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Research Series on the Chinese Dream
and China’s Development Path

Wang Rong · Cuiping Zhu Editors

Annual Report on
the Development
of the Indian Ocean
Region (2017)
The Belt and Road Initiative and South
Asia
Research Series on the Chinese Dream
and China’s Development Path

Series editors
Li Yang, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, Beijing, China
Li Peilin, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, Beijing, China
Drawing on a large body of empirical studies done over the last two decades, this
Series provides its readers with in-depth analyses of the past and present and
forecasts for the future course of China’s development. It contains the latest
research results made by members of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences. This
series is an invaluable companion to every researcher who is trying to gain a deeper
understanding of the development model, path and experience unique to China.
Thanks to the adoption of Socialism with Chinese characteristics, and the
implementation of comprehensive reform and opening-up, China has made
tremendous achievements in areas such as political reform, economic development,
and social construction, and is making great strides towards the realization of the
Chinese dream of national rejuvenation. In addition to presenting a detailed account
of many of these achievements, the authors also discuss what lessons other
countries can learn from China’s experience.

More information about this series at http://www.springer.com/series/13571

Wang Rong Cuiping Zhu
•

Editors

Annual Report
on the Development
of the Indian Ocean
Region (2017)
The Belt and Road Initiative and South Asia

123
Editors
Wang Rong Cuiping Zhu
Research Institute of Indian Ocean Research Institute of Indian Ocean
Economies Economies
Yunnan University of Finance and Yunnan University of Finance and
Economics Economics
Kunming, Yunnan, China Kunming, Yunnan, China

ISSN 2363-6866 ISSN 2363-6874 (electronic)

Research Series on the Chinese Dream and China’s Development Path
ISBN 978-981-13-2079-8 ISBN 978-981-13-2080-4 (eBook)
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Singapore
Preface

Nowadays, the world situation is changing constantly. Under this backdrop, we

vaguely detected the sign of “imbalance” and “disorder” coexisting in the world we
live. On the one hand, from the basic pattern of mutual check and balance of the
West and the East as a result of the nearly 50 years of Cold War between the US
and the former Soviet Union after World War II in 1945, to the formation of “super
hegemony” of the US after the disintegration of the former Soviet Union in 1991, to
the gradual forming of the pattern of “one superpower and many powers”, as well
as the game of big power strategy, all contributing to the formation of a complicated
and changeable world pattern. These vicissitudes are clearly associated with
changes in economic power and lead to a more and more obvious trend of
multi-polarization. A basic fact is that the American economy experienced a
“golden age” after World War II when its economic aggregate accounted for 60%
of the world’s total. It lingered around 40% in the 1960s but assumed a downward
trend thereafter. After 2001, the share of the US economy in the world began to
decline, down from 32% in 2001 to 23% in 2015. Meanwhile, G7 GDP accounted
for 78% of the world’s total in 1991, but this ratio dropped to 48% in 2015. The
share of emerging economies, represented by BRIC countries, increased signifi-
cantly. In 2015, emerging economies contributed 60% to world economic growth.
Among them, China’s GDP accounted for 14% of the world total and its contri-
bution to world economic growth hit 33%. In any case, power influencing the world
pattern shifted from G7 to G20 is both a shift of the global economic center and a
transformation of the world pattern. To some extent, that shows the role of the US
as a world police governing international affairs is in the decline or even the ability
of US-led G7 in governing the world does not seem to be equal to their ambitions.
They need badly cooperation with emerging economies represented by China.
On the other hand, accelerating globalization and technological innovation that
happened since the 1990s has led to interests and needs of different nations inter-
twined with each other, sparking major changes and competition in the political,
economic, and cultural spheres around the world. Due to inequality in competition
opportunities and competition modes, the gap between the rich and poor is
widening. The resulting conflicts are also increasingly manifested as conflicts of

v
vi Preface

culture and social values in the process of globalization. Turbulence resulting from
conflicts of values and interest disputes fuels a treacherous and changeable world
pattern. That makes it difficult to see what world pattern is being formed. Currently,
East Asia is still the most dynamic center of economic growth, and interconnection
and intercommunication will become the engine of world economic growth.
Besides the turmoil and conflicts in the Middle East and North Africa, the Korean
Peninsula also faces simmering crisis. As the international security system is still
rigescent, extremism and nationalism is raging, making global governance more
and more difficult. We can vaguely feel that the world pattern is being or is about to
be transformed. This also makes China’s surrounding security face greater chal-
lenges. The most worrying thing is “resonance situation” taking shape. No wonder
many are confused now. They wonder what is going on in the world and what
China should do.
It was in this context that President Xi Jinping put forward “One Belt” and “One
Road” during his visits to Kazakhstan in Central Asia and Indonesia in Southeast
Asia, respectively. In 2014, “One Belt and One Road”, Beijing-Tianjin-Hebei
coordinated development and Yangtze River Economic Zone construction were
listed as the top three strategies of China in the Central Economic Working
Conference. In 2015, the National Development and Reform Commission, the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of Commerce jointly issued “Vision and
Action Plan for Promoting the Construction of the Silk Road Economic Belt and
21st Century Maritime Silk Road”, which symbolizes the completion of a top-level
design, all-round roll out, and gradual advancement. As from 2016, “One Belt and
One Road” was carried out in full scale. In May 2017, the first “One Belt and One
Road” summit forum will be staged in Beijing. It is expected that “One Belt and
One Road” will be the focus of China’s internal and external development planning
in the next few years.
“One Belt, One Road” has won a widespread response from the international
community since it was initiated. The cooperation mode featuring policy commu-
nication, infrastructure connectivity, trade link, capital flow, and understanding
among peoples is accepted by Asian, African, and European countries along the
line to different degrees. Southeast Asia, Central Asia, and South Asia are
undoubtedly the key areas for implementing the “One Belt, One Road” Initiative.
Currently, the Initiative is going the fastest in Southeast Asia and five countries in
Central Asia. In South Asia, though the “China–Pakistan Economic Corridor” is
progressing very well, but this flagship project has not yet produced a significant
pulling effect on the entire South Asian region, nor has it had an obvious radiation
effect on the surrounding area. South Asia remains a challenging region where this
project is progressing relatively slow. Among South Asian countries, Bangladesh,
Sri Lanka, Maldives, and Nepal have actively supported and are willing to coop-
erate with China within the framework of “One Belt, One Road”. However, India,
as a big power in South Asia, always regards “One Belt, One Road” with suspicion
and distrust. India is always wavering despite that China has a positive attitude to
cooperation. Even though it responded positively to “Bangladesh–China–India–
Burma Economic Corridor” and “Sino-Indian Economic Corridor”, it is obviously
Preface vii

slow in taking concrete actions. In fact, India is well aware of the fact that “One
Belt, One Road” will bring it considerable economic benefits, but fears it will also
bring a huge security threat, which will challenge its sphere of influence in South
Asia and even affect its unique influence in the Indian Ocean. In India’s view, “One
Belt, One Road” has become a tricky issue that it cannot find a way to deal with
properly. It is like a fish bone stuck in the throat. As a result, India not only
supported the separatist activities of the Dalai group but used Dalai as a “card”
repeatedly as part of its strategy toward China. In order to contain China and
maintain the balance of power in Asia, the United States tries to deepen US–India
cooperation in strategy and security fields. Moreover, it claimed openly on many
occasions that it would help India become the world’s “leading power.”
“One Belt, One Road” is a major initiative that China put forward as a way to
achieve great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation and to promote world peace and
development based on the development direction it has identified for itself.
McKinsey predicted that by 2050, countries and regions along “One Belt, One
Road” will contribute 80% of global GDP growth; hence, this region enjoys
tremendous potential of development. The main goal of “One Belt, One Road”
strategy can be described by two keywords: one is development and the other
stability. It is a cooperation based on common interests and common security
concerns. Along the “One Belt, One Road”, many countries are inflicted by
domestic political turmoil, national conflicts, constant religious disputes, and ter-
rorist threats. While development cannot solve all problems, or development itself
is not a panacea for security dilemmas and instability. But development, especially
cooperative development, is one of the good recipes for solving global governance
imbalances and regional conflicts. China has an old saying, “poverty gives rise to a
desire for change; people living in turmoil hope for stability.” “One Belt, One
Road” can help us achieve economically mutual benefits and a win-win situation,
and deepen international security cooperation. It will help China and the countries
along the “One Belt, One Road” “seek common security with mutually beneficial
cooperation beyond the scope of unilateral security.”
In conclusion, no country can play a leading role in the world and regional order
alone, let alone provide public goods, such as mechanisms and systems, under the
background featuring the irreversible trend of globalization and continuing regional
economic integration. The US is no exception. In a long period of time in future,
there is almost no possibility of military conflicts between world and regional
powers, and more of the conflicts between big powers will be transferred to the
economic field. Global governance problems can only be addressed by promoting
development and mutual cooperation. Given the current situation, the impact of the
2008 International Financial Crisis on the world economy has not yet been com-
pletely eliminated. Affected by recession in Europe and economic downturn in the
US, the trend is obvious that world economy will slow down even though may not
continue to struggle in the quagmire of crisis. In this context, the “One Belt, One
Road” initiative can not only provide a source of power for a full recovery of the
world economy by exploring a way to develop bilateral and multilateral cooperation
with countries along the Belt or Road to release demand and growth potential
viii Preface

through regional economic integration, but can help to promote communication and
coordination between all countries in the world and form a fair and reasonable
global governance order via mutual cooperation and mutual benefits.

Kunming, China Wang Rong

April 2017
Contents

Part I General Report

The South Asian Direction of “OBOR” Strategy: Geopolitical Pattern,
Indian Difficulties and Breakthrough Path . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
Cuiping Zhu
Modi’s Attitude Towards China, “Issue Diplomacy” and the Prospect
of India’s Participation in the “OBOR” Initiative . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
Hailin Ye

Part II Special Report

Connecting the “One Belt and One Road” Initiative with the
Interconnected Himalayan Region—Reflections on the Construction
of the China–Nepal–India Economic Corridor . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51
Shisheng Hu
The Current Situation of the One Belt and One Road Initiative
and Its Development Trend . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 103
Jiadong Zhang
The Security Structure in South Asia and Its Impacts on Belt
and Road Initiative . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 139
Peng Liu
An Analysis on the Geopolitical Pattern and Regional Situation
in South Asia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 175
Chuanlu Feng

Part III Country Study

Opportunities and Challenges in Current China–Pakistan Economic
and Trade Relations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 213
Yiming Lin

ix
x Contents

Sino–Bangladeshi Cooperation Under Perspective of the “Belt and

Road”: Demand, Intention and Space . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 237
Yishuang Yang
Re-shaping the Sino–Sri Lanka’s Economic Relations Under the
Framework of the “21st Century Maritime Silk Road” Initiative . . . . . 273
Yanfang Li
Myanmar’s Situation Under NLD Governance and China–Myanmar
Co-construction OBOR . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 307
Wu Liu and Jiajun Liu
Abstract

China has 14 neighboring countries onshore, the most of its kind in the world, with
the majority of them located in South Asia, Southeast Asia, and Central Asia.
Among them, South Asia is the region where China has the most neighbors
onshore, including India, Pakistan, Nepal, Bhutan, and Afghanistan. Sharing a
common boundary of nearly 5000 km long, these countries account for one-third
of the total neighbors onshore of China. South Asia has three geographical features.
First, it is located in the zone where Southeast Asia, West Asia, and Central Asia
converge and is adjacent to West China. However, the Himalayas disconnect South
Asia from Asian continent. The South Asia subcontinent links Europe, Middle East,
East Asia, and Australia together. Second, as South Asia is at the center of the
Indian Ocean, it is geographically independent. It adjoins the Bay of Bengal and the
Arabic Sea on the west and east. Third, India lies at the heart of South Asian
subcontinent. Other South Asian countries, including Pakistan, Bangladesh,
Bhutan, Nepal, Maldives, and Sri Lanka, all share land or sea boundaries with
India. Yet, these countries do not border each other. Enjoying favorable geo-
graphical location, China and South Asia have a broad scope for cooperation. That
is also why South Asia is an important part of the “One Belt, One Road” vision and
action plan.
“One Belt, One Road” is a deterministic decision China made in response to the
rapidly changing world situation and rising uncertainties of surroundings. It is a
significant initiative that China launched in exploring global governance patterns
and seeking deeper economy and security cooperation. Since the proposal was put
forward, it won positive response and support from most South Asian neighbors,
including Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Bangladesh, Maldives, Afghanistan, and Nepal.
Therefore, “One Belt, One Road” has made significant progress in this area. For
example, the construction of the China–Pakistan Economic Corridor has achieved
remarkable results; Bangladesh–China–India–Burma Economic Corridor con-
struction is under progress; China–Nepal–India Economic Corridor construction
has entered the stage of study; and investment cooperation potential between China
and South Asian countries is gradually being released. Nevertheless, China’s
investment in South Asia is far less than that in Southeast Asia and Central Asia.

xi
xii Abstract

In terms of regional investment distribution, China invests the most in Southeast

Asia, while that in Central Asia is growing the fastest. However, “One Belt, One
Road” is still advancing at a slower pace in South Asia. One of the major reasons is
that except for Pakistan, China and other countries in South Asia lack strategic
mutual trust and policy interaction. Some countries, despite positive attitude, still
have scruples about the initiative and hence act prudently. India in particular is still
suspicious of this initiative. China and India are still in a stage of strategic mutual
suspicion.
“One Belt, One Road” development in South Asia can achieve the following
three mutually beneficial win-win goals at least. First, it will enhance economic
foundation and strength of major partners in this region, deepen economic inter-
dependency between China and its main partners, and help to achieve common
development and prosperity in China and South Asia. Second, interconnection and
intercommunication and trade and investment between China and South Asia will
create good conditions for security interaction, hence contributing to realization
of the goal of common security. Third, as the pattern of economic and security
interaction between China and South Asia takes shape, cooperation centering
around on policy communication, infrastructure connectivity, trade link, capital
flow, and understanding among peoples will be further deepened, which will help to
bring closer the political relations between China and major partners and realize the
objective of building a community of shared future for mankind.
Of course, challenges and risks we have to confront in implementing “One Belt,
One Road” in South Asia cannot be ignored: First, the security situation in South
Asia is worrying. A variety of nontraditional security issues are hidden security
hazards for intercommunication and interconnectivity construction. Second, mul-
tiple countries in South Asia are backward economically, and low-efficient coop-
eration will bring unpredictable economic risks. Third, many South Asian countries
are politically unstable, bringing political risks to China’s investment in South Asia.
Fourth, project cooperation between China and small South Asian countries is
prone to interference from India in the region or even big powers outside the region,
such as the US and Japan.
At present, the geopolitical pattern of South Asia features geographical impor-
tance and security vulnerability. Asymmetric power structure and imbalanced
security architecture are also an important factor affecting the geopolitical rift in
South Asia, while terrorism and ethnic extremism that are closely intertwined have
become a major cause behind security deterioration in South Asia. The strategic
position, cooperation depth, and breadth of South Asia in the “One Belt, One Road”
initiative depend on not only the geopolitical structure of South Asia itself and its
position in the region and the world at large, but on China’s geopolitical structure,
its strategic positioning in South Asia, strategic appeal, and the interaction between
China and South Asian countries. The strategic importance of South Asia is also
reflected in the close geographical relations between South Asia and Central Asia,
the Iranian plateau, and Southeast Asia, as well as the changing situation that come
along with South Asia interacting with these regions. The importance of South
Asia, as an independent strategic unit, depends to some extent on the level of
Abstract xiii

participation and the breadth and depth of cooperation. After all, geographical
factors are only a fundamental factor in determining the political behavior of a state
and the relations between nations. It is not a key factor, let alone the only factor.
As a stakeholder in South Asia, India regards China’s foreign policy of bringing
harmony, security, and prosperity to neighbors and deepening economic coopera-
tion with multiple South Asian countries under the backdrop of Belt and Road as a
“threat”. This is why India has never ceased supporting the separatist activities
of the Dalai Group as a way to control and take advantage of the national sepa-
ratism of the Tibetan exiles. Dalai group has become a “card” that India repeatedly
uses as a part of its strategy toward China. In order to contain China and maintain
the balance of power in Asia, the United States, as a world hegemony, tries to
deepen US–India cooperation in strategy and security fields. Apart from that, it
claimed openly on many occasions that it would help India become the world’s
“leading power.” This has invisibly become is a major cause of intensified strategic
competition in South Asia. As the center of power of South Asia, India wants to
resist the penetration of external forces into South Asia. Meanwhile, it also hopes to
compete against Pakistan and balance China’s influence in South Asia by bor-
rowing the power of Western powers, especially the US. This caters to the global
strategy of the United States, fuels instability of the geopolitical relations in South
Asia, and boosts Sino-US strategic competition in South Asia.
Regardless of how important India is or whether it is important in the “One Belt,
One Road” strategy, it seems unlikely to make a breakthrough to India–China
cooperation in the short term. In the view of India, even if the cooperation is
deterministic and predictable, it cannot make up for the loss of strategic interest
resulting from influence and power confrontation. India’s external development
strategy, even the external economic development strategy, especially that for
India–China economic cooperation must be based on assessment of threat and
strategic environment. Geopolitical factors are something it is sure to take into
account. India, although not necessarily a supporting point of “One Belt, One
Road”, has distinct geopolitical features, which decides it is a country of strategic
interests to both “One Belt” and “One Road”. At the same time, an integrated South
Asian subcontinent has a strategic advantage as an independent unit. The key is
whether India is willing or able to make good use of these advantages. If so, it will
no doubt gain cooperation benefits that other South Asian countries cannot or have
difficulty to obtain. In addition to the benefits from bilateral cooperation, India will
undoubtedly benefit from South Asia’s economic prosperity and social stability, or
it may even be the biggest beneficiary in this area.
It’s better for the doer to undo what he has done. Regarding Sino-India relations,
China always shows a positive attitude. Chinese leaders have also released signals
of cooperation on different occasions, showing goodwill to and trust in India. As
very important neighbors to each other, both India and China have common
strategic interest in Southeast Asia, South Asia, and the Indian Ocean. It is real-
istically possible and strategically significant for the two nations to be linked with
each other strategically, which is incomparable between China and any other
countries. If India’s neighbors are actively involved in the “One Belt, One Road”,
xiv Abstract

but India insists on “walking alone” or even “trying to find a new path” and uses its
limited energy and strength to weaken China and contain the rise of China, that
would only consume more internal force of India and is contrary to India’s long-
term interests and its goal to be a big power. It is for this reason that China and India
try to seek broad consensus and mutually beneficial cooperation in line with the
common interests of both sides and their respective strategic considerations. To
implement “One Belt, One Road” in South Asia, the difficulty lies in India. In the
final analysis, the problem relates to Sino-Indian ties. To overcome it, concerted
efforts from both sides are expected. We have reason to believe that benefits
generated from bilateral cooperation will spill into the political field and become a
lubricant of political mutual trust as long as both China and India are willing to
work hard and take actions to strengthen communication in the field of culture and
seek cooperation in the field of economy and security, which will ultimately help to
promote the development of Sino-Indian relations.
 Part I
General Report
The South Asian Direction of “OBOR”
Strategy: Geopolitical Pattern, Indian
Difficulties and Breakthrough Path

Cuiping Zhu

Abstract Currently, the world pattern has been suffering the collision of global
problems one after another, which makes the global governance more closely linked
with the international order. In this context, the great power strategy is still affected
by the inertial thinking formed during the cold war. What’s worse, the occurrence of
various changes and crisis brings the internal and external development strategy of a
country into dilemma. As an important move to explore the means of global
governance and seek the deepened economic and security cooperation with coun-
tries along the route, “OBOR” is a deterministic choice made by Chinese govern-
ment under the conditions of a rapidly changing world pattern and a rise in the
uncertainty of the surrounding environment. China is the largest neighboring
country of South Asia. Although a huge potential market demand for South Asia
means broad cooperation space, the cooperation between China and South Asia is
faced with more obstacles compared to Southeast Asia, Central Asia and other
regions. It is with the misunderstanding and contrasting points of view based on
“geopolitical imagination” that result in the missing of cooperation opportunities.
With the background of OBOR initiative, the strategic position, the breadth as well
as the depth of cooperation in South Asia not only depend on the geopolitical
structure itself and its position in the regional and world pattern, but also depends on
China’s geopolitical structure, China’s strategic position and interest demands in
South Asia as well as the interaction between China and South Asian countries. The
Indian difficulties of “OBOR” in the South Asian direction, after all, consist in the
Sino-Indian relations. The solution of this problem requires the joint efforts of both
sides. We have reason to believe that as long as China and India are ready to put
efforts and take action to strengthen communication in humanities and seek
cooperation in the economic and security field, the “dividends” of cooperation will
overflow to the political field and become the lubricant of political trust, which will
eventually push forward the development of Sino-Indian bilateral relations.

C. Zhu (&)
Research Institute for Indian Ocean Economies, Yunnan University of Finance and
Economics, Kunming, China
e-mail: zhucuip@sina.com

© Social Sciences Academic Press and Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2018 3
W. Rong and C. Zhu (eds.), Annual Report on the Development of the Indian Ocean
Region (2017), Research Series on the Chinese Dream and China’s Development Path,
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-13-2080-4_1
4 C. Zhu

Keywords OBOR South Asia Geopolitical pattern Indian difficulties
After nearly 40 years of reform and opening up, China has made remarkable
achievements in economic development. However, the advancement of sustainable
development is faced with difficult internal choices and huge external challenges. At
present, the imbalance of economic development in the eastern, central and western
regions of China is prominent, and the industrial structure is in urgent need of being
further adjusted and optimized, particularly the traditional industries that are faced
with great difficulties in development and reform. At the same time, due to the
characteristics of China’s economic structure and the changes of the international
economic environment in recent years, China’s economy has shown a clear
imbalance to the outside, which in turn exacerbates the imbalance in the economy,
wherein the continued expansion of the trade surplus is not only an outstanding
performance of China’s internal and external economic imbalances, but also a “lame
excuse” used by western countries led the United States to promote and implement
trade protectionism. In addition, the sign of recession is obvious in Europe, the
economic recovery in the United States lacks of motivation, and Japan’s economy is
in continuous downturn. The world powers seem vulnerable, and the chaos of the
world economic pattern has been looming out of the crisis of global governance. At
the same time, influenced by the development trend of the multi-level world
structure and the strategic layout of the world and regional powers in the Asia Pacific
region, China’s surrounding environment is becoming more and more complicated.
In view of this, the challenge of the international pattern is not the new cold war, but
the disorder of the world order. The disorder brings anxiety, and the anxiety further
leads to populism. The Brexit, Trump phenomenon and Erdogan phenomenon are all
expressions of anxiety.1 How will China safe against a rainy day? How to maintain a
strategic concentration in the complex and unpredictable international situation and
furthest avoid the “cooperation dilemma” in the development of relations with
neighboring countries through playing the linkage effects of internal and external
development based on geographical advantage and competitive advantage?
“OBOR” initiative is a product of China’s response to internal and external
environmental changes. In September and October of 2013 when president Xi
Jinping visited Kazakhstan and Indonesia, he proposed the cooperation initiative to
build the “Silk Road Economic Belt” and “the 21st Century Maritime Silk Road”.
On March 28, 2015, the National Development and Reform Commission, the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Commerce jointly issued the Vision
and Action of Jointly Building the Silk Road Economic Belt and the 21st Century
Maritime Silk Road, clearly pointing out that the Silk Road Economic Belt
smoothly crosses from China to Central Asia, Russia and Europe (Baltic); from
China to Central Asia and West Asia to the Persian Gulf and the Mediterranean;
from China to Southeast Asia, South Asia and Indian Ocean. The main direction of

1
Jin Canrong: A Correct Understanding of the Influence of “The Belt and Road” Strategy on the
International Situation, http://news.gdufs.edu.cn/Item/87426.aspx]. Chinese how to take
precautions?
The South Asian Direction of “OBOR” Strategy: Geopolitical … 5

the maritime Silk Road in the 21st Century is from the Chinese coastal ports to the
South China Sea, then to the Indian Ocean, and finally extended to Europe; from
Chinese coastal ports to South China Sea, then to the South Pacific Ocean. In terms
of the cooperation emphasis, the cooperation model with the main content of
“policy coordination, facilities connectivity, unimpeded trade, financial integration
and people-to-people bond” is also proposed.2 At the same time, the conference
promoting the construction work of “OBOR” also officially designated the six
economic corridor, the new Eurasian Continental Bridge, China, Mongolia and
Russia, China-Central Asia-West Asia, China-Indo-China Peninsula, China and
Pakistan and BCIM, as the main framework, promoting the implementation of the
“OBOR” strategy.3 As to the region, Southeast Asia, South Asia and Central Asia
are undoubtedly the focus in the development direction of “OBOR” initiative. From
the current situation of promotion and implementation, there are still a few coun-
tries along the route taking the attitude of suspicion and even boycott toward
“OBOR”, among which the more typical one is India, a large country in South Asia.
Therefore, this paper tries to answer the following questions based on the analysis
of the characteristics of the South Asian geopolitical pattern: first, the strategic
position of South Asia in China’s “OBOR” initiative; second, the progress and
efficiency that has been achieved in the South Asian direction of “OBOR” strategy;
third, the Indian difficulties to be confronted in the further promotion of the
implementation of the “OBOR”; fourth, how to break through the Indian difficulties
in the South Asian direction.

1 Main Features of the Geopolitical Pattern in South Asia

South Asia is a vast area extended from the South of the Himalayas to the Indian
Ocean. There are altogether eight countries, including India, Pakistan, Bangladesh,
Nepal and Bhutan that are in the subcontinent of South Asia, Afghanistan that is
adjacent to Central Asia as well as Sri Lanka and Maldives that are known as the
“pearl” and “necklace” respectively. The subcontinent of South Asia refers to a
relatively independent Peninsula land which is in the south of the Himalayas, with a
total area of 4,300,000 km2. When we analyze the geopolitical pattern of South
Asia, on one hand, it’s necessary for us to combine with the geographical structure,
the security situation and the national psychological structure. On the other hand,
we also need to consider the impact of the security architecture and the strategic
location both in the South Asia and in the Indian Ocean. In this way, the geopo-
litical pattern of South Asia is characterized as follow:

2
The issuance of The Documents Concerning the Vision and Action of Jointing Building “The
Belt and Road”, World Wide Web. http://world.huanqiu.com/hot/2015-03/6037723.html.
3
The Launch of the Planning for the Six Economic Corridor in the “The Belt and Road”, China.
Com. http://www.china.com.cn/opinion/think/2015-05/28/content_35680924.html.
6 C. Zhu

First, the coexistence of geographical importance and security vulnerability

is one of the main features of the South Asian geopolitical pattern. No one can
deny the importance of South Asia in the regional and global geographic strategy of
world powers. This first comes from the uniformity and importance resulted from
the geographically independent unit of the subcontinent of South Asia, and the
demonstrated diversity and diversification for failure to form a unified unit in
politics, as well as the security vulnerability thus induced. From the geographical
point of view, South Asia backs the Himalayas with Southeast Asia in the East and
Iran plateau in the northwest. It is the flank of the Middle East, the world’s oil
center, and the hinterland of Central Asia. Located in the South Asian subcontinent
of North India Ocean, it has the Arabia sea on the left side and the Bay of Bengal on
the right side, rightly in the center of the arc zone connecting two key oil-transit
chokepoints including the Strait of Hormuz and the Strait of Malacca. Overall,
South Asia in geography has three distinct characteristics: first, it is located in the
intersection zone of Southeast Asia, West Asia and Central Asia, as well as adjacent
to the western China, but the Himalayas separate the South Asia from the Asian
continent. The subcontinent of South Asia is still the hub connecting Europe,
Middle East, East Asia and Australia; second, South Asia is in the center of Indian
Ocean, which has formed a relatively independent unit geographically, with the
eastern and western side respectively adjacent to the bay of Bengal and Arabia sea;
third, India is in the center of South Asian subcontinent, and other countries of
South Asia including Pakistan, Bangladesh, Bhutan, Nepal, Maldives and Sri Lanka
are adjacent to India either by land or by ocean, but they are not adjacent between
each other.4 In particular, the geographical location of the heart of the world sea
power zone and the geographical territory that penetrates into the center of India
Ocean forces the India to regard ocean, especially Indian Ocean, as its life-gate of
national security.5 Due to the special geographical position of South Asia, the
United States had been brewing a regional strategy several years after the “911”
event, attempting to put together South Asia and Central Asia that are geographi-
cally adjacent but have different geopolitics. At the same time, it also takes certain
strategic deployment and promotion measures. Although affected by many factors
including the regional security situation and the historical grievances as well as
realistic contradictions between neighboring countries, this integration strategy does
not make any progress, but further highlights the important position of South and
Central Asia in the global strategy of great powers. In South Asia, although the
population in India, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Maldives and other South Asian countries
is very concentrated in Indian Ocean, it can be regarded as the center of the region,
but they are faced with a dilemma. They have little influence on their dependent
Indian Ocean, not to mention the control. If the ocean channels through which they

4
Zhu Cuiping: The Relationship and Mutual Influence Between the Strategy of China, the United
States and the South Asia, South Asia Studies, third edition of 2016, page one.
5
Zhang Wenmu: India and Indian Ocean—From the Perspective of China’s Geopolitics. Beijing:
China Social Sciences Press, 2015 edition, page 102.
The South Asian Direction of “OBOR” Strategy: Geopolitical … 7

reach the coast are harmed or truncated, or the Indian Ocean is controlled by one or
several hostile states, then the weakness of these countries in South Asia in shipping
will immediately become obvious, making people feel pain.6
It is worth mentioning that there are two countries with nuclear weapons in
South Asia, namely, India and Pakistan, and they both belong to the sea and land
complex countries. Of course, India, whether in population size, economic power or
military strength, is the leading power in South Asia. India is located in the center of
the subcontinent of South Asia, stabbing the Indian Ocean like a sword and
watching intently the international maritime line across India Ocean; Pakistan is an
important gateway from Central Asian countries to the Arabia sea, and the “side
door” of Persian Gulf.7 Especially for India, it should be remembered that it is a
country with the characteristics of peninsula, and its trade is mainly dependent on
maritime traffic, making its fate greatly affected by the ocean.8 At the same time, the
coastline of the India subcontinent is the longest in the world. It is as long as the
mainland of India, but it is more vulnerable to be attacked.9 In the British colonial
period, the safety of India subcontinent is considered to depend on the “sphere of
influence” which remains till today and the two largest natural barriers of
Hindukush and the Himalayas. British authorities respectively establish the “buffer
state system” in Persian (Iran), Afghanistan, Nepal, Tibet, Sikkim and Burma to
ensure the strategic integration of the India subcontinent.10
Second, the asymmetry of power structure and the imbalance of the security
structure is an important factor affecting the geopolitical rift in South Asia. In
South Asia, either the geographical location, area, population or economic devel-
opment indicators, India is dominant in the amount. Besides, other South Asian
countries around India like a myriad of stars surround the moon, forming the
“core-periphery” India-centric power structure. From the power structure based on
hard power, although hard power of Pakistan is not enough to form a “duopoly”
situation with India in the subcontinent of South Asia, Pakistan is the only country
to compete with India among the South Asian countries, while the conflict between
India and Pakistan is one of the main rifts in the South Asian geopolitics. Since
independence, India and Pakistan have maintained a tense confrontation on
Kashmir, and three wars have occurred in 1947, 1965 and 1971. The Kashmir issue
can be said to be a knot difficult or even unable to untie between India and Pakistan.
The relationship between the South Asian countries, in addition to the adversarial

6
A. J. Cottrell, R. M. Burrell editor: Indian Ocean: Importance in the Politics, Economic and
Military, Shanghai People’s Publishing House, 1976 edition, page 303.
7
Zhang Wenmu: India and Indian Ocean—From the Perspective of China’s Geopolitics. Beijing:
China Social Sciences Press, 2015 edition, page 347.
8
Panikkar: India and Indian Ocean: On the Influence of Sea Power on the History of India, the
world knowledge press, 1965 edition, page 8.
9
A. J. Cottrell, R. M. Burrell editor: Indian Ocean: Importance in the Politics, Economic and
Military, Shanghai People’s Publishing House, 1976 edition, page 303.
10
Song Dexing: The Geopolitical Structure of South Asia and the Security Strategy of India, South
Asia Studies, 2004 edition, page 21.
8 C. Zhu

relationship between India and Pakistan, also includes the semi-dependency rela-
tionship on India(Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, Maldives), completely dependent rela-
tionship on India (Nepal and Bhutan) and the neither friendly nor aloof relationship
(Afghanistan).11 From the perspective of security architecture, South Asia’s
geopolitical security structure cannot be ignored. South Asia has always been
considered or been taken for grant to be the sphere of influence of India. As a great
power which has huge sphere of influence in South Asia, India is not only unable to
provide security for the region, but also has concerns about the safety of its own,
and this worry goes far beyond itself and extends to Southeast Asia, West Asia, far
East and other regions. Either the worries brought about by the Indian and Pakistan
nuclear strategy and the nuclear confrontation to regional security, or the deterrence
shown by the “the axis power” India to small countries in South Asia has triggered
a sense of insecurity in the heart of these small South Asian nations, and even the
sense of dissatisfaction that dares to anger but dare not say, triggering the
“derailment” mentality in these countries by different degrees. From a commanding
and coherent point of view, South Asia is a unique and relatively closed strategic
unit, and its security architecture presents the characteristics of imbalance and
fracture.12 This is why India has always been difficult to get rid of the trouble
caused by the security structure, and always stressed the “strategic autonomy” and
“security self-help”.
Third, the mix of terrorism and national extremism is the main source of
the deterioration in the security situation of South Asia. The South Asian
security situation has always been difficult to shake off the haze of terrorism and
national extremism. First of all, terrorism is the cause of instability in the security
situation in South Asia. India Ocean region has always been a relatively concen-
trated area of piracy, terrorism and other non-traditional threats, and coastal areas
include Somalia, Yemen, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Iran and Pakistan. These constitute the
coverage area of al-Qaeda network worthy of the name.13 Among them, South Asia
is the hardest hit area of global terrorism. According to statistics, there are nearly 40
active extremist organizations in India, and over 50 are in Pakistan, most of which
are cross-border organizations. With strong strength and complex background,
these organizations have long been engaged in a variety of violent activities and
making appalling casualties. From 2005 to 2014, in addition to Afghanistan, the
number of deaths caused by violent terrorist attacks in South Asia is as high as
110,000. For the world’s top ten major terrorist attacks in 2013, Pakistan,
Afghanistan and India respectively ranked the second, third and fourth place,

11
Yang Siling: “The Belt and Road Initiative”: The Analysis Perspective of the Relations Between
Countries in South Asia, Study on India Ocean Economy, fifth issue of 2015, page 10.
12
Yang Xiaoping: Security Architecture of South Asia: Structural Imbalance and Fracture
Integration, World Economy and Politics, second issue of 2012, page 80.
13
Robert D. Kaplan: The Future of the Indian Ocean and the Power of the United States, translated
by Wu Zhaoli, Mao Yue, Beijing: Social Sciences Academic Press, 2013, page 6.
The South Asian Direction of “OBOR” Strategy: Geopolitical … 9

second only to Iraq.14 Since the independence of India, the riots in the Northeast
have killed more than 500, 000 people. Even in the decade between 1992 and 2001
when the situation was relatively mild, there were still 12,181 people killed in war
and terrorism in the northeast of India.15 The terrorist attack that took place in
Mumbai in 2008 was blamed by India to have been launched by “Lashkar-e-Taiba”,
one of South Asia’s largest Islamist militant groups based in Pakistan. Regardless of
the truth of the facts, people will inevitably cast doubt on the Islamic extremists,
which, to a certain extent, has caused tensions in South Asia, especially the rela-
tions between India and Pakistan. Secondly, the ethnic and religious conflicts in
South Asia are the main causes of potential conflicts. The deep-rooted contradic-
tions and conflicts between the two groups of Hindus and Muslims are one of the
most important factors affecting the development and stability of international
relations in South Asia. “Hindu supremacy” is often the root cause of religious and
ethnic conflicts in India, and it also has an impact on international relations. In
terms of the number, Muslims in South Asia account for about 1/3 of the world’s
Muslim population. Among them, Pakistan is the largest countries where Muslims
are the main population in South Asia. Although Pakistan’s Muslim population is
smaller than that of Indonesia and belongs to the world’s second country where
Muslim accounts for the major population, it has nuclear power and an army of
700,000, so it can be regarded as the world’s most powerful country where Muslims
are the main population. Although Muslims in India are ethnic minorities, the large
Muslim population accounts for 14% of the total population of India whose Muslim
population ranks the top three of the world, followed by Bangladesh. Muslims in
India have often been accused of being the “fifth column” of Pakistan, which
inevitably led to condemnation and strong reaction by the Muslims from Pakistan,
Bangladesh and Afghanistan. In India, the local Hinduism believers account for
82%, and foreign religious Muslims account for 12%. The mutual hatred and
religious conflict between Hindus and Muslims have existed before the partition of
India and Pakistan. Even if divided and conquered, the religious conflict still cannot
be resolved, which can be said to have formed a “revenge” knot. In 2002, the riot
between Hindus and Muslims that took place in Gujarat killed at least 800 people.
In October 2015, a tragedy happened in Uttar Pradesh because of a rumor that one
Muslim took part in cattle slaughter and ate beef, who was finally beaten to death by
hundreds of villagers. At the same time, the ethnic issue in South Asia is also the
typical cases of ethnic conflict and ethnic separatism. The Hindu Tamils have
obvious separatist tendencies. They advocate the establishment of “Tamils inde-
pendent country”, and have endless conflicts with the Buddhist Sinhalese, even
resort to force, which triggers a protracted civil war between the armed separatist

14
Zheng Di: On the Penetration of “Islamic State of South Asia, World Wide Web, http://world.
huanqiu.com/hot/2015-09/7512883.html.
15
Li Jinke, Madewen: On the Causes of the Generation and Constant Development of National
Separatist Movement in the Northeast India, International Forum, fourth issue of 2008, page 73.
10 C. Zhu

Tamil Tigers and the Sri Lankan army. Sri Lanka has long been seen as a sphere of
influence by India, and any threat to Sri Lanka’s security and stability will be seen
as a threat to India’s security. As a result, India gets directly involved in Sri Lanka’s
ethnic conflict, which also has a profound impact on the pattern of security in South
Asia. Besides, the spread and penetration of foreign extremist forces in South Asia
has exacerbated the instability of the security situation in South Asia. The tentacle
of the extremist organizations which self- proclaimed to be “Islamic State” is
extended to South Asia, making the original complex and dangerous security sit-
uation in South Asia worse. “Pan Islamism”, one of the modern Islamic social
thoughts and social movements, is an ideology that proposes that Islam is not only a
religious belief, but also a set of politics system, emphasizing that the world Muslim
people of all ethnic groups who have common historical and cultural traditions,
common interests, wishes and requirements should unite to defend the revival of
Islamic faith.16 The “Pan Islamism” not only deviates from the construction of
national sovereignty, but also holds aloft the banner of promoting Islamic culture,
advocating the output of “Islamic Revolution” and threatening the territorial
sovereignty of other countries. It tries to agglomerate the Islamic countries under
the banner of fundamentalism and takes terrorist activities as a means of penetra-
tion. For example, in the violence that happened in the mosque of Babri in 1992,
according to official statistics, there were 1097 people killed and 4085 injured in a
week. The government imposed a curfew in the 135 towns. Ten years later, some
Hindus took the train to Ayodhya with an aim of rebuilding Rama temple, the arson
of Islamic fundamentalists killed 58 people, and a new round of conflict was put to
stage again.17 At present, the infiltration of Islamic religious forces and the inter-
twined ethnic and religious conflicts in South Asia aggravate the instability of
regional security situation.
Fourth, the participation of foreign powers is a major incentive to boost the
strategic competition in South Asia. In recent years, the economic downturn,
geopolitical turmoil, terror crisis, civilization friction and other chaos have fallen
and risen one after another, and the current international order and system are faced
with new challenges. Some western scholars even exclaimed that we were going
toward “a disordered world”.18 Due to the ingrained territorial issue and irrecon-
cilable religious and ethnic disputes, India and Pakistan has been in rival relations
since the partition, and both of them carried out a nuclear test at the end of 1990s.
India, as the center of power in South Asia, on the one hand, resists the infiltration
on the South Asia by the external forces, on the other hand, also hopes to use the
Western powers, especially the United States forces, to battle against Pakistan, and

16
Pan Islamism, http://baike.baidu.com/link?url=vVKxFxg8s0yH49mD-CQkaFFiElFqe0ig5b3
upLakbOKd_uR_hPLe7X3jkRCo9i3xbyC9Ufmid7wcP2v7EzIpnLQtKSGLS3Fgya_mZXaoJPEP
HsN0O_uhPPEQ9TKr1WH3acJPfkJo1VmgsFBbW6gxOa.
17
Zhao Lingmin: Behind the Religious Conflicts in India, Southern People Weekly, August 28,
2012.
18
Wang Yi: Build a New International Relations with Cooperation and Win-win as the Core,
International Studies, third issue of 2015, page 2.
The South Asian Direction of “OBOR” Strategy: Geopolitical … 11

at the same time, balances China’s influence in South Asia, which not only caters to
America’s global strategy, but also boosts the instability in the geopolitical relations
in South Asia and the strategic competition between China, American and India in
South Asia. India has long supported the separatist activities of Dalai’s rebel group,
controlled and exploited the ethnic separatism of Tibet exiles, regarding it as a
“card” that can be repeatedly used in India’s strategy against China. In a sense,
cross-border ethnic issues are international themselves, which is also easily be used
as “political chips” by the political forces of some countries in order to maximize
the strategic dividend and economic interests. At the same time, as the stakeholders
of South Asia, Chinese foreign policy of “bringing harmony, security and pros-
perity to neighboring countries” and the deepening economic cooperation under the
context of “OBOR” with many South Asian countries are regarded as “threat” by
India. The United States, as the world hegemony, in order to tie down China and
maintain the balance of power in Asia, not only deepens the strategic and security
cooperation with India, but also publicly claims to help India become the a world
leader power on a number of occasions. Especially under the influence of global-
ization, the interaction of various ethnic and religious relations and the collision of
different values of civilization have caused an unprecedented impact on the concept
of sovereignty and ideology. The western countries represented by the United
States, while promoting the economic globalization, also outputs its democracy,
freedom, human rights and other values and advocates theories including “the
weakening national sovereignty”, “limited sovereignty” and “new interventionism”,
exacerbating the conflict of worldwide civilization and values. In this way, the
characteristics combining geopolitics and resources politics determines that Indian
Ocean and its adjacent waters will become the core area of resource contention and
power competition for future powers, playing an important role in the game of
global strategy among great powers.
In short, the asymmetry of the power structure of the South Asia, the regional
geographical features with India as the center, the strategic tradition of British India,
the experience and lessons of Cold War and the major geopolitical changes of the
Post-Cold War make India committed to the goal of “regional core” mainly relying
on the “self-help” strategy.19 Even from the perspective of current situation, in
South Asia, the geographical location richly endowed by nature determines that the
South Asia is the “arena” of geopolitical game among great powers, the spread of
terrorism decides that South Asia is the “disaster area” of global security threats,
and the great economic development potential of makes itself the “cooperation
area” of sharing economic benefits. These all three determine the strategic game of
foreign powers in South Asia and the direction and strength of devotion to South
Asia.20

19
Song Dexing: The Geopolitical Structure of South Asia and the Security Strategy of India, South
Asia Studies, first issue of 2004, page 20.
20
Zhu Cuiping: The Relationship and Mutual Influence Between the Strategy of China, America
and the South Asia, South Asia Studies, third issue of 2016, page 2.
12 C. Zhu

2 Strategic Position of “OBOR” Initiative in South Asia

Spykman once said, “If one want to measure a country’s foreign policy, it must first
be based on the position of the country in the world. However, compared with the
position, the area, topography and natural resources are the most important factors
determining the status of a country in international relations”.21 Just as what
Friedrich, the founder of modern political geography, said, “great politicians never
lack the sense of geography…. When we speak of sound political instincts, we
usually mean a correct assessment of the geographic basis of political power”. The
early politicians in geography including British geographer Mackeand and German
Haushofer viewed geography as an important factor in determining the fate of a
country. As to the importance of political geography, American strategist
Brzezinski also stressed that, “know the Eurasian countries that are energetic and
have the ability to cause potentially important changes in international power dis-
tribution in terms of the geopolitical strategy, clarify the basic foreign policy goals
of their respective political elites and pursue for the possible consequences of these
goals. Determine the Eurasian countries with geopolitical importance whose geo-
graphical position or its existence of their own play the role of the catalyst for more
active geo-strategic countries or regions”.22 Therefore, the strategic position and the
breadth and depth of cooperation of “OBOR” initiative in South Asia not only
depends on the geopolitical structure of South Asia itself and its position in the
regional and world situation, but also depends on the geopolitical structure of
China, the strategic positioning and strategic demands of China in South Asia as
well as the interaction between China and South Asian countries.
Since 2013 when “OBOR” initiative was proposed, in addition to most inter-
pretation and analysis from the perspective of geopolitics by foreign academic
community, the domestic academic circles also have a lot of analysis from the
geo-strategic perspective, among which the representative points include: Wang Jisi
maintains that China’s proposition of “OBOR” strategy is a timely response to
changes of the world pattern. China should strategically rely on the Asia in the
geographical sense (not just the East Asia), linking the East to the West and
connecting the South to the North. China should have a larger blueprint in the
Eurasian continent, and even the world, but not take the restoration of the “Chinese
order” and the pursuit of “East Asian hegemony” or “Asian hegemony” as the
goal.23 In Huang Renwei’ s view, “OBOR” is the experimental field for the new
concept of international order, including the new international economic order, the

21
[America] Nicholas
John
Spykman: Peace Geography, translated by Liu Yuzhi, Beijing: The
Commercial Press, 1965, page 41.
22
[America] Zbigniew
Brzezinski: The Grand Chessboard: American Primacy and Its Geopolitical
Strategy, translated by China Institute of International Studies, Shanghai Century Publishing
Group, 2007 edition, page 34.
23
Wang Jisi: Great Power Strategy: Research and Reflection on the International Strategy, CITIC
Publishing Group, published in 2016, page 109.
The South Asian Direction of “OBOR” Strategy: Geopolitical … 13

new international security order and the political order based on the fate of the
community.24 From this point of view, the cross regional cooperation platform of
“OBOR” proposed by China, to a certain extent, advocates a new geopolitical
concept.25 The core of “OBOR” is strategic relationship rather than transportation
facilities, and the political role in the connection of traffic facilities is determined by
the strategic relationship. The strategic goal of “OBOR” is to establish reliable
strategic partnership with neighboring countries.26 However, Shi Yinhong believes
that the promotion of the “OBOR” construction requires caution in attitude, politics
and strategy. The strategic planning is part of it, and what really plays the decisive
role is the strategic planning between China and the cooperation countries.27 At the
same time, carry out and uphold the right idea of moral and profit of “OBOR” and
build it with an aim of creating a community of destiny so that the international
community will identity the peaceful rise of China as a great power, which is the
important role of “OBOR” in non-economic field.28 After all, “OBOR” has highly
strategic significance. It is not a strategy focusing only on the development of
China, but one that, with the development of China as an opportunity, tries to
achieve the peaceful development of the region and the world and practice the new
peace, cooperation and development among great powers, calling for the strategic
understanding and strategic consensus between China and partners so that the
strategy can become a new model to promote the open development and win-win
cooperation in the new period.29
Whether from the point of land or sea, South Asia that overlooks the Indian
Ocean spans across the important channel connecting China and the Middle East,
which is concerned with the security of China’s trade and energy channel.30 From
the security architecture and the strategic position of great powers in South Asia and
the Indian Ocean, the United States’ military deployment in the base of Diego
Garcia and the Fifth Fleet strength bring about the incomparable advantage of
hegemony in Indian Ocean. Then there comes the Indian navy. It can be said that
the Bay of Bengal in the northeast of Indian Ocean has always been the scope of

24
Huang Renwei: “The Belt and Road Initiative” is the Experimental Field for the New Concept of
International Order, People.com.cn, http://world.people.com.cn/n/2015/0705/c1002-27255803.
html.
25
Zhu Hong, An Ning: Geography Return of National Major Development Strategy: On the
Geopolitical Significance of “The Belt and Road”, Tropical Geography, the fifth issue of the
thirty-fifth volume of 2015, page 607.
26
Yan Xuetong: The Core of “The Belt and Road” is Strategic Relations Rather Than Traffic
Facilities, International Herald Tribune, June 19 of 2015.
27
Shi Yinhong: The Promotion of “The Belt and Road” Construction Requires “Prudent”
Mentality, People.com.cn, http://world.people.com.cn/n/2015/0705/c1002-27256546.html.
28
Li Xiangyang: Implement and Uphold the Right Idea of Moral and Profit of “The Belt and Road”,
China.com.cn, http://www.china.com.cn/opinion/think/2017-02/27/content_40368781.htm.
29
Zhang Yunling: Focus on “The Belt and Road Initiative”, Chinese Social Sciences, http://www.
cssn.cn/jjx/jjx_gd/201407/t20140731_1274694.shtml.
30
Zhu Cuiping: The Relationship and Mutual Influence in the Strategy Between China, America
and South Asia, South Asia Studies, third issue of 2016, page 5.
14 C. Zhu

influence of the Indian navy. India has established naval bases on the Andaman
Island and Nicobar Island, and in recent years, it has continued to strengthen and
expand naval bases here and continuously held military exercises with the United
States and countries near the Malacca Strait, attempting to hold the throat of the east
of Indian Ocean. In Western Indian Ocean, Iran guards the Strait of Hormuz which
also holds the throat area of Gulf and the Gulf of Oman. When the relations
between Iran and western countries deteriorates due to nuclear issue, the Iran
military has repeatedly held large-scale military exercises in the Strait and threat-
ened to blockade the Strait of Hormuz, the strategic channel of world petroleum
transport so as to cut off the energy transport of the Strait.31 Even for the Arabia sea
in the northwest of Indian Ocean, India also looks considerable confidence. Such
confidence not only comes from the growing naval superiority of itself, more
importantly, comes from the Indian Ocean which has long been regarded as “India’
ocean” by Indian strategists and policy elites. For India, whether from the per-
spective of the land power theory or the sea power theory, the Indian Ocean and its
north shore regions are in the core position of world geopolitics. From the Napoleon
war to the Britain and Russia’s battle for Afghanistan at the end of the nineteenth
Century, from World War II to the cold war between the United States and the
Soviet Union, the hundreds of years of history of world hegemony has proved this
point.32 At present, the United States has the hegemony in the Indian Ocean, and in
the foreseeable future, this position is difficult to shake; India has to maintain the
unique hegemony in the subcontinent of South Asia and strives for the absolute
dominance of India ocean affairs; China has to protect the channel security in the
Indian Ocean and to seek the economic benefits here. The goal of each country is
very clear by now, while the strategically structural contradictions caused by the
competition in the Indian Ocean between China, America and India is also difficult
to avoid, and the key lies in how to control the conflict and maintain a situation of
“maintaining their conflict but without complete break”. In essence, international
politics and geopolitics are cruel, which actually are based on real interests rather
than morality or ideology. The feature of “competitive coexistence” in the great
power relations is becoming more obvious. China has been equipped with certain
strength, so it can actively seek for power among the regional or world powers and
strive to establish a “balance of power conducive to promoting the stability and
development”.33
“OBOR” strategy is a major initiative that aims to build a community of interests
as well as community of common destiny with African and European countries
through “policy coordination, infrastructure connectivity, unimpeded trade, finan-
cial integration, and people-to-people bonds”, which is also a major deployment for

31
Iran Threatened to Blockade the Strait of Hormuz, the strategic channel of World Petroleum
Transport, Xinhuanet.com, http://news.sohu.com/20070108/n247489865.shtml.
32
Li Zhonglin: On the Monroe Doctrine of the Indian Version, Observer, http://www.guancha.cn/
america/2010_12_17_52282.shtml.
33
Wang Jisi: Great Power Strategy: Research and Reflection on the International Strategy, CITIC
Publishing Group, published in 2016, page 110.
The South Asian Direction of “OBOR” Strategy: Geopolitical … 15

China to deal with the surrounding dilemma and challenges. So, what is the
strategic position of South Asia in China’s “OBOR Initiative”? First of all, from the
geographical location of China, the Europe, West Asia, Africa, Central Asia and
South Asia are mostly located to the west of China. The economic and political
center of Russia is the “Fast West” of China, the Korean Peninsula and Japan are
the “Near East” of China, and the United States is the “Fast East” across the Pacific
Ocean for China. In terms of this geographical position, China is indeed “a central
country”.34 In the world’s geographical layout, seeing from the east, we can find
that China has a long coastline in the Western Pacific, which greatly promotes the
opening of China’s coastal areas. Look at the west, the Xinjiang area of China not
only borders Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan and other oil countries in Central
Asia and is near to Pakistan, but also has the advantage of direct access to Pakistan
through the Strait of Hormuz; at the same time, in the Indo-China Peninsula,
adjacent to Burma, China also has the geographical advantage of direct access to
the Bay of Bengal via Burma port. Further from the neighborhood, China is a
country with the largest number of neighboring country in the world, namely, 14
land neighbors. Among them, South Asia, Southeast Asia and Central Asia account
for the majority, while South Asia is the area where China has the most land
neighboring countries. China has a common boundary with India, Pakistan, Nepal,
Bhutan and Afghanistan in South Asia, and the total length of the border is nearly
5000 km, accounting for 1/3 of the total number of land neighboring countries.
Judging only from geography, the geographical position richly endowed by nature
means that China and South Asia have broad space for cooperation, which making
South Asia an important part of the vision and action plan of “OBOR Initiative”.
When it comes to the geopolitical structure of South Asia and the influence of
the strategic game among great powers, South Asia has a pivotal role in the India
Ocean region and even in the whole world. Whether from the land or the sea, the
South Asia overlooking the Indian Ocean spans across the important channel
connecting China to the Middle East, which is concerned with the security of
China’s trade and energy channel. Although China is not a country in India Ocean,
China has the strategic interests claim of energy channel security and trade channel
security in South Asia and the India Ocean region.35 But still, it can be said that the
strategic position of South Asia in China’s “OBOR” is weaker than that of the
Southeast Asia, Central Asia and other regions. One of the main reasons is that in
addition to Pakistan, China and other countries in South Asia still lack mutual trust
and positive interaction, especially China and India are still in the stage of strategic
mutual doubt. Although South Asia can exist as an independent strategic unit, the
importance of this region, to a certain extent, depends on the extent of participation

34
Wang Jisi: Great Power Strategy: Research and Reflection on the International Strategy, CITIC
Publishing Group, published in 2016, page 98.
35
Zhu Cuiping: The Relationship and Mutual Influence in the Strategy Between China, America
and the South Asia, South Asia Studies, third issue of 2016, page 5.
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