export 112

10. How ‘Poor’ were the ‘Poor’ Indian Weavers? 124

11. Technology in Bengal Textile Industry 156

12. The Decline of the Textile Trade and Industry 161

6 CONTENTS

13. Conclusion 176

Appendices
Appendix 1: An Account of the District of Dacca, 1801
by John Taylor, Commercial Resident of
Dhaka Edited with Detailed Annotations by
Sushil Chaudhury 189
Appendix 2: Letter of a Spinner (Woman) of Santipur,
Bengal, published in the Samachar-Darpan
of the 5th January 1828 228
Appendix 3: Names/Terms used in Persian Chronicles
in Respect of Textile Production 230

Original Sources 239

Index 251
 Illustrations

(between pp. 128-9)

Plate 1: Spinning fine yarn

Plate 2: Warping
Plate 3: Reeling yarn from a reed
Plate 4: Applying the reed to the warp
Plate 5: Weaving
Plate 6: Forming the heddles
Plate 7: Steaming cloths during the process of bleaching
Plate 8: Arranging displaced threads in cloth
 Tables

3.1. Prices of Two Types of Muslins Khasa and Mulmul 30

3.2. Cost of Textiles Procured by the Dutch Company
1752/3 and 1754/5 33
3.3. Expensive Textiles Exported by Companies 1752/3 34
6.1. Quinquennial Total & Average of Silk Textile Exports
Asian and European Companies 1750/1 to 1754/5 74
6.2. Production Cost of Taffetas in Kasimbazar, 1756 74
8.1. Quadrennial Total & Average of Dutch &
English Textile Exports 1710/11-1717/18 93
8.2. Share (Percentage) of Textile Value in the Total Export
Value Dutch & the English Select Years (1700-55) 94
8.3. Orders for Textiles from Europe and England
(Number of Pieces Ordered in Select Years) 96
8.4. Share of Garras and Khasas in the Total
Textiles Ordered (Select Years 1720-50) 97
8.5. Quinquennial Total and Average of
Annual Textile Exports (Dutch and English, 1730-55) 99
8.6. Volume and Value of English Textile Exports
(Quinquennial Period, 1740/1-1744/5 & 1748/9-
1752/3) 101
8.7. Share Percentage of Different Categories
of Textiles Exported by the Companies 1730-55
(First Five Years of Each Decade) 102
 L I S T O F TA B L E S 9

8.8. Volume and Value of the Dutch and

English Textile Exports 1753/4 and 1754/5 103
8.9. Dutch-Asiatic Trade (Textiles) [Quinquennial
Total & Average (in Pieces) 1705/6-1709/10 &
1713/14-1717/18] 104
8.10. Dutch Intra-Asiatic Trade in Bengal Textiles
[Quinquennial Total, Average and Share Percentage
in the Total No. of Pieces 1730-55 (First Five Years of
Each Decade)] 106
8.11. Percentage Share of Different Textile Categories
Exported by the Dutch to Batavia, Japan and Persia
(First Five Years of Each Decade, 1730-55) 108
9.1. Geographical Distribution of Piece-goods in
the English Company’s Orders 1681-3 117
9.2. Geographical Distribution, Unit Price and
Share of Different Areas in the Total Value
of Dutch Textile Export from Bengal to
Holland, 1753-4 and 1754-5 118
9.3. Quinquennial Total and Average of
Silk Textiles Exports: Asian Merchants and
European Companies 1750/1 to 1754/5 119
10.1. Manufacturing Costs of Khasas and Baftas in
Burron, 1788 & 1789 134
10.2. Cost of Garra Production and Weaver’s
Earnings, Birbhum, 1787 135
10.3. Production Cost of Taffetas in Kasimbazar, 1756 136
12.1. Export of Textiles from Dhaka by
Asian/Indian Merchants: 1747 and 1797 165
 CHAPTER 1

Prologue

he textile industry in India is a traditional handicraft

T cottage industry especially in Bengal. From time immemorial

Indian textiles were exported, again especially from Bengal, to
different parts of the world, including the erstwhile Roman Empire.
But it was from the mid-seventeenth century that there was a great
demand for Bengal textiles in various parts of the world including
Europe. As Bengal was the hub of the textile industry, the Bengal
textile trade and industry in the backdrop of the Indian scenario will
be discussed. In the process the various similarities as also dissimilarities
in the textile industry of the various regions of India in the early
modern era will also be touched upon.
There is little doubt that the textile industry had a vital role in the
socio-economic life of Bengal as also in many parts of India, especially
from the mid-seventeenth to mid-eighteenth century. The village
economy of the then Bengal was primarily agriculture based – a large
part of the population was engaged in agricultural activities. Of these
peasant-workers, most of them engaged themselves in weaving textiles
in their leisure time. Indeed, in the early modern era, Bengal textile
industry was basically a rural cottage industry. Thus in Bengal, as in
some other parts of India, the peasant was also a weaver or vice versa.
In this production system, the peasant-weaver’s cottage was his
workshop. His tools were very few and primitive with which he and
his family produced the cloth. The cotton or yarn was purchased by
him from the local hat (small village market) and it was his wife who
12 SPINNING YARNS

spun yarn from the cotton. Later the whole family helped in weaving
the cloth. When finished, the weaver used to sell it in the local hat
or to the dalals or merchants of whom there was no dearth in the
market. In general, the practice was that the weaver would receive
some advance from the merchant-middlemen, dalals, dadni merchants
and the likes for buying the raw materials, especially cotton or thread/
yarn and for maintaining himself and his family during the period
(about six months) when he would be busy in weaving cloth. When
the demand for cloth was high, the weaver worked full-time and
found no time for cultivation. Many peasants even turned full-time
weavers to meet the demands of the market.
At this point one might ask the question: why was there such a
high demand for textiles? The answer is simple. Besides the personal
needs of the peasant-weavers, there was then a huge demand for
Bengal textiles in different parts of Asia including India as also in
Europe because of the fact that Bengal textile was not only cheap but
also of much superior quality as compared to the other textiles available
in the markets. After the discovery of direct sea-route from Europe
to Asia by Vasco de Gama in 1498, the demand for Bengal textiles
in Europe increased considerably from around the mid-seventeenth
century. Thus on the one hand the demand of the Asian merchants
and on the other that of the Europeans resulted in a huge amount
of textile exported from Bengal till the mid-eighteenth century. But
the export more or less came to an end with the British conquest of
Bengal in 1757 bringing with it whole-scale repressions by the
Company officials, its servants and the gomastas, and after the
Industrial Revolution in Britain towards the end of the century, the
Bengal textile industry started to decline.
Unfortunately, there is a dearth of books written in English dealing
exclusively with the Bengal textile industry. Those available are
concerned mostly with the muslin industry of Dhaka. For instance,
Abdul Karim’s Dhakai Muslin (1965) though a commendable work
deals mostly with the Dhaka muslin industry. However, many of his
observations are in general applicable to the Bengal industry as a
whole. However, it should be pointed out that Karim did not touch
upon some very significant aspects of the textile industry. Not only
the number of books written in English on the Bengal textile industry
 P RO L O G U E 13

are very few but most of them were written more than a hundred
years back. James Taylor’s A Descriptive and Historical Account of the
Cotton Manufacture of Dacca in Bengal, published in 1851, contains
very few details of the Bengal textile industry as whole – N.N.
Banerjee’s Monograph on the Cotton Fabrics of Bengal published in
1878 can hardly be relied upon. Moreover this 62-page book is very
difficult to get hold of – only seven copies are available in the world
and none in India.
However, there is significant discussion on the Bengal textile
industry in some publications of the last century. For instance, J.C.
Sinha’s Economic Annals of Bengal (1927), H.R. Ghosal’s Economic
Transitions in the Bengal Presidency (1950), N.K. Sinha’s Economic
History of Bengal (vol. 1) (1956) are quite remarkable contributions
in this respect. Then again from around the 1970s, several treatises
on the economic history of Bengal contain very useful information
on the textile industry – K.N. Chaudhuri, The Trading World of Asia
(1978), Om Prakash, Dutch East India Company and the Economy of
Bengal (1985) and The European Commercial Enterprises in Pre-Colonial
India (1998), P.J. Marshall’s, Bengal: The British Bridgehead (1987)
and the Sushil Chaudhury’s Trade and Commercial Organization in
Bengal, 1650-1720 (1975) and From Prosperity to Decline: Bengal in
the Eighteenth Century (1995). But all of them deal with Bengal/
Indian textile industry only as a part of other themes. Two significant
works dealing exclusively with Bengal textile industry in the second
half of the eighteenth and early nineteenth century are D. Mitra’s The
Cotton Weavers of Bengal (1978) and Hameeda Hossain’s The Company
Weavers of Bengal (1988). But there is next to nothing in them about
the textile industry in the pre-modern era. Recently an excellent
collection of essays on various aspects of south Indian textiles has
been published (Giorgio Riello and Tirthankar Roy (eds.), How India
Clothed the World?, 2006) which will be helpful in reconstructing the
history of the Indian textile industry in some areas. Unfortunately
here too one gets only piecemeal discussions of different regions, and
not a comprehensive study of the Indian textile industry in the early
modern era as a whole.
However, so far as the regional studies on textiles in various parts
of India are concerned, there are quite a few good works till date. S.
14 SPINNING YARNS

Arasaratnam’s and Vijaya Ramaswamy’s work on south Indian textiles,

especially Textiles and Weavers in Medieval South India, Prasannan
Parthasarathi’s, The Transition to a Colonial Economy: Weavers,
Merchants and Kings in South India, 1720-1800 (2001).
Actually while working for more than four decades on various
aspects of Indian Ocean trade, the activities of the European
Companies and their impact on Indian’s/Bengal’s economy and
politics, the commercial enterprises of the Armenians in Bengal/India
and their role in the overland trade, etc., in the different archives and
libraries of India and abroad, especially in the British Library, London
and Algemeen Rijksarchief in Holland, this author has collected a lot
of material on the Indian/Bengal textile industry. On the basis of
these material as well as those are available as secondary sources, an
attempt has been made to write a monograph on Bengal textile
industry.
For centuries, Bengal textiles were admired all over the world.
Foreign travellers and observers, right from the Roman times down
to the late eighteenth century, spoke highly of the fine quality and
cheapness of the textiles manufactured in Bengal. As such Bengal
textiles were exported to different parts of the world till the late
eighteenth century when the British occupation of Bengal on the one
hand and the advent of the Industrial Revolution in England on the
other sounded the death-knell of Bengal’s traditional indigenous
industry. Hence one would have expected that there will be at least
several works devoted entirely to the Bengal textile industry and trade
in the early pre-Colonial era. Unfortunately it is not the case.
The various aspects of the Bengal textile industry and trade has
been discussed in this monograph. The Introduction outlines the
main propositions the author has tried to examine in the book.
Chapter 2 is an account of the admiration for the Indian textiles,
particularly Bengal muslins, from the Roman times and then by
Herodotus, Ptolemy, Pliny, among others and later on by the hordes
of foreign travellers who visited India from the fifteenth to the
eighteenth centuries. Besides, the chapter depicts how the contemporary
European observers narrated the wonderful expertise and excellence
of the work of the Indian artisans, especially the Bengal weavers and
spinners in the seventeenth and the eighteenth centuries. It has also
 P RO L O G U E 15

been demonstrated here that Bengal not only produced expensive

muslins and fine textiles but also coarse and cheap cloth for which
there was a great demand in many parts of the world. In this context
the question that naturally crops up is who were the major exporters
of these textiles – the Europeans or the Asian merchants?
Chapter 3 showcases the advantages that Bengal had over other
centres of textile production in India, of which the most important
and distinct ones may be identified as (1) abundance of highly skilled
labour, specially weavers and spinners; (2) remarkably low cost of
production; (3) cheap and highly flexible transport facilities in its
riverine network and finally, (4) a flourishing agriculture resulting in
cheapness of staples like rice, cotton yarn, silk thread, etc. Besides,
the Bengal textile industry had certain special features which were
not to be found in any other region. These were: the textile industry
in Bengal was basically a rural domestic handicraft industry, it was
spread all over Bengal. At the same time it was characterized by
localization and specialization achieved through generations. Besides,
in common with other major centres of textile production like Gujarat,
Coromandel, and the Punjab, Bengal enjoyed for long an active
regional and intra-Asiatic trade, the presence of an entrepreneurial
class from all over Asia and locally produced cotton and silk. But it
should be noted that it was the comparative advantages of Bengal,
listed above, over the other centres of textile production that gave it
the preponderance in textile trade and industry for centuries, including
the period under review.
Chapter 4 deals with the production system and organization of
the textile industry in Bengal. In this traditional production system,
the weaver used to produce cloth in his home with his family. His
cottage was his workshop. In this personalized production system, a
little capital used to suffice. Sometimes there is reference of head
weavers who used to weave cloth with the help of a few other weavers.
However, a very important and significant fact about the production
system was that the dadni or advanced system was a traditional and
integral part of production system. It has also been explained here
the raison d’être of the dadni system and its extension in the seventeenth
and the eighteenth centuries. Besides, this chapter gives a description
of the different stages of cloth production right from spinning to
16 SPINNING YARNS

winding and preparing the yarn, warping, applying the reed to the
warp, beaming or applying the warp to the end roll of the loom,
preparing the heddles or harness and lastly the weaving, washing, etc.
Chapter 5 is mainly concerned with a detailed discussion of the
Dhaka muslin industry. Quite a few things like the origin of the word
‘muslin’, why was the Dhaka muslin the most beautiful, where in
Dhaka was the cotton suitable for production of muslin grown, who
did spinning of yarn for muslin, which were the aurangs where the
best quality and most expensive muslin were produced, how expensive
were these muslins and finally what was the production organization
like in the royal karkhanas or musbool-khas-kothi where muslins for
the royalty and nobility were produced in Dhaka are discussed in this
chapter.
Bengal produced not only muslin or fine cloth and cheap and
coarse textiles but also silk, and mixed cotton and silk textiles in large
quantities. How and where were these textiles produced, what was
the process of silk production, how was the silk yarn and who did it,
what was the approximate cost of producing silk textiles and finally
the comparative role of the Asian and Europeans in the export of silk
textiles in Bengal are discussed in Chapter 6.
Chapter 7 is devoted to an analysis of the procurement system of
textiles adopted by European and Indian/Asian merchants. It was
because of the diffusion of textile production in Bengal (not so much
in regions), that procurement was not an easy task. However, the
Asian/Indian merchants had certain advantages over the Europeans
in procuring textiles. In most cases the Asian/Indian merchants
employed gomastas who were in general their kith and kin or people
who belonged to the same caste. These people were conversant of the
local language and as such could directly contract with the weavers
for supply of cloth. Moreover they could cover their food and lodging
with a small sum of money compared to the Europeans. But in the
case of the Europeans, the process was rather difficult. As their
employees did know the local language they had to depend on dadni
merchants, dalals or paikars for the supply of export commodities.
So they had to employ in their principal factories a local person as
the chief merchant who used to arrange for the supply of necessary
items for export through dadni merchants or dalals. Basically the
 P RO L O G U E 17

dadni merchants were the mainstay for procurement of textiles and

other export goods. Among the dadni merchants in Calcutta, the
dominance was of the Seth and Basak families and in Kasimbazar it
was the Katma family. But the main difficulty in procurement of
export items, especially textiles and silk was that the Companies
suffered from a chronic shortage of liquid capital and they had to
borrow from the local credit market, especially from the House of
the Jagat Seths. All this is detailed in this chapter.
Why and how the Companies came to India/Bengal for trade and
what was their role in the export trade of textiles is described in
Chapter 8. It also examines why there was a sudden boom in textile
export and the comparative role of the English and Dutch Companies
in the export of textiles, with quantitative evidence. Besides it gives
an account of the different types of cloths exported by the two
Companies. It also looks into the role of Bengal textiles in the inter-
Asian trade of the Dutch Company.
There has been a consensus among historians for a long time that
the European Companies were the major exporters of textiles from
Bengal/India and that compared to it the role of the Asian/Indian
merchants was insignificant. Chapter 9 has tried to establish with
qualitative as well as quantitative evidences that in textile export, not
to speak of silk export, the Asians/Indians were much ahead of the
Europeans. This scenario was completely reversed after the British
conquest of Bengal in 1757.
Chapter 10 relates to the condition of the artisans – weavers,
spinners, etc. – who were the chief pillars of the textile industry. Here
we have tried to ask a few questions – how far mobile were the weavers?
Were they willing to leave their habitation in the face of oppression
by the ruling authority/mahajans/Company officials? How much
freedom did they enjoy? Could they produce cloth according to their
choice or well compelled to do so at the dictates of others? Was it
possible for them to bargain with the dadni merchants/dalals/paikars
at the time of the contract? More importantly, what was the economic
condition of the artisans and how much did they earn? In the records
of the European Companies, there are numerous references to the
poverty of the weavers. Was it a fact or figment of an ‘imagination’
of the Company factors? Last but not the least, the condition of the
18 SPINNING YARNS

weavers in the beginning of the eighteenth century is compared here

with that of the weavers towards the end of the eighteenth century.
Chapter 11 deals with the debate regarding the absence of
technological innovations despite a huge demand for textiles in the
eighteenth century. It has also taken up the question how could India/
Bengal afford to meet the demand for the large amount of textiles
with the almost primitive form of production system. The next chapter
takes a look at the scenario in the other centres of textile production,
especially in south, western and northern India in the backdrop of
the different aspects of the textile production in India. Lastly, it has
been attempted to find out the reasons/causes behind the decline of
the Bengal textile industry which began in the second half of the
eighteenth century. In conclusion, there is a resume of the main pro­
positions with explanations put forward in the volume.
N.B. It has not been possible to identify some of the aurangs
(production centres) of textiles. Again, it was difficult to make out
what exactly was the type of some of the cloths as most of them have
been out of circulation for long and have become obscure. Hence we
had to keep the names as found in the records. There might be a little
repetition here and there but that was necessary for clarification of
some issues.
 CHAPTER 2

Historical Perspective

he reputation of the Bengal textiles industry reached its

T zenith in the early modern era. The textiles produced in Bengal,

especially the finer varieties, had received overwhelming
appreciation from observers in different countries for centuries. In
fact, a variety of Bengal textiles were exported to different parts of
the world even more than 2,000 years back. James Taylor noted that
the famous muslins of Dhaka were appreciated very much in Europe
even in the first century ad. Draped in exquisite muslin attire, the
beautiful ladies of the Roman Empire loved to exhibit their figure
in them. Muslin was indeed a prized fabric for them.1 Again, an
anonymous publication of the first century ad, Periplus of the Erythrean
Sea referred to a muslin, ‘Gangitiki’, which came most probably from
East Bengal.2 Indeed it was a fact that prominent personalities right
from Herodotus and Strabo down to Ptolemy, Pliney, among others
referred to Bengal muslins in their works. The Arab geographer and
traveller, Sulaiman, who visited India in the ninth century, wrote in
his work Silsilat-ut-Tawarikh that ‘cotton fabrics made in the kingdom
of Rahmi [which has been identified as East Bengal] are so fine and
delicate that a dress made of it may pass through a signet ring’.3 So
it is apparent from the above that Bengal textiles were quite well
known and exported to various countries of the world.
Not only that, the delicacy and beauty of Bengal textiles was noted
by numerous foreign travellers and observers who came to India. An
Arab traveller from Morocco who visited Bengal in the mid-fourteenth
20 SPINNING YARNS

century was so impressed when he saw the muslins in Sonargaon that

he remarked that such beautiful and exquisite cloth of so fine a quality
could hardly be found anywhere in the world.4 Similarly, the Buddhist
monks and travellers who visited Bengal in the fifteenth century,
spoke highly of the Bengal textiles. The Chinese traveller Mahuan
who visited Bengal in the early fifteenth century mentioned about
the muslins of Sonargaon like malmals, etc., and observed that it is
a wonder how the people could make such fine quality cloth there.5
Duarte Barbosa, the Portuguese traveller, noticed early in the
sixteenth century that ‘different kinds of fine cloth such as estravantes
used as headdresses by Portuguese ladies and as turbans by the Arabs
and Persians, mamonas, duguazas, chowtars, sinabafa and beatilha were
manufactured in Bengal. Though it is difficult to these piece-goods,
it may be tentatively suggested that the above terms stand respectively
for sirband, malmal, du-gazi cloth, chowtars, sinaband and bethilas.6
Again, the Venetian traveller, Ludovico Varthema, who visited Bengal
in the same century noted that varieties of fine fabrics like bairam,
mamone, lizati ciantar, donzar and sinabaf, etc., were available here.
Towards the end of the sixteenth century, the English traveller, Ralph
Fitch, wrote that Sonargaon is a ‘town . . . where there is the best and
finest cloth made in India.’7 Almost at the same time the greatest
historian of the Mughal era, Abul Fazl, noted that ‘the sarkar of
Sonargaon produces a species of muslin very fine and in great quantity’.8
Evidently the Bengal textiles, especially, the finer varieties had
overwhelming appreciation all over the world for centuries. Even in
the late 1760s, the Dutch traveller Stavorinus stated that the Bengal
muslins were made so fine that a piece of twenty yards in length or
even longer could be put into a common pocket ‘tobacco-box’.9 It
was not only the visitors from the West who were surprised by the
extreme fineness and exquisite beauty of the Bengal textiles, but even
to Robert Orme, the official historian of the English East India
Company who lived in Bengal in the early 1750s, it remained a puzzle
‘how works of such extraordinary niceness can be produced by a
people . . . who must be deprived of such tools as seem absolutely
necessary to finish such manufactures.’10 His ‘surprise was heightened’
when he found that in Dhaka ‘where all the cloths for the use of the
king and his seraglio are made’ were of ‘such wonderful fineness as
 H I S TO R I C A L P E R S P E C T I V E 21

to exceed ten times the price of any linens permitted to be made for
Europeans, or any other else in the kingdom’. He tried to account
for the exceptional quality of the fabrics by referring to the high skill
of the Bengali weavers and comparing it with that of their European
counterparts. He wrote:11
As much as an Indian is born deficient in mechanical strength, so much his
whole frame endowed with an exceeding degree of sensibility and pliantness.
The hand of an Indian cook-wench shall be more delicate than that of an
European beauty; the skill and features of a porter shall be softer than those
of a petit maitre.

Similarly, the Danish report on the textile production in Bengal

written in 1789, also reflected on how ‘through unwearying industry
and with the help of a few paltry tools’ the weavers in Bengal produced
‘the prettiest and finest cloths with use of machines’.12 In his famous
report on the Dhaka cloth manufacture, John Taylor, the Commercial
Resident of Dhaka wrote in 1800 dwelt on the ‘singular beauty of
the fabric’ and ‘the extraordinary skill requisite in manufacturing it’.13
But one should remember here that Bengal did not only manufacture
muslins and fine textiles, it had at the same time a traditional and
flourishing trade and industry in ordinary and medium quality which
enjoyed a substantial market in many parts of India and Asia in
general. The export of textiles from Bengal to Coromandel, Ceylon,
South-East Asia, as also to West and Central Asia in the seventeenth
and the first half of the eighteenth century comprised mainly coarse
and medium quality piece-goods while the trade with areas in the
region of Agra, Lahore, Multan, the Persian Gulf and the Red Sea
might have been mostly in finer quality fabrics. The European
Companies, however, exported both ordinary and fine textiles
throughout the period of our study. But they were not interested in
sending high quality expensive muslins as there was no demand for
these in Europe. However, they exported medium quality and less
expensive muslins.
It is generally held that there was a boom in the Bengal textile
industry with the coming in of the Europeans. Some historians believe
that consequent to the export of textiles by the Companies, the textile
industry in Bengal prospered immensely which in turn led to a
22 SPINNING YARNS

flourishing economy. It seems quite natural to think so tentatively

because it is possible to get complete quantitative data on the
Companies’ exports from Bengal in the archives in the British
Museum, London or the Algemeen Rijksarchief, in The Hague. And
from these materials, it is easy to build a rosy picture of the European
exports. As a result, the exports by Asian/Indian merchants from, of
which textiles were the most significant items, gets almost lost in the
backdrop of the quantified European trade. But in the case of Asian/
Indian trade, the main problem is that quantitative evidence of the
Asian/Indian trade is very hard to come by. As a result it is not possible
to put forward enough quantitative data on Asian/Indian trade in
the face of the European trade and as such the European trade is
considered much more than the Asian/Indian trade.
But if one goes through the Company records, whether the Dutch
or the English, very carefully and meticulously, one would find that
the Asians/Indians were equally competing with the Europeans in
the commodity market, whether it was market for textiles or for raw
silk. In fact, the Europeans were often writing to their Home offices
that the Asians/Indians were dominating these markets buying
anything and everything they want leaving very few things for them.
But if one is a little cautious and keep in mind all the time, the Asian/
Indian perspective, and with a bit of luck, one finds at least some,
though perhaps not enough, quantitative evidence on the Asian/
Indian trade. And we are lucky in that respect. With whatever evidence
we have at the moment, we can raise the question whether the
European trade was more significant than the Asian/European trade
in the seventeenth and the eighteenth century? We shall try to find
an answer to this question in the present volume.

NOTES
1. James Taylor, Cotton Manufacture, pp. 46-8; Dr. Ure, Cotton Manufacture in
Britain, p. 54; Syed Murtaza Ali, ‘Dacca Muslin’, in Journal of the Asiatic
Society of Bengal, vol. XIII, no. 2, 1968, p. 203.
2. J.C. Sinha, ‘Dacca Muslin Industry’, in Modern Review, April 1925, p. 400.
3. Elliot & Dowson, History of India, vol. 1, p. 5; Abdul Karim, Dhakai Muslin,
pp. 48-52.
4. Ibn Batuta, The Voyages of. . ., vol. 4, p. 122.
 H I S TO R I C A L P E R S P E C T I V E 23

5. Abdul Karim, Dhakai Muslin, p. 11.

6. Duarte Barbosa, The Book of . . ., vol. II, pp. 145-6.
7. Ralph Fitch and William Foster, Early Travels, p. 28.
8. Abul Fazl, Ain-i-Akbari, ed. Jarett, vol. II, p. 124.
9. J.S. Stavornius, Voyages, p. 413. The ‘tobacco-box’ here meant actually a
snuff-box.
10. Robert Orme, Historical Fragments, p. 412.
11. Ibid.
12. Ole Feldbaeck, ‘Cloth Production in Bengal’, BPP, vol. LXXXVI (July-
December 1967), p. 126.
13. Home Misc. 456F, f. 147.
 CHAPTER 3

Bengal’s Advantages
over other Regions of India

or a long time Bengal had several advantages over other

F centres of textile production in India. The most important and

distinct ones among them were: (1) Profusion of highly skilled
workers/artisans; (2) surprisingly low cost of production; (3) Cheap
and highly flexible transport facilities in its riverine network; (4) a
thriving agriculture resulting in inexpensive rice, cotton yarn, silk
thread, etc. Besides, in common with other major centres of textile
production like Gujarat, Coromandel, and the Punjab, Bengal enjoyed
for long an active regional and intra-Asiatic trade, the presence of an
entrepreneurial class from all over Asia and locally produced raw
material like cotton and silk. But it should be noted that it was the
comparative advantages of Bengal, listed above, over other centres of
textile production that gave it the preponderance in the textile trade
and industry for centuries, including the period under review.
The entire process of textile manufacture was quite complex and
it involved the participation of a host of workmen. Right from the
cultivation of cotton or mulberry plants, the spinning of the cotton
or reeling of silk, the warping, the fixing of the harness to the warp,
and the loom, and the final weaving and washing required highly
specialized and technical skill. In its peasant-cultivators, spinners,
reelers, weavers and washermen, Bengal had the special expertise
needed for the complex craft of manufacturing cloth and silk textiles.
 B E N G A L’ S A DVA N TA G E S 25

The famous muslins of Dhaka and the silk-piece goods of Kasimbazar

were the specimens of the workmanship of the highly skilled labour
force of the areas – a skill which was transmitted from one generation
to another for centuries. And the Bengali workmen produced the
finest quality of textiles with the simplest possible tools which provoked
Robert Orme to write: ‘. . . the tools which they use are as simple
and plain as they can be imagined to be. The rigid clumsy fingers of
an European would scarcely be able to make a piece of canvas with
the instruments which are all that an Indian employs in making a
piece of cambric.’1
There was no dearth of skilled workforce, and in fact, there was
an abundance of it in Bengal because of the fact that textiles production
was primarily a rural domestic handicraft industry. The members of
the whole family, including the children, participated in it. The
spinning of cotton or the winding of silk was almost exclusively the
monopoly of the women in the family who utilized their traditional
and hereditary skill, taking time off the daily chores. The peasant-
cultivator was often a weaver as well and whenever necessary could
shift from one occupation to the other, part-time or full-time,
depending on the situation or vice versa. It was almost a common
feature in Bengal that even children contributed their part in the
complex process of production of cloth. The abundance of labour,
together with the cheapness of staples like rice, wheat and yarn auto­
matically kept the production cost lower in Bengal than in other
regions. Again, the staples were cheap because of the high productivity
in the agricultural sector. Indeed, the legendary cheapness of provisions
in Bengal has been attested by all contemporary foreign travellers and
observers.2 To all this was added Bengal’s unique advantage of having
an affordable and easy transport system for its numerous inland
waterways. Almost every important producing area of Bengal textiles
was easily accessible through navigable rivers and the cost of
transportation from those areas to any trade mart of Bengal or main
emporium of northern India or to the ports, for that matter, was
probably the cheapest compared to that in any other region of India.
So it is no wonder that Bengal enjoyed an unrivalled supremacy in
textile trade and industry for centuries and probably even more so
for the period under review.
26 SPINNING YARNS

Let us now examine in detail the salient/distinct features of Bengal

textile industry. The first notable feature of Bengal’s handicraft industry
was that, as we have seen earlier, it was basically a rural domestic
industry. There is no denying the fact that the industry thrived in
urban areas too but the basic characteristic of the manufacture in
Bengal was that it was mostly a rural and domestic industry. Orme’s
observation that in Bengal ‘it is difficult to find a village in which
every man, woman and child is not employed in making a piece of
cloth’ only brings out the predominantly rural character of the
industry.3 No doubt the European Companies and to some extent
the Asian merchants collected their cloth for export mainly at several
trade marts and urban centres but that too through a network of
intermediaries who as agents procured their wares from weavers or
hats in the rural areas. Dhaka, Kasimbazar, Malda, Hughli, Radhanagar,
Santipur, Jugdea, etc., were mainly the emporia rather than prominent
weaving centres. The Danish report typically refers to the rural
character of the textile industry when it observes that the district of
Birbhum, the principal centre of garra (a coarse and cheap calico),
was ‘almost solely inhabited by weavers’.4
That the textile industry in Bengal was primarily a rural domestic
handicraft industry is borne out by the fact that the weaver was most
often than not a peasant farmer. The specialized works such as spinning
of cotton, winding of silk, etc., was exclusively done by the women
in the peasant/weaver family, and even the children in the family were
involved in the process of manufacture. It was not only Orme who
noted the ‘assistance which the wife and the family are capable of
affording to the labours of the loom’5 but among many others the
Danish report too emphasized that the weaver bought cotton which
‘he himself, his wife and family may clean and spin’6 and took the
cloth after weaving to the market. Again, Cansius of the Dutch
Company, while describing the textile manufacture of Malda district
in 1670, stated that the hinterland of the aurungs of the district
extended over as many as 350 villages.7 In 1741 the English Council
at Kasimbazar noted that the garras, one of the main staples of the
European trade, were produced in the ‘town and the villages within the
circuit of twenty miles round about Cutwa [Katwa] which town is chief
place to which they [merchants and weavers] bring the said cloth
 B E N G A L’ S A DVA N TA G E S 27

when ready in order to send it away by boats or land carriage as the

time of the year admits’.8 Even as late as 1757, while considering the
proposal of making contract with weavers through gomastas, excluding
the dadni merchants or dalals, it noted that the ‘extent of the different
aurungs is so very considerable’ that it would require an ‘infinite
number of servants to overlook the weavers’.9 So it can be said Orme
was not exaggerating the rural character of the textile industry in
Bengal when he wrote that ‘the weavers live entirely in villages’ and
the weaver was generally ‘living and working with his wife and several
children in the hut’.10 It may be noted here that this is rather contrary
to the character of the industry in some other parts of India. Though
the textile industry in the south like Coromandel was mainly a rural
domestic handicraft industry like that of Bengal, in western and
northern India it was mainly urban-based or situated close to the
urban areas.11
The second distinct feature of the Bengal textile industry was its
extremely diffused character. As it was basically a rural domestic
industry, the natural corollary was its extraordinary diffusion. And
an important factor contributing to the decentralization of the industry
was the extensive and comparatively cheap means of Bengal’s riverine
transport system. As a result, the textile industry in Bengal could be
highly decentralized and spread over a large area, which was not the
case in northern and western India. It is important to note here that
the ‘vital qualitative difference between production for a purely local
market and production for export and inter-regional trade’ was blurred
to a considerable extent. Hence whether it was the traditional Asian
merchants or the newcomers in the trade – the European Companies
in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries – all had to procure their
wares through a network of intermediaries from areas widely dispersed
all over Bengal. One of the main reasons why the Companies could
not purchase textiles from the weavers directly was, besides their
ignorance of the local language and the market conditions, the
widespread diffusion of the industry in Bengal.
Another distinctive characteristic of Bengal textile industry was
its localization. It was not only Robert Orme but even travellers like
Stavorinus, among others, who emphasized the fact that every distinct
kind of cloth was the product of a particular district.12 Each and every
28 SPINNING YARNS

locality producing textiles had its special characteristics imprinted in

the product so much so that, according to the Calcutta Council’s
report of 1752, the piece-goods could not be packed in one and the
same bale as ‘fabric of every aurung had its peculiar qualities’.13 Let
us consider what the main factors were for this localization and
concentration of artisans in a particular area. These were the availability
of the relevant raw material and ‘the cumulative effect created by a
hereditary concentration of craft skills’. It appears that the location
of these centres of production was ‘neutral with respect to transport
costs’ or other important mercantile considerations because not only
the manufacture of luxury cloth was localized but even the same was
the case with even coarse and medium quality calicoes. That is why
while muslins were produced mostly in Dhaka and silk fabrics in
Kasimbazar. Places like Birbhum which were not quite so near the
port of shipment area, produced ordinary textiles like garra and Malda
which was a more distant place from the considerations of transport
and shipment produced both fine and coarse textiles.
So it appears that the proximity to the supply of suitable raw
materials was one of the main factors behind the localization of textile
industry in Bengal. The most famous and the finest muslins were
manufactured in Dhaka district where the finest cotton in the world
was produced. Likewise the areas around Kasimbazar held the
monopoly of manufacturing the silk piece-goods as most of the quality
silk was produced in the vicinity of this famous trade mart. This
localization (and of course specialization too) was so much an integral
part of the textile industry in Bengal that some of the well-known
aurungs were named after the particular product of that manufactur­
ing centre. The point can be established with a few illustrations from
contemporary records. In 1741, the Kasimbazar Council, while
referring to the Maratha invasions, noted that before the Marathas
had left, they burnt all the ‘Taffaty aurungs’.14 Again the manufacturing
centres of garras in Birbhum and Burdwan were referred in Company
records as ‘Garra aurungs’. The English factors at Kasimbazar wrote
in 1742 that they were facing extreme difficulty in providing garras
as there were hardly ‘four or five hundred merchants that had any
gomastas at the Gurrah aurungs’.15 Numerous such references are to
be found in the Company records which clearly underline such
localized (and specialized too) aurungs.
 B E N G A L’ S A DVA N TA G E S 29

However, there were additional factors which contributed to such

localization. As for example, the Fort William Council wrote to the
Court of Directors in 1732 that it was almost impossible to make
the garras within the factory bounds because ‘every piece [of garras]
would be double the price, it is at the particular aurungs where the
cotton grows and rice much cheaper’ that garras were made.16 It is to
be noted here that all the aurungs in the districts where cloth was
made produced their own cotton. As John Taylor informs us, several
of the districts which were big manufacturing centres of textiles ‘grew
little or no cotton’, drawing their supplies from other parts of the
province or the country.17 Notable examples were the districts of
Birbhum and Burdwan. While Birbhum needed about 100,000
maunds of cotton, its annual production did not exceed 80,000
maunds and Burdwan imported at least about 50,000 maunds.18 The
coarse cotton textiles like garras and dosooties, produced mainly in
the above two districts, were generally made of Surat cotton, and the
fluctuation in the import of cotton from Surat often affected the price
of these fabrics.19 So it appears that along with the twin considerations
of raw materials and concentration of hereditary skill, the prices of
staples like rice, cotton and silk as also the tradition of making a
particular variety in a particular area explain the localization of the
textile industry in Bengal.
Last and but not the least, another remarkable distinctive feature
of the Bengal textile industry was the extent of specialization it had
reached during the period under review. It is quite unique that not
only every district but even every aurung produced textiles on a
specialized basis. Though in general most districts produced most
varieties of cloth, it is significant that there was not only regional
specialization but often the products of every aurung had their own
distinctiveness which differentiated them from the product of another
aurung. That was the reason why the same types of piece-goods and
of the same size produced in one aurung varied in price from that
produced in another aurung, depending on the fineness of quality
and workmanship. Though the same types of textiles were produced
in several aurungs of different districts, they were generally identified
by the name of the aurungs, and not just by the name of the textile.
This will be borne out by the following table (Table 3.1) where the
different types of the two principal muslins namely, khasa and mulmul
30 SPINNING YARNS

TABLE 3.1: PRICES OF TWO TYPES OF MUSLINS KHASA AND MULMUL

Name of Piece-goods Length & Breadth Prices per piece

(in covido) Rs. As.
Khasa Malda fine 40 × 3 17 8
” ” flowered 40 × 3 22 5
” Cogmaria 40 × 3 9 8
” ” 40 × 2¼ 7 6
” Orrua 40 × 2¼ 7 12
” ” flowered 40 × 2¼ 12 8
” Serry 32 × 1¾ 3 3
” Burron 40 × 2 4 12
” Kumarkhali 40 × 2 4 12
Mulmul Santipur 40 × 3 10 –
” ” fine 40 × 3 16 8
” ” 40 × 2½ 7 12
” ” 40 × 2 6 12
” Cossajura 40 × 2 11 –
” ” fine 40 × 2 19 –
” ” ” 40 × 2¼ 22 8
” ” ” 40 × 3 30 –
” Serry 36 × 1¾ 4 –
Source: BPC, vol. 15, pp. 233-4, Annex to Consult., 31 March 1742. One covid =
18 inches.

and their respective prices at which the English Company contracted

for with the dadni merchants of Calcutta in 1742 is to be found.
Quite a few things are clear from the above table. First, muslin
called khasa were produced in several aurungs. So the price of khasa
will not be known until and unless one knows the aurung where it
was made. Khasa is referred to in the records sometime as khasa Malda,
sometime as Khasa Cogmaria, sometime as khasa Orua and sometime
as khasa Burron. Second, the price of khasa (for that matter for all
sorts of textiles) depended on the aurung where it was manufactured.
For example, while the price of khasa Malda was Rs. 17.5, the price
of khasa Cogmaria was only Rs. 9.5. The size of the cloth was the
same in both cases. Again the same is the case of other muslins like
mulmul. While the price of mulmul Santipur (fine) was Rs. 16, that
of mulmul Cossajura (fine) was Rs. 30. Third, the price of cloth
depended on its size (length and breadth), e.g. khasa Cogmaria
 B E N G A L’ S A DVA N TA G E S 31

(40 co × 3 co) was Rs. 9.5 but if its size was 40 co × 2.5 co, the price
came down to Rs. 7.
The entire district of Dhaka was known for the production of
muslins which were the finest variety of Bengal textiles but the best
types of muslins were manufactured only in three aurungs namely
Junglebari, Bazetpur and Sonargaon. The finest and the most expensive
plain muslins called mulboos khas (royal clothing) were produced
exclusively in aurungs during the period. But here again there was
difference in the quality of the produce of these aurungs which only
brings out the degree of specialization in the various production
centres. While the weavers of Junglebari and Bazetpur excelled in
muslins of a close texture, those of Sonarpur specialized in making
thin and clear muslins.20 It is noted here that not only in weaving
but also in spinning, washing, etc., that specialization was a typical
feature of Bengal textile industry. The best thread was spun at
Junglebari and Bazetpur, ‘the fabrics of which arangs from the great
skill with which the cotton was spun, possess a peculiar softness’.21
As the Danish report informs us, there were certain washermen in
all weaving districts whose washing can be imitated nowhere’.22 Again
John Taylor noted that the art of making jamdanies of embroidered
cloth in the loom was the monopoly of the weavers of the Dhaka
aurung. These weavers who specialized in manufacturing jamdanies
were called ‘jamdani weavers’.23 Similarly, jamawars, an expensive
variety of silk-piece goods, were manufactured by weavers who
specialized in that particular kind of work.24
The question that crops up here is whether the theoretical concept
of ‘important economics of concentration’25 was somewhat blurred
by the distinctive features of the Bengal textile industry. The assumption
that production for local consumption and local market should be
distinguished from production for export and inter-regional trade
can hardly applied to the Bengal situation. There is little doubt that
the main consideration of manufacturing cloth for local consumption
was the availability of cotton or yarn while the consideration of
distance, both between manufacturing and consuming areas, and
between production centres and the point of final shipment, naturally
comes in as the cost of transport is vital for the profitability of the
enterprise. Besides, the merchants or the middlemen had to organize
32 SPINNING YARNS

proper inspection through agents to ensure the quality of the finished

goods as per specification. If all these considerations were applicable
to Bengal, it would have been difficult to explain why cheap and
ordinary calicoes like garras, a staple of the European trade, were
produced only in Birbhum and Burdwan districts, and both coarse
and fine cloth manufactured in Malda, since both the areas, especially
Malda, were quite far from the port of shipment. Similarly, if the
spatial pattern in the product of mulmuls in Dhaka and taffetas in
Kasimbazar can be explained on the ground of special geographical
factors and concentration of hereditary craft skills, how can one
explain that Dhaka and Kasimbazar also produced coarse calicoes like
baftas, salampuries, garras and guineas for export.26
Again, the idea that muslins and silk-piece-goods were ‘high-cost
luxury products’ consumed in the richer households and hence the
location of production centres of these textiles was ‘neutral with
respect to transport costs’ hardly conforms to the fact.27 Of course,
the muslins and silk-piece-goods were more expensive than ordinary
cloths like garras or baftas. But there were different varieties of muslins
or silk-piece-goods with varying range of prices depending on the
fineness, workmanship and the aurungs where they were manufactured.
Sometimes there was not much of a difference in the prices of several
types of muslins, silk-piece-goods, fine calicoes or ordinary textiles.
Again within the same variety, the prices could vary widely, depending
on the quality of fineness, workmanship and the place of production.
The cost prices of some these textiles procured in different parts of
Bengal by the Dutch Company in 1752/3 and 1754/5 as shown in
Table 3.2, will clearly illustrate the point.
The bewildering variety of textiles produced in Bengal – 150
different names of the textiles to be found in the first ten years of the
eighteenth century in the English Company records – makes their
classification into different categories such as muslins, fine and coarse
calicoes, silk and mixed piece-goods an extremely difficult task. Any
attempt to do that can hardly be foolproof. John Taylor noted that
in Dhaka alone there were more than 100 varieties of cloth manu­
factured.28 And as we seen from Table 3.2, it is equally difficult to
state in general terms that muslins and silk piece-goods were high-cost
luxury items. Except for certain known varieties of muslins such as
 B E N G A L’ S A DVA N TA G E S 33
TABLE 3.2: COST OF TEXTILES PROCURED BY THE
DUTCH COMPANY 1752/3 AND 1754/5

Name of Piece-goods Catagory Produced in Piece per piece

(in Florins)
Khasa Junglebary Muslin Dhaka 72-5
Khasa Ordinary Muslin Hughli 13-15
Mulmul Ordinary Muslin Hughli 11-15
Duriyas Muslin Dhaka 46-51
Duriyas Muslin Hughli 25-9
Bethilas Fine calico Hughli 11-12
Chowtars Fine calico Hughli 12-12.5
Humhums Silk piece-good Hughli 11-12
Bandanas Silk Kasimbazar 8.9
Taffetas (Armosijn) Silk Kasimbazar 8.5-9.5
Dheris Silk Kasimbazar 17-18
Baftas Coarse calico Dhaka, Hughli 8.5-9
Guinees Coarse calico Hughli, 13-14
Kasimbazar
Source: Collected and computed from Dutch Export Invoices in VOC records.
Note: Guinees were of the size 75 co × 2¼ co while other piece-goods were generally
40 co × 2¼ co. 1 Re = 1.5 Florins.

jamdanies, nainsooks or silk textiles like jamawars, most of the ordinary

muslins or silk piece-goods were not really very expensive items. That
is why both the English and the Dutch Companies exported a large
quantity of these varieties. Though the finest and the best muslins
were most expensive, it was not only the fineness of quality which
accounted for the high price. As Taylor reported, the same kind of
jamdanies which used to cost Rs. 250 in Nawab Sirajudaullah’s time
(1756-7) sold at Rs. 450 per piece at the time of Muhammed Reza
Khan, the naib-nazim of Dhaka, in the 1760s, not because of ‘any
superior fineness of the thread’ but expensive patterns. But the
jamdanis exported by the Dutch and English in 1752/3 cost only
between Rs. 31 and 43. Some of the costlier varieties of textiles
exported by the Companies are mentioned in Table 3.3 along with
their respective prices.
It should be mentioned here, that the difference in the cost price
of the textiles purchased by the two companies may be due to the
disparity in the size of the fabrics procured by the companies and
34 SPINNING YARNS

TABLE 3.3: EXPENSIVE TEXTILES EXPORTED BY COMPANIES 1752/3

Piece-goods Category Dutch Cost: English Cost:

Price (Rs.) Price (Rs.)
Nainsooks Muslin 43 31-6
Jamdanies Muslin 21-2
Alliballis Muslin 36 16-25
Duriyas Muslin 18-31 12-27
Jamawars Silk piece-goods – 30
Source: For Dutch exports, process calculated from export invoices of VOC records.
Price for English exports calculated from Bengal General Journal & Ledgers,
Range 175, vol. 54.

because of the different aurungs where the piece-goods were bought.

It is not possible to find out all this because of the absence of relevant
material in the records.

NOTES
1. Robert Orme, Historical Fragments, p. 414.
2. For some of the observations, see, S. Chaudhury, Trade and Commercial
Organiztion, 1650-1720, pp. 4-5, 241-6.
3. Orme, Historical Fragments, p. 400.
4. Ole Feldbaeck, ‘Cloth Production in Bengal’, BPP, p. 128.
5. Orme, Historical Fragments, pp. 409-10.
6. Feldbaeck, ‘Cloth Production in Bengal’, p. 126.
7. Report of Henry Cansius on Malda, VOC 1278, ff. 2173-4, 7 September
1670.
8. Fact. Records, Kasimbazar, vol. 6, 16 October 1741.
9. Fact. Records, Dacca, vol. 3, 30 November 1757.
10. Orme, Historical Fragments, p. 410.
11. K.N. Chaudhuri, The Trading World of Asia, p. 249.
12. Orme, Historical Fragments, p. 413; Stavorinus, Voyages, p. 474.
13. BPC, vol. 25, f. 299, 17 November 1752.
14. Fact. Records, Kasimbazar, vol. 6, 26 May 1742.
15. Ibid., 3 April 1742.
16. C&B Abstr., vol. 3, f. 180, 25 February 1752.
17. Home Misc. vol. 456F, f. 112.
18. N.K. Sinha, Economic History of Bengal, vol. 1, p. 104.
19. Beng. Letters Recd., vol. 23, ff. 51, 60; FWIHC, vol. 1, pp. 917-18, 925.
20. Home Misc. 456F, f. 135.
21. Ibid., p. 129.
 B E N G A L’ S A DVA N TA G E S 35

22. Ole Feldbaeck, ‘Cloth Production in Bengal’, BPP, p. 132.

23. Fact. Records, Kasimbazar, vol. 12, 20 December 1753; NAI, Home Misc.
vol. 61, ff. 183-8.
24. K.N. Chaudhury, Trading World, p. 241.
25. Ibid.
26. It is clear from the export invoices of the Dutch ships from 1752/3 to 1754/5
where an area-wise breakdown of cargoes is available that the Dutch procured
baftas from Dhaka and garras, salampuries and guineas from Kasimbazar.
27. K.N. Chaudhuri, Trading World, p. 241.
28. Home Misc. 456F, f. 173.
 CHAPTER 4

Production Organization

t may be noted here that an important aspect of the Bengal

I textile industry in the pre-modern era was that weaving was

generally a subsidiary occupation to cultivation and the peasant
could easily move from farming to weaving in the slack season or vice
versa. This is apparent from James Taylor’s observation in the 1860s:1
A ryot [peasant] quitting his plough to work at the loom or leaving the latter
in order to resume the former is a common occurrence, especially among
those who make coarser cloths in many parts of India but in Dacca that is
seldom the case, weaving being there a distinct trade, to which those practising
it devote their whole-time attention.
But in the early eighteenth century, even the weavers in Dhaka
were seen taking part in cultivation. It has been reported by the
Kasimbazar Council in 1736 that the women spinners and ‘men that
served the weavers’ were obliged to ‘apply themselves to agriculture
in order to pay their rents’ which were then reported to have gone
up considerably’.2 Even John Taylor noted that towards the end of
the eighteenth century, a number of weavers in Dhaka cloth for which
the demand had gone down significantly had chosen to quit weaving
and turned to other occupation, presumably agriculture.3 However,
in Bengal it was a long established tradition that the peasant-weavers
produced cloth at home for their own consumption. This is borne
out in the poems of Mukundram who wrote that the women in the
peasant family were spinning cotton for making cloth for their own
use.4 It seems that the farmers not only made cloth for their own use
 P RO D U C T I O N O RG A N I Z AT I O N 37

but also for the market even long before the eighteenth century. This
is borne out by the contemporary vernacular literature where there
are numerous references stating that the peasant-weavers were taking
their manufactures to the local hats for sale and that they were buying
cotton, yarn and victuals with the money they received by selling
their wares. So it can be said with little hesitation that in Bengal both
farming and weaving ran side by side and it was that if one went on,
the other could not.
Even the poor peasants who lived from hand to mouth did indeed
produce cloth for their own use. Again, it may be pointed out that
the same peasant caste carried out the functions of all the early stages
of silk production – from mulberry cultivation to the winding of
cocoons – except perhaps the finishing process which was a highly
specialized craft. Along with this small peasant-weaver family as the
basic unit of production, we come across in the sources occasional
reference to weaving shops and head weavers. The Dhaka factors
reported in 1736 about such weaving shops where spinners and men
who helped the weavers were working.5 Moreover, while writing about
the profit of the weavers in the mid-eighteenth century, John Taylor
referred to the head weaver who bought thread for weaving cloth.6
However, though the head weaver is known to have functioned in
Hughli in 1670s, he had acted as an intermediary between the weavers
and merchants, and exercised some authority over his community.
His function and precise status is not known from the sources.7 And
it appears that he was not so common a feature of the weaving village
in Bengal as he seems to have been in the Coromandel Coast.8 If he
had been, we should have noticed his presence in the sources but he
is rarely to be seen there. John Taylor, however, reported that the
production of some cloth in Dhaka was carried out by master weavers
possessing two or three looms and employing an apprentice (nikari)
and a journeyman (kareegar).9 At the same time it is interesting to
note that in the mid-eighteenth century it was common for respectable
families of the weaving community to employ their own capital in
manufacturing goods that they sold freely on their own.10 Some of
the weavers in Dhaka were even reported to have advanced money
to a ‘number of most skilled spinners’ for the supply of the finest
thread.11
38 SPINNING YARNS

PROCUREMENT SYSTEM

The dadni (advance) system was an integral part of the Bengal textile
industry. Whether Asian merchants or the European Companies,
everyone had to procure cloth through a dadan given to the merchant
middlemen, dalals, paikars and sometimes directly to the weavers.
Occasionally, the Asian merchants used to buy cloth from the open
market but in most cases they arranged for their supply by sending
their gomastas (agents) to the aurungs where they contracted with the
weavers giving them advances. They had the advantage over the
Europeans because their gomastas were mostly their kith and kin or
belonged mainly to their caste and creed, and were conversant with
the local language and market conditions so that they could buy
goods at cheaper rates than the Europeans. But the factors of the
Companies had no knowledge of the local language or the markets.
Besides they could not arrange to collect cloth like the Asians, from
remote parts of the country. The goods bought through dadni were
called patan or patni. But the good which were bought in the spot
market were called khush kharid. However, in all probability, most of
the textiles for inter-regional and long-distance trade were produced
against advances paid and contracts made under the dadni system. It
may be noted here that sometimes rich weavers used their own capital
for producing cloth – something which will be apparent from a
contemporary observer,12 quoted below, though this was perhaps an
exception rather than the rule.
It was common practice for respectable families of the weaver caste to employ
their own capital in manufacturing goods, which they sold freely on their
own accounts. At Dacca in one morning 800 pieces of muslin brought by
the weavers of their own accord have been purchased at the door of one
gentleman.
The basic raison d’être of the dadni system has been explained in
various ways by the historians.13 The common argument with varying
degrees of emphasis is that it was necessitated by three important
considerations. First, the weavers’ need for finance; the dadni provided
him with the cash to buy the raw materials for manufacturing cloth
and to sustain himself and his family for the period, extending
sometime to six months that took him to finish his work. Second, it
 P RO D U C T I O N O RG A N I Z AT I O N 39

gave him the necessary security for the purchase of the goods ordered.
Third, while on the one hand it played an important role in securing
large enough quantity for the merchants who advanced dadney, on
the other it was also a way of binding up the producers in the face
of competition from other buyers in the market of whom there was
no dearth in the seventeenth and the first half of the eighteenth
century. Though a traditional system, it seems that the dadni system
was quite extended during the period under review to meet the
requirements of ‘an expanded and expanding market’. But the
suggestion that ‘the need to operate through the system of contracts
increased considerably’ with the European demands for specific size,
quality, design, etc., can hardly be taken for granted.14 For long Bengal
had been supplying her traditional markets in different parts of India,
South-East Asia, West and Central Asia, the Persian Gulf and the
Red Sea areas and North Africa with varying degrees of standard, size
and quality, and hence standardization was not something absolutely
new, nor was the volume of this traditional trade in any way less than
that of the European trade during the period under review.
In this context it should be noted that the dadni or advance system
was somewhat different from the verlagg system of the sixteenth and
seventeenth-century Europe. In the putting-out system of Europe
most of the artisans were supplied with necessary raw materials and
cash payment was made out to them with only an advance against
their wages. But in the dadni system in Bengal, the weavers were
almost in all cases given cash advance only; advance in raw material
is extremely rare to come by. Even in the royal karkhanas, as we have
seen earlier, the weavers bought and brought their own yarn for weav­
ing. But more importantly, while in Europe at all stages of product­
ion the output belonged to the merchant-financier, in Bengal the
producer appears to have retained considerable independence – he
had control over his produce until it changed hands and was still the
owner of the means of production, though his freedom to fix the
price of his goods was not unrestricted. The merchant-middlemen
who paid the advance to the weavers had the first claim on the goods
and it might be that the debt obligation often exposed the weaver to
coercive control of the merchant-financier. But what is extremely
significant is that the weaver/artisan was still, in Max Weber’s
40 SPINNING YARNS

terminology, not reduced to the position of a ‘wage earner’.15 So the

weaver in Bengal in the pre-colonial period retained the ownership
of his means of production – his loom, bought his own yarn
independently and at least in theory was the owner of his product.
The observation that ‘this was no more than an illusion of ownership’16
perhaps is not wholly appropriate. The transactions under the dadni
system were in the form of sales with the weaver/artisan retaining
considerable independence. At most, the system promoted the control
of merchant capital over the producer and not the process of pro­
duction itself. It was only under the English Company after 1757
that the weavers had virtually become wage workers on terms and
conditions over which he had no control.17
It seems that the bulk of the production for medium and long-
distance trade was done through advance contract or dadni system,
though the Asian merchants might have bought some textiles on the
spot market with cash payment. But it is not clear as to what extent
in the two sectors – the basic family unit of production with marginal
presence of rich weavers investing their own money for production
and the dadni contracts – there was an overlapping of functions or
whether duality of production was maintained to cater to the demands
of trade. Yet what emerges from a close scrutiny of the sources is that
there was an increasing division of labour based on caste and occu­
pational differentiation in Bengal textile industry in the seventeenth
and the eighteenth centuries.

PROCESS OF WEAVING

Almost every stage connected with the production of textiles – from

cotton-carding, spinning, unwinding and rewinding the thread,
formation of the cloth on the loom, washing, bleaching, dyeing, etc.
– was virtually an independent manufacturing activity. The observation
of Robert Orme is appropriate in this context. He emphasized that
unlike other industries where the craftsmen could perform singly all
the different stages of production, the textile industry required the
combined skills of several separate groups of craftsmen before the
finished cloth could reach the consumer.18 Indeed the weaving of
cloth was a very complex process and called for a thorough knowledge
 P RO D U C T I O N O RG A N I Z AT I O N 41

of the preparation and treatment of the natural thread before it could

be made ready for weaving. John Taylor gave a very precise account
of the weaving of mulmul in Dhaka around the late eighteenth century
which brings out clearly how complicated the process of weaving
was.19
Preparation of warp yarn consisted of sorting the thread from different parts
of the warp. Approximately eighteen days were taken to soak, rinse and dry
the yarn several times before it was sized in rice starch and wound on reels.
The warp was next laid by two men over bamboo sticks which had been
fixed at regular intervals in the open ground. The warp was fixed to the loom
by two men while the reel was attached to the warp by two. It took two
men ten to thirty days to fix the warp. Weaving required one or two persons,
though for jamdani variety of mulmul, which was embroidered in the loom,
a third weaver worked on the flowering. Ordinary assortments were made
in 10 to 15 days, the fine variety required twenty days and the superfine
thirty days.
Needless to say, the above would be also applicable more or less for
Bengal textiles in general.
The three main stages of weaving in general were: (1) procurement
of kapas or cotton; (2) spinning of yarn from cotton; and (3) weaving
with the yarn. Cotton was produced in almost all parts of Bengal and
as such there was no dearth of cotton in general in Bengal. H.T.
Colebrooke (1804) noted in the early nineteenth century that Bengal
produced almost the whole amount of cotton needed for textile
production.20 In the case of Dhaka, all the best cotton needed for
manufacturing muslins were produced in Dhaka and the neighbouring
areas. Edward Baines (1835) wrote that the soil of Sonargaon, Kapasia,
Jungleburry, etc., were such that the best cotton was produced in all
these places.21 All this will be discussed in detail later when we take
up production of muslin in Dhaka. However, it should be mentioned
here that a part of the cotton needed for producing garras in Birbhum
and Burdwan was imported from Surat in Gujarat.
Cotton that was produced in different parts of Bengal had different
names. Without going into details of that, we better talk about the
cotton that was produced in Dhaka and its neighbourhood because
those were the best quality cotton in the whole of the world. Generally
in Dhaka two varieties of cotton was produced, namely phooti and
42 SPINNING YARNS

bairati. The quality of phooti was much better than that of bairati.
The best quality muslin was produced with phooti cotton. Of course,
muslin was also produced by using bairati cotton. Its quality was
much inferior to that made with phooti. The phooti cotton was
produced only in a small area in the west bank of the river Meghna.
The details of this will be discussed in the chapter dealing with muslin
production in Dhaka. Here it may only be mentioned that John
Taylor specifically noted that the phooti cotton produced in that small
area was of the best quality in the whole of the world.22
Cotton plants are generally 3 to 4 ft high and cotton grows twice
a year – in the spring and the autumn. As spring cotton was much
better than the other varieties, it was cultivated in most of the lands.
After the harvest of cotton, rice was grown in these lands. Cotton
was grown in a land for two-three years and then kept fallow for a
year so that its fertility was kept intact. The best growers of cotton
were the Baruis or cultivators of betel leaf.23 The seeds of cotton were
to be preserved very carefully against damp weather. About 2 seers of
seeds are required to sow a land measuring one bigha (around half
an acre?) and one bigha used to produce around 6 maunds of cotton.
In every seer of raw cotton, there would be about three-fourths of
seeds and only one-fourth cotton. About a third of the cotton, that
part adheres most to seeds, is capable of being spun into the finest
thread which was absolutely necessary for making the best muslins.
The rest of the cotton was used for making inferior quality muslins
or other ordinary cotton piece-goods. However, though most of the
cotton required for making cloth was produced in Bengal, some
cotton had to be imported from Surat and it was called Sironj cotton.
This cotton was mostly used for making coarse cloth. Besides a small
amount of cotton came from Assam, Tripura, Chittagong Hill Tracts
and Arakan. Needless to say, this cotton was used for making cheap
and coarse textiles. The said cotton was called bhoga cotton.

SPINNING

The cultivation of cotton and the spinning was like a part-time activity
of a peasant-weaver family. They did it like their daily chores in their
leisure hours or taking time off from their other works. But when
 P RO D U C T I O N O RG A N I Z AT I O N 43

there was a high demand for Bengal textiles, then the peasant-
cultivator had to devote most of his time in cotton cultivation. But
as mentioned earlier, the peasant could turn to paddy or other
cultivation after harvesting the cotton crop. Spinning, however, was
the exclusive domain of the womenfolk in the peasant-weaver family.
They did the work in their leisure hours or taking time off their daily
chores. This spinning was a part-time as well as a cottage industry.
Generally, these women in the peasant-weaver family did spin from
cotton all the thread needed for weaving cloth in the house. However,
sometimes it was seen that the weavers were buying thread in the
local hat but that might be due to the high demand for cloth for
which the home-spun yarn was not enough and hence had to fall
back on the local supply.
It should be mentioned here that though weaving was a caste-based
hereditary occupation in Bengal, there was no caste bias so far as
spinning was concerned and even women of high caste including
Brahmins, Vaidyas, and Kayasthas spun yarn as did the women of
weaving castes like the Jugi, Tanti, Juluha, etc. Thread for coarse
varieties was spun by a wheel and for fine varieties by a spindle. Thread
was made in all aurungs of Dhaka district but the greatest quantity,
and with a few exceptions, the best, was spun in Jungleburry and
Bazetpur, the cloth of which aurungs, from the greater skill, with
which the thread was prepared, possess a peculiar softness. However,
the number of such skilled spinners was not very many. John Taylor
noted that their number in Dhaka around 1800 was only thirty.24
Preparing thread from cotton and then spinning was a very difficult
and complicated task which needed a host of people. For the details
of the process of preparing the thread before spinning, it will be
appropriate to quote here from a near-contemporaneous author, James
Taylor (1851), who was a commercial resident of Dhaka in the mid-
eighteenth century.25
The cotton in the state of kapas is first cleaned and prepared by the women
who spin the yarn. Fragment of leaves, stalks and capsules of the plant are
carefully picked out with the fingers, and the wool adhering to the seeds is
then carded with the jaw-bone of the boalee fish, the teeth of which, being
small, recurved and closely set, act as a fine comb in removing loose and
coarser fibres of the cotton, and all extraneous matter. . . . [The spinner
44 SPINNING YARNS

then] sits down to the laborious task of cleaning with this instrument each
separate seed of cotton. Having accomplished this, she proceeds to detach
the fibres from the seeds. This is done by placing a small quantity of the
combed cotton upon a smooth flat board, made of wood of the chalta tree,
and then rolling an iron pin backwards and forwards upon it with the hands,
in such a manner as to separate the fibres without crushing the seeds. The
cotton is next teased with a small handbow, formed of a piece of bamboo
with two elastic slips of the same material inserted into it, and strung with
a cord made of catgut, muga silk or plantain fibres, twisted together. The
bamboo slips are movable within the centre piece, and in proportion to the
extent they are drawn out, or pushed back, the tension of the cord is increased
or diminished. The cotton having been reduced by the operation of bowing
to a state of light downy fleece, is spread out and lapped round a thick
wooden roller; and, on the removal of the latter instrument, it is pressed
between two flat boards. It is next rolled round a piece of lacquered reed of
the size of a quill; and, lastly, is enveloped in the smooth and soft skin of
the cuchia fish, which serves as a cover to preserve it from dust and from
being soiled, whilst it is held in the hand, during the process of spinning.
Four things were needed for making thread from cotton. These
were a spindle (taku), one bamboo basket, a piece of shell embedded
in clay and a little hollow stone containing chalk-powder. The spindle
is about 10 to 14 inches in length, and is not much thicker than a
stout needle. Attached to the spindle, near its lower point, is a small
ball of dry clay, to give it sufficient weight in turning. The basket is
used to keep the cotton. The third one, the shell, is for keeping the
lower portion of the spindle so that it does not get stuck in the soil
and can turn easily. The hollow stone with chalk-powder is required
so that the spinner could dip her finger so that they are dry at all
times. The spinner holds the spindle in an inclined position, with its
point resting in the hollow of the piece of the shell, and turns it
between the thumb and forefinger of one hand, while she, at the same
time, draws out the single filaments from the roll of cotton held in
the other hand, and twists them into yarn upon the spindle. When
a certain quantity of the yarn has been spun and collected on this
instrument it is wound from it upon a reed.26
The thread could be spun only at a certain point of the day – either
early morning or late afternoon. A little bit of moisture in the
atmosphere is needed while spinning is done. So the spinners used
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what I then advanced in words and acts that have branded his nation
with the stigma of infamy.
But the well-meaning pacifists of all shades and degrees, from
the wordy interpreters of Prussian philosophies in high places down
to the credulous man in the street, who pinned his faith to the
business instincts of our German customers, clung tenaciously to
their comfortable faith. At last, five months ago, I uttered a further
warning:

Among the new or newly intensified currents of political life

now traversing the Continents of Europe, none can be compared
in its cultural and political bearings and influence with the rivalry
between the Slav and Teutonic races. This is no mere dispute
about territorial expansion, political designs, or commercial
advantages. It is a ruthless struggle for mastery in all domains of
national and international existence, which, so far as one can
now see, may at most be retarded by diplomatic goodwill on
both sides, but can hardly be settled with finality by any treaty or
convention. For here we are dealing with an instinctive, semi-
conscious movement which obeys natural laws, and not with a
deliberate self-determining agency which may be modified by
13
argument or swayed by persuasion.

In that same article I gave Germany’s plea for a preventive war,

which I felt was then in the air. And I quoted the pregnant remark of
my German colleague of the Berliner Tageblatt, who deliberately
wrote: “It cannot be gainsaid that the growth of Russia is in itself a
peril.” This chosen people, these apostles of culture and humanity,
could not brook the natural growth of a gifted neighbour. Russia must
be exterminated that Germany might thrive.
The Governments of Germany and Austria-Hungary then
considered that the odds against Russia’s participation in a war to
shield Servia were, under the existing conditions, almost tantamount
to certainty. The German Ambassador in Vienna stated this positively
to our Ambassador there and to his other colleagues. It was an
axiom which admitted of no question. It followed that France and
Great Britain would also hold aloof, and a duel with a foregone
conclusion could, under these propitious conditions, be fought by
Austria against Servia. And this was the state of things for which the
Central European Powers had been making ready from the
conclusion of the Bucharest Treaty down to the assassination of the
Archduke Franz Ferdinand. This monstrous crime, for which there
are neither excuse nor extenuating circumstances, wholly changed
the aspect of affairs, and provided the Teutonic allies with a most
welcome war-cry which was sure to rally their friends, while
immobilizing their enemies. It was not, therefore, to be wondered at
that they took such a long time to study the ways and means of
utilizing it to the fullest. And in this they succeeded so well that
France, Great Britain, Italy, and even Russia freely admitted Austria’s
right not merely to punish Servia for her aggressive agitation, but
also to take effective guarantees for her future good behaviour.
Never before was European public sentiment so universally and
whole-heartedly on the side of Austria-Hungary. Every nation and
political party sympathized with her aged monarch and supported the
legitimate claims of her Government. If the grievances ostensibly put
forward in Vienna and Budapest, and recognized by all civilized
peoples, had really represented the full extent of what Austria
desired to see redressed once for all, there would have been no war.
And left to herself, Austria would probably have contented herself
with this measure of amends for the past and guarantees for the
future. But she was not a free agent. In all fundamental issues she is
the vassal of Prussia. And the development of this crisis brought out
their inseparability in sharp outline and relief. Every act of the Austro-
Hungarian Government, from the moment when the Archduke fell in
Sarajevo to the declaration of war against Servia, was conceived
with the knowledge and collaboration of Berlin, and performed
sometimes at its instigation and always with its approval.
Germany herself is commonly said to have been bent upon war
from the outset of the crisis. Conscious of her readiness for the
struggle, she is supposed to have been eager to seize on the
puissant war-cry afforded her by the crime of Sarajevo to profit by
the military unpreparedness of France, Russia, and Great Britain,
and the internal strife in these countries, which had seemingly struck
their diplomacy with paralysis and disqualified their Governments
from taking part in a European conflict.
That this theory is erroneous I know on the highest authority.
Having watched, sometimes at close quarters, the birth, growth,
cultivation, and ripening of the scheme which has now borne fruit in
the bitterest and most tremendous war on record, and having had
more than once some of the decisive State papers under my eyes, I
can affirm that Germany’s hope and desire and striving were on the
opposite side. She deprecated a European war sincerely. She
sought to ward it off by every means compatible with the realization
of her main scheme, and she was disappointed beyond words at her
failure. Her main scheme was to deal with each of the Entente
Powers separately, and to reserve Great Britain for the last. And it
was presumably in furtherance of this programme that Admiral von
Tirpitz tendered his advice to the Kaiser—as we are told he did—not
to break with England yet, but to conciliate her by every available
means, and thus to gain time for the German navy to reach the
standard which would enable it to cope with ours.
That the German scheme of separating the Entente Powers and
crushing them one by one was feasible will hardly be denied. One
has only to read the recent diplomatic correspondence on the crisis
in the light of certain other data to realize how lucky the Entente
Powers may account themselves at having been provoked one and
all by Germany. Each Power felt strongly tempted to circumscribe its
own interests to the narrowest limits, and to keep its powder dry until
these were manifestly assailed. That was the temper of the Entente
States. “In the present case,” Sir Edward Grey explained to the
German Ambassador, “the dispute between Austria and Servia was
not one in which we felt called to take a hand. Even if the question
became one between Austria and Russia, we should not feel called
upon to take a hand in it.”
Clearly, then, Germany might tackle Russia without drawing
Great Britain to the side of her enemy. But even “if Germany were
involved,” the Foreign Secretary went on to say, “and France
became involved, we had not made up our minds what we should
do.” Consequently it might well seem no great feat of diplomacy for
Germany to set inducements and deterrents before us sufficiently
powerful to keep us neutral. In no case was the Prussian scheme of
dealing separately with each Power chimerical.
The invasion of Servia as the first step had a twofold object for
Germany, who encouraged it from the outset: first, to gratify her
Austrian ally, on whom Servia had in truth inflicted terrific losses
during the past four years, thus enabling the Habsburgs to cripple
the independent Slavs of the South, and obtain guarantees against
the recurrence of the evil; and then to compel the principal Balkan
States to form a block against Russia, so that they could be relied
upon as a new Great Power in the coming struggle against that
Empire. On this subject I write with knowledge, having myself taken
a hand more than once in the international negociations which had
the Balkan equilibrium for their object. The first phase in the Teutonic
advance towards supreme world-power, then, was the tossing aside
of the Bucharest Treaty as a worthless scrap of paper, and the
formation of this Balkan League. And the first serious obstacle to it
was raised by myself in a series of negociations which may be made
public elsewhere.
Germany, therefore, was not anxious to bring about a European
war just yet. On the contrary, her efforts to postpone it were sincere
and strenuous. And to her thinking she had reduced the chances of
a clash of nations to a faint possibility. Consequently it would be
much nearer the mark to say that, convinced that she would succeed
in “localizing the war,” she was bent on carrying out her policy in
every event, but that this policy being ultimately found incompatible
with the vital interests of Russia, the limits of whose forbearance she
had miscalculated, led necessarily to the present conflict. But for this
emergency, too, she had been extensively preparing and deemed
herself quite ready. Into Germany’s calculations and expectations I
have more than once had an insight, and I can affirm that she was
twice out in her reckoning of the probabilities. I ought, however,
emphatically to add that even for one of these miscalculations she
made due allowance. When the latent crisis became acute the
opinion prevailed in Berlin that the stability of the Tsar’s dynasty, as
well as the solvency and the integrity of his Empire, were bound up
with the maintenance of peace, and that Russia, being thus fettered,
Austria would be allowed, with certain formal reserves, to have a free
hand against Servia. And Germany’s initial efforts were directed to
enlisting the co-operation of Great Britain and of France in the task
of securing this advantage for her ally. That is why she was credited
with a praiseworthy desire to restrict the war-area as much as
possible.
As we have seen, the grounds for Germany’s optimistic forecast
were reinforced by the opinions of certain Russian authorities. These
experts strongly held that a war with Germany would open the
sluice-gates of disaster for their country. There are always such
Calchases in every land, but Russia possesses an abnormally large
number of them. Some of these views were committed to paper, laid
before the highest authorities, and also reported simultaneously to
the Foreign Office in Berlin. The financial, military, and political
considerations adduced in support of these conclusions were also
fully set forth in the communications on the subject which Germany’s
agents in St. Petersburg supplied to the Wilhelmstrasse. Much of
interest might be written on this aspect of the preliminaries to the war
—much that is striking, instructive, and in a way sensational—but
this is hardly the moment for anything in the nature of startling
disclosures.
In what the policy consisted which Germany and Austria pursued
under the mask of indignation against the Servian abettors of murder
is well known by now even to the general public. Over and over
again I unfolded it in the columns of the Daily Telegraph; and from
the day on which ominous rumours about Austria’s expected Note to
Servia began to disquiet Europe, I announced that the assassination
of the Archduke Franz Ferdinand was but the flimsiest of pretexts,
that Austria was minded to take the initiative in the struggle of the
Teutons against the Slavs, and that the European press was making
a strange mistake in accepting the theory that her aim was the
condign punishment of the accomplices of the assassins. I added
that this was no dispute, in the ordinary sense of the term, between
Austria and Servia; it was only a question of which of the two could
impose its will on the other. In a word, it was a trial of strength—eine
Machtfrage.
Germany’s aim, I repeat, was, and had long been, to sever the
bonds that linked France with Russia, so as to be able to tackle each
one separately. The methods to which her statesmen had recourse
in order to effect a severance between the two allies were of a piece
with the expedients now being resorted to for the purpose of egging
on Turkey to a breach of her neutrality—such as the forging of Mr.
Burns’ alleged oration and the speech of the Lord Mayor of London
against the war. But some of them which have never yet been even
hinted at are far more sensational even than this. One of the Kaiser’s
own little schemes which has never been mentioned even in well-
informed diplomatic circles outdid in breeziness the episode of the
scrap of paper.
The Entente was to be dealt with like an artichoke—to have leaf
after leaf torn off. To attain this Germany employed fair means and
foul—first flattered and cajoled the French—and when
blandishments failed passed abruptly to brutal threats. But her
diplomacy in its obsequious as well as its menacing mood had failed
of its purpose. And now war was to be essayed as a means to the
end, but a war with Servia only. Its objects, as we saw, were
materially to weaken Slavdom, humiliate Russia, create a Balkan
League against that Empire, and supply an object-lesson to those
politicians in France who were opposed to the alliance with the
Tsardom, on the ground that it might at any moment involve the
Republic in a sanguinary struggle for obscure Slav interests. The
duel contemplated was to be confined to Austria-Hungary and
Servia. Every lever was to be moved to keep it restricted to that
narrow compass. As an Austrian victory would ensure a partial
dismemberment of Servia, to be followed by a new grouping of the
Balkan States—this time under the ægis of the Habsburgs—the
Central European Powers would have won a most useful ally in the
shape of a new and compact Balkan League.
A partnership of Turkey, Bulgaria, Roumania, and Greece, under
the lead of Austria and Germany, Servia being constrained to keep
the step with these, would have constituted a stout bulwark against
the tide of Slavdom flowing towards the Adriatic, and a puissant ally
in the event of a European war. That this was a real scheme, and is
not merely an inference or an assumption, may be taken as certain. I
became acquainted with the details of it at its inception. Bulgaria
knows it and Turkey knows it. Bulgaria’s pressing offer, made to
Turkey at the very moment when I was successfully endeavouring to
obtain the assent of the Porte and of the King of Greece to a treaty
which I had drawn up for the settlement of all their differences, was
brought to my cognizance. Happily, the suggested deal was
scrutinized and rejected by the Porte. Turkey, as represented by
Talaat Bey, had brought an open mind to the matter, allowing herself
to be swayed only by her own interests; and as it appeared that
these would fare best by the treaty which I proposed, she assented
to this. Greece, needing permanent peace as a condition of internal
development, showed herself amenable to reason and ready to
compromise. And she, too, agreed to the treaty. Roumania,
animated by a like broad and liberal spirit, was steadfastly opposed
to every move, by whomsoever contemplated, which was likely to
jeopardize public tranquillity or modify the Treaty of Bucharest, and
favoured every arrangement capable of imparting stability to the
status quo.
But perseverance and importunity are characteristic traits of
German methods in diplomacy as in commerce. And on this
occasion they stamped her Balkan policy with the well-known cachet
of the Hohenzollerns. The moment it was decided that the Austrian
demands should be so drafted as to ensure their rejection by Servia,
the two Central European Powers set to work anew to stir up
opposition to the Treaty of Bucharest, realize the scheme for a
Balkan League with its sharp point turned against Russia, and have
a large part of King Peter’s realm carved up by the Balkan States
themselves without the ostensible intervention of Austria or
Germany. This is an important point in the march of events which
preceded the war—a point, too, which, so far as I am aware, has not
been noticed by any publicist or statesman.
 It is worth a moment’s consideration. The world has not forgotten
the assurance which Austria gave to Russia as an inducement to
hold her hand and allow Servia to be punished. It took the shape of
an undertaking that the Dual Monarchy would not annex any portion
of Servian territory. Now, on the face of it, this was a concession the
worth of which, from Russia’s point of view, might well be reckoned
considerable. And in truth it had great weight with the St. Petersburg
Foreign Office. For it seemed to imply that at the close of Austria’s
campaign against Servia the vanquished Slav State would at any
rate lose none of the land of which it was possessed before the war.
That was the obvious meaning of the official Austro-Hungarian
assurance, and it was construed in this sense by all the
Chancelleries of the Entente Powers without exception. It worked as
a motive to lure Russia to the far-reaching concessions she offered
to Austria-Hungary in the hope of “localizing the war.” Sir M. de
Bunsen wrote to Sir Edward Grey that the Austrian Minister of
Foreign Affairs thought “that Russia would have no right to intervene
after receiving his assurance that Austria sought no territorial
aggrandisement.”
But in reality the phrasing of this self-denying promise was
deceptive. Austria undertook that she would not incorporate Servian
territory in her own Empire, but in reading this declaration the accent
should be laid on the word she. She would refrain from cutting off
slices of Servian territory for herself. But it was resolved, none the
less, that Servian territory should be carved up and partitioned
among Servia’s neighbours—Bulgaria, Turkey, and Albania. The
three Greek islands—Samos, Chios, and Mytilene—were to revert to
their late owner. Russia never suspected this curious wile. Otherwise
she would not have fallen into the trap as she did. That it was part of
a deliberate plan which Germany and Austria set about realizing is
established beyond question. Neither can it be gainsaid that the form
of words chosen later on by Germany for the assurance she offered
to Sir Edward Grey respecting the integrity of France left room, and
was meant to leave room, for a similar subterfuge. To my knowledge,
and to that of at least one European Chancellery, Germany decided
on making an offer to Italy of Tunis, Nice, and Savoy, all which she
might claim and receive as a recompense for active co-operation
during the war. And this by-compact was deemed perfectly
consistent with her promise to Sir Edward Grey. Whether that bid for
co-operation was actually made to Italy, I am unable to say. That it
was one of the inducements to be held out to the Consulta, I know.
Meanwhile Turkey was exhorted to throw aside the Treaty which
I had drafted, and which was to have been signed by the Grand
Vizier and M. Venizelos at my house during the week ending on
August 3rd. She was further urged to close with Bulgaria’s offer of a
treaty of partition without delay, and to make common cause with
her. At the same time M. Venizelos was advised to treat with King
Ferdinand’s representatives, and come to an arrangement by which
Bulgaria should retake from the Serbs “the territory which by right
belongs to them,” and a certain lesser slice from Greece, who would
receive in turn partial compensation and perpetual guarantees.
Moreover, all Bulgaria’s territory, new and old, should be insured by
Turkey and Greece. A draft of this treaty actually existed. In case of
refusal, Greece was menaced with the loss of everything she had
acquired by her Balkan victories. How these suggestions were
received I had no means of learning. But the final upshot is disclosed
by recent events. Turkey, eager to regain some part of what she lost,
and believing the present moment propitious, lent herself readily to
Germany’s designs. It was only after the infraction of her neutrality
by the warships Goeben and Breslau, and moved by fear of the
consequences to which her connivance had exposed her, and by the
proofs adduced that neutrality would pay better than a fresh Balkan
campaign, that she reined back. She now apparently takes a
modified view of the situation, and the more statesmanlike of her
leaders recognize that, after all, her interests may turn out to be
dependent upon the goodwill of the Entente Powers. But Enver
Pasha, a Pole by extraction and a German by sympathy, still seems
bent on exposing the Ottoman Empire to the risks of a single cast of
the die.
 CHAPTER V
GERMANY’S PROGRAMME

Germany’s programme, then, from the beginning of the crisis

resolves itself into two parts: to restrict the war in the sense that
Austria’s enemy was to have no allies, and to extend it by letting
loose against Servia as many of the Balkan States as could be
enlisted by enticing promises. Congruously with the first object, the
seemingly humane movement in favour of “localization” was
approved by the Chancellor, localization being construed to mean
the neutrality of Russia. And for a time it was not merely hoped, but
believed, that Russia would remain quiescent. Indeed, this belief
was, as we have seen, the groundwork of the policy with which the
German Ambassador in Vienna identified himself.
M. von Tschirschky is one of those convinced, acidulous
Russophobes who are obsessed by racial hatred of an intensity
which men of the English-speaking races are unable to realize. His
diplomatic methods extend far beyond the limits within which the
average Ambassador and diplomatist feels it his duty to keep his
activity. In proselytizing he is an adept; but his limitations are those
of countrymen and class. He had lived in St. Petersburg, where his
diplomatic career was Sisyphus work, and ever since then the
keyword of his policy has been delenda est Moscovia. Nor was he
concerned to dissemble his passion. Every politician in Austria,
native and foreign, was aware of it, and when diplomatists there
heard that he had been enjoined by his Chief to plead the cause of
moderation in Vienna, they shrugged their shoulders and grinned.
He assured the Austrian Government that, from information in
possession of the Wilhelmstrasse, Russia was powerless to strike a
blow. “She is a negligible quantity,” he repeated. “If her armies were
to take the field the dynasty would fall. And the Tsar, alive to the
danger, is resolved to steer clear of it. Were he prevailed upon to run
the risk, the whole political and financial structure would fall to pieces
like a pack of cards.” And he was certain of what he advanced. He
honestly deceived himself before misleading his friends.
Parenthetically, it may be well to remind the reader that this
contention about Russia’s military impotence, which was accepted in
Vienna as well as Berlin, makes short work of the plea now
advanced that it was Russia’s bellicose attitude that provoked
Germany. The contrary proposition is true. Germany was
aggressively insolent because Russia was believed to be militarily
powerless. That is why Austria’s ultimatum to Servia was so indited
that a refusal could be counted upon.
The history of that Note is curious. The assassination of the
Archduke Franz Ferdinand was fastened upon as a fitting pretext for
mutilating the Servian State. Servia’s Government and the entire
class of intellectuals from which it was drawn were stigmatized as
the real authors of the crime. The murder itself was declared to be
but a typical act of an unprincipled political organization which had
ramifications all over the land, including all political parties, the
clergy, and the teaching bodies. Bomb-throwing, assassination, and
a subversive propaganda in Bosnia and Herzegovina were alleged to
be among its recognized methods. Austria-Hungary, it was
contended, could not lead a normal life so long as this state of affairs
was allowed to endure. It must, therefore, be transformed radically.
But no transformation could be effected until Servia was brought to
her knees by the Habsburgs and forced into the groove of chronic
quiescence which had been destined for her by the murdered
Archduke. In other words, she must become a satellite of her
powerful neighbour, and subordinate her policy, military, commercial,
and foreign, to that of the Ballplatz. This was the programme, most
of which had been adopted some eighteen months before, during the
factitious excitement about the imaginary murder of the Austrian
Consul, Prochaska, by the Serbs. I announced it in the Daily
Telegraph at the time. Since then it had been kept in abeyance, and
now the crime at Sarajevo was held to have supplied a favourable
conjuncture for reviving it.
 That official way of stating the grounds of the quarrel had one
great advantage. It identified Servia with monstrous crime and
Austria with law and justice. Foreign Governments which set a high
value on the reign of order and tranquillity would, it was hoped, be
deterred from giving countenance to such a nation of criminals as
Servia was alleged to be. By way of strengthening this deterrent,
they were reminded of the stain on Servia’s honour contracted when
King Alexander and his consort were brutally done to death. By that
crime, it was alleged, the present King himself had been
compromised, and was consequently now powerless to curb his
unprincipled subjects, on whose goodwill his own tenure of office
depended. From Servia’s goodwill, therefore, there was nothing to
be hoped. But if regeneration could not come from within, it must
proceed from outside. And as Austria’s political interests were also at
stake, she would undertake the work of sternly punishing crime and
efficaciously preventing its recurrence. To this rôle no civilized Power
could reasonably demur without laying itself open to a charge of
fomenting a vast criminal organization which it behoves monarchs
and people alike to put down by every means in their power. This
was the argument by which Russia was to be floored. It was also the
bridge over which she would, it was assumed, recoil from Servia
when Servia was at grips with Austria-Hungary.
Now in that chain of allegations there was at least one link of
truth. Servian propaganda in Bosnia and Herzegovina had certainly
been unceasing, resourceful, and dangerous. It had also inflicted
enormous losses on the population of the Dual Monarchy. And the
Vienna Cabinet had undoubtedly a strong case for putting forth
energetic action and exacting substantial guarantees. Had it
contented itself with thus redressing real grievances all Europe
would have endorsed its claims and the war would have been
postponed.
For Bosnia and Herzegovina, whose inhabitants are all Serbs by
race and language, were honeycombed with disaffection. No
outsider realized or even yet realizes the extent to which Austrian
rule there was burrowed. During the exhaustive investigation into the
origins of the crime of Sarajevo, the Central Governments learned
with dismay that disaffection was rife everywhere. This sensational
revelation was the only result of the inquiry, which was hidden from
the public gaze, lest it should compromise the local authorities and
discredit the administration in the eyes of the peoples.
But Austria had other interests besides her own to consider.
Once more it had fallen to her lot to discharge the functions of
“brilliant second” to her ally. And this was her undoing.
So much depended on the reception which her demands would
meet in Servia and Europe generally that the utmost care was
bestowed on the wording of it. The task of drawing it up was
confided to the Hungarian Premier, Count Tisza, partly on intrinsic
grounds—this statesman having displayed a keen interest in foreign
politics generally and in Balkan affairs in particular—and partly for
political reasons, Austria being desirous of bestowing upon Hungary
an active rôle in what was a fateful enterprise for both halves of the
Monarchy. Before the text of the document was fixed, the results of
the inquiry into the assassination were committed to writing, in the
form of a pièce justificative, intended to bring the outside world into
dynamic contact with what Austria brandmarked as a realm of
assassins and anarchists. Hardly any mystery was made of the
object which the demands were meant to attain. It was expected and
intended that M. Pasitch would find it impossible to assent to the
terms laid down, some of which could only be complied with by his
treating the Constitution as a worthless scrap of paper. It was felt
that if he yielded an indignant people would sweep away his
Government, return a negative answer, and possibly inaugurate a
saturnalia of anarchy, to which the Emperor Franz Josef’s troops
would put a speedy end.
Sir Maurice de Bunsen, the British Ambassador in Vienna, in one
of his despatches, writes of this ultimatum: “Its integral acceptance
by Servia was neither expected nor desired, and when, on the
following afternoon, it was at first rumoured in Vienna that it had
been unconditionally accepted, there was a moment of keen
disappointment.” I was in Vienna at the time, and I know that that is a
correct presentment of the facts.
 A long period of anxious suspense had preceded the publication
of the Note. In diplomatic circles curiosity became painfully intense.
Every hint of what was coming was eagerly snatched up,
commented, and transmitted to headquarters. Italian diplomacy,
weighed down by a sense of heavy responsibility and intuitive
apprehension of imminent danger, was treated to vague phrases
about the heinous nature of the crime, the necessity of preventing its
recurrence, and Austria’s resolve to have her relations with the Slav
kingdom placed on a new and stable basis. But beyond these
generalities nothing concrete was submitted either to the Duke of
Avarna in Vienna or to the Marquis di San Giuliano in Rome.
The Russian Ambassador in the Austrian capital was led to infer
that no sweeping stroke would be dealt against Servia, and that the
demands contemplated would be compatible with her integrity,
independence, and honour. And he accordingly took a fortnight’s
leave of absence a few days before the Note was presented.
Very different was the attitude of the Austrian Government
towards Germany, who was vigilantly watching for every new phase
of the historic transaction in order to subordinate the whole to her
own vaster design. Nothing was kept back from the politicians of the
Wilhelmstrasse but the rough draft of the Note. The German
Ambassador, von Tschirschky, however, was one of the few who
were initiated into that mystery. This, it must be confessed, was
natural. For without the resolute backing of Germany the position
taken up by Austria-Hungary would have been untenable.
Congruously with this privileged position, Germany’s representative,
von Tschirschky, saw the proposed text of the ultimatum. Not that his
advice on the subject was taken or solicited. His views were known
in advance. But it was he who telegraphed the wording of the
document to the Kaiser, who was then ostentatiously absent from
Germany. I advance this statement with full knowledge of what
actually took place. This communication was made not merely for
the purpose of keeping the War Lord informed of what it behoved
him to know, but also and mainly in order to secure his express
assent to the set terms of an official paper which was intended to
bring about hostilities between Austria and Servia, and might
incidentally precipitate a European conflict.
Well, the rough draft as originally drawn up by Count Tisza did
not obtain the Emperor’s unconditional approval. The versatile
monarch suggested a certain amendment to the wording and fixed
the time-limit, the alleged object of which was to leave no room for
evasion, no loophole for escape. And as a matter of course the
verbal modifications he proposed—I only know that their purpose
was to sharpen (scharfmachen) the terms—were embodied in the
ultimatum which, thus amended and sanctioned, was duly
presented. I further had it on the same indisputable authority that the
time-limit of forty-eight hours was the result of a proposal coming
direct from Kaiser Wilhelm, who held that Servia must not be allowed
to deliberate or to take counsel with Russia, but should be
confronted with the necessity of giving a categorical answer at once.
His own mode of action towards Russia and Belgium, to each of
which States he allowed but twelve hours for deliberation, was
conceived in the same spirit and prompted by a like calculation.
 CHAPTER VI
THE POSITION OF ITALY

Why this differential treatment as between Germany and Italy? one

may ask. Both being Austria’s allies, each might reasonably claim
the same degree of confidence as the other. Whence, then, this one-
sided distrust? To this query the answer came pat and plausible.
There was no difference in the degrees of confidence displayed by
Austria towards the Governments of her allies, no more information
having been vouchsafed to one than to the other. To the Berlin
Foreign Office was dealt out the same meed of intelligence as to the
Consulta. Consequently there is no ground for complaint. The matter
being a concern of Austria’s, with no direct bearings on the Triple
Alliance, was communicated to the other two members of the
Alliance in exactly the same measure. And I have good grounds for
believing that the Berlin Foreign Office did not receive directly from
the Ballplatz in Vienna the text of the ultimatum to Servia. The Kaiser
was the sole direct recipient.
None the less, Italy’s position was necessarily shaped in part by
Austria’s failure to keep her informed of a move which might entail a
European war, and might, therefore, warrant a claim on her for her
services as an active ally in that war. The Consulta argued that if
Italy was deemed not to have a sufficient interest in a transaction
which was calculated to lead to an armed conflict, neither could she
be considered to have a corresponding interest in the upshot of that
transaction. For the duties of an ally during war presuppose certain
corresponding rights in peace, and foremost among these is her
claim to be consulted, to offer advice, and to exercise a moderating
influence. And as she was deprived of those rights, so she was ipso
facto relieved of the corresponding duties. And to this line of
reasoning there is no convincing answer. That, however, is but the
formal aspect of Italy’s justification of her neutrality. She can and
does take her stand on higher ground. Bound to aid her allies only if
these are attacked, she is under no obligation to co-operate with
them in the field if they themselves are the aggressors. And as
Austria and Germany deliberately provoked hostilities, they have no
real claim on their ex-ally.
In France, and to a lesser extent in Great Britain, much—too
much, to my thinking—has been written about the strong motives
which appeal to King Victor Emanuel’s Government to abandon its
neutrality and throw in its lot with the Entente Powers. It was a
deplorable blunder, we are told, on the part of the short-sighted
statesmen of the Consulta to have ever entered into partnership with
the military States of Europe. Worse than this, it was an act of the
blackest ingratitude towards France, and in a lesser degree towards
Russia. But the belligerents of the Entente are generous, and Italy, if
she repents and makes amends by joining hands with France and
Great Britain before it is too late, will be magnanimously forgiven and
lavishly rewarded. Unredeemed Italy—Italia irredenta—now under
the Austrian yoke, will be presented to her at the close of hostilities.
She may also take possession of Valona and supreme command of
the Adriatic. But these rewards are for timely action. If she waits too
long she will have waited in vain.
Exhortations of this kind are to be deprecated as mischievous.
They are likely—if they produce any effect at all—to damage the
cause which they are meant to further. Italy must be allowed to
understand her own vital and secondary interests at least as well as
the amateur diplomatists who so generously undertake to ascertain
and promote them, and all of whom have an axe of their own to
grind. In the eyes of the world, though not in those of her ex-allies,
Germany and Austria, she has completely vindicated her right to
hold aloof from her allies in a war of pure aggression, waged for the
hegemony of the Teutonic race. But to pass from neutrality to
belligerency, to treat the allies of yesterday as the enemies of to-day,
without transition and without adequate provocation, would be in
accordance neither with the precepts of ethics nor the promptings of
statesmanship.
The reproach hurled at Italy for her long co-partnership with
Austria and Germany appears to me to be unmerited. It was neither
a foolish nor an ungrateful move. On the contrary, I feel, and have
always felt, convinced that it was the act of an able statesman whose
main merit in the matter was to discern its necessity and to turn that
necessity into a work of apparent predilection. As a member of the
Triple Alliance, Italy discharged a twofold function, national and
international. She avoided a war against Austria-Hungary which,
whatever the military and naval upshot, would have secured for her
no advantages, political or territorial, and would have exhausted her
resources financial and military. And in this way, while directly
pursuing her own interests, she indirectly furthered those of all
Europe. Even under the favourable conditions realized by her
membership of the Alliance, it was no easy task to repress popular
feeling against Austria. At one time, indeed, when Count Aehrenthal
was Minister of Foreign Affairs in Vienna, an Austro-Italian war was
on the point of breaking out. The late Archduke Franz Ferdinand and
his protégé, Baron Conrad von Hoetzendorff, who was then, and is
now, Chief of the General Staff, were strongly in favour of severing
the links that bound the Habsburg Monarchy to Italy and delivering
an ultimatum to the Consulta. Between their quarrel and overt war
stood a solitary individual, Count Aehrenthal, who had the courage of
his opinion and refused to countenance the projected breach. His
resignation or a pacific settlement were the alternatives which he laid
before his sovereign, and this perspective, together with his lucid
exposé of the sinister results of the proposed plunge, enlisted the
aged Emperor on his side, and Baron Conrad von Hoetzendorff was
gently removed—for a time—from the General Staff and appointed
to a different post of trust.
Another function discharged by Italy while she retained her
membership of the Alliance was purely international. She continued
steadfastly to cultivate cordial relations with Great Britain, turning a
deaf ear to the admonitions, exhortations, and blandishments of
Berlin. No competent student of international politics who has
watched the growth of Italy ever since she entered the Alliance, and
has had the means of acquainting himself with the covert threats,
overt seductions, and finely spun intrigues by which her fidelity to
Great Britain was tested, will refuse to her statesmen the palm of
European diplomacy or to her Government a sincere tribute for her
steadfast loyalty to her British friends. Her policy during this
chequered period has been a masterpiece of political wisdom and
diplomatic deftness. In the Triple Alliance her influence was, and was
intended to be, of a moderating character. It was thus that it was
regarded by her statesmen and employed by her diplomatists.
Whenever a quarrel between one of her own allies and one of ours
grew acute, Italy’s endeavour was to compose it. She was at least as
much averse to war as we were ourselves, and she cheerfully made
heavy sacrifices to avert it. So long, therefore, as she was treated as
a fully qualified member of the Alliance, we could feel assured that
European peace had a powerful intercessor among its most
dangerous enemies.
That is why, before the war, I always shared the view of the
statesmen of the Consulta that Italy should do nothing calculated to
sever her connection with Austria and Germany. I went further than
this, and maintained that it was to our interest to support her
diplomatically in the Near East and elsewhere, on the ground that
the stronger she became the greater would her influence for peace
grow, and the more valuable the services she could and would
14
confer upon us without impairing her own interests.
But by means of poisonous insinuations diplomatic and
journalistic, the Wilhelmstrasse strove hard to sow suspicion and
breed dissension between her and her western friends. It was, for
instance, asserted by Germany that when last the Triple Alliance was
prematurely renewed, the terms of the treaty had been extended,
and an agreement respecting the sea-power of the allies in the
Mediterranean had been concluded by all three. This was a
falsehood concocted presumably for the purpose of embroiling
France, Russia, and Great Britain with Italy. Its effect upon Russia
was certainly mischievous. And having ascertained from two of the
allies that it was an invention, I publicly stigmatized it as such, and
affirmed that the treaty had been signed without modification. And
events have proved the accuracy of my information.
Another and much more insidious untruth, emanating from the
same source and fabricated for a like purpose, turned upon the
withdrawal of our warships from the Mediterranean, where our
interests were confided to the care of the French navy. This
disposition was, of course, taken with a view to the general sea-
defences of Great Britain and France in case of an emergency such
as that which has since had to be faced. It was certainly not directed
against Italy, with whom our Government neither had nor expected to
have any grounds for a quarrel. None the less, it supplied too
attractive an occasion to be lost by the ever-ready Prussian, who
made haste to use it in order to generate mistrust between Italy and
her friends of the Entente. Sundry Italian diplomatists were initiated,
in seemingly casual ways, into the “true meaning” of that “insidious”
move. It was not directed against Germany and Austria, they were
assured, but had Italy, and Italy alone, for its object. France, jealous
of the growing power and prestige of Italy in the Midland Sea, had
sought and obtained Great Britain’s assent to the concentration of
France’s warships there. This innovation constituted, and was meant
to constitute, a warning to Italy to slacken her speed in the Midland
Sea. And I was requested to make private representations to our
Foreign Office, accompanied by a request that this unfriendly
measure should be discontinued. My assurances that it contained
neither a threat nor a warning to Italy were but wasted breath.
Information of a “trustworthy” character had been obtained—it was
not volunteered, and could not, therefore, be suspected—that the
initiative had been taken by France, whose dominant motive was
jealousy of Italy.
To my mind this misstatement, which derived the poison of its
sting from the truly artful way in which it was conveyed through “a
disinterested source,” was one of the most mischievous of Prussian
wiles. Italy was led to believe that the real design of the Republic
was the establishment of French hegemony in the Mediterranean;
that M. Poincaré, whose regrettable speech about the French
steamers Carthage and Manuba, which had been detained by Italy