Introduction to Quantum Mechanics

David J. Griffiths
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I NT ROD UCT I ON TO Q UANT UM MECHANI CS

Third edition

Changes and additions to the new edition of this classic textbook include:

A new chapter on Symmetries and Conservation Laws

New problems and examples

Improved explanations

More numerical problems to be worked on a computer

New applications to solid state physics

Consolidated treatment of time-dependent potentials

David J. Griffiths received his BA (1964) and PhD (1970) from Harvard University. He taught at Hampshire
College, Mount Holyoke College, and Trinity College before joining the faculty at Reed College in 1978. In
2001–2002 he was visiting Professor of Physics at the Five Colleges (UMass, Amherst, Mount Holyoke,
Smith, and Hampshire), and in the spring of 2007 he taught Electrodynamics at Stanford. Although his PhD
was in elementary particle theory, most of his research is in electrodynamics and quantum mechanics. He is
the author of over fifty articles and four books: Introduction to Electrodynamics (4th edition, Cambridge
University Press, 2013), Introduction to Elementary Particles (2nd edition, Wiley-VCH, 2008), Introduction to
Quantum Mechanics (2nd edition, Cambridge, 2005), and Revolutions in Twentieth-Century Physics
(Cambridge, 2013).

Darrell F. Schroeter is a condensed matter theorist. He received his BA (1995) from Reed College and his
PhD (2002) from Stanford University where he was a National Science Foundation Graduate Research
Fellow. Before joining the Reed College faculty in 2007, Schroeter taught at both Swarthmore College and
Occidental College. His record of successful theoretical research with undergraduate students was recognized
in 2011 when he was named as a KITP-Anacapa scholar.

2
I NT ROD UCT I ON TO Q UANT UM
MECHANI CS
Third edition
DAVID J. GRIFFITHS and DARRELL F. SCHROETER
Reed College, Oregon

3
 University Printing House, Cambridge CB2 8BS, United Kingdom

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www.cambridge.org
Information on this title: www.cambridge.org/9781107189638

DOI: 10.1017/9781316995433

Second edition © David Griffiths 2017

Third edition © Cambridge University Press 2018

This publication is in copyright. Subject to statutory exception and to the provisions of relevant collective licensing agreements, no
reproduction of any part may take place without the written permission of Cambridge University Press.

This book was previously published by Pearson Education, Inc. 2004

Second edition reissued by Cambridge University Press 2017

Third edition 2018

Printed in the United Kingdom by TJ International Ltd. Padstow Cornwall, 2018

A catalogue record for this publication is available from the British Library.

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Names: Griffiths, David J. | Schroeter, Darrell F.

Title: Introduction to quantum mechanics / David J. Griffiths (Reed College, Oregon), Darrell F. Schroeter (Reed College, Oregon).
Description: Third edition. | blah : Cambridge University Press, 2018.

Identifiers: LCCN 2018009864 | ISBN 9781107189638

Subjects: LCSH: Quantum theory.

Classification: LCC QC174.12 .G75 2018 | DDC 530.12–dc23

LC record available at https://lccn.loc.gov/2018009864

ISBN 978-1-107-18963-8 Hardback

Additional resources for this publication at www.cambridge.org/IQM3ed

Cambridge University Press has no responsibility for the persistence or accuracy of URLs for external or third-party internet websites
referred to in this publication and does not guarantee that any content on such websites is, or will remain, accurate or appropriate.

4
5
 Contents
Preface

I Theory
1 The Wave Function
1.1 The Schrödinger Equation
1.2 The Statistical Interpretation
1.3 Probability
1.3.1 Discrete Variables
1.3.2 Continuous Variables
1.4 Normalization
1.5 Momentum
1.6 The Uncertainty Principle
Further Problems on Chapter 1

2 Time-Independent Schrödinger Equation

2.1 Stationary States
2.2 The Infinite Square Well
2.3 The Harmonic Oscillator
2.3.1 Algebraic Method
2.3.2 Analytic Method
2.4 The Free Particle
2.5 The Delta-Function Potential
2.5.1 Bound States and Scattering States
2.5.2 The Delta-Function Well
2.6 The Finite Square Well
Further Problems on Chapter 2

3 Formalism
3.1 Hilbert Space
3.2 Observables
3.2.1 Hermitian Operators
3.2.2 Determinate States
3.3 Eigenfunctions of a Hermitian Operator
3.3.1 Discrete Spectra
3.3.2 Continuous Spectra

6
 3.4 Generalized Statistical Interpretation
3.5 The Uncertainty Principle
3.5.1 Proof of the Generalized Uncertainty Principle
3.5.2 The Minimum-Uncertainty Wave Packet
3.5.3 The Energy-Time Uncertainty Principle
3.6 Vectors and Operators
3.6.1 Bases in Hilbert Space
3.6.2 Dirac Notation
3.6.3 Changing Bases in Dirac Notation
Further Problems on Chapter 3

4 Quantum Mechanics in Three Dimensions

4.1 The Schröger Equation
4.1.1 Spherical Coordinates
4.1.2 The Angular Equation
4.1.3 The Radial Equation
4.2 The Hydrogen Atom
4.2.1 The Radial Wave Function
4.2.2 The Spectrum of Hydrogen
4.3 Angular Momentum
4.3.1 Eigenvalues
4.3.2 Eigenfunctions
4.4 Spin
4.4.1 Spin 1/2
4.4.2 Electron in a Magnetic Field
4.4.3 Addition of Angular Momenta
4.5 Electromagnetic Interactions
4.5.1 Minimal Coupling
4.5.2 The Aharonov–Bohm Effect
Further Problems on Chapter 4

5 Identical Particles
5.1 Two-Particle Systems
5.1.1 Bosons and Fermions
5.1.2 Exchange Forces
5.1.3 Spin
5.1.4 Generalized Symmetrization Principle
5.2 Atoms
5.2.1 Helium
5.2.2 The Periodic Table
5.3 Solids
5.3.1 The Free Electron Gas
5.3.2 Band Structure
Further Problems on Chapter 5

7
 6 Symmetries & Conservation Laws
6.1 Introduction
6.1.1 Transformations in Space
6.2 The Translation Operator
6.2.1 How Operators Transform
6.2.2 Translational Symmetry
6.3 Conservation Laws
6.4 Parity
6.4.1 Parity in One Dimension
6.4.2 Parity in Three Dimensions
6.4.3 Parity Selection Rules
6.5 Rotational Symmetry
6.5.1 Rotations About the z Axis
6.5.2 Rotations in Three Dimensions
6.6 Degeneracy
6.7 Rotational Selection Rules
6.7.1 Selection Rules for Scalar Operators
6.7.2 Selection Rules for Vector Operators
6.8 Translations in Time
6.8.1 The Heisenberg Picture
6.8.2 Time-Translation Invariance
Further Problems on Chapter 6

II Applications
7 Time-Independent Perturbation Theory
7.1 Nondegenerate Perturbation Theory
7.1.1 General Formulation
7.1.2 First-Order Theory
7.1.3 Second-Order Energies
7.2 Degenerate Perturbation Theory
7.2.1 Two-Fold Degeneracy
7.2.2 “Good” States
7.2.3 Higher-Order Degeneracy
7.3 The Fine Structure of Hydrogen
7.3.1 The Relativistic Correction
7.3.2 Spin-Orbit Coupling
7.4 The Zeeman Effect
7.4.1 Weak-Field Zeeman Effect
7.4.2 Strong-Field Zeeman Effect
7.4.3 Intermediate-Field Zeeman Effect
7.5 Hyperfine Splitting in Hydrogen

8
 Further Problems on Chapter 7

8 The Varitional Principle

8.1 Theory
8.2 The Ground State of Helium
8.3 The Hydrogen Molecule Ion
8.4 The Hydrogen Molecule
Further Problems on Chapter 8

9 The WKB Approximation

9.1 The “Classical” Region
9.2 Tunneling
9.3 The Connection Formulas
Further Problems on Chapter 9

10 Scattering
10.1 Introduction
10.1.1 Classical Scattering Theory
10.1.2 Quantum Scattering Theory
10.2 Partial Wave Analysis
10.2.1 Formalism
10.2.2 Strategy
10.3 Phase Shifts
10.4 The Born Approximation
10.4.1 Integral Form of the Schrödinger Equation
10.4.2 The First Born Approximation
10.4.3 The Born Series
Further Problems on Chapter 10

11 Quantum Dynamics
11.1 Two-Level Systems
11.1.1 The Perturbed System
11.1.2 Time-Dependent Perturbation Theory
11.1.3 Sinusoidal Perturbations
11.2 Emission and Absorption of Radiation
11.2.1 Electromagnetic Waves
11.2.2 Absorption, Stimulated Emission, and Spontaneous Emission
11.2.3 Incoherent Perturbations
11.3 Spontaneous Emission
11.3.1 Einstein’s A and B Coefficients
11.3.2 The Lifetime of an Excited State
11.3.3 Selection Rules
11.4 Fermi’s Golden Rule
11.5 The Adiabatic Approximation
11.5.1 Adiabatic Processes

9
 11.5.2 The Adiabatic Theorem
Further Problems on Chapter 11

12 Afterword
12.1 The EPR Paradox
12.2 Bell’s Theorem
12.3 Mixed States and the Density Matrix
12.3.1 Pure States
12.3.2 Mixed States
12.3.3 Subsystems
12.4 The No-Clone Theorem
12.5 Schrödinger’s Cat

Appendix Linear Algebra

A.1 Vectors
A.2 Inner Products
A.3 Matrices
A.4 Changing Bases
A.5 Eigenvectors and Eigenvalues
A.6 Hermitian Transformations

Index

10
 Preface

Unlike Newton’s mechanics, or Maxwell’s electrodynamics, or Einstein’s relativity, quantum theory was not
created—or even definitively packaged—by one individual, and it retains to this day some of the scars of its
exhilarating but traumatic youth. There is no general consensus as to what its fundamental principles are, how
it should be taught, or what it really “means.” Every competent physicist can “do” quantum mechanics, but the
stories we tell ourselves about what we are doing are as various as the tales of Scheherazade, and almost as
implausible. Niels Bohr said, “If you are not confused by quantum physics then you haven’t really understood
it”; Richard Feynman remarked, “I think I can safely say that nobody understands quantum mechanics.”
The purpose of this book is to teach you how to do quantum mechanics. Apart from some essential
background in Chapter 1, the deeper quasi-philosophical questions are saved for the end. We do not believe
one can intelligently discuss what quantum mechanics means until one has a firm sense of what quantum
mechanics does. But if you absolutely cannot wait, by all means read the Afterword immediately after finishing
Chapter 1.
Not only is quantum theory conceptually rich, it is also technically difficult, and exact solutions to all but
the most artificial textbook examples are few and far between. It is therefore essential to develop special
techniques for attacking more realistic problems. Accordingly, this book is divided into two parts;1 Part I
covers the basic theory, and Part II assembles an arsenal of approximation schemes, with illustrative
applications. Although it is important to keep the two parts logically separate, it is not necessary to study the
material in the order presented here. Some instructors, for example, may wish to treat time-independent
perturbation theory right after Chapter 2.
This book is intended for a one-semester or one-year course at the junior or senior level. A one-semester
course will have to concentrate mainly on Part I; a full-year course should have room for supplementary
material beyond Part II. The reader must be familiar with the rudiments of linear algebra (as summarized in
the Appendix), complex numbers, and calculus up through partial derivatives; some acquaintance with Fourier
analysis and the Dirac delta function would help. Elementary classical mechanics is essential, of course, and a
little electrodynamics would be useful in places. As always, the more physics and math you know the easier it
will be, and the more you will get out of your study. But quantum mechanics is not something that flows
smoothly and naturally from earlier theories. On the contrary, it represents an abrupt and revolutionary
departure from classical ideas, calling forth a wholly new and radically counterintuitive way of thinking about
the world. That, indeed, is what makes it such a fascinating subject.
At first glance, this book may strike you as forbiddingly mathematical. We encounter Legendre,
Hermite, and Laguerre polynomials, spherical harmonics, Bessel, Neumann, and Hankel functions, Airy
functions, and even the Riemann zeta function—not to mention Fourier transforms, Hilbert spaces, hermitian
operators, and Clebsch–Gordan coefficients. Is all this baggage really necessary? Perhaps not, but physics is
like carpentry: Using the right tool makes the job easier, not more difficult, and teaching quantum mechanics
without the appropriate mathematical equipment is like having a tooth extracted with a pair of pliers—it’s
possible, but painful. (On the other hand, it can be tedious and diverting if the instructor feels obliged to give
elaborate lessons on the proper use of each tool. Our instinct is to hand the students shovels and tell them to

11
start digging. They may develop blisters at first, but we still think this is the most efficient and exciting way to
learn.) At any rate, we can assure you that there is no deep mathematics in this book, and if you run into
something unfamiliar, and you don’t find our explanation adequate, by all means ask someone about it, or look
it up. There are many good books on mathematical methods—we particularly recommend Mary Boas,
Mathematical Methods in the Physical Sciences, 3rd edn, Wiley, New York (2006), or George Arfken and Hans-
Jurgen Weber, Mathematical Methods for Physicists, 7th edn, Academic Press, Orlando (2013). But whatever
you do, don’t let the mathematics—which, for us, is only a tool—obscure the physics.
Several readers have noted that there are fewer worked examples in this book than is customary, and that
some important material is relegated to the problems. This is no accident. We don’t believe you can learn
quantum mechanics without doing many exercises for yourself. Instructors should of course go over as many
problems in class as time allows, but students should be warned that this is not a subject about which anyone
has natural intuitions—you’re developing a whole new set of muscles here, and there is simply no substitute
for calisthenics. Mark Semon suggested that we offer a “Michelin Guide” to the problems, with varying
numbers of stars to indicate the level of difficulty and importance. This seemed like a good idea (though, like
the quality of a restaurant, the significance of a problem is partly a matter of taste); we have adopted the
following rating scheme:

an essential problem that every reader should study;

a somewhat more difficult or peripheral problem;

an unusually challenging problem, that may take over an hour.

(No stars at all means fast food: OK if you’re hungry, but not very nourishing.) Most of the one-star problems
appear at the end of the relevant section; most of the three-star problems are at the end of the chapter. If a
computer is required, we put a mouse in the margin. A solution manual is available (to instructors only) from
the publisher.
In preparing this third edition we have tried to retain as much as possible the spirit of the first and
second. Although there are now two authors, we still use the singular (“I”) in addressing the reader—it feels
more intimate, and after all only one of us can speak at a time (“we” in the text means you, the reader, and I,
the author, working together). Schroeter brings the fresh perspective of a solid state theorist, and he is largely
responsible for the new chapter on symmetries. We have added a number of problems, clarified many
explanations, and revised the Afterword. But we were determined not to allow the book to grow fat, and for
that reason we have eliminated the chapter on the adiabatic approximation (significant insights from that
chapter have been incorporated into Chapter 11), and removed material from Chapter 5 on statistical
mechanics (which properly belongs in a book on thermal physics). It goes without saying that instructors are
welcome to cover such other topics as they see fit, but we want the textbook itself to represent the essential
core of the subject.
We have benefitted from the comments and advice of many colleagues, who read the original
manuscript, pointed out weaknesses (or errors) in the first two editions, suggested improvements in the
presentation, and supplied interesting problems. We especially thank P. K. Aravind (Worcester Polytech),
Greg Benesh (Baylor), James Bernhard (Puget Sound), Burt Brody (Bard), Ash Carter (Drew), Edward
Chang (Massachusetts), Peter Collings (Swarthmore), Richard Crandall (Reed), Jeff Dunham (Middlebury),
Greg Elliott (Puget Sound), John Essick (Reed), Gregg Franklin (Carnegie Mellon), Joel Franklin (Reed),

12
Henry Greenside (Duke), Paul Haines (Dartmouth), J. R. Huddle (Navy), Larry Hunter (Amherst), David
Kaplan (Washington), Don Koks (Adelaide), Peter Leung (Portland State), Tony Liss (Illinois), Jeffry
Mallow (Chicago Loyola), James McTavish (Liverpool), James Nearing (Miami), Dick Palas, Johnny Powell
(Reed), Krishna Rajagopal (MIT), Brian Raue (Florida International), Robert Reynolds (Reed), Keith Riles
(Michigan), Klaus Schmidt-Rohr (Brandeis), Kenny Scott (London), Dan Schroeder (Weber State), Mark
Semon (Bates), Herschel Snodgrass (Lewis and Clark), John Taylor (Colorado), Stavros Theodorakis
(Cyprus), A. S. Tremsin (Berkeley), Dan Velleman (Amherst), Nicholas Wheeler (Reed), Scott Willenbrock
(Illinois), William Wootters (Williams), and Jens Zorn (Michigan).

1 This structure was inspired by David Park’s classic text Introduction to the Quantum Theory, 3rd edn, McGraw-Hill, New York (1992).

13
Part I
Theory
◈

14
 1
The Wave Function
◈

15
 1.1 The Schrödinger Equation
Imagine a particle of mass m, constrained to move along the x axis, subject to some specified force
(Figure 1.1). The program of classical mechanics is to determine the position of the particle at any given time:
. Once we know that, we can figure out the velocity , the momentum , the
kinetic energy , or any other dynamical variable of interest. And how do we go about
determining ? We apply Newton’s second law: . (For conservative systems—the only kind we
shall consider, and, fortunately, the only kind that occur at the microscopic level—the force can be expressed as
the derivative of a potential energy function,1 , and Newton’s law reads
.) This, together with appropriate initial conditions (typically the position and
velocity at ), determines .

Figure 1.1: A “particle” constrained to move in one dimension under the influence of a specified force.

Quantum mechanics approaches this same problem quite differently. In this case what we’re looking for
is the particle’s wave function, , and we get it by solving the Schrödinger equation:

(1.1)

Here i is the square root of , and is Planck’s constant—or rather, his original constant (h) divided by :

(1.2)

The Schrödinger equation plays a role logically analogous to Newton’s second law: Given suitable initial
conditions (typically, ), the Schrödinger equation determines for all future time, just as, in
classical mechanics, Newton’s law determines for all future time.2

16
 1.2 The Statistical Interpretation
But what exactly is this “wave function,” and what does it do for you once you’ve got it? After all, a particle, by
its nature, is localized at a point, whereas the wave function (as its name suggests) is spread out in space (it’s a
function of x, for any given t). How can such an object represent the state of a particle? The answer is provided
by Born’s statistical interpretation, which says that gives the probability of finding the particle at
point x, at time t—or, more precisely,3

(1.3)

Probability is the area under the graph of . For the wave function in Figure 1.2, you would be quite likely
to find the particle in the vicinity of point A, where is large, and relatively unlikely to find it near point B.

Figure 1.2: A typical wave function. The shaded area represents the probability of finding the particle between
a and b. The particle would be relatively likely to be found near A, and unlikely to be found near B.

The statistical interpretation introduces a kind of indeterminacy into quantum mechanics, for even if you
know everything the theory has to tell you about the particle (to wit: its wave function), still you cannot
predict with certainty the outcome of a simple experiment to measure its position—all quantum mechanics
has to offer is statistical information about the possible results. This indeterminacy has been profoundly
disturbing to physicists and philosophers alike, and it is natural to wonder whether it is a fact of nature, or a
defect in the theory.
Suppose I do measure the position of the particle, and I find it to be at point C.4 Question: Where was the
particle just before I made the measurement? There are three plausible answers to this question, and they serve
to characterize the main schools of thought regarding quantum indeterminacy:
1. The realist position: The particle was at C. This certainly seems reasonable, and it is the response Einstein advocated. Note, however,
that if this is true then quantum mechanics is an incomplete theory, since the particle really was at C, and yet quantum mechanics was unable
to tell us so. To the realist, indeterminacy is not a fact of nature, but a reflection of our ignorance. As d’Espagnat put it, “the position of the
particle was never indeterminate, but was merely unknown to the experimenter.”5 Evidently is not the whole story—some additional
information (known as a hidden variable) is needed to provide a complete description of the particle.

2. The orthodox position: The particle wasn’t really anywhere. It was the act of measurement that forced it to “take a stand” (though how
and why it decided on the point C we dare not ask). Jordan said it most starkly: “Observations not only disturb what is to be measured, they
produce it …We compel [the particle] to assume a definite position.”6 This view (the so-called Copenhagen interpretation), is associated
with Bohr and his followers. Among physicists it has always been the most widely accepted position. Note, however, that if it is correct
there is something very peculiar about the act of measurement—something that almost a century of debate has done precious little to
illuminate.

17
 3. The agnostic position: Refuse to answer. This is not quite as silly as it sounds—after all, what sense can there be in making assertions
about the status of a particle before a measurement, when the only way of knowing whether you were right is precisely to make a
measurement, in which case what you get is no longer “before the measurement”? It is metaphysics (in the pejorative sense of the word) to
worry about something that cannot, by its nature, be tested. Pauli said: “One should no more rack one’s brain about the problem of
whether something one cannot know anything about exists all the same, than about the ancient question of how many angels are able to sit
on the point of a needle.”7 For decades this was the “fall-back” position of most physicists: they’d try to sell you the orthodox answer, but if
you were persistent they’d retreat to the agnostic response, and terminate the conversation.

Until fairly recently, all three positions (realist, orthodox, and agnostic) had their partisans. But in 1964
John Bell astonished the physics community by showing that it makes an observable difference whether the
particle had a precise (though unknown) position prior to the measurement, or not. Bell’s discovery effectively
eliminated agnosticism as a viable option, and made it an experimental question whether 1 or 2 is the correct
choice. I’ll return to this story at the end of the book, when you will be in a better position to appreciate Bell’s
argument; for now, suffice it to say that the experiments have decisively confirmed the orthodox
interpretation:8 a particle simply does not have a precise position prior to measurement, any more than the
ripples on a pond do; it is the measurement process that insists on one particular number, and thereby in a
sense creates the specific result, limited only by the statistical weighting imposed by the wave function.
What if I made a second measurement, immediately after the first? Would I get C again, or does the act
of measurement cough up some completely new number each time? On this question everyone is in
agreement: A repeated measurement (on the same particle) must return the same value. Indeed, it would be
tough to prove that the particle was really found at C in the first instance, if this could not be confirmed by
immediate repetition of the measurement. How does the orthodox interpretation account for the fact that the
second measurement is bound to yield the value C? It must be that the first measurement radically alters the
wave function, so that it is now sharply peaked about C (Figure 1.3). We say that the wave function collapses,
upon measurement, to a spike at the point C (it soon spreads out again, in accordance with the Schrödinger
equation, so the second measurement must be made quickly). There are, then, two entirely distinct kinds of
physical processes: “ordinary” ones, in which the wave function evolves in a leisurely fashion under the
Schrödinger equation, and “measurements,” in which suddenly and discontinuously collapses.9

Figure 1.3: Collapse of the wave function: graph of immediately after a measurement has found the
particle at point C.

Example 1.1
Electron Interference. I have asserted that particles (electrons, for example) have a wave nature,
encoded in . How might we check this, in the laboratory?
The classic signature of a wave phenomenon is interference: two waves in phase interfere
constructively, and out of phase they interfere destructively. The wave nature of light was confirmed in

18
1801 by Young’s famous double-slit experiment, showing interference “fringes” on a distant screen
when a monochromatic beam passes through two slits. If essentially the same experiment is done with
electrons, the same pattern develops,10 confirming the wave nature of electrons.
Now suppose we decrease the intensity of the electron beam, until only one electron is present in
the apparatus at any particular time. According to the statistical interpretation each electron will
produce a spot on the screen. Quantum mechanics cannot predict the precise location of that spot—all
it can tell us is the probability of a given electron landing at a particular place. But if we are patient,
and wait for a hundred thousand electrons—one at a time—to make the trip, the accumulating spots
reveal the classic two-slit interference pattern (Figure 1.4). 11

Figure 1.4: Build-up of the electron interference pattern. (a) Eight electrons, (b) 270 electrons, (c)
2000 electrons, (d) 160,000 electrons. Reprinted courtesy of the Central Research Laboratory,
Hitachi, Ltd., Japan.

Of course, if you close off one slit, or somehow contrive to detect which slit each electron passes
through, the interference pattern disappears; the wave function of the emerging particle is now entirely
different (in the first case because the boundary conditions for the Schrödinger equation have been
changed, and in the second because of the collapse of the wave function upon measurement). But with
both slits open, and no interruption of the electron in flight, each electron interferes with itself; it
didn’t pass through one slit or the other, but through both at once, just as a water wave, impinging on
a jetty with two openings, interferes with itself. There is nothing mysterious about this, once you have
accepted the notion that particles obey a wave equation. The truly astonishing thing is the blip-by-blip
assembly of the pattern. In any classical wave theory the pattern would develop smoothly and
continuously, simply getting more intense as time goes on. The quantum process is more like the
pointillist painting of Seurat: The picture emerges from the cumulative contributions of all the
individual dots.12

19
20
1.3 Probability

21
 1.3.1 Discrete Variables

Because of the statistical interpretation, probability plays a central role in quantum mechanics, so I digress
now for a brief discussion of probability theory. It is mainly a question of introducing some notation and
terminology, and I shall do it in the context of a simple example.
Imagine a room containing fourteen people, whose ages are as follows:

one person aged 14,

one person aged 15,
three people aged 16,
two people aged 22,
two people aged 24,
five people aged 25.

If we let represent the number of people of age j, then

while , for instance, is zero. The total number of people in the room is

(1.4)

(In the example, of course, .) Figure 1.5 is a histogram of the data. The following are some questions
one might ask about this distribution.

Figure 1.5: Histogram showing the number of people, , with age j, for the example in Section 1.3.1.

Question 1 If you selected one individual at random from this group, what is the probability that this
person’s age would be 15?
Answer One chance in 14, since there are 14 possible choices, all equally likely, of whom only one has that
particular age. If is the probability of getting age j, then
, and so on. In general,

22
 (1.5)

Notice that the probability of getting either 14 or 15 is the sum of the individual probabilities (in this case,
1/7). In particular, the sum of all the probabilities is 1—the person you select must have some age:

(1.6)

Question 2 What is the most probable age?

Answer 25, obviously; five people share this age, whereas at most three have any other age. The most
probable j is the j for which is a maximum.
Question 3 What is the median age?
Answer 23, for 7 people are younger than 23, and 7 are older. (The median is that value of j such that the
probability of getting a larger result is the same as the probability of getting a smaller result.)
Question 4 What is the average (or mean) age?
Answer

In general, the average value of j (which we shall write thus: ) is

(1.7)

Notice that there need not be anyone with the average age or the median age—in this example nobody
happens to be 21 or 23. In quantum mechanics the average is usually the quantity of interest; in that context it
has come to be called the expectation value. It’s a misleading term, since it suggests that this is the outcome
you would be most likely to get if you made a single measurement (that would be the most probable value, not
the average value)—but I’m afraid we’re stuck with it.

Question 5 What is the average of the squares of the ages?

Answer You could get , with probability 1/14, or , with probability 1/14, or
, with probability 3/14, and so on. The average, then, is

(1.8)

In general, the average value of some function of j is given by

(1.9)

(Equations 1.6, 1.7, and 1.8 are, if you like, special cases of this formula.) Beware: The average of the squares,
, is not equal, in general, to the square of the average, . For instance, if the room contains just two
babies, aged 1 and 3, then , but .

23
 Now, there is a conspicuous difference between the two histograms in Figure 1.6, even though they have
the same median, the same average, the same most probable value, and the same number of elements: The
first is sharply peaked about the average value, whereas the second is broad and flat. (The first might represent
the age profile for students in a big-city classroom, the second, perhaps, a rural one-room schoolhouse.) We
need a numerical measure of the amount of “spread” in a distribution, with respect to the average. The most
obvious way to do this would be to find out how far each individual is from the average,

(1.10)

and compute the average of . Trouble is, of course, that you get zero:

(Note that is constant—it does not change as you go from one member of the sample to another—so it can
be taken outside the summation.) To avoid this irritating problem you might decide to average the absolute
value of . But absolute values are nasty to work with; instead, we get around the sign problem by squaring
before averaging:

(1.11)

This quantity is known as the variance of the distribution; σ itself (the square root of the average of the square
of the deviation from the average—gulp!) is called the standard deviation. The latter is the customary measure
of the spread about .

Figure 1.6: Two histograms with the same median, same average, and same most probable value, but different
standard deviations.

There is a useful little theorem on variances:

Taking the square root, the standard deviation itself can be written as

24
 (1.12)

In practice, this is a much faster way to get σ than by direct application of Equation 1.11: simply calculate
and , subtract, and take the square root. Incidentally, I warned you a moment ago that is not, in
general, equal to . Since is plainly non-negative (from its definition 1.11), Equation 1.12 implies that

(1.13)

and the two are equal only when , which is to say, for distributions with no spread at all (every member
having the same value).

25
 1.3.2 Continuous Variables

So far, I have assumed that we are dealing with a discrete variable—that is, one that can take on only certain
isolated values (in the example, j had to be an integer, since I gave ages only in years). But it is simple enough
to generalize to continuous distributions. If I select a random person off the street, the probability that her age
is precisely 16 years, 4 hours, 27 minutes, and 3.333… seconds is zero. The only sensible thing to speak about
is the probability that her age lies in some interval—say, between 16 and 17. If the interval is sufficiently
short, this probability is proportional to the length of the interval. For example, the chance that her age is
between 16 and 16 plus two days is presumably twice the probability that it is between 16 and 16 plus one day.
(Unless, I suppose, there was some extraordinary baby boom 16 years ago, on exactly that day—in which case
we have simply chosen an interval too long for the rule to apply. If the baby boom lasted six hours, we’ll take
intervals of a second or less, to be on the safe side. Technically, we’re talking about infinitesimal intervals.)
Thus

(1.14)

The proportionality factor, , is often loosely called “the probability of getting x,” but this is sloppy
language; a better term is probability density. The probability that x lies between a and b (a finite interval) is
given by the integral of :

(1.15)

and the rules we deduced for discrete distributions translate in the obvious way:

(1.16)

(1.17)

(1.18)

(1.19)

Example 1.2
Suppose someone drops a rock off a cliff of height h. As it falls, I snap a million photographs, at
random intervals. On each picture I measure the distance the rock has fallen. Question: What is the
average of all these distances? That is to say, what is the time average of the distance traveled?13
Solution: The rock starts out at rest, and picks up speed as it falls; it spends more time near the top, so
the average distance will surely be less than . Ignoring air resistance, the distance x at time t is

The velocity is , and the total flight time is . The probability that a
26
The velocity is , and the total flight time is . The probability that a
particular photograph was taken between t and is , so the probability that it shows a
distance in the corresponding range x to is

Thus the probability density (Equation 1.14) is

(outside this range, of course, the probability density is zero).

We can check this result, using Equation 1.16:

The average distance (Equation 1.17) is

which is somewhat less than , as anticipated.

Figure 1.7 shows the graph of . Notice that a probability density can be infinite, though
probability itself (the integral of ρ) must of course be finite (indeed, less than or equal to 1).

Figure 1.7: The probability density in Example 1.2: .

∗ Problem 1.1 For the distribution of ages in the example in Section 1.3.1:
(a) Compute and .
(b) Determine for each j, and use Equation 1.11 to compute the standard
deviation.
(c) Use your results in (a) and (b) to check Equation 1.12.

27
 Problem 1.2
(a) Find the standard deviation of the distribution in Example 1.2.
(b) What is the probability that a photograph, selected at random, would
show a distance x more than one standard deviation away from the
average?

∗ Problem 1.3 Consider the gaussian distribution

where A, a, and are positive real constants. (The necessary integrals are
inside the back cover.)
(a) Use Equation 1.16 to determine A.
(b) Find , , and σ.
(c) Sketch the graph of .

28
 1.4 Normalization
We return now to the statistical interpretation of the wave function (Equation 1.3), which says that
is the probability density for finding the particle at point x, at time t. It follows (Equation 1.16)
that the integral of over all x must be 1 (the particle’s got to be somewhere):

(1.20)

Without this, the statistical interpretation would be nonsense.

However, this requirement should disturb you: After all, the wave function is supposed to be determined
by the Schrödinger equation—we can’t go imposing an extraneous condition on without checking that the
two are consistent. Well, a glance at Equation 1.1 reveals that if is a solution, so too is ,
where A is any (complex) constant. What we must do, then, is pick this undetermined multiplicative factor so
as to ensure that Equation 1.20 is satisfied. This process is called normalizing the wave function. For some
solutions to the Schrödinger equation the integral is infinite; in that case no multiplicative factor is going to
make it 1. The same goes for the trivial solution . Such non-normalizable solutions cannot represent
particles, and must be rejected. Physically realizable states correspond to the square-integrable solutions to
Schrödinger’s equation.14
But wait a minute! Suppose I have normalized the wave function at time . How do I know that it
will stay normalized, as time goes on, and evolves? (You can’t keep renormalizing the wave function, for
then A becomes a function of t, and you no longer have a solution to the Schrödinger equation.) Fortunately,
the Schrödinger equation has the remarkable property that it automatically preserves the normalization of the
wave function—without this crucial feature the Schrödinger equation would be incompatible with the
statistical interpretation, and the whole theory would crumble.
This is important, so we’d better pause for a careful proof. To begin with,

(1.21)

(Note that the integral is a function only of t, so I use a total derivative on the left, but the integrand is
a function of x as well as t, so it’s a partial derivative on the right.) By the product rule,

(1.22)

Now the Schrödinger equation says that

(1.23)

and hence also (taking the complex conjugate of Equation 1.23)

(1.24)

29
Another random document with
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Spanish, mingled in such a way that the lines of cleavage of race
continually run at right angles to the lines of cleavage of speech;
there being communities practically of pure blood of each race found
speaking each language. Aryan and Teutonic are terms having very
distinct linguistic meanings; but whether they have any such ethnical
meanings as were formerly attributed to them, is so doubtful that we
cannot even be sure whether the ancestors of most of those we call
Teutons originally spoke an Aryan tongue at all. The term Celtic,
again, is perfectly clear when used linguistically; but when used to
describe a race it means almost nothing until we find out which one
of several totally different terminologies the writer or speaker is
adopting. If, for instance, the term is used to designate the short-
headed, medium-sized type common throughout middle Europe,
from east to west, it denotes something entirely different from what is
meant when the name is applied to the tall, yellow-haired opponents
of the Romans and the later Greeks; while if used to designate any
modern nationality, it becomes about as loose and meaningless as
the term Anglo-Saxon itself.
Most of the great societies which have developed a high
civilization and have played a dominant part in the world have been
—and are—artificial; not merely in social structure, but in the sense
of including totally different race types. A great nation rarely belongs
to any one race, though its citizens generally have one essentially
national speech. Yet the curious fact remains that these great
artificial societies acquire such unity that in each one all the parts
feel a subtle sympathy, and move or cease to move, go forward or
go back, all together, in response to some stir or throbbing, very
powerful, and yet not to be discerned by our senses. National unity is
far more apt than race unity to be a fact to reckon with; until indeed
we come to race differences as fundamental as those which divide
from one another the half-dozen great ethnic divisions of mankind,
when they become so important that differences of nationality,
speech, and creed sink into littleness.
An ethnological map of Europe in which the peoples were divided
according to their physical and racial characteristics, such as stature,
coloration, and shape of head, would bear no resemblance whatever
to a map giving the political divisions, the nationalities, of Europe;
while on the contrary a linguistic map would show a general
correspondence between speech and nationality. The northern
Frenchman is in blood and physical type more nearly allied to his
German-speaking neighbour than to the Frenchman of the
Mediterranean seaboard; and the latter, in his turn, is nearer to the
Catalan than to the man who dwells beside the Channel or along the
tributaries of the Rhine. But in essential characteristics, in the
qualities that tell in the make-up of a nationality, all these kinds of
Frenchmen feel keenly that they are one, and are different from all
outsiders, their differences dwindling into insignificance, compared
with the extraordinary, artificially produced, resemblances which
bring them together and wall them off from the outside world. The
same is true when we compare the German who dwells where the
Alpine springs of the Danube and the Rhine interlace, with the
physically different German of the Baltic lands. The same is true of
Kentishman, Cornishman, and Yorkshireman in England.
In dealing, not with groups of human beings in simple and primitive
relations, but with highly complex, highly specialized, civilized, or
semi-civilized societies, there is need of great caution in drawing
analogies with what has occurred in the development of the animal
world. Yet even in these cases it is curious to see how some of the
phenomena in the growth and disappearance of these complex,
artificial groups of human beings resemble what has happened in
myriads of instances in the history of life on this planet.
Why do great artificial empires, whose citizens are knit by a bond
of speech and culture much more than by a bond of blood, show
periods of extraordinary growth, and again of sudden or lingering
decay? In some cases we can answer readily enough; in other cases
we cannot as yet even guess what the proper answer should be. If in
any such case the centrifugal forces overcome the centripetal, the
nation will of course fly to pieces, and the reason for its failure to
become a dominant force is patent to every one. The minute that the
spirit which finds its healthy development in local self-government,
and is the antidote to the dangers of an extreme centralization,
develops into mere particularism, into inability to combine effectively
for achievement of a common end, then it is hopeless to expect
great results. Poland and certain Republics of the western
hemisphere are the standard examples of failure of this kind; and the
United States would have ranked with them, and her name would
have become a byword of derision, if the forces of union had not
triumphed in the Civil War. So, the growth of soft luxury after it has
reached a certain point becomes a national danger patent to all.
Again, it needs but little of the vision of a seer to foretell what must
happen in any community if the average woman ceases to become
the mother of a family of healthy children, if the average man loses
the will and the power to work up to old age and to fight whenever
the need arises. If the homely, commonplace virtues die out, if
strength of character vanishes in graceful self-indulgence, if the virile
qualities atrophy, then the nation has lost what no material prosperity
can offset.
But there are plenty of other phenomena wholly or partially
inexplicable. It is easy to see why Rome trended downward when
great slave-tilled farms spread over what had once been a country-
side of peasant proprietors, when greed and luxury and sensuality
ate like acids into the fibre of the upper classes, while the mass of
the citizens grew to depend not upon their own exertions, but upon
the state, for their pleasures and their very livelihood. But this does
not explain why the forward movement stopped at different times, so
far as different matters were concerned; at one time as regards
literature, at another time as regards architecture, at another time as
regards city-building. There is nothing mysterious about Rome’s
dissolution at the time of the barbarian invasions; apart from the
impoverishment and depopulation of the Empire, its fall would be
quite sufficiently explained by the mere fact that the average citizen
had lost the fighting edge, an essential even under a despotism, and
therefore far more essential in free, self-governing communities such
as those of the English-speaking peoples of to-day. The mystery is
rather that out of the chaos and corruption of Roman society during
the last days of the oligarchic republic, there should have sprung an
Empire able to hold things with reasonable steadiness for three or
four centuries. But why, for instance, should the higher kinds of
literary productiveness have ceased about the beginning of the
second century, whereas the following centuries witnessed a great
outbreak of energy in the shape of city-building in the provinces, not
only in Western Europe, but in Africa? We cannot even guess why
the springs of one kind of energy dried up, while there was yet no
cessation of another kind.
Take another and smaller instance, that of Holland. For a period
covering a little more than the seventeenth century, Holland, like
some of the Italian city states at an earlier period, stood on the
dangerous heights of greatness, beside nations so vastly her
superior in territory and population as to make it inevitable that
sooner or later she must fall from the glorious and perilous eminence
to which she had been raised by her own indomitable soul. Her fall
came; it could not have been indefinitely postponed; but it came far
quicker than it needed to come, because of shortcomings on her part
to which both Great Britain and the United States would be wise to
pay heed. Her government was singularly ineffective, the
decentralization being such as often to permit the separatist, the
particularist, spirit of the provinces to rob the central authority of all
efficiency. This was bad enough. But the fatal weakness was that so
common in rich, peace-loving societies, where men hate to think of
war as possible, and try to justify their own reluctance to face it either
by high-sounding moral platitudes, or else by a philosophy of short-
sighted materialism. The Dutch were very wealthy. They grew to
believe that they could hire others to do their fighting for them on
land; and on sea, where they did their own fighting, and fought very
well, they refused in time of peace to make ready fleets so efficient,
as either to insure them against the peace being broken, or else to
give them the victory when war came. To be opulent and unarmed is
to secure ease in the present at the almost certain cost of disaster in
the future.
It is therefore easy to see why Holland lost when she did her
position among the powers; but it is far more difficult to explain why
at the same time there should have come at least a partial loss of
position in the world of art and letters. Some spark of divine fire
burned itself out in the national soul. As the line of great statesmen,
of great warriors, by land and sea, came to an end, so the line of the
great Dutch painters ended. The loss of pre-eminence in the schools
followed the loss of pre-eminence in camp and in council chamber.
In the little republic of Holland, as in the great empire of Rome, it
was not death which came, but transformation. Both Holland and
Italy teach us that races that fall may rise again. In Holland, as in the
Scandinavian kingdoms of Norway and Sweden, there was in a
sense no decadence at all. There was nothing analogous to what
has befallen so many countries; no lowering of the general standard
of well-being, no general loss of vitality, no depopulation. What
happened was, first a flowering time, in which the country’s men of
action and men of thought gave it a commanding position among the
nations of the day; then this period of command passed, and the
State revolved in an eddy, aside from the sweep of the mighty
current of world life; and yet the people themselves in their internal
relations remained substantially unchanged, and in many fields of
endeavour have now recovered themselves, and play again a
leading part.
In Italy, where history is recorded for a far longer time, the course
of affairs was different. When the Roman Empire that was really
Roman went down in ruin, there followed an interval of centuries
when the gloom was almost unrelieved. Every form of luxury and
frivolity, of contemptuous repugnance for serious work, of enervating
self-indulgence, every form of vice and weakness which we regard
as most ominous in the civilization of to-day, had been at work
throughout Italy for generations. The Nation had lost all patriotism. It
had ceased to bring forth fighters or workers, had ceased to bring
forth men of mark of any kind; and the remnant of the Italian people
cowered in helpless misery among the horse-hoofs of the
barbarians, as the wild northern bands rode in to take the land for a
prey and the cities for a spoil. It was one of the great cataclysms of
history; but in the end it was seen that what came had been in part
change and growth. It was not all mere destruction. Not only did
Rome leave a vast heritage of language, culture, law, ideas, to all the
modern world; but the people of Italy kept the old blood as the chief
strain in their veins. In a few centuries came a wonderful new birth
for Italy. Then for four or five hundred years there was a growth of
many little city states which, in their energy both in peace and war, in
their fierce, fervent life, in the high quality of their men of arts and
letters, and in their utter inability to combine so as to preserve order
among themselves or to repel outside invasion, can not unfairly be
compared with classic Greece. Again Italy fell, and the land was
ruled by Spaniard or Frenchman or Austrian; and again, in the
nineteenth century, there came for the third time a wonderful new
birth.
Contrast this persistence of the old type in its old home, and in
certain lands which it had conquered, with its utter disappearance in
certain other lands where it was intrusive, but where it at one time
seemed as firmly established as in Italy—certainly as in Spain or
Gaul. No more curious example of the growth and disappearance of
a national type can be found than in the case of the Graeco-Roman
dominion in Western Asia and North Africa. All told it extended over
nearly a thousand years, from the days of Alexander till after the time
of Heraclius. Throughout these lands there yet remain the ruins of
innumerable cities which tell how firmly rooted that dominion must
once have been. The overshadowing and far-reaching importance of
what occurred is sufficiently shown by the familiar fact that the New
Testament was written in Greek; while to the early Christians, North
Africa seemed as much a Latin land as Sicily or the Valley of the Po.
The intrusive peoples and their culture flourished in the lands for a
period twice as long as that which has elapsed since, with the
voyage of Columbus, modern history may fairly be said to have
begun; and then they withered like dry grass before the flame of the
Arab invasion, and their place knew them no more. They
overshadowed the ground; they vanished; and the old types
reappeared in their old homes, with beside them a new type, the
Arab.
Now, as to all these changes we can at least be sure of the main
facts. We know that the Hollander remains in Holland, though the
greatness of Holland has passed; we know that the Latin blood
remains in Italy, whether to a greater or less extent; and that the
Latin culture has died out in the African realm it once won, while it
has lasted in Spain and France, and thence has extended itself to
continents beyond the ocean. We may not know the causes of the
facts, save partially; but the facts themselves we do know. But there
are other cases in which we are at present ignorant even of the
facts; we do not know what the changes really were, still less the
hidden causes and meaning of these changes. Much remains to be
found out before we can speak with any certainty as to whether
some changes mean the actual dying out or the mere transformation
of types. It is, for instance, astonishing how little permanent change
in the physical make-up of the people seems to have been worked in
Europe by the migrations of the races in historic times. A tall, fair-
haired, long-skulled race penetrates to some southern country and
establishes a commonwealth. The generations pass. There is no
violent revolution, no break in continuity of history, nothing in the
written records to indicate an epoch-making change at any given
moment; and yet after a time we find that the old type has
reappeared and that the people of the locality do not substantially
differ in physical form from the people of other localities that did not
suffer such an invasion. Does this mean that gradually the children
of the invaders have dwindled and died out; or, as the blood is mixed
with the ancient blood, has there been a change, part reversion and
part assimilation, to the ancient type in its old surroundings? Do tint
of skin, eyes and hair, shape of skull, and stature, change in the new
environment, so as to be like those of the older people who dwelt in
this environment? Do the intrusive races, without change of blood,
tend under the pressure of their new surroundings to change in type
so as to resemble the ancient people of the land? Or, as the strains
mingled, has the new strain dwindled and vanished, from causes as
yet obscure? Has the blood of the Lombard practically disappeared
from Italy, and of the Visigoth from Spain, or does it still flow in large
populations where the old physical type has once more become
dominant? Here in England, the long-skulled men of the long
barrows, the short-skulled men of the round barrows, have they
blended, or has one or the other type actually died out; or are they
merged in some older race which they seemingly supplanted, or
have they adopted the tongue and civilization of some later race
which seemingly destroyed them? We cannot say. We do not know
which of the widely different stocks now speaking Aryan tongues
represents in physical characteristics the ancient Aryan type, nor
where the type originated, nor how or why it imposed its language on
other types, nor how much or how little mixture of blood
accompanied the change of tongue.
The phenomena of national growth and decay, both those which
can and those which cannot be explained, have been peculiarly in
evidence during the four centuries that have gone by since the
discovery of America and the rounding of the Cape of Good Hope.
These have been the four centuries of by far the most intense and
constantly accelerating rapidity of movement and development that
the world has yet seen. The movement has covered all the fields of
human activity. It has witnessed an altogether unexampled spread of
civilized mankind over the world, as well as an altogether
unexampled advance in man’s dominion over nature; and this
together with a literary and artistic activity to be matched in but one
previous epoch. This period of extension and development has been
that of one race, the so-called white race, or, to speak more
accurately, the group of peoples living in Europe, who undoubtedly
have a certain kinship of blood, who profess the Christian religion,
and trace back their culture to Greece and Rome.
The memories of men are short, and it is easy to forget how brief
is this period of unquestioned supremacy of the so-called white race.
It is but a thing of yesterday. During the thousand years which went
before the opening of this era of European supremacy, the attitude of
Asia and Africa, of Hun and Mongol, Turk and Tartar, Arab and Moor,
had on the whole been that of successful aggression against
Europe. More than a century went by after the voyages of Columbus
before the mastery in war began to pass from the Asiatic to the
European. During that time Europe produced no generals or
conquerors able to stand comparison with Selim and Solyman,
Baber and Akbar. Then the European advance gathered momentum;
until at the present time peoples of European blood hold dominion
over all America and Australia and the islands of the sea, over most
of Africa, and the major half of Asia. Much of this world conquest is
merely political, and such a conquest is always likely in the long run
to vanish. But very much of it represents not a merely political, but
an ethnic conquest; the intrusive people having either exterminated
or driven out the conquered peoples, or else having imposed upon
them its tongue, law, culture, and religion, together with a strain of its
blood. During this period substantially all of the world achievements
worth remembering are to be credited to the people of European
descent. The first exception of any consequence is the wonderful
rise of Japan within the last generation—a phenomenon unexampled
in history; for both in blood and in culture the Japanese line of
ancestral descent is as remote as possible from ours, and yet Japan,
while hitherto keeping most of what was strongest in her ancient
character and traditions, has assimilated with curious completeness
most of the characteristics that have given power and leadership to
the West.
During this period of intense and feverish activity among the
peoples of European stock, first one and then another has taken the
lead. The movement began with Spain and Portugal. Their flowering
time was as brief as it was wonderful. The gorgeous pages of their
annals are illumined by the figures of warriors, explorers, statesmen,
poets, and painters. Then their days of greatness ceased. Many
partial explanations can be given, but something remains behind,
some hidden force for evil, some hidden source of weakness upon
which we cannot lay our hands. Yet there are many signs that in the
New World, after centuries of arrested growth, the peoples of
Spanish and Portuguese stock are entering upon another era of
development, and there are other signs that this is true also in the
Iberian peninsula itself.
About the time that the first brilliant period of the leadership of the
Iberian peoples was drawing to a close, at the other end of Europe,
in the land of melancholy steppe and melancholy forest, the Slav
turned in his troubled sleep and stretched out his hand to grasp
leadership and dominion. Since then almost every nation of Europe
has at one time or another sought a place in the movement of
expansion; but for the last three centuries the great phenomenon of
mankind has been the growth of the English-speaking peoples and
their spread over the world’s waste spaces.
 Comparison is often made between the Empire of Britain and the
Empire of Rome. When judged relatively to the effect on all modern
civilization, the Empire of Rome is of course the more important,
simply because all the nations of Europe and their offshoots in other
continents trace back their culture either to the earlier Rome by the
Tiber, or the later Rome by the Bosphorus. The Empire of Rome is
the most stupendous fact in lay history; no empire later in time can
be compared with it. But this is merely another way of saying that the
nearer the source the more important becomes any deflection of the
stream’s current. Absolutely, comparing the two empires one with the
other in point of actual achievement, and disregarding the immensely
increased effect on other civilizations which inhered in the older
empire because it antedated the younger by a couple of thousand
years, there is little to choose between them as regards the wide and
abounding interest and importance of their careers.
In the world of antiquity each great empire rose when its
predecessor had already crumbled. By the time that Rome loomed
large over the horizon of history, there were left for her to contend
with only decaying civilizations and raw barbarisms. When she
conquered Pyrrhus she strove against the strength of but one of the
many fragments into which Alexander’s kingdom had fallen. When
she conquered Carthage she overthrew a foe against whom for two
centuries the single Greek city of Syracuse had contended on equal
terms; it was not the Sepoy armies of the Carthaginian plutocracy,
but the towering genius of the House of Barca, which rendered the
struggle forever memorable. It was the distance and the desert,
rather than the Parthian horse-bowmen, that set bounds to Rome in
the east; and on the north her advance was curbed by the vast
reaches of marshy woodland, rather than by the tall barbarians who
dwelt therein. During the long generations of her greatness, and until
the sword dropped from her withered hand, the Parthian was never a
menace of aggression, and the German threatened her but to die.
On the contrary, the great expansion of England has occurred, the
great empire of Britain has been achieved, during the centuries that
have also seen mighty military nations rise and flourish on the
continent of Europe. It is as if Rome, while creating and keeping the
empire she won between the days of Scipio and the days of Trajan,
had at the same time held her own with the Nineveh of Sargon and
Tiglath, the Egypt of Thothmes and Rameses, and the kingdoms of
Persia and Macedon in the red flush of their warrior-dawn. The
empire of Britain is vaster in space, in population, in wealth, in wide
variety of possession, in a history of multiplied and manifold
achievement of every kind, than even the glorious empire of Rome.
Yet, unlike Rome, Britain has won dominion in every clime, has
carried her flag by conquest and settlement to the uttermost ends of
the earth, at the very time that haughty and powerful rivals, in their
abounding youth or strong maturity, were eager to set bounds to her
greatness, and to tear from her what she had won afar. England has
peopled continents with her children, has swayed the destinies of
teeming myriads of alien race, has ruled ancient monarchies, and
wrested from all comers the right to the world’s waste spaces, while
at home she has held her own before nations, each of military power
comparable to Rome’s at her zenith.
Rome fell by attack from without only because the ills within her
own borders had grown incurable. What is true of your country, my
hearers, is true of my own; while we should be vigilant against foes
from without, yet we need never really fear them so long as we
safeguard ourselves against the enemies within our own
households; and these enemies are our own passions and follies.
Free peoples can escape being mastered by others only by being
able to master themselves. We Americans and you people of the
British Isles alike need ever to keep in mind that, among the many
qualities indispensable to the success of a great democracy, and
second only to a high and stern sense of duty, of moral obligation,
are self-knowledge and self-mastery. You, my hosts, and I, may not
agree in all our views; some of you would think me a very radical
democrat—as, for the matter of that, I am—and my theory of
imperialism would probably suit the anti-imperialists as little as it
would suit a certain type of forcible-feeble imperialist. But there are
some points on which we must all agree if we think soundly. The
precise form of government, democratic or otherwise, is the
instrument, the tool, with which we work. It is important to have a
good tool. But, even if it is the best possible, it is only a tool. No
implement can ever take the place of the guiding intelligence that
wields it. A very bad tool will ruin the work of the best craftsman; but
a good tool in bad hands is no better. In the last analysis the all-
important factor in national greatness is national character.
There are questions which we of the great civilized nations are
ever tempted to ask of the future. Is our time of growth drawing to an
end? Are we as nations soon to come under the rule of that great
law of death which is itself but part of the great law of life? None can
tell. Forces that we can see, and other forces that are hidden or that
can but dimly be apprehended, are at work all around us, both for
good and for evil. The growth in luxury, in love of ease, in taste for
vapid and frivolous excitement, is both evident and unhealthy. The
most ominous sign is the diminution in the birth-rate, in the rate of
natural increase, now to a larger or lesser degree shared by most of
the civilized nations of Central and Western Europe, of America and
Australia; a diminution so great that if it continues for the next
century at the rate which has obtained for the last twenty-five years,
all the more highly civilized peoples will be stationary or else have
begun to go backward in population, while many of them will have
already gone very far backward.
There is much that should give us concern for the future. But there
is much also which should give us hope. No man is more apt to be
mistaken than the prophet of evil. After the French Revolution in
1830, Niebuhr hazarded the guess that all civilization was about to
go down with a crash, that we were all about to share the fall of third
and fourth-century Rome—a respectable, but painfully overworked,
comparison. The fears once expressed by the followers of Malthus
as to the future of the world have proved groundless as regards the
civilized portion of the world; it is strange indeed to look back at
Carlyle’s prophecies of some seventy years ago, and then think of
the teeming life of achievement, the life of conquest of every kind,
and of noble effort crowned by success, which has been ours for the
two generations since he complained to High Heaven that all the
tales had been told and all the songs sung, and that all the deeds
really worth doing had been done. I believe with all my heart that a
great future remains for us; but whether it does or does not, our duty
is not altered. However the battle may go, the soldier worthy of the
name will with utmost vigour do his allotted task, and bear himself as
valiantly in defeat as in victory. Come what will, we belong to peoples
who have not yielded to the craven fear of being great. In the ages
that have gone by, the great nations, the nations that have expanded
and that have played a mighty part in the world, have in the end
grown old and weakened and vanished; but so have the nations
whose only thought was to avoid all danger, all effort, who would risk
nothing, and who therefore gained nothing. In the end, the same fate
may overwhelm all alike; but the memory of the one type perishes
with it, while the other leaves its mark deep on the history of all the
future of mankind.
A nation that seemingly dies may be born again; and even though
in the physical sense it die utterly, it may yet hand down a history of
heroic achievement, and for all time to come may profoundly
influence the nations that arise in its place by the impress of what it
has done. Best of all is it to do our part well, and at the same time to
see our blood live young and vital in men and women fit to take up
the task as we lay it down; for so shall our seed inherit the earth. But
if this, which is best, is denied us, then at least it is ours to remember
that if we choose we can be torch-bearers, as our fathers were
before us. The torch has been handed on from nation to nation, from
civilization to civilization, throughout all recorded time, from the dim
years before history dawned down to the blazing splendour of this
teeming century of ours. It dropped from the hands of the coward
and the sluggard, of the man wrapped in luxury or love of ease, the
man whose soul was eaten away by self-indulgence; it has been
kept alight only by those who were mighty of heart and cunning of
hand. What they worked at, provided it was worth doing at all, was of
less matter than how they worked, whether in the realm of the mind
or the realm of the body. If their work was good, if what they
achieved was of substance, then high success was really theirs.
In the first part of this lecture I drew certain analogies between
what has occurred to forms of animal life through the procession of
the ages on this planet, and what has occurred and is occurring to
the great artificial civilizations which have gradually spread over the
world’s surface, during the thousands of years that have elapsed
since cities of temples and palaces first rose beside the Nile and the
Euphrates, and the harbours of Minoan Crete bristled with the masts
of the Aegean craft. But of course the parallel is true only in the
roughest and most general way. Moreover, even between the
civilizations of to-day and the civilizations of ancient times, there are
differences so profound that we must be cautious in drawing any
conclusions for the present based on what has happened in the past.
While freely admitting all of our follies and weaknesses of to-day, it is
yet mere perversity to refuse to realize the incredible advance that
has been made in ethical standards. I do not believe that there is the
slightest necessary connexion between any weakening of virile force
and this advance in the moral standard, this growth of the sense of
obligation to one’s neighbour and of reluctance to do that neighbour
wrong. We need have scant patience with that silly cynicism which
insists that kindliness of character only accompanies weakness of
character. On the contrary, just as in private life many of the men of
strongest character are the very men of loftiest and most exalted
morality, so I believe that in national life as the ages go by we shall
find that the permanent national types will more and more tend to
become those in which, though intellect stands high, character
stands higher; in which rugged strength and courage, rugged
capacity to resist wrongful aggression by others will go hand in hand
with a lofty scorn of doing wrong to others. This is the type of
Timoleon, of Hampden, of Washington and Lincoln. These were as
good men, as disinterested and unselfish men, as ever served a
State; and they were also as strong men as ever founded or saved a
State. Surely such examples prove that there is nothing Utopian in
our effort to combine justice and strength in the same nation. The
really high civilizations must themselves supply the antidote to the
self-indulgence and love of ease which they tend to produce.
Every modern civilized nation has many and terrible problems to
solve within its own borders, problems that arise not merely from
juxtaposition of poverty and riches, but especially from the self-
consciousness of both poverty and riches. Each nation must deal
with these matters in its own fashion, and yet the spirit in which the
problem is approached must ever be fundamentally the same. It
must be a spirit of broad humanity; of brotherly kindness; of
acceptance of responsibility, one for each and each for all; and at the
same time a spirit as remote as the poles from every form of
weakness and sentimentality. As in war to pardon the coward is to do
cruel wrong to the brave man whose life his cowardice jeopardizes,
so in civil affairs it is revolting to every principle of justice to give to
the lazy, the vicious, or even the feeble or dull-witted, a reward which
is really the robbery of what braver, wiser, abler men have earned.
The only effective way to help any man is to help him to help himself;
and the worst lesson to teach him is that he can be permanently
helped at the expense of some one else. True liberty shows itself to
best advantage in protecting the rights of others, and especially of
minorities. Privilege should not be tolerated because it is to the
advantage of a minority; nor yet because it is to the advantage of a
majority. No doctrinaire theories of vested rights or freedom of
contract can stand in the way of our cutting out abuses from the
body politic. Just as little can we afford to follow the doctrinaires of
an impossible—and incidentally of a highly undesirable—social
revolution, which in destroying individual rights—including property
rights—and the family, would destroy the two chief agents in the
advance of mankind, and the two chief reasons why either the
advance or the preservation of mankind is worth while. It is an evil
and a dreadful thing to be callous to sorrow and suffering and blind
to our duty to do all things possible for the betterment of social
conditions. But it is an unspeakably foolish thing to strive for this
betterment by means so destructive that they would leave no social
conditions to better. In dealing with all these social problems, with
the intimate relations of the family, with wealth in private use and
business use, with labour, with poverty, the one prime necessity is to
remember that though hardness of heart is a great evil it is no
greater an evil than softness of head.
But in addition to these problems, the most intimate and important
of all, and which to a larger or less degree affect all the modern
nations somewhat alike, we of the great nations that have expanded,
that are now in complicated relations with one another and with alien
races, have special problems and special duties of our own. You
belong to a nation which possesses the greatest empire upon which
the sun has ever shone. I belong to a nation which is trying on a
scale hitherto unexampled to work out the problems of government
for, of, and by the people, while at the same time doing the
international duty of a great power. But there are certain problems
which both of us have to solve, and as to which our standards should
be the same. The Englishman, the man of the British Isles, in his
various homes across the seas, and the American, both at home and
abroad, are brought into contact with utterly alien peoples, some with
a civilization more ancient than our own, others still in, or having but
recently arisen from, the barbarism which our people left behind
ages ago. The problems that arise are of wellnigh inconceivable
difficulty. They cannot be solved by the foolish sentimentality of stay-
at-home people, with little patent recipes, and those cut-and-dried
theories of the political nursery which have such limited applicability
amid the crash of elemental forces. Neither can they be solved by
the raw brutality of the men who, whether at home or on the rough
frontier of civilization, adopt might as the only standard of right in
dealing with other men, and treat alien races only as subjects for
exploitation.
No hard-and-fast rule can be drawn as applying to all alien races,
because they differ from one another far more widely than some of
them differ from us. But there are one or two rules which must not be
forgotten. In the long run there can be no justification for one race
managing or controlling another unless the management and control
are exercised in the interest and for the benefit of that other race.
This is what our peoples have in the main done, and must continue
in the future in even greater degree to do, in India, Egypt, and the
Philippines alike. In the next place, as regards every race,
everywhere, at home or abroad, we cannot afford to deviate from the
great rule of righteousness which bids us treat each man on his
worth as a man. He must not be sentimentally favoured because he
belongs to a given race; he must not be given immunity in
wrongdoing or permitted to cumber the ground, or given other
privileges which would be denied to the vicious and unfit among
ourselves. On the other hand, where he acts in a way which would
entitle him to respect and reward if he was one of our own stock, he
is justly as entitled to that respect and reward if he comes of another
stock, even though that other stock produces a much smaller
proportion of men of his type than does our own. This has nothing to
do with social intermingling, with what is called social equality. It has
to do merely with the question of doing to each man and each
woman that elementary justice which will permit him or her to gain
from life the reward which should always accompany thrift, sobriety,
self-control, respect for the rights of others, and hard and intelligent
work to a given end. To more than such just treatment no man is
entitled, and less than such just treatment no man should receive.
The other type of duty is the international duty, the duty owed by
one nation to another. I hold that the laws of morality which should
govern individuals in their dealings one with the other, are just as
binding concerning nations in their dealings one with the other. The
application of the moral law must be different in the two cases,
because in one case it has, and in the other it has not, the sanction
of a civil law with force behind it. The individual can depend for his
rights upon the courts, which themselves derive their force from the
police power of the State. The nation can depend upon nothing of
the kind; and therefore, as things are now, it is the highest duty of the
most advanced and freest peoples to keep themselves in such a
state of readiness as to forbid to any barbarism or despotism the
hope of arresting the progress of the world by striking down the
nations that lead in that progress. It would be foolish indeed to pay
heed to the unwise persons who desire disarmament to be begun by
the very peoples who, of all others, should not be left helpless before
any possible foe. But we must reprobate quite as strongly both the
leaders and the peoples who practise, or encourage, or condone,
aggression and iniquity by the strong at the expense of the weak.
We should tolerate lawlessness and wickedness neither by the weak
nor by the strong; and both weak and strong we should in return
treat with scrupulous fairness. The foreign policy of a great and self-
respecting country should be conducted on exactly the same plane
of honour, of insistence upon one’s own rights and of respect for the
rights of others, that marks the conduct of a brave and honourable
man when dealing with his fellows. Permit me to support this
statement out of my own experience. For nearly eight years I was
the head of a great nation, and charged especially with the conduct
of its foreign policy; and during those years I took no action with
reference to any other people on the face of the earth that I would
not have felt justified in taking as an individual in dealing with other
individuals.
I believe that we of the great civilized nations of to-day have a right
to feel that long careers of achievement lie before our several
countries. To each of us is vouchsafed the honourable privilege of
doing his part, however small, in that work. Let us strive hardily for
success even if by so doing we risk failure, spurning the poorer souls
of small endeavour who know neither failure nor success. Let us
hope that our own blood shall continue in the land, that our children
and children’s children to endless generations shall arise to take our
places and play a mighty and dominant part in the world. But
whether this be denied or granted by the years we shall not see, let
at least the satisfaction be ours that we have carried onward the
lighted torch in our own day and generation. If we do this, then, as
our eyes close, and we go out into the darkness, and others’ hands
grasp the torch, at least we can say that our part has been borne
well and valiantly.
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