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VYTAUTO DIDIOJO UNIVERSITETAS (VYTAUTAS MAGNUS UNIVERSITY)

Mykolas Jurgis Drunga

THE TIME-GAP ARGUMENT: DOES IT REFUTE DIRECT REALISM? (AR LAIKO ATOTRKIO ARGUMENTAS SUGRIAUNA TIESIOGIN REALIZM?)

Daktaro disertacija Humanitariniai mokslai, filosofija (01 H)

Kaunas, 2011

Disertacija ginama eksternu

Mokslinis konsultantas: prof. dr. Gintautas Maeikis (Vytauto Didiojo universitetas, humanitariniai mokslai, filosofija 01 H)

VYTAUTO DIDIOJO UNIVERSITETAS

MYKOLAS JURGIS DRUNGA

THE TIME-GAP ARGUMENT: DOES IT REFUTE DIRECT REALISM? (AR LAIKO ATOTRKIO ARGUMENTAS SUGRIAUNA TIESIOGIN REALIZM?)

Daktaro disertacijos santrauka Humanitariniai mokslai, filosofija (01 H)

Kaunas, 2011 3

Disertacija ginama eksternu

Mokslinis konsultantas: prof. dr. Gintautas Maeikis (Vytauto Didiojo universitetas, humanitariniai mokslai, filosofija 01 H)

Disertacija ginama Vytauto Didiojo universiteto Filosofijos mokslo krypties taryboje: Pirmininkas prof. dr. Leonidas Donskis (Europos parlamentas, humanitariniai mokslai, filosofija 01 H) Nariai: prof. dr. Dalius Jonkus, humanitariniai mokslai, filosofija 01 H, Vytauto Didiojo universitetas prof. dr. Timo Airaksinen, humanitariniai mokslai, filosofija 01 H, Helsinkio universitetas prof. dr. Heta Gylling, humanitariniai mokslai, filosofija 01 H, Helsinkio universitetas doc. dr. Elena Lisanyuk, humanitariniai mokslai, filosofija 01 H, Sankt Peterburgo valstybinis universitetas Disertacija bus ginama vieame Filosofijos mokslo krypties tarybos posdyje 2011 m. gruodio mn. 9 d. 11 val. Vytauto Didiojo universiteto Humanitarini moksl fakulteto prof. M. Gimbutiens (211) auditorijoje. Adresas: K.Donelaiio 52, Kaunas, Lietuva Disertacijos santrauka isiuntinta 2011 m. lapkriio mn. 9 d. Disertacij galima perirti Vytauto Didiojo universiteto ir Lietuvos nacionalinje Martyno Mavydo bibliotekose.

Ar laiko atotrkio argumentas sugriauna tiesiogin realizm?


1. vadas
Tai Lietuvos filosofinje literatroje dar nesvarstytas klausimas, kaip apskritai tik maai nagrinta ir visa sritis (painimo teorija, kitaip vadinama epistemologija ar gnoseologija), kuriai jis priklauso. Todl tam, kad klausim adekvaiai nuviestume, sunku atsiremti koki nors gyvybing lietuviko filosofavimo tradicij1. Tuo tarpu usienio literatroje, ypa anglakalbje, painimo teorijos problematika aptariama nepalyginamai gausiau ir nuodugniau. Tai viena i prieasi, kodl is darbas angl kalba. Antra prieastis ta, kad autorius uaugo ir filosofij (vis pirma analitin) studijavo Jungtinse Amerikos Valstijose ir ten pradjo i disertacij rayti, bet jos nebaig. Todl is darbas pirmiausia priskirtinas prie anglakalbi epistemologijos istorijos bandym. Taiau dl to, kad jis ginamas Lietuvos universitete, autorius iuo darbu nort spausti pd ir Lietuvos filosofiniame gyvenime. (Trei prieast paminsiu paiame io rainio gale.) ios disertacijos tikslas yra duoti original na iuo metu analitinje filosofijoje itin nemadingo teorinio idealizmo gynyb. Teorin idealizm (kur netrukus tiksliau apibdinsiu) reikia skirti nuo praktinio idealizmo, kuris yra etin laikysena, reikalaujanti siekti tam tikr ideal. iame darbe kalbsiu tik apie teorin idealizm, vadinsiu j tiesiog idealizmu ir susitelksiu vien jo versij, btent subjektyvj idealizm. Jo centrin tez galima suformuluoti taip: bti tai (juslmis ar protu) suvokti arba bti (jusli ar proto) suvoktam. Vadinasi, bti kitaip nei suvokjui arba suvoktam daiktui nemanoma. iai tezei paremti nagrinsiu tai, k lietuvikai bt galima pavadinti laiko atotrkio argumentu. Apvelgdamas io argumento istorij nuo G. W. F. Leibnitzo iki dabarties laik, sukonstruosiu toki io argumento versij, kuri bt galjs panaudoti subjekyviojo idealizmo tvas Georgeas Berkeleyjus, idant dar aikiau parodyt savo doktrinos teisingum. Berkeleyjikos dvasios laiko atotrkio argumentas siekia pirmiausia rodyti vaizdini buvim ir po to sugriauti ne tik (iuo metu dominuojanio) tiesioginio, bet ir (maiau populiaraus) netiesioginio realizmo neidealistin versij ir itokiu bdu, kadangi kit alternatyv nra, rodyti

Sunku, bet ne absoliuiai nemanoma, nes trupuiuk atsilieti vis dlto galima Vosyliaus Sezemano (kone vienintelio) ratus jis ne tik pats buvo europinio lygio filosofas, pasireiks kaip painimo teorijos ir estetikos inovas, bet ir enkliai prisidjo prie atitinkamos lietuvikosios filosofins terminijos sukrimo. Utat iame rainyje daugeliu jo pasilyt termin ir naudosiuosi. Tik ne visais: pvz., vietoje gnoseologija visuomet, kaip anglo-amerikietikoje aplinkoje prasta, raau epistemologija (iskyrus, kai cituoju). iaip dauguma V. Sezemano naudojam termin puiks, pvz.., pagava kaip percepcijos sinonimas.

(visikai nepopuliar anglikai raaniame pasaulyje) subjektyvj metafizin bei epistemologin idealizm kaip i vis pozicij vienintel galim priimti. Tad trumpas atsakymas titulin disertacijos klausim bt toks: taip, laiko atotrkio argumentas didele dalimi sugriauna tiesiogin realizm, jei pastarasis suvokiamas, kaip paprastai tai daroma, neidealistikai, taiau jis ne griauna, o, prieingai, palaiko tiesiogin realizm, jei tas suvokiamas idealistikai. Dabar platliau aptarsiu keli iame darbe vartojam pagrindini termin reikm.

2. Kai kurios esmins svokos


Analitins filosofijos tradicijoje skiriamos trys doktrinos, atsakanios klausim, kokie yra percepcijos, kitaip sakant, juslins pagavos (regos, klausos, lytjimo, uosls, skonio) objektai arba, dar kitaip tariant, kokie dalykai yra jusli pagaunami, t. y., matomi, girdimi, lytjimu jauiami, uuodiami, ragaujami. ios trys doktrinos tai (1) tiesioginis (betarpikasis) realizmas (kartais jis pats arba viena jo atmaina dar vadinama naiviuoju realizmu), (2) netiesioginis realizmas (kartais vadinamas atstovaujamuoju, kartais kritiniu realizmu) ir (3) idealizmas (kartais arba visikai tapatinamas su fenomenalizmu, arba atskiriamas nuo fenomenalizmo, bet laikomas jam giminingu). Idant paaikintume, kuo ios doktrinos skiriasi, paranku pasitelkti dar vien skirt tarp epistemologini ir metafizini (kitaip sakant, ontologini) realizmo ir idealizmo ri. Tiesioginis ir netiesioginis realizmai yra epistemologins doktrinos, kurios daniausiai remiasi metafiziniu (ontologiniu) realizmu, bet gali remtis ir metafiziniu idealizmu. Metafizinis realizmas teigia, jog u smons (vadinamojo vidinio pasaulio) rib visikai savarankikai egzistuoja nuo jos nepriklausomas materialusis pasaulis (vadinamas ioriniu), kuris yra fundamentalus (nesuvedamas niek kita) ir kur, - ia jau prasideda epistemologiniai realizmai, - smon gali pagauti arba tiesiogiai (betarpikai), arba netiesiogiai (tarpikai). Tuo, kad smon j gali pagauti betarpikai, sitikin tiesioginiai realistai. Anot j, kai irime balt sien, tai j ir tik j ikart ir matome. O tai, jog materialaus pasaulio daiktus galima painti tik netiesiogiai, pirmiausia betarpikai pagavus jiems atstovaujanius, juos pavaduojanius smons duomenis (kurie tik smonje ir teegzistuoja) ir tik paskui per juos, taigi netiesiogiai painus paius materialiuosius daiktus (t smons duomen prieastis), teigia netiesioginiai realistai. Anot pastarj, kai, pvz., matome balt sien, i ties matome du dalykus sienos formos balt smons duomen ir j suklusi balt fizin sien. iuos du epistemologinius (tiesiogin ir netiesiogin) realizmus grindiant metafizin realizm atmeta metafizinis idealizmas. Pastarasis teigia, pirma, kad fundamentali, savarankika 6

btis yra tik smon ir, antra, kad (o tai galime vadinti idealistine ilyga) materialusis pasaulis yra ivestinis, egzistuojantis tik kaip login smons konstrukcija. Vis dlto su metafiziniu idealizmu yra sutaikomi ir (kitais atvejais metafizinio realizmo ramstomi) epistemologiniai realizmai, pripastantys, jog galima (tiesiogiai arba netiesiogiai) painti materialius daiktus, bet prileidiantys taip pat galimyb, jog itie daiktai, laikantis idealistins ilygos ir prieingai metafiziniam realizmui, neturi fundamentalios, nuo smons nepriklausomos bties. Pats idealizmas gali bti ne tik metafizinis, bet ir epistemologinis. Jeigu epistemologinis realizmas teigia, kad smon sugeba pagauti (tiesiogiai ar netiesiogiai) materialius daiktus, tai epistemologinis idealizmas teigia, kad smon sugeba pagauti savo paios turinius. Taiau itaip ias dvi doktrinas apibrus, neaiku, kodl jos laikomos viena kitai prieingos. Be to, pagal tokias apibrtis jos abi atrodo akivaizdiai teisingos: juk kas gi ginyt, kad smon sugeba painti ir materialius daiktus, ir savo paios turinius2? Tai reikia, jog norint atspindti i doktrin prieingyb, taip pat ilaikyti princip, jog tik viena j gali bti teisinga, reikia duotuosius apibrimus iek tiek pakeisti. Viena galimyb priimti Sezemano silym epistemologiniu idealizmu vadinti teorij, pasak kurios ms painimas yra apribotas smons sferos, t. y. painimo objektai tra tik smons turiniai (idealioji btis platesne prasme), o epistemologiniu realizmu atitinkamai vadinti poir, kuris pripasta, kad painimui prieinama ir nepriklausoma nuo smons btis (pvz., savarankikai egzistuojs iorinis pasaulis)3. Vadinasi, pagal tai ms pirmins apibrtys pakeistinos taip: Jeigu epistemologinis realizmas teigia, kad smon sugeba, be savo paios turini, pagauti (tiesiogiai ar netiesiogiai) dar ir materialius daiktus, tai epistemologinis idealizmas teigia, kad smon sugeba pagauti vien tik savo paios turinius. Vis dlto pastarasis teiginys nereikia, jog, pagal epistemologin idealizm, smonei visikai negalima pagauti materiali daikt, o tik tai, kad tokie daiktai nra u smons sferos, kad jie tiesiog i smons turini sukonstruoti. Sezemanas tatai gerai supranta ir t jo supratim rodo kad ir ios citatos. Pirmiausia jis teigia, jog metafizinis idealizmas yra teorija, tvirtinanti, kad visai biai pamatu eina dvasin (psichin), arba imateriali, btis. Tai aikus apibrimas: btis, pasireikianti smons forma, yra pamatas, fundamentas, i kurio gali idygti ir materials daiktai. ia prasme idealizmas yra materializmo, laikanio mediag bties pradu, prieyb ir sutampa madaug su spiritualizmu. Toliau Sezemanas dsto tai k (leisdamas suprasti, kad bent iuo atveju jis epistemologijai teikia pirmenyb prie metafizik):

Ginyt tie, kurie nepripasta materiali daikt buvimo, ir tie, kurie nepripasta smons turini buvimo. Taiau iuos nihilistinius poirius galima i karto atmesti kaip maai pagrstus. 3 Vosylius Sezemanas, Ratai. Filosofijos istorija, kultra. Vilnius, Mintis, 1997, p. 348-349.

Kadangi klausim: kas i tikro yra? galima kritikai nuviesti tik isiaikinus, kas galima painti, tai gnoseologinis idealizmas daniausiai siejasi su ontologiniu idealizmu, nors ontologinis (metafizinis) idealizmas gali jungtis ne tik su gnoseologiniu idealizmu, bet ir su gnoseologiniu realizmu4. ia Sezemanas labai taikliai nusako filosofini doktrin tarpusavio ryius.

3. Kodl reikia pripainti vaizdinius?


iame darbe a ir imuosi apginti epistemologin bei metafizin idealizm, sujungt su epistemologiniu realizmu. Konkreiau kalbant, siekiu apginti t subjektyvj idealizm (fenomenalizm), kuriam rykiausiai atstovauja Georgeas Berkeleyjus5, bet kuriam iek tiek pritariani iraik galima rasti ir Gottfriedo Wilhelmo Leibnizo, Immanuelio Kanto bei Johanno Gottliebo Fichts ir ypa Arthuro Schopenhauerio ratuose6. is idealizmas yra subjektyvus, nes pabria pastantj subjekt kaip viso painimo ieities tak bei teigia, jog tik smoningi, individuals subjektai gali k nors painti, ir jis tolygus fenomenalizmui, nes teigia (ia remiuosi V. Sezemano pateiktu apibrimu, tik dviem sakiniais j papildau), kad visas ms inojimas, jo turinys tiesa, ne visas apskritai, o tik tas, kuris apima materialj pasaul (tai pirmas papildymas) susideda i smons bsen (spdi, idj) arba smons reikini7, kurie esamomis slygomis ia ir dabar tikrai egzistuoja arba ia ir dabar egzistuot, jeigu esamos slygos bt buvusios kitokios (tai antras papildymas).

ten pat, p. 349. Raau taip, o ne Berkeleys, Berkeleyis ar Berklis, nes Berkeleyjus geriausiai atitinka anglik jo pavards rayb su lietuvika galne. Lietuvikai reikt tarti Barkljus. 6 r., pvz., Parerga ir paralipomena, Vilnius, Pradai, 2001. ia Schopenhaueris pagrstai teigia, kad Berkeleyjus nuosekliai jo dekartinink keliu ir dl to tapo tikrojo idealizmo pradininku, t. y. tos sampratos, kad viskas, kas yra its erdvje ir j pripildo, taigi apskritai regimasis pasaulis, savo bt kaip pai savaime gali turti absoliuiai tik ms vaizdinyje ir kad yra absurdika, net prietaringa priskirti jam dar bt u vaizdinio rib ir nepriklausom nuo pastaniojo subjekto ir tuo remiantis pripainti savaime egzistuojani materij. Tai yra labai teisinga ir gili valga joje gldi visa Berkeleyjaus filosofija, p. 20-21. Tuoj pat po odio materij Schopenhaueris prideda toki ina: Filosofams diletantams, prie kuri priklauso daug jos daktar, od idealizmas reikt visai iplti i rank, nes jie, neinodami, k jis reikia, kreia su juo visokias idaigas: idealizmas jiems kai kada yra spiritualizmas, kai kada kakas panaaus filisterikumo prieingyb, ir iai j pairai pritaria bei j remia vulgarieji literatai. Taiau Schopenhaueris nepateikia joki argument, kodl viena savo reikme idealizmas negali bti tapatus spiritualizmui, o kita praktiniam idealizmui, taigi filisterikumo prieingybei. Toje paioje inaoje jis toliau aikina taip: odiai idealizmas ir realizmas nra benamiai klajnai jie turi savo aikias filosofines reikmes; jei kas mano k nors kitka, tevartoja kit od. Idealizmo ir realizmo priepriea apibdina tai, kas painta, objekt, o spiritualizmo ir materializmo priepriea t, kuris pasta, subjekt. (Nieko neimanantys i laik postringautojai idealizm ir spiritualizm tiesiog painioja.). Bent jau Sezemanas juos ne painioja, o tiesiog sutapatina pagal labai sen tradicij, kad idealizmas viena reikme (epistemologine) yra priepriea realizmui, o antra (metafizine) materializmui. Taigi nors cituotoje Schopenhauerio inaoje beveik viskas medus, deja, pakliuvo ir auktelis deguto. 7 Vosylius Sezemanas, Ratai. Gnoseologija. Minties leidykla, Vilnius, 1987, p. 260.
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O tam, kad apginiau (iuo metu anglo-amerikiei filosofijoje labai maai alinink turint) subjektyvj idealizm, turiu sugriauti tarp mintj filosof iuo metu vyraujant tiesiogin realizm, taip pat ir ano imtmeio pirmojoje pusje vyravus netiesiogin realizm, bet, aiku, sugriauti juos tik tiek, kiek jie neidealistiki ir remiasi metafiziniu realizmu. Tuo tikslu vis pirma bandysiu rodyti, kad egzistuoja ir painime kertin vaidmen vaidina dalykai, kurie net ir lietuvikai yra ar gali bti vardijami gana vairiai. Tai jutimai, (jutiminiai, jusliniai) spdiai, (jutimins, juslins) idjos, jutim (jusli) duomenys, jusliniai smons turinio duomenys (arba tik: jusliniai smons duomenys), jusliniai smons reikiniai, fenomenai, vaidiniai, vaizdiniai, ir taip toliau. Vadinkime visus iuos dalykus be skirtumo vaizdiniais. Ir nors dauguma iuolaikini analitini filosof ir beveik visi tiesioginiai realistai vaizdini buvim neigia, juos idealistai ir netiesioginiai realistai veda tam, kad paaikint iliuzijas (tikrovs ikraipymus) ir haliucinacijas (nesam daikt tariamas pagavas). Pvz., mogus iri balt sien, taiau jam (dl kokio nors jo paties organinio negalavimo, dl tam tikro sienos apvietimo ar dl kitos prieasties) ji atrodo mlynai. Kaip i iliuzij paaikinti? Arba, mogus iri t pai balt sien, taiau jam (kadangi jis chronikas girtuoklis ar narkotik prisirijs) atrodo, kad ant tos sienos raitosi oranins spalvos drieai. Kaip paaikinti i haliucinacij? Pasak idealist ir netiesiogini realist, iliuzijos atveju mogus tiesiogiai pagauna mlyn vaizdin (jis tikrai mato kak mlyna), o haliucinacijos atveju drieo formos besiraitant oranin vaizdin (jis tikrai mato kak besiraitanio oraninio ir drieiko). Tiesioginiai realistai tai neigia, nes, j nuomone, pirmuoju atveju mogus tiesiogiai pagauna tik balt sien, antruoju irgi tik balt sien, ir joki vaizdini, atskir nuo baltos sienos, pripainti nereikia. Tai kodl (antruoju atveju) mogui vis dlto atrodo, kad jis mato ant baltos sienos kaink drieikai besiraitanio oraninio? Na, atsako tiesioginiai realistai, jeigu jo smegenys liguistai paveiktos alkoholio ar narkotik, tai jo sprendimo galia paeista ir jo odiais negalima pasitikti. Jam tiesiog rodosi, ir jis kliedi! O kas darosi pirmuoju atveju, kuris daug normalesnis, pasitaiko gerokai daniau ir jo nesukelia jokios psichik deformuojanios mediagos? ia mogui irgi tik rodosi, kad siena yra mlyna ji balta, ir nieko mlyno joje realiai nra, - sako tiesioginiai realistai ir klausia: koki ia dar reikia vaizdini!? Taip, sutinka idealistai ir netiesioginiai realistai: nieko mlyno toje baltoje sienoje i ties nra, taiau kodl jam vis dlto atrodo, kad siena mlyna? Kuo fakt galima paaikinti? Juk nesiginijama dl sienos spalvos (visi sutinka, kad ji balta), tik klausiama, kokio fakto dka mogui rodosi, kad ji mlyna, o ne, pvz., balta (taip, kaip ji i tikrj yra) ar alia ar oranin ar violetin ar dar kokia kita? Teigdami, kad mogui tik atrodo, kad siena mlyna, tiesioginiai realistai nieko nepaaikina, ypa jie nepaaikina paties fakto, jog balta siena atrodo mlynai. 9

Tatai paaikina tik idealistai ir netiesioginiai realistai teigdami, jog mogus tiesiogiai mato mlyn vaizdin, kur jis arba (klaidingai) interpretuoja kaip ireikiant sienos spalv, arba i kit duomen supranta, kad siena, nors atrodo mlyna, tokia nra. Kitaip sakant, jis i ties mato kak mlyna, bet tas kakas nra siena, o tik sienos vaizdinys (jutim duomuo). Jis mato ir sien, taiau mato j ne balt, o mlyn (ia ir suveikia mlynasis vaizdinys) taigi mato du dalykus (nors nebtinai suvokia juos kaip du), mato sien ir jos mlyn vaizdin. Btent itaip iliuzijas aikina idealistai ir netiesioginiai realistai (apie tai, kur jie isiskiria, kalbsime iek tiek vliau 5-ojo io straipsnio skyrelio antrojoje pastraipoje). Panaiai idealistai ir netiesioginiai realistai sutaria ir dl haliucinacij. Iliuzijos atveju mums rodosi tikras daiktas, bet ne toks, koks jis yra: jis rodosi turintis savyb, kurios stokoja, ar stokojantis savybs, kuri turi. Taiau kai patiriame haliucinacij, tai mums rodosi visikai nesamas daiktas su savybmis, kurias jis turt, jeigu egzistuot. Taigi girtuoklis ar narkomanas mato sienoje kak kaip drieas besiraitanio oraninio, kurio fizinje realybje visai nra, o daltonikas mato ne t spalv, kuri i ties sienoje yra, bet kit. Taiau abiem atvejais j paklydimus paaikina tai, jog jie realiai mato tik smonje egzistuojanius vaizdinius. Vadinasi, idealistai ir netiesioginiai realistai prikia tiesioginiams realistams, kad pastarieji nestengia paaikinti iliuzij ir haliucinacij. Savo disertacijoje i mint pltoju ir vaizdini buvim rodinju disertacijos skyriuose 2.2 ir 2.4. Jeigu tokie dalykai kaip vaizdiniai (jutim duomenys) i ties egzistuoja, tai (metafiziniu realizmu grindiamas) tiesioginis realizmas klaidingas, nes btent jis teigia, kad iorinius (materialius) daiktus pastame betarpikai ir jokio jutim duomen tarpininkavimo nereikia. O btent tai, kad j ne tik yra, bet ir reikia, rodo tik k minti du argumentai argumentas i haliucinacij ir argumentas i iliuzij. Yra ir dar vienas, kauzalinis argumentas, nurodantis ne tik haliucinacij buvim (to jau savaime utenka jutim duomen egzistavimui rodyti), bet j dar papildantis tam tikru samprotavimu, i kurio aiku, kad jutim duomenys dalyvauja ne tik haliucinacijose, bet ir kiekvienoje percepcijoje: 1. Teorikai manoma, aktyvuojant kok nors normalioje percepcijoje dalyvaujant smegen proces, sukelti haliucinacij, kuri savo subjektyviu charakteriu bt t percepcij visikai panai. 2. Jei haliucinacija ir percepcija turi t pai neuralin prieast, reikia jas ir panaiai aikinti. Nebt pagrsta sakyti, kad haliucinacijoje dalyvauja vaizdinys (jutim duomuo), o percepcijoje jis nedalyvauja, jei abi turi t pai betarpik prieast. Vadinasi, 3. Visi percepcijos procesai smegenyse sukuria tam tikr smons objekt, kurio negalima sutapatinti su kokiu nors iorinio pasaulio reikiniu, t.y. jie sukuria vaizdin (jutim duomen). 10

itie trys argumentai puikiai inomi, disertacijos skyriuose 6.3.2., 6.3.3., 6.3.4. ir 6.3.5. juos smulkiau aptariu ir paaikinu, kodl juos reikia priimti. Neblogai inomas, taiau reiau naudojamas dar vienas argumentas u jutim duomen buvim, o btent jis ir sudaro mano disertacijos a.

4. Laiko atotrkio argumentas


is argumentas, pirm kart idstytas G. W. Leibnizo, kai tik literatroje minimas, tai daniausiai kritikai. A t kritik nuodugniai apsvarstau ir prieinu prie ivados, kad ji visa neteisinga ar bent nepakankamai pagrsta. Bet yra kelios io argumento versijos ir a sukonstruoju toki, kuri bt galjs panaudoti G. Berkeleyjus, jeigu bt mans, kad jam jos reikia. Taiau jis, matyt, buvo patenkintas kitais argumentais, kuriais man gals pakankamai pagrsti savo sitikinim, jog materialusis pasaulis susideda i vaizdini ir jog (tik truput pakoreguojant A. Schopenhauerio formuluot) viskas, kas yra its erdvje ir j pripildo, taigi apskritai regimasis pasaulis, savo bt kaip pai savaime gali turti absoliuiai tik Dievo smonje ir ms vaizdinyje ir kad yra absurdika, net prietaringa priskirti jam dar bt u vaizdinio rib ir nepriklausom nuo pastaniojo subjekto ir tuo remiantis pripainti savaime egzistuojani materij. Vis dlto, ypa nuo XX a. pradios, vis daugiau filosof pradjo ne tik abejoti G. Berkeleyjaus teiginiais bei argumentais (kuri daugumos a smulkiau nenagrinju), bet taip pat ir teigti, kad toki dalyk kaip vaizdini (jutim duomen) staiai nra. Tuo tikslu, daugiausia gindami tiesiogin realizm, jie kritikavo (mano mintus) argumentus i iliuzij ir haliucinacij bei kauzalin argument, kuriuos a ustoju. Taiau pagrindin mano disertacijos tez yra ta, kad (1) laiko atotrkio argumentas yra gerokai stipresnis negu daugumai j svarsiusi filosof atrodo ir kad (2) jis rodo vaizdini buvim bei tuo paiu visikai ar didele dalimi rodo tiesioginio realizmo klaidingum. O likusia dalimi (jei tokia ivis lieka) t klaidingum rodo kiti, tik k minti argumentai. Savo disertacijos originalum velgiu ne tik tame, kad tai, kiek inau, yra vienintelis tokios apimties ir pobdio darbas, itisai skirtas iam Leibnizo ir Bertrando Russello vertintam argumentui ir jau imtmet besitsianioms jo sukeltoms diskusijoms apvelgti, bet ir tame, kad iuo argumentu ginu btent jungtin epistemologinio ir metafizinio idealizmo bei epistemologinio realizmo pozicij, kuriai filosofijos istorijoje atstovavo tik Berkeleyjus, o dabartyje tik neseniai mirs Johnas Fosteris ir gal dar pora kit, skaitant Howard Robinson. A taip pat bene vienintelis imuosi uduoties bandyti rodyti, jog itokiai pozicijai apginti 11

berkeleyjikasis laiko atotrkio argumentas (j idstau disertacijos skyriuje 1.4.) tinka geriausiai. tai jis (idstytas naudojantis G. Berkeleyjaus terminologija): (1) Tarkime, kad iriu tai, k laikau esant Saule. (2) Kadangi Sauls viesos spinduliams, anot fizik, trunka apie atuonias minutes, kad mane pasiekt, logikai manoma, jog per t laik Saul bt sunaikinta ir jau nebeegzistuot tada, kada jos viesa pasiekia mano akis. (3) Tarkime, kad Saul i ties per t laik sunaikinta. (4) Tai, ko jau nebra, nebegali bti kakas, k a tiesiogiai matau. (5) Taiau vis dlto a tiesiogiai (betarpikai) matau kak, k laikau esant Saule. Vadinasi, (6) Tai, k tiesiogiai matau, yra regimoji (akivaizdi) Saul, ne fizin Saul, kuri tariame buvus sunaikinta. (7) Taiau tiesiogiai matau tik vien regimj (akivaizdi) Saul ir nieko kito, kas j atitikt ar bt panai j tik vien spindint apskrit viesul danguje, bet ne du. (8) O be itos tiesiogiai regimos Sauls nei tiesiogiai, nei netiesiogiai nematau jokio kito j panaaus daikto. (9) Jei netiesioginis (kitaip sakant, atstovaujamasis) realizmas teisingas, tai galiu matyti tai, kas jau nebeegzistuoja, ir matau ne tik regimj (akivaizdi) Saul, bet ir dabar tariamai sunaikint fizin Saul. Vadinasi, (10) Netiesioginis (kitaip sakant, atstovaujamasis) realizmas neteisingas. (11) Nors ios regimosios Sauls antrine prieastimi gal ir yra fizikos Saul, jos, kaip ir vis daikt, pirmin ir tikroji prieastis yra Dievas. (12) Taiau regimoji Saul yra viesos, spalvos ir formos jutim derinys arba i i jutim sukonstruotas ms pai smegen krinys. (13) is derinys arba krinys egzistuoja arba u smons rib, arba smonje. (14) Jeigu jis egzistuoja u smons rib, jis galt radikaliai pasikeisti, man to nepastebjus. (15) Taiau itas viesos, spalvos ir formos jutim derinys arba i i jutim sukonstruotas ms pai smegen krinys negali radikaliai pasikeisti, man to nepastebjus. Vadinasi, (16) Mano matoma regimoji Saul egzistuoja mano smonje. (17) Bet net jeigu fizikos Saul nebt buvus sunaikinta (o tikrovje ji niekada nebuvo ir monijos istorijoje tikriausiai niekada ir nebus sunaikinta, vis tiek a tiesiogiai matyiau tik regimj Saul dl 7-ajame teiginyje pamintos prieasties. 12

(18) Tarkime, kad fizikos Saul sunaikinta nebuvo, t. y. kad (3) yra neteisinga prielaida. (19) Tuomet tuo paiu aktu, kuriuo matau regimj Saul, a taip pat tiesiogiai ar netiesiogiai matau nesunaikint fizikos Saul, kuri yra dar didesnis viesos, spalvos ir formos jutim derinys ar dar sudtingesnis i i jutim sukonstruotas ms pai smegen krinys ir tai toks derinys ar krinys, kurio vien dal sudaro regimoji Saul. Vadinasi, (20) Kai tik matau regimj Saul, matau ir didesn jutim, kuri bent kakiek matau tiesiogiai, derin. (21) Bet tai, kas galioja regimosios Sauls matymui, galioja atitinkamomis aplinkybmis ir kiekvieno kito regimo daikto atveju. Vadinasi, (22) Visi regimi daiktai yra jutimai arba jutim deriniai, egzistuojantys tik smonje. Paskutin ivada ir ireikia berkeleyjikj idealizm. Kadangi argumentas logikai sandarus, belieka tik vertinti jo premis teisingum. Taiau tai per didelis udavinys vienam net ir disertacijos ilgio darbui, todl nuodugniai pagrsiu tik por, literatroje gausiausiai priekait sulaukusi, premis, btent, 4-j ir 12-j. Daugiausia dmesio skirsiu 4-osios premisos (vadinkime j matymo vykio ir matomo objekto vienalaikikumo teze) pagrindimui, nes ji daniausiai puolama. J apgynus, pirmoji ivada (ireikta 6-ja premisa) tvirtai rodyta, nes premisas (1) (4), atrodo, galima laikyti neginytinomis. i ivada teigia, jog hipotetiniu sunaikintos Sauls atveju matome regimj Saul, o tai ir yra, k Berkeleyjus vadina idja, o mes vaizdiniu. Jei i ivada teisinga, tai vaizdini buvimas rodytas bent vienu, regimosios Sauls, atveju. Tam, kad rodytume, jog vaizdinius matome ir visais kitais, ne vien regimosios Sauls, atvejais, reikia papildom argument, kuruos pateikiu, remdamasis daugiausia Lenu Carrieriu, savo disertacijos skyriuje 4.9. Antroji ivada (ireikta 9-ja premisa), atmetanti netiesiogin realizm, remiasi empiriniu pastebjimu, kad nieko, iskyrus vien Saul pana daikt, mes ir nematome, o pagal netiesiogin realizm turtume matyti bent du (vien betarpikai, antr netiesiogiai). Gali atrodyti, kad su netiesioginiu realizmu is argumentas apsidirba per lengvai, taiau tuo, kad netiesioginis realizmas visikai netikinamas, neabejoja ir Davidas Smithas: jam atmesti jis skiria labai trump argument, bet Johnas Fosteris su juo dorojasi kur kas isamiau; abiej, ypa pastarojo, argumentus apvelgiu skyriuose 5.3. ir 3.5.4. Vis dlto netiesioginiam realizmui pritaria Brianas OShaughnessyis (3.4.), taiau a bandau rodyti, kad jo argumentams natraliau bt isiskleisti idealizmu (3.5.3.). Morelandas Perkinsas taip pat gina netiesiogin realizm (3.5.2.). Be to, jis, kaip ir B. OShaughnessyis, rykina skirtum tarp tiesiogins ir 13

netiesiogins pagavos (3.5.5.). T skirtum taip pat rykina, remdamasis Berkeleyjumi, Jamesas Cornmanas ir kiek kitaip B. Russellas (3.5.1) bei J. Fosteris (3.5.4.). Bdai skirti tiesiogin nuo netiesiogins pagavos gali bti keli ir vienodai pagrsti (3.5.5.)

5. Ar galima matyti tik tai, kas egzistuoja dabar?


Grkime prie 4-osios premisos. Labai daug filosof jai prieinasi. Jiems atrodo, kad galime betarpikai matyti ne tik tai, kas dabar dedasi, bet ir tai, kas praeityje vyko ne tik dangaus knus ir pokyius juose, bet ir tai, kas tik k vyko (bet daugiau nebevyksta) panosje. Kai kurie i t filosof netgi teigia, kad viskas, k dabar regime, yra grynai praeityje. J vis argumentus idstau ir kritikuoju antrame ir treiame disertacijos skyriuose, labiausiai nusitaikydamas tokius tiesioginius realistus kaip F. Dretske, A. Quintonas, D. M. Armstrongas, A. J. Ayeris, R. Chisholmas, G. Pitcheris, J. Bengsonas, K. Waltonas. Anot j, jau vien dl mokslinio fakto, kad daiktus matome tik tada, kai ms organizmus paveikia daikt ileidiama ar atspindima ir baigtiniu greiiu keliaujanti viesa, tas matymas vyksta vliau nei toji viesa palieka matomj daikt. Todl, es, ir matome daikt ne tok, koks jis dabar (matymo akimirk) yra, o tok, koks jis buvo, kai ileido ar atspindjo vies. Netiesioginiai realistai, priimdami priepaskutiniame sakinyje mint fakt, paskutin sakin perrao taip: Todl tiesiogiai matome ne daikt, bet jam atstovaujanius vaizdinius, o netiesiogiai ities matome daikt ne tok, koks jis dabar (matymo akimirk) yra, bet tok, koks jis buvo, kai ileido ar atspindjo vies. Idealistai, taip pat priimdami mintj mokslin fakt, t anos pastraipos paskutin sakin perrao taip: Todl tiesiogiai matome vaizdinius, i kuri, jei daiktas matymo akimirk egzistuoja, jis ir sunkonstruotas ir taip pat j tiesiogiai matome, o jei nebeegistuoja, tai buvo sunkonstruotas ir jo dabar nei tiesiogiai, nei netiesiogiai nematome, bet i dabar tiesiogiai matom vaizdini bei kit fakt galime daryti pagrstas ivadas apie jo buvusias savybes. Taiau ne visi tiesioginiai realistai 4-j premis neigia. Davidas Lewisas jai pritaria todl, kad, jo sitikinimu, ne(be)sam daikt matyti negalima, o ir vaigds, tol, kol jas matome, nra tiesiogiai praeityje, nes, jo nuomone, viesos laiduojama ssaja turi toki pat teis, kaip ir vienalaikikumas tam tikroje atskaitos sistemoje, bti jau nebegaliojanios absoliutaus vienalaikikumo svokos teistu pdiniu. Taigi jis teigia, jog visos ms matomos vaigds egzistuoja tuo metu, kai yra matomos; tatai teigia ir Hanochas Ben-Yamis, pltodamas regimo vienalakikumo samprat (6.1). Todl jiedu neigia 2-j laiko atotrkio argumento premis. Tada, inoma, is argumentas u vaizdini buvim sublika. 14

Nesu pakankamai kompetentingas vertinti D. Lewiso ir H. Ben-Yamio pozicij remianius fizikos argumentus, taiau dalijuosi J. Bengsono nuomone, jog laikyti tai, kas vyko prie, tarkim, 700 met, dabarties vykiu, grubiai paeidia ms turim dabarties svok. Bet net jeigu nebt laiko atotrkio tarp akimirkos, kada viesa palieka vaigd, ir akimirkos, kada ji pasiekia ms akis, yra kitas laiko plyys tarp akimirkos, kada viesa pasiekia ms akis, ir akimirkos, kada mes vaigd pamatome. Juk nerv sistemai reikia mayts dalies sekunds, kad perkelt signal i tinklains smegenis, ir per t laik vaigd arba bet koks kitas objektas gali spti inykti. Tuo atveju, rodos, vl ikyla galimyb laiko atotrkio argument panaudoti. Tokiais trumpais laiko plyiais i ties rmsi, idstydamas savj laiko atotrkio argument, G. W. Leibnizas. Pavyzdiu imdamas irjim ne Saul, o ia pat ant sienos kabant paveiksl, jis teig, kad, kol viesos spinduliai nuo paveikslo keliauja mano akis, paveikslas gali inykti, todl, jei taip vyko ir kadangi tam tikru laiku galiu matyti tik tai, kas tuo laiku egzistuoja, tai tuo laiku ir matau jau nebe paveiksl, o tik jo vaizdin. Taiau XX-ajame amiuje kai kurie filosofai (pvz., H. Robinsonas) argument atmet ne todl, kad jie atmest matymo vykio ir matomo objekto vienalaikikumo tez (tam tikru laiku galiu matyti tik tai, kas tuo laiku egzistuoja), bet todl, kad ios tezs teisingumui, j manymu, neturi reikms laiko skirtumai, kurie per mai, kad mogaus akis (ir smon) juos pastebt. Kai tezje kalbame apie laiko atvilgiu sutapti turinius matymo vykio laik ir matomo objekto laik, omeny turime mogaus juntam, smonje pagaunam laik, o ne t, kur manoma tik mokslikai nustatyti. Utat tokiu atveju (kai laiko tarpas, nors jis fizikai realus, taiau jo nemanoma mogikai uiuopti) laiko atotrkio argumentas netenka pagrindo, nuo kurio j bt galima paleisti darb. Todl siekiant rodyti, kad ir iuo atveju matome ne fizin daikt, o jo vaizdin, tenka kliautis argumentais i haliucinacij ar i iliuzij ar kauzaliniu argumentu, kuri kiekvienas rodo, kad visais, taigi ir trumpo laiko atotrkio, atvejais, pirmiausia matome vaizdinius. Taiau D. Lewisas ir H. Ben-Yamis beveik tikrai klysta, ir laiko atotrkis tarp akimirkos, kai viesa palieka vaigd, ir akimirkos, kai ji pasiekia ms akis, yra pakankamai didelis, jog laiko atotrkio argumento visikai pakakt vaizdini buvimui rodyti. 4-ajai premisai pritaria ir kitas tiesioginis realistas L. Carrieris, bet ne todl, kad jis, kaip tik k mintieji du, manyt, jog dl viesos greiio tarp vaigds ir jos matymo atsiranda regimas vienalaikikumas, o todl, kad, jei tam tikru laiku vaigd i ties ugsusi, tai tuo laiku matome ne pai (jau praeityje atsidrusi) vaigd, o jos ileidiam vies, nors ir atrodyt, kad matome vaigd. Bet viesa, kaip ir pati vaigd, yra, jo nuomone, fizinis objektas, ne vaizdinys, tad laiko atotrkio argumentas rodo ne tai, kad visada matome vaizdinius, o tai, kad 15

visuomet matome vies, bet tais atvejais, kai vies ileids fizinis objektas dar egzistuoja, tai matome ir j. iuo poiriu dalijasi ir B. OShaughnessyis (r. 4.7., 4.8., 4.10., 4.12.). Jie abu pritaria tezei, kad tam tikru konkreiu laiku galime matyti tik tai, kas tuo laiku egzistuoja, o ne anksiau egzistavo ar tuo labiau vliau egzistuos. A pats skyriuje 4.14. rodau, kad i tez yra btina, login tiesa, kurios pagrindinis ramstis yra valga, kad jeigu daiktas yra matomas, tai turi bti jei ne fizikai, tai bent logikai manoma, kad matantysis galt tuo daiktu manipuliuoti, j paveikti, pakeisti ir t. t. Bet itaip daryti tak galima tik dabar esaniam, o ne praeityje buvusiam, daiktui. Todl jei daiktas dabar matomas, tai jis turi ir dabar egzistuoti. i valg pasiekti man padjo diskusijos su J. J. Valbergu (r. skyrius 4.3. ir 4.4.). Beje, tez, jog matome tik tai, kas dabar egzistuoja, paremia ir kai kurie tyrimus atlikinjantys neurobiologai. Tai aptariu skyriuje 6.4. Lygiai taip pat ir tai, k girdime dabar, egzistuoja dabar. Tai teig A. O. Lovejoyjus ir daugelis kit filosof, nors neig G. Pitcheris, taiau jo argumentus galima tikinamai sukritikuoti, tai ir darai skyriuje 3.2. odiu, ir garsams galioja principas, kad esse est audiri. Bet ar tikrai vaigds ar bet kokio kito daikto skleidiama ar atspindima viesa yra fizinis objektas? Skyriuose 4.8., 4.10., 4.12 ir 6.5. argumentuoju, kad nors fotonai yra fizins dalels ir gali bti tapatinamos su viesa, kita prasme viesa yra pojtis arba jutimas, kur fotonai smonje sukelia, o is viesos jutimas ir yra vaizdinys. Taigi, jeigu, pasak L. Carrierio ir B. OShaughnessyio, kiekvien kart, kai kok nors daikt matome, matome vies, tai visada matome ir vaizdin. O kaip regimi vaizdiniai sudaro regim fizin objekt? Atsakyti klausim reikia pagrsti 12-j premis. Tai didele dalimi darau, atmesdamas pagrindinius konkurentus netiesiogin neidealistin realizm (skyriuose 5.3. ir 3.5.4.) ir, inoma, tiesiogin neidealistin realizm (jam atmesti skiriama visa disertacija). Taiau kaip konkreiai fiziniai daiktai konstruojami i vaizdini klausim, pateiks kelias alternatyvas, palieku atvir (skyriuje 6.5.). Tai udavinys ateities tyrinjimams. Jie btini, siekiant galutinai rodyti idealizm.

6. Kitos problemos
Disertacijoje daugiausia dmesio skiriu matymo objektams. Taiau galima kelti ir klausim, kas per dalykas yra pats matymas. Daniausiai matymas yra laikomas aktu arba bsena, kuriuo arba kuria tam tikras subjektas (mogus ar gyvnas) siejamas su tam tikru objektu (vaizdiniu arba daiktu). Pvz., sakin Jonas mato Jon galima suvokti kaip teigiant Jono akt Jons atvilgiu pagal model Jonas vizualiai pagauna Jon arba t sakin galima suvokti kaip teigiant Jono bsen Jons atvilgiu pagal model Jonas yra vizualinio Jons pagavimo bsenoje. Yra ir treia 16

galimyb. Galima matym laikyti grynu santykiu tarp mataniojo subjekto ir matomojo daikto, pagal model Jon ir Jon sieja matymo (pirmasis mato antrj) santykis. itie trys modeliai subtiliai skiriasi. Mano disertacijos ivados suderinamos su visais trimis. Bet yra dar dvi teorijos, bandanios nusakyti matymo login esm. Pagal vien j, matyti daikt tai reprezentuoti (specifine ir nelabai aikia io odio prasme) jo savybes. Tai iuo metu labai madinga reprezentacin teorija. Kuo ir kiek ji skiriasi nuo atstovaujamojo (kitaip sakant, netiesioginio) realizmo kontroversikas klausimas. klausim svarstau ir apie pai reprezentacin teorij neigiamai atsiliepiu skyriuose 5.2, 5.3. ir 5.4. Taiau skyriuje 5.6. prieinu prie ivados, kad reprezentacin teorija, nors ir klaidinga, bet ji netrukdo berkeleyikajam laiko atotrkio argumentui. Visai kitaip su dar viena teorija. Tau vadinamoji prieveiksmin (adverbialin) teorija, kuri lietuvikai idstyti lengviau negu anglikai. Grkime prie ankstesnio iliuzijos pavyzdio, kai irime balt sien ir mums atrodo, kad ji mlyna. Daug kas (skaitant mane) prieiname prie ivados, kad ia matome kak mlyna btent, mlyn vaizdin. O prieveiksmininkai (adverbialistai) sako nieko panaaus: matome balt sien, tik ji atrodo mlynai. Taip pats tai ireikiau, kai i iliuzij (pirmusyk) idsiau. Prieveiksmininkai nori ivengti vaizdini, j vietoje kalbdami apie matymo bdus, ireiktus prieveiksmiais. Deja, i teorija neatlaiko kritikos. Tiesa yra ta, kad balt sien matome ne mlynai tiesiog matome j mlyn, matome mlyn objekt, ir tas objektas yra vaizdinys, nors iliuzinis. Kad prieveiksmin teorija klaidinga, pagrindiu skyriuje 5.5.

7. Baigiamosios pastabos
Berkeleyikj idealizm gerokai sunkiau apginti anglo-amerikietikosios analitins filosofijos negu lietuvikosios filosofins tradicijos kontekste. Tai dar viena prieastis, kodl, siekdamas ikio, darb raiau ir ginuosi anglikai. Amerikoje ir iaip anglakalbiame pasaulyje iandien maai kas traktuoja idealizm rimtai (bet tai nereikia, kad niekas taip nedaro, tik tokius filosofus galima ant vienos rankos pirt suskaiiuoti, kelis i j suminjau ir dviem savo disertacijoje ypa rmiausi), o Europoje (tuo paiu ir lietuvikojoje tradicijoje) padtis visai skirtinga. Nebtina ia minti kadaise danai ir kyriai linksniuot, o dabar lyg susitarus beveik visuotinai pamirt Lenin, laikius Berkeleyj ir jo takoje buvusius filosofus pagrindiniais savo prieininkais ir j kritikai paskyrus vis savo Materializm ir empiriokriticizm. Utenka tik paymti, jog Berkeleyj gerb ir pozityviai vertino Edmundas Husserlis, kurio fenomenologijos tradicija Lietuvoje tikrai gyva, jei ne dominuojanti. Husserlis ne tik Berkeleyj vertino, bet ir buvo savo djomis gerokai j panaus. Anot Hermano Philipseo, 17

kaip ir Husserlis, Berkeleyjus man, kad materialaus pasaulio, egzistuojanio nepriklausomai nuo smons, svoka yra absurdika. 55-ame savo Idj I skyriuje Husserlis neig ess berkeleyikas idealistas dl to, kad jis neneigia pasaulio buvimo. Taiau is bandymas nesusisieti su nepopuliariuoju vyskupu nevyks, nes remiasi Berkeleyjaus imaterializmo

nesupratimu. Kaip ir Husserlis, Berkeleyjus teigia tik paalinantis absurdik pasaulio egzistavimo interpretacij, bet neneigiantis paties jo buvimo. Kaip Husserlis, Berkeleyjus yra redukcinis, bet ne nihilistinis idealistas. Ir kaip Husserlis, jis teigia, jog material pasaul sukonstruoja protas i jam imanentik jutim ar idj8. Beje, tai, kad ne tik Husserlis, bet ir Mauriceas Merleau-Ponty buvo idealistai, teigia ir mano disertacijoje minimas Davidas Smithas, paras anglo-amerikieiams analitikams tinkam vad Husserlio filosofij. O kad lietuvikojoje tradicijoje idealizmas gyvas, aiku i to, kiek laiko ir energijos jam aptarti bei kritikuoti skiria V. Sezemanas. Skirtingai nei pastarasis, idealizm paniekinaniai traktuoja P. Kuraitis, o anksiau Angelas Daugirdas. Taiau savo disertacijoje a i ir kit lietuvik altini neminiu ne tik todl, kad jie Vakar pasaulyje maai inomi, bet pirmiausia todl, kad tai, k i j galima imokti, nublanksta prie tai, k idealizmo klausimu galima pasisemti i anglakalbs literatros. Kaip tik todl, manau, ir svarbu, jog tai, k apie idealizm neigiamo ar teigiamo sako anglakalbiai filosofai, ypa analitikai (kuri poiriais jau domimasi ne tik visur kitur, bet ir emyninje Europoje, nors maiausia ms alyje), bt igirsta ir Lietuvoje.

r. Herman Philipse, Transcendental Idealism. In: The Cambridge Companion to Husserl, 2011.

18

Abstract
The Time-Gap Argument (TGA), apparently first used by Leibniz and here examined systematically and historically, is an attempt to show that whenever we see anything, there is something we see that is mental, i.e., a sense-datum. This conclusion is derived from four empirical premises and one held to be a conceptual truth. The empirical premises are that (a) in order for a physical object to be seen, it is causally necessary for this object to have emitted or reflected light that reaches our eyes; that (b) light travels at a finite speed; that (c) by the time light emitted by it reaches our eyes, a certain star has already ceased to exist; and that (d) at that time we nonetheless see something star-like at or near the place where there used to be a star. The alleged conceptual truth is that (e) in order for any object or event to be seen at time t, it must exist at t. The argument from (a), (b), (c), (d), and (e) to the just-mentioned conclusion still needs a further premise asserting a continuity between the case of the star and any other cases of possible perception. Since this premise as well as (a), (b), (c), and (d) can be shown to be wellsupported and since the argument from them in conjunction with the disputed (e) to the conclusion is valid, critics of the TGA have attacked (e) with the aim of showing that the argument is unsound and that the conclusion is false. In this dissertation I defend the TGA and its conclusion by arguing that (e) is indeed a conceptual truth and that these attacks on it, waged throughout the last hundred years, are one and all unsuccessful. They involve one or more of the following claims: that present perception only appears to, but does not really, require the present existence of the object perceived; that there is no radical break between perception and memory; that we can directly see into the past; that we always do see only into the past, if we see anything at all; that if we see anything it can only be physical objects or events; that any light we see is physical; that there are no good reasons to posit mental sense-data; and that no mental sense-data in fact exist. I attempt to show that all these claims are false or inconclusively supported. In the course of doing so, I also argue against the Representational and Adverbial Theories of Perception insofar as these deny the existence of sense-data. Finally, since the conclusion of the TGA (as stated above) leaves open the possibility of our also seeing physical things in virtue of our seeing sense-data, I argue for an Idealist (Phenomenalist) rather than a Representative Realist construal of the relation between our seeing sense-data and our seeing physical objects. This construal allows me to recognize and defend a Direct Realist version of Idealism, according to which what we directly perceive are presently existing sensory records of physical events, which events, even if they are in the past and are not themselves perceived, were or are logically constructed out of such records. This kind of Idealism is superior to a Representative Realism 19

that claims we directly perceive presently existing records of past events that are ontologically entirely distinct from these events; and both are superior to a Non-Idealist Direct Realism which claims we perceive past events directly.

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Contents
Preface Chapter One: Introduction 1.1. Aiming towards Idealism 1.2. The Crux of the Time-Gap Argument: Must a Thing Exist When It Is Perceived? 1.3. Other Objections to the TGA 1.4. A Berkeleian TGA 1.5. The Importance of the TGA Chapter Two: Denying the Simultaneity-Requirement (I) 2.1. The Existence-Requirement 2.2. Dretske on the TGA and the Simultaneity-Requirement 2.3. An Excursus: Physical vs. Phenomenological Simultaneity 2.4. Dretske and Direct Awareness (I) 2.5. Dretske and Direct Awareness (II) 2.6. Quinton on the TGA 2.7. Armstrong on the TGA 2.8. Conclusion about Dretske, Quinton, and Armstrong Chapter Three: Denying the Simultaneity-Requirement (II) 3.1. Can Our Eyes Range into the Past (Only)? 3.2. The TGA and the Velocity of Sound: Pitcher et al. 3.3. Perception, photography, television, and memory (I) 3.4. Perception, photography, television, and memory (II) 3.5. Direct vs. Indirect Perception 3.5.1. Cornman, Russell, Berkeley 3.5.2. Perkins 3.5.3. OShaughnessy 3.5.4. Foster 3.5.5. Conclusion about Direct vs. Indirect Perception 3.6. Conclusion about Seeing into the Past Chapter Four: Affirming the Simultaneity-Requirement 4.1. Cornman and the TGA 4.2. Dancys Objection: Presence Is Ambiguous 4.3. Valberg on Presence 4.4. The Puzzle of Experience 21

4.5. Berkeley on Perceivings and Perceiveds 4.6. Berkeley and the Simultaneity-Requirement 4.7. OShaughnessy and the Simultaneity-Requirement 4.8. Carrier et al. on Seeing Light and the SimultaneityRequirement (I) 4.9. The Continuity Argument 4.10. Carrier et al. on Seeing Light and the SimultaneityRequirement (II) 4.11. Seeing distant objects vs. seeing objects close-by: Mandelbaum and No 4.12. Carrier et al. on Seeing Light and the Simultaneity-Requirement (III) 4.13. Presentism vs. Eternalism 4.14. Conclusion about the Simultaneity-Requirement Chapter Five: The Representational and Adverbial Theories 5.1. Dretske and the Sensory Core 5.2. Travis and Alston on Representationalism 5.3. Jackson on Representationalism 5.4. Valberg and No on Representationalism 5.5. The Adverbial Theory of Perception 5.6. Conclusion about the Representational and Adverbial Theories Chapter Six: What We See 6.1. Apparent Simultaneity 6.2. Intra-Organismic Time-Gaps 6.3. Other Arguments for Sense-Data 6.3.1. The Simplest Arguments 6.3.2. Valberg on the Argument from Illusion 6.3.3. Smith on the Argument from Illusion 6.3.4. Robinsons Response to Smith on the Argument from Illusion 6.3.5. The Causal Argument 6.4. Seeing the Present 6.5. Conclusion about What We See

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Preface
My short answer to the title question of this work is: Yes and No. The Time-Gap Argument does refute (or at least it goes a long way toward refuting) Direct Realism if the latter is construed, as it standardly is, non-idealistically. It doesnt refute iton the contrary, it supports itif Direct Realism is understood idealistically. My long answer is set forth and defended on the following pages. This dissertation is the result of work I started and should have finished decades ago. Soon after catching the bug of philosophy in the 1960s I read some passages which have held me in their grip ever since. Bertrand Russell had written in his Human Knowledge: Its Scope and Limits (1948) that though you see the sun now, the physical object to be inferred from your seeing existed eight minutes ago; if, in the intervening minutes, the sun had gone out, you would still be exactly seeing what you are seeing. We cannot therefore identify the physical sun with what we see; nevertheless what we see is our chief reason for believing in the physical sun. In a similar vein A. J. Ayer wrote in The Problem of Knowledge (1956) that an instance which Russell often cites is that of the sun which we only see as it was eight minutes before; when it comes to remote stars the difference may amount to thousands of years. It may even happen that by the time we see it the star has ceased to exist. But if the star no longer exists, we cannot, so it is argued, now be seeing it; and since in every case in which the light has had an appreciable distance to travel it is possible that the object which we are seeing has gone out of existence in the interval, we cannot ever identify it with what we see: for our present experience will be the same, whether the object still exists or not. When I was ready to begin writing my doctoral dissertation at M.I.T. in 1971, I chose the Time-Gap Argument as my topic, with the immediate approval of my thesis advisors Baruch A. Brody and James F. Thomson. At that time I didnt yet know what conclusions Id come to; for a while I even flirted with radical positions such as that only sense-data but no physical objects exist and that even if the latter existed we would never see them. Judith J. Thomson firmly dissuaded me from entertaining such extreme views; but even though I never rejected her advice (and found myself increasingly reluctant to contradict certain fundamental commonsense claims as enunciated by G. E. Moore) I couldnt for the life of me see my way clearly to any satisfactory treatment of the argument. As a result of this philosophical perplexity, and the pressure as well as the lure of competing personal interests, I never completed my dissertation at M.I.T. But the bug stayed with me; and although I had now entered the journalism profession, in my spare time I continued dabbling in philosophy. Since the early 2000s the perceptual time-gap 23

problem was the main topic of electronic communication with Fred Dretske, John Foster, Howard Robinson, David Smith, and Jerry Valberg. Concurrently I pursued two even older interests. One, emerging in secondary school, was Christian philosophy, especially that of an existentialist bent, together with philosophy of religion in general. The other interest, first aroused at the University of Chicago in the mid-1960s, centered around George Berkeley; much later this led not only to new collegial friendshipswith Timo Airaksinen, Bertil Belfrage, and Tom Stoneham, among othersbut also to invitations to read papers at International Berkeley Society conferences in Helsinki and Karlsruhe. It was my thinking about how George Berkeley would have responded to the Time-Gap Argument that finally gave me the idea of how to continue and complete my dissertation. Luckily, this topic is not yet exhausted: it wasnt a dead horse when I started my dissertation, and it isnt one now. To be sure, much of the literature on the Time-Gap Argument dates from the early and middle decades of the last century, but significant papers have been written on it in the last two decades as well. There still is virtually no unanimity in the approaches taken. More importantly, very little of this most recent or even earlier work defends the point of view I do, and none of it rules it out with arguments that would make my endeavor silly. (I now, but didnt always, share the attitude expressed by Brand Blanshard when, in his Autobiography, he avowed: I have never been able to accept the realist view that the objects of direct experience are independent of consciousness. Indeed everything we sense or feel seems to me to exist only in consciousness.) Thus my text is, I hope, neither otiose nor antiquated. I am grateful to Vytautas Magnus University, where I now work in the Public Communications Department and the Lithuanian Emigration Studies Center, for letting me defend this dissertation as an external student. I wrote most of it in the last decade in Prague and Kaunas in the severely limited time left over from my teaching, research, broadcasting, and translating duties. If accepted, it will most likely be one of the very few theses in analytic philosophy to have been defended in English at a Lithuanian university. My arguments and views owe much to reading the works of, and/or to corresponding with, the people mentioned above (Foster, Robinson, and Valberg, most of all). I especially thank Professor Gintautas Maeikis for consenting to be my Consultant and Professors Timo Airaksinen and Heta Gylling as well as Dalius Jonkus and Elena Lysaniuk for kindly serving on my dissertation committee. Hearty thanks go to Professor Leonidas Donskis not only for his splendid friendship (both personal and philosophical) but also for his unflagging help at VMU early on in helping me both psychologically and materially to overcome many bureaucratic hurdles on my non-standard academic path. For their assistance in enabling me to fulfill all requirements Im also grateful to the intellectually enthusiastic Professor Egdijus 24

Aleksandraviius, head of the Lithuanian Emigration Institute, who secured me my first job at VMU; to VMU University Rector Professor Zigmas Lydeka, who with his colleagues is doing his utmost to help make this school into a modern European university with an ambitious tradition in Baltic philology, historiography, and philosophy; and to other members of the VMU community, including Kristina Jrait and Alisija Rupien, for all their support. (If I dont mention all its only for fear, in my senior moments, of forgetting some.) Last but certainly not least I wish to express my immense gratitude to Professor Auks Balytien: she not only enabled me to put to profitable use my journalistic and teaching talents but also invaluably guided me in taking the final steps required toward completion of my dissertation. I dedicate this work to my wife, Vida, who truly is my better half.

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Chapter One: Introduction


1.1. Aiming towards Idealism

Ever since the time of Descartes the nature of perceptionthe sensory perception of items in the physical world by human subjects9 has been a live, and continues to be an unresolved, philosophical problem. Though there always have been broad consensuses on the ontological nature of the perceived object and on the nature of our epistemological access to it, these have not lasted forever, sometimes taking centuries to change, sometimes far less. Thus for the last few decades, at least in the Anglo-American tradition, the majority opinion has increasingly favored Direct Realism, which gradually took over its present-day leading position from the Indirect or Representative Realism (sometimes also called Causal Realism as well as, less often, Critical Realism) that reigned supreme (though not unchallenged) in the early and middle parts of the last century; while still earlier it was Idealism that had been predominant (though, again, not exclusively so) for more than a century, having replaced the older forms of Representative Realism that had largely prevailed throughout the early modern period. But at no time was any of these three basic positions either utterly dominant or utterly dead. For the sake of orientation, let me say that I will understand these views in the way that John Foster has characterized them at the beginning of his fairly recent The Nature of Perception: First, there is Direct Realism. This accepts a Realist view of the physical world: it takes the physical world (the world of physical space and material objects) to be something whose existence is logically independent of the human mind, and something which is, in its basic character, metaphysically fundamental. And, within this realist framework, it takes our perceptual access to the physical world to be direct. Second, there is the Representative Theory (or Representative Realism). This too accepts a Realist view of the physical world. But it sees this realismin particular, the claim of mind independenceas putting the world beyond the reach of direct perception. Thus, in place of the claim that our perceptual access to the physical world is direct, it insists that the perceiving of a physical item is always mediated by the occurrence of something in the mind which represents its presence to us. Finally, there is Idealism. This agrees with the Representative Theory in holding that direct perceptual awareness does not reach beyond the boundaries of the mind, but manages to combine this with the insistence that

The concept is ordinary; the words are John Fosters. Much of what follows is either under the direct influence of, or, to a lesser extent, in conscious opposition to, this seminal modern Idealist philosopher.

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our perceptual access to the physical world is nevertheless direct. What enables it to combine these seemingly irreconcilable views is that it abandons Physical Realism. Thus it takes the physical world to come within the reach of direct perceptual awareness by taking it to be something which is logically created by facts about human sensory experience, or by some richer complex of facts in which such sense-experiential facts centrally feature.10 In the rest of his book Foster undertakes to refute both Direct Realism and Representative Realism and thereby to prepare the ground for a defense of Idealism. My dissertation, too, is an attempt to help clear the way for Idealism. However, it is much more limited in that I devote myself to discussing and defending just one argument against Direct Realism, although I attempt to do so in a way that favors Idealism rather than Representative Realism.11

1.2. The Crux of the Time-Gap Argument: Must a Thing Exist When It Is Perceived?

Both Foster and I aim to do something that David Smith, in an even more recent book, claims to be impossible. There he argues that Direct Realism cannot be shown to be false by reflecting on the nature of perception12. In aid of this, Smith extensively and carefully discusses the Argument from Illusion and the Argument from Hallucination, and attempts to show that they do not pose insuperable threats to Direct Realism. However, he says very little about, and thinks very little of, the Time-Gap Argument (henceforward, TGA), which I believe has a much greater chance of discrediting Direct Realism than Smith admits. The over-all aim of my dissertation is to make this belief plausible.

John Foster, The Nature of Perception (OUP, 2000): 1. This classification (meant to be exhaustive) of views on the nature of the perceived object and of our access to it will be the main focus of my discussion. However, since views are also classifiable with respect to what kind of item (relation, state, or event) the perceiving itself is taken to be, I will engage this related issue too. 11 Currently Idealism is a thoroughly unpopular position. The only philosophers I know of in the Anglo-American tradition nowadays championing versions of it are, I believe, Robert M. Adams, John Bolender, A. C. Grayling, Peter B. Lloyd, Howard Robinson, and, first and foremost, the unfortunately recently departed John Foster. To the list of recent idealists we might add T. L. S. Sprigge and, a bit further back in time, my teacher Roderick Firth and the latters teacher C. I. Lewis. Several currently active philosophers, including Jerry Valberg, Peter Unger, and David Smith, are in one respect or another seriously sympathetic to it. Thus in the present philosophical climate defenders of Idealism have their job cut out for them. My dissertation is intended to be but a small contribution. 12 A. D. Smith, The Problem of Perception (Cambridge, Mass. and London, England: Harvard University Press, 2002): 5-6. However, Smith doesnt mention that Francis Bacon might be considered to have prefigured the TGA. It was Arthur O. Lovejoy who in The Revolt Against Dualism (p. 23) quoted certain passages from Novum Organum, II, 46 to show that the probability of a temporal sundering, and therefore an existential duality, of the content given and the reality made known to us through that content had suggested itself to Bacon, though the latter then unfortunately discounted that probability for several bad reasons. Lovejoy went on to claim that the conjecture of the images or rays of the heavenly bodies taking some appreciable time in travelling to us had been not only propounded but embraced and defended already by Francis Bacons subtler medieval namesake Roger Bacon three centuries earlier.

10

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What is valuable in the little that Smith does say about the TGA is his reminder, relegated to a footnote, that Leibniz was (one of) the first to state it concisely.13 He did this in his New Essays on Human Understanding, in the context of claims (by Philalethes, a spokesman for Locke) that the ideas which are received by sensation are often altered by the judgment of the mind in grown people and that we substitute the cause of the image for what actually appears to us, and confound judging with seeing. Assenting to this, Leibniz (in the guise of Theophilus) says that when we are deceived by a painting our judgments are doubly in error. First, we substitute the cause for the effect, and believe that we immediately see the thing that causes the image. For strictly we see only the image, and are affected only by rays of light. Since rays of light need timehowever littleto reach us, it is possible that the object should be destroyed during the interval and no longer exists when the light reaches the eye; and something which no longer exists cannot be the present object of our sight. Secondly, we are further deceived when we substitute one cause for another and believe that what comes merely from a flat painting actually comes from a body.14 It is, of course, in the course of describing the first deception that Leibniz so succinctly laid out this pioneer version of the TGA. In the body of his own book Smith implies that this argument can either be reflected ambulando or be independently answered without too much difficulty.15 When asked about how he would proceed to deflect it, he replied he would do so by rejecting its crucial premise that, necessarily, any object of direct awareness exists at the time of the awareness. According to Smith, this premise can be rejected without absurdity.16 But can it? Many philosophers share Smith's view on this issue but many others do not. The latter, unlike the former, have a strong intuition that the notion of direct perceptual awareness of something in the past just doesn't make any sense. Clearly, the point can rationally be decided only by argument. Therefore, let me, following Howard Robinson,17 set out an argument for this premise as follows: (1) The direct perceptual awareness of a star, for example, is a psychological state that has content.

ibid., 275, n. 27. Leibniz, G. W. New Essays on Human Understanding, tr. P. Remnant and J. Bennett (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982): 134-135. 15 Smith, The Problem of Perception, 9. 16 Personal communication. 17 Here I am expanding an argument given on p. 81 of his Perception. Robinson is another Idealist philosopher whose work has inspired the present essay.
14

13

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(2) The content of a psychological state is what (in whole or in part) constitutes that state, what (in whole or in part) makes it the state that it is. (3) What constitutes the direct perceptual awareness of a star, what makes it the state that it is, is, in part, the star one is directly perceptually aware of. (4) Anything which (in whole or in part) constitutes something else must exist at the same time as, or overlap in time with, the thing which it wholly or partly constitutes. Therefore, (5) The content of a direct perceptual awareness of a star cannot cease to exist at an earlier time than the direct perceptual awareness of which it is the content. I think that this argument is sound,18 but most philosophers seem to be unaware of it. In an early work on perception the Direct Realist Fred Dretske objected to its conclusion (i.e., that any object of perceptual direct awareness must exist at the time of the awareness) on the grounds that it is neither desirable nor warranted. I will respond to his elaborate and revealing argumentation, as well as that of Anthony Quinton and David Armstrong, two other Direct Realists, in Chapter Two of my dissertation. Jonathan Dancy, likewise a Direct Realist, has claimed that this conclusion masksand illegitimately trades onan ambiguity (and also relies on an inadmissible infallibility). I will discuss his arguments together with John Fosters, who perhaps surprisingly is no fan of the TGA. The latters arguments are as follows. In comments to me in an e-mail exchange, John Foster has objected to (4) on the grounds that it isnt obvious that anything which partly constitutes something else must exist at the same time as, or overlap in time, this other thing, and anyway, that my claim would be taken by the Direct Realist as begging the question. In answer to my question, If this other thing exists from time t onwards to time t+1, then how can the thing that partly constitutes it (and thereby is a part of it) exist entirely before time t?, Foster replied by saying that the Direct Realist won't think that the earlier object is part of the later perceptual episode, but only that the perceptual state (type-state) which that episode realizes is a state of being aware of that earlier item, and so a state that could not be realized if that item did not exist (my emphasis). It is only in this sense that he will take the earlier item to be partly constitutive of the later perception.19 But why could that state not be realized if that (earlier) item did not exist? It is, I think, only because this would violate the conceptual requirement that in order to be perceived, an item must exist at some time or otherperhaps (leaving this issue provisionally open) not necessarily

18

Speaking on the same page about the claim that content and act must be simultaneous Robinson says he finds its intuitive appeal overwhelming. Thats exactly my view. 19 Personal communication.

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the same time as that at which it is perceived. Let us call this the existence-requirement for perception (which few if any philosophers nowadays would be willing to question), and distinguish it from the simultaneity-requirement. The latter is something that both the Direct Realist (or rather, to be more exact, most Direct Realists, though emphatically not all) and Foster (who tries to refute Direct Realism on other grounds) reject. In Chapter Four, I will defend it further against Fosters just-mentioned misgivings as well as those of Dancy and of many other like-minded philosophers writing at the beginning or middle of the last or the beginning of the present century. But, first, in Chapter Three I will present several of the other arguments of these like-minded philosophers. These are surprising arguments in that they deny the existence of a radical separation between perception and memory and claim that one can gain genuine perceptual access to the past not only by remembering things, but also by looking at past things as well as looking at photographs of them or watching television broadcasts. In addition to objecting to the simultaneity-requirement, Dretske, in a later exchange, has objected to (3) as well by claiming that the content of a psychological state, e.g., what makes the direct perceptual awareness of a star the state that it is, is not the star, but is completely given by the properties that the state represents the star as having. The content, says Dretske, is just like a measuring instrument. A thermometer is in the same representational state (has the same content) if it registers 95 degrees in location L (representing L as being 95 degrees) as it does when it registers 95 degrees in location L' (representing L' as 95 degrees). Likewise, I think, an experience of a star (a distant object that no longer exists) as a bright shiny object has the same content as an experience of a nearby object (which still exists) as a bright shiny object.20 In Chapter Five, I will give reasons for thinking that Dretskes account (called the Representationalist Theory of Perceptual Experience or Representationalism or Representationism21 for short, and currently quite popular) is not at all compelling. But even if Im wrong and the Representationalist Theory of Perceptual Experience is correct, I will argue that this need not militate against the simultaneity-requirement for perception. In the same chapter I will also briefly discuss James W. Cornmans presumptive objection to (3) on the grounds that my present perceptual experience of a distant star consists in my being in a state of star-sensing now as a result of my eyes being suitably affected by stimulus

20

21

Personal communication. Not to be identified with the Representative Theory (Representative Realism) of Fosters classification, although the difference isnt straightforwardly clear. See sections 5.2. and 5.4.

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previously transmitted from the star...22 A star-sensing, according to him, is neither a star nor the awareness of a star but an objectless, adverbial sensing event. I will give reasons (largely unoriginal ones) for saying that no such events exist.

1.3. Other Objections to the TGA

Not all philosophers, not even all Direct Realists, who attack the TGA do so by denying the simultaneity-requirement. Len Carrier,23 for example, is one Direct Realist who accepts it. He can do so because he rejects the Leibnizian versions implied conclusion that what we immediately see is only the image rather than the thing that causes the image, i.e., the star. He rejects this conclusion because he accepts (1) the view that though we do not immediately see either the star or its image, we do immediately see the stars light and (2) the view that both the star and its light are physical objects rather than images of them. These views, I will argue contra Carrier, to the extent they are correct actually strengthen the TGAs force against Direct Realism. Other Direct Realists (David Lewis and Hanoch Ben-Yami) suggest an interpretation of the scientific facts that tries to block the TGA altogether by denying that a star can go out of existence before light from it reaches the seeing subject. If it cannot, it follows, in the words of Lewis, that ...the stars, as I now see them, are not straighforwardly past; for lightlike connection has as good a claim as simultaneity-in-my-rest-frame to be the legitimate heir to our defunct concept of absolute simultaneity.24 This view poses what is perhaps the greatest challenge to the TGA. Still, as I will try to show, I think it can be overcome. The discussion will involve distinguishing two time gaps: (1) the one between the time light ostensibly leaves a star and the time it arrives at the observers eye, and (2) the much shorter one between the time it arrives at the observers eye and the time (a certain processing in the brain having taken place) the star or its light or its image is seen. I will argue that even if the first time gap should (contrary to fact, I believe) pose no problem for the Direct Realist (as Lewis and Ben-Yami25 argue), the second time gap (an intra-organismic

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J. W. Cornman, Perception, Common Sense, and Science (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1975): 49-50. 23 L. S. Carrier, The Time-Gap Argument, Australasian Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 47, No. 3 (December, 1969): 263-272. 24 D. Lewis, Veridical Hallucination and Prosthetic Vision. In: J. Dancy, ed. Perceptual Knowledge (OUP, 1988): 83. 25 Hanoch Ben-Yami, Apparent Simultaneity. In [2007] EPSA07: 1st Conference of the European Philosophy of Science Association (Madrid, 15-17 November, 2007).

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one) certainly does (contra Ben-Yami again, but now basing himself on Daniel Dennett26); but it does so, I admit, only if certain other arguments against Direct Realism work.

1.4. A Berkeleian TGA

Although all versions of the TGA initially aim to refute Direct Realism, some go on to try to prove Indirect Realism, while others proceed in an opposite direction, first trying to refute Indirect Realism and then going on to prove Idealism. Particularly pertinent here are some of the claims and arguments of George Berkeley, whose thought will play a major role in what follows. This is a good place to introduce an absolutely essential distinction between two kinds of Direct Realism. As Berkeley wrote towards the end of his Three Dialogues, My endeavors tend only to unite and place in a clearer light that truth, which was before shared between the vulgar and the philosophers: the former being of opinion, that those things they immediately perceive are the real things; and the latter, that the things immediately perceived, are ideas which exist only in the mind. Which two notions put together, do in effect constitute the substance of what I advance.27 The first of these notions is a Direct Realism that is distinct from the one the TGA aims to refute. The latter Direct Realism, to put it in the words of David Smith, combines (1) an epistemological component, the view that we directly perceive the physical world, with (2) a metaphysical component, the view that the physical world has an existence that is not in any way dependent upon its being cognizedthat is, perceived or thought about. Smith goes on to say that according to Direct Realisms metaphysical component, [t]he physical world is not, as it is usually put, dependent on consciousness, at least not finite consciousness. This gives us a Realism that is opposed to Idealism: the view that whatever seems to be physical is either reducible to, or at least supervenient upon, cognitive states of consciousness.28 Berkeleys Direct Realism, too, has an epistemological component, and it is the same as the one in the Direct Realism discussed by Smith; but its metaphysical component is just the opposite. The metaphysical component of Berkeleys Direct Realism is captured in the second notion that he mentions, which, of course, implies Idealism as characterized by Smith. Thus we may call Berkeleys Direct Realism Idealist, and Smiths Direct Realism Non-Idealist.

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Daniel Dennett, Consciousness Explained (Boston: Back Bay Books, Little Brown and Company, 1991): 101170. 27 George Berkeley, Works, 3D, 262 28 Smith, The Problem of Perception, 1-2.

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Now while Berkeley did not in fact use the TGA, he could have used it. There is nothing in his philosophy that would make it inadmissible or inadvisable for him to argue for Idealist Direct Realism as follows: (1) Suppose I look at what I take to be the sun. (2) Since rays of light from the sun, according to the physicists, need about eight minutes time to reach me, it is possible that the sun should be destroyed during that interval and no longer exist when its light reaches my eye. (3) Now just suppose that the sun actually has been destroyed during this interval. (4) But something that no longer exists cant be something that I now immediately see. (5) Yet I do see something immediately that I take to be the sun. Therefore, (6) What I immediately see is the visible sun, not the sun of physics that I suppose to have been destroyed. (7) But I immediately see only one visible sun and nothing else having a conformity or resemblance to29 it; only one dazzlingly bright round thing in the heavens rather than two. (8) And in addition to the immediately seen visible sun I do not immediately or mediately see any other thing resembling it. (9) If Indirect or Representative Realism is true, then I can see something that no longer exists and I do see both the visible sun and the physical sun I suppose to have been destroyed. Therefore, (10) Indirect or Representative Realism is false. (11) This visible sun, though perhaps secondarily caused by the sun of physics, has, like all things, strictly and truly been caused by God. (12) But the visible sun is a collection of, or a fiction of our own brain30 dependent on, ideas of color, light, and figure. (13) This collection of, or this fiction of our own brain dependent on, ideas of color, light, and figure, either exists without the mind or within the mind. (14) If it exists without the mind, then it could radically change without my noticing it. (15) But this collection of, or this fiction of our own brain dependent on, ideas of color, light, and figure, could not radically change without my noticing it. Therefore,
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Berkeley, Works, 203. Berkeley, Three Dialogues, Preface

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(16) The visible sun I see exists within the mind. (17) Even if the sun of physics had not been destroyed (as in reality it never has been and most likely never will be in human life-time), I still would be immediately seeing the visible sun onlyfor exactly the reason mentioned in (7). (18) Suppose that the sun of physics has not been destroyed, i.e., that (3) is false. (19) Then in the very act of immediately seeing the visible sun I am also perceiving, whether immediately or mediately, the undestroyed sun of physics, which is a larger collection of, or a more complex fiction of our own brain dependent on, ideas of which collection or fiction the visible sun is a part. Therefore, (20) Whenever I see the visible sun I perceive a larger collection of ideas, some of which I perceive immediately. (21) But what is true of perceiving the visible sun is true, mutatis mutandis, of perceiving any sensible object whatsoever; Therefore, (22) All sensible objects are ideas or collections of ideas which exist only in the mind. QED. Although I find this Berkeleian TGA entirely congenial, in this work I mostly engage with only a part of itthe part that helps to refute Non-Idealist Direct Realism. And that, to begin with, comes right at the beginning. Thus all the steps before the first conclusion (6) are either legitimately supposed or uncontroversial except for (4), which is a corollary of the simultaneity-requirement. Once (4) has been fully defended, (6) is firmly secure. But since the visible sun is what later philosophers would have called an array of sun-like sense-data or a complex of sense-data of the sun or something similar with the expression sense-data (or synonyms thereof) in its name, the argument for (6) establishes the existence of sense-data31 and thereby the falsity of Non-Idealist Direct Realism at least in the case of seeing the sun. In order to get the same result for all cases of seeing, defenders of the TGA typically resort to a Continuity Argument. Premise (20) represents the conclusion of such an argument but the argument itself is not contained in the above Berkeleian TGA. Yet there are considerations not

I assume that the many arguments voiced over the years against positing sense-data can be overcome. For strong defenses of this assumption see, inter alia, Foster, Ayer, 144-191; Robinson, Perception; Foster, The Nature of Perception, 147-170, 186-195; and OShaughnessy, Consciousness and the World, 439-514. The last three books especially make any claim that the sense-datum theory should be relegated to the philosophical dustbin seem hollow, pretentious, and closed-minded.

31

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explicitly offered by Berkeley out of which such an argument may readily be constructed. This, too, is something I will try to do. Once the existence of sense-data is secure, Non-Idealist Direct Realism has been defeated, thus leaving us to choose between Indirect (Representative) Realism and Idealist Direct Realism. Although justifying this choice goes beyond what this dissertation minimally aims to accomplish, I will, in the course of discussing the Berkeleian and other versions of the TGA, argue in favor of considerations that support the rejection of Indirect Realism. And my defense of Idealist Direct Realism will largely (though not exclusively) be limited to the point that if Non-Idealist Direct Realism and Indirect Realism have been eliminated, Idealist Direct Realism is the only option left.

1.5. The Importance of the TGA

Although the TGA might have originated with Leibniz, the first extended discussion of it occurred much lateralmost a hundred years ago in a symposium called The Time Difficulty in Realist Theories of Perception and published in the Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 11 (1911-12), with H. W. Carr, F. B. Jevons, W. Brown, and G. Dawes Hicks participating. From at least that time onwards it always found people willing to defend it or to refute it. Of major early 20th century British philosophers, twoBertrand Russell and C. D. Broad endorsed it strongly (Broad) or even wholeheartedly and repeatedly (Russell). Their contemporary G. E. Moore, who did not, is nonetheless reported to have remarked that to many people it appeared absolutely conclusive.32 One of these, whether or not Moore had exactly him in mind, was the American philosopher and historian of ideas A. O. Lovejoy (1873-1962).33 His presentation and defense both of (1) the epistemological dualism of sensed data and perceived objectswith the TGA receiving pride of place in this connectionand of (2) the metaphysical dualism of mind and body still seem to me to be not far off the mark and well worth reading. Other important philosophers who have thought highly of the TGA include Maurice Mandelbaum (1908-1987) and our contemporary J. J. Valberg. The latter has produced and defended what in effect is a short version of the TGA or, rather, a strongly related argument that he thinks leads to a puzzle of experience deemed by him to be insoluble but which I will try to show can be solved by adopting a Berkeleian Idealist Direct Realism. Nevertheless, a much greater number of other philosophers interested in perception have discussed the TGA very little or not at all, or else they have criticized it. Of the latter, some have
32 33

In Lectures on Philosophy, edited by C. Lewy (London, 1966): 67. See The Revolt Against Dualism, especially pp. 23-25, 77-85.

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thought it important enough to deserve a very thorough examination. These include David Armstrong, James Cornman, Jonathan Dancy, Fred Dretske, Moltke Gram, George Pitcher, and Anthony Quinton, all writing in the second half of the last century. But even in the first decade of the 21st century the argument has excited interest, though one young philosopher criticizing it no longer calls it the TGA or speaks of a perceptual time-gap or time-lag; instead he hails what he takes to be the actuality of interstellar perception. I will discuss the TGA-related views of all these philosophers, including a few others perhaps no less important but not mentioned so far. It is my hope that even if my dissertation falls short of its goal of showing that the TGA proves the existence of sense-data and disproves NonIdealist Direct Realism, it will at least constitute a reasonably complete critical survey of all the positions so far taken on what Mandelbaum has called one of the strongest of all the arguments which can be used against direct realism.34 But how, in addition to working toward the same conclusion, is the TGA related to these other arguments (including the Argument from Illusion and the Causal Argument)? In what ways, if at all, are these arguments inferior to the TGA? On the other hand, can the TGA really stand on its own, or is it (as Ive already suggested at the end of 1.3.) in need of their assistance, after all? No discussion of it would really be enlightening and complete without answers to these questions. These will also emerge in the following pages. Finally, a concluding remark about my procedure. In Chapters Two, Three, and Four I will provide a full defense of the simultaneity-requirement, first by presenting and trying to deflect attacks on it and then by giving positive reasons to uphold it. In Chapter Five I will criticize Dretskes Representationalist Theory and Cornmans Adverbial Theory of Perceptual Experience. Chapter Six will feature a discussion of the second and smaller time-gap (mentioned toward the end of 1.3. above), of some other arguments for sense-data, and a conclusion in which the key insights of Valberg, Cornman, Carrier, Foster, and Berkeley are joined together. Brief discussions of, or references to, other philosophers writing on the TGA will occur throughout the text. Hopefully, by the end, Direct Realism of the Non-Idealist variety will, insofar as it is Non-Idealist, not seem to be the most attractive option; and Direct Realism of the Idealist kind will not seem as unattractive as it is still commonly supposed to be.

34

M. Mandelbaum, Philosophy, Science, and Sense Perception (Baltimore: The John Hopkins Press, 1964): 174.

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Chapter Two: Denying the Simultaneity-Requirement (I)


2.1. The Existence-Requirement

If anything whatsoever is seen, that thing must exist and it must exist at the time it is seen. The consequent of the foregoing conditional has two clauses, the first of which states the existencerequirement and the second the simultaneity-requirement. As Ive already indicated, the first is now largely undisputed while the second is not. On my view, both conditions have to be satisfied. First, a few words about the existence-requirement. The issue of whether, with respect to this requirement, the verb to see has one sense or more than one used to be vociferously argued about some fifty or more years ago. Three positions have been taken on this issue: (1) there is one sense (use) of to see and this sense (use) logically requires that the thing seen exist; (2) there is one sense (use) of to see and this sense (use) does not require the existence of the thing seen; (3) there are two senses (uses) of to see, one of them requiring the existence of the thing seen and the other not requiring it. As far as Im aware, this issue has been settled (as far as anything in philosophy can be settled) by Fred Dretske in his 1969 book Seeing and Knowing, a seminal work in thirdquarter-century philosophy of perception. There he lengthily presents what to my mind is a fully satisfactory defense of the view that there is only one sense of see, a sense governed by the existence-requirement. It is what he calls a non-epistemic sense whose correct application to any agent does not require that agent to have any concepts, beliefs or even minimal human understanding. In this sense a dog as well as a human being, a child as well as a scholar can see a floppy disk even though he, she, or it may not understand, or be capable of understanding, what it is they see. And it is in this sense that, as Dretske puts it, one cannot truly say of S (whether this be some other person or yourself) that S sees a D unless there exists a D, a real D, which S sees. Now, of course, sometimes this existence condition may be suspended by the words in which a perceptual report is couched or by the context in which it is given. Thus, if the report George B. saw the female Pope praying to Allah is preceded by the words It looked to George B. as though or the words In George B.s dream, or the words Theres a story that goes as follows:. . . , the existence-requirement is on that occasion cancelled without its thereby being implied that there is a sense of to see not governed by the existence-requirement or that there are two senses one of which is so governed and the other isnt. As Dretske observes, 37

[t]he fact that there is only one sense of the verb in question here (in relation to the existence condition) is supported by the fact that unless we signal our suspension of the existence condition by some manner or means, our listener can object to our claim to have seen a D on the grounds that there are no Ds (or no Ds in the vicinity). If there were two senses of the verb, one of which was not governed by an existence condition, this type of objection would not be generally available. For, then, it would be possible, with a straight face and in all sincerity, to truly say that one saw Harold at the scene of the crime without even believing he was there, and indeed without his having been there.35 This is all I will say in defense of the existence-requirement for now; to my knowledge, Dretskes argument on this point has been neither effectively challenged nor refuted. The simultaneity-requirement (the simultaneity principle, the simultaneity-thesis: I use all three names interchangeably) is a different matter. Soon after defending the existencerequirement he goes on to discuss the question of when D must exist to be seen. That is, can we see stars that no longer exist? Dretske claims that the latter question must be answered affirmatively and that the simultaneity-requirement does not apply to seeing; he spends even more time on arguing against the simultaneity-requirement than he does on arguing for the existence-requirement. Since his and my intentions are opposed here and since I believe his negative argument to be instructive but flawed, I will use his argument against the simultaneity-requirement as a way of eventually getting into my argument for it.36

2.2. Dretske on the TGA and the Simultaneity-Requirement

Though Dretske rather thoroughly prepares the ground for the TGA, unfortunately he chooses an ill-suited hinge on which to make the argument turn, viz., a coffee pot. (Why I think it is poorly chosen will emerge a bit later.) Dretske starts out by retelling the well-known causal story: If the statement S sees a coffee pot is true, then, as a matter of well-established scientific fact, light is being reflected from the coffee pot into Ss eyes, the light is stimulating certain sensitive cells which, in turn, are transmitting electrical impulses via

35

36

Dretske, Seeing and Knowing, 49-50. Dretskes defense of the existence-requirement occurs on pp. 43-50. My quoting and discussing it at such great length is additionally justified by its having helped persuade David Smith (as I learned in a personal note from him) to give the TGA exceedingly short shrift. That alone makes a careful engagement with Dretskes argument worthwhile. I should mention that Dretskes 1969 text represents one of the last sustained endeavors to refute the TGA before it was taken up again in the early 1990s by Valberg and Robinson (favorably) and subsequently by a larger number of other philosophers (mostly unfavorably).

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the cortical nerve to the cerebral cortex where a pattern of excitation occurs. As a consequence of this chain of events, S undergoes an experience, an experience which we might ordinarily describe by saying that S (first) sees the coffee pot. Let us refer to this typical or standard sequence of events with the notation e1, e2, e3, ...; the terminal event or stage, en, will be that last event or state of affairs which, until it happens, S has not yet seen the coffee pot. ... I shall simply refer to en as the terminal stage en in the standard causal sequence associated with seeing a coffee pot. If the sequence e1, e2, ... en is interrupted at any stage, by inserting a barrier between S and the coffee pot, by Ss closing his eyes, or by some severe damage to Ss nervous system, then the latter members of this sequence will not occur and S will not (as we commonly say) see the coffee pot. Nonetheless, the terminal stage in this sequence of events, or something very much like the standard terminal stage, that which does not normally occur until e1 through en
-1

have occurred, can occur without these particular

causal antecedents. We might, theoretically at least, stimulate Ss cerebral cortex by a set of electrodes and thereby create for S a visual experience which was, from its subjective side, indistinguishable from the one that was initiated by light from the coffee pot in the standard or normal case. Or, if S is suffering from some kind of hallucination, the last member (or something very much like the last member) of our standard sequence may occur, or the latter members of it may occur, without the usual antecedents; S might (if he makes a mistake) describe himself as seeing a coffee pot when there is no coffee pot which is reflecting light into his eyes. Finally, . . . there is a brief temporal interval, measurable perhaps only in microseconds, between the time when the light leaves the coffee pot and the occurrence of the terminal stage (i.e., between e1 and en). When we speak of seeing the moon, the sun, or the stars, the temporal interval becomes appreciable. In some of these cases one can legitimately speak of the causal sequence as beginning many years prior to the occurrence of the terminal event itself. This is sometimes expressed by saying that when we see a star we see it as it was many years ago, light requiring that long to reach us from the star.37 From this uncontested statement of facts, says Dretske, it seems to follow that the terminal stage itself is the most significant stage of the causal sequence; if it occurs, whatever its causal antecedents, then the percipient will undergo an experience which, in its subjective aspect, is indistinguishable from what he

37

Dretske, Seeing and Knowing, 68-70. Subsequent quotations from this book are all from pp. 70-75.

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experiences when he (as we ordinarily say) really sees a coffee pot. But when he really sees a coffee pot, we want to say that the coffee pot looks some way to him. And this seems to suggest that within the terminal state itself there is something describable as a coffee-pot-looking-something, an element which he takes to be the coffee pot in the standard case and which he might mistakenly take to be a real coffee pot in the nonstandard case. When this terminal event has the standard causal antecedents we ordinarily say that S sees a coffee pot (the coffee pot looks some way to S); when it does not have the standard causal antecedents, we say he is hallucinating or whateverin this case it definitely is not a coffee pot which he might mistakenly take to be a coffee pot. But there is no significant difference between these two events aside from their causal antecedents. We seem forced to the view that in both the standard and the non-standard case an event occurs which may be described by saying that S is visually aware of something which he may or may not take to be a (real) coffee pot. In the non-standard case it is certainly not a coffee pot. But even in the standard case it cannot be said to be the coffee pot itself since, if for no other reason, the coffee pot may no longer exist when this terminal event occurs. Hence, we may say that a percipient is directly aware of the element which is contemporaneous with the terminal event; when this terminal event has the standard causal antecedents we say that S sees the coffee pot, but this should now be understood to mean that S sees the coffee pot indirectly since it is not the coffee pot which looks some way to him. The coffee pot is merely associated with that causal sequence which terminates in an event (en) which, whether it has these antecedents or not, may be described by saying that something looks to him as we would ordinarily say the coffee pot looks to him. It is this something which he sees directly. Something like this is behind every attempt to introduce a direct vs. an indirect way of seeing things by analyzing the causal process of perception. The idea is that we are always, even in cases that are normally described by saying that we see an object of some sort, directly aware of an impression, percept, or sensation which is aroused in us by the causal action of light. This is an extremely seductive argument, and I do not wish to belittle its persuasiveness. After generously admitting the force of this argument Dretske nonetheless claims there is one, perhaps two, mistakes in it. What are they? He explains the first (alleged) mistake as follows: In hallucination (or artificial stimulation of the brain) we may have a visual experience, call it en, which is indistinguishable from the experience we have when we are said to see a real coffee potcall this en . Now, since en 40 and en are (or may be)

indistinguishable and in the case of en it is clear that we are aware of something which is not a coffee pot (although we may take it to be a real coffee pot), then also in en, the so-called veridical case, we must be aware of something which is not a real coffee pot. The pattern of this argument is obviously fallacious. I may not be able to distinguish between Ss handing me a genuine one-dollar bill (en) and Ss handing me a counterfeit one-dollar bill (en). If the counterfeit is good, the two events may be indistinguishable. Surely, however, we cannot conclude that because I am being handed a counterfeit bill in the one case, I must therefore be receiving a counterfeit bill in the other case. It may well be that in what we commonly refer to as the experience of seeing a coffee pot, there are other (hallucinatory) experiences which are indistinguishable from it. But this does not imply that the two sorts of experience involve an awareness of the same sorts of things. We can quite consistently maintain that in the standard case we are visually aware of the coffee pot, it is the coffee pot itself which looks some way to us, although this experience is indistinguishable (subjectively) from other experiences in which we are not aware of a coffee pot. In my view, however, what is fallacious here is not the argument that Dretske attacks, but Dretskes attack on it. The last sentence quoted raises the question, If in the non-hallucinatory case it is the coffee pot itself which looks some way to us and if this experience is subjectively indistinguishable from another experience in which theres no awareness of a coffee pot, then what is it that makes the latter experience indistinguishable from the former? Dretske nowhere so much as even tries to answer this obvious question. I will return to this point in a moment. For now let me note that even though I may not be able to distinguish between getting a genuine bill and getting a counterfeit one, in both cases I am really receiving a one-dollar bill; and it is a matter for further investigation whether that bill is genuine or counterfeit. Surely Dretske is right in saying that just because I am being handed a counterfeit bill in the one case, it doesnt follow I must be receiving a counterfeit bill in the other, just as he would have been right in saying that merely because I am being handed a genuine bill in the one case, it doesnt follow I must be receiving a genuine bill in the other; for in both cases it must still be determined whether that one-dollar bill is genuine or not; and just merely looking at them (however intently) is often not enough for telling which is which.38 That latter claim is exactly the point of those philosophers who argue for the view that in perception we are always directly aware of what Locke and Berkeley prefer to call ideas and others call appearances, presentations, phenomena, sensations, images,

38

That is why, when bills are larger, cashiers and bankers routinely subject them to more searching tests.

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impressions, sense-impressions, percepts, prehensa, qualia, sensa, sense-data, or sense-qualia.39 These philosophers (let us call them sense-datum theorists, for convenience) would not start out by saying that visual awareness is something that is analogous to being handed a counterfeit one-dollar bill; if they made use of the analogy at all, theyd start out by saying that visual awareness (of, say, something looking like a coffee pot) is analogous to being handed a bill; and then theyd go on to claim that this visual awareness could be either an awareness of a real coffee pot or an awareness of a hallucinated one, both possibilities being so far theoretically open. Now, of course, any given bill is either genuine or counterfeit, depending on its causal history (i.e., whether or not it has been printed according to certain procedures in a certain government press and/or vetted by certain authorities). Finding out which is the case would involve either tracing this history or, what is usually the case, submitting the bill to more severe inspection tests than merely looking at it with the naked eye; for the latter alone, to repeat, is often insufficient for distinguishing the genuine article from a good counterfeit. Suppose that a certain bill handed to me by S turns out to be counterfeit. It doesnt follow and no one in his right mind would arguethat an indistinguishable bill handed to me by S (or anyone else) will turn out to be counterfeit, too. But nor will anyone in the visual awareness case argue (as Dretske says they will) that since en and en are (or may be) indistinguishable and in the case of en it is clear that we are aware of something which is not a coffee pot (although we may take it to be a real coffee pot), then also in en, the so-called veridical case, we must be aware of something which is not a real coffee pot. What the above-mentioned philosophers will argue, rather, is that any visual awareness of something looking like a coffee pot is either an awareness of a coffee pot or an awareness of something else (something looking like, without being, a coffee pot) and that both these types of awareness have a common component, namely, an awareness of a complex of coffee-pot-like sense-data. The presence of this component is what explains why the experience of the coffee pots looking some way is subjectively indistinguishable from a similar experience in which theres no coffee pot looking any way at all. (This picks up the point raised a few paragraphs back.)

39 I, along with other philosophers accepting their existence, will understand these objects of perception to have the following features: (1) they are things of which perceivers are directly aware; (2) they are mental in the sense of being mind-dependent (which leaves open the possibility that they are also physical if, for example, the mind-body identity theory should be true, which it probably isnt); (3) they actually possess standard sensible qualities; (4) they are not intrinsically of something (they possess no intrinsic intentionality) although they are usually taken or interpreted as being of something; and (5) they are either sensory particulars (in which case they are usually called sense-data) or sensory universals (in which case they are usually called sense-qualia or just qualia). I apply the term sense-data to both, and mark the distinction, when required, explicitly. I call something physical if and only if it exists in space-time, is a particular, and is perceivable by more than one observer.

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Therefore, contra Dretske, it seems that these two types of experience do, after all, involve an awareness of the same sorts of things.40 But this common component need not be all there is to both experiences; it might not exhaust both of their contents. It might exhaust the content of the hallucinatory experience, but not that of the veridical one. Moreover, there is an allimportant question left open that still has to be answered. Is my experience veridical or hallucinatory? Is my visual awareness of something looking like a coffee pot an awareness of a coffee pot or an awareness of something else (something that looks like though it isnt a coffee pot)? Now finding out the answer to the this question involves, at a minimum, determining what preceded my experience and what follows it. This is something that the experience by itself does not disclose. So much for the first mistake allegedly found by Dretske. The second mistake in that extremely seductive argument occurs in what he calls its strongest form, the TGA. But before we get to that mistake let us finally look at Dretskes own infelicity (or is it a sly stratagem?) in presenting the TGA in terms of a coffee pot.

2.3. An Excursus: Physical vs. Phenomenological Simultaneity

Dretske claims that (w)hen we see the coffee pot, the terminal stage in the causal sequence could occur at a time when the coffee pot no longer exists. This is easier to appreciate in the case of distant objects (stars), but even in routine cases the same feature is present although the temporal interval which makes this possible becomes extremely small. Let us consider, then, a standard causal sequence with this minor alteration: when the terminal event, en, occurs, the object which initiated the sequence, the object which we ordinarily say we see, has ceased to exist. Certainly this catastrophic incident will not affect the character of en since the object has already (before it ceases to exist) exercised all the causal influence on en of which it is capable. Now, when en occurs the percipient has the experience which is ordinarily described by saying that he sees the object. Yet, in this case, the object no longer exists. The percipient is aware of something which looks like a coffee pot, but this something cannot be the coffee pot itself. And if this is so, it indicates that the percipient is always directly aware of something other than the coffee pot; for whether or not the coffee pot ceases to exist makes no difference to the terminal
At least, this is a highly plausible conclusion. But it has been disputed--if not by Dretske himself in this book then by those who subscribe to the so-called disjunctive view of perception. I think this view has been persuasively criticized by, among very many others, Robinson (in his Perception, p. 152-159) and Valberg (in The Puzzle of Perception, p. 98-100).
40

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event, and we have just shown that this terminal event may be described by saying that something other than a coffee pot looks some way (e.g. like a coffee pot) to the percipient. My seeing a coffee pot is certainly a routine case of seeing; but what Dretske unfortunately fails to acknowledge is that its actually impossible that in such a case the terminal event, en, occurs after the coffee pot has ceased to exist. To see this, lets again consider the Leibniz version of the TGA. While Dretske uses a coffee pot as his sample of an object seen, Leibniz uses a picture; but in both cases the distance between perceiver and object is roughly the same and equally minusculecompared to the distance between any perceiver on earth and any celestial objects she might perceive. Now in his TGA Leibniz claims that we see something all right and believe its the picture we seebut it cant be the picture because it has been destroyed, so what we see is something very much like it41 (otherwise we wouldnt think we still see it), and that is the image. There is a strong objection to this reasoning which applies to Dretskes version of the TGA as well. We may presume that Leibniz knew that light travels at such a high finite velocity and that the distance between any picture and human eyes is so small that the pictures destruction one or two nanoseconds after light-rays had left it is something we could not consciously notice. Since, however, he famously had a doctrine of unconscious perception, this would not have impeded Leibniz from making a meaningful distinction between our seeing the picture and our seeing its image. So Leibniz would probably have claimed, in defense of his time-gap argument (and here I state this defense in the words of Howard Robinson who wrote them without explicit reference to Leibniz), that the fact that we cannot discriminate very small time intervals is simply irrelevant. Whether or not I can discriminate such an interval, I do in fact perceive [the picture as it was some minuscule part] of a second ago; and it could, conceivably, have changed in some perceptible respect just in that time, so that by the time I in fact perceive it it is different from how I perceive it to be. The context is relevantly extensional and not intentional: my cognitive abilities in minute time discriminations are not to the point. Speaking for himself now, Robinson then goes on to say that the response to this defense [of the TGA] would be that it misses the point. This, I think, is exactly right; and it is a point that I believe must be insisted on. The point, Robinson goes on to say, is that the content must be phenomenologically contemporaneous, which means that it must not be possible to discriminate

Hence the word proxy (used by Smith) and the expression perceptual deputy (used by Gram) are very appropriate to describe the function of what Leibniz calls images, Berkeley calls ideas, and most subsequent philosophers call sense-data.

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any time distinction between perception and content by direct experience. This condition is satisfied provided that the physical time difference is insufficient to be noticed. Something like this is probably what Berkeley too would have said had he thought or heard of Leibnizs TGA. Even if it is a matter of some controversy whether he accepted the existence of insensible corpuscles, he certainly did not believe there could be insensible perceptions.42 So he would not have used this version of TGA to show anything, much less that we only see a picture-like thing that is caused by the picture rather than the picture itself. For Berkeley the TGA could have gotten off the ground only if we knew, on independent grounds, that a certain visible object had ceased to exist at time t and yet a perceptibly appreciable moment later we still seemed to see it, i.e., it appeared to us as though it were still there. This is certainly not the case with coffee pots or any other familiar, nearby things for most human observers in most circumstances. Thats why Berkeley, had he used the TGA, would have stated it in terms of seeing a star, the sun, or even the moon. And thats what most philosophers who discuss the TGA have in fact done. Except for Dretske who, I will now contend, misjudges the argument and underestimates its strength largely because of that inappropriate example of his. More importantly, he not only misgauges the argument, but also tries to mask this fact and thereby inadvertently plays into the TGAs hands.

2.4. Dretske and Direct Awareness (I)

Immediately following my last quote from his text (section 2.3), Drestke takes up direct awareness only eventually to shortchange itin a way that I find both crafty on Dretskes part and ultimately self-defeating. Showing this will take some time. He first says this: Being directly aware of something is a state of affairs which implies that the element of which one is directly aware must exist at the time one is directly aware of it. Since science has shown us that coffee pots need not exist at the time when, as we ordinarily say, we see them, we must conclude that we are never directly aware of coffee potsnor anything else the perception of which involves a causal sequence involving a temporal interval.

It is a separate question whether or not Berkeley was right in believing so. There is much to be said for Leibnizs view. Certainly Dretske is one in a long list of contemporary philosophers who believe that unconscious perceptions are both possible and actual. Still, in this work we are concerned mainly with conscious perceptions. Insensible perception will only become a topic in Chapter Six, where we will also take a new look at phenomenological contemporaneity.

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This conclusion, I remark, is actually false for those cases where the temporal interval is too small to be humanly perceptible. Science, as Ive just argued, has not shown what Dretske claims it has shown; i.e., it has not shown that all the temporal differences that scientists can determine to obtain are relevant to what humans can perceive to exist or not to exist. Still, at this point it seems that Dretske actually endorses the general conclusion (for all cases whatsoever), because he goes on to say, disparagingly: Some philosophers have resorted to heroic methods to avoid this conclusion. They have suggested, for instance, that seeing D is an activity which begins at the moment when the light rays (which eventually enter our eyes) are reflected from D.43 That is, the concept of seeing is stretched far enough backward in time to ensure the existence of the objects which we seat least they must exist when we begin to see them. I call this method heroic because it seems to be an outright sacrifice of common sense in order to save common sense. For if we adopt this alternative, we must say that we begin to see the star many years before we (as we ordinarily say) see it. In fact, we may begin to see the stars before we are born (or even conceived) and finish seeing them when we are four years old.44 There is nothing preventing one from talking this way, I suppose, but I do not think one will be talking about seeing something as this is ordinarily understood. For I think it is part of what we mean when we say of S that he saw D that he began to see D, or he first saw D, when and only when D began to look some way to S or, to put it in terms of the causal analysis, only when the causal sequence first reached the terminal stage, en. I fully agree with Dretske on this criticism of Hirst.45 He then continues as follows: I think we must conclude, then, that if someone builds into the notion of direct awareness the idea that the object of which we are directly aware must (logically must) exist at the time we are directly aware of it, then (given the finite velocity of light and the transmission of impulses) we are not directly aware of such things as coffee pots when, as we ordinarily say, we see them. I do not see how this conclusion can be avoided.

43

Here Dretske refers in a footnote to R. J. Hirsts The Problems of Perception, p. 308. Here Dretske, in another footnote, says that Hirst concedes the oddity of these consequences but shrugs them off with the observation that our ordinary ways of speaking are theoretically very unsatisfactory. 45 The same criticism is leveled against Hirst by C. W. K. Mundle in his 1971 book Perception: Facts and Theories. On p. 44 he first quotes Hirsts statement (from p. 133 of The Problems of Perception) that [w]e must either say that seeing or hearing the object is the whole causal process or that it is the end-stage of it. Then Mundle observes that Hirst chooses the former alternative. This commits him, however, to some embarrassing conclusions. For example, that my seeing the sun takes about eight minutes, the time taken for light to travel from sun to earth. Worse still, Hirst would have to say that my seeing a distant star takes a much longer time than I have lived. Russells statement that we cannot suppose that the last effect jumps back to its starting point, has special force here.
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Well, again, this conclusion can (and must!) be avoided by noting that coffee pots ordinarily are physically too close to us for them to be able to cease to exist before our seeing of them ceases. Thereupon, however, Dretske avows surprise in a way that is surprising to me: But proponents of this view [i.e., that the object of which we are directly aware must (logically must) exist at the time we are directly aware of it] have gone on to draw a much stronger conclusion than the one I have just conceded, a conclusion that is totally unwarranted by anything that has already been admitted. They have gone on to draw the conclusion that we are directly aware of something when we see a coffee pot. Where does this conclusion come from? This, I think, is the second mistake he had in mind in the lengthy quote cited in section 2 above. But before I say where I think this conclusion comes from and why it is fully warranted (and also why I find his surprise surprising), let me quote Dretske still further: Consider an analogy. We all know what is involved in receiving a message from D. D may signal us with a flag, send us a letter, call us on the telephone, or speak to us on the radio. Suppose, now, that I define a new notion, directly receiving a message from D, such that this is only possible on the condition that D must (logically must) exist at the time I directly receive his message. It follows immediately that I do not directly receive messages, either by radio, telephone, or letter, from distant friends. In each case my friend could have ceased to exist before I received his message. Of course, if someone hands me his message in person, we might say that I received his message directly. But in cases where I did not receive Ds message directly, does it follow that there is someone or something from whom I did receive a message directly? Is there anything to which I must be related by this newly defined relation? I do not see why there should be. When the postman hands me the letter from my distant cousin, I am not directly receiving a message from my cousin. From whom am I directly receiving a message? The postman? But if we say this, then we are completely altering the original meaning of receiving a message from. Originally this meant that the person from whom I received the message composed it; it is now being taken to mean the person who hands me the composed message. Or suppose Martians signal us by radio. We are not directly receiving a message from them. From who or what are we directly receiving a message? From the radio waves which eventually reach us? If so, and I do not know of any other suitable candidate for the thing which must exist at the time we receive the message, then we are interpreting the phrase receiving a message from in such an eccentric way that it is positively misleading to continue using it in the phrase directly receiving a message from. For we are now interpreting the latter phrase in such a way that we can 47

be related by it to such things as electromagnetic waves. In short, we can directly receive messages from things which it does not even make sense to suppose we received a message from (in anything like the original sense of these words). But to what, we might ask, is receiving a message from D supposed to be analogous? Dretske has been discussing Ss seeing a coffee pot; but is receiving a message from D really analogous to Ss seeing something? Well, in Berkeleys view it is: he thinks that when S sees the coffee pot, it is God who has put ideas of the coffee pot into Ss mind as if He were sending a message to S (we will return to this point in a later chapter). But thats not Dretskes thought at all; he shows no inclination to believe that our seeing something is due to Gods sending us messages. Of course, there may be other ways in which receiving messages is analogous to seeing but Dretske offers no hint, in this text, as to what they might be. Therefore his supposed analogy seems pointless.46 Furthermore, the difference between somebodys handing me his message in person and his having somebody else do it is perfectly obvious, as is the naturalness of saying that in the former case I received the message directly and in the latter I did so indirectly: Dretske is without a doubt right here. But if someone introduces a new notion, directly receiving a message from D, such that this is only possible on the condition that D must exist at the time someone directly receives his message, then, as Dretske again correctly implies, this would mean that quite a few messages are only indirectly received without any of those being directly received at all. Yet how is all of this supposed to be relevant to the issue of whether the coffee pot (or anything else) is perceived, whether directly or indirectly? First of all, Dretske is wrong in suggesting that the contemporaneity of perception and thing perceived is what marks off direct perception from perception as such (perception simpliciter). Of course, one may stipulate that S directly perceives D =def S perceives D and D exists at the

In response to my objection Dretske wrote to me as follows: The point of my mail example was to agree that something must exist at the time you get a letter from x (even if x no longer exists), but the thing that exists at this later time need not be something from which you are receiving a letter. You need not stand to this proximal event (mailman dropping a letter in your mailbox) in the relation (or anything like the relation) you stand to x. Likewise, I agree that when the star appears to you at a time the star no longer exists something must exist (in your head) to explain your experiencing the star as still existing, but this needn't be something of which you are aware. You say it must. What is the argument? It seems to me you beg the question by saying something must look some way to you and it can't be the star. Why not? I say it cant be the star because the star no longer exists; its no longer there to be looking some way to me; whats looking some way to me (indeed looking to me as though there were a star there) is a sense-datum, of which I am aware by virtue of being aware of its looking to me as though there were a star there (although I might not be aware of it as being a sense-datum; Im just aware of the sense-datum); and I must be aware of this sense-datum in order to explain why I have an experience as of the star as still existing rather than not experiencing anything (relevant) at all or just thinking of the star or just imagining it or just remembering my seeing of it. And this sensedatum is probably not in my head, but it certainly is in my mind.

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time S perceives D. Under this definition, the vast majority of things perceived would indeed trivially turn out to be directly perceived. But this is not at all the way that philosophers who have found the concept of direct perception useful have defined the term. What, after all, would be the point of such a stipulative definition? It seems entirely unmotivated. For these philosophers, that things directly perceived exist at the time they are perceived is not a matter of arbitrarily defining directly perceive in the way just described. Rather, they have been led to distinguish between direct and indirect perception in order to solve certain problems arising in the philosophy of perception. For this reason, beginning with Locke,47 they have suggested and/or constructed conceptions of direct or immediate perception so as to distinguish either two types of knowledge, or two ways of getting to know (the same or different kinds of) things. One of these conceptions has been developed in a Berkeleian, the other in a Russellian, way. Both ways, though distinct, crucially involve the claim that what makes perception indirect is some kind of mediation. This, and not the contemporaneity of perceiving and perceived, is the crux of the matter. We will discuss this issue in detail in 3.5.

2.5. Dretske and Direct Awareness (II)

Secondly, Dretskes wrong turn becomes fully evident in the next two paragraphs of his text. Heres the first: If the term awareness (sees or perceives) is to have anything like its normal sense, anything like the sense it has in S is aware of (sees or perceives) the coffee pot, then it does not follow that S must be directly aware of something or see something directly when he sees the coffee pot. If one wishes to insist that he must be directly aware of something when he sees the coffee pot, then one must be prepared to admit that the statement S is directly aware of D does not imply that D is even the sort of thing which it makes sense to suppose someone aware of (in the original sense of this term). D need not be the sort of thing which can be colored, or even look coloredanymore than radio waves need be the sort of thing which can compose messages. The only condition D must satisfy is that D must necessarily exist when we (as we ordinarily say) see the coffee pot. And if we cast around for what this might be, it is not difficult to find the natural candidate: it is simply the coffee pots looking some way to S.48 For this state of

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See An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, Book IV, Chapter IV, Section 3. The locution of Ds looking some way to S is introduced by Dretske on pp. 20-21 of his text when he construes S seesn D as D is visually differentiated from its immediate environment by S and then says that the phrase visually differentiated is meant to suggest that Ss differentiation of D is constituted by Ds looking some way to S and, moreover, looking different than its immediate environment. He goes on to explain that when I say that D
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affairs is necessarily involved in Ss seeing the coffee pot, it is simultaneous with his seeing the coffee pot (indeed, it is just an expression for the terminal stage of the causal sequence-- en), and it can occur when the coffee pot no longer exists. This, in fact, is precisely what the scientific facts show us: that the coffee pot can continue to look some way to us after it has ceased to exist. The fact that the coffee pots looking some way to S does not sound like the sort of thing of which S can be aware (it certainly is not colored or shaped like a coffee pot) should not disturb us; for there is nothing which should lead us to believe that being directly aware of this sort of thing is anything like being aware of something. This last sentence is disconcerting, in two ways. First of all, if I can be aware of my seeing the coffee pot (and Dretske is not, or at least shouldnt be, denying that), then why can't I be aware of its looking some way to me (even though that way, or its looking so to me, is obviously not itself colored or shaped in any way)? Surely, in the very process of my coming to be aware that Im seeing the coffee pot I can also become aware of how its looking to me, cant I?49 Secondly, the second clause of that sentence seems to me to be an outright howler: how can being directly aware of anything whatsoever fail to be like being aware of something? How can

looks some way to S, I do not wish this to be understood to mean that, for some character C, it looks to S as though (as if) D (or something) were C. The locution looks as though (or as if) it were usually signifies that the percipient believes, or is inclined to believe, or is prepared to cautiously put it forward that, what he sees is a certain sort of thing or possesses a certain property. That is, it suggests or implies something about the belief attitude of the percipient, and I want the construction D looks some way to S to be free of this implication. D can look some way to S without its looking to S as though it were C (for any C). . . . As I am using the phrase, Ds looking some way to S presupposes a sentient being (S) equipped with an appropriate visual apparatus by virtue of which, to employ an expression of the psychologists, D occupies a portion of Ss visual field. It presupposes or entails nothing about whether S notices D, whether he takes, or is inclined to take, D to be something in particular, or whether he exploits his visual experience in any way whatsoever. But even though D can look some way to S without its looking to S as though it were C, Dretske should not exclude the possibility that D can look some way to S together with its also looking to S as though it were C. In the cases of conscious human adult perception discussed here this is often the case. 49 When I called Dretske on this, he answered as follows: When I said that the coffee pot's looking some way to us was not something we are aware of I meant "aware of" in the way we are aware of objects and events (coffee pots, sunsets, shadows, trees, etc.)--things that, when we are (visually) aware of them, look some way to us. I don't think something's looking some way to us looks some way to us. We are, of course, aware of a thing's looking some way to us in the factive sense of "aware"; we are aware (of the fact) that it looks some way to us. But we can be aware that something looks some way to us (this fact) without being aware of the state of affairs--something's looking some way to us--that constitutes this fact just as I can be aware of (the fact) that I see a tree without being aware of (the state of affairs) my seeing the tree. I am aware (of the fact) that I experience things without being aware of my experience of things (this state of affairs). Even if the last two sentences were true, what I am claiming is not that when Im aware of seeing a coffee put I must also be aware of its looking some way to me; Im only claiming that when Im aware of seeing a coffee pot I can also be aware of its looking some way to me (even though its looking some way to me doesnt itself look any way to me), and nothing Dretske says addresses this claim. But can I really be aware of a fact without being aware of the state of affairs constituting this fact? Only if the fact, for example, is psychological and the state of affairs is physical involving neural activity. But in that case I would deny that such a physical state of affairs could constitute (rather than just partially explain) the psychological fact. Moreover, if I am aware of the fact that I experience things, I can in a jiffy be made aware of my experience of things (the state of affairs) simply by, e.g., your asking me, Are you aware of your experience of things?

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being directly aware of something not be like being aware of something? I think that Dretske must have misspoken himself here. But even before this last sentence theres something howling for attention: How long after the coffee pot ceases to exist can the state of affairs of the coffee pots looking some way to me last? Presumably (Dretske would answer, and reasonably so), for as long as light rays from the coffee pot are still streaming into my eyes and getting transduced into neural impulses that accompany, or are identical with, my seeing the coffee pot. But if so, then, it seems to me, Dretske is well on his way to losing his case. For consider: In the normal case (of human interaction with coffee pots), at any time t at which I see the coffee pot, the following statements are true: (1) the time it takes for light to travel from the coffee pot to my eyes is well below the threshold of human perceivability; (2) the coffee pot exists; (3) I see the coffee pot; (4) it is possible that I am aware of seeing the coffee pot; (5) it is possible that the coffee pot looks some way to me; (6) it is possible that I am aware of its looking some way to me; (7) if the foregoing three possible states of affairs were actual, then all the states of affairs from (3) to (6) would be phenomenally simultaneous. Now in this, the normal, case, it is (again) just false to say that what the scientific facts show us is that the coffee pot can continue to look some way to us after it has ceased to exist. The unvarnished truth is that the coffee pot can continue to look some way to us only for as long as it exists and not a humanly discernible moment longer. What can continue to look some way to us after it has ceased to exist is, if Dretske is right, just some celestial body.50 But is Dretske right? Lets suppose he is. Lets also suppose that at some point during the interval when light rays from the celestial body are still streaming into my eyes and getting transduced into neural impulses that accompany, or are identical with, my seeing of it, this celestial body is destroyed. Since Dretske claims that Im still seeing the celestial body, this can only be the body as it was many years ago; in other words, what I see, according to him, is a long-past state of the no-longer-existing heavenly body. But can something that now no longer exists look some way to me now? Can my two-storey, sixbedroom-room house that burned to the ground last year, or even yesterday, look some way to me today? What would it even mean to say, not that the cinders or ashes left behind, but that the
50

Or, at least, something very much further away from, and bigger than, us than visible coffee pots usually are; not even the most distant mountain would fit the bill here.

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house itself looks some way to me now? Admittedly, there is no light reflected from the house that now reaches my eyes, but that only explains why the house isnt looking some way to me now; it doesnt explain what it would mean to say the house is looking some way to me now, if it were looking some way to me now. Of course, it isnt, and it cant be. I can only have thoughts and memories about how it was looking to me when it still existed; I can also imagine what it would look to me now if it still existed; and I can imagine how it would look to me if I were looking at it now; but it, the no-longer-existent thing, cannot now actually look any way to me at all (in the way that anything that does now exist is looking to me now). So why does Dretske think that the no-longer-existent star is looking some way to me now? Obviously, its because (1) theres still light from it being received by my eyes, as a result of which (2) it appears to me as if Im seeing that star. These two claims are something both Dretske and I can agree on. But Dretske thinks (3) I am seeing the star (even though it no longer exists) and therefore (4) the star is also looking some way to me, while I deny both (3) and (4). Instead of (3) I claim that (5) I am seeing a sense-datum of the star (what Berkeley would call a visual star) and instead of (4) I claim that (6) the sense-datum is looking like a star to me. So which one of us is right? At this point I would challenge Dretske thus. What can he (or indeed anyone else) mean in saying the star is looking some way to us now? In our e-mail correspondence I had posed a related question to him as follows: How can the coffee pot continue to look some way to us after it no longer exists? Isn't it true that if the coffee pot looks some way to us, there must be some quality (say, brownness) it looks to us to have? And isnt it the case that its looking some way to us just is its having some quality it looks to us to have? But if so, how can it look to us to have a quality if it no longer exists, if it isn't there to have that quality or even just to look to have it? To this Dretske responded: I admit it sounds a little funny. But just a little. I am willing to concede that x's looking some way to us is just for there to be some quality x looks to have. And what the scientific facts show us is that something can look to have a quality when it no longer exists. But you slip from this into the more suspicious description its having some quality it looks to us to have. I admit that it sounds much more strange to speak of something actually having a quality (it looks to us to have) when it doesn't exist, but I would resist the inference from: 1. x looks to us to have quality Q

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to 2. x has a quality (viz., Q) it looks to us to have. That looks like you are moving outside the scope of looks something that only belongs inside the scope of this operator. To which I replied as follows: Since you admit that it sounds much more strange to speak of something actually having a quality (it looks to us to have) when it doesn't exist and therefore resist this inference, may I take it that when you say that what the scientific facts show us is that something can look to have a quality when it no longer exists, you mean to imply that the no-longer-existent coffee pot merely looks to have, but doesn't actually have, that quality? Am I reading you correctly? If so, then at least you avoid what I would call the contradiction of claiming that something can actually continue to have a sensible quality after it has ceased to exist. Dretske answered that indeed this is what he meant. But in that case we must be careful to observe that in the contexts at hand looks can either mean seems or visually appears. When Dretske agrees that the no-longer-existent coffee pot merely looks to have, but doesn't actually have, the quality of brownness, I think he has in mind looks as seems. But when he claims that everything we see looks some way to us he I think has in mind looking as visually appearing. Therefore I would strongly press the following objection: How can any no-longer-existing thing so much as even merely look (=seem) to have a property, when that property is a sensible (visually, tactually, aurally, olfactorily, gustatorily, kinaesthetically apparent) one such as is necessarily present in that things looking (=visually appearing) some way to us, which is what Dretske says the star (really, not just seemingly) does when we see it? Its just evident, I would claim, that any star seen by human beings actually does have qualities, one of which is looking (=visually appearing) to be a silvery luminescence, a pinprick of light. Hence, if Dretske says we can see a no-longer-existent star, then he must say it has that quality, too; so he cannot after all avoid (though he wants to) the conclusion that no-longerexistent objects have sensible qualities. Consequently, since Dretske does say we can see a star that no longer exists, he must also say that that non-existent star can still have sensible qualities which we now see, even if it is only the property of looking to be a pinprick of light. And now for the second of those two crucial paragraphs I mentioned several pages back: I conclude, then, that if someone wants to define a sense of direct awareness (immediate acquaintance, sensing) which has built into it the idea that the elements of which we are directly aware must exist at the time we are directly aware of them, then, in those cases which are ordinarily described by saying that we see a physical object, D, 53

either (i) there is nothing of which we are directly aware or (ii) the meaning of the term aware has been so shifted that the phrase S is directly aware of A is but an alternative way of describing the state of affairs which I have expressed by saying that D looks some way to S. And there is nothing in all of this which should suggest the conclusion that when we see a coffee pot, this visual achievement is mediated by our direct awareness of something other than a coffee pot. It seems to me that the first alternative Dretske mentions, namely, that (i) there is nothing of which we are directly aware, is simply unavailable here. Certainly, in most such cases, whenever were talking or thinking about coffee pots, or practically any other physical object in front of our eyes, they must exist, and we are aware of them, when we see them. This is just to repeat what was already said. Thus Dretske, I think, is just wrong on this point. It also strikes me that in virtue of leaving open alternative (ii) Dretske is really acknowledging, back-handedly, the truth of the sense-datum theory. For what is Ss having a sense-datum of D if not yet another way of Ds looking some way to S? In effect, the latter seems to be, in crucial ways, the functional equivalent, in Dretskes account, of the former, in the sense-datum theorists account. Just as Dretske wants Ds looking some way to S to be able to last even after D no longer exists, so the sense-datum theorist wants Ss having a sensedatum of D to be able to occur, in accordance with the TGA, even after D ceases to exist. And just as Ds looking some way to S allows Dretske to provide for the possibility that S can see a star that no longer exists, so Ss having a sense-datum of D allows the sense-datum theorist to provide for the possibility that it appears to S as though he were seeing a star even when he is not. Of course, the sense-datum theorist wont think Dretske can really provide for the possibility that S can see a star that no longer exists; what Ds looking some way to S allows Dretske to provide for (in the sense-datum theorists eyes) is only its looking to S as though he were seeing a star. From the latter Dretske then draws the conclusion that S, in effect, sees the star directly, whereas the sense-datum theorist concludes that S directly sees a sense-datum and thereby either (a) directly or indirectly sees the star, or (b) has evidence that there was a star to be seen in the past. This difference connects with the fact that in the sense-datum theorists account, Ss having a sense-datum of D has a mediating function that Ds looking some way to S doesnt have, in Dretskes account. For Dretske, the perception of all objects is direct (=immediate); thus he finds no real application for the concept of indirect (= mediate) perception. The first time Dretske explicitly mentions mediationif only to dismiss itis precisely in the last-quoted sentence. But he can dismiss it only because (to repeat) visual awareness of the coffee pot is not a good example for illustrating the difference between indirect and direct awareness. The sense54

datum theorist, of course, claims that both types of awareness occur in the coffee pot case, although proving this requires something like the Berkeleian version of the TGA. Now, at last, something else falls into place. Earlier in this section I quoted Dretske as saying that the proponents of the view that the object of which we are directly aware must (logically must) exist at the time we are directly aware of it have gone on to draw the conclusion that we are directly aware of something when we see a coffee pot. Where does this conclusion come from? Well, it should be clear now that it comes from the fact that the coffee pot, if we see it and are aware of it, must (logically must) exist at the time we are directly aware of it. This conclusion follows from both the existence-requirement and the (by now overly familiar) fact that a humanly visible coffee pot cannot go out of existence while some humans are still seeing it. It should also be clear that if we change coffee pot to sun and go back to the Berkeleian TGA of Chapter One, then an analogous conclusion comes from the fact that if it looks to us now (at any time falling within the eight-minute interval between the time the sun went out of existence and the time the last light rays from it reached our eyes) exactly as if the sun were still shining there, then we are visually aware of something; but given that the sun no longer is shining there, what we must be aware of is the suns sense-datum. All this is perfectly reasonable; and what is surprising is that Dretske seems to be baffled by this (as shown by his rhetorically asking, Where does this conclusion come from?). Another philosopher who, like Dretske, thinks that a no-longer-existent thing or state could be perceived and who wrote on this topic at roughly the same time, was Anthony Quinton. Thus before completing this segment of my discussion of Dretske I would like to consider some relevant passages of Quintons.

2.6. Quinton on the TGA

Quinton writes that (i)f an astronomer says there is an explosion at the north-west corner of the sun at the moment what he says is false, or at best an accidentally true prediction about an explosion he will be in a position to see in eight minutes' time but is not the explosion he takes himself to perceive.51 Let us assume the astronomer is speaking sincerely and Quinton is speaking the truth. So the explosion the astronomer now takes himself to see does not exist, i.e., there just is no such explosion occurring there now. But why does this astronomer believe what he says? Why does he believe that there is indeed an explosion occurring at the north-west

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Quinton, The Nature of Things, 200.

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corner of the sun now, when no such event is actually occurring there? Why does he take himself to perceive an explosion there when there is no explosion to be perceived, no explosion occurring there at all? He is not (I assume) hallucinating nor is he enjoying a clairvoyant vision. Hence it must be because it seems to him as though there were an explosion occurring there now. But why is that so? Why does it seem to him as though there were an explosion occurring there now? Given that he's neither hallucinating nor being clairvoyant and that there's no real explosion to be seen, mustn't it be because he is now aware of a proxy explosionan explosionlike sense-datum? How else could one explain what he takes himself to see? Quinton himself neither raises nor answers this question.52 This, I think, leaves the sense-datum theorist with a distinct advantagesimply because he does raise and answer this question. A little later Quinton writes: (i)n seeing the sun I see a roughly spherical, luminous object lying in the heavens in a certain direction from where I am standing. I also think I perceive, but do not, that this thing has a certain temporal property, that of being contemporaneous with my act of seeing. Though I am right to believe that there is such a thing out there this is not justified by that perception. Only inference can justify what I correctly believe on the basis of a misperception. But I do still see the sun, even if it is the sun of eight minutes ago.53 What is the misperception here? Well, it seems to be this: that the roughly spherical, luminous object lying in the heavens in a certain direction from where I am standing has a certain temporal property, that of being contemporaneous with my act of seeing. But why do I think (falsely, in Quintons opinion) that I perceive that it has this property? For it, the sun of eight minutes ago, obviously doesnt have it: while my seeing occurs now (at time t), the sun of eight minutes ago (call it the sun-at-t-8) ceased to exist when that minute ended. So the sunstage that I am now seeing no longer exists: what Im now seeing is a sun-stage of the past. Therefore, the misperception is just this: seeing what I now see as existing now. I see the past but mistakenly think it is the present. But what explains this mistake? Why do I make it? What is it that causes me to think wrongly that what is actually past is really present? These questions, again, are ones that Quinton does not raise or attempt to answer. But they seem to me to be good, legitimate questions deserving of an answer.

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In discussing Quintons treatment of an analogous situation (one in which a white wall that is seen appears yellow), David Smith says that Quinton (together with legions of other philosophers who have followed him in this) has no answer at all to the question of what it is about the nature of a persons perceptual experience that inclines him to believe hes seeing a yellow wall (Smith, The Problem of Perception, 39). 53 Quinton, The Nature of Things, 202.

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Let us take this more slowly again just to make sure that the answer to these questions isnt something thats already implicit in Quintons text. If seeing what he now sees as existing now is a misperception, then is there something that Quinton is right about? He thinks he is right about there being a roughly spherical, luminous object lying in the heavens in a certain direction from where he is standing. Nevertheless, this correct belief of his is, in his own words, not justified by what he perceives. Well, what does he perceive? He thinks he perceives that there is this spherical, luminous object out there in the heavens, and he erroneously thinks that he perceivesthat is to say, he actually misperceivesthat this object is contemporaneous with his perceiving. It isnt. What is contemporaneous with his perceiving is the sun-at-t; but he can't be seeing this sun-stage as yet, because at t, when he is supposed to be seeing a spherical, luminous object in the sky, this sun-stage has not yet emitted any light to his eyes. It will do this, at best, only eight minutes after t. So what does Quinton see? He sees a sun-stage, the sun-at-t-8. And what is this correct belief of his? What is he right about? He thinks he is right to believe that there is such a thing out there. But which thing is that? The sun-at-t-8 was, but no longer is, out there. What is out there is the sun-at-t, but Quinton can't be seeing this sun-stage (as yet). What he does see, he thinks, is the sun-at-t-8, and he thinks that he is right to believe that there still is the sun out there at t; but this belief, he says, is not justified by his perception of the sun-at-t-8. So what does justify this correct belief of his that there is a sun out there at t? Recall what he says: Only inference can justify what I correctly believe on the basis of a misperception. He doesnt spell out this inference so we will try to do it for him. What we have to work with, Quinton suggests, is three elements: a misperception, an inferential premise, and a correct belief. The misperception (the basis for the inference) is that the thing he perceives (the sun-at-t-8) is actually contemporaneous with his perception (at t) of it. The inferential premise is presumably that it is highly unlikely that the sun went out of existence at some moment during the last eight minutes. The correct belief is that at t the sun is still out there. So this inference is a probable (=probably correct) inference from the past to the present. This is as explicit a reconstruction of Quintons passage as I can manage. But still it yields no answers to our questions about the misperception: When I see the past but mistakenly think it to be the present, what explains this mistake? Why do I make it? What is it that causes me to think wrongly that what is actually past is really present? The sense-datum theorist, of course, claims that seeing what I now see as existing now involves, in one respect, no misperception and no mistake at all; hence these questions dont even arise for him. But they do for Quinton and he fails to answer them. This again leaves the sense-datum theorist in a better position.

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Now the respect in which there is no misperception for the sense-datum theorist is the following: When he claims that seeing what I now see as existing now involves no mistake he has in mind direct (immediate) perception only: in now seeing a spherical, luminous object that exists now I am directly seeing a solar sense-datum which is not a sun-stage though it is related to one, either as caused by it or as part of it. And the respect in which there may be a misperception for the sense-datum theorist is that he may think that in addition to now seeing a solar sense-datum he is also now seeing the star itself. But suppose now the logically possible but improbable happened; suppose the sun (mysteriously) did go out of existence five minutes ago. Then Quintons belief would be false; it would not be the case that, at t, there was a roughly spherical, luminous object out there. So in that case what would he say? Not knowing that the improbable happened, he would no doubt continue saying that, at t, he saw the sun (despite the fact that, unbeknownst to him, it no longer existed) and that it was the sun-at-t-8. Thus he would, again, be subject to a misperception (the same misperception that the roughly spherical, luminous object he thinks he sees is contemporaneous with his act of seeing); but, in addition, he would also be making a terribly wrong inference (that there still is that roughly spherical, luminous object shining out there at t.) Yet would he be right about anything? Yes, he would be right in thinking that the sun-at-t-8 existed. But what would this correct belief of his be based on? He presumably would say it is based on (what he takes to be) the fact that he is directly seeing it; the sense-datum theorist would say it is based on a highly probable inference to the past from the fact that hes now seeing a sense-datum of the star. Fortunately, the improbable event just described never happens; but something similar often transpires in the case of vastly more distant objects, such as the stars. So that when I, especially at night, look out and look above me, some of the things that I see are still there when I see them; but others probably are not. The light on my neighbor's porch is still on when I see it; but the pinpricks of light in the sky, the starsI dont know: most of them are still on (I suppose), but a few are long dead and gone (or so scientists assure us). The problem is that I (or the scientists) have no way of knowing, just by looking, which of the stars I see are still extant and which are dead: they all shine the same! Moreover, they all seem to be equally in front of my eyes nowtogether with everything else that I see. This consequence of the Dretske-Quinton view seems very funny, for two reasons. It seems funny, first, because we are told to accept the view that what is in front of our eyes and is seen by us now may either exist now or not exist now, and that we might not be able to tell, just by looking, which is the case. (This view is so strange that it could only be accepted if 58

there are exceedingly strong arguments for it, stronger than those that Dretske or Quinton have provided.) And it seems funny, second, because it doesnt sit well with what Dretske already has taught us about there being just one sense of the verb to see and its being governed by the existence condition (see 2.1.). According to this doctrine, its just not possible with a straight face and in all sincerity, to truly say that [at t] one saw Harold at the scene of the crime [at t] without even believing he was there [at t], and indeed without his having been there [at t].54 But now we seem to be told that it is possible with a straight face and in all sincerity, to truly say that one saw, at t, the star in the sky, without even believing it was there at t, and indeed without its having been there at t. Why? Why does saying that at t I saw Harold at the scene of the crime entail that he was there at t, while saying that at t I saw the star in the sky does not entail that it was there at t? Whats the big difference between Harolds being seen at the scene of the crime and the stars being seen in the sky? It might seem that, for Dretske, the answer is obvious. But discussing it in Chapter Four will lead us to wonder whether the existence-requirement for perception doesnt straightaway imply the simultaneity-requirement, after all.

2.7. Armstrong on the TGA

Writing just ahead of Dretske and Quinton there was another important (indeed, path-breaking) Materialist philosopher who also denied the simultaneity-requirement but valiantly tried to face the questions they either handled inadequately or totally ignored. David Armstrong, like Dretske, discusses the TGA extensively and feels its force; in addition, as a great Berkeley scholar he is fully sensitive to the pressure to acknowledge the existence of ideas. Though he doesnt succumb to it, he comes close (though not close enough) to admitting sense-data by being prepared to talk of sense-impressions. We describe our visual sense-impressions, he says, when we speak about what we seem to see, in the phenomenological sense of the phrase, but we restrict ourselves to the immediately seen.55 And seeing immediately is nothing but the acquiring of immediate knowledge of, or inclination to believe in, facts about the physical world, by means of the senses.56

54

The bracketed expressions are not in Dretskes text, but I assume they are consistent with what he has in mind there. 55 Armstrong, Bodily Sensations, 6. 56 Armstrong, Perception and the Physical World, 148.

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In some ways Armstrongs approach to the TGA is superior to both Dretskes and Quintons. It is superior to Dretskes in that, like Berkeley, Armstrong is ready to differentiate between immediate and mediate perception, and even more importantly, he isnt baffled, the way Dretske is, by the pressure to admit that in the case of the no-longer-existent heavenly body there is something we seem to see immediately, something other than the heavenly body. And it is much superior to Quintons in that it not only tries to answer the familiar, obvious questions but also raises, and grapples with, some new ones. Its well worth quoting at length what Armstrong says on the TGA in his Perception and the Physical World: It is logically possible that perception of an event should occur at exactly the same moment as the event itself occurs. Descartes actually thought that this did happen. He thought that a rod-like movement originated in the object, which produced a movement in the brain absolutely simultaneously. At the same instant that this movement in the brain occurred, the object was perceived. But we know now that in every case a time must elapse (sometimes a very short one) before a particular state of affairs is perceived. In some cases the time-gap is appreciable, when we hear distant thunder it is a few seconds, when we see the sun it is eight minutes, when we see the stars it is many years. But in every case there is some time-gap. But now one may begin to wonder how we can perceive now what happened then. How can we cross the time-gap, and get to the past? The past is over and gone, and how can we see what is over and gone? Must not perception take as its object what is happening now? Under the influence of this line of thought one may be driven over once again to the view that the only thing that can be immediately perceived is something that occurs now, for example, our present sense-impressions. And then we have once again accepted some form of Representative theory, with all its difficulties.57 Not wishing to be forced into Representative Realism (let alone Idealism, which, as a Materialist, he seems to consider to be completely beyond the pale), Armstrong must reject the TGA. He says that a complete emancipation from this argument is not very easy, so we shall proceed by stages; and in the first stage he mainly distinguishes between physical and phenomenological simultaneity, much as we have done in section 2.3. The conclusion of this stage is that the world being as it is, we are justified in saying that, in most ordinary perception, there is no time-gap to worry about. This is exactly our contention. The difficult cases are comparatively small in number (seeing the sun or a star, hearing distant thunder). It
57

Armstrong, Perception and the Physical World, 143. Further separately unannotated quotations are from pp. 143152 of this work.

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is just with respect to these visual cases that the TGA comes into play; and here Armstrong argues as follows: If we confine ourselves to what seems to be immediately perceived, that is, if we confine ourselves to our sense-impressions, we must admit that our impression is always of something that exists in the present. If an astronomer sees a star vanish, there is no doubt that he perceives the past. And he may perceive it as past. But his senseimpressions are impressions of something happening now: a light seems to go out in the sky now. If our analysis of perception is correct, he will have an inclination to believe falsely that something is happening up above him in the sky now. His immediate perception involves illusion about time, even if about nothing else, and it is only his mediate perception that is veridical. So it seems that we cannot have immediate perception of the past as past. Our immediate perception of past happenings must involve illusion, illusion about the time of the happening immediately perceived. In the case of the star, it may be questioned whether our immediate perception really involves any temporal illusion. It may be suggested that what we immediately perceive is not the star, but a present happening, causally connected with the extinction of the star many years ago. The star sends a message to us, as it were, and we immediately perceive the message, not the star. The foregoing two paragraphs are something that a sense-datum philosopher could assent to without reservation. But in the next paragraph Armstrong starts to wonder what it is that we immediately see in this case; and this is where the problems start: What could the immediate objects of sight be? They could not be our sense-impressions, for we cannot perceive sense-impressions. They could not be the light-waves from the star, for we do not see light-waves. The only possible immediate object of sight is the star itself. But then we must admit that our perception involves temporal illusion, because the star's extinction appears to be occurring now. It is exactly at the second sentence that the sense-datum philosopher will part company with Armstrong. He will say that star-like sense-impressions (a.k.a. sense-data) is precisely what we are visually aware of (even if we do not ordinarily say we perceive them); and he will ask, What is the argument for saying we cannot be aware of them? Armstrong doesnt give any in this section; he might have done so elsewhere in Perception and the Physical World, to which, unfortunately, I couldnt gain access in its entirety. However, in another book written immediately after this one Armstrong warns us that we must not be led by the substantive

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sense-impression into the unthinking assumption that sense-impressions are a sort of object.58 To this the sense-datum theorist will surely respond, How could we fail to be?, and add that far from being unthinking, this assumption is a very natural one to make. I assume that Armstrong might have some of the usual objections to treating sense-data as objects, of which there are many; I think they are sufficiently well disposed of in the works of Robinson, Foster, and OShaughnessy.59 The next sentence is surely right; but it prompts the obvious question, Why couldnt the immediate object of sight be light from the star? Surely we can see light (rather than lightwaves), cant we? This is just what Maurice Mandelbaum suggested in his book on senseperception;60 what Len Carrier asserts in his own treatment of the TGA;61 and what John Dewey claimed in his 1916 lecture on Nave Realism vs. Presentative Realism.62 Brian OShaughnessy, even more insistently, argued that we always see light and in a certain sense only light and that we must see light whenever we see physical objects.63 We will engage these points in detail in 3.5.3., 4.6., and 4.7. The third and fourth sentences suggest the fascinating possibility (not explicitly considered by Armstrong) that the star isnt extinct after all, that it still exists, that it isnt straightforwardly past (as weve already seen David Lewis putting it; well again discuss this possibility in 3.3. and Chapter Six). What Armstrong settles on instead is the view that we can and do see past things and events, as he explains in the next paragraph: So it seems that immediate perception is sometimes a perception of past happenings.

But, at the same time, the past cannot be immediately [my italics] perceived as past. All perception of the past as past is mediate [my italics] perception. There is no perception of a time-gap in immediate perception. In other words (to be entirely clear about this), we now immediately perceive the star as it was but no longer is, we perceive a past state of the now-extinct star, but we do not immediately perceive it as past: this we perceive only mediately. Immediately we perceive only what was; but we falsely think we perceive what is now; we are subject to an illusion. Then Armstrong
Armstrong, Bodily Sensations, 6. The sense-datum theorist, of course, would also contest Armstrongs claim that perception is nothing but the acquiring of knowledge of, or inclination to believe in, facts about the physical world, by means of the senses. This view, he would say, makes sense-perception too much like cogitation (thinking) and assimilates sense experience too much to intellectual activity. More importantly, it thereby seems altogether to leave out the object perceived (whether immediately or mediately) and to leave unexplained how perceptual contact with it is made. 60 M. Mandelbaum, Philosophy, Science, and Sense Perception (Baltimore: The John Hopkins Press, 1964): 177179. 61 L. S. Carrier, The Time-Gap Argument, Australasian Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 47, No.3, Dec. 1969: 263272 and Time-Gap Myopia, Australasian Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 50, No. 1, May, 1972: 55-57. 62 John Dewey. "Naive Realism vs Presentative Realism" Chapter 9 in Essays in Experimental Logic. Chicago: University of Chicago (1916): 257. 63 Brian OShaughnessy, Consciousness and the World, 441.
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revealingly admits the following: Ironically, however, this absence of a time-gap in immediate perception gives rise to two serious problems. The first goes as follows: We must admit that the notion of perceptual illusion is co-ordinate with the notion of veridical perception. When we speak of immediate perceptual illusion, it should at least make sense to speak of immediately perceiving the true state of affairs. When I press my eye-ball, the candle-flame looks double. But it is possible for the candle-flame to look as it is. Now suppose that when somebody perceives a star vanish, he simultaneously perceives the flight of a bird. It looks to him as if a bright object vanishes from the sky at the same instant as a thing with a birdlike shape moves across the sky. But, in fact, the first event occurred long before the second event, and so immediate perceptual illusion is involved. But if the concept of immediate perceptual illusion is co-ordinate with the concept of immediate veridical perception, it seems that it should at least make sense to speak of immediately perceiving the true state of affairs. We should be able to perceive immediately that the first event occurred long before the second event. But the difficulty is that we cannot understand what it would be like to perceive this (my italics). I can understand having the immediate perception that the bright thing in the sky is very much further away from my body than the object with the bird-like shape. (Of course, immediate perception only gives me 'very much further away'.) But what would it be like to perceive immediately that the extinction of the light occurred very much before the motion of the bird-like object? This is far from clear (my italics). Armstrong is making two very good points here: one, that if it makes sense to speak of immediately seeing things the way they are not, it should also make sense to speak of immediately seeing the very same things the way they are; and two, that it is hard to understand, and far from clear, what it would be like to see, immediately, one event occurring very much (centuries, days, or even minutes) before another. It is indeed admirable that Armstrong admits this difficulty (as far as I know, he is the first philosopher to have done so). But though he raises it, I cant see how and where he solves it, in this text or in any other. Therefore I cant see him as disposing of the sense-datum account. As noted above, Armstrong also identifies a second serious problem raised by the absence of a time-gap in immediate perception: We have put forward the view that immediate perception is nothing but the acquiring of immediate knowledge of, or inclination to believe in, facts about the physical world, by means of the senses. Now, if this is so, it seems that immediate perception of the past should be logically possible. Why should I not acquire immediate information about the past, knowing it to be the past, by using my senses? If we cannot give sense to the notion 63

of immediate perception of the past as past, it seems that our account of perception may be in jeopardy. Yet it is not clear what immediate perception of the past as past would be like. Again, I agree and again, I dont see where he provides a solution to this problem. The closest (and its not very close at all) that he comes to suggesting one is at the very end of his discussion of the TGA, where he says that: So to talk about looking into the sky, and acquiring, by the use of the senses, immediate information that something had happened in the past, would be a case for which we have no linguistic rules ready. We could not call it memory, for memory entails previous perception. We could not call it mediate perception, for that would be contrary to the description of the case as the immediate acquiring of information. We could not call it immediate perception, for we want to say that what is immediately perceived at least appears to exist in the present. We can certainly imagine that, by use of our senses, we should immediately acquire knowledge about the past, known as being past. We can imagine this knowledge being of the same sort as our perceptual knowledge, and just as detailed. But we should be reluctant to call it perception, although we would have no other single term to label it by. There is, of course, an excellent reason for this: this sort of phenomenon does not in fact occur. It is a mere logical possibility, for which our language has not provided. What is this mere logical possibility that Armstrong is talking about, this sort of phenomenon that does not in fact occur? Presumably it is our immediately acquiring by our senses knowledge about the past, known as being past. Although he admits it is not clear what immediate perception of the past as past would be like, he does claim we can certainly imagine this, yetand thats my complainthe doesnt explain how we can imagine it. Nevertheless, he at least prods the reader to attempt to construct, in his imagination, a possible scenario in which this sort of phenomenon does occur and in which we might immediately acquire by our senses knowledge about the past, known as being past. Heres my try at such a construction: Lets suppose (contrary-to-fact) that when a star explodes it turns orange so that during and after the explosion the light emitted (by what remains of the star) is orange. If this were a scientific fact and I knew it, then the following would be the case: if I perceived an orange light in the night sky at the same time as I perceived the flight of a bird, I would immediately know that a star has exploded, even though the first event occurred long before the second event. Of course, I would immediately know this only in a sense of immediate that does not exclude experience and learning (which are necessary conditions for acquiring scientific knowledge). 64

But can this really be immediate knowledge? This is a type of knowledge that Berkeley extensively treats of in his Essay towards a New Theory of Vision and calls mediate, as does Russell in his own related discussions. What is immediate on anybodys view is my knowledge that my sense-impression of an orange light was simultaneous with the birds flight. So it is doubtful whether my imagined example meets Armstrongs needs; whether, that is, the stars explosion in orange really is immediately perceived as past in just the way my senseimpression of an orange light is immediately perceived as simultaneous with the flight of the bird. Consequently, I dont find support for Armstrongs claim that we can certainly imagine that, by use of our senses, we should immediately acquire knowledge about the past, known as being past. Nonetheless, there is one more clear plus for Armstrongs account in that he, additionally, tries to explain why the simultaneity-requirement seems plausible. In the paragraph coming just before the one I quoted last, he writes: We have seen that in ordinary cases of immediate perception, in the paradigm cases where the objects we perceive are at no great spatial distance, the events perceived occur at the same time as the perception of them. An event that occurred in the past would have been perceived in the past, and so could only be remembered now. I suggest that this fact tends to be written into the concept of immediate perception. We tend to make it a logical necessity that what I now immediately perceive must exist now. There is a contingent fact involved, a fact about the speed of reaction of our sensory apparatus to physical events in our environment; but a conceptual necessity about immediate perception is erected on the foundation of this contingent fact. The discovery that we see the stars as they were many years ago comes as something of a shock to our conceptual system. But it does not force any extensive conceptual revision on us, for, when we look at the stars with this new knowledge, it still looks as if we are immediately perceiving present events. We need only say that what I immediately perceive now must at least seem to exist now. Lets suppose that Armstrong is right and that it is not logically (conceptually) necessary that the events perceived occur at the same time as the perception of them. What I claim nevertheless is that they always do. In other words, it is not just the case that normally the events perceived occur at the same time as the perception of them; it is also the case that in absolutely every case of perception we do perceive something that really exists or occurs at the time we perceive it. And I claim this because I cant imagine an exception to this regularity, just as I cant conceive of somethings happening without a cause. I cant conceive of an effects happening without a cause because that would violate a logical (linguistic, semantic) rule; and I 65

cant conceive of an events happening without a cause because that would violate a metaphysical rule. In the same way I cant conceive of perceiving something this second without there being something there that is perceived this second. This would violate a metaphysical rule, too. (We can call both logical and metaphysical rules conceptual). Therefore, if that things not physical, it must be non-physical; and theres no way around this. I hope finally to settle this issue in Chapter Four.

2.8. Conclusion about Dretske, Quinton, and Armstrong

Having surveyed three attempts to meet the TGA by denying the simultaneity-requirement, we are ready to state a few conclusions. One is certainly that if one claims that one directly sees a star now, then one must admit one sees it as it was (when it emitted the light in virtue of which one sees it) and not as it now is. This point, already obvious, will be reinforced in subsequent chapters. Now the TGA is an argument designed to show, with the help of the simultaneityprinciple, that if we do see physical objects, whether directly or indirectly, at all, then we do so in virtue of directly seeing sense-data. And this argument has not been refuted by either Dretske, or Quinton, or Armstrong. Dretske articulates the argument in terms of an unsuitable example and thereby fails to bring out the full force of it. When in looking at a coffee pot he asks what he can be seeing directly other than the coffee pot itself, to prove to him that he also sees sense-data is very difficult (though not impossible) because he does see the coffee pot directly, and additionally postulating the direct perception of sense-data thus seems thoroughly uncalled-for. But claiming, as he does, that the coffee pot can go out of existence before the seeing of it means ignoring the difference between physical and phenomenal simultaneity, with only the latter being required for human perception. And when he starts talking about the coffee pots looking some way to him and asserts that this is simultaneous with his perception of it, he is introducing something suspiciously close to sense-data. Moreover, he seems to be forced to admit that a no-longer existent star still has sensible properties at the time it is seen. Thus Dretskes case against the simultaneity-requirement is wobbly. Quinton fails to raise and to answer some obviously pertinent questions, such as: Why does someone take herself to perceive a certain event somewhere when there is no such event to be perceived, no such event occurring there at all? When I see the past but mistakenly think it to be the present, what explains this mistake? Why do I make it? What is it that leads me to think wrongly that what is actually past is really present? Failing so much as even to consider these

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questions makes his case against the TGA and the simultaneity-requirement still more seriously incomplete. Armstrong makes a conscious effort to answer these questions without invoking sense-data, and this might amount to a satisfactory treatment of the TGA while denying the simultaneityrequirement, if he had also convincingly answered his own further questions: What it would be like to see, immediately, one event occurring very much (centuries, days, or even minutes) before another? Why should I not acquire immediate information about the past, knowing it to be the past, by using my senses? The fact that Armstrong tries to answer questions that Dretske and Quinton either shortchange or ignore and that he comes up with some pertinent questions of his own, makes Armstrongs account easily the best of the three, although Dretskes is (no less, and perhaps even more, than Armstrongs) an excellent introduction to the problem.

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Chapter Three: Denying the Simultaneity-Requirement (II)


3.1. Can Our Eyes Range into the Past (Only)?

In the philosophical world today denying the simultaneity-requirement is by far the more popular position. But often this denial seems to be inadequately argued for; sometimes it gets even less support than Quinton, say, gives it. On the other hand, theres a certain almost irresistible pull towards denying it, a pull of which one might have been conscious already as soon as one had read ones Dretske and especially ones Armstrong. It might become stronger still after one considers some of the philosophers yet to be discussed, in this chapter, before finally realizing that both philosophical reason and common sense require us to resist this ensnaring pull. One of the first post-war philosophers to deny the simultaneity-requirement was A. J. Ayer in 1956. In The Problem of Knowledge, after stating the TGA, he went on to criticize it as follows: This argument draws its strength from the fact that one tends to think of seeing as connected only with the present. It is assumed that, unlike our memories or our imaginations, our eyes cannot range into the past: whatever it is that we see must exist here and now if it exists at all. But this assumption is not unassailable. Why should it not be admitted that our eyes can range into the past, if all that is meant by this is that the time at which we see things may be later than the time when they are in the states in which we see them? And having admitted this, why then should we not also admit that it is possible to see things which no longer exist? Such ideas might never have occurred to us were it not for the discoveries of physics; but once these physical facts are recognized, it does not seem too hard to adapt our way of speaking to them. We have to balance the oddity of saying that we can see what is past against the oddity of saying that we do not see physical objects; and to give our eyes access to the past may well seem the more reasonable course.64 However, this is not the choice we are faced with: in seeing what is past we, if we saw anything, would still be seeing physical objects; but if we do deny that we can see what is past we are not thereby forced to say, for all that Ayer has shown, that we do not see physical objects at all, only perhaps that we do not see them directly. Thus this reason that Ayer gives for denying the simultaneity-requirement seems thin.

64

Ayer, The Problem of Knowledge, 94-95.

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Moreover, in talking about adapting our way of speaking to the facts he seems to suggest the view that on a certain (deep?) level there is no fact of the matter with respect to the simultaneity-requirement, only ways of speaking. But he suggestsand there seems to be no reason to believe this. Incidentally, while in 1956 Ayer seemed willing to admit that it is possible to see things which no longer exist, in the late 1980s, not long before his death, he showed no sign of this willingness when he wrote (in another context) that it is at least very doubtful whether it makes sense to talk of being a current observer of past events.65 Another post-war proponent of denying the simultaneity-requirement was Roderick Chisholm, who said: . . . we tend to assume, until we are taught otherwise, that any event or state of affairs we perceive must exist or occur simultaneously with our perception of it. . . . We tend to assume, more generally, that S can perceive a at t only if a exists at t. Chisholm proposed to refute this assumption as follows: But to assume that S can perceive a at t only if a exists at t is no more reasonable than to assume that S can receive or reflect light from a at t only if a exists at t. The perception of a star that is now extinct should be no more paradoxical than the action of such a star on a photographic plate or its reflection in the water.66 It is perfectly true that a star can act on a photographic plate or be reflected in water when it, the star, no longer exists. But is the action of a star on me while I perceive it really much like its action on a photographic plate or its reflection in water? Is a perceiver really much like a photographic plate or like water? Is perceiving really much like receiving a physical impression? In short, is being on the receiving end of a physical action really all there is to perceiving? The extent to which these questions call for a negative answer is the extent to which Chisholm has not refuted the simultaneity-assumption. And that extent is immense if, as seems obvious (and as Chisholm should be the first to admit), perceivers are beings capable of consciousness and perceiving very often involves the perceivers awareness of what he/she perceives. Therefore, Chisholms analogy appears weak. Incidentally, I might mention that Chisholm made no secret of his great admiration for Thomas Reidhe not only regarded him as one of the great philosophers of all time but also claimed that Reids philosophical theory of perception is the correct one.67 Now its quite surprising to hear the latter claim from someone who should not fail to be aware that Reid
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Ayer, Reply to T. L .S. Sprigge, The Philosophy of A. J. Ayer, ed. L. E. Hahn (La Salle, Ill.: Open Court, 1992): 602. 66 Chisholm, Perceiving, 153. 67 Chisholm, Keith Lehrer and Thomas Reid, Philosophical Studies 60: 33.

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accepted the simultaneity principle, and did so most emphatically.68 Of course, Reid gave no argument for itbut thats only because he took it for granted as a first principle needing no argument. Reid did not thereby deny the principle might conceivably be disputed and even proven false; but its fair to say that Chisholms remarks quoted above dont come close to disproving it. Perhaps we might interpret Chisholm more liberally and generously as claiming that perceiving is like receiving a message. We already encountered this claim when discussing Dretske (see 2.4.) and Armstrong (see 2.7). In Dretskes lips its import was unclear; but we thought the sense-datum theorist could very well endorse the suggestion, made by Armstrong, that what we immediately perceive is not the star, but a present happening, causally connected with the extinction of the star many years ago. The star sends a message to us, as it were, and we immediately perceive the message, not the star.69 Armstrong, as weve said, does not accept this suggestion literally; for he thinks that it only seems to us as if something is happening in the sky at present, that what we really see is a past happening, and, anyway, that we cant perceive sense-impressions. The sense-datum theorist can unabashedly embrace Armstrongs suggestion and claim that the stars message is the sense-datum. But Chisholm, perhaps no less than Armstrong, wishes to avoid sense-data. Nevertheless, his reasoning on this point, as expounded in several of his classic publications, has, to my mind, been effectively countered by Andrew Chrucky.70 Be that as it may, Chisholms reason for denying the simultaneity-requirement seems unconvincing. On the other hand, Ingvar Johansson, writing in the 1990s, agrees that the simultaneityassumption must be categorically denied, but claims that Chisholm doesnt grasp the full implications of this denial. They are in Johanssons view quite radical: If direct realism is true in relation to things around us, then we perceive backwards in time, but it is then an extremely short time interval, almost infinitesimal, which we bridge. However, if direct realism is true even for star perception, then we can perceive backwards over a huge time interval. Mostly, we do in one and the same perception perceive things at different distances from us. This means that veridical perceptions of the world are extended backwards in time. This is what we have to teach ourselves if we want to be direct realists, but Chisholm doesn't even hint at this. As far as I know, there is only one philosopher who has stated this feature of perception clearly, and that is

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For example, in the first of his Essays on the Intellectual Powers of Man, Reid states: Thirdly, the immediate object of perception must be something present, not something in the past. We can remember past events but we cant perceive them. 69 Armstrong, Perception and the Physical World, 147-148. 70 www.ditext.com/chrucky/sensa.html

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Samuel Alexander at the beginning of this century, but, for some reason, he mentioned it only in a footnote.71 The relevant footnote is to a 1912 paper; it has Alexander speaking of experience as compresence within the world of the experiencer and the experienced and claiming: Perhaps I should say at once that compresence does not mean simultaneity in time. I am compresent with a past event which I apprehend. And indeed the events I perceive always are past, by however small an interval. Compresent means simply belonging to the same universe.72 Thus, according to Johansson and Alexander, we are always without exception seeing things that are more or less in the past. This was a rather popular position among scientifically-minded philosophers before and long after the First War,73 and still continues to be. For example, more recently, the same thesis has been advanced by Robert L. Solso. He says that [o]ne implication of the finite speed of light is that we always see the past: the light striking our eyes brings us information from some finite time ago when it was reflected from or generated by some object at a distance from us. While the terrestrial past is very short, the cosmic past is very long indeed. Look at the stars tonight and think how long it took the light to reach your retina, which is effectively how far into the past you are viewing.74 The (by now) obvious reply to this is the following: (1) practically everything we see closer to us than the heavenly bodies exists in the present time after all, because what matters for our perception is human- phenomenal, not physicalscientific, simultaneity; (2) even if it were the case that we can see the past, this would apply at best to some physical things and events only; for no matter what we see, we always see mental sense-data, too, and these exist at the time we see them;

Ingvar Johansson, Perception as the Bridge between Nature and Life-World. In: hem.passagen.se/ijohansson/ Quoted by Johansson (in the above-mentioned text) from S. Alexander 'The method of metaphysics; and the categories', Mind N.S. 21:1-20, p. 3 n. 2 (1912). 73 In 1912, a group of American philosophers (E. B. Holt, Walter T. Marvin, William Pepperell Montague, Ralph Barton Perry, Walter B. Pitkin, and E. G. Spaulding) published a cooperative work, The New Realism, in which they made the same point (in the words of W. P. Montague) as follows: The events we perceive as present are always past, for in order to perceive anything it must send energy of some kind to our sense organs, and by the time the energy reaches us the phase of existence which gave rise to it has passed away. E. B. Holt, from whom Chisholm apparently took his cue, put it this way: An object is not only frequently but invariably seen at a moment of time later than that when it had the position and other circumstances which it still has in our vision of it. The illustration hallowed by the tenderest association for the idealist seems to be the case of seeing the sun or other heavenly bodies some millions of years behind time, or indeed millions of years after it has ceased to exist. But now what advantage over us has the photographic plate, as plainly physical and as little mental or illusory as we all grant that to be? 74 Solso immediately goes on as follows: To give some scale of the time involved, light from the sun takes about eight minutes to arrive, while light arriving tonight from the Andromeda nebula was already one million years old before humans appeared on Earth ... See his Cognition and the visual arts, p. 8.
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(3) the information vision affords us is not, literally speaking, from the past but sometimes, at best indirectly, about the past. The first claim is secure; the second and third we will finish arguing for in the next chapter. We have already discussed in detail Dretskes, Quintons, and Armstrongs ways of denying the simultaneity-requirement and found them more or less wanting. Most other similarly oriented approaches follow in their footsteps. Thus, Georges Dicker, for example, claims that the simultaneity thesis is shown false by the relevant scientific facts.75 Ive already argued (against Dretske, in 2.3. and 2.4.) that science shows no such thing. But another author writing at about the time of Dretske, Quinton, and Armstrong (and standing strongly under the latters influence) is George Pitcher, who deserves special treatmentmainly because of the way he calls attention to, and evaluates the significance of, the fact that sound, too, travels at a finite (but slower) velocity.

3.2. The TGA and the Velocity of Sound: Pitcher et al.

Dubbing the TGA the time-lag argument (though this makes little difference) and wishing to uphold Non-Idealist Direct Realism, Pitcher says that a Direct Realist does not have much to fear from the time-lag argument. He can simply insist that the finite speed of light does not entail that we do not directly see things and states of affairs in the external world, but only that we must see them as they were some time ago. We see real physical things, properties, and events, all right, but we see them late, that is all. According to a [D]irect [R]ealist, it is a mere prejudice of common senseand one on which the time-lag argument tradesthat the events, and the states of objects, that we see must be simultaneous with our (act of) seeing them. Heres Pitchers argument on behalf of the Direct Realist: If light waves travelled as slowly as sound waves, he would say, common sense would never have made that erroneous assumption. When one is watching a baseball game from some distance away, the sound of the bat hitting the ball reaches us a few seconds after it is actually made, but that fact does not, and should not, lead one to suppose that he is (directly) aware only of an auditory sense-datum, and not of the crack of the bat actually hitting the ball. He is (directly) aware of the real physical sound made by the bat hitting the ball, but he simply hears it a few seconds late. It is a scientific discovery that the same sort of thing must be said, mutatis mutandis, about our seeing of things and

75

G. Dicker, Perceptual Knowledge, 48.

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events. But that discovery need not have the slightest tendency to make a [D]irect [R]ealist abandon his theory in favor of a sense-datum theory.76 Lets examine this passage more closely. Pitcher argues that the fact that the sound of the bat hitting the ball reaches us a few seconds after it is made should not lead us to suppose that we are directly aware only [his emphasis] of an auditory sense-datum, and not of the crack of the bat actually hitting the ball. But what is the force of this only? Is Pitcher saying that we are directly aware of this auditory sense-datum, but were also aware of something else: the crack of the bat actually hitting the ball? Or is he saying that the auditory sense-datum is (identical with) the crack of the bat against the ball? Or, thirdly, is he saying were not aware of an auditory sense-datum at all, just of that crack of the bat hitting the ball? I think he definitely prefers the third alternative (otherwise hed hardly have put this passage in a chapter entitled: Sense-data and How to Avoid Them). In that case, however, I would argue (1) that we are directly aware of this auditory sense-datum; (2) that it is identical with the crack of the bat, i.e., the cracking sound caused by the bats collision with the ball; (3) that we are also, as Pitcher says, aware of the real physical sound made by the bat hitting the ball, and (4) that this latter awareness incorporates our interpretation of the auditory sense-datum as a physical sound. Thus by denying that were directly aware of the auditory sense-datum, Pitcher would be leaving something important out of the story. But perhaps Pitcher wouldnt be leaving anything out, perhaps Id be putting something in, something that doesnt belong in that story? For why on earth, someone might object, do we need the auditory sense-datum when weve got the audible crack of the bat? Well, my reason for saying so is this: lets remember that we also have the bats collision with the ball as well as multiple events of visually and audibly apprehending that collision. The collision is precisely datable (in human perceptual terms): for every baseball game watcher who directly sees it, no matter where theyre located in the arena, the visual awareness of the collision occurs at exactly the same time (modulo human perception) that it itself occurs. But the auditory awareness of that same collision is a different matter: the batter, the pitcher, and the players and viewers close-by all hear the collision simultaneously with its occurrence and with its visual apprehension; but those further away in the arena hear it fractions of a second later in increasing lengths of time-lag directly proportional to their distance from the collision. Thus there does seem to be a good case for saying there are multiple events each of which is individually simultaneous with a certain baseball game watchers perception of that same event.

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Pitcher, A Theory of Perception, 48.

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Thats their hearing of the sound. So Pitcher, like the other Direct Realists discussed previously, seems not to be able to escape sense-data, after all. Moreover, it appears that the simultaneity-thesis is as well if not better supported by our experience with the speed of sound than it is by our experience with the speed of light. This is precisely (and perhaps surprisingly) what Armstrong, too, appears to believe. Ive previously quoted the following remark of his: It may be suggested that what we immediately perceive is not the star, but a present happening, causally connected with the extinction of the star many years ago. The star sends a message to us, as it were, and we immediately perceive the message, not the star. Armstrong, of course, rejected this suggestion for solving the visual time-gap problem, but immediately following the above quotation he went on to concede: Now this suggestion may be correct in the case of sound. There seems to be some force in thinking of sound as actually spreading out from its source, like a balloon rapidly inflating. (And here I am not speaking of the sound-waves.) So when two people hear the same sound it may be argued with some plausibility that they immediately hear two different things, because they are in different positions. These considerations may dissolve the problem of the time-gap when we hear a distant sound. But the suggestion seems inapplicable to the case of the star.77 Ive already explained how it is applicable to the star (for visual sense-data are like sounds in this respect), but the point to be stressed now, against Pitcher, is that it is applicable to the case of hearing the baseball crack as well.78 To paraphrase Pitcher, the events, and the states of objects, that we hear are undoubtedly simultaneous with our (act of) hearing them, no less than the event and the state of the bat-ball collision we see is simultaneous with our (act of) seeing it. Len Carrier has also argued that those who dismiss the simultaneity-requirement do so for inadequate reasons: If conceptual truths are to be based ultimately upon factual ones, the latter ought to be general enough to apply to all perception. This does not seem to be the case. Though the speed of sound is far less than that of light, we do not consider it correct to say that we hear physical objects that no longer exist. And though it takes time for nerve impulses to

Armstrong, Perception and the Physical World, 146-147. Incidentally, his assertions about sound (in particular, his explicit denial that here he is talking about sound-waves) are difficult to square with his taking sound to be physical. 78 With the understanding, of course, that the sense-datum theorist is not thereby prevented from claiming that we hear the physical collision, too.

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reach the central nervous system, we do not speak of touching or tasting objects that no longer exist.79 Quite agreeing with the spirit of the above quotations third sentence, I would only amend its main clause to state (pedantically but accurately) that we do not consider it correct to say that we now immediately hear physical events that just occurred but we do consider it correct to say we now immediately hear the sounds these events just made. (And, of course, in immediately (directly) hearing the sound we mediately (indirectly) gain information about the physical collision.) Finally, that the slower velocity of sound is of no help to the Direct Realist had already been pointed out by Lovejoy in 1930. To his claim that [t]he doctrine of the finite velocity of light meant that the sense from which most of our information about the world beyond our epidermal surfaces is derived never discloses anything which (in Francis Bacons phrase) really exists in that world, at the instant at which it indubitably exists in perception Lovejoy added the following footnote: The retardation of auditory sensation must so soon and so constantly have forced itself upon the notice of primitive man that an implicit epistemological dualism with respect to sound may be supposed to have prevailed from an early period in the history of the race. It was, however, a vague dualism because a sound does not so clearly present itself as occupying a definite place, or as an adjective of an object or event in such a place.80 The location and nature of sound (I think by adjective Lovejoy meant attribute) still engenders philosophical controversy (see, e.g., the articles on Sounds and Auditory Perception in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy). The sound that an epistemological dualist in Lovejoys sense (i.e., an Indirect Realist or Idealist) needs is a sensation produced in the observer when the sound waves strike the ear, as D. L. C. Maclachlan has it.81 Or, equivalently, it is a quale, a sound-quale, whose esse is audiri, as John Foster puts it, adding that this position comes to assume the familiar form of the traditional sense-datum theory.82 As Foster explains, [q]ualia are realized in sensation. . . . We must take the sensory realization of qualia as fundamental, and see their occurrence as objects of awareness as something to be explained in terms of it. We must say, not that qualia are realized by being sensed, but
79

Carrier, The Time-Gap Argument, 269. Lovejoy, 24. 81 D. L. C. Maclachlan, Philosophy of Perception, 26 82 Foster, The Case for Idealism, 104.
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that they are sensed by being realized. . . . Such qualia . . . are the very sensation-types (or sensory universals) of which . . . sensations are but the tokens (or instances. And when realized, these qualia are displayed, as objects of awareness, simply because the sensations which instantiate them, being episodes of consciousness, are self-revealing: the sensations display their own intrinsic character and, thereby, display the sense-qualia they entoken. . . . we must say that any sensation, in whatever sense-realm, is just a token or instance of a certain sense-quale, and that it constitutes an awareness of that quale simply by being, as an episode of consciousness, self-revealing. Thus we must say that colour-patterns are visually realized because they are the very sensation-types (sensory universals) of which visual sensations are the tokens (instances), and that sound-qualia are auditorily realized because they are the very sensation-types (sensory universals) of which auditory sensations are the tokens (instances).83 Another philosopher who affirms the existence of sense-data and of sounds as auditory sensations is Brian OShaughnessy. He first imagines this possible exchange: Where was the sound of the Krakatoa explosion an hour later?In Australia, India. Japan. and then goes on as follows: That one and same soundassuming a single individuatable roar occurredmight have reached all those places (while all was silent at Krakatoa); exactly as the first note emitted by Heifetzs violin at some concert, and heard by a thousand listeners, will have reached the farthest recesses of the auditorium 1/5 of a second after coming into being; which implies that it inhabited all those places by that time and had left the violin for good. . . . In sum, while the sound originates at a distance and we can hear that it is coming from a direction and even place, and while there is no auditory experience of hearing that the sound is where we are, the sound that we hear is nonetheless where we are.84 The sound is where we are, I would argue, because it is in our minds; and our minds may, for some purposes, be regarded as where we and our bodies are.85 Thus I would agree with OShaughnessy in spirit (if not in important detail). I conclude that facts about sounds do not militate against the TGA for sense-data and its crucial premise, the simultaneity-requirement, in particular.

83

ibidem, 105. OShaughnessy, Consciousness and the World, 445. 85 See the section on Embodiment in John Foster, The Immaterial Self, 261-266.
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3.3. Perception, photography, television, and memory (I)

One of the most recentand originalattempts to deny the simultaneity-requirement is due to John Bengson.86 His aim is to challenge both the view that we perceive only the present and the view that in order to perceive, ones sensory organs must be operating at the time of perceiving. In other words, one must use ones sense organs to perceive. I think that to deny this second view seems positively bizarre for sense-perception; nevertheless Bengson intends to make it seem plausible both (1) that by virtue of remembering something we can perceive with [our] eyes shut and (2) that the viewing of photography and of television broadcasts can be tantamount to perceiving the past. But first he takes up a more straightforward case. Bengson writes: Consider the so-called North Star, Polaris. Polaris is 650 light-years away, so its light takes roughly 650 years to reach us. So, when we look at Polaris now (in the twenty-first century), we are seeing it as it was in the fourteenth century. And if Polaris had suddenly exploded in 2003, we would not know it until the year 2653. This is because we cannot see Polaris as it is presently; we can only see it as it was, in the past. As a result, this is an instance of perception of the past. So far this is just a restatement of the denial, not an argument for it. Bengson argues for Polariss perception being an instance of perception of the past by appealing to the causal theory of perception. According to his version of this theory, an agent A perceives a perceptual object o if (1) A has an experience as of o and (2) As experience is appropriately and counterfactually dependent on o. Thus, if o is Polaris, A has an experience as of Polaris, and As experience is appropriately and counterfactually dependent on Polaris, then it follows that As experience is of something in the pastA sees Polaris as it was in the fourteenth century. In such a case, we can legitimately be said to be in perceptual contact with what our present experience is ofnamely, something in the past. It is interesting to note that Bengson clearly recognizes that it was David Lewis, a champion of the causal theory of perception, who, of all people, challenged the idea that the stars we perceive in the night sky are in the past. Bengson correctly renders Lewiss ideas and also, to my mind, rightly criticizes them. Having cited his words that ...the stars, as I now see them, are not straightforwardly past; for lightlike connection has as good a claim as simultaneity-in-myrest-frame to be the legitimate heir to our defunct concept of absolute simultaneity,87 Bengson

86

See his paper, How to Perceive the Past with your Eyes Shut, 2006. All quotations from Bengson below are from this intriguing paper. 87 See 2.6.

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goes on to state that Lewis appears to believe that if observers light cone,

is seen now, then because it is within an is not

is simultaneous with what is happening now

straightforwardly past, but present. If this is so, then an explosion of Polaris that occurred almost seven centuries ago is present so long as we see it now. But this view, Bengson justly observes, has an unpalatable consequence. For presumably, such an explosion does not occur in the present. Indeed, it does an injustice to our concept of the present to apply it to that which occurred almost seven centuries ago: pace Lewis, we clearly consider such an event to be past. In consequence, we have the following highly intriguing situation: both philosophers are keen on claiming that we really do see the stellar explosion but Lewis wants to keep the simultaneity-principle and thus is forced to deny that the explosion occurred way back in the past; whereas Bengson, recognizing that the stellar explosion did occur way back in the past, is thereby forced to insist (happily!) that we can see the pasteven to the point of our being in perceptual contact with something that occurred almost seven centuries ago. I think that both philosophers would be much better off if they admitted sense-data: not only could Lewis then keep the simultaneity-principle, but he wouldnt also be forced to deny that the explosion occurred in the past; and Bengson wouldnt be forced to claim that we actually enjoy perceptual contact when, in gazing at the stars, we take ourselves to be seeing an explosion and infer that it occurred almost seven centuries ago. My question here would be: perceptual contact with what? We will come back to this decisive point later but first let us follow where Bengson daringly leads usinto territory where the distinctions between (1) seeing a scene, (2) seeing a photograph of it, (3) seeing a television broadcast of it, and (4) remembering (having seen) it seem to blur. He engages in a bit of science fiction and supposes that Martians whove finally arrived on earth possess a more sophisticated perceptual system: they can freeze a given visual image (perhaps by arresting the patterns of light currently on the retina), allowing them to enjoy a given perception while the world around them continues to change. When they freeze a given image, do the Martians continue to perceive what it is an image of? It would seem so. After all, they are enjoying an experience that, all things being equal, is appropriately causally and counterfactually dependent on what it is of. So, if the Martians did in fact perceive the scene initially, because their frozen perceptions continue to satisfy the causal and counterfactual conditions that mark out genuine perception, it would seem to follow that they still perceive the scene seconds or minutes later when it is frozen in their 78

perceptual field. Thus, such snapshot perception enables the Martians to perceive (indirectly but genuinely) a given scene long after it has occurred.88 Bengson then says that snapshot perception might not be wholly science fictional and in support quotes Solso: When we [human beings] look at an object . . . we do not see it all at once, as common

wisdom suggests, but go through series of scans in which the eye momentarily stops on one feature . . . then darts on to another part . . . and then on to another . . . and so on. Each feature is seen in a brief glimpse, then our eyes focus on another point for additional processing. The span of material seen at each fixation point is sharply limited due to the narrow field of foveal vision. Since this scanning/stop maneuver takes place over very short time periods, the subjective experience is that we are seeing [an object] all at once, when, in fact, our visual perception of it is built up from a series of discrete snapshots.89 Thus we, like the Martians, enjoy a form of snapshot perception, says Bengson. Next he claims that Kendall Walton has convincingly argued that viewing photographs involves such snapshot perception. In most cases, photographs are appropriately causally and counterfactually dependent on what they are of, although some overand underdeveloped or artistically altered photographs might not be. The important point for Bengson is Waltons claim that unlike the content of a painting or sketch, which depends on what the artist believes that he or she sees, the content of a photograph is determined by what is really there before [the photographer], regardless of what he [or she] thinks. . . . Because they have such natural dependence (i.e., counterfactual dependence not mediated by an agents intentional states) and thus preserve real similarity relations between objects, photographs, Walton argues, are transparent. It is in virtue of their transparency that photographs allow us to see through to the reality they display.

Much earlier than Bengson it was Charles B. Daniels who (in his 1970 paper replying to Carriers important 1969 paper) envisioned just such a science-fiction scenario, only involving not Martians, but inhabitants of much more distant planets. In his 1972 reply to Daniels, Carrier wrote: He imagines an advanced civilization in a distant planetary system being able to gather light in such a way that they could see us going about our activities long after we had died. But this is a situation that I cannot imagine if we are to speak strictly and avoid the looseness that results from similarity in visual content. For instance, we speak loosely when we say that we see people on televison. Strictly, what we see is a picture of light and shade, the causal origins of which includes a physical object. That we make this distinction in common speech is good reason for saying that the members of Daniels imaginary civilization would not see us at all, but only patterns of light. I can only applaud wholeheartedly this passage of Carriers. Solso, Cognition and the Visual Arts, p. 26. The quotation I give is more complete than Bengsons. Solso, as weve seen, also claims that in all cases of visual perception we see the past only. With respect to that claim, Bengson, perhaps surprisingly, states that it is unclear to me whether Solsos desired conclusionnamely, that we always perceive the pastis correct. Thus Bengson, while arguing that we can see the past, seems to want to leave open the possibility that we can see the present as well.
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Furthermore, there are, says Bengson, relevant similarities between photography and other devices which clearly do not preclude but rather enable (indirect) perception. For instance, we would not deny that someone with eyeglasses perceives what her visual experiences are of. Even though the lenses act as mediating transducers, if appropriate causal and counterfactual dependence is maintained, then she still sees (albeit indirectly). Because mirrors also maintain such dependence, we should not deny that when looking at oneself in a mirror, one is in fact looking at oneself. A periscope produces a similar result: so long as appropriate causal and counterfactual dependence is maintained, its mirrors act as mediating transducers which allow one to see (again, albeit indirectly). Since photographs also maintain appropriate causal and counterfactual dependence, they, like eyeglasses, mirrors, and periscopes, appear to act as mediating transducers that allow one to see (once again, albeit indirectly). . . . Interestingly, that looking through photographs is on a par with clear cases of perception is consistent with how we ordinarily speak about viewing photographs. Just as we are likely to assert that we see ourselves when looking in the mirror, although we do so indirectly, we are likely to assert that we see a photographed object, albeit indirectly. When viewing a photograph of the Taj Mahal, for instance, it is only natural to (non-metaphorically) say things like I see the Taj Mahal. The same is true of film, television, and other so-called moving pictures. Consider watching a game on the television: we frequently and unhesitatingly say that we see the game, the players, the fans, the ball, the last-second-shot, and so on. In fact, we often think we see such things better via the television than can those (e.g., the referees) who are actually there, seeing them directly! No doubt Bengson is right that some of us do frequently and unhesitatingly say such things. One problem, however, is that saying them might not withstand critical scrutiny. This is what Foster argues in The Nature of Perception.90 He does this in the course of an attempt to refute Indirect Realism after having given what he takes to be conclusive reasons for the sense-datum theory and accordingly assuming that theory to be true. Hence Bengson would most likely reject Fosters arguments. But there are others that do not depend on the truth of the sense-datum theory. One is suggested by Bengson himself: after presenting a few more examples of unusual types of (alleged) perception, including some episodic memories supposedly as instances of another

90

See p. 205-218.

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form of perception, one that allows us to (visually) perceive the past, even with our eyes shut, he admits that if one finds all this highly counterintuitive and plainly unacceptable, then one may take the argument of this paper to be a reductio ad absurdum of the causal theory of perception. I think this theory is indeed flawed, but Bengson hasnt presented the best version of it. Hes left out a condition that makes the theory half-way plausible, one that is explicitly insisted upon by its advocate David Lewis. This condition is not only a clause in a proper definition of the causal theory of perception but also a basic requirement upon perception itself. Thats the view, in Lewiss words, that I see if and only if [b]efore my eyes various things are present and various things are going on. Having thus endorsed the existence-requirement (of 2.1.), Lewis goes on to say, famously, that it is not far wrong to say simply that someone sees if and only if the scene before his eyes causes matching visual experience. So far as I know, there are no counterexamples to this in our ordinary life. But to my ears this supplement to the existence-requirement sounds too much as if there were supposed to be two corresponding things in play herethe scene before ones eyes (with, say, five trees) and the matching visual experience (of five trees)when, in fact, on any credible theory of perception there should seem to be just one five-treed complex involved here (namely, that contained in the scene before ones eyes). Lewis proceeds to explain that (1) the visual experience, which he implies goes on in the brain (or perhaps the soul), and (2) the scene before ones eyes cannot match in the way that a scale model matches its prototype, or anything like that. Rather, visual experience has informational content about the scene before the eyes, and it matches the scene to the extent that its content is correct. . . . The content of the experience is, roughly, the content of the belief it tends to produce.91 I think that this conception of visual experience is wrong, starting with the droll idea that visual experience is something going on in the brain (I will discuss this in 5.4.) and ending with its suggestion (perhaps among the earliest in the literature) of the Representational Theory of Perceptual Experience (which I will criticize in Chapter Five). However, my main objection to the Causal Theory of Perception is the same as Ayers when he says that it seems to me obvious that no strict description of the content of a sensory experience can carry any implication concerning its cause. I also adhere to my view that the insertion of a causal clause into our analysis of perceptual statements, whatever good reason there may be for it, is not a primitive procedure, since it is logically subsequent to

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D. Lewis, Veridical Hallucination and Prosthetic Vision. In: Dancy, J. (ed.) Perceptual Knowledge (OUP, 1988): 79-80.

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the transformation of percepts [sense-data] into visuo-tactual continuants [physical objects]. It is true that, once I believe that a physical object is there in front of me, I am likely to accept the subjunctive conditional that, unless it really were there, I should not in these circumstances even be having the experience on which my perception of it is founded. But this by no means entails that the acceptance of any such conditional is a constituent of the belief that the physical object is there. On the contrary, unless the physical object were already posited, it would not be available to figure in the causal hypothesis. Neither can it be posited simply as the cause of the experience, for this would be consistent with its being anything whatsoever. . . . [The] reason to believe in the existence of physical objects . . . must lie in the character of our sense experiences . . . it cannot simply consist in the attribution of causes to them.92 Consequently, Ayer claims, there is more to our perceiving objects than their causing us to have certain perceptual experiences,even, I would presume, matching onesand this sounds entirely right. But let us return to some of Bengsons examples. In endeavoring to assimilate memory to perception, he argues as follows: For instance, we often say things like I can still see the look on his face. Such statements reflect a peculiar fact about memory: we often remember past scenes in such a way as to make them present to us once again . . . Episodic memories . . . involve being in a state that is qualitatively identical or very similar to a specific past experience. For instance, when remembering ones childhood, one may have an experience as of the house in which one grew up or the yard where one often played. In such cases, past scenes become present to us once again. . . . Like photographs, genuine episodic memories involve experiences that are appropriately causally and counterfactually dependent on what they are of. In effect, like photographs, genuine episodic memories maintain natural dependence and preserve real similarity relations between objects. Given this, some episodic memories appear to have much in common with eyeglasses, mirrors, and periscopes. It would seem that like these prosthetic devices, genuine episodic memories make a contribution to the enterprise of perceiving. In short, there seems to be reason to believe that genuine episodic memories, like photographs, are transparent. Bengson then explains how

92

A. J. Ayer, Replies. In: G. F. Macdonald (ed.) Perception and Identity (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1979): 293.

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it is reasonable to hold that some episodic memories are continuous with so-called ordinary perception. For one, there is the possibility of snapshot perception. Second, there is the way that we sometimes talk about our remembrances. In addition, as we have just seen, episodic memories are in ontologically relevant ways on par with ordinary perceptions. That is, in some episodic memories, () A has an experience (qua memory) as of o, and () As experience (qua memory) is appropriately causally and counterfactually dependent on o. That genuine episodic memories satisfy the causal theory of perception is at least prima facie reason to think that, in such cases, we can legitimately be said to be in perceptual contact with what our present memories are of. Bengsons suggestion that some episodic memories are forms of perception has already been challenged (effectively, I think) by Lewis when he presented the following: Example 2: The Memory. I hallucinate not at random; visual memory influences the process; thus I seem to see again a scene from long ago; this past scene causes visual experience which matches it. I do not see. No problem: the past scene is not part of the scene before my eyes.93 In other words, if I seem to see vividly some past scene in the way of hallucinating it, I cannot really be seeing it, because that scene is not in front of my eyes now. For the same reason I cannot see that past scene if Im only vividly recollecting it in the way of an episodic memory. Whats more, vivid memory of a scene has a different feel, a different phenomenology from actually seeing that scenethis is perhaps the main reason for distinguishing memory from perception. But actually seeing something is also different from seeing it in a photograph. In a footnote to his discussion of seeing the Taj Mahal, Bengson says Consider the question Did you see the Taj Mahal? In certain contexts, one can legitimately answer by saying, Yes, I saw the Taj Mahal, if, for instance, one was just shown a photograph of the Taj Mahal. But in other contexts, one can legitimately answer by saying, No, I have never seen the Taj Mahal, if one has never seen the Taj Mahal in person (regardless of whether one has or has not seen photographs of it). Incidentally, one with a propensity for linguistic analysis might say that on the present view, statements made while looking through photographs, such as A sees o, are to be

93

Lewis, ibidem, 83.

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analyzed as A sees o in virtue of seeing the photograph. An adverbial analysis is also available: A sees o photographically. Either way, A sees o. But I would object that it is one thing to see a photograph of the Taj Mahal and quite another to see the Taj Mahal itself. What we have here are two different things seen, not two different ways of seeing one and the same thing. Of course, seeing the Taj Mahal and seeing a photograph of it have something in common: both give us information about the Taj Mahal. But the amount of such information is usually greaterboth actually and still more so potentially when gained by seeing the Taj Mahal itself than when gained by seeing its picture. One is in a much better position to acquire visual information by inspecting the Taj Mahal that one sees in reality than one is by inspecting its photograph. One can gain even more information by walking around the really seen Taj Mahal; but one cant walk around the photographed Taj Mahal at all; whereas walking around the photograph (which is possible) gives us no new information about the building whatsoever. Seeing something in the flesh (bodily, in person, in reality) puts the observer in a position to gain not only more visual information about that thing, but also to touch it, to feel it, to smell it, to taste it, to hear itsomething seeing a photograph of it is incapable of doing.

3.4. Perception, photography, television, and memory (II)

Still, theres a way of understanding realistic photography that minimizes the difference between looking at it and visual perception of the world. Kendall L. Walton has articulated such an understanding masterfully. Its high time to deconstruct this alluring but faulty conception, sentence by sentence. (I will put his sentences in bold, and my rejoinder in regular typeface.) In the abstract to his famous paper,94 Walton writes: Photographs are transparent; in looking at a photograph of something one sees the thing itself. No, in looking at a photograph of something one sees just a photograph; one thereby sees a picture, an image, of that thing, but not directly that thing itself; the thing itself one sees, at best, indirectly, which in some crucial respects isnt nearly as good as seeing the thing itself directly. You cant, for example, hold up the photograph in one hand and with your other shake hands with the indirectly seen woman pictured in it unless she herself is standing right next to you; in which case youd be shaking hands with the (directly seen) real woman, not with her image. And being able to shake hands or otherwise interact with the persons (things) you see is
94

Kendall L. Walton, Transparent Pictures: On the Nature of Photographic Realism, Nous, Vol. 18, No. 1 (March 1984): 67.

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absolutely essential to direct seeing, which is part of the reason why in looking at things photographically youre not really seeing them. Having said this, I am fully aware that more needs to be said about the distinction between seeing things directly and seeing them indirectly; this I will do in the next section. Photography is not just a new means of producing pictures. True; but it is principally that. It is also an aid to vision, as are eyeglasses, mirrors, telescopes, and microscopes. True again. But there are big differences between these mere aids to vision, on the one hand, and both photography (as a means of producing pictures) and photographs (the pictures produced thereby), on the other. Whereas the main use of the above-mentioned aids to vision is merely instrumental, photographs and photography can have important aesthetic functions as well. They (photographs and photography) are also useful in criminal and historical investigations of all kinds: visually comparing photographs of people with the people themselves by looking at both photographs and people can help, e.g., policemen and historians to identify accurately both photographs and people. All this presupposes that mere aids to vision (on the one hand) and photographs (on the other) belong to essentially different kinds of human artifact. Mirrors enable us to see around corners. Telescopes and microscopes make distant and small objects visible. But when you look at things in mirrors or through eyeglasses, telescopes, or microscopes, even if you directly see only their images, you also automatically gain knowledge about where youd have to go and what youd have to do to see them without these aids, i.e., directly. Looking just at photographs of things never by itself tells you any of that. With the help of photography we can see into the past as well. Not really. We can see into the past only in the way of seeing pictures of it; but we cant see the past itself; the past we can only remember. Of the preceding three clauses, the first is true and weve already admitted it. The second and third are in the course of being proven. We must resist the tendency to water down this claim, to take it as a colorful and exaggerated way of saying that in viewing a photograph one has the impression of seeing the thing photographed, or that the photograph one sees is some sort of substitute or surrogate for the object. Watering it down in any of these ways endangers both its interest and its truth. We really do, literally, see our deceased ancestors when we see photographs of them. No, we dont, not really and not literally. In this life, we really and literally dont see our dead ancestors at all. We last saw them, really and literally, some time before they passed 85

away, while they were still alive. (And my last three sentences would be true even if there were no afterlife, even if this life were all there is.) Now, to be sure, in viewing a photograph one does not have the impression of seeing the thing photographedimpression is the wrong word here. But neither does one actually see the thing (that was) photographed; what one may have is the illusion of seeing the thing in the photograph. Notice how Walton subtly slips from talking about seeing the thing photographed when denying it (the thing photographed) is an impression to talking about the photograph one sees when denying it (the photograph) is a substitute or surrogate for the object. Of course, the photograph is no substitute or surrogate; its more of a memento of the object: a reminder rather than a replacement. Nothing is a substitute for a dead person, especially if you loved her or him. Finally, why must we resist the tendency to water down Waltons claim if in so doing we merely take it as a colorful and exaggeratedand figurativeway of saying that enjoying a piece of realistic photography is like veridical perception. They are alike in that both present the world as it is, although perception does it incomparably more powerfully and resourcefully. Looking at photography is to real perception of the world somewhat as a computer is to a human being. There are likenesses here without the former becoming a form of the other, as Walton claims. Slippery slope considerations give the claim an initial plausibility. If we see through eyeglasses, mirrors, and telescopes, dont we also see via closed circuit television monitors and live television broadcasts? If so, on what grounds would it be reasonable to deny that we see athletic events when we watch delayed broadcasts of them, or that we see through photographs and photographic films? We do see objects through eyeglasses, in mirrors, and through telescopes. But in the first case we see them directly, and in the second and third, indirectly, by seeing their images. When I see something through my glasses, I usually know just in virtue of seeing it how much and in what direction I have to move in order to touch that thing. Butand this is crucialI usually dont know this, and not in the same way, when I just see a live television broadcast of that thing. Even if I see the thing or event on closed-circuit television, the image might not tell me how to get from the monitor to the thing or event; usually I must have additional information to do that. Much less do I see that thing or event if I only watch a delayed broadcast of it, or see a photograph or photographic film of it. On these points I am supported by OShaughnessy. He supposes that things can be so arranged that we see both a TV image of a scene from a spectacle and next to it the scene itself; thus, he says, we could look at the scene, and then at the TV image, and whereas in one case 86

we really would be looking at the scene, in the other case we would be looking at an array of coloured patches before us as presenting to view a particular simultaneous spectacle; and the one simply is not the other. Despite the identity of content and appearance and time, and despite the significant overlap of cognitive utility in the case of these two phenomena, only one of these visual experiences is an example of seeing the scene in the flesh, of actually setting ones eyes upon that scene.95 OShaughnessy then criticizes the analogy between seeing things in a mirror and seeing them on TV. He admits that one is initially inclined to say that the mirror shows the scene in the very same sense . . . as the TV image. . . . and say that in one case we see the real thing and in the other case merely an image of the real thing. But if we do not see the real thing when we see the mirror image, what that is not the real thing do we see when we stare at whatever it is that we see when we look into a mirror? It is empty verbiage to say that we see an image, bearing in mind that in this situation we are unable to produce an analogue of the coloured areas on the TV screen.96 But why (I ask) is it just empty verbiage to call that which we see in a mirror an image? You can place yourself vis--vis the mirror and a certain thing in such a way that you both see the real thing (suppose its black and three-cornered) and its image in the mirror. Then you see two black and three-cornered things, one being the real thing, the other its mirror-image. Why is that empty verbiage? Nevertheless, the basic point (a correct one) to take from OShaughnessy is that one should be very careful with slippery-slope considerations here. Alva No 97 also discusses the difference between normally seeing a thing and seeing it on TV: When you watch a live sporting event on television, you are able to track whats happening, but you do so in a perspectivally non-veridical way. Perhaps you adopt the standpoint of one or more cameras. Crucially, you dont correctly or veridically experience the events spatial relation to yourself. It would be dogmatic to deny that you see the sporting event, that you see it through or by means of the television cameras. It may be dogmatic to deny this, but since dogmas may be true or false the real question is whether this dogma is true, and so far No hasnt shown that it is not. He goes on to say

95

OShaughnessy, Sense Data, 180. Ibidem. 97 In his Causation and Perception: The Puzzle Unravelled, Analysis 63,2, April, 2003.
96

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But it would be just as dogmatic to insist that there is no difference whatsoever between normal perception, in the here and now, and televisual perception. The difference is . . . easy to explain: when you witness events in person, your experiences track not only how things are, but also how things are in relation to you. I fully agree that there is this difference; thats why I assert the first dogma and deny I see the sporting event through or by means of the television cameras. I would say I do not see the sporting event at all, whether directly or indirectly; I only have the illusion of seeing it.98 What I do see are live TV images of it, which give me information about the sporting event either as good as, or better than, or worse than the information I would get from seeing the sporting event itself. In a footnote added to the quoted passage, No writes: I take it that it matters that you are watching the game on TV live, i.e. in real time. The security guard, for example, really watches (and sees) the crowd on closed-circuit monitors. Exactly what the role of time is in perceptual experience is tricky. Can you see the stars in the heavens, even though they may no longer exist? Thus No is withholding his judgment on the TGA. However, he is denying the dogma and asserting that we can directly see sporting events on TV if we see them live. The latter is what I deny, on Fosterian grounds (explained further in 3.5.4.) A few criticisms similar to mine of Waltons main thesis (that photographs are transparent) have also been voiced earlier by Gregory Currie and Nol Carroll. With ordinary seeing we get information about the spatial and temporal relations between the object seen and ourselves. . . . Call this kind of information egocentric information. . . . Photographs, on the other hand, do not convey egocentric information, claims the former,99 although agreeing that photographs can serve, along with information from other sources, in an inference to egocentric information.100 According to the latter, as quoted or paraphrased by Walton, I can orient my body spatially to what I see, either with the naked eye or through a telescope or microscope. But when I see a photograph I cannot orient my body to the photographed objects. The space of the objects is disconnected phenomenologically from the space I live in.101 Currie and Carroll are right, I think, and Waltons response seems unpersuasive. He admits that an account of what it is to see should explain how seeing enables organisms to acquire

98

See Foster, The Nature of Perception, 218. Currie, Gregory, Image and Mind: Film, Photography, and Cognitive Science (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), 66. 100 ibidem. 101 Noel Carroll, "Towards an Ontology of the Moving Image," Film and Philosophy, ed. Cynthia Freeland and Tom Wartenberg (New York: Routledge, 1995), 71.
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information about their surroundings. But then he claims that there is no reason to assume that such an account must limit seeing to cases in which that is done. However, it seems obvious and indisputable that cases in which organisms are not enabled to acquire information about their surroundings just arent cases of seeing, period. Being enabled to get information about the percipients environment constitutes the very essence of visual perception, at least when consciously undergone by humans above the age of infancy. In regarding viewers as actually seeing things when they see photographs of them Walton claims that he was not especially concerned to be faithful to the ordinary sense of the word see (if there is such a thing). Well, there certainly is; its been around in languages and cultures for thousands of years; and thats what were concerned with here. Nevertheless, Im aware that some philosophers think that in view of such considerations as Walton offers perception has turned out to be rather different from how common sense took it to be.102 But these philosophers have nowhere near conclusively shown that theyre right and that the ordinary sense or concept of perception needs to be (as opposed to: may be) replaced, changed, or even just extended. I admit, though, that Walton and Bengson have raised new and intriguing questions. Still, on the issue immediately relevant here, whether we can see into the past, the verdict is still out, as far as the evidence so far presented is concerned. By the time we have finished the next chapter, this situation, I hope, will have changed.

3.5. Direct vs. Indirect Perception

Weve already and repeatedly spoken of perceiving directly or indirectly; I think it is very important not to conflate different ways of making the distinction as well as different senses in which perception may be direct (immediate) or indirect (mediate).

3.5.1. Cornman, Russell, Berkeley

The first post-war analytic philosopher to insist seriously on this point seems to have been James W. Cornman. In 1971 he was able to claim, probably correctly, that I know of no one who has worked very carefully at the task of explaining what is meant by the expression directly perceive an object, even though Berkeley and Russell are [t]wo philosophers whose
102

See Robert Hopkinss review of Foster, The Nature of Perception in The Philosophical Quarterly (Vol. 51, No. 205, Oct. 2001): 555.

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philosophy depends on a clear understanding of direct perception.103 According to Cornman, direct perception for Berkeley implies an exclusively factual relationship between perceiver and object perceived and has no epistemological component, whereas Russell adds an epistemological feature to Berkeleys purely factual interpretation. I will now proceed to explicate their conceptions (and others) in my own way and then draw some conclusions. According to Russell, we are directly aware of something when we are aware of it without the intermediary of any process of inference or any knowledge of truths, in which case we have knowledge by acquaintance of it or simply are just acquainted with it. As Russell says, [t]hus in the presence of my table I am acquainted with the sense-data that make up the appearance of my table.104 On the other hand, [m]y knowledge of the table as a physical object . . . is not direct knowledge. Such as it is, it is obtained through acquaintance with the sense-data that make up the appearance of the table. This is the first component of his distinction between direct (immediate) and indirect (mediate) awareness. The second component is his claim that it is possible, without absurdity, to doubt whether there is a table at all, whereas it is not possible to doubt the sense-data. Thus, according to Russell, direct awareness (or perception; in this context it doesnt matter which word is used) not only isnt knowledge of a truth or the result of an inference, but its object cannot be doubted. Third, he calls his knowledge of the table knowledge by description and says that the table is 'the physical object which causes such-and-such sense-data'. This describes the table by means of the sense-data. In order to know anything at all about the table, we must know truths connecting it with things with which we have acquaintance: we must know that 'such-and-such sense-data are caused by a physical object'. There is no state of mind in which we are directly aware of the table; all our knowledge of the table is really knowledge of truths, and the actual thing which is the table is not, strictly speaking, known to us at all. We know a description and we know that there is just one object to which this description applies, though the object itself is not directly known to us. In such a case, we say that our knowledge of the object is knowledge by description. From any of these statements of Russells, does it immediately follow that the thing perceived must exist at the time it is perceived? This is perhaps debatable. Russell, as far as I can tell, always assumed the simultaneity-requirement (to my mind, utterly plausibly and correctly), but in no writing of his that Im familiar with does he explicitly state it or, for that matter, argue for it. Thus we might be tempted to ask, Isnt it perfectly consistent (with what

103

104

Cornman, Materialism and Sensations, 222. The other quotations from this book are from p. 224. Russell, The Problems of Philosophy (New York: Oxford University Press, 1959), 89. The other quotations from this book are from the same page.

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Ive quoted from Russell) to say that at time t I am aware of, and acquainted with, a sense-datum of the star and hence that this sense-datum indubitably exists, but that the time it exists is earlier than t? Well, it seems that the answer is negative, after all. Here, unexpectedly perhaps, it is Cornman who not only sets us straight but explicates Russells words as straightforwardly as possible when he states the following: Clearly, if to perceive something directly is, as Russell claims, to be acquainted with it, to have it present and presented to the perceiver, then the thesis that all objects exist at the time they are directly perceived is not only true but analytic. Cornman then proceeds to formulate a TGA which he thinks is very plausible; we will discuss it in Chapter Four. A simpler and more frequently encountered way than Russells of making the distinction between direct (immediate) and indirect (mediate) perception takes its cue from Berkeley when in the guise of Philonous he implies that things are perceived immediately when they are perceived without the intervention of others.105 But, says Philonous, . . . I grant we may in one acceptation be said to perceive things mediately by sense: that is, when from a frequently perceived connexion, the immediate perception of ideas by one sense suggests to the mind others perhaps belonging to another sense, which are wont to be connected with them. For instance, when I hear a coach drive along the streets, immediately I perceive only the sound; but from the experience I have had that such a sound is connected with a coach, I am said to hear the coach. It is nevertheless evident, that in truth and strictness, nothing can be heard but sound: and the coach is not then properly perceived by sense, but suggested from experience. So likewise when we are said to see a red-hot bar of iron; the solidity and heat of the iron are not the objects of sight, but suggested to the imagination by the colour and figure, which are properly perceived by that sense.106 Incidentally, Cornman seems to be in error when he says that direct perception for Berkeley implies an exclusively factual relationship between perceiver and object perceived and has no epistemological component. The factual relationship is primary in the sense that it is what defines direct perception, but in the same Three Dialogues Berkeley is certain that what is directly (immediately) perceived is also indubitable. This is where epistemology comes in: Wood, stones, fire, water, flesh, iron, and the like things, which I name and discourse of, are things that I know. And I should not have known them, but that I perceived them by my senses; and things perceived by the senses are immediately perceived; and things
105 106

Berkeley, Works, 3D, 174 ibidem, 204.

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immediately perceived are ideas; and ideas cannot exist without the mind; their existence therefore consists in being perceived; when therefore they are actually perceived, there can be no doubt of their existence. Away then with all that scepticism, all those ridiculous philosophical doubts. What a jest is it for a philosopher to question the existence of sensible things, till he hath proved to him from the veracity of God; or to pretend our knowledge of this falls short of intuition or demonstration? I might as well doubt of my own being, as of the being of those things I actually see and feel.107 In his earlier Essay towards a New Theory of Vision, Berkeley had repeatedly made pretty much the same distinction between immediate and mediate perception: It is evident that when the mind perceives any idea, not immediately and of itself, it must be by some other idea. . . which is itself immediately perceived in the act of vision.108 And I know evidently that distance is not perceived of itself. That by consequence it must be perceived by means of some other idea which is immediately perceived, and varies with the different degrees of distance.109 Again, we must bear in mind that there are two sorts of objects apprehended by the eye, the one primarily and immediately, the other secondarily and by intervention of the former.110 In the later Theory of Vision Vindicated and Explained, Berkeley even more emphatically generalized the point for all the senses: Ideas which are observed to be connected with other ideas come to be considered as signs, by means whereof things not actually perceived by sense are signified or suggested to the imagination, whose objects they are, and which alone perceives them. And as sounds suggest other things, so characters suggest these sounds; and, in general, all signs suggest the things signified, there being no idea which may not offer to the mind another idea which hath been frequently joined with it.111 A bit later in the same work Berkeley applied the same distinction to sight and touch: What we immediately and properly perceive by sight is its primary object, light and colours. What is suggested or perceived by mediation, therefore, are tangible ideas which may be considered as secondary and improper objects of sight.112 In Alciphron, Berkeley once more clearly reiterated this distinction by putting it in the mouth of Euphranor, his spokesman:

107

ibidem, 230. Berkeley, NTV, Sections 9 and 11. 109 ibidem, Section 18. 110 ibidem, Section 50. 111 Berkeley, TVV, Section 39. 112 ibidem, Section 42.
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To me it seems that a man may know whether he perceives or no; and if he perceives it, whether it be immediately or mediately; and if mediately, whether by means of something like or unlike, necessarily or arbitrarily connected with it.113 Some of these points have in the 20th century (after the appearance of Dretskes pathbreaking book) been elaborated upon by Moreland Perkins, Brian OShaughnessy, and John Foster, among many others. Perkins, as far as I know, has not discussed the simultaneity principle; Foster has (in private), but he has not endorsed it; OShaughnessy has (though perhaps not as unequivocally as one might wish); and Berkeley, as I will argue in Chapter Four, is committed to it, but not exactly because it follows from his definition of immediately perceive. Thus I stand by my earlier claim that the simultaneity-requirement is not what philosophers interested in a definition of direct perception start out with but is something that reflection on direct perception may, and usually does, lead to.

3.5.2. Perkins Perkins starts his whole book114 with a brief consideration of Berkeley: In Berkeleys language, the question from which this book arises is this one: Is what we immediately perceive by the senses something that depends for its existence upon our perceiving it and therefore something internal to our minds? My answer is, yes. However, I prefer to speak of immediate awareness. . . . What we are directly aware of are sensuous qualities whose instantiation within us partly constitutes our sensory, conscious states. . . . Unlike Berkeley, whose power to believe in the incredible is one of the wonders of the philosophical world, I am, like Locke, a merely commonsensical Newtonian who presumes that there are mind-independent objects which we succeed in perceiving by sense. These objects, therefore, I hold that we indirectly perceive; also, that within perception the sensuous qualities belonging to us of which we are directly aware represent for us objective properties of physical objects before our sense organs.115 No doubt because he finds it incredible, Perkins does not consider the idealist possibility at allthe option that the sensuous qualities belonging to us of which we are directly aware do not represent but actually constitute for us objective properties of physical objects before our sense organs, thereby making them mind-dependent.

113

Berkeley, Works, 3:152. Sensing the World is sadly underestimated. David Smith correctly appraises it as a fine work containing an exhaustive and unanswerable polemic against reductive accounts of sensory experience (Smith, p. 279, n. 49). 115 Perkins, Sensing the World, 1.
114

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What I wish to emphasize in the present context is the fine way in which Perkins makes most of the required distinctions; I will again cite at length from his unfortunately little-known text: Sometimes we become conscious of one thing through becoming conscious of another. A man walks into his house and sees on a table an open handbag; through becoming thus visually conscious of the handbag he may become mentally conscious of the presence of his wife somewhere in the house. He does not perceive that the handbag is there by seeing or hearing his wife; he becomes conscious of his wifes presence through noticing the handbag. Although we do not ordinarily do so, we could describe his situation by saying that after entering the house the man is visually conscious of the handbag, that he becomes (mentally) conscious of his wifes presence in being more directly conscious of the handbag, and hence that he is only indirectly conscious of his wife. Instances of sensory awareness of one item mediating a less direct awareness of another are not limited to occasions, like the present one, of achieving a merely mental awareness of the second item. Suppose that from his living room, where the handbag is visible on the table, the same man now hears his wifes voice coming from the kitchen. He does not discover that a sound has occurred through hearing (or seeing) his wife; he becomes conscious of his wifes presence in the kitchen through becoming conscious of the sound she makes in speaking from there. He is, one might say, more directly conscious of the sound his wife has produced than of his wife herself. Of his wife in person he is not yet, we may say, directly conscious. However, whereas in seeing the handbag and thereby becoming aware of his wifes presence somewhere in the house he did not succeed in seeing his wife, so his awareness of her presence in the house could not yet be said to be sensory (because not visual), and so was merely mental, now, hearing her speak from the kitchen, he not only hears the sound she makes, he also, as we always say, hears her: his indirect awareness of his wife we conceive to be also auditory. But auditory awareness is sensory awareness; so when he hears her voice his indirect awareness of his wife is sensory awareness. . . . If we have begun to accept this mode of describing instances of awareness as more or less direct, it will be natural by now to say that if this same man walks into the kitchen and sees his wife, then he has, at last, become quite as directly conscious of his wife as he had before been, first, of the open handbag and then, a moment later, of the sound of her voice. It does not now seem to be the case that it is through being conscious of something else that he can tell that his wife is there before his eyes, just as it does not seem that it was through being conscious of something else that he earlier noticed the 94

handbag on the table or, a moment later, heard a voice. Without further critical reflection we might naturally say that this man is directly conscious first visually of the handbag, then aurally of the human, vocal sound, and finally again visually of the woman herselfof whom he had, until at last seeing her in the kitchen, at first been only indirectly conscious.116 All this, suggests Perkins, is what we might say without further critical reflection. But if we do engage in such reflection we should come around to agreeing with those philosophers who have held that what we unreflectively believe about direct, sensory awareness of things before our sense organs is mistaken. They have held that we are directly conscious through our senses of no objects or events situated before our sense organs, but always only of items that are not before these organsitems, furthermore, which depend for their very existence upon our being conscious of them. According to this view, of everything before our sense organs of which we achieve sensory awareness we are always only indirectly aware: we discover by sensory awareness of it that each such object or event is out there before our sense organs only in virtue of being directly aware of something that is not out therean interior, sensuous item that depends for its existence upon our direct awareness of it. This philosophical thesis concerning our sensory consciousness of the physical world I shall call indirect realism.117 This is the thesis that Perkins in his book tries to show is the truth about sensory awareness. The false thesis, by contrast, is the one that we unreflectively accept, namely, the thesis of direct realism, which holds that, of however many sorts of things before our eyes and other sense organs we may be, in attending to them, only indirectly conscious, for each sense there exists before our sense organs at least one sort of thing of which we can and commonly do become directly conscious: of these physical objects and eventsand of some of their features we achieve awareness without mediation through a more direct awareness of anything else. These and other remarks of Perkinss constitute an elaborate expansion of Berkeleys (quoted above). In addition, paying particular attention to Perkinss contrast between merely mental awareness (roughly corresponding to Berkeleys suggestion to the imagination and perception by the imagination) and sensory awareness (which Berkeley usually calls immediate perception), we can find in Perkinss text plenty of ammunition against Waltons and Bengsons claims that we can both see the past and see with our eyes shut.
116 117

ibidem, 11-12. ibidem, 13. The next quote from Perkins is on the same page.

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In this connection it is interesting to note the following divergence between some of the modernists (Berkeley and Perkins included) and some of the postmodernists (Walton, Bengson, et al). The two groups strive in opposite directionsthe former seeking as it were to set boundaries within and around normal vision; the latter endeavoring to loosen them up and expand it (normal vision) considerably. Thus, on the one hand, Berkeley in particular insists that it must be acknowledged that we never see and feel one and the same object because [t]hat which is seen is one thing, and that which is felt is another.118 He also insists that [o]ur experience in vision is got by the naked eye and [w]e apprehend or judge from this same experience, when we look through glasses; yet [w]e may not . . . in all cases, conclude from the one to the other, because that certain circumstances, either excluded or added, by the help of glasses, may sometimes alter our judgments, particularly as they depend on praenotions.119 On the other hand, the postmodernists aim to minimize or erase altogether the boundaries between perception and memory, and between seeing things in the flesh and seeing them in photos and/or on television.

3.5.3. OShaughnessy

Another philosopher for whom the concept of mediation is crucially important is Brian OShaughnessy. He says that almost always the perception of objects is through the perception of certain mediating Xs which are non-identical with the object, and the same is true of the Xs themselves. With the single exception of proprioception, mediation is needed for the entire gamut of publicly perceptible items in physical space (proprioception evading the rule through being an inter-systemic phenomenon). Epistemologically almost everything in physical nature lies at a remove. Mediation is a near-universal necessity, and is exemplified in the perception of material objects, light, movement, colour, sound, and much else.120 Since OShaughnessys nearly 700-page-long text is very dense, I will next avail myself of David Smiths convenient summary.121 According to OShaughnessys multiply

representationalist account, says Smith, [w]henever a material object is perceived, it is in virtue of our perceiving several mediators. Something m is a mediator in relation to object x if it is non-identical to x

118

Berkeley, NTV, Section 49. Berkeley, TVV, Section 69. 120 B. OShaughnessy, Consciousness and the World, 592-93. 121 A. D. Smith, OShaughnessys Consciousness, The Philosophical Quarterly, Vol 51, No. 205, Oct. 2001: 532539. The quotations below are all from pp. 537-539.
119

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and x is perceived in virtue of ms being perceived. Mediators fall into two categories. Those in one category, though non-identical with a given x, are also non-distinct from it. For example, we see a physical object at any given moment only in virtue of seeing a limited portion of its surface. Most would agree with this, if only because there is little temptation to suppose that we see surfaces instead of material objects, and because surfaces do present a visual appearance. OShaughnessys theory becomes much more contentious when he argues that any material object is also seen only in virtue of our seeing mediators that are entirely distinct from those objects. There are two sorts of distinct mediators in the theory. The first is light. Whenever we see a material object otherwise than as a silhouette, we see (in the full sense that we are visually aware of) the light which that object is reflecting onto our retinas: We always see light. Indeed, in a certain sense only light. . . . Light epistemologically precedes the objects it brings to view.122 OShaughnessy also recognizes an even more proximal type of visual mediator, sense-data. We ultimately see whatever we see in virtue of seeing sense-data. In part he justifies this claim by the familiar appeal to causal considerations. It is possible for visual experiences to be enjoyed in the absence of a suitable real-world object, and indeed in the absence of any light impinging on our retinas. (OShaughnessy is especially fond of citing after-images in this connection.) Should this occur, we would be aware of something even more inner than our retinas, namely, sense-data. All we get in standard cases of perceiving objects in the world is something more: light, causal relations to some material object, and so on. Such additional factors cannot obliterate the form of awareness which was present in the former situation. Therefore sense-data are present as immediate objects of awareness in all perceptual situations. There are, however, distinctive features to OShaughnessys account. For one thing, he stresses more than some do the way in which sense-data are quite independent of whether we are aware of them or not, having purely physical causes in the optical system. Sense-data are brute presences in consciousness, which we can overlook or attend to, just as we can the physical objects whose presences they are. With respect to a sense-datums having purely physical causes in the optical system, Roderick Firth in his 1949-50 paper Sense-data and the Percept Theory complained that [s]ome philosophers have complicated the matter by actually defining a sense-datum as that constituent of a perception which is caused by the physical stimulus. As an example he cites

122

OShaughnessy, Consciousness and the World, 441, 442-443.

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Russell, who on one occasion, in his Philosophy, wrote that a sense-datum is the core, in a perception, which is solely due to the stimulus and the sense-organ, not to past experience. Firth agrees that it is empirically demonstrable . . . that the nature of particular states of perceptual consciousness is determined partly by the direct physiological effects of the stimulus, and partly by the past experience and present interests of the perceiver. But then he cautions that to conclude from these facts alone that there must be at least two constituents in every state of perceptual consciousness, one of them (the sense-datum) corresponding in some simple fashion to the direct physiological effects of the stimulus, would be to commit the physiological fallacy and obscure the actual character of perceptual consciousness.123 Although it isnt very clear what this alleged fallacy amounts to (and, indeed, whether it is a fallacy) and thus not clear whether OShaughnessy actually commits it (or comes close to committing it), his conception of sense-data seems somewhat to resemble Russells (as represented above), and it does have some unusual features. As Smith points out, for OShaughnessy, [t]he existence of a sense-datum does not by itself constitute the having of a visual experience. For that to occur, the sense-datum must be attended to and taken in some way. What we take the object to be is the internal object, or the content, of the experience. This, unlike the sheer awareness of sense-data, is an intentional affair. . . . For one thing, intentional content is not determined by purely physical causes alone, as sense-data are, but also by the recognitional and conceptual capacities of the subject. For another, intentional content can have no gaps in it: we cannot overlook part of what we take an object to be, as we can overlook a sheer sensuous presence in our visual field. Indeed, it makes no sense to speak of noticing the internal objects of experience: noticing must already be there for such objects so much as to arise. OShaughnessy, indeed, uses this point as an argument against the currently popular attempts to give a purely cognitive or intentional account of perception. . . . Another important and distinctive aspect of OShaughnessys theory is his account of what he terms the transitivity of attention. Because sense-data stand in reliable projective relations to the arrays of light at our retinas (i.e., we normally see a red square sensedatum to the right of a round yellow one because a red square beam of light impinges on the retina to the left of a round yellow one), and because such light stands in similar projective relations to (parts of the surfaces of) material objects, in seeing sense-data in ordinary situations we ipso facto see the causally responsible light and material object.

123

R. Firth, Sense-data and the Percept Theory, in: J. Troyer, ed., In Defense of Radical Empiricism, 29-30.

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Smith goes on to make a number of interpretive and critical comments, one of which is the following: [T]hroughout the development of his account of perception, many readers will feel surprise that OShaughnessy never addresses the epistemological problems which generations of philosophers have believed to attach to representationalism. There simply appears to be no problem here, as far as OShaughnessy is concerned. It is difficult not to sympathize with this assessment. At the same time it is occasionally less than clear whether and to what extent OShaughnessy really is a Representationalist: some crucial passages of his, though partly Representationalist, tend in an Idealist direction. To be sure, in a few other passages he distances himself from Idealism quite explicitly, though he never deems it worthy of any serious discussion or refutation. Still, let us direct our attention to the following: In any case a theory of sense-data can be defended which comes close to the traditional theory . . .It takes the following form. We shall assume that we are giving an account of a normal enough example of seeing: more exactly, of monocular seeing (for simplicity). Then in the first place the visual experience or perception is understood to be an event in the attention: more precisely, an event of noticing. Secondly, the object of noticing is something that is sited in the visual field. The third and most contentious part of the theory is sense-data-ist in character. It claims that the immediate object of the above attentive event is a visual sensation: more specifically, the colour and two-dimensional properties of a two-dimensional array of visual sensations. Meanwhile, the visual sensation itself is taken to be a a psychological individual of type sensation, which is located in the visual field, and endowed with colour-brightess and an extent that is characterizable through the use of two variables (such as right/left and up/down). The theory concludes with the contentious and representationalist claim that the seeing of this sensuous phenomenon is identical with the seeing of whatever public physical perceptible it manages to make visible. Thus, one perceptual or attentive event is said to fall under double descriptions: one involving reference to the sensuous object, the other to the physical object.124 Though the event of seeing is one, the objects seen are two: this is, as far as it goes, a Representationalist claim. But more typically a Representationalist would assert there to be a duality of events, too; and he would mark this by using two different verbs: the sensuous object, say, is sensed, the physical object is perceived. Sometimes he doesnt use different verbs but

124

OShaughnessy, Consciousness and the World, 466.

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still leaves no doubt that there are not only two objects, but two events as well. In both cases this would be full-fledged Representationalism. OShaughnessy at any rate shies away from it; he sticks to the one event-two objects story and a bit later claims the following: Now this account is representationalist in that it is in (or through) experiencing the colour and contour of the immediately perceived sensation that we experience the identical colour and contour of the distinct and mediately perceived public perceptible. The claim is that the immediate material object of the visual experience is the visual sensationa senseless psychological primitive with colour and expanseand nothing else. It is not the public physical object, for it is the sensation; nor the experience, for no experience can be its own immediate material object; and it is not the content of the experience, for the content is not distinct from the experience and is not an individual. It is a senseless psychological primitive that is endowed with only some of the experienced properties of the public physical perceptible, namely its colour and two-dimensional layout.125 So the visual sensation is not the physical object yet the seeing of this sensation is identical with the seeing of the physical object. This account is (as Ive admitted) partly Representationalist, yet it tends toward Idealism. If the public physical perceptible had been a cherry and if gustatory, tangible, olfactory sensations had been brought in in addition to the visual ones, then these sensations or senseless126 psychological primitives taken together would have been endowed with all of the experienced properties of the public physical perceptible, and OShaughnessy would then surely have been able to echo the following words of Berkeley: Take away the sensations of softness, moisture, redness, tartness, and you take away the cherry. Since it is not a being distinct from sensations; a cherry, I say, is nothing but a congeries of sensible impressions, or ideas perceived by various senses: which ideas are united into one thing (or have one name given them) by the mind; because they are observed to attend each other. Thus when the palate is affected with such a particular taste, the sight is affected with a red colour, the touch with roundness, softness, etc. Hence, when I see, and feel, and taste, in sundry certain manners, I am sure the cherry exists, or is real; its reality being in my opinion nothing abstracted from those sensations.127

125

ibidem, 467. By senseless OShaughnessy most likely means generated completely independently of intellect (see ibidem, 477), but I would more naturally take senseless (somewhat like Berkeleys stupid) as meaning not itself sensing (though, of course, the senseless is capable of being sensed.) 127 Berkeley, Works, 3D, 249.
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Berkeley is saying that the cherry, being a congeries of sensible impressions, although not identical with any or all of them, is also not distinct from these impressions. This seems to be thoroughly Idealist just because in experiencing the sensation I am experiencing the physical object insofar as this sensation partly constitutes that object.

3.5.4. Foster

John Foster is explicitly concerned to argue for what he calls Phenomenalistic Idealism. In his latest and last book on this topic, he restates three key notions necessary for expounding and defending his case. One notion is that of constitution, which he defines as follows: A fact F is constituted by a fact F, or by a set of facts S, if and only if the obtaining of F is logically necessitated by the obtaining of F (the obtaining of the members of S), and, with respect to that source of necessitaton: (1) the obtaining of F is logically due to the obtaining of F (the obtaining of the members of S); (2) the obtaining of F involves nothing over and above the obtaining of F (the obtaining of the members of S).128 It is Fosters aim of prove that the physical world is something whose very existence is constituted by facts about human sensory experience, or by some richer complex of nonphysical facts in which such experiential facts centrally feature.129 This is the thesis of phenomenalistic idealism. In order to distinguish the three rival views of perception mentioned at the beginning of Chapter 1.1., Foster introduces two other key notions, one of which is that of perceptual mediation and the other that of -terminal perception. He explains these as follows:

First, given a subject S and two items x and y that he simultaneously perceives, I shall say that Ss perceiving of x (the fact of his perceiving x) is mediated by his perceiving of y (the fact of his perceiving y) if and only if (1) Ss perceiving of x is constituted by the combination of his perceiving of y and certain additional facts, and (2), apart from any concern they may have with Ss perceiving of y, these additional facts do not involve anything about Ss perceptual condition at the relevant time. Where a subjects perceiving of one item is mediated, in this way, by his perceiving of another, we can

128 129

Foster, A World For Us, 6. Foster, ibidem, 40.

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speak of him as perceiving the second item more immediately than he perceives the first.130 Second, I shall say that a subject S -terminally perceives an item x at a time t if and

only if x is a physical item and S perceives x at t and there is no other physical item y such that Ss perceiving of x at t is mediated by his perceiving of y at t. So, the perceiving of an item qualifies as -terminal just in case the item is physical and there is

no other physical item that is, in the context of that perceiving, perceived more immediately. (This leaves open the possibility of there being a non-physical item that is perceived more immediately.) I shall take it for granted that physical-item perception is not infinitely regressive, and that whenever a physical item is perceived, there is some physical item which is, in respect of that perception, -terminally perceived.131

Now we can begin to bring out the difference between the three rival views Foster is concerned to discuss as follows: Suppose, at a certain time t, Ralph sees an apple on the table in front of him. His seeing of the apple is mediated, in the sense defined, by his seeing of a certain portion of its surface (it is constituted by the combination of his seeing of this portion and the fact this latter item is a portion of the apples surface), and his seeing of this persisting surface portion is, in an exactly analogous way, mediated by his seeing of a certain momentary stage of it . . . This momentary stage of the apples surface portion is what, in the sense defined, Ralph -terminally sees at twhat, relative to the domain of physical -terminal object O. The

candidates, he most immediately sees. . . . Let us call this [Direct Realist] will say that, given that O is the

-terminal object of perception,

Ralphs seeing of O is a fundamental aspect of his psychological condition at t: his fundamental psychological state, though wholly a matter of what is occurring within his mind at that time, inherently involves his standing in this awareness relation to this external physical item. In contrast, the [Representative Realist] will say that, instead of being psychologically fundamental, the fact of Ralphs visual contact with O breaks down into two components. One component will cover all the relevant aspects of Ralphs psychological condition at tall that obtains or occurs in his mind at that time that in any way logically contributes to the obtaining of the relevant perceptual factand the [Representative Realist] will insist that these aspects, on their own, do not secure

130 131

ibidem, 7. ibidem.

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perceptual contact with O or suffice for physical-item perception at all. The other component will cover the remaining facts that are relevant to the securing of visual contact with Ofacts that do not involve anything further about the subjects psychological condition at t. In practice, [Representative Realists] will take the first component to consist in Ralphs having a certain kind of visual experience at t, and will take the second component to consist in, or centrally involve, facts concerning the qualitative relationship of this experience to O and the nature of the causal process from O to the occurrence of the experience. [Direct Realists] too will take the seeing of O to involve the occurrence of a visual experience and will accept that this experience occurs at the end of a causal process starting from O. But they will take this experience to be one which, by its intrinsic psychological nature, puts the subject into perceptual contact with O.132 So far this concerns just Direct Realism and Representative Realism. Foster, of course, thinks these two Realist views can be refuted. Very briefly put, the first fails because it does not allow an adequate understanding of the relationship between perceptual contact and phenomenal content; whereas the second fails because once we accept that the subjects contact with the relevant physical item decomposes in the envisaged way, there is no way of understanding how that contact can qualify as genuinely perceptual.133 Now both of these views take it for granted that the physical world is something external something with an existence distinct from, and logically independent of, facts about human mentality. Both assume that our awareness has to reach to things beyond the boundaries of the mind if it is to make contact with things in the world. The alternative Foster recommends is to embrace a brand of Idealism on which there would be no difficulty in supposing that our sensory experiences bring us into perceptual contact with physical items. For we would no longer have to think of these items as belonging to a reality that lies beyond the realm of experience. Awareness would not need to reach beyond the boundaries of the mind in order to make ontological contact with the factors by which the existence of the physical world is constitutively sustained.134 In his earlier book Foster explains a bit more fully how Idealism of the Phenomenalistic kind enables us to understand the way our sensory experiences bring us into perceptual contact with physical items. Putting Pauline in place of Ralph and visual sense-quale in place of visual

132

ibidem, 9-10. Foster, A World For Us, 37. 134 Foster, A World For Us, 40.
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experience and assuming that Non-Idealist Direct Realism (what Foster calls Physical Realism) has been refuted, when Pauline -terminally sees a certain momentary stage of an apples surface . . . the only

item immediately before Paulines mind is a certain visual sense-quale, and, in the Realist system, the only way in which the occurrence of this quale would be connected with the relevant portion-stage would be by a complex causal process, running through the subjects eyes and brain. It is impossible to see how this causal connection could turn the awareness of the quale into one which genuinely reaches to the external item. But, in the Idealists system, the situation is quite different. There is still a sense in which the contact with the portion-stage is mediated: the occurrence of the sense-quale does not in itself qualify as awareness of the physical item. But, in the new situation, the mediating and mediated objects are ontologically linked. For the occurrence of the quale is itself an instance of the operation of the sensory constraints by which, on their own or in combination with other factors, the existence of the portion-stage is constituted. In such a case, it is no more difficult to see how the presentation of the quale succeeds in giving access to the portion-stage of the apples surface than to see how the perceiving of this stage gives access to the persisting portion, or the perceiving of this portion gives access to the whole apple. Nor, indeed, is it difficult to see how, despite the mediation, the access to the physical item canin accordance with the traditional conception of Idealismbe thought of as direct.135 There are two points to be noticed here. One is that it is just this absence of an ontological link between mediating and mediated objects, this ontological separation between sense-qualia or sense-data and physical items, that vitiates popular attempts to establish Representative Realism (such as Frank Jacksons, to be discussed in 5.3.). The other point is that there is a type of mediation whose occurrence does not prevent the perception of the mediated item to be direct. Such perception can be direct if the mediating and mediated items share an ontological nature; for example, if the mediating item is a part or portion of the mediated item, or if the former is a sense-datum and the latter is constructed out of sense-data. Hence, there can be direct perception with mediation, or without it; but indirect perception is always with mediation.

3.5.5. Conclusion about Direct vs. Indirect Perception

135

Foster, The Nature of Perception, 256.

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Perkins, OShaughnessy, and Foster would agree that (1) all mediating items (mediators) are non-identical to the items they mediate and that (2) some but not all of these mediators are also essentially distinct from the items mediated. They would further agree (3) that one standardly sees a mediated item (say, a physical object) in virtue of, or by, or through, seeing a spatial or temporal part of it (the mediating item). Finally, they would agree (4) that a mediating item (mediator) can be more or less mediate; hence that a perception of it can be more or less indirect. But they might disagree on whether seeing a mediated item is always a case of indirect perception. Thus Foster thinks that on his Idealist story seeing a physical object can still be direct because the mediating sense-qualia are identical in nature with the object. This identity of ontological nature would not obtain, in his view, if Representative (Indirect) Realism were true. Since Perkins and OShaughnessy think that it is true, they also seem to think that any mediation makes the perception of the mediated physical object indirect. Cornman, we will recall, claimed that the distinction between direct and indirect perception can be entirely factual or non-epistemic, as drawn by Berkeley; or it can combine both a factual and an epistemic component, as expounded by Russell. But we have seen that, contrary to Cornman, Berkeleys distinction also has an epistemic component (see 3.5.1.). And we havent yet mentioned a third way discussed by Cornman of drawing the distinction; namely, Norman Malcolms, which is entirely epistemic. According to this way, also extensively discussed by Dretske, S sees D directly if and only if there are some properties of D about which S cannot be mistaken.136 It seems that Perkinss, OShaughnessys, and Fosters ways of distinguishing between direct and indirect perception all hail more or less from Berkeley.

3.6. Conclusion about Seeing into the Past

Those philosophers who think that we can see into the past are divided between (1) those who think that we can see present things and happenings in addition to seeing past things and happenings, and (2) those who think that whenever we do see something, it is always in the past. The first group includes, among many others, Dretske, Quinton, Armstrong, Ayer, Chisholm, Pitcher, and Bengson; the second group includes, among others, Alexander, Johansson, Solso, and the American New Realists. In both cases philosophers base their relevant conviction on what science has allegedly shown. In both cases the belief that we can see into the past is also

136

Dretske, Seeing and Knowing, 62.

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motivated by the desire to avoid postulating sense-data and countenancing idealism. We have seen how this belief, though in some ways highly attractive, may be challenged; in the next chapter we will argue that this challenge is insurmountable.

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Chapter Four: Affirming the Simultaneity-Requirement


4.1. Dancys Objection: Presence Is Ambiguous

Earlier (in 3.5.1.) I quoted James W. Cornman as saying that [c]learly, if to perceive something directly is, as Russell claims, to be acquainted with it, to have it present and presented to the perceiver, then the thesis that all objects exist at the time they are directly perceived is not only true but analytic. Cornman claims this in the course of constructing a plausible TGA that he thinks can be refuted only by invoking the adverbial theory of perception. We will return to this issue in the next section. But first I want to take up a challenge to this thesis issued by Jonathan Dancy. He says that it is a mistake . . . to suppose it obvious than an object of which we are directly aware must exist and have the qualities we attribute to it at the moment at which we are aware of it. This is a thought about time; the awareness and its object must exist at the same time. In [this] expression of that thought there is . . . a hint of the desire for infallibility. But forgetting that as irrelevant, we can still ask whether the object of direct awareness must not at least exist at the moment of awareness. Surely the direct object is presented to us; it is directly present to us. But how can it be now present to us if it is now non-existent? At best the non-existent must be thought of as absent (temporally and geographically), and so not present. There is an unfortunate ambiguity in the notion of present here, and I suggest the argument above trades on it. In one sense of present, the present is contrasted with the absent (temporally or geographically). In another sense, the present is that which is presented, that of which we are directly aware. So long as we do not trade on this ambiguity, I see no argument to force us from one sense to the other. In the sense defined, I suggest that an object such as a distant star can have ceased to exist by the moment at which we are of it.137 But how can that which is not present (in the first sense), which is temporally or geographically absent, how can that be present (in the second sense), i.e., be presented? If its not there, how can it show up for us to have it be presented to us and for us to be aware of it? It just can, and I know of no argument that it cant, says Dancy; it just cant, and no further argument is needed for my position, counters Cornman.

137

Dancy, Introduction to Contemporary Epistemology, 146-147.

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But, obviously, whether or not the latter is right, further and more probing argument is always desirable. This I will presently try to give on Cornmans (and my) behalf. Next Dancy admits that his suggestion (that an object such as a distant star can have ceased to exist by the moment at which we are aware of it) may seem counter-intuitive. If you find it so, you will be confirmed (I expect) in this when you notice that if it is right there will be available a sense in which memory can be direct awareness of the past.138 I do find it so; I do notice that if Dancys view is right, then there will be available a sense in which memory can be direct awareness of the past, but the latter claim (that memory can be direct awareness of the past) is precisely what Im inclined to deny; and Im inclined to deny it for the reasons that A. O. Lovejoy gives in his The Revolt Against Dualism: Intertemporal cognition, the knowing at one time of things which exist or events which occur at another time, seems a patent example of a mode of knowledge which we are under the necessity of regarding as potentially genuine and yet as mediate. When I remember, for example, not only is there a present awareness distinct from the past memory-object (that alone would imply only the duality of act and content), but the present awareness manifestly has, and must have, a compresent content. But the past event which we say the memory is of cannot be this compresent content.139 Lovejoy then discusses the view of those who deny that when an event is past it ceases to exist and who claim, like C. D. Broad does, that [o]nce an event has happened it exists eternally and that past events are always there waiting to be remembered; and there is no a priori reason why they should not from time to time enter unto such a relation with certain present events that they become objects of direct acquaintance.140 According to Lovejoy, [t]his view, however, implies an inconceivable divorce of the identity of an event from its date. The things which may be said to subsist eternally are essences; and the reason why they can so subsist is that, by definition, they have no dates. They do not exist at all, in the sense in which dated and located things do so; and if events eternally existed after they had once happened (and when they were no longer happening), they would likewise exist before they happened; eternalness can hardly be an acquired character. The present image and the past event may be separate embodiments of the same essence; they are not identical particulars, because the particularity of each is undefinable apart from its temporal situation and relations. The duality of the memoryimage and the bygone existence to which it refers seems to be inherent in what we mean

138

ibidem. Lovejoy, 21. 140 Lovejoy, 22. The quotes from Broad, cited by Lovejoy, are in The Mind and its Place in Nature, 252.
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by remembrance; if the two were one our intertemporal knowing would defeat its own aim of apprehending the beyond, by annulling its beyondness. The very wistfulness of memory implies such duality; the past, in being known, still inexorably keeps its distance. Plainest of all is that a mans experiencing of yesterday, the event of his then having an experience, does not seem to him, in being remembered, to become todays experiencing. Common sense, however much inclined in its more self-confident moments to believe in direct perception, has never, I suppose, believed in direct memory; it has been well aware that what is present in retrospection is a duplicate which somehow and in some degree discloses to us the character, without constituting the existence, of its original.141 That this common-sense view of memory is natural and defensible is also implied in the Stanford Encyclopedias article on Memory. This, among other things, states that [a]lthough it takes many significantly different forms, this idea that a trace acquired in past experience somehow represents that experience, or carries information about it, is at the heart of representative or indirect realism in the philosophy of memory. This has been the dominant view of memory in modern philosophy of mind, and it is assumed in much work on memory in cognitive science. Research programmes for representative realism thus seek to clarify the nature of representations in memory, and the various processes in which they are involved. . . Some recent work in the cognitive sciences of memory. . . is intended to respond to or incorporate the more powerful . . . criticisms [of the entire representative realist framework] within revised forms of representative realism. Thus because I think it is highly respectable to reject Direct Realism, and to accept Indirect Realism, with respect to recollective awareness of the past, I continue to take it as counterintuitive that any object can go out of existence before we become directly visually aware of it. This is one, but perhaps not a conclusive, argument against Dancys position. Others will emerge presently.

4.2. Cornman and the TGA

Some of the most sustained work on the TGA and its simultaneity-principle has been done by James Cornman142 in two books, in which tackling these issues is part of a broader philosophical

141

142

ibidem. He, too, has called the TGA the most forceful argument for sensa derived from causal facts of perception (Perception, Common Sense, and Science, p. 47). (Sensa, of course, is his term for what others call sense-data.)

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program. One of these books, Materialism and Sensations, dating from 1971, attempts to provide a materialist account of sensations by first rebutting Reductive Materialism and Eliminative Materialism and then arguing for Adverbial Materialism, which in turn requires rejection of sense-data and acceptance of an adverbial construal of sensations. The other book is the 1975 volume Perception, Common Sense, and Science, which Dancy in 1985 called one of the best available on the philosophy of perception and one to which his own discussion is much indebted.143 In that second book Cornman examines perception of the external world and advances a metaphysical theory he calls compatible common-sense realism. Throughout both these works the author emphasizes that his conclusions, though painstakingly (if not always perspicuously) argued-for, are only tentative and provisional. He presents versions of the TGA in both books, including two versions that he regards as plausible, to say the least. The first version, presented in the earlier book, argues for the existence of sense-data. Though Cornman does not accept the conclusion, he praises the argument as strong. The second version, presented in the later book, is directed towards proving the falsity of nave realism; Cornman regards it as entirely successful. I will discuss them in turn; but first a few words about some of his many discussions of the simultaneity-principle. In Materialism and Sensations he states two versions of it: (a) It is impossible that something is perceived at a time it does not exist. (b) All objects exist at the time they are perceived. Cornman argues against these as follows. With respect to (a) he asks, But why should anyone think that it is logically impossible? Whether or not it is reasonable, it is at least logically possible that we see a star at the time it no longer exists. There is no contradiction entailed here.144 But this is just a vigorous denial of (a), not a strong argument for rejecting it. And (b), he asserts, is unreasonable, because it is quite reasonable to claim that some stars are perceived when they no longer exist.145 Once again, this is just a bare denial of the claim at issue. Fortunately, Cornman doesnt leave it at that but goes on to say that this claim is bolstered by construing perceiving adverbially; that

He goes on to say that [p]hysiologists, such as Brain and Eccles, have described these complex causal processes as culminating in experiences of sense-data or percepts, but they seem to provide no reason for preferring this description to one that mentions adverbial sensings. . . . I should think that it is at least as reasonable to hold that adverbial sensing events are effects of neural events as to hold that these effects are phenomenal objects or properties. 143 Dancy, 158. 144 Cornman, Materialism and Sensations, 220. 145 ibidem, 221.

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is, by taking it that the event of a person perceiving a star is the event of the star appearing in some way to him as a result of the star being a proper stimulus of him. This would allow for people sometimes perceiving stars when the stars do not exist.146 In Perception, Common Sense, and Science he elaborates on this as follows: Often, when someone claims that we directly see a physical object, such as a hand, he takes this to imply that we are perceptually acquainted with the hand, that is, that the hand is not only presented to us when we see it, but it is present with us when we see it. This is clearly the view of the perception of physical objects that a nave realist and, initially at least, a Berkeleian would have, and it is the view of the experience of sensa that an indirect realist and a Berkeleian have. However, . . . it is not required for direct perception of physical objects. If my present perceptual experience of a distant star consists in my being in a state of star-sensing now as a result of my eyes being suitably affected by stimulus previously transmitted from the star, then I directly perceive the star now, even if it does not exist now and I am not perceptually acquainted with it. And . . . the causation of such a sensing event is at least as reasonable an effect of physical and neurophysical events as is a sensum. Thus the causal facts involved in the time-gap . . . provide no reason to accept the existence of sensa.147 Therefore, Cornman is saying, there are two ways of dealing with the time-gap. The one he prefers denies the simultaneity-principle and, accordingly, denies sense-data but affirms adverbial sensings and concludes that stars are perceived directly. The other affirms the simultaneity-principle and concludes that stars are perceived indirectly because the objects of direct perception are the existing sense-data. Although admitting the plausibility of the second way, he wishes to reject its affirmative conclusion about sense-data. Since this is a conclusion I wish to defend, lets look at how Cornman proposes to reject it; but for that we first need to lay out the argument in detail. This is the one for sense-data found in Materialism and Sensations. He introduces it by saying that [n]ot everyone will agree that perceiving something is to be identified merely with having a perceptual experience of a certain kind. To perceive an object, especially to see it or touch it, is seemingly to be in some kind of contact with it, to have it presented to one. But this kind of relationship to an object requires its existence.148 Here is the argument (let me call it the MS Argument):149

146

ibidem. Cornman, Perception, Common Sense, and Science, 49-50. 148 Cornman, Materialism and Sensations, 221. 149 ibidem, 219-226. All further quotations from this book are from these pages.
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(1) If something is directly perceived, then it is directly perceived during the time a veridical perceptual experience of it occurs. (2) Any veridical perceptual experience of an external physical object occurs after the stimulus energy transmitted from the object first affects a sense organ. Therefore, (3) If an external physical object is directly perceived, then it is perceived after the stimulus energy from it first affects a sense organ. (4) If some external physical objects are directly perceived after the stimulus energy from them affects a sense organ, then some external physical objects do not exist at the time they are directly perceived. (5) But all objects exist at the time they are directly perceived [the simultaneityprinciple]. Therefore, (6) No external physical objects are directly perceived. (7) If no external physical objects are directly perceived, then either no external physical objects are perceived, or some are indirectly perceived and sense-data are directly perceived. (8) Some external physical objects are perceived. Therefore, (9) Sense-data are directly perceived. Therefore, (10) Sense-data exist. Of course, someone using the TGA to argue seriously for sense-data would reformulate premise (4), perhaps by replacing its consequent some external physical objects do not exist at the time they are directly perceived with the consequent some external physical objects do not exist at the time it seems as though they are directly perceived. But since Cornmans intention is the opposite, he accepts (4) as it stands and can afford to declare that in this argument [n]o premise is clearly dubious and that [t]he only way to avoid its conclusion is to claim that there are cases of perception of physical objects in which there are no objects of acquaintance, because no objects are given or presented in those perceptual experiences. For Cornman this means rejecting premise (7). This may, says he, appear to be egregiously implausible, but it may seem less outrageous if it is realized that this is merely a claim about the factual character of perception and is compatible with something always being given in a purely epistemological sense. This remark seems obscure; I will come back to it.

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Then Cornman goes on to say that [t]here remains, however, the problem of how it can be that some things are perceived when nothing is directly perceived. His answer consists in a highly involuted discussion, as a result of which premise (5) is now held to have been shown to be dubious by the fact that it is surely plausible to claim that certain stars are perceived at times they do not exist, because perceiving them consists in star-sensing as a result of stimulus energy from the stars and some of these stars do not exist when the star-sensings occur. And with no intermediaries, they are directly perceived in a Berkeleian sense but not in an acquaintance sense. The latter requires physical objects to be present and presented in perceptual experiences, so that a direct perceptual realist who subscribes to the adverbial theory . . . might even go on to argue that no objects of any kind are perceptually given in this sense. Because perceptual experiences are adverbial and because of the time gap, no external physical objects nor any other objects are presented. But since, although these objects are not perceptually given (being neither present nor presented) they nevertheless are seen directly, what might be given in a purely epistemological sense is the knowledge that (say) a star is or was there. Perhaps this is what Cornman had in mind with the obscure remark cited above. Even so, his reasons for rejecting (7) seem unconvincing. I find (7) to be obviously true. Therefore, in view of the fact that both Cornman and I find none of the other premises clearly dubious (to say the very least), I conclude that the MS Argument, with premise (4) as amended above, is a fine TGA for the existence of sense-data. In Perception, Common Sense, and Science he lays out a somewhat similar TGA (call it the PCSS Argument) for a somewhat different conclusion:150 (1) If something is perceived by s at a time t, then t is one time at which s has a veridical perceptual experience of it. (2) No veridical perceptual experience of an external physical object by s occurs before the stimulus energy transmitted from the object first affects a sense organ of s. Therefore, (3) If an external physical object is perceived by s at t, then t is not a time before the stimulus energy from the object first affects a sense organ of s. (4) Some external physical objects that are perceived by a person, s, have ceased existing before stimulus from them first affects a sense organ of s. Therefore,

150

Cornman, Perception, Common Sense, and Science, 243-247. All further quotations from this book are, if not indicated otherwise, from these pages.

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(5) Some external physical objects are perceived by a person, s, at a time when the objects do not exist. (6) If nave realism is correct, then if a person, s, perceives an external physical object at t, then he is perceptually acquainted with it at t. (7) If a person, s, is perceptually acquainted with an object at t, then it exists at t and, if s should be normal and conditions optimal, s would experience it approximately as it is at t. Therefore, (8) Nave realism is incorrect. The simultaneity-thesis, of course, is implied by premise (7). Of this argument Cornman says that it is is valid and it certainly seems sound. Surely a nave realist will not refute it by attacking premises (1), (6), or (7). They are not only clearly true, but are true by definition. His only hope, then, is to attack one of the two empirical premises, (2) and (4). But (2) is an obvious truth and, moreover, is surely accepted by a nave realist. . . . He must, consequently, concentrate on (4). To refute premise (4), a nave realist must counter the strong scientific reason for accepting it. There is good reason to believe that exploding stars have been seen, and that, given the scientific hypotheses about their distances from the earth and about the speed of light in outer space, they exploded light years before their explosion was seen. He must, then either refute the claim that they are at such great distances, or justify that the speed of light in outer space is substantially greater than 186,000 miles per second. Cornman is right, of course, in firmly rejecting both alternatives mentioned in the last sentence. But is there really good reason to believe that exploding stars have been seen and that they exploded light years before their explosion was seen? Yes, there is good reason to believe and natural to saythese things. But cant this same good reason be accommodated by believing and saying that sense-data of exploding stars have been seen and that they have been seen light years after the stars exploded? I dont see why it cant except for a wish to avoid sense-data. If one lacks this wish then one can rewrite (4) as (4a) Some external physical objects whose sense-data are perceived by a person, s, have ceased existing before stimulus from these external objects first affects a sense organ of s. Now (5) doesnt follow (its false anyway), and this argument against nave realism collapses, but there are others that are much better (such as our Berkeleian TGA). Thus when in his conclusion about nave realism Cornman says that [w]e have finally come to agree with 114

the many philosophers who have claimed that nave realism should be rejected, I can assent to the last clausebut only partially and not in the sense Cornman intended. Indeed we must be careful here. What is nave realism, according to Cornman? He says that it comprises two theses. The first is that the world consists in large part of perceivable objects that are not perceivers, that exist unperceived, and that are not affected either by being perceived or, generally, by changes in the usual conditions in which they are perceived; many of these objects have and are perceived to have . . . the observable, occurrent physical properties of size, shape, weight, solidity, texture, motion (rest), location, sensuous color, and hotness (coldness).151 This, the thesis that most physical objects exist and have many of their properties independently of the mind, is not refuted by the PCSS Argument. And that it is not so refuted is, indeed, why he actually endorses this version of the TGA, for Cornman, like most modern philosophers, is emphatically not an Idealist. But it is the thesis that Idealists (and therefore I) wish to refute; consequently they (and I) cannot accept this argument. Moreover, we cannot accept it because what this argument refutes is the second thesis, namely, that to perceive a physical object is to be . . . perceptually acquainted with it.152 This is precisely the thesis that Idealists wish, not to refute, but to preserve. Cornman defines perceptual acquaintance in terms of being perceptually presented to and present with a perceiver, and perceptual presentedness (presentation) and perceptual presence are, in turn, defined by him as follows:153 p is perceptually presented to s at time t = df. (1) s immediately perceives p at t, and (2) if, at t, s should be a normal perceiver who immediately perceives p in normal conditions of perception, the p would appear to s at t as it is at t. p is perceptually present with s at time t = df. p exist at t when s immediately perceives p. This is the sense of perceptual acquaintance in which the Direct Realist says physical objects can be directly perceived and the Representative Realist (Indirect Realist) denies that they are, claiming instead that physical objects, if perceived at all, are perceived indirectly. The

151

Cornman, Perception, Common Sense, and Science, 219. ibidem, 224. 153 ibidem, 223,
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Idealist Direct Realist also accepts that physical objects can be directly perceived in this sense, although he calls attention to the fact that there may be two meanings of directly that the Direct Realist and the Indirect Realist can make use of here.

4.3. Valberg on Presence

One philosopher who has well-articulated views about presence and related concepts is Jerry Valberg. He says that [b]y an object of experience we shall mean something present in experience.154 But, he asks, What do we mean by present in experience, present to us, and so on? Heres the first part of Valbergs answer: Presence (in experience) connotes a kind of direct or immediate availability. An object which is present is right there, available to us. This makes it tempting to view presence as the reciprocal of Russells idea of acquaintance. That is, an object with which we are (in Russells sense) acquainted is present in experience; and an object which is present in experience is one with which we are acquainted.155 Valberg does not resist this temptation; he endorses this tie between acquaintance and presence, since both ideas imply immediate availability; but there is one difference: whereas for Russell objects of acquaintance may be either particulars or universals, for Valberg experiential presence is limited to the category of particulars. What is present, directly available, is always a particular.156 Thats the first point about presence, says Valberg, and continues: But since particulars traditionally are temporal (but not necessarily spatial) objects . . . of which it makes sense to ask how long they have existed or lasted, when they began to exist, and so on . . . , the second point to make about presence in experience is than an object present in experience is always a temporal object.157 A third point about presence is the intimate connection between experiential and temporal presence: We have a strong inclination to view objects that are present in experience as being, at that very time, existent: if something is now present, it now exists. This inclination to encompass the object within the temporal present does not extend to reference, or thought in general. There is no problem about referring to, or thinking of, objects which

154

Valberg, The Puzzle of Experience, 4. ibidem. 156 ibidem, 5. 157 ibidem.


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no longer exist. But our inclination is to say that such things cannot be present in experience, that they cannot now be objects of experience.158 Having said this, Valberg then adds the following all-important footnote: The reason for saying (guardedly) that we are inclined to view experiential and temporal presence as connected in this way, rather than flatly asserting that they are thus connected, is that the connection is sometimes used by philosophers to argue . . . that the object of experience is always internal. I have in mind the famous time-lag argument. Some philosophers, when they see this coming, claim that the connection between experiential and temporal presence is only apparent. The case of stellar explosions, they will say, shows that things (events) can be present in experience, after they cease to exist. There is no point getting into this issue, since, for the purpose of providing a distinguishing mark of experiential presence (for the purpose of distinguishing objects of experience from, say, objects of reference), the appearance of a connection suffices.159 But why, in Valbergs view, does the (mere) appearance of a connection suffice? Why, for the purpose of distinguishing objects of experience from objects of thought, isnt it necessary that the objects present in experience actually be (rather than just appear to be) at that very time existent? We will pursue this question in due course. For now just a few more words of clarification about the direct availability that objects have in virtue of being present. This involves two ideas: that of focusing on, fixing on, or picking out an object; and that of demonstrative reference to an object. According to Valberg, we cannot focus on something unless it is present in our experience: the fact of an objects presence is what makes the object available for us to focus on. Thus an object which is present in experience is, in virtue of that fact, available (then and there) for us to focus on and pick out.160 And when we make a demonstrative reference to something, we thereby do focus on (pick out) the object to which we refer. So just as we can think of the fact of an objects presence as what makes the object available for us to focus on, or pick out, we can think of this latter fact as what makes the object available for demonstrative reference (what makes the object demonstratively available). A fact of presence, we might say, is what creates the possibility of focusing, and what creates the possibility of focusing creates the possibility of demonstrative reference.161

158

ibidem. ibidem, 19. 160 ibidem, 6. 161 ibidem, 7.


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Thus, an object of experience is something present in experience: something which is right there, available for us to pick out or focus on, and refer to demonstratively.162 Next I would like to bring out how much Valberg values the TGA. In the footnote referred to several paragraphs above, he goes on to say that it has much in common with the problematic reasoning, which is what Valberg calls the argument leading into his puzzle of experience. Both the TGA and Valbergs problematic reasoning depend on what he calls the causal picture of experience, which is a set of basic facts about the transmission and reflection of light, the nature of the eye, and the process in the nervous system and brain which results or culminates in visual experience.163 (It is what we outlined, using Dretskes words, at the beginning of 2.2.). Valberg continues: It is worth noting, however, that, even if the time-lag argument were correct, the problematic reasoning is more fundamental. It depends on less; it does not depend on the fact of a time-lag. The problematic reasoning would work equally well if light travelled instantaneously.164 So what is Valbergs problematic reasoning?

4.4. The Puzzle of Experience Here is Valbergs problematic reasoning in three discursive stages.165 The first stage is the thought that [t]he present activity in my brain . . . is the causal outcome of a chain of events involving light rays being reflected from a certain objectthe book on the table, say. In turn, the activity in my brain is causally responsible for my experience being as it now is.166 The second stage is the reflection that if the activity in my brain could somehow be held constant, the earlier parts of the causal chain might be eliminated without this having any effect on my experience. If the activity in my brain were to continue as it is, my experience would continue as it is. It would continue as it is, even if, say, something interfered with the light rays being reflected to my eyes; or even if the object reflecting the light rays were miraculously annihilated. God (it is handy to bring God in here) might arrange such a situation. God might eliminate the object while maintaining the activity in my visual cortex. Is that not a coherent state of affairs, something God might bring about? And, if the activity in my

162

ibidem. ibidem, 9-10. 164 ibidem, 19. 165 He takes much longer to expound it than I do here. 166 Valberg, The Puzzle of Experience, 10.
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brain were to continue on as it is, my experience would also continue on as it is. It would continue to run along perfectly smoothly, despite the fact that the external object would no longer be there. This possibility, which is implicit in our everyday knowledge about the causal dependence of experience on objects and processes in the world (implicit, that is, in the causal picture of experience), might be summed up by saying that the external thing, the object in the world, is potentially irrelevant to experience.167 Now comes the third stage. It consists of four steps. The first is to look at the book on my table and to focus on whatever it is that is present now in my experience while I am looking at the book. Certainly there is, right now, something present in my experience.168 The second step is to remain focused on it for a little while (about five seconds should be enough). I do this very closely, never letting my attention waver, always staying right with the object on which I am focused.169 The third step is to reflect on this bit of my history in the light of the potential irrelevance of the book. Consider the hypothesis that half-way through the last five seconds God . . . eliminated the book but maintained the activity in my brain just as it was when the book was there. When the book was there, it reflected light to my eyes; this process eventuated in the activity in my visual cortex. The hypothesis is that, half-way through the last five seconds, God (as it were) took over from the book, having eliminated it, and directly maintained the activity in my brain. But in reflecting on this hypothesis I realize that it seems to be compatible with how things have been in my experience during the last five seconds . . . with the fact that this object, the object on which I am now focused, has been present in my experience for the last five seconds, even though, [h]ad God intervened, the book would have ceased to exist twoand-a-half seconds ago but this object would have remained (just as it has remained) present in my experience. There would have been a rupture in the world; a certain external object, a book, would have suddenly ceased to exist. This would have been evident to an onlooker, but for me, within my experience, things would have flowed smoothly on, without a ripple or flickerjust as they have done. That is to say, this object would have been (just as it has been) present to me for the whole of the last five seconds.170 The fourth step is to draw the obvious conclusion.

167

ibidem, 10-11. ibidem, 14-15. 169 ibidem, 15. 170 ibidem, 15-16.
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It follows (plainly) that this object on which I have actually been focused for the last five seconds, is not the book. For my having been focused on this object is compatible with the supposition of Gods intervention, and it is part of the supposition that, half-way through the last five seconds, God eliminated this book. So the object on which I have actually been focused, this object, is such that it might have survived the elimination of the book. So it cannot be the book.171 This, the probematic reasoning, is not restricted to the object on which I am now focused and the book in front of me on the table. It works for any object in the world and any object on which I might focus. Any object in the world, any external thing (apart from my brain), is such that God could eliminate it compatibly with keeping the activity in my brain the same. . . . With respect to anything present in my experience . . . I can reduce to absurdity the assumption that it is part of the world.172 But if the object present in my experience is never part of the world, never an object whose existence is independent of the fact of its presence, then it must be an object whose existence is not independent of its presence in my experience, an internal object, a sense-datum. This, then, is the conclusion of the problematic reasoning.173 On Russells use of the term sense-data, which has become pretty standard, Valberg claims in another important footnote, sense-data are by definition internal objects. Russells procedure is first to argue that the objects of experience are internal, and then (in effect) to dub these internal objects sense-data . . . But Russells usage is not universal. Moore, unlike Russell, seems to define the term sense-data . . . in such a way as to leave it open whether sense-data are external or internal. In effect, sense-datum for Moore means: that which is present in experience (object of experience). The question for Moore, about which he can never quite make up his mind, is whether sense-data (thus defined) are or are not external things (or parts of external things) . . . Thus, if we express the conclusion of the problematic reasoning by saying that the object of experience is always a sense-datum, this would accord better with Russells use of the term than with Moores.174 There is one troubling aspect of Valbergs thought regarding internal objects and sense-data that I now wish to call attention to. He says that [a]n internal object is an object whose existence is not independent of its presence in experience. In this case, existence and presence collapse into one. The fact of existence
171

ibidem, 16-17. ibidem, 17-18. 173 ibidem, 18. 174 ibidem, 19-20.
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and the fact of presence are the same fact. Examples of internal objects are after-images and hallucinatory objects (such as Macbeths dagger). Thus we do not regard such objects as part of the world.175 But this last sentence (introduced by Thus) doesnt seem to follow from the previous ones; and it seems in any case to be unargued-for and false. An argument of sorts appears in the immediately following passage in which Valberg makes the familiar distinction between material objects, which are external, space-filling, and part of the world, and immaterial objects, which likewise are part of the world: The world will contain, as Descartes thought, two radically different categories of objects and phenomena. Some will consist of matter, others of spirit. Whether Descartes was right in this view is not relevant here. What is relevant is simply that internal objects are not immaterial objects. (An after-image is not like a ghost.) Internal objects are neither material nor immaterial. They do not consist of anything. They are not part of the world.176 Here Valberg barely conceals his disapproval of the Cartesian partition of the world into matter and spirit. I, like Foster, think there is nothing wrong with this partition; I also think that ghosts are not the best examples of spiritual things, that ghosts almost certainly do not exist, and that souls do (thus I would reject Gilbert Ryles characterization of the soul as a ghost in a machine). The best examples of spiritual things are thoughts (thinkings), feelings, emotions, mental images, after-images, sensations, and sense-data: these are all mental, almost certainly immaterial, and definitely part of the world. That they are not part of the world is plausible only on the assumption that the world is wholly material, but this assumption is daring (it must be strenuously argued-for) and most likely wrong. However, the problematic reasoning is only one half of what Valberg calls the puzzle of experience. The other half comes about by simply being open to our experience. When you open up to your experience, this is how the conflict, the antinomy, the puzzle of experience, presents itself: I start by going through the problematic reasoning. I conclude that this object, the object present to me when I look at the book, cannot be the book. It cannot be the book because, by the reasoning, it could survive the elimination of the book. So it, this object, is an internal object, something which exists only in so far as it is present in my experience. But wait, this object is a book. The object present to me when I look at the book on the table is the book on the table. There is nothing else there. Now I realize that,
175 176

ibidem, 8. ibidem.

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as a contribution to philosophy, thoughts of this sort may appear a trifle quick and simple-minded; yet it is precisely such thoughts that come over me when I reach the conclusion of the problematic reasoning. And when they come over me, they totally overcome the conclusion. The reasoning establishes that this is an internal object. But it is not. It, this object, is a book. What gives me the right to say this? Where is the argument? There is no argument. The arguments are all on the other side. I do not conclude that the object present to me is a book, but that is all I findthe book. That is to say, the book is all I find when I am open to how things are in my experience. If I reflect on the fact that how things are in my experience is the causal product of what is happening now in my brain, I seem driven to the conclusion that the object present in my experience when I look at the book, this object, is not a book. Yet if I am open to (how things are in) my experience, all I find is the book. Thus the antinomy is a function of the fact that my experience is a subject-matter on which I can reflect in two different ways. There is the indirect way: reasoning, in terms of the causal picture of experience, to a conclusion about how things are in my experience. And the direct way: simply being open to how things are in my experience.177 Thats Valbergs puzzle of experience: it arises from first reasoning about our experience (in a way reminiscent of but much more concise than the TGA) and then becoming open to our experience. Having presented and articulated this puzzle, Valberg goes on to explain further how it arises and then to look for possible solutions to the puzzle. A solution would be finding a mistake in the problematic reasoning or in our attitude to the reasoning. But he finds no mistake; and thus concludes that the puzzle of experience is unsolvable, that we are stuck with it. I will argue in my final chapter that there is one solution to the puzzle that Valberg has shortchanged a bit: namely, the theistic Phenomenalist (Idealist) one. But let us first look in greater detail at Berkeleys position regarding perceivings and objects perceived, and the time at which perceivings occur. 4.5. Berkeley on Perceivings and Perceiveds At Principles, Section 5 Berkeley says that it is impossible for me to conceive in my thoughts any sensible thing or object distinct from the sensation or perception of it. This, plus the

177

ibidem, 21-22.

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statement in the first edition that in truth the object and the sensation are the same thing and cannot, therefore, be abstracted from each other and the PC585 entry wherein I pray you does the perception of white differ from white all suggest a principle that S. A. Grave and Colin Turbayne have called the Identity Principle; but A. C. Grayling thinks that this label is wholly misleading, since Berkeley, according to Grayling, is not committed to the view that ideas are identical with perceivings of them.178 If that were Berkeleys view, the conclusion that if a thing is perceived at a certain time then it must exist at that time would readily follow. But thats not his view, acccording to Grayling: Berkeley is not claiming that a particular idea is to be identified with a particular perceiving of it, for the nonidentity of states of awareness and their contents is a thesis already well entrenched as the view that, from the finitary viewpoint, ideas, at any rate those that constitute real things, are not dependent for their existence on any particular finite perceiving of them. What it means not to be able to conceive apart any sensible thing or object distinct from the sensation or perception of it (P5) is therefore far from a claim that the idea and the perception of it are numerically the same thing, but rather that an idea is always and essentially an idea perceived, and perception is always and essentially the perception of ideas.179 So the question is as follows: For Berkeley, are sensations and their objects merely nonabstractable one from the other, as Grayling claims, or actually numerically identical, as Turbayne claims? I think that this specific objection to Turbaynes reading misfires. When Grayling says that from the finitary viewpoint ideas that constitute real things are not dependent for their existence on any particular finite perceiving of them, this is true, of course, if dependent means causally dependent (and in this context it cannot mean anything else). Now, for Berkeley, all ideas are particular and of particulars, and my idea of the visible sun can be like yours and a lot of other finite observers, yet all of these ideas are in some way ontologically dependent on God (a point not only not denied, but positively emphasized, by Grayling). Which way that is, scholars dispute about: does God Himself perceive ideas like those of finite observers; or does He have a volitional policy vis--vis finite observers, and if so, how does that work? But none of this in the least implies the non-identity of states of awareness [particular perceivings] and their contents [particular ideas perceived], as Grayling contends. On the contrary, the non-dependence of any particular ideas existence on any particular finite
178 179

Grayling, Berkeley, 169-170. ibidem, 171.

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perceiving of it seems to be perfectly compatible with any particular perceiving of it being numerically identical with that particular ideas being perceived; just as this identity claim is compatible with Graylings own, weaker reading of Berkeley that an idea is always and essentially an idea perceived, and perception is always and essentially the perception of ideas. Still, I think Grayling is absolutely correct in thinking there is something wrong with the view (whether Berkeley held it or not) that a particular idea is to be identified with a particular perceiving of it. I will discuss this important point a bit later; first I briefly want to take up another thought of Graylings, namely, that there are many examples of distinct items that are related by mutual non-abstractability. In his words, [e]very process-product relation, for example, is of this kind; bread and the baking of it, a picture and the painting of it, are cases in point.180 Obviously, the loaf of bread cannot exist before it has been baked nor can the baking of it come after it, the loaf, has ceased to exist. But is the perception of a thing a process-product relation? According to Belfrage, thats exactly what it is in Berkeleys Theory of Vision, where he analyzes the perceiving process, not the end-product, so-called sensible things, which play a crucial part in the Principles.181 In Graylings view, the natural model for Berkeleys account of perception is neither the process-product model nor even the act-object model because finite minds are passive in perceiving real ideas, which are input from an independent external source. Their passivity is embedded in activity, however, in the sense that to receive an idea involves having, say, to turn ones eye or sniff at a rose (1D196). But although to this extent perception of real ideas involves activity, the content of a particular state of awareness is not produced by an act of will, as in the case of ideas of imagination, but is somewhat consequent to eye-turnings and sniffings (ibid.), and therefore to be distinguished from them (1D197).182 The best model, Grayling implies, is, therefore, the state-content model; and it is just in terms of such a model that the Robinsonian argument (for the premise that if I see something now then it must exist now; see 2.1) has been formulated. If Turbaynes interpretation of the Identity Principle in Principles, section 5 is correct, i.e., if the thing immediately seen is identical with the seeing of it, then, of course, it just follows that if I see something now it must exist now. The problem here is not only that if someone doesnt already accept the simultaneity-requirement he might be even less inclined to accept this as a

180

ibidem, 173. Belfrage, The Scientific Background of George Berkeleys Idealism, 217. 182 Grayling, Berkeley, 173.
181

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reason for it, but also, and more importantly, that this is just dead wrong. A thing, whatever it is, can no more be identical with the seeing of it than a horse can be identical with the kicking of it. A headache, of course, is identical with the feeling of it; but this in no way warrants the claim that this pain (this headache, this feeling of it) is identical with the head that aches. The headache is only like the head in that both are mind-dependent. Tom Stoneham argues forcefully in this connection that Berkeley is best understood as adhering to the subject-object model of perception, to be distinguished from the act-object model (which, according to Stoneham, is better called the subject-act-object model to reveal all its elements). In addition to these two, there are three more models relevant to discussions of Berkeley: the adverbial model; the Representative Theorys subject-object-object model, which Berkeley tries to refute; and the intentional model, which he never explicitly discusses or even acknowledges. The subject-object model, which Stoneham also calls SMP (The Simplest Model of (Sense) Perception), is introduced by him in the context of the debate about whether Berkeley holds an act-object model of perception or an adverbial model; according to the latter the distinction between act and object collapses. As Stoneham writes, It is standardly assumed that if this distinction collapses, we are left with just the act, the perceiving, and consequently the difference between seeing red and seeing green must be the difference between seeing redly and seeing greenly. But a collapse can go either way: the object could collapse into the act or the act into the object. SMP holds that we do not have a duality of act and object, but merely an object (and a subject, of course, but the identity and properties of the subject are irrelevant to the content of the perception, to what is perceived). This alternative is obscured by the universal assumption that if S perceives O, then there is a (mental) event which is a perceiving of O by S. SMP simply denies this: when S perceives O, S and O exist, and they stand in a relation, namely perceiving, but their standing in this relation is neither constituted nor enabled by any concurrent event or occurrence in S.183 Their standing in this relation is a state. That state, though (obviously) not constituted or enabled by any (other) event or occurrence in S, is trivially constituted by itself, by Ss perceiving O; and it exists as much as S and O do. There being this state of perceiving makes SMP a case of the state-content model (where content=object) preferred by Grayling (again, it might be more perspicuous to call it the subject-state-content model).

183

Stoneham, Berkeleys World, 54-55.

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Thus SMP is committed to maintaining that when S perceives O there is a subject of perceiving, a relation of perceiving, and an object or content perceived. Now every model of perception except the adverbial one must agree that there is between S and O a relation of perceiving. Thus it is clear that SMP is incompatible with Turbaynes account of Berkeley, according to which the perceiving and the perceived are the same (unless the perceptual relation between S and O is not Ss perceiving of O; or that perceptual relation is identity; or there is no perceptual relation between S and O at all. But all three options are absurd.) This is another thing wrong with Turbaynes reading, assuming that SMP really is Berkeleys default account of perception, as Stoneham claims (correctly, in my opinion). On Stonehams account of Berkeley, if Ss perceiving of O is realized at time t, then obviously S must exist t; but doesnt the same go for O? I would say so, but some philosophers (e.g., John Foster) claim it is logically possible for a perceptual relation to obtain now between a currently existing S and a past item O. I will return to this issue shortly (in the next section). If Graylings interpretation of Principles, section 5 in terms of non-abstractibility is correct (something very likely given the failure of Turbaynes), then we do not get from that alone the conclusion that if I see something immediately now it must exist now. It could have existed earlier: what I immediately see now is something that existed earlier and was then also immediately perceived, of course; but not necessarily by me. However, if perceiving is a process-product relationship, as Grayling has Berkeley allowing for ideas of imagination and for all Gods ideas184 and Belfrage has Berkeley allowing for all human ideas that constitute sensible objects, then of course the object seen cannot cease to be before the seeing of it, but must come to be some time during the seeing of it (most likely, toward, or at, the end of it). And very often, the object endures after its production. Thus at least Belfrages Berkeley supports the premise we need.

4.6. Berkeley and the Simultaneity-Requirement

John Foster, as we saw, is one philosopher who says he lacks the intuition that perception and perceived must at least be partly simultaneous. He also claims that insisting on this requirement would mean begging the question against the Non-Idealist Direct Realist. But why cant we take a hard line here and say the simultaneity-requirement is so obvious that its the Non-Idealist Direct Realist whos begging the question against both the Indirect Realist and the Idealist Direct Realist? If the speed of light had been infinite, or as long as its

184

Grayling, Berkeley, 172.

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finitude had not dawned on people, nobody would have questioned the simultaneity requirement on perceivings and perceived items in the first place. I think that this is how Berkeley would have seen things. And heres my argument. In Dialogues 238, when Hylas brings up the oar with one end in the water and asks Philonous how a man can be mistaken in thinking it crooked, Philonous gives a long reply, from which it is evident that Berkeley did take the simultaneity-requirement to be achingly selfevident, so much so that he (like Russell about two hundred years later) neglected to spell it out explicitly. (This is in line with Robert J. Fogelins observation that Berkeleys grounds for committing himself to idealism involve a direct appeal to intuitions concerning the nature of things we encounter in experience.185) I quote each of Philonouss sentences and follow it with my elaboration of what I take to be Berkeleys relevant intuition. Philonous: He is not mistaken with regard to the ideas he actually perceives; but in the inferences he makes from his present perceptions. What are they, these present perceptions? The perceivings he now has, or the ideas he now perceives? For Berkeley these presuppose each other. In the realm of ideas, every perceiving is of an idea; and every idea is actually perceived. The mans present perceptions include both his perceivings and the ideas he perceives, about which, Berkeley emphatically tells us, he cannot be mistaken. His perceptions are not just his states of perceiving; they also contain the objects of perceiving, what he actually perceives; and it isntand most likely also cant bethe case that he is at present perceiving something and that thing is not present but past; the perceiving and the perceived both occur at present, that is, now. Philonous: Thus in the case of the oar, what he immediately perceives by sight is certainly crooked; and so far he is in the right. The perceived thing is, not was, crooked. It could have been, but neednt have been, crooked before; but now, at the time of perception, it certainly is crooked. Philonous: But if he thence conclude, that upon taking the oar out of the water he shall perceive the same crookedness; or that it would affect his touch, as crooked things are wont to do: in that he is mistaken. So if he takes the oar out of the water, in the immediate future, he will perceive not crookedness but straightness; now, not having taken the oar out of the water yet, he sees crookedness and would, if he touched the oar now, feel straightness; but upon taking the oar out he would both feel and see straightness (or, more precisely, feel tangible straightness and see visible straightness).

185

Fogelin, Berkeley and the Principles of Hman Knowledge, 42.

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Philonous: In like manner, if he shall conclude from what he perceives in one station, that, in case he advances towards the moon or tower, he should still be affected with the like ideas, he is mistaken. Each perceiving at a station has its own distinct perceived object at that station; a station is a place, and at each place a moving man perceives an idea at least numerically different from the previous one. The perceived object is at the same time as the perceiving but not at the same place in physical space, since the man is moving toward the moon or tower. But, of course, in the final metaphysical synthesis, that is, at Graylings level 3, the stations and the perceived objects are at the same metaphorical places in Gods mind and really (actually or potentially) in any number of finite minds. Philonous: But his mistake lies not in what he perceives immediately, and at present (it being a manifest contradiction to suppose he should err in respect of that) but in the wrong judgment he makes concerning the ideas he apprehends to be connected with those immediately perceived: or, concerning the ideas that, from what he perceives at present, he imagines would be perceived in other circumstances. What he perceives at present, mentioned twicethis refers both to the time of the perception and to the time of the what, the content, of the perception: these times are the same. And this is something he cant be mistaken about (it would be a manifest contradiction to suppose such an error). Philonous: The case is the same with regard to the Copernican system. We do not here perceive any motion of the earth: but it were erroneous thence to conclude, that, in case we were placed at as great a distance from that as we are now from the other planets, we should not then perceive its motion. We do not here and now see the vanishing of the sun or the explosion of a star; but because we know the Laws of Nature which, as Berkeley says at Principles 105, extend our prospect beyond what is present, and near to us, and enable us to make very probable conjectures, touching things that may have happened at very great distances of time and place, as well as to predict things to come, we know that if we had been placed sufficiently close to the sun or that star, we would at once have seen the vanishing or the explosion; but here and now, of course, we only see the suns shining or the stars twinkling. Moreover, by the same Laws of Nature, we know that if it were possible (which it physically isnt) to travel now, instantaneously, closer to (say, within ten million km of) where the vanished physical sun used to be, we wouldnt see any visible sun anymore, not even the much greater one wed see if the sun were still there. So, all in all, it does seem as if Berkeley accepts the simultaneity requirement. 128

4.7. OShaughnessy and the Simultaneity-Requirement

In the famous chapter called Seeing the Light OShaughnessy briefly discusses perception at cosmic distances in two paragraphs to which I will come shortly. But first let me outline, and briefly criticize, his general view of seeing light. He holds (1) that we invariably do see light whenever we see any physical object and also many times when we dont, (2) that our perception of light is non-representational, and (3) that, by contrast, our seeing of material objects is mediated by light. Thus he (4) distinguishes between the light-representative theory of light perception, which he rejects, and the light-representative theory of object perception, which he accepts. Let me begin with the all-important first point. OShaughnessy starts by saying that surely we sometimes see and identify samples of light: For example, a torchlight shining across a dark and dusty room. This is something that has a shape and position, that can be viewed from angles and exhibits foreshortening, that can be individuated and singled out in opposition to particular objects like the furniture. So is this not a paradigmatic example of seeing the light? In fact it is an atypical instance of the seeing of light. Indeed, it is because one naturally selects such phenomena as paradigmatic that one begins to doubt that the light that makes sight possible is itself on view. One knows that there are beams emanating from all the things we seebut where are they? I think it is fair to say that those beams, criss-crossing the room inches from our very eyes, are for the most part completely invisible. More, we see nothing and a fortiori no light between our eyes and the objects that we see . . . And there seems to be no such thing as the individuation within the visual field, and in opposition to the visible material objects, of the light beams that are coming to our eyes from those objects. Nor do we see any such beams as shaped and positioned and foreshortened (etc.). In a word, if we see light all the time then it must be markedly unlike the seeing of objectsor of a torchlight across a dusty room. For the truth is that the seeing of this torchlight is thanks to the seeing of objects rather than the reverse, that it is the seeing of an object-collective of the nature of a crowd, viz. a cylindrical collection of dust particles. Indeed, for the most part the beam itself is invisible, and those shining specks are like so many Man Fridays footstepsevidence of the unseen! Then because these cases of the seeing of light are in so many ways on a par with the seeing of material

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objects, we may falsely assume that all cases are, and go on looking for something of the nature of a Light Object.186 But there is no Light Object, says OShaughnessy; and if we think there is, its only because we fail to realize that seeing a torchlight is seeing a material object, a collection of dust particles. Nevertheless, we may ask, is that right? First, in seeing a torchlight across a dusty room, I see specks of dust immersed in, and enveloped by, a shining cylindrical light-beam that is separated (even if not sharply and precisely, then anyway sufficiently clearly) from the surrounding darkness. In this case I see both the particles and the beam. Secondly, suppose the room isnt all that dusty. In that case Ill see even fewer dust particles suspended or floating in the beambut, again, I will see that beam. Thirdly, suppose the light in the room is very dim, so dim that its almost totally dark, and its only because the room is familiar that I dont stumble over, or bump into, any furniture. Then I wont see any dust particles at all; therell be no shining specks whatsoeverbut I will still see that beam. All these facts make OShaughnessys claim that for the most part the beam itself is invisible difficult to acceptunless that for the most part is meant to allow for just those three cases. If so, it seems indeed to be a fact, as OShaughnessy goes on to say, that all is empty between eye and object if by that is meant that we dont see the rays criss-crossing the room inches from our very eyes. Nor do we see what these rays are composed of, i.e., the photons. But we do see beams or columns or shafts of light in the dark; while in daylight, the material objects we see are all strongly or softly bathed in sunlight (and/or artificial light), which we also invariably, unavoidably, and sometimes enjoyably see. Yet neither the all-pervading artificial light in a room, nor the all-pervading sunlight (whether bright or dim) during the day, nor the torchlight or other lights seen at night, are identical with, or like, material objects. They are all sensuous presences dependent on consciousness: I would not hesitate to call them visual sensedata, which, according to OShaughnessy, engage the attention before anything else.187 Indeed, what else can they be, if not sense-data? Having argued that we do see light sometimes, OShaughnessy then argues, convincingly to my mind, that [a]s after-images demonstrate the reality of visual sensations, and thereby open the floodgatesso that every point of every visual field is necessarily visual-sensationinhabited, so if we ever see light at any point in the visual field, we must always see light at every non-black point of every veridical visual field. Now either we never, or sometimes, or always see light. Then who will say we never see light? Catching sight of torchlight, of car
186 187

OShaughnessy, Consciousness and the World, 440. ibidem, 465.

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headlights, the sun, moonlight, a distant window in the forest at night, all rule out this possibility.188 On a page further down he again asks whether it not be preposterous to suggest we never see light? What is it that violet radiation has that ultra-violet radiation lacksif not visibility? For why the ultra? What is the blue what that we see when we see the blue sky above, if not the light raining down upon us? Do we not see light when we see rainbows? stars? conflagrations?189 Stars and other stellar bodies are our concern here, and it is regarding them that OShaughnessy adduces the following two-paragraph argument, after having first supposed that he is in a room with an orange lamp glowing in one corner and an orange-painted sphere illuminated in the other: We shall suppose a vast stellar orange body, with the angular dimensions in our sky of the moon, situated a light year away. Assume this object to be almost always unilluminated and invisible to us. Then let us suppose that for one second an intense beam of white light falls upon its surface at 9 p.m. on 1 January 1999 (GMT). The orange light reflected in that second reaches our eyes at 9 p.m. on 1 January 2000. For a second we see orange light, an orange light in the sky, a heavenly object, an orange surface, the orange colour of a heavenly object`not all that different in appearance from the orange sphere glowing in the corner of the room, or the normally illuminated orange-painted object in the other corner. Where is the heavenly object? A light-year away. Where is the orange surface? Ditto. Where is the orange colour of that surface? Ditto. Where is the orange light in the sky? Ditto (for this is the sense in which we say, I saw a light [i.e., something bright] moving slowly down the mountain side). Where is the orange light? Where our eyes are. The temptation to postulate a light-representative theory of light perceptionsuch that we set eyes upon light that is light-years away through setting eyes on light that is herecomes to the fore in the tension between the last two questions and answers. I conclude that when I look at the orange lamp glowing in the corner of the room, and the properly illuminated sphere in the other corner, then (A) I see the two spheres, as and at where they are, (B) I see their colour as and at where it is, (C) I see their surfaces, as and at where they are, and all of this is both identical with and due to the fact (D) I see in

188 189

ibidem, 441. ibidem, 443.

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either case orange light that is where I am. This constitutes a light-representative theory of the visual perception of objects.190 Before commenting on these two paragraphs (which we may call OShaughnessys TGA), I will quote some of what he says a little later: The light that we see, in seeing objects at a remove in space, is not merely located where we are; to be precise, it is located upon our retinas.191 It is not situated on the surface of the eye, nor a little in front of the eye, nor a mile or light-year in front of it, for the radiation at these points has yet to encounter the visual systemand be seen. . . . Then just as the sound that we hear is where our ears are situated, so too is the light that we see upon our retinas. Perception at a distance, which is something that light effects for material objects, fails to obtain in the case of each of these mediators. The light and sound that we perceive are invariably close at hand. More exactly, they tend to be sited on or just within our perimeters. But what kind of experience could it possibly be to set eyes upon light that is situated at the back of ones eyes? The answer to this question is simple: it is no different from any other visual experience. And the reason for this is equally simple: it is one and the same as those familiar experiences. However, that they are the same experience is concealed by the interpretational content of most visual experience. For just as we see material objects at a distance in and through seeing light that is on our retina, so in reverse fashion we see light that is situated on our retinas in the mode of seeing material objects at a distance.192 But what is it to see light situated on our retinas in this mode? OShaughnessy proposes answering this by answering a different question: what would it be like to see light on the retina not in the mode of seeming to see objects at a distance? What would it be like to see it in the mode of seeing light? He says:

ibidem, 448. This is what Berkeley, too, claimsat least if Gary Thrane is right. In his 1977 paper Berkeleys Proper Object of Vision Thrane states on p. 243 that there are three relatively well-known positions on this issue. In the nineteenth century it was usually held that (1) Berkeley's proper object of vision was the pattern of light on the retina and (2) that this was a reasonable thesis. A second, more recent position, is that Berkeley indeed thought (1) that we see the pattern of light on the retina but (2) that this is absurd (D. M. Armstrong). And, finally, it has been held (Colin Turbayne) that, (1) since it is absurd to hold that we see the pattern on the retina, (2) Berkeley could not have meant that the proper object of vision is the retinal pattern. I shall urge that Berkeley does indeed hold that the proper object of vision is the pattern of light on the retina. In part, my case rests on showing that this is not an absurd thesis. Further, I will show how Berkeley's characterization of the proper object of vision follows from the thesis that the proper object is the retinal pattern. Much of what OShaughnessy says characterizes seeing light on our retinas coincides with what Thrane says is Berkeleys account of retinal images as the proper objects of human vision. 192 OShaughnessy, Consciousness and the World, 448-449.
191

190

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It would be an experience not all that dissimilar from the one we encounter when we close our eyes in daylight. We would experience a continuous visual field, populated by coloured patches, given in particular directions out from the head, containing visible spatial structures of the kind of circles and lines. No more. What would be absent would be experiences of depth, of spatial structures like hemisphericity, indeed of material objects generally, and the near flawless typing of contents (car, tree, chair etc.). Then if such visual experience were to be generated veridically by light, and in a manner sufficiently resembling our present experience of sound, we would I suggest be seeing the light that is located on our retinaswithout seeing its material object sources. And we would presumably see that light as light. . . . And yet, even though in this imagined situation we experience the light on the retina as light, we do not experience it as on the retina. . . . For it must be emphasized that, just as we do not hear the sound which is situated at our ears as or to be at our ears, since our experience of sound is purely directional experience, so likewise in the case of the experiencing of light. We do not see the light that is on our retinas as on our retinas, let alone see it to be there. To believe so would be to misconstrue the present theory as involving the rather wild supposition that we see our own retinas in seeing material objects. Seeing the light on our own retinas is not to be likened to seeing a patch of light upon the carpet. While the latter necessitates the differentiation of a surface within a space of three dimensions, the former does not. This is because it is purely directional in character. Light is given in directions, but not in depths, out from the body. The third dimension of light is simply invisible.193 Now let us return to OShaughnessys TGA, those two paragraphs quoted earlier. According to OShaughnessys supposition, we see all the things he enumerates for just a second at 9 p.m. on 1 January 2000. Notice how OShaughnessy just mentions one timethe timeat which all these things are seen by us and also explicitly states where they are when we see them, namely, a light-year away; but he doesnt explicitly state whether he thinks we see them as they are at 9 p.m. on 1 January 2000 or as they were at 9 p.m. on 1 January 1999. Of course, at 9 p.m. on 1 January 2000 the moon-sized stellar body still exists, even though it is unilluminated. Its orange surface, too, still exists and it is still orange even though theres no light falling on it. It is reasonable to say that we see the body and its surface and the latters orange colour at 9 p.m. on 1 January 2000 as they were at 9 p.m. on 1 January 1999 (even if during the intervening year they may have changed very little, relative to what human vision is able to discern).

193

ibidem, 449.

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But what about the orange light in the sky? At 9 p.m. on 1 January 1999 there was no light in the skybecause if, as OShaughnessy says, this is the sense in which we say I saw a light . . . moving slowly down the mountain side, then ex hypothesi on 1 January 1999 there just wasnt any light in the sky that we or any other human beings could have seen. Here, I think, OShaughnessy correctly assumes that there is one central, Berkeleian, sense of light such that light is necessarily something that is seen. And, of course, the orange light that, according to OShaughnessy, is where our eyes are (i.e., our eyes on 1 January 2000), was there on 1 January 2000, and not a year earlier. And it was there for just a second in that yearthe same amount of time the orange body was illuminated in the previous year. Thus my conclusion from this case is that OShaughnessy does accept the simultaneity-principle. That he accepts it may also seem evident from what he says in the Introduction of his book. Yet on reflection this is not quite so evident. The passage I have in mind is the following: I suggest there is no mystery as to what consciousness is. Unlike much in the mind, there is reason for thinking that consciousness is not an indefinable, whether of the type of simple qualia, or such as we encounter in some of the fundamental phenomena of the mind like experience, belief, desire. Consciousness has a determinate character of internal type, and there exist logically necessary and sufficient psychological conditions for the presence of this phenomenon. . . . Now a cornerstone in the analysis of consciousness is the fact that its presence entails contemporaneous experience (a stream of consciousness). This is a transparently clear analytic necessity.194 Thus, for OShaughnessy, consciousness at t clearly entails experience at t of something. Abstractly, there are four possibilities of what that something might be: (1) a material object existing before but not at t; (2) a material object existing at t; (3) a mental object existing before but not at t; or (4) a mental object existing at t. Now since mental objects are dependent on consciousness of them, then if I am awake with my eyes open, possibility (4) is in this case certainly actual: I certainly am conscious of (what is) a mental object (a sense-datum) at t. In virtue of that, possibility (2) may also be actual, and it usually is: whenever Im awake, for example, I see (some of) my physical surroundings at t. But what about the abstract possibilities (1) and (3)? Are they logically excluded? It might seem that they are: for after all, if the presence of consciousness entails contemporaneous experience, how can I be conscious at t of a mental or material object existing before t? But, for all that OShaughnessy has said in this passage, I can: what is excluded is non-contemporaneous

194

ibidem, 4-5.

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experience; but in cases (1) and (3) the experience at t is contemporaneous with consciousness at t: only the objects of the experience (and the consciousness) are not; they exist before t. Nevertheless, that OShaughnessy means to exclude possibilities (1) and (3) is sufficiently evident from his own treatment of the TGA discussed earlier. And that there is overwhelming reason to accept the simultaneity-principle will be additionally argued for in the next sections, particularly 4.14.

4.8. Carrier et al. on Seeing Light and the Simultaneity-Requirement (I)

One contemporary philosopher who, unlike OShaughnessy, wants to avoid sense-data but, like OShaughnessy, embraces the simultaneity requirement (and does so more emphatically and explicitly than OShaughnessy), is Len Carrier (whom we have previously described as a NonIdealist Direct Realist). He presents the TGA as consisting of three premises and a conclusion as follows: P1. In order for a physical object to be seen, it is causally necessary that the object has emitted or reflected light. P2. Light travels at a finite speed. P3. In order for a physical object to be seen at a certain time T, it is necessary for this object to exist at time T. Conclusion. Whenever one sees anything he sees something that is non-physical.195 (Note that P3 is just a corollary of the simultaneity-requirement.) Carrier thinks the premises are true but the conclusion doesnt follow. Of course it doesntanyone can see that. But its also evident why thats so: some premises are missing. One of them would be the premise (Carrier, in his exposition, doesnt give it a label) that by the time light emitted by a certain star reaches an observers eyes, it has ceased to exist. But if the star does not exist at time T, Carrier goes on to remark correctly, then, according to P3, it is not the case that the star is seen at time T. We cannot deny, however, that the observer does see something at T.196 The latter, of course, is another premise required for the conclusion indicated. Nevertheless, the only valid conclusion to be drawn from the argument so far is that what the observer sees must be something different from the star. It has not yet been established that what is seen at time T is non-physical. But what else can there be, in this case, that is physical? There seem to be only two viable alternatives: (a) some physical property of the star, or
195 196

Carrier, The Time-Gap Argument, 263. ibidem, 263-264.

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(b) the light that the star once emitted.197 Carrier opts for (b), and gives some good arguments; but first he disposes of (a), saying that it runs afoul of the following argument. Every property requires a bearer. Since that which does not exist can possess no properties at all, it cannot possess any physical properties that remain to be seen. A Platonist might reject this argument by denying that properties require bearers; but this move affords the Direct Realist no solace. For even if physical properties do exist apart from their exemplification, in this separate state they are only subject to contemplation. If they are also to be seen, they must attach themselves to some physical item. But this item is no longer available in the story about the exploded star.198 Carrier then mentions two objections to (b), his own preferred candidate for the physical object seen in the extinct star case. They are as follows: (i) Light is causally necessary for seeing but is not itself seen. In this respect it is like the optic nerve, which is also causally necessary for seeing. (ii) If light were seen, then one would have to see light waves or particles. But since these are physically impossible to see, light cannot be seen.199 Later he shows that these objections are unfounded. But if you accept them, then neither (b) the light that the star once emitted nor (a) some physical property of the star (discredited, as weve just seen, by Carrier himself) is available for you an item that is seen in the disintegrated star case. Thus, (s)ince (a) and (b) exhaust the possibilities of seeing something physical, what the observer sees in the case of the disintegrated star must be something non-physical.200

4.9. The Continuity Argument

Once we are clear about what it is that we see in the no-longer-existent star case, we can give a plausible Continuity Argument to cover all cases of seeing. Carrier formulates it thus: (i) There is no qualitative visual difference between the case in which a star exists and the case in which it does not. Since all the criteria for identification coincide, if something non-physical is seen in the latter case, then something non-physical must be seen in the former case, too. (ii) If we always see something non-physical in the case of distant objects, such as stars, then there is no non-arbitrary place to set the distance at which we fail to see something non-physical. No one is tempted to say that we must give a
197

ibidem, 264. ibidem. 199 ibidem. 200 ibidem.


198

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different analysis of vision when we extend distances from five to fifty yards, or even to a mile or to five miles. Nor is it conceivable that we must explain seeing the moon differently from seeing the sun, or from seeing the stars. There is a continuity between near and far objects, so that there is no justification for saying that there is some near point at which we cease to see what is non-physical. Hence, whenever anything is seen, something non-physical is seen.201 I dont have anything at all to object to in this argument, except that I would substitute mental for non-physical. And I would do this because I would like the TGA to prove the existence of sense-data; and if Carriers version requires the conclusion that in all cases of seeing we see light, either emitted or reflected (and it does, as we shall see in 4.12.), then I wish that light to be a sense-datum, or for there to be sense-data of light, with the understanding that sense-data are essentially mental items (that might turn out to be physical, too). Michael Huemer, thirty-odd years later, constructs a continuity argument similar to Carriers. He first supposes that 1000 light-years away from us there was a star destroyed 300 years ago and then goes on to say: For suppose that there is a second star, also 1000 light-years away, next to the first one, but that this second star has not been destroyed and continues to exist now. Could we, with any plausibility, claim that what we are seeing in these two cases is a radically different kind of thing? If the first case is one of seeing a sense-datum of the star, isnt the second case also one of seeing a sense datum? After all, ones experience has exactly the same kind of etiology and the same introspectible character in the two cases. The only difference is that in the one case, the star was destroyed 700 years after it emitted the light thats now causing your experiencebut that has no effect whatever on you or your experience. So if a sense datum exists in one case, why wouldnt it exist in the other? If you buy this argument, you will also have to accept sense data for all the objects around you. For in the case of any perception, there is always some time gap. When you look at your own hand, there is a (very small) delay between the time it bounces off its surface and when you have an experience of seeming to see your hand. So if the time gap argument shows you are not really seeing a star, it also shows you are not really seeing your hand.202 But then Huemer introduces and rejects the solution offered by Carrier. He does this as follows:
201 202

ibidem, 264-265. Huemer, Skepticism and the Veil of Perception, 131-132.

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Perhaps what you are really seeing is simply the light emitted by the star, rather than either the star itself or a sense-datum. The light from the star continues to exist at the time you have the visual experience, so theres no problem, right? Well, almost. There is still a delay (very short) between the time light rays strike your retina and the time you have a visual experience, required for the signals to reach your visual cortex and your brain to process the information. In fact, the particular photons causing your visual experience do not exist at the time your experience occurs, having been absorbed by your retina. Therefore, if the time gap argument shows that youre not really seeing the star, it must equally prove that you are not really seeing the light either. Nor, for the same reason, could you be seeing retinal images. I assume no one will be tempted to say youre seeing your brain. So the only thing left for you to be seeing appears to be a sense datum.203 This conclusion that Huemer seems to be left with is, from my point of view, ideal: the TGA indeed shows that what we are seeing are sense-data; and thats the conclusion I want. But Huemer doesnt want to accept this conclusion; therefore, his only option is to reject the simultaneity-principle, and thats what he does. He says that (a)fter this elaborate argument, my response may seem disappointingly simple. What are you aware of when looking at the star 1000 light-years away? You are aware of the star, as it was 1000 years ago. I see no reason why one should not be able to perceive something in the past. Obviously, the time at which your perceiving occurs cannot be before your experience occurs. But why must the time of the perceived state of affairs be identical with the time of the perceiving?204 If this isnt clear yet, it will be by the end of this chapter, when we will have presented many reasons why one cannot perceive something that exists in the past rather than present. Of course, I am also claiming that when, in the no-longer-existent-star case, we are seeing sense-data, it is the sense-data of light that we are seeing. At any rate, to finish with the Continuity Argument, heres C. D. Broads version from 1959: The case where the body seen is near to the percipient's body cannot fairly be considered in isolation from cases where it is very remote. We see bodies which are at all sorts of distances, from close at hand to many millions of miles away. The external causal conditions of the visual perceptions are, so far as we know, precisely similar in kind in all these cases. Is it really credible that there is a certain range of distance, on one side of which the immediate objects of visual sensations are parts of the surfaces of bodies
203 204

ibidem, 132 ibidem.

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emitting light to the percipient's eye, and on the other side of which they are of a wholly different nature? . . . I think that all the arguments for the non-corporeality of visual sensibilia rest on considerations of continuity. In view of the continuity in the external conditions of our visual sensations, I find it very hard to believe that some of the visual sensibilia which we sense are parts of the surfaces of the bodies which we see, and that others are not parts of the surface of any body, if to be a body and to be a part of the surface of a body be understood in [a] simple literal way . . . Now I also find it very hard to believe that all the visual sensibilia which we sense are parts of the surfaces of the bodies which we see, if "body" and "part of the surface of a body" are understood in that way. Therefore I am strongly inclined to think that none of them are.205 And I might also remark here that Broad never explicitly discusses or questions the simultaneity-requirement. He seems to regard it as self-evidently obvious.

4.10. Carrier et al. on Seeing Light and the Simultaneity-Requirement (II)

Let us return to the TGA as presented by Carrier. He wishes to preserve the simultaneityprinciple, which (we will remember) he formulates thus:206 P3. In order for a physical object to be seen at a certain time T, it is necessary for this object to exist at time T. But some philosophers who reject it propose to replace it with the following: P4. In order for a physical object to be seen at time T, it is necessary and sufficient that some state of this object be seen at T. Carrier claims, however, that P.4 will not by itself get around the hypothesis of the exploded star. He points out that states, like properties, must be borne by individuals; and if the individual in question does not exist, no states of that individual can exist, either. There can be no state that survives the destruction of a thing of which it is a state and lingers about to be seen. He then goes on to claim: At this juncture, supporters of P4 would insist that what is seen in the case of the disintegrated star is some past state of it. It must now be determined whether good

205 206

Broad, Reply to my Critics, 807-808. Carrier, The Time-Gap Argument, 265.

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sense can be made of this move and, if so, whether the price of making it might prove too great.207 In order to make good sense, this move, says Carrier, requires us to interpret the existential quantifier itself, as well as all predicates, in a tenseless fashion, inserting temporal indicators whenever necessary so that the star itself, regardless of its disruption, is always on hand to support its physical states and properties. . . . Thus, even if the exploded star no longer exists, in the tensed sense of exists, P4 requires our saying that the star really does exist after all, speaking tenselessly.208 But, says Carrier, requiring a tenseless way of speaking is just too high a price to pay for a solution to the problem of the time-gap. Why? He thinks there are just three possibilities as to the best way of describing reality. They are: (i) (ii) (iii) A completely tenseless way of speaking best describes the world. A completely tensed way of speaking best describes the world. Both the tensed and tenseless ways of speaking are equally accurate, covering the same territory like two maps with different projections. He himself proposes to remain neutral on which, if any, of these answers is correct; but what he finds strange is that in order to make good sense of the P4 solution to the problem of the time-gap, answer (i) must be chosen. Now it might be the case that (i) does give the right answer but, if so, this should require independent argument, and not be forced upon one by his treatment of the time-gap in perception. I therefore consider it a defect in the P4 solution that it makes demands on the way we are to speak about the world and consequently makes demands upon our choice of ontology. Those, for example, who believe in temporal becoming, and believe that objects come into existence, change, and then pass away, will be disappointed to find their ontology incompatible with the P4 solution.209 Carrier then says that his preferred solution (namely, that in the case of the disintegrated star and, because of the Continuity Argument, in all other cases of seeing as wellwhat we see is light) depends upon no such ontological decision and will be congenial to any of these three ways of speaking. It seems obvious that a solution that is ontologically neutral here has just that much more chance of being correct.210

207

ibidem. ibidem, 266-267. 209 ibidem, 267. 210 ibidem.


208

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Towards the end of 4.8 we mentioned two objections to the claim that we can and do see light. In answer to the first, Carrier says that light is external to our bodies, so that it is not analogous to the optic nerve. The former is a causally necessary factor which is seen, whereas the latter is a causally necessary factor which is not seen. Ordinary language supports this point. We speak naturally of seeing a beam of light or a point of light, or seeing nothing but bright lights or seeing the first light of day. We have no such constructions that involve the optic nerve, and justly so, since we can only see what is before our eyes.211 Now it might seem that Carrier is contradicting here what OShaughnessy claims about the location of the light that we see: for the former, it is always external to our bodies; for the latter, the light that we see is always on the retina. But the contradiction, though it exists, is superficial: OShaughnessy claims that the light falling on our retinas is always interpreted as being external to our bodies; whereas for Carrier the only light we directly see is the light external to our bodies, before our eyes: the light on our retinas is light we do not see. In this respect it is like the optic nerve, a causally necessary factor for seeing but not itself seen. Carrier makes this even clearer in his response to Charles B. Daniels. There he says that Daniels objects to my view that what we see in the case of an extinct star is only its light. He says that when we see light we can usually point to the place where we see it to be. But where is the light from the defunct star? The obvious answer is that this light is everywhere that it manages to reach, and that includes the path on which it travels to reach ones eyes. Daniels then imagines a situation in which the only light that lies on the line between my retina and the place the star last occupied all happens to be located inside my eyeball . . . This situation creates no puzzle for my view, since I was explicit in claiming that we only see what is before our eyes and not what is in them . . . If all the light from the extinct star is inside my eyeball, then this is light that I no longer see.212 Here the opposition to OShaughnessy is stark: for Carrier, no light that I see is inside my eyeball; for OShaughnessy, all the light I see is inside my eyeball. And yet, though stark, it also is superficial in that, unlike nearly all other recent or current analytic philosophers, both emphatically proclaim the following central thesis (I state it in Carriers words): Thus I must maintain that in all cases of seeing we see light, either emitted or reflected; whereas just in some cases we do see physical objects: only in those cases in which these objects still exist at the time they are seen.213

211

ibidem, 269 Carrier, Time-Gap Myopia, 55. 213 Carrier, The Time-Gap Argument, 270.
212

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The question that divides them (Where is the light I see?) must also be faced by other philosophers seriously considering this solution to the time-gap problem. One of them is Howard Robinson. He says that if in answer to this question (in the case of looking at the sun) one chose the light that is striking the eye, then one would have the problem of why one did not seem to see two suns, for there are two spatially separate packages of light striking the two eyes: and there might, too, be pressure to treat all visual perception in the same way, and this would be no better than the sense-datum theory.214 When I asked Robinson to explain what he had in mind by this last sentential clause, he replied: What I think I meant was that, if one agreed that, in general, one perceived light striking the eye, rather than the object from which the light was coming, one would be aware of an intermediary entitythe light at the eye not the external object. And this looks rather like a form of Representative Realism, with the light constituting a kind of physical sense-datum.215 It is in anticipation of such a response and to avoid Representative Realism that Carrier insists that in all cases of seeing we see light but only in some do we also see physical objects. He therefore explicitly denies that [w]e see either the light or the object, but not both216 and thereby evades Robinsons objection that he is treating the light at the eye as a kind of physical sense-datum of the external object. But at my eye is not the only possible answer to the question, Where is the light I see? To continue the quote from Robinson, if one chose light at some distance from the eye there would be the problem of deciding how far away the preferred light was deemed to be. . . . [One answer could be] that in the case of stars and sun we perceive the light that is that distance away from the eye which is the maximum distance at which the light reaches the eye in a shorter time than the minimum time discrimination we are able to make. This may vary according to the nature and state of the subject. The sun and the stars that we see will, then, be purely visual phenomena, rather like the blue of the sky or a rainbow.217 A bit later Robinson raises the question of whether the nave realist can cope with the[se] purely visual phenomena . . . or whether they constitute a foothold for the sense-datum theorist.218 He leaves this question unanswered.

214

Robinson, Perception, 82. Personal communication 216 Carrier, The Time-Gap Argument, 270. 217 Robinson, Perception, 83. 218 ibidem, 84.
215

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4.11. Seeing distant objects vs. seeing objects close-by: Mandelbaum and No

Earlier in the history of contemporary philosophy this question was discussed by, among others, Maurice Mandelbaum. I will quote his remarks in full because they are both interesting and important in more than one respect: When we say that we see the sun or a star we presumably do not believe that the sun which we see is actually to be described as a dazzlingly bright disk, nor that the star itself is a tiny glittering point of bluish light: in our everyday world we accept sun and stars as being immensely distant objects which possess characteristics quite different from those we would attribute to them if we were merely describing what is visible to us when we look at the heavens. Nevertheless, when we say that we see a particular star we mean that what we see is a star. These two beliefsthat we do really see a star, and yet that the star does not possess the properties which we see it as havingare not inconsistent. What saves then from inconsistency is the fact that in such cases we readily interpret the relationship between the object which we see and the qualities which that object appears to us to possess as a causal relationship. Such a causal relationship need not be clearly conceived, and on the level of common sense it presumably is not: it merely involves a belief that if there were no object of the sort that we refer to as a star we should not be presented with the particular qualities by means of which we describe how the star looks to us.219 In a footnote to this passage Mandelbaum approves of C. D.Broads claim (in the latters Perception, Physics, and Reality) that, in Mandelbaums words, the difficulties of nave realism tend to push common sense toward the acceptance of a causal theory of perception. In that footnote Mandelbaum goes on to say: It is also true that an acceptance of scientific astronomy would lead us to distinguish, as I have distinguished, between the stars nature and the appearance which it presents to us. However, in addition, I should like to point out that there may well be phenomenological grounds on whichwithout argumentwe distinguish between what we call things and which we regard as mere appearances, and that stars (as we see them) may possess those phenomenological characteristics which lead us to classify them as belonging to the latter rather than to the former group. Among such phenomenological characteristics

219

Mandelbaum, Philosophy, Science, and Sense Perception, 177-178.

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I might mention indefiniteness of contour, lack of fixity (e.g., flickering), absence of perceived microstructure, and color which is not surface-color. . . .220 Mandelbaum, in the main text, continues: To separate the look of a starits appearance to usand the star itself, is not to invent entities for philosophic purposes. To speak of the faint and shimmering light of a star when we look at the heavens is a perfectly natural mode of discourse, and one which we take to be descriptive of our experience. The point of light which we see is a token of the stars presence, as a faint and flashing light may be the token of an airplanes presence. In neither case need we thinknor need we speakas if what were there for us to see was to be identified with the object itself.221 Yet what Mandlebaum is saying here is so tricky that we should be extremely careful. In the second sentence he tells us that in speaking of the faint and shimmering light of a star we are describing our experience. But is it our experience we are describingor are we describing what we experience, the object of our experience, and saying of it that it is a faint and shimmering light? I opt for the second alternative, and think that Mandelbaum, upon reflection, would not object. In the last sentence Mandelbaum tells us what it is that we need not think or speak. But does this mean that we cannot or even should not identify the point of light with the star? The faint and flashing light may indeed be the token of an airplanes presence: after all, it is just the airplanes light working rather than the airplane itself. But isnt the flashing of the airplanes light just the airplanes presence announcing itself? And the shimmering light in the skyisnt that the star itself? Mandelbaum wants there to be two objects and two processes, but isnt there just one? No, there are two: Mandelbaum is right. But the two are so closely connected that they are easily (but mistakenly) identified. Immediately after the above quotation (asserting that there is no need to think that what were there for us to see was to be identified with the object itself), Mandelbaum makes the following noteworthy point: However, there must be acknowledged to be a very great difference between what we take for granted about seeing a star and what we take for granted when, for example, we see a book. In the latter case we would assuredly reject the view that what we are actually seeing is caused by the object at which we are looking; rather, what we see strikes us as being the object. And this is true even in those cases in which we feel there
220 221

ibidem, 178. ibidem.

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is something deceptive about the appearance of what we see. For example, if we regard the illumination as responsible for making a book appear a different color from the color which we would say that it actually is, we would nonetheless hold that what we have immediately before us is the book itself, and not some token of it.222 One thing that surprises about this passage is the thought that there is an opposition between what a perceived object causes and what it is; i.e., whats surprising is the thought that the view that what we are actually seeing is caused by the object at which we are looking is somehow incompatible with the perceived objects being that object. In other words, what we would assuredly reject is the view that (as Dummett expressed it) there is nothing more to our perceiving objects than their causing us to have certain perceptual experiences.223 Then Mandelbaum continues: On the other hand, when we look at a star we are willing to accept the view that what we see is in some sense an image of the star, for if we were to describe (and not merely name) what we are at present seeing, we would not regard that description as an accurate description of the star itself: what we see (we might say) is the light of the star. It is because of this difference between the two cases that direct realists take the case of seeing a book as paradigmatic for an analysis of perception, while one who holds a representative theory of perception would wish to devote careful attention to cases such as those of the star, in which distance substantially alters the appearance of objects.224 This last sentence is also (pleasantly) surprising. And now for my crucial point: isnt a shimmering, flickering light always the way a star appears to us? Dont we (human beings on Earth) always see a star as just being a point of light? Isnt that the only appearance of a star available to us in our terrestrial condition? The answer to these rhetorical questions is, I believe, Yes. And this is so whether or not the star still exists at the time the flickering light is seen. Alva No seems partially to agree with this but puts a unique twist to it and lands himself in a possible contradiction: When you look up in the night sky, you dont actually visually experience the stars; what you see, rather, are points of light in the night sky, points of light you reasonably take to be stars (or to be marks or signs or traces of stars). The stars themselves do not enter into your experience. The direct theory of perception fails for the seeing of stars in the night sky. We can see why this is so by considering that, for ones experience of the night sky to be veridical (as we would like to say), theres no requirement that stars be
222

ibidem, 178-179. Dummett, Common Sense and Physics, in Macdonald, G. F. (ed.), Perception and Identity, Essays Presented to A. J. Ayer, with His Replies, 36. 224 Mandelbaum, Philosophy, Science, and Sense Perception, 179.
223

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points of light, or that they really look like points of like, or that they be located where we seem to see them. Thats why the fact that stars may have gone extinct millions of years ago does not put the lie to our current experience of the night sky.225 The contradiction emerges from the conjunction of the statements that what you see . . . are points of light, that these points of light may reasonably take[n] to be stars, that you dont actually visually experience the stars and that [t]he stars themselves do not enter into your experience while the points of light do. To get rid of the contradiction, No would have to say one of two things. Either (a) the points of light are the stars, in which case they (the stars) are ipso facto seen by you and therefore they do enter into your experience. Or (b) they (the points of light) are not the stars but only marks or signs or traces of stars, which marks or signs or traces you do see and which, again, do enter into your experience. Which alternative does he choose? For the time being this remains a mystery. No next compares looking at stars with looking down from the height of a very tall skyscraper at cars and people below: The people look to be the size of ants! That is to say, you cant really experience the people from the top of the skyscraper. After all, theres nothing in the least ant-like

about people (in respect of size). That they look the size of ants is intelligible, of course. This means, roughly, that what you see takes up about the same amount of visual field as an ant would when looked at from a normal upright position. What cant be denied is that this is an incorrect experience of the people. For what would make such an experience veridical? The actual presence of ant-sized people!226 To be sure, much of this makes sense, but saying: You cant really experience the people from the top of the skyscraper come on! What about the terrorist sharpshooter ensconced at the top of a high-rise and picking down the ants one by one? Of course, his experience is undesirable and horrid; nevertheless he has an experience of people that, from that height, is visually correct. If, looking down from the top of a very high skyscraper, he saw people who looked, not the size of ants but the size of elephants, now that would be an incorrect (nonveridical) experience! And the only reason we wouldnt call an experience of people looking the size of ants veridical is that we tie veridicality to normal conditions of observation, which looking at people from atop a skyscraper doesnt provide. Later in his paper No makes a very good point:
225 226

Noe, Real Presence, 49. ibidem, 49-50.

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I have proposed that we think of seeings as like touchings. On this analogy, seeing how things look is a way of coming into contact with them, it is a way of grasping them. This is why the things themselves enter into visual experience. We see that is to say, we come into contact with them.227 But there are ways in which we may fail to establish and maintain contact with things in perception, says No. One of them is allegedly as follows: When we look up at the night sky, I argue, we just dont succeed in making contact with the stars although we do succeed in making contact with the lights in the night sky. The stars are just too far away! Ditto for the people down below on the ground. . . . It is relevant that most cases of nonveridical perception are cases of merely partial nonveridicality. You misperceive the spoon as bent in water, for it isnt bent. But in thus misperceiving the spoon, you do succeed in seeing the spoon. In exactly the same way, you may fail to visually experience the stars, but not because you are hallucinating. You do experience the lights in the night sky. You are in contact with them. For example, when you move your eyes away, they go out of view. You modulate your relation to them in this and many other ways. For the vast majority of cases of nonveridical perception, the world is at hand, and is present, thus, as a partner in the experience, as content for the experience.228 But arent the lights in the sky as far away as the stars? And if you do experience the lights in the night sky and you are in contact with them and you modulate your relation to them in various ways, then why does No think you may fail to visually experience the stars? Isnt it the case that anything you do with respect to the lights in the night sky you canand do accomplish with respect to the stars as well? And the people down below on the ground are so much closer to you than the lights in the night sky that you can even consciously and deliberately target them. Yet in another way No is absolutely correct. The people down people you see from atop a skyscraper you dont see in any of their individualitydont see their faces, clothes, build, walk, or any other distinguishing features. So the sharpshooter picking down the ants below one by one is not consciously and deliberately targeting them as specific people. If he were instructed to assassinate a specific person and just given a picture of him and told that this person would be in the crowd at that location and time, it would be a sheer accident if he hit the person in question. So for us looking at people from the top of a skyscraper is an incorrect way of experiencing people No is right. But we, earthlings, have few if any other ways of
227 228

ibidem, 51. ibidem, 52.

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experiencing stars than by looking up at the night sky and observing the points of lightso here No overstates his case. Besides, our expectations for experiencing stars are different and much lower than our expectations for experiencing people.

4.12. Carrier et al. on Seeing Light and the Simultaneity-Requirement (III)

There is one more objection to Carriers thesis that we see light that weve mentioned (in 4.10.) but not yet answered. Carrier answers it thus: [E]ven though light may be composed of, say, photons, it is not the case that one must see photons if he sees light. For a wall is composed of molecules; but we may see a wall without thereby being forced to see the molecules that compose it, since the latter are invisible to the naked eye. According to the logical principle of identity, we need only assume that light is identical with that which is composed of photons, just as the wall is identical with that which is composed of molecules. In seeing light, then, we do see that which is composed of photons. But seeing the whole in either case does not require one to see the parts, since the parts are, ex hypothesi, invisible.229 The logical principle is unexceptionable, but this just forces us to recognize that light is ambiguous: it can either mean (1) that which is composed of photons, or it can mean, as Berkeleys Philonous has it, (2) light and colors in the vulgar sense, or taken for the immediate objects of sight230; i.e., things secondarily caused by, but not composed of, photons. Carrier opts for (1); but I will argue that (2) is correct and that Carrier should opt for it. He then continues as follows: The consideration above also answers the criticism that we only speak loosely about seeing a beam of light, whereas what we really see are the masses of odds and ends bits of dust, etc.that are illuminated. But we cannot see these odds and ends because, at such a distance, they are too small to be seen. Perhaps light does bounce off these particles of dust, but it cannot be these particles we see. If we could see then, then we might just as well say that whenever we look at a table we can see the microscopic dust on its surface. But we do not say this. Though what we seewhether it is a beam of light

229 230

Carrier, The Time-Gap Argument, 269-270. Berkeley, Works, 3 D, 187.

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or a tablemay owe part of its visibility to something else, we cannot, logically, see invisible particles.231 This passage brings out another conflict between Carrier and OShaughnessy. Both agree that we see a torchlight, say; but OShaughnessy claims we see the torchlight in virtue of seeing the specks of dust from which the light bounces off; whereas Carrier claims that in most cases we dont see the dust at all, just the light. On this issue Ive already voiced my misgivings regarding OShaughnessy in 4.7, and they coincide in large measure with Carriers points here. The light that we see, however, is not that which is composed of photons, but that which is caused by them: a sensible expanse (sense-datum) of light. I support this claim by appeal to the arguments that Foster presents in The Case for Idealism, Chapters 4, 5, and especially 6. More on this in my own Chapter Six.

4.13. Presentism vs. Eternalism

Carrier regards it as a virtue of his solution to the time-gap problemand, by extension, of all treatments of the TGA that endorse the simultaneity-principlethat it is neutral with respect to whether a tenseless or a tensed way of speaking describes the world better. Another way of formulating the latter issue is in terms of the following question. Which is true: Presentism or Eternalism? As Ned Markosian puts it in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Presentism is the view that, necessarily, it is always true that only present objects exist (where present means temporally present, as opposed to spatially present). By contrast, Eternalism is the view that objects from both the past and the future exist just as much as present objects. Markosian himself, though recognizing that Presentism faces major problems, holds it to be the common sense view and defends it. Now Carrier claims, in effect, that, one who endorses the simultaneity-principle can stay neutral on the issue of whether Presentism or Eternalism is correct, whereas someone denying that principle and claiming that what we see in the no-longer-existent star case is some past state of it, is committed to Eternalism. This issue has been discussed by three other philosophers in their papers on the TGA. That of Ronald W. Houts is especially intriguing. Concentrating on George Pitchers way of dealing with the TGA, Houts shows that it has some wildly implausible implications. One of them is that we are not now at any spatial distance from what we see. Let us start with the situation in which we are allegedly presently seeing an extinct star. . . . [W]hat we presently

231

Carrier, The Time-Gap Argument, 270.

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see, according to Pitcher as Houts explains his view, is a stage of the star which obtained many years before we were born. But that stage of the star (as well as the star itself) does not presently exist. Both existed many years ago, and are presently nonexistent. However, as Houts points out, there is no spatial distance between two physical things which do not coexist [exist at the same time]: a necessary condition for two physical things to be spatially distant from one another is for them to coexist.232 Therefore, it follows, on Pitchers view, that, although I (allegedly) see the no-longer-existent star, my body is at no distance from it. Or, as Houts puts it, I (or my body) am not now at any spatial distance from the past, presently nonexistent star I see. So, sometimes, some of the physical things we see are not at any spatial distance from us.233 This is a disconcerting conclusion. Houts shows by further argument that Pitcher is committed to denying three other, more general, and seemingly self-evident theses: namely, that (1) at a time t, we (or our bodies) are at some spatial distance from all events and stages we perceive at t, that (2) all the spatially noncontiguous events and stages we perceive at a certain time are or were at some spatial distance from one another, and that (3) we sometimes perceive at-a-time events and stages which are or were in a three-dimensional array.234 In other words, one who accepts Pitchers (and a multitude of other philosophers) way of dealing with the TGA by denying the simultaneity-requirement is forced to say that, for example, when at night I look at my hand, the moon, and the stars, these objects are not spatially related to each other in any three-dimensional array. This result, claims Houts, is a reductio ad absurdum of such theories.235 He concludes his paper with these words: It is important for philosophers who agree with Pitcher to recognize that their response to the time-lag argument entails the falsity of propositions (1)-(3). It is then requisite for them to face the implications of this result in light of their allegedly "commonsensical" and "scientific" theories of Direct Realism. This is a problem about which these philosophers have been reticent too long.236 Thus Houts issued a challenge; but the philosophers challenged continued to be reticent for another three decades: as far as I am aware, Houtss gauntlet was picked up only by John Kardosh in 2008 and Sean Enda Power in 2010. As I find Kardoshs paper outside my area of competence, Ill discuss only Powers.

232

Houts, Some Implications of the Time-Lag Argument, 151. ibidem. 234 ibidem, 156. 235 ibidem. 236 ibidem, 157.
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Power met the challenge by forthrightly conceding that the TGA refutes Direct Realism, but only on the assumption of Presentism. He also agreed that, taking Presentism for granted, Houts assumption that things at different times are not related spatially is correct; given one thing is present, the things at other times are not present; thus they do not exist. Lacking existence, they do not have spatial relations with anything (even if they once did). Thus, if I seem to perceive them in any spatial relations, this perception would be illusory.237 Instead, what Power recommends is to abandon Presentism in favor of Eternalism. Then Direct Realism can be savednot, indeed, in Carriers way (by holding fast to the simultaneityprinciple and claiming that in all cases of perception we see light) but in the way of his opponents who (a) deny the simultaneity-principle; (b) claim the superiority of a completely tenseless way of speeking; and (c) insist that we do see the star itself (in the disintegrated star case) because, though it exists no longer, it still exists in an unqualified sense. In addition, claims Power, Eternalism is better supported by modern physical theory and is more compatible with Relativity than is Presentism. We will return to this issue in 6.1.

4.14. Conclusion about the Simultaneity-Requirement

I am ready now to state explicitly, and to expound in a fully detailed and elaborate way, why I think the simultaneity-thesis is a conceptual, necessary, and analytic truth. To see a thing is to come into visual contact with it. That means being able not only to look at it, but also to look at it more closely, to approach it, and to touch it. Therefore, it must exist. For all the things (actions) just mentioned to be able to happen, it, the thing seen (the thing one has come into visual contact with) must exist. And it must exist at the time it is seen: it can neither cease to exist before it is seen nor start to exist after it is seen. That it cannot start to exist after it is seen may seem self-evident; it should be no less self-evident that a thing cannot cease to exist before it is seen. Seeing something puts me into perceptual contact with it. But if Im in perceptual contact with something physical, it should be logically possible for me to enter into some physical contact with it as well. Yet if it doesnt exist at t, then I cant (its logically impossible for me to) enter, at t, into physical contact with it. Therefore, Im not in perceptual contact with it either.

237

Powers, Perceiving External Things and the Time-Lag Argument,

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A thing, in order to be seen, must be able to be physically looked at, pointed to or at, approached, touched, prodded, poked, handled, affected, influenced, changed, destroyed, or otherwise acted upon or interacted with. If it cant be physically looked at, pointed to or at, approached, touched, prodded, poked, handled, affected, influenced, changed, destroyed, or otherwise acted upon or interacted with, then it cant be seen. But if it can be seen, then it can also be physically looked at, pointed to or at, approached, touched, prodded, poked, handled, affected, influenced, changed, destroyed, or otherwise acted upon or interacted with. And it can only be physically looked at, pointed to or at, approached, touched, prodded, poked, handled, affected, influenced, changed, destroyed, or otherwise acted upon or interacted with at time t, if it exists at time t. In other words, it cant be physically looked at, pointed to or at, approached, touched, prodded, poked, handled, affected, influenced, changed, destroyed, or otherwise acted upon or interacted with at t, if it does not exist at t (for example, because it only existed at a time previous to t, or because it only will exist at a time after t, or because it never existed, exists, or will exist). Thus the main reason why a physical thing that no longer exists now cannot be seen now is that it cannotlogically cannotbe physically looked at, pointed to or at, approached, touched, prodded, poked, handled, affected, influenced, changed, destroyed, or otherwise acted upon or interacted with now. And this physical thing that no longer exists now cannot be the object of such present acts precisely because it existed only in the past. But it must be able to be physically looked at, pointed to or at, approached, touched, prodded, poked, handled, affected, influenced, changed, destroyed, or otherwise acted upon or interacted with now, if I or anybody else is to see it now. None of these statements seems to me open to the least doubt. I cant imagine how they might be questioned. Therefore, I think, these statements constitute a solid proof of the simultaneity-principle. But now suppose someone said in objection that theres a certain star in the night-sky which you are pointing to and looking at and therefore you think it exists but unbeknownst to you it has gone out of existence hundreds of years ago. Isnt this a possible scenario? And if so, wouldnt this be a case of your looking at something that no longer exists and thus a case that falsifies your claim that you can only physically look at something if it exists now? No, this is not a possible scenario. What makes it impossible is this: if you can physically look at something, this implies there is a line that can be drawn between yourself and that thing. But if that thing doesnt exist, then there is no such line, and thus you are not physically looking at that thing. It only seems to you that you are pointing to, and physically looking at, a star, one that exists not in your mind only; what you are really pointing to, and looking at, is the night-sky 152

with some star-like lights which only exist in your mind. (How this is to be understood, and what it amounts to, will be explained in our conclusion in Chapter Six.) Pierre Jacob has claimed that [s]ome of the things that [people] can see are objects that they can also reach, grasp and manipulate with their hands. Many of the things that they can see, however, are not objects that they can reach and grasp. As Austin pointed out, humans can see, e.g., mountains, lakes, liquids, gases, clouds, flames, movies, shadows, holes, stars, planets, comets, and events.238 But even if they are not objects that they can reach and grasp, at least they are objects that they can act upon or interact with in any of the other ways enumerated above, or they are events in which such objects (as can be acted upon and interacted with in these ways) essentially figure. I conclude that the simultaneity-requirement is entailed by the existence-requirement and that the proposition For all (x), x is seen at t if and only if x exists at t is a conceptual, analytic, and necessary truth. It is conceptual because its truth follows on reflection from an understanding of the concepts involved; for exactly the same reason it is analytic; and its a necessary truth because no counterexamples to it can be thought of.

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Jacob, Grasping and perceiving objects, 1.

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Chapter Five: The Representational and Adverbial Theories of Perception


So far I have mostly assumed the subject-act-object and subject-state-object (content) models of perception and mostly focused on the objects of perception, which are either sense-data or external objects. In this chapter I will also focus on the perceiving of these objects and, in particular, on two theories about that perceiving: the Representational and the Adverbial Theories.

5.1. Dretske and the Sensory Core

In conclusion of his chapter on what he calls non-epistemic seeing and from which I have been quoting previously, Fred Dretske says: One occasionally hears it said that if one systematically strips away from a given perceptual act all the accretions due to past experience, all the collateral information, anticipations, interpretive and inferential elements, all the habitual or conditioned associations, then one will be left with a pure sensory corethe given of sense experience. Such stripping operations are taken very seriously by those who propose them. We begin by seeing a plump juicy tomato and finish by being told that all that is really given is a bulgy red patch, not really edible at all. What I have tried to show in this chapter is that we have a way of seeing plump juicy tomatoes which, when subjected to this stripping operation, leaves, as the sensory core or the directly given, precisely the same plump juicy tomato with which we began. If S, as we commonly say, sees a tomato, then we can supply him with the mentality of a one-year-old, take away all his past experience of tomatoes, subtract whatever beliefs he has about the tomato, allow him no inferences or interpretations, give him nothing that is not indubitable from the experience itself, and we are left with a simple residue: Ss seeing a tomato. The tomato is the sensory core, the directly given, if these phrases are meant to signify what it is that S sees when this is purified of all inferential, interpretive, and discursive or associational elements.239 If core can be taken to mean content, and I dont see why it cant, then Dretske can be taken to claim that the content of the sensory experience of the tomato is the tomato itself. This is exactly analogous to my claiming that the content of the sensory experience of a star is the
239

Dretske, Seeing and Knowing, 75-76.

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star itself. Recall two premises of my (Robinson-suggested) argument for the simultaneitythesis: (2) The content of a psychological state is what (in whole or in part) constitutes that state, what (in whole or in part) makes it the state that it is and (3) What constitutes the direct perceptual awareness of a star, what makes it the state that it is, is, in part, the star one is directly perceptually aware of. I take it that the expressions direct perceptual awareness of a..., act of perceiving a..., sensory experience of a... are at least roughly equivalent here. Thus if Dretske were to accept (2) and (3), he would be well on his way to accepting the conclusion (the simultaneity-thesis). But in an e-mail letter from 2002, speaking of himself, he said that I am ready to agree . . . that the content of a mental state constitutes that state . . . but I doubt whether the (external) object (the external object that the state represents as F), is part of that content. Rather, I think the content of a mental state is completely given by the properties that the state represents something as having. . . . an experience of a star (a distant object that no longer exists) as a bright shiny object has the same content as an experience of a nearby object (which still exists) as a bright shiny object. Thus, while in 1969 Dretske might have accepted that the star is the content of a certain mental state in just the way the tomato is the content of another, a few decades later his view is different: according to that new view, it is no longer the star (tomato) itself that is part of the content constituting a mental state; rather, this content consists entirely of the properties the mental state represents the star (tomato) as having. For what reasons did Dretske change his mind? And are they good ones? These are legitimate and interesting questions: the first, for (a small part of) the history of philosophy; the second, more broadly, for the philosophy of mind and of perception, in general. What I minimally need to do here is only to evaluate how Dretskes new theory bears on the TGA; but this will require some verdict on its plausibility, and also an answer to the second question.

5.2. Travis and Alston on Representationalism

I am impressed by some of the arguments given by those philosophers, primarily Charles Travis and William P. Alston, who think the Representationalist Theory of Perceptual Experience (also called representationalism, representationism, intentionalism) to be mistaken. Alston in particular focuses heavily on Dretske and makes some general suggestions as to why he and other representationalists might have come to find the theory attractive. Travis doesnt refer to Dretske at all but formulates the theory untendentiously to fit all representationalists as follows: 155

Perhaps the most common view of perception today is that it is representational: that in our perceptual experiencein our seeing, hearing, feeling, smelling, what we dothe world is represented to us as being thus and so.240 He then goes on to say that he knows of no argument that any defender of the view has given for it. Rather it is assumed from the outset. Some philosophers perhaps assume it faute de mieux, seeing representation as better material than qualia for answering a very special question as to what an experience was like. Others may be moved by the thought that perceptual experience, being mental, is intentional, and that intentionality just is that sort of aiming at the world which representation is. Yet intentionality, according to Travis, is but one form of the mental: perception, and experience, exemplify another. In any event, perception is not representational.241 Travis starts out his argument by harking back to John L. Austin. Of himself and his relationship to Austin he says that the points I will make against the representationalist view differ little, if at all, from points Austin makes in Sense and Sensibilia . . . , a remarkably rich work. Were Austin not so thoroughly ignored, perhaps I would not have written this.242 Then he quotes Austins observation that [i]n fact, of course, our senses are dumb. . . . our senses do not tell us anything, true or false and elaborates as follows: Austins idea is that, rather than representing anything as so, our senses merely bring our surroundings into view; afford us some sort of awareness of them. In this respect, Travis maintains, Austin is of one mind with Descartes: Sensory experience is, for Descartes, one more case where I am simply confronted with ideas. I cannot be confronted correctly or incorrectly, veridically or deceptively. I simply confront what is there. Perception leads me astray only where I judge erroneously, failing to make out what I confront for what it is. . . . [P]erception is a source of unmediated awareness. I will call awareness mediated if it is hostage to awareness of something else: that further awareness is part of what entitles one to take it that X is so, or present; so part of what qualifies one as aware of that. In unmediated awareness, ones entitlement to take it that X is hostage to no more than some form of awareness of X itself (such as seeing it).243 Travis doesnt add, but I do, that Austin should also have been (but unfortunately wasnt) of one mind with Berkeley who, after all, adopted Descartess view on this point. Just recall (for one of many things on this topic) what Philonous says of the man who thinks an oar with one
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Travis, The Silence of the Senses, 57. ibidem. 242 ibidem, 64. 243 ibidem, 65.
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end in the water to be crooked: He is not mistaken with regard to the ideas he actually perceives; but in the inferences he makes of his present perceptions.244 The Descartes-Berkeley view was also endorsed by Kant when he stated that truth or illusion is not in the object, in so far as it is intuited, but in the judgment about it, in so far as it is thought. It is therefore correct to say that the senses do not errnot because they always judge rightly but because they do not judge at all. . . . In the senses there is no judgment whatsoever, neither a true nor a false judgment.245 These philosophers would all have rejected the Representational Theory of Perceptual Experience, had they thought of it. Travis, in his paper, goes on to argue very carefully and exhaustively that representationalism is mistaken: there is nothing in perceptual experience which makes it so that in it anything is represented as so (except insofar as the perceiver represents things to himself as so). . . . . Perceptual experience is not as such either veridical or delusive. It may mislead, but it does not take representation to accomplish that.246 Let us now turn to Alston, who in one fell swoop criticizes both representationalism and adverbialism. Having claimed that Representational theories of perception were very prominent in the 17th and 18th centuries and that contemporary representationists are closer in some respects to these forebears than they care to admit, Alston says that the mid-twentieth century in Anglo-American philosophy of perception was dominated by a reaction against the sense datum-theories that had been so prominent in the first third of the century; and that before sense-datum theories had collapsed under the weight of an impressive accumulation of difficulties, opposition to them up until the last few decades of the 20th century was spearheaded by the Adverbial Theory of Perception. This is the view that perceptual experience, instead of being a direct awareness of objects (public or private), is a way of being conscious and in this respect on a par with feeling anxious, relieved, or excited and other apparently objectless mental states. This has the advantage of doing justice to the role of sensory experience in perception, while avoiding any commitment to non-physical, private objects of awareness.247 Alston then says that the adverbial theory itself faces serious difficulties. For one thing it conflicts with the apparent fact that what is most distinctive to perceptual experience is the presentation of objects to consciousness. Perceptual experience doesnt seem at all to be an objectless mode of consciousness like feeling anxious or relieved. This defect is reflected in the artificial (at
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Berkeley, Works, 3 D, 238. Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, 1787/1929, A294/B350. 246 Travis, The Silence of the Senses, 57. 247 Alston, Perception and Representation, 254-255.
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best) way in which adverbial specifications of sensory consciousness are constructed by taking familiar ways of specifying perceived objects and mechanically turning them into adverbssensing flowering-crab-applely, blue spherely, bottle of winely, etc. There are in addition a variety of more technical problems. . . . These difficulties emerge only when thinkers take the adverbial idea with full seriousness. More often, people who think of themselves as adverbialists are content to specify a particular perceptual experience in such ways as It was just as if I were seeing an apple tree, without making any serious attempt to spell out just what kind of similarity with veridical perception is being attributed. In this last gambit it is barely below the surface that adverbialism is designed not only to avoid commitment to sense data, but also to accommodate something taken as a sacrosanct datum by virtually every account of perception from the 17th century on viz., the possibility of a perceptual experiences being of exactly the same intrinsic character in veridical perception and in complete hallucination. This supposed possibility has been thought to render impossible any serious direct realism, in which the experience involved in veridical perception is a direct awareness of an external physical object, or, to reverse the direction of description, a direct presentation of an external object to the subjects consciousness. For, it is supposed, in an hallucination there is no such presentation; and if the experience involved there is intrinsically just like one in a veridical perception of an external object, then in the latter case as well the experience cannot be constituted as direct realism would have it. An adverbial characterization of the experience that mentions no object at all is in at least as strong a position to realize this desideratum as a sense datum theory that builds a relation to a private object into veridical perception and hallucination alike. Against this background we can understand the current popularity of

representationism. It seems to its proponents to provide a way of enjoying all the desiderata mentioned above. By thinking of the experience involved in an objects looking a certain way, e.g., smooth, as a matter of the subjects having a certain kind of representation of the object as smooth, it takes the experience to be purely intra-mental (and hence capable of being intrinsically the same whether or not there is an real smooth object being perceived), while at the same time accommodating the intuitive object directedness of perceptual experience by construing this as a representation of an object as bearing certain characteristics, the representation obtaining whether or not this intentional object turns out to be real and, if it is, whether it is as it is represented as

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being. At the same time it avoids commitment to an internal direct object of awareness (sense datum) that mediates the perception of the external object.248 Alston then proceeds to criticize representationism, with great care and at great length, first by clarifying the basic concepts and then by arguing for the following four claims: (1) There is no sufficient reason for positing a representative function for perceptual experience. It doesnt seem on the face of it to be that, and nothing serves in place of such seeming. (2) Even if it did have such a function, it doesnt have the conceptual resources to represent a state of affairs. (3) Even if it did, it is not suited to represent, e.g., a physical property of color. (4) Finally, even if I am wrong about the first three points, it is still impossible for the phenomenal character of the perceptual experience to consist in its representing what it does. My central argument for this central claim of the paper is that it is metaphysically, de re possible that one have a certain perceptual experience without its presenting any state of affairs. And since all identities hold necessarily, this identity claim fails.249 Since Alston, by his own admission, lays the greatest weight on his argument for claim (1), this is the only one Ill highlight. It is the argument that we lack sufficient reason for positing any such representation at all and that in the absence of such a sufficient reason there is no basis for attributing a representative function to perceptual experience. The only other basis there could be is that [perceptual experience] presents itself, is experienced as, a representation. But that is clearly not the case. When something I see looks a certain way to me (conical, red...), it doesnt appear on the face of it be a representation of anything. The mind is not irresistibly conveyed to something it is representing the way the mind is when one looks at a (realistic) painting or a photograph. The experience is not of that sort. Phenomenologically it has the character of a presentation of an object as being such-and-such. The experience terminates in the object presented without, so far as it appears, functioning to put [the subject] in mind of something else. Hence we need a reason beyond the phenomenological character of the experience to take it to be a representation.250 Dretske and other representationalists do give a reason of this sort; they, says Alston, suppose that perceptual experiences must represent facts about perceived objects in order to perform their function of providing the belief-desire system with information concerning those objects. Everyone

248

ibidem, 255-256. ibidem, 253. 250 ibidem, 275-276.


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recognizes that this is (at least a basic part of) what perception is for. And, they claim, [perceptual experience] could not perform this function without constructing such representations.251 But this account, though possible, is not the only available. Alston presents another: furnish[ing] the belief-desire system with information about perceived objects . . . could also be done by [the perceptual experiences] simply being what it introspectively seems to be, viz., the objects presenting itself as such-and-such . . ., provided the belief-desire system has the capacity to read off of that the ways the object presents itself and to encode those ways in the form of one or more propositions, i.e., encode them as representations of states-of-affairs. And why should it not have this capacity? That is what it is fitted to doconstruct propositionally shaped representations and make use of them in thought and motivation. On this alternative account all the representing is done on the recipient side of the transaction between experience and thought. There is no need for the donor side to construct any representation. I take this alternative to the [representationalist] picture to be superior on the grounds of simplicity and economy. Provided the belief-desire system has the capacity it posits, there is no need for any representing on the [perceptual experience] side; it would be a fifth wheel that is making no contribution to the outcome.252 With respect to Alstons final claim (4), Ill just remark that it revolves around the very plausible consideration that some very young human perceivers, as well as some non-human ones, could have what we would recognize as a perceptual experience without having the conceptual wherewithal to represent any facts, physical or otherwise, concerning putatively perceived objects. As Alston says, and I cant help but agree, when we think of the likes of frogs and insects (and even dogs and cats) . . . it does seem eminently possible that an object can look a certain way to a frog without the frogs representing the object as having the kind of physical property that is responsible for its looking that way, or indeed any physical property at all. Even if frogs can do something that could properly be called experientially representing some states-of-affairs concerning perceived objects, it strains credibility to the utmost to imagine those representations picking out some particular physical property of the object.253

251

ibidem, 276. ibidem, 276-277. 253 ibidem, 285-286.


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This point is one that Dretske might find especially bruisingin view of his insistence, in Seeing and Knowing, that the account of perception he gives there applies to infants and animals as well. I will not pursue this point further here.

5.3. Jackson on Representationalism

Frank C. Jackson, who for much of the second half of the last century used to be a champion of sense-data and in 1977 even wrote a classic defense of the Representative Theory of Perception, towards the end of that century changed his mind about sense-data. In a draft paper from 2000 called Some reflections on representationalism he explained why. Since this paper wasnt published in a journal or book, but just put on the Internet explicitly as a draft, my emphasis, too, will not be so much on Jackson personally as on the ideas contained therein. Since many of them are not Jacksons alone but have been floating around in representationalist circles for years, theyre worthy to be criticized (even if Jackson himself might put them a little or even very differently in 2011). Still, Ill start with a personal confession of Jacksons. Speaking of himself, he says: The reason I abandoned the sense datum theory was my belated realisation that it fails to capture the representational nature of perceptual experience.254 Earlier in the paper he had stated that it should be no surprise that, as a former sense datum theorist, I find representationalism very attractive. Both theories see the nature of experience as lying in the properties of the objects of experience, with the big difference that, for representationalists, the properties of the objects of experience reside in the way that experience represents things as being. There need be nothing actually having the properties; the objects are intentional objects.255 He also states that both the sense-datum and the representationalist theory subscribe to the act-object account of sensory experience. The act-object account of sensory experience captures the nature of experience through the properties of the objects of sensory awareness. On the act-object view, the difference between an itch and a pain lies in the difference between what one is aware of, and not in the mode of awareness as in adverbial theories.256

254

Jackson, Some reflections on representationalism, 2. ibidem, 1 256 ibidem.


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Adverbial theories in his opinion are wrong, and Jackson now likes how representationalism handles the many-property problem he raised for adverbial theories of sensory experience some years ago. At that time he asked how theories that talk of ways of sensing can capture the fact that having a red, round after-image involves, in some sense, the properties of redness and roundness attaching to the very same thing. It is, for example, wrong to analyse having a red, round after-image simply in terms of sensing redly and sensing roundly. For we must distinguish having a red, round after-image from having a red after-image at the same time as having a distinct round one. Representationalism handles this problem nicely in terms of the difference between having an experience that represents that there is something that is both red and round before one, and having an experience that represents that there is something red before one and that there is something else round before one.257 But Jacksons main foe is now the sense-datum theory, about which he says: The central objection to the sense datum theory is that it is a classic piece of buck passing. We should all agree the experience of, say, there looking to be something red in front of one represents that there is, in the world, something red in front of one.258 Now my question is: Why should we all agree on this? Is it because it is self-evident? A truism? Indisputable? No one in fact disputes it? Jackson doesnt let on. As a matter of fact, there are some serious philosophers who do dispute it. Perhaps Jackson is saying that even if it isnt exactly self-evident, a truism, or indisputable, there are some good arguments supporting it. But what are they? Again, Jackson doesnt give a hint. This is in line with the observation made by Alston and Travis that representationalists often dont give arguments for why they are representationalists. In any case, lets look at this proposition that Jackson claims we should all agree on: the experience of there looking to be something red in front of one represents that there is, in the world, something red in front of one. What does this actually mean? Is it, and why is it, something worth saying? What is gained by pointing out that the experience of there looking to be something red in front of one represents that there is, in the world, something red in front of one? What word could be substituted for represents here? Shows? Portrays? Means? States? Carries the information? They all, though similar, come to something just a tad different. And why is any of them needed?

257 258

ibidem, 1-2. ibidem, 2.

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Instead of saying what he did, couldnt Jackson simply have said the following: If there looks to be something red in front of one, then there is, in the world or in ones mind, something red in front of one? This would have been simpler and clearer. To speak bluntly, Jacksons phrase the experience of there looking to be something red in front of one represents that there is, in the world, something red in front of one sounds stilted and wordy: the expressions experience of and represents that sound like circumlocutions; they seem to be empty verbiage. Immediately after the quoted phrase Jackson continues: It is definitive of perceptual experience that it represents how our world is. We can all agree on this independently of whether we think that representational content exhausts the phenomenology. This means that sense datum theorists analysis of the experience of there looking to be something red in front of one in terms of direct awareness of something mental that actually is red, the sense datum, must preserve this feature. But then the key relation of direct awareness to something mental must be explicated as involving representing that there is something red in the world, and we have gained nothing. It is like analysing knowledge as belief that constitutes knowledge. What confuses sense datum theorists, or confused me anyway, is the thought that the requirement that there be something which is red of which the subject is directly aware, automatically captures, or part way captures, the key representational notion. This is a mistake.259 I would object once more to the the very first sentence of this quotation. I would say that what is definitive of perceptual experience is, at most, that it presents (not: represents) how our world is. Consequently, I would also reject the second, third, fourth, and fifth sentences. There simply is no such thing as the representational content of a perceptual experience; a fortiori it is not a feature that any sense-datum analysis must preserve, nor must the key relation of direct awareness to a sense-datum be explicated as involving representing that there is something red in the world. In fact, the sense-datum theory seems to be all right as it stands: it doesnt need to preserve or to explicate what Jackson (currently) thinks it does. Hence, with respect to the last two sentences of the above quote, I would say the following: it is indeed a mistake to think that the requirement that there be something which is red of which the subject is directly aware, automatically captures, or part way captures, the key representational notion; but the mistake is not that it doesnt capture this notion (indeed it

259

ibidem, 2-3

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doesnt), the mistake is thinking that it, a representational notion, is required at alland that it is key. Yet not being able to let go of this notion Jackson elaborates: It is true that I can represent how I am representing something to be by using the actual way something is. For example, I might represent to you the colour I remember the murderers coat to be by holding up an actual sample of the colour. Here I would be using the actual colour of one thing, the sample, to represent how my memory represents the colour of something else, the murderers coat, to be; a colour which the coat, of course, may or may not have. In that sense, we have a model for understanding the sense datum theory (and it is noteworthy that it would be an obvious mistake to run the reification of appearances objection against this way of representing how I remember things to be). But, and this is the crucial point, the fact that I am using an actual sample of the colour cuts no representational ice per se. I could be using the sample to represent the one colour I do not think the murderers coat to be. Or I could be following the convention of holding up a sample with the colour complementary to that I remember the murders coat to be. In the same way, standing in a certain direct-awareness relationship to a mental item with such and such properties says nothing, represents nothing, per se, about how the world is. TheI now think, extraordinaryfailing of the sense datum theory is that it does not start to address the representational nature of perceptual experience. It somehow manages to leave out the most important part of the story.260 But this is the most important part of the story and leaving it out is an extraordinary failing only if you are in the grip of a false picturethat perceptual experience has a representational nature. It doesnt; its nature is presentational. This picture is additionally false in having the worlds objects be represented, rather than idealistically constituted out of the sense-data. What is really the case, in the true story, is that perceptual experience directly presents sense-data; and through them, in most cases, it directly presents the objects themselves. In other words, on the idealist story, standing in a certain direct-awareness relationship to a mental item with such and such properties is perfectly enough for showing how the world is; no representing whatsoever is needed. When he was a traditional Representationalist (in the spirit of his 1977 book Perception), Jackson could have moved toward idealism (without doing too much violence to his thenavowed beliefs) while still adhering to sense-data. But upon becoming a physicalist a few decades later, he, in his own words, had another good objection to the sense datum theory.

260

ibidem, 3.

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When something looks square to one, there need be nothing physical that is square in existence. But, for the physicalist, the physical things are all the things.261 To me this sounds not like an objection to sense-datum theory, but, on the contrary, like a reason to posit sense-data: the objection would only be to physicalism. Frank Jacksons move from traditional Representationalism to its contemporary version is perhaps best reflected in an article he wrote in 1992262: I am watching a football game on television. My senses, in particular my eyes and ears, tell me that Carlton is winning. What makes this possible is the existence of a long and complex causal chain of electro-magnetic radiation running from the game through the television cameras, various cables, my television set and a region of space between my eyes and the television screen. Each stage of this process carries information about preceding stages in the sense that the way things are at a given stage depends on the way things are in preceding stages. . . . There needs to be systematic covariance between the state of my brain and the state of the march, and that will not obtain unless it obtains between intermediate members of the long causal chain. . . . A few of the stages in this transmission of information between game and brain are special in the sense that I am in some sense perceptually aware of them. . . . For instance, I am perceptually aware of the images on the screen. I am also perceptually aware of the game. Otherwise I could not be said to watch the game on television. Now my perceptual awareness of the march depends on my perceptual awareness of the screen. The former goes via the latter. . . . if you suddenly covered the screen with a cloth and asked me (1) to report on the images, and (2) to report on the game, I might well find it easier to report on the game than on the images. But that does not mean that my awareness of the game does not go via my awareness of the images on the screen. It shows that I am more interested in the game than in the screen, and so am storing beliefs about it in preference to beliefs about the screen. But if my awareness of the game goes via my awareness of the images on the screen, what does my awareness of the images on the screen go by? The latter awareness is certainly not direct. So what does it causally depend on? Jackson goes on to say that [o]ur initial statement of Representative Realism talked of the information acquired in perceiving an object being most immediately about the perceptual experience caused in us by the object, and only derivatively about the object itself. In the act/object, sense-

ibidem, 3 (footnote 3). Frank Jackson, Representative Realism, in: Jonathan Dancy and Ernest Sosa (eds.), A Companion to Epistemology: 445-448. What follows are quotations from the end of that article (pp. 447-448).
262

261

165

datum approach, what is held to make that true is the fact that what we are immediately aware of is a mental sense-datum. But instead, Representative Realists can put their view this way: just as awareness of the match goes via awareness of the screen, so awareness of the screen goes via awareness of experience, and in general when subjects perceive objects, their perceptual awareness always goes via awareness of experience. These passages illustrate nicely the beginning of Jacksons slide from traditional to contemporary Representationalism (as well as Alstons claim that the difference between them isnt all that great). In Jacksons encyclopedia article, experience has replaced mental sensedata as the object of immediate awareness. But this isnt quite yet contemporary Representationalism in full dress, for thae latter does not require that the perceiver be aware of the experience at all. As William Seager and David Bourget explain in their representation-friendly paper Representationalism about Consciousness from 2007, contemporary or Modern

Representationalism (MR), as they call it, claims that perception is representational in the sense that it is intentional, not in the sense that it is mediated by internal pictures.. . . When someone perceives a cardinal they are perceiving a bird and not one of their own mental states. While dependent upon there being an active mental representation within the perceiver, proponents of MR deny that perception is indirect, proceeding via an apprehension of this representation. . . . There is no maple leaf in the head. When one imagines a Canadian flag, one is aware of the content of a flag-representation which encodes shape and color information. This encoding does not have to be flag-shaped and colored red. Whatever the vehicle of this representational content might be, perhaps a neural state, there is no need for there to be any awareness of it.263 Let me end this section by returning to traditional Representationalism and its refutation. Even though thinking of himself as a traditional Representational Realist, OShaughnessy, as weve seen in 3.4., denies that seeing something, say a theater play, on TV is really seeing the play (as you would if you were sitting in the theater itself rather than in front of the TV). This accords well with what Foster says in criticizing the view that someone watching a live football match on television is really seeing the match itself. Foster, I think, has most effectively disposed of any such view as Jacksons on p. 212-218 of The Nature of Perception. It is a terse but compelling dispatch of Indirect Realism as a whole, as is David Smiths even shorter argument,

263

Seager and Bourget, Representationalism about Consciousness, 3,

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on p. 13-16 of The Problem of Perception, attempting to show that, as a matter of the first philosophical importance, . . . Indirect Realism is incoherent.

5.4. Valberg and No on Representationalism

I think the best take on these issues is Jerry Valbergs. He, too, distinguishes between two kinds of Representationalism. One, that of the 1977 Jackson, is usually called the Representational (Representative) Theory of Perception (or Representative Realism). Valberg calls it the traditional Representationalism of Descartes and Locke. The other, what weve been calling the Representational Theory of (Perceptual) Experience, he calls contemporary

Representationalism (much like Alston does in his paper, discussed above). This is the doctrine now upheld by Jackson and Dretske, among many others, and argued against by Travis and Alston. Valberg also argues against (both sorts of) Representationalism. With respect to what he takes to be its contemporary version, he says the following: I think that, when we conceive of experience as something which occurs in our heads (or souls), it is extremely natural to adopt a Representationalist view of experience, that is, to think of what is going on in the head as representing what is out in the world, in the very way that a picture or image represents an object in the world. On this model, the sensory content of experience will play the same role as the coloured shapes in a picture. It will function, not as the object, but as the vehicle, of representation. The object, as we said, will be the thing in the worldthe external object.264 Now, according to Valberg, contemporary and traditional Representationalism differ as follows: [t]raditional Representationalism takes the vehicle of representation (the sensory content, the ideas, etc.) to be what is present in experience. But it does it in such a way that [t]he object in the world is represented by what is present in experience, but is not itself present. By contrast, contemporary Representationalism does not place anything between the subject and the world.265 However, does contemporary Representationalism preserve the presence of the world? Valberg says: Suppose I make a picture of the book on my desk. The coloured shapes in the picture represent the book (they are the vehicle), and in that sense the book is in the picture. Now consider the idea that my experience has a sensory content, and that, like the coloured shapes in the picture, the sensory content of my experience represents the book. So we could say that, in a representational sense, the book is in my experience. . . . But,
264 265

Valberg, The Puzzle of Experience, 130-131. ibidem, 131.

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if the book is in my experience in the sense that the sensory content of my experience represents the book, what has happened to the fact that the book is present in my experience? The danger is that we may forget about the fact of presence, or suppose we are dealing with that fact in dealing with the fact of representation. These are, I want to insist, utterly different facts; there is no way of equating them.266 Valberg goes on to repeat a previous point (made both by him and by me), namely, that we have a strong inclination to view what is present in experience as existing when it is present: if it is present now, it exists now. We have no comparable inclination with respect to representation. In our example, the book represented by my picture exists now. Would it matter if the book were destroyed? Would we be any less inclined to say that the picture represents the book? Or think of it from the standpoint of experience: suppose that the sensory content of my experience represents the book, and that the book is present in my experience. Then God eliminates the book. We will want to say that the book can no longer be present in my experience. But there seems no reason to deny that, if the sensory content of my experience remains the same, it continues to represent the book.267 Besides Valberg, Alva No, too, seems to have a good grasp of some of these issues. According to him, perceivings are episodes of grappling with the world itself. He recommends we should think of perceptual experiences as temporally extended patterns of engagement with the world, not as things that happen in us. We enact perceptual experience; it doesnt happen to us. Perceptual experiences, then, should not be thought of as representations, as internal states that are about a scene. Rather, they are episodes of contact with a scene. This nonrepresentationalist conception of experience squares with perceptual phenomenology, I would say. After all, perceptual experiences dont feel like representations. It doesnt seem to us, when we see, as if what we experience is represented in our head. Rather, it seems to us as if what we see is out there in the world. And it seems to us as if we have a special kind of access to what is out there. Our sense of the presence of objects and properties around us, in perceptual experience, is understood in terms of our being skillfully poised to reach out and grasp them. Instead of thinking of perceiving on the model of seeing, which is in turn understood on a kind of quasi-photographic or opticalprojective model, we should think of perceiving on the model of touching.268

266

ibidem. ibidem, 131-132. 268 No, Real Presence, 47-48.


267

168

This is quite in line with my own reflections expounded earlier, especially in connection with my rejection of John Bengsons and Kendall Waltons assimilation of seeing photographs to the seeing of non-photographic reality. I would also endorse the following remarks (with the exception of the second sentence) of No:269 For philosophers there may be a temptation to think of experiences as a kind of logical act, comparable to an act of judgement or to assertion. We find it natural to think of experiences as representations. But experiences are not acts, in this sense; they are not representations; they are activities, events themselves; they are temporally extended patterns of skilful engagement. When you perceive an event unfolding, it is not as if you occupy a dimensionless point of observation. You live through an event by coupling with it. What you experience is the event, as it plays out in time. You experience the singers song, and the ball players play, and the dancers dance, by tracking what they do over time. The very experience is a world-involving achievement of control and attention. All in all, I think that perceptual experience doesnt represent anything as being so or as not being so: perceptual experiences just arent representations. Theyre not like thoughts, which represent (whether truly or falsely) reality or irreality; theyre not like sentences, which express thoughts and in so doing likewise represent reality or irreality; theyre not like pictures, which can likewise represent reality or irreality, or which create their own, artistic, reality. Perceptual experiences neither represent nor create anything; they just present the world, period. Here I largely agree with Charles Travis when he says that perception, as such, simply places our surroundings in view; affords us awareness of them. There is no commitment to their being one way or another. It confronts us with what is there, so that, by attending, noting, recognizing, and otherwise exercising what capacities we have, we may, in some respect or other, make out what is there for what it isor, again, fail to. It makes us aware, to some extent, of things (around us) being as they are. It is then up to us to make out, or try to, which particular ways that is. Perception cannot present things as being other than they are. It cannot present some way things are not as what is so. That would not be mere confrontation. So it cannot represent anything as so. Representing, by nature, is liable to be of what is not so. . . . [I]n perception things are not presented, or represented, to us as being thus and so. They are just

269

No, Experience of the world in time, 3132.

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presented to us, full stop. It is in making out, or trying to, what it is that we confront that we take things, rightly or wrongly, to be thus and so.270 The only reservation I have is regarding the very last sentence. When in perception, in perceptual confrontation with things, they are presented to us, full stop, there is one respect in which quite automatically, in that very perception, we do take them to be thus and so. Namely (and here I would agree with John Foster), we take (interpret) these things as being located, together with ourselves (the perceiving subjects), in a common three-dimensional space, and located in a way which, with varying degrees of specificity, purports to characterize the spatial relationship between them from the subjects standpoint (in the perspective of his viewpoint).271 But perhaps it isnt necessary to see Foster (and myself) as really disagreeing with Travis. If perception simply places our surroundings in view and affords us awareness of them, as Travis has it; and if we and our surroundings exist in a common three-dimensional space with various perceived spatial relationships between us, as Foster and I have it, then isnt it the case that when Travis speaks of the presentation of things to us, full stop, he need not be saying something incompatible with Fosters talk of [t]he notion of an interpretation blending with a presentation to form an integrated, conceptually enriched, episode of awareness and of cases where the interpretation is an integral part of the whole experience, rather than an extraneous judgement about it, or about the object perceived.272 We will return to this issue at the end of the next chapter.

5.5. The Adverbial Theory of Perception

In 5.2. Ive already mentioned William Alstons objections to adverbialism, the gist of which lies in the claim that it conflicts with the apparent fact that what is most distinctive to perceptual experience is the presentation of objects to consciousness. Perceptual experience doesnt seem at all to be an objectless mode of consciousness like feeling anxious or relieved. This defect is reflected in the artificial (at best) way in which adverbial specifications of sensory consciousness are constructed by taking familiar ways of specifying perceived objects and mechanically turning them into adverbs.

270

Travis, The Silence of the Senses, 65. Foster, The Nature of Perception, 151-152. 272 ibidem, 155.
271

170

The latter artificiality is due to what Frank Jackson calls the many-property problem, Howard Robinson calls the problem of structural complexity, and John Foster calls the problem of sensible complexity faced by adverbialism. In an extended discusion of the Adverbial Theory of Perception, John Foster argues that the linguistic objection can be overcome. In particular, he argues that by recognizing an ontology of episodes of sensingan ontology of sensory acts273 in place of sensory objects, the adverbialist can deal with the phenomenon of sensible complexity.274 Nevertheless, the theory is vulnerable at two other, and more fundamental pointspoints which concern the substance of its philosophical claims, rather than the descriptive adequacy of the associated language.275 One of these is the point that what the Adverbial Theory takes to be the true character of our experiential situation is at variance with what an introspective analysis seems to disclose. Foster thinks that when we focus on the character of our experiences introspectively, we do not become aware of the supposed adverbial nature of their sensory core. If we accept the distinction between the sensory and interpretative components of phenomenal experiencea distinction recognized by both the Sense-Datum Theory and Adverbial Theory accountsand if we introspectively focus on the character of our experiences in the light of this distinction, we can, indeed, come to identify what (in that framework) qualifies as the sensory core. And my becoming aware of this core, we become aware of the sensible qualities which feature in its content. But we are always aware of this core as the sensing, or sensory awareness, of some item (for example, a colour-array, a felt patch of texture, a sequence of sounds), and are aware of the sensible qualities involved as aspects or elements of this item. We never manage to achieve, introspectively, an explicitly adverbial view, where we are aware of the sensory episode as merely a sensing in a certain manner (a manner not defined by the character of an object of sensory awareness), and are aware of the sensible qualities as the modes of sensing which compose this manner. But why not, if an adverbial view would be correct?276 After trying several other ways, and failing, to uncover the supposed adverbial character of the sensing, Foster concludes that the introspective situation shows the adverbial theory to be highly implausible, even if it does not refute it absolutely.277

273

Foster, The Nature of Perception, 175. ibidem, 178. 275 ibidem. 276 ibidem, 179. 277 ibidem, 181.
274

171

What does so is the second point referred to above, namely, that the Adverbial Theory leaves us without any explanation of how phenomenal experience, in the relevant sense, comes to occur. For if the sensory core is truly adverbialthe sensing in a certain manner, rather than the sensing of a certain objectit becomes impossible to understand how we manage to experience it as presentationally perceptive, or indeed as perceptive in any way.278 I leave out the details of Fosters critique and conclude, in his words, that I do not see how we can continue to regard the adverbial theory as a serious option.279

5.6. Conclusion about the Representational and Adverbial Theories

In Chapters One through Four I assumed the subject-state-object/content model of perception, but made this explicit only in 4.5., insofar as I agreed with Tom Stoneham that this is Berkeleys default model. In this chapter I rehearsed objections to the intentional model, otherwise known as the Representational Theory of Perception. Now I must record and justify my conviction that, though false, it is, after all, compatible with both the simultaneity-principle and the postulation of sense-data, as required by the TGA. According to this model, which regards mental states as being like measuring instruments, a mental state has content just like a thermometer can have contentby being in a representational state. As Dretske explained, a thermometer is in the same representational state (has the same content) if it registers 95 degrees in location L (representing L as being 95 degrees) as it does when it registers 95 degrees in location L (representing L as 95 degrees). Likewise, an experience of a star (a distant object that no longer exists) as a bright shiny object has the same content as an experience of a nearby object (which still exists) as a bright shiny object. If thats so, then the bright shiny object of which the experience is of can be a physical object or a mental sense-datum; it can actually exist now, or in the past, or never have existed (in which case it would be a hallucination); it can be an indeterminate distance away from me; and it can either be a star, or my neighbors light, or whatnotas long as its bright and shiny. Now, as it happens, and if I were to speak in this way, my experience (switching to Armstrongs example in 2.7.) of what I take to be a stars vanishing and of a birds flight much closer to me represents the stars vanishing and the birds flight as occurring simultaneously, even though the star vanished eons earlier. So the representation is false, but that is no skin off
278 279

ibidem, 185. ibidem.

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the Representational Theorys back. It leaves virtually all options open. What it doesnt do, of course, is provide a premise for the TGA; but it is not incompatible with all of its premises and conclusion. The Adverbial Theory of Perception, by contrast, is not only thoroughly false (this quality it shares with Representationalism), but it also is both useless for, and irreconcilable with, the TGA. Cornman needed it so as to avoid sense-data. If he could have been convinced that the Adverbial Theory is, though initially perhaps appealing, but ultimately quite hopeless, his case against sense-data would have collapsed, and the TGA might have had one more unambiguously supportive proponent.

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Chapter Six: What We See


In Section 1.3. I mentioned some Direct Realists who attack the TGA but not by denying the simultaneity-requirement. Besides Len Carrier, who presumed to avoid the TGAs conclusion (that we see sense-data) by claiming that we always see light, there are David Lewis and Hanoch Ben-Yami who simply deny that a star can go out of existence before light from it reaches the eyes of a seeing subject. According to Lewis, the stars as I now see them are not straightforwardly past; for light-like connection has as good a claim as simultaneity-in-my-restframe to be the legitimate heir to our defunct concept of absolute simultaneity.280 Thus we can see stars as they are now.

6.1. Apparent Simultaneity

This view has been worked out more fully by Ben-Yami in his paper Apparent Simultaneity. He claims that backward light-cone simultaneity, which he prefers to call apparent simultaneity, has certain advantages over what he calls Einstein simultaneity. In a section of his paper titled Appearance as Reality,281 Ben-Yami writes that According to our pre-scientific approach, what we are now seeing is happening now. This view presupposes that the speed of light from source to observer is infinite; and indeed, most natural philosophers from Aristotle to Descartes argued that that is lights speed. With the advent of modern science, however, with its claim that lights speed is finite, this pre-scientific view had to be given up. Our improved knowledge of the world (science) seemed to establish that the world is not as it appears to be. The things we now see are not only not happening now, but they did not even happen together at all: we now see the sun where and as it was eight minutes ago, but the moon where and as it was just over a second ago. In this way a gap opened between how the world appears to us and how we think it really is. The scientific image of the world became radically different from its manifest or apparent image. And, since in our nonreflective moments, which constitute the great majority of our active life, we act on the basis of the worlds apparent image, we have to concede that our everyday attitude to the world involves an illusion.

280

D. Lewis, Veridical Hallucination and Prosthetic Vision. In: J. Dancy, ed. Perceptual Knowledge (OUP, 1988): 83. 281 All quotations of Ben-Yami are from his paper Apparent Simultaneity. In [2007] EPSA07: 1st Conference of the European Philosophy of Science Association (Madrid, 15-17 November, 2007).

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However, if one adopts backward-light-cone simultaneity, this gap partly closes . . . According to backward-light-cone simultaneity, what we now see through vacuum is what is happening now. The world is as it appears to be, in this respect. Science does not force us to reject our everyday view of the world. Since according to backward-light-cone simultaneity what appears to be happening now, that is, what we now see, is indeed happening now relative to us, this simultaneity can also be called Apparent Simultaneity. This is the phrase I shall use below. Ben-Yami then discusses how the notion of apparent simultaneity may be fruitfully applied to criticizing the TGA. He lays out the argument in the following steps: 1. Light reaches the seeing subject after it has left the seen object. 2. During that time-lag the seen object may have ceased to exist. 3. Necessarily, what we are directly aware of when we see an object, exists at that moment. 4. Therefore, what we are directly aware of when we see an object is not the object seen. Ben-Yami notes that some have tried to criticize this argument by claiming that what we are directly aware of need not exist when we are aware of it. But I dont find this plausible, he remarks and explains why: When we see anything, whether near-by or far away, the qualities of which we are directly aware are there for us to inspect and study, and we often can, if we wish, pay them more or less attention. It seems preposterous to claim that they may not be instantiated while these cognitive processes, focusing on them, are taking place. If the argument is unsound, its fault lies somewhere else. I fully agree with Ben-Yamis explanation of why premise (3) is correct. Therefore, recognizing the truth not only of (3), but also of (2), and wishing to avoid the conclusion, he has no choice but to claim that Apparent Simultaneity suggests a different way out: according to it, the arguments first premise is false. Relative to the observer, the event of seeing something is simultaneous with the event being seen. Accordingly, what we are directly aware of when we see an object may be the seen object. Direct Realism is unharmed by the Time-Lag Argument. Ben-Yami adds the following: To show that the Time Lag Argument is unsound, we do not have to accept Apparent Simultaneity as the true simultaneity; it is enough that it is an optional simultaneity definition. If that is so, then the arguments first premise in not true simpliciter; its truth is a matter of convention. Yet the argument assumes that its first premise is simply true. 175

I lack the competence in physics to assess whether Ben-Yamis and Lewiss response to the TGA is adequate. However, Im inclined to agree with what Bengson says (see 3.3.) when he first states and then criticizes Lewiss view. The view, according to Bengson, is that Lewis appears to believe that if is seen now, then because it is within an observers light cone, is

simultaneous with what is happening now

is not straightforwardly past, but present. If this

is so, then an explosion of Polaris that occurred almost seven centuries ago is present so long as we see it now.282 (Lewis himself claims that he got this idea from the physicist Eric Mellum.283) Bengsons criticism of this view is that it is just plain wrong, for presumably, such an explosion does not occur in the present. Indeed, it does an injustice to our concept of the present to apply it to that which occurred almost seven centuries ago: pace Lewis, we clearly consider such an event to be past.284

6.2. Intra-Organismic Time-Gaps

But even if there is no time-gap between the time light leaves a star and the time it arrives at our eyes, there is another gap before we actually have a visual experience. As Ben-Yami explains, Some might try to save the argument by claiming that even if light cannot be said to leave the seen object before reaching the seeing subject, it still takes the nervous system some time to transfer the signal from retina to brain, and during that time the seen object may have ceased to exist. In other words, if the TGA can be circumvented, along the lines of Lewis and Ben-Yami, for the first time-gap, then the second one (between the time the light hits the retina and the time it has been finished being processed in the brain) certainly cannot, and the TGA can successfully move to its conclusion: what we directly see are sense-data and Direct Realism is false. To this, Ben-Yami objects as follows: But this response presupposes a Cartesian model of perception, as if the perceiving subject is a homunculus located somewhere deep in our brain. If, following an approach developed by Dennett [1991], we maintain that the time we see anythingwe, the embodied human beingscannot be determined more accurately than the vague interval between the activation of our retinas by the light and the subsequent activation of the relevant parts of our brain, then this line of response is no longer available.

282

Bengson, How to Perceive the Past with Your Eyes Shut, 3. Lewis, Veridical Hallucination and Prosthetic Vision., 83, note 9. 284 Bengson, ibidem.
283

176

Fortunately, Dennetts approach is not unassailable, and it has been assailed by Selmer Bringsjord. He first claims that the cornerstone of Daniel Dennett's case for his multiple drafts view of consciousness in his Consciousness Explained is a set of inferences he draws from the phi phenomenon. Then he explains why these inferences are incorrect, in part by explaining phi (as replicated in our own lab) in such a way that it is consistent with the standard conceptions of consciousness Dennett seeks to supplant.285 If Bringsjord is correct, then Dennetts rejection of the Cartesian model is unjustified and the response criticized by Ben-Yami is still viable. But if so, then the TGA is effective with respect to the intra-organismic time-gap as well. Still, rather than delving into the Dennett and Bringsjord controversy, I suggest reconsidering what we said, in 2.3., about Leibnizs original TGA. There we claimed that when the distance between the perceived object and the perceiver is too short and thus the time-gap between the lights leaving the object and its hitting the perceivers eye is too brief (as in the case of someones looking at a painting), then the TGA cannot properly get a foothold. We also mentioned a reply on Leibnizs behalf as well as a rejoinder to that reply. The reply went as follows: the fact that we cannot discriminate very small time intervals is simply irrelevant. Whether or not I can discriminate such an interval, I do in fact perceive [the picture as it was some minuscule part] of a second ago; and it could, conceivably, have changed in some perceptible respect just in that time, so that by the time I in fact perceive it it is different from how I perceive it to be. The context is relevantly extensional and not intentional: my cognitive abilities in minute time discriminations are not to the point. And the rejoinder to this reply was that it misses the point: the perception and the content perceived must be phenomenologically contemporaneous, which means that it must not be possible to discriminate any time distinction between perception and content by direct experience. This condition is satisfied provided that the physical time difference is insufficient to be noticed. But now we can bring up another point, namely, that this condition must be satisfied and phenomenological contemporaneity is required only for the TGA to succeed. Other arguments for the same conclusion (that in all cases of perception we perceive sense-data) require neither phenomenological contemporaneity nor an unnoticeable time difference between the perceiving and the perceived. Therefore, if there are any other successful arguments for this conclusion, then these arguments will work in cases of the intra-organismic time-gap as well, and reliance
285

S. Bringsjord, How to Explain the Phi Phenomenon Without Dennett's Exotica: Good Ol' Computation Does Just Fine, Abstract.

177

on the TGA to deal with that minuscule time-gap will not be needed. (But its over-all point that during the combined time-gap between the time the light from an object leaves the object and the time that a visual experience caused by it occurs, a sense-datum of the object is immediately seen, still stands, of course.) Let us, then, ask, Are there any other good arguments for this conclusion?

6.3. Other Arguments for Sense-Data

At least two others have been extensively (much more extensively than the TGA) discussed in the literature. They are the Argument from Illusion and the Causal Argument (sometimes also called the Argument from Hallucination.) Of these, the first, if successful, is the one that should have the greater weight put on it, because illusion occurs incomparably more frequently than does hallucination. The Argument from Illusion is, I believe, entirely successful: the most productive (though not uniformly supportive) recent discussions of it in the literature are those of Valberg, Smith, and Robinson. The Causal Argument is also successful, but it presents an unexpected challenge that reinforces Berkeleys and Fosters theistic brand of Idealism. Then there is a great variety of arguments for sense-data presented by OShaughnessy; though I have agreed with their conclusion, I have not discussed any of the arguments themselves; but I think it is safe to say that the probability of some of them being sound is high. Finally, there are exceedingly simple arguments that can be thought of as basically depending on just one fact about perception.

6.3.1. The Simplest Arguments

For example, the mere fact that hallucinations occur shows the existence of sense-data: what else can a hallucinated pink rat be if not what has been called a wild sense-datum? Then theres an argument from the perception of color that the decidedly anti-Idealist philosopher Peter van Inwagen introduces almost surreptitiously in the course of critically discussing Berkeley.286 He plausibly attributes to Berkeley the assumption that [t]he sensible properties of common objects are the same things as the sensations we have when we see or touch (or hear or taste or smell) common objects (where by common objects van Inwagen means ordinary material ojects). Now, says van Inwagen, when I look at a blank sheet of white paper . . . I have a certain sensationa sensation of whiteness. And the paper, everyone agrees, is white, or

286

Peter van Inwagen, Metaphysics, 52.-54.

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has the property of whiteness. The word whiteness occurs both in my description of my sensation and in my description of the piece of paper. It seems, therefore, to designate something that is both a property of the paper and is present in my mind. This, says van Inwagen, is what Berkeley thinks. He goes on to ask: But is this right? Isnt it far more plausible to suppose that the word whiteness designates two different things when we are talking about my sensation and when we are talking about the piece of paper? When we use the words white and whiteness to talk about sensations, we are talking about something that can exist only as a part of some persons conscious experience. When we use these words to talk about a piece of paper, however, we are using them to talk about a feature of the piece of paper, a feature of the paper that it would have even if it were locked up in a dark room. . . . The feature or property of the paper that we call whiteness does not vanish from the paper when no one is experiencing the paper; the paper can lose this feature only if it is dyed or undergoes some other treatment that weof coursedescribe as changing the papers color. A bit later van Inwagen describes this physical property of the paper thus: We experience the property whiteness by having sensations of whiteness (provided that these sensations are caused by the presence of a white object and are caused on the normal way). We could say that these sensations represent to us the presence of an object that has the property. And we can easily form a conception of this property: it is the property of common objects that (in appropriate circumstances) causes observers of the objects to experience sensations of whiteness. And just before this passage van Inwagen explained that [a] person experiences sensations of whiteness when that person looks at an object that has the property of whitenessat least if the persons eyes, optic nerve, and brain are in good working order and if the object is being viewed under normal conditions. It seems from all these passages that van Inwagen is subscribing to a Representative (Indirect Realist) theory of perception, and hes doing so because it offers what he thinks is a good account of color perception. According to such an account, in any veridical perception, sensations (sense-data) of whiteness represent to us the presence of an object that has the property of whiteness; and more generally, sensations of any color represent to us the presence of an object that has that color, if the perception is veridical. And if its not veridical, then the sensations represent to us the presence of an object that as a matter of fact has a different color from the color of the sensations that we are experiencing. the wrong color, but the sensations we experience are of that color. 179

This is not only a Representative Realist theory of perception, but also a dispositional account of physical color. But the issue between Berkeley and van Inwagen isnt whether sensations and sensed properties are or arent the same. Or rather, thats one issue; but theres another issue as van Inwagen has framed it here, namely, whether the two occurrences of whiteness (in the whiteness the sensation is of and in the whiteness of the paper seen) designate the same item. On this issue van Inwagen says no, whereas Berkeley and I say yes. My argument is as follows. The whiteness that the sensation is of is the whiteness of the sensed paper. But no sensations are such that there is no property which they are of. So whenever a sensation occurs, there is a property it is of that gets instantiated. Therefore, if there is no such property instantiated in the external world, then it must be instantiated in some persons conscious experience (i.e., his mind). But every property has a bearer. Therefore, a property that is instantiated in the mind has a mental bearer, i.e., a sense-datum bearing that property. Thus a dispositional account of color perception entails the existence of sense-data provided only that sensations of color sometimes occur.

6.3.2. Valberg on the Argument from Illusion

According to Valberg, there are experiential facts (facts that presuppose experience), to be contrasted with facts of existence, at least where the existence of external objects is concerned.287 To go back to his favorite example of a physical object, a book in front of him on the table: The book can be present only from within experience; but the book exists on its own, whether or not it is present. The fact of the books existence is not an experiential fact.288 Experiential facts come in three sorts. First, there are facts of presence: it is only from within experience that something can be present, demonstratively available.289 Second, there are facts of appearance: it is only from within experience that it can look, or appear, as if something is present.290 Third, there facts of manifestation, to be distinguished from facts of appearance. The way an object looks, or appears, to us is its way of being manifest to us. In the classical case of the stick immersed in water looking bent, the fact that the stick looks bent is a fact of manifestation; the fact that it looks as if a bent stick is present is a fact of appearance. The fact of manifestation, but not the fact of
287

Valberg, The Puzzle of Experience, 77-78. ibidem, 78. 289 ibidem, 77 290 ibidem, 77-78.
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appearance, entails that a stick is present. But neither fact could obtain unless something is present. An object cannot appear (be manifest) one way or another without being present. But, equally, an object cannot be present without appearing one way or another. Visually (if this is relevant), the object must look one way or another. And, as we know, the way an object looks need not be the way it is. In the bent-stick example, the fact of appearance (versus manifestation) is that it looks as if something bent is present. A fact of appearance [] must be grounded on a fact of presence. In the example under consideration, it looks as if a stick is present because a stick is present. But [this] ground of the fact of appearance has another component, namely, the fact of manifestation: that the stick looks bent (that it is manifest in a bent way). If the stick did not look bent, it would not appear that something bent is present in my experience. When the stick is removed from the water, it looks straight. Now the relevant fact of appearance is that it looks as if something straight is present. And, as before, the ground of this fact has two components: the fact of presence (the presence of the stick) and the fact of manifestation (that the stick looks straightwhich it is).291 Now Valberg says that [o]ne reason for going into these matters is that he wants to disassociate himself from a certain familiar argument for sense-data, the so-called Argument from Illusion. This argument starts from the fact objects can appear other than they are. The stick, say, looks bent. Now here an appeal is made to a principle which sounds rather like our point about grounding. Nohing, it will be said, can look F unless there is present in experience something which is F. In the bent-stick case, then, there must be something which is bent present in my experience. Since the bent object is not the stick, it must be an internal object (a sense-datum). This argument rests on a confusion between facts of appearance and facts of manifestation. If in the bent-stick case the object present is not the stick but a sensedatum, then it cannot be true (as we are supposing) that the stick looks bent; for the stick cannot look bent unless it is present. The argument treats a fact of manifestation (that the stick looks bent) as if it were a fact of appearance. Thus it seeks to ground the fact of manifestation on a fact of presence. This is a mistake. If we try to ground a fact of manifestation on a fact of presence, we undermine its status as a fact of manifestation. The correct view, I think, is that a fact of manifestation is the ground, or part of the

291

ibidem, 78-79.

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ground, of a fact of appearance; but a fact of manifestation itself has no ground. In this respect it is like a fact of presence, ungrounded.292 This is what Valberg says, and most of it seems just right. But there are a couple of contentious points. First, why does Valberg think a fact of manifestation has, or perhaps even needs, no ground? Admittedly, let a fact of presence be ungounded; its just a brute fact. But why cant we say, in the case of the stick taken out of the water, that the fact of its manifestation (that it looks straight) is grounded on the fact that it is straight? Secondly, in the case of the straight stick looking bent when immersed in water, why cant we say the fact of its manifestation (that it looks bent) is grounded on the fact it presents a bent sense-datum? Why cant it be the case that, in this instance, there are two connected objects present: the stick that looks bent and the sense-datum that really is bent? The idea here would be that the stick is a whole of which the sense-datum is a partso that in seeing the latter youre seeing the former. In other words, just as you can see a man by seeing his back, hand, or face, so you can see a stick by seeing some of its sense-data. Someone might reply that this idea illegitimately conflates two senses of part in play here: sense-data are logical parts of sticks and stones; whereas backs, hands, and faces are physical parts of human beings. But even if there are these two senses (of course there are), why should this make any difference here? For example, John Foster in The Immaterial Self discusses the dualist option that each human being is a logical creation of two parts or natures: a soul and a body. As Foster puts one version of this view, each person is a unitary entity whose existence is wholly constituted by the existence of a non-physical basic subject, the existence of a purely corporeal object, and the attachment-relationship between them, and . . . this unitary entity takes on the twin natures of the entities which feature in its constitution.293 Views of this kind once dominated the Western philosophical scene; some sectors of the latter still take them seriously; and I see little in the way of fatal objections to them. Now, in the bent-looking stick case, we also have, in a certain way, more than one thing present. We have the stick, and we have the many sense-data that constitute it, one of which is the sense-datum as of a bent stick. But in another way, we just have the stick. The stick is a unitary entity whose existence is wholly constituted by the existence of many actual and

292 293

ibidem, 79. Foster, The Immaterial Self, 238-239.

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potential sense-data, some of which are sense-data as of a straight stick, while others are sensedata as of a bent stick. This is an Idealist view, and nothing that Valberg says in this context seems to rule it out. In a footnote to Valbergs last sentence above, after quoting the following passage from C. D. Broads Scientific Thought, p. 240: When I look at a penny from the side I am certainly aware of something; and it is certainly plausible to hold that this something is elliptical in the same plain sense in which a suitable bent piece of wire, looked at from straight above, is elliptical. If, in fact, nothing elliptical is before my mind, it is very hard to understand why the penny should seem elliptical rather than of any other shape, Valberg comments: The last sentence of this quote should make us pause, since it employs something very much like our point about grounding. But it is a misapplication of the point. To say that the penny looks elliptical is to say how it, the penny, appears (is manifest) in our experience. It is to express a fact of manifestation. If we attempt to ground this fact on the presence of an internal object, we treat it in a manner appropriate to a fact of appearance; and, by inserting the internal object, we lose the fact with which we began.294 But why, by inserting the internal object, should we lose the fact with which we began? What is this fact? Its the fact that the penny looks elliptical. We shouldnt lose this fact, and we dont lose it, if we ground it not only on the presence of an elliptical internal object (sensedatum), but also on the presence of the round but elliptical-looking penny. In other words, why cant we have at least two objects present here: both the penny that merely looks elliptical and the penny-related sense-datum that actually is elliptical? If it is replied that theres just one penny-like object present in this example, just as there was, in a way, one stick-like thing in the previous one, the answer would again be: yes, in a certain sense, theres just one thing present in each case; but what this shows is that the penny and the stick is each in some way composed of the sense-data; hence, in another sense, there are, in both cases, multiple objects present. This, to repeat, is an Idealist position, arrived at by the Argument from Illusion. 6.3.3. Smith on the Argument from Illusion In the recent philosophical literature it is David Smith who has concerned himself most extensively with the Argument from Illusion, first setting it up as carefully as possible and

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Valberg, 100, Note 3.

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defending it, then attempting to refute it. Smith expounds the argument in four steps. The first just is the premise that perceptual illusion can occur,295 that, putting it more explicitly, there is no type of physical feature that may not appear differently from the way it really ease to any sense that could possibly perceive it. The next step . . . is an inference from this: that whenever something perceptually appears to have a feature when it actually does not, we are aware of something that does actually possess that feature. So, if you are looking at a white wall, which because of the illumination looks yellow to you, you are aware of something yellow. This inference is commonly known as the sense-datum inference, with the immediate object of awareness that the inference introduces termed a sense-datum. This is the heart of the [a]rgument. . . . The third step in the [a]rgument consists in pointing out that since the appearing physical object does not possess that feature which, according to the previous step, we are imnmediately aware of in the illusory situation, it is not the physical object of which we are aware in such a situation; or, at least, we are not aware of it in the direct, unmediated way in which we are aware of whatever it is that possesses the appearing featurethat direct way in which we formerly took ourselves to be generally aware of normal physical objects. In the previous example, since the wall is white, not yellow, but what we are immediately aware of is yellow, not white, what we are immediately aware of cannot be the wall. . . . The conclusion of the [a]rgument thus far is that in no illusory situation are we directly aware of the physical object that, as we should initially have put it, appears to us other than it is. The final step in the [a]rgument is what we may call the generalizing step: we are immediately aware of sense-data, and only at best indirectly aware of normal physical objects, in all perceptual situations, veridical as well as illusory.296 The reason for taking this final step is the subjective indiscernibility of veridical and possible illusory situations. To put it crudely, being aware of a sense-datum is exactly like perceiving a normal object. But a sense-datum, whatever ot may turn out precisely to be, is clearly a radically different type of thing from a normal physical objectat least as the latter are usually (that is, realistically) conceived. So how could awareness of two such radically different types of object be experientially identical? How could we mistake one for the other?297

295

Smith, The Problem of Perception, 23. ibidem, 25-26. 297 ibidem, 26.
296

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Here Smith refers to a point made also by H. H. Price that these two radically different sorts of perceptual object may form, subjectively, a smoothly connected series: that there could, as Price put it, be a sensibly continuous transition from a state of veridical perception to an illusory one, and conversely.298 Finally, Smith emphasizes that the Argument from Illusion does not require that illusions actually happen (though, of course, they do!), but only that they be barely possible. From such a mere possibility the argument then proceeds (to repeat) as follows: It is of the very nature of illusion, as opposed to hallucination, that were we to perceive something illusorily, we should be aware of the same kind of object as we could be aware of veridically; by the sense-datum inference, we should be aware of a sense-datum in the possible illusory situation; so such a sense-datum, not a normal physical object, is the kind of object we are aware of when perceiving veridically.299 Smith then criticizes a number of popular ways of disposing of the Argument from Illusion. These need not be surveyed here except to say that Smith fully supports his claim that the only way to block this Argument is subtle and non-obvious and that the accounts of perception that are generally purveyed today (i.e., most of those published before the appearance of Smiths book) simply do not face up to the Arguments puzzling power.300 This would be a ringing and unqualified endorsement of the Argument from Illusionwere it not for the fact that Smith thinks he has found a way to block it. Thus the Argument, in his view, can be resisted and Non-Idealist Direct Realism can be sustained. The way to proceed is to put the standard accounts of perceptual consciousness behind us, along with aprioristic assumptions about what such consciousness must be like, and turn, as Husserl put it, to the things themselves. What we need is a careful phenomenological appreciation of the lived character of perceptual experience. . . . [I]f Direct Realism is true we should be able to discern a non-sensuous aspect to such experience, though one that is not a matter of the exercise of concepts. Let us, therefore, take a fresh, unbiased look at perceptual consciousness, to see if we can discern anything that makes it, simply qua mode of sensory consciousness, distinct from sensation.301 In fact Smith thinks he can discern three basic phenomena that suffice for perceptual consciousness and that distinguish it from the mere having of sensations. To put it briefly, the first is the spatiality of perceptual consciousness, understood as the phenomenal, three-

298

ibidem, 26-27. ibidem, 29. 300 ibidem, 21. 301 ibidem, 133.
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dimensional locatedness of the objects of awareness in relation to a sense-organ.302 The second is kinetic structure, the way in which perception is integrated with movementspecifically, movement on the part of the perceiving subject . . . the movement of sense-organs in relation to perceived objects . . . the bodily movements . . . by which we come to enjoy different perspectives on perceptible objects.303 And the third is what borrowing a term of Fichtes, he calls the Anstoss: thats the phenomenon of a check or impediment to our active movement: an experienced obstacle to our animal striving, as when we push or pull against things.304 Smith then says that the first two basic phenomena of perceptual consciousness phenomenal three-dimensionality and kinetic structurecan be comprehended by a single account,305 on which they can be seen as achieving an identical phenomenonone that alone can confer perceptuality upon sensuous modes of awareness.306 This phenomenon is what psychologists term perceptual constancy and Smith sometimes calls phenomenological constancy. Hereby Smith deems himself to have located a feature of perceptual experience . . . that is both sufficiently basic in all conscious animal perception, and that will allow us to distinguish between an object of perceptual experience and either sensations or sense-data. In relation to sensuously presentational perception, this is to be found in perceptual constancy, elsewhere in the Anstoss, and nowhere else. Here and here alone do we find within sense-experience itself the phenomenological independence of object from subject that is the hallmark of perceptual consciousness. Here we find the distinctive intentionality of perception: one that is distinct from, and indeed more basic than, that to be found in thinking.307 It is from such merely phenomenological observations that Smith endeavors to construct an original and needed refutation of the Argument from Illusionneeded in his view because in its absence nothing else will block this argument.

6.3.4. Robinsons Response to Smith on the Argument from Illusion

302

ibidem, 133-134. ibidem, 140-141. 304 ibidem, 153. 305 ibidem, 170. 306 ibidem. 307 ibidem, 186.
303

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It is just at this juncture that Robinson jumps in to defend the Argument against Smiths claim that it doesnt actually prove that we fail to be perceptually aware of ordinary physical (normal) objects. Robinson cites (part of) Smiths complaint that [t]he only proof that is offered . . . proceeds by pointing out that the sensory qualities that feature in illusory perceptual experience are inherent in sense-experience itself. It forces us to recognize sensory qualia. This, however, does not constitute the proof; it is but one stage of it. What has to be shown in addition is that we are directly aware of these sensory qualitiesor, rather, of whatever it is that possesses themas objects. Only then will the normal object be edged out of its presumed position as object of immediate awareness. Only then will transcendence have been lost. So all we have to show, in order to block the Argument, is that we are not directly aware of whatever it is that possesses such qualities, so that awareness of the latter does not cognitively mediate our awareness of normal physical objects. Showing that such bearers are sense-data would carry the Argument through; but that, I have suggested, is what has not been, and cannot be, demonstrated.308 According to Robinson, Smith has made an illicit move here. It is the move from demanding that the quality be an object of awareness, to demanding that we be aware of what it is that posseses the quality, not just of the quality itself, and treating these as equivalent. That this is a mistake can be seen as follows. When something looks other than it is, we are usually aware of how it looks, so we are directly aware of the qualities involved in illusion. Because this is how the physical object looks to be, there is a sense in which we are not directly aware of what actually possesses these qualities, insofar as that is not the physical object. We are not, that is, directly aware of what it is that possesses these qualities. But this does not matter, for it is enough for the proponent of the Argument to show (i) we are aware of the qualities presented in illusions as objects of awareness, and (ii) these are in fact possessed by something other than the physical objects. It is not necessary that (iii) we are directly aware of them as possessed by something other than the physical objects. So once it is conceded that we are aware of the qualities presented in illusions, and that they are in fact possessed by something, which must be something other than the physical object, then it follows that we are aware of that thing. The difficulty of Smiths position becomes especially clear if combined with his account of secondary qualities. Smith is a subjectivist about such qualities. Such

308

ibidem, 186-187.

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qualities have the same status as the various qualities of bodily sensations. So there is as much chance of a physical object being sensuously red as there is of a pin that is stuck into my body possessing the same quality as my resulting pain. But it can hardly be doubted that sensuous red is an object of awareness. It follows that, in a de re sense, it is the thing that exhibits the quality of sensuous redwhich is not the physical objectthat is the object of awareness.309 Robinson also criticizes Smiths appeal to perceptual constancy. Admitting the attractiveness of this idea, Robinson agrees that there is a sense in which, when I see a white wall as white, ignoring the various patternings of shadow, . . . then I am not aware of the deviant qualia, only of the standard property.310 But theres also a sense in which one is aware of the varieties of shadows, only one does not take notice of them in certain ways.311 More importantly, many cases of illusion are not subject to constancy. When I take off my glasses, things become blurred and very noticeably so: the blurred shapes, not the actual properties of any physical objects, become the objects of my awareness. Nor do I spontaneously ignore the bentness of the oar in water.312 Robinson also briefly discusses Smiths notion of the Anstoss, which he calls interesting and difficult,313 but insufficient for a defense of direct realism because what the Anstoss does is frustrate our wills, and that alone could not create more than a very abstract picture of the world.314 I think Robinson is correct here and that rather than helping Direct Realism the Anstoss helps us see the absurdity of a certain kind of scepticism. I am, therefore, inclined to agree with Robinson verdict: . . . it seems to me that Smith fails to refute the argument, in the very strong form in which he states it. That the Argument from Illusion is indeed irrefutable seems also clear from Fosters discussion of it in his The Nature of Perception. I will not rehearse his arguments here, just state that the only criticism of Fosters discussion that I have come across in the literature is Robert Hopkinss. And that criticism is totally unconvincing.315

Robinson, Review of Smiths The Problem of Perception, 522-523. ibidem, 523. 311 ibidem. 312 ibidem. 313 ibidem, 524. 314 ibidem. 315 Hopkins asserts that Fosters case against direct realism fails to distinguish between imprecision and inaccuracy in how experience represents the world. Once that distinction is made, I think it is clear that the case really depends on the claim that [Direct Realism] cannot allow for imprecision. But if this is so, the argument relying on that claim is otiose. Perceptual content is never wholly precise: there is always a point beyond which, although the object is characterized in one way or another, our experience of it fails to commit itself on which. But Hopkins fails to distinguish between slight imprecision and radical distortion; and it is this differenceand the continuity between precision, slight imprecision, and radical distortionon which Fosters argument turns, and not on any claim that direct realism cannot allow for imprecision.
310

309

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6.3.5. The Causal Argument

The Causal Argument for Sense-Data has recently been used by both Robinson and Foster. I will state it as it occurs in Robinsons Perception: It is clearly true that: 1. It is theoretically possible by activating some brain process which is involved in a particular type of perception to cause an hallucination which exactly resembles that perception in its subjective character. 2. It is necessary to give the same account of both hallucinating and perceptual experience when they have the same neural cause. Thus, it is not, for example, plausible to say that the hallucinatory experience involves a mental image or sense-datum, but that the perception does not, if the two have the same proximatethat is, neuralcause. These two propositions together entail that perceptual processes in the brain produce some object of awareness which cannot be identified with any feature of the external worldthat is, they produce a sense-datum.316 This argument has been attacked, mainly but not exclusively by attempting to discredit the premise (2). In his book, Robinson refutes these attacks, including that stemming from the socalled disjunctive analysis, masterfully. Therefore, I would unhesitatingly conclude, in concert with Robinson, that the Causal Argument is successful, were it not for the fact Foster, who once approved of it too, later came to reject it, for reasons that seem to me to have considerable force. As a result, it is not easy to make up ones mind about the Causal Argument, for the situation is indeed more complicated than at first it might seem, and this in two respects. The first respect is the following: On the one hand, this argument is intuitively appealing; there is very much to be said for it; and both Robinson and (the earlier) Foster have said it well. On the other hand, there also is a good case against it, which is made all the stronger by its dovetailing, as well see presently, with my (and Fosters, and Berkeleys) ultimate thesis that God (or an equipotent agent) guarantees the veracity of our perceptions. Let me, therefore, turn directly to Fosters recent criticism of the argument (again, though his discussion is lengthy and minute, mine will be as compact as possible). It is admitted by all sides that the Causal Argument depends heavily on, and draws much of its strength from, the principle of same type of proximate cause, same type of immediate effect.

316

Robinson, Perception, 151.

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Thus it is possible for me to either see the sun, or to hallucinate it. In both cases the proximate cause (neural event) is the same; but in the first case the immediate effect is my seeing the sun (the remote cause), and in the second case the immediate effect is my hallucinating the sun by seeing a sun-like sense-datum (where the remote cause is an evil demon, a cunning scientist, or whomever or whatever else caused the hallucination). The intervening process (what happens between the remote cause and the proximate cause) does not matter. Now Foster thinks that there is a logical and convincing way both to preserve this principle and to reject the argument. All the Direct Realist has to do is to say that although the remote cause does not stamp its character on the intervening process, it causally affects the outcome directly. In other words, he can claim that, at the point when the [perception or hallucination] is about to occur, the factors which directly contribute, causally, to its occurrence and character include not just the current state of the brain, but also certain aspects of the preceding causal process, including, crucially, certain aspects of the way in which the neural process leading up to the realization of the brain state has itself been brought about. This would mean that there was, after all, no violation of the principle same type of proximate cause, same type of immediate effect, since what we have hitherto been describing as the remote cause would become directly relevant to the outcome, and therefore an element of the proximate cause. More precisely, the process which leads up to the neural process would play a double causal role. It would still continue to play, in the straightforward way, the role of what brings about the neural process, and, on that score, would indeed count as the remote cause with respect to the psychological outcome. But it would also, as part of the whole physical process leading up to the even in the brain, combine with this event to exert a direct influence on the psychological outcomein particular, to fix it as something perceptive or as something hallucinatoryand, on that score, would count as part of the proximate cause.317 This is, admittedly, a bizarre-seeming explanation of why the nature of the psychological outcome varies, systematically, according to the way in which the neural process is brought about, says Foster. For [e]verything else we know about the world suggests that causation does not work in this sort of way: it always works in a way which is not only temporally directed (from earlier to later), but temporally continuous, so that earlier events only have an influence on noncontiguous later events by affecting the chain of events that intervene. The idea that earlier events may have a direct influence on what happens after a temporal intervalan

317

Foster, The Nature of Perception, 35-36.

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interval in which any record of the relevant features of those earlier events have been lostseems very strange, and perhaps hardly credible.318 It is the sense that this postulated causal mechanism is extremely unusual that makes the Causal Argument seem natural and plausible. But, cautions Foster, in the present case there are two good reasons why our ordinary modes of causal explanation may fail to apply.319 One is that, while our usual paradigms of causation are drawn exclusively from the physical realm: they concern the ways in which one physical event or set of conditions brings about another, what it is that we are seeking in this case is an account that concerns the relationship between the physical and the mentalbetween the types of physical process leading up to perception and hallucination and the nature of the psychological outcome itself. And we cannot just assume without further ado that forms of causality which are operative in the physical realm will be operative in the psychophysical realm as well.320 The second, and more crucial, reason is that in standard cases, when some physical object is caused to come into a certain state . . . this state does not consist in, or inherently include, a relationship to something earlier. . . . But in the case of perception, as the Direct Realist construes it, the situation is quite different. The subject is caused to come into a psychological state which . . . is inherently a relationship with an earlier itema state which, on its own, suffices to put the subject into perceptual contact with a physical event or object-stage at an earlier time. And this does not just mean that the relevant state is one which cannot be realized without putting the subject into contact with some earlier physical item. It means that there is a particular earlier item of which the state is, in itself, perceptive.321 Now what the champion of the Causal Argument fails to realize, according to Foster, is that the sort of situation which arises with respect to the distinction between perception and hallucination also arises, routinely, with respect to the distinction between different perceptions.322 Thus, to take an example of my own, if I am inside a giant circular enclosure and am surrounded on all sides by a huge, uniformly white wall, then, if I look at the wall and keep my gaze steady, I will be seeing that portion of it from which light is streaming into my eyes. If a second later I move my head (and eyes) a little bit to the right but keep on looking, I will see an adjacent, numerically different but qualitatively indistinguishable portionbecause light is now streaming into my eyes from it, the different portion of the uniformly white wall

318

ibidem, 37. ibidem. 320 ibidem, 37-38 321 ibidem, 38. 322 ibidem, 43.
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Im looking at now (and not from the previous portion I was looking at a second ago). If I change the direction of my gaze yet again but keep on looking, I will see yet another portion of white wall: this portion is again reflecting light to my eyes though this portion is numerically different from the first two. Let me call the three portions of uniformly white wall Ive mentioned Portions 1, 2, and 3. The same goes mutatis mutandis for all cases of ordinary seeing. In all cases the identity of what I see is causally determined, in part, by the identity of the item that reflects or emits the light that is likewise causally responsible, in part, for what I see. As Foster puts it, even where the causal process from item to brain are qualitatively identical on [three] occasions, as they are in the examples I just gave, the psychological outcomes [perceptions of Portions 1, 2, and 3] will be qualitatively different, simply because the [three] psychological states involved will be inherently perceptive of different things [here, three different portions of the white wall].323 He then draws the following conclusion: If the Causal Argument had been initially viewed in this broader perspective, it would never have seemed compelling. For, as it occurs in the perceptual context, the situation does not create even a prima facie problem for the theorist. Rather, it serves to make clear the sort of causal account that his distinctive understanding of perception requiresan account which sees the whole causal process, from item to brain, as directly responsible for the nature of the perceptual outcome, and, in particular, sees the identity of the initiating item as causally fixing the identity of the perceptual target. This is an account which the [Direct Realist] can accept, without embarrassment, prior to any issue over the treatment of hallucination, and can then suitably deploy, to dispose of the Causal Argument, once this issue has been raised.324 Yet it is just here that the other, and absolutely essential, complication arises. Above I quoted Foster as stating that, according to the Direct Realist, in virtually all ordinary perception, [t]he subject is caused to come into a psychological state which . . . is inherently a relationship with an earlier itema state which, on its own, suffices to put the subject into perceptual contact with a physical event or object-stage at an earlier time. In an e-mail from 2003, citing this passage, I asked Foster: However, can any subject, at time t, be put into direct, unmediated perceptualas opposed to conceptual or recollectivecontact with an object-stage that, at t, no longer exists? Isnt it just obvious that no human subject can directly perceive the past, as opposed to thinking about it or remembering it? In other words, isnt the direct realist
323 324

ibidem. ibidem.

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immediately refuted by the TGAan argument according to which the subject perceives something caused by, and (in some respects) qualitatively similar to, but not identical with, the physical object in question? I then added that I agreed with Fosters point (which I quoted above and now repeat) that the Direct Realist requires an account which sees the whole causal process, from item to brain, as directly responsible for the nature of the perceptual outcome, and, in particular, sees the identity of the initiating item as causally fixing the identity of the perceptual target. But then, quoting Fosters further remark that [t]his is an account which the [Direct Realist] can accept, without embarrassment, prior to any issue over the treatment of hallucination, and can then suitably deploy, to dispose of the Causal Argument, once the issue has been raised, I asked Foster: But isn't the time-gap argument precisely the embarrassment this account cannot overcome? To this he replied: You may be right. Certainly many philosophers would share your intuition that the notion of direct perceptual awareness of something in the past makes no sense. I dont share that intuition myself, but I guess the issue is one I should have discussed. He never did discuss it in anything that he wrote later (including his last book, A World For Us). However, what I wish to record here is that Foster did admit that the TGA may pose a real difficulty for the defense that he gave, on the (Non-Idealist) Direct Realists behalf, against the Causal Argument. I conclude that because the TGA stands unrefuted it really does pose this difficulty and that the Direct Realist is not saved from the Causal Argument by Fosters defense against it. Therefore, the (Non-Idealist) Direct Realist is refuted both by the intact Causal Argument and by the TGA, the latter saving the former from Fosters attempt to weaken it. And, of course, the Causal Argument, like the Argument from Illusion discussed earlier, can be of service to the TGA by helping it prove that even in minuscule time-gaps we immediately perceive not physical objects, but sense-data (as discussed in 6.2.). On the other hand, there is one point on which both the TGA (or, more exactly, its Berkeleian version) and (part of) Fosters defense against the Causal Argument agree. To see this, we should recall that neither the TGA nor the Causal Argument shows that we do not perceive physical objects; what each shows is that we do directly perceive sense-data and that we may, in addition, perceive physical objects as well. But in the latter case, if we do perceive physical objects, then their perception obeys certain stricturesthose imposed both by the Berkeleian TGA and Fosters defense against the Causal Argument. 193

It might be thought that the defense is only deployed on behalf of the Direct Realist, with Foster showing him how he can disarm the Causal Argument. But we must remember that Direct Realism comes in two varieties: the much more common Non-Idealist kind and the Idealist one, which, following in the footsteps of both Berkeley and Foster, we are defending here. Now Ive shown that Fosters defense against the Causal Argument doesnt work for the Non-Idealist Direct Realist: he is thoroughly refuted by that argument. As for the Idealist Direct Realist, he doesnt need this defense against it: after all, the Causal Argument is one of the arguments he can happily use against his non-Idealist fellow. But Fosters defense has one element that all Direct Realists, whether Idealist or not, can and must agree on: its the claim that the perceived itemany perceived itemplays a direct causal role in the targeting of the perception onto it. Let us call this the Perceptual Target Assumption (PTA). How it works and why its justified I will explain more fully in the next section. For now, lets just note that since the Causal Argument is sound, what is perceived in all cases is a sense-datum. This may be a logical part of a physical object, which, if it still exists, will be perceived as well, although if it does not, then the sense-datum will be a trace of the nolonger-existent object. Or it may be a wild sense-datum, in which case it is part of a hallucination. But in all cases what sense-datum is seen causally depends on how and by whom it was produced. This, the PTA, is what is correct in Fosters defense. What is incorrect (and, to repeat, is shown to be so by the TGA) is the Non-Idealist Direct Realists claim (seconded in Fosters defense) that the perceiving subject is caused to come into a psychological state which . . . is inherently a relationship with an earlier itema state which, on its own, suffices to put the subject into perceptual contact with a physical event or object-stage at an earlier time. Weve already established that this claim is false and that its negation, the simultaneitythesis, is true, but most recently additional support for the latter has come from an unexpected quarter.

6.4. Seeing the Present

In most cases the perceptual time-gap is extremely small: thats why the TGA can get started only by considering examples of objects at astronomic distances from us. Yet its conclusion holds for objects perceived at short distances as well. These are the close-by objects, motions and changes in which matter to us practically every day. Many types of human activity, for example, swatting a fly; catching a ball; ducking a blow; avoiding a swerving car; and, to take a nowadays more exotic example, stepping into and out of an open moving lift (such as used to 194

be, and in some places still are, common in office-buildings throughout Europe)all these require the perceiver, as one evolutionary neurobiologist puts it, to see the present. Otherwise, he or she will not succeed at such a (mundane) activity. The reason why most human beings are good or excellent at most of these activities is that their perceptual systems have evolved to perceive, not events or object-stages at an earlier time, as Foster claims, but events or objectstages as they occur now. That neurobiologist is Mark A. Changizi, previously a professor at Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute, now director of 2AI Labs in Boise, Idaho. In his view, as expounded in his 2009 book The Vision Revolution, we evolved to see moving objects, not where they are, but where they are going to be. Without this ability, we couldnt catch a ball because the brains ability to process visual information isnt fast enough to allow us to put our hands in the right place to intersect for a rapidly approaching baseball. If our brains simply created a perception of the way the world was at the time light hit the eye, then by the time that perception was elicited which takes about a tenth of a second for the brain to dotime would have marched on, and the perception would be of the recent past,325 Changizi explained in that book. In an interview with David DiSalvo on the Neuronarrative site, he reiterated his theory as follows: When light hits our retina, what our brains would like to do is instantaneously generate a perception of what the world looks like. Alas, our brain cant do this instantaneously. Our brains are slow. It takes around a tenth of a second for your perception to be built, and thats a long time when youre moving about. If you perceived the world the way it was when light hit your eye, youd be having a tenth-of-a-second old view of the world. Because of this, visual systems have evolved mechanisms to try to generate a perception not of the way the world was when light hit the eye, but generate a perception of the way the world will be by the time the perception occurs in a tenth of a second. By the time the perception is elicited, the anticipated future will have arisen, and the perception will be of the present. That is, in order to perceive the present (have perceptions at time t that are of the world at time t), our visual systems must anticipate the near-future.326 Now this quotation is just what my thesis needs, but it has to be amended a bit. Take the thirdto-last sentence. A perception of the way the world will be a tenth of a second later just cant be a perception in the strict sense of that word, since this forbids perceiving the future, i.e., what is not there yet, just as it forbids, on the basis of the simultaneity-principle (which Changizi accepts), perceiving the past, i.e., what was, but no longer is, there. So what the visual

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http://itunes.apple.com/us/book/the-vision-revolution/id380289384?mt=11 http://neuronarrative.wordpress.com/2010/05/05/everything-we-knew-about-human-vision-is-wrongauthor-mark-changizi-tells-us-why/
326

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mechanisms try to generateand actually elicitare sense-data in the present, which sensedata, since they arent wild but of a physical object, mediate the actual perception of the object in the present. When I suggested my emendation (with an argument for positing sense-data) to Changizi, he responded that there was something deep and nice about this argument. Usually I get by ignoring the time delay between the event and the light hitting the retina, but what is the right way to think about it when that delay is non-zero, whether a fraction of a second, eight minutes, or a billion years? I'd prefer not to have to say one is perceiving sense-data, but I'll have to ponder this.327 In the paper from which Ill cite next, Changizi uses the terminology of a Representative Theory of Perception and speaks of visual percepts, which term is sometimes used in the philosophical literature a synonym for sense-data. Thus interpreting his views along sensedata-ist lines seems natural and called-for, as is the remark Ive italicized. Im talking about a 2008 paper, entitled The trade-off between speed and complexity and published in Behavioral and Brain Sciences. In it he stated that proponents, such as himself, of the hypothesis that the brain has mechanisms for perceiving the present (i.e., mechanisms designed to generate a perception at time t that is representative of the scene at time t) typically say that the advantage is that it helps overcome inevitable neural delays. That is, latency compensation and perceiving the present have gone hand in hand. The implicit assumption can often seem to be that natural selection has attempted to minimize neural delays by shortening wires, speeding up signal propagation, and using rapid computational algorithms for generating a visual percept and whatever latency between retina and perception is left is handed over to the compensation mechanisms to deal with. Although this is an open possibility, the hypothesis that we perceive the present is not committed to this possibility; it is only committed to the idea that perceptions belong to the present [my italics M. J. D]. What is left open is how long the delay is, and whether it is all inevitable or whether the delay may be much longer than it would be if selection for short processing times trumped all other selection pressures.328 Changizi then suggests considering computer software as an analogy. Computer processing speed has risen by many orders of magnitude over the course of the last 20 years, but you may have noticed that many of your programs still take considerable time to start up. Computer designers know how long a wait we are willing
327 328

Personal communication. Changizi, The trade-off between speed and complexity, 203.

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to endure, and use that time to carry out fancier computations. That is, when faster computers arrive, computer designers do not appear to be saying, Now we can compute the same old things nearly instantaneously! Instead, they seem to be saying, Now think about how much more we can compute while the user waits! Just as computer software delay is a consequence of a trade-off between shorter delay and more complex computations, our perceptual delay is a trade-off between shorter delay and fancier visual computations. For example, if evolution can find a new clever trick for extrapolating farther out into the future say from 30 msec to 120 msec then it could utilize this trick and allow itself four times the amount of computation time to build sophisticated useful perceptions. The resultant latency of 120 msec would not be understood as an inevitable delay left over after trying to reduce it as much as possible. Instead, it would be better to say that there is selection pressure to maximize the delay for which the nervous system is able to compensate, thereby buying more time to prepare the perception. Counterintuitively, then, it may well be that the slower-to-react brains are the smarter ones. Visual prediction as indicated by perceptual adaptation to temporal delays and discrete stimulation.329 Changizis hypothesis (that there is an evolutionary perceptual adaptation to temporal delays whereby visual prediction kicks in so as to enable perceptions of the present) still awaits more testing and confirmation, and it is, as far as I know, not yet universally accepted. On the other hand, my cursory examination of the relevant literature suggests that so far it has not been seriously challenged. In any case, if it were true, it would explain why in the vast majority of ordinary situations phenomenal simultaneity is enough to enable us to execute motion-involving tasks punctiliously. In matters our health and safety vitally depend on, we perceive (things in) the present, even though the signals that condition our perceptions were emitted or reflected by (momentarily) past stages of these things. Of course, there is almost no chance that evolution will produce visual systems allowing us to see stars as they are now; but that is most likely because far-away things are, in most cases, much less important to our well-being. Thats why, if we dont want to say that most if not all of the things we see are in the past, we only have the choice of saying EITHER that we see present sense-data but not physical things in the past OR that from these sense-data we get information about what these past things were like, without actually seeing them in the past. Incidentally, that we actually see all things, including stars, not as they were in the past, but as they are now, was a thesis advanced by some Direct Realists early in the last century. One of

329

ibidem.

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them was G. Dawes Hicks. His view, as I indicated in section 1.5. above, was presented in a symposium called The Time Difficulty in Realist Theories of Perception, published in the Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 11 (1911-12), and roundly criticized by A. O. Lovejoy in his Revolt Against Dualism (p. 76-85). The criticism was so convincing on both philosophical and scientific grounds that, on this count, Hicks was, as far as I can tell, neither defended nor emulated. To return to the much more interesting Changizi hypothesis: it entails what in the last section I called the Perceptual Target Assumption (PTA)namely, that the perceived item plays a direct causal role in the targeting of the perception onto it. This assumption says nothing about the time of the perception targeted (by something or someone) in the circumstances involving the perceived item. To this assumption Changizi only adds the claim that thanks to evolution we see the present, thus yielding Changizis hypothesis. Through quotations from his texts I explained how Changizis hypothesisand by implication, the PTAworks. I conclude that its probable that evolution has made the PTA true. But evolution has been enabled by God, according to some modern theists (those who do not deny evolution). Foster was one of the latter: no wonder he championed the PTA. Berkeley, too, no doubt, would have had a theistic view of evolution, if he had heard of, and accepted, it. And he also doubtless would have approved of the PTA if he had thought of it. Berkeley, of course, would have insisted that it is God who, in the circumstances involving the perceived item, targets the perception thereof onto that item, and does it in such a way that the perceived item (the idea or sense-datum) and the perception thereof are simultaneous.

6.5. Conclusion about What We See

Before bringing this chapter and my whole dissertation to a close, let me briefly return to three contemporary philosophers whom we have already discussed at great length. They accept the simultaneity-requirement but stand in different relations to Berkeleys philosophy. Two of them are stumped by questions to which Berkeleys idealism has an answer, and the third comes very close to the truth about what we see. Jerry Valberg, in his The Puzzle of Experience, presents an amended and highly simplified TGA, which, he thinks, gives rise to an insoluble puzzle. Suppose that after the light-rays have left an external object, God eliminates that object but lets the light-rays reach our eyes and set in motion the usual cortical processes so that everything in our experience remains the same. What we then see is not, of course, the external object, which has been eliminated, but a sense-datum, an internal object, which exists only in so far as it is perceived. Thats what we are forced to 198

conclude philosophically because of the TGA, which is irrefutable and which exploits, most fundamentally, the potential irrelevance of the external thing to our experience. On the other hand, says Valberg, its just obvious that external objects do exist; one need only be open to how things are in ones experience. So what we have is an irresolvable antinomy, which he calls the puzzle of experience. But, I think, Berkeleian (Phenomenalistic) Idealism does solve this puzzle. For according to it, it isnt the object itself (except secondarily) that causes my experience of it through any activity in my visual cortex, but God Himself who primarily and directly causes all external objects and all our experiences of them under certain appropriate circumstances. Hence, external things are actually (not just potentially) irrelevant to our experience. Thats exactly what the Berkeleian TGA leading to Idealism shows; it shows that all perceivable things are internal, but not that all things are internal: perceivers (including God) are all external with respect to each other. Valberg, of course, doesnt believe that Berkeleian Idealism can be proven; moreover, he believes that even if it could be, the puzzle will break out within that Idealism itself; thats why his puzzle stays a puzzle, for him. A bit later I will say more about the provability of Berkeleian Idealism, but for now I wish to pinpoint exactly where I think Valberg goes wrong. First, he has it exactly right when he asserts the following: Phenomenalism begins with the idea that, strictly speaking, the object of experience is always internal. So how could the conclusion of the problematic reasoning pose a difficulty for Phenomenalism? The conclusion of the reasoning and Phenomenalism seem to be made for each another.330 But then, asks Valberg, how would the Phenomenalist distinguish (as he must, on his own insistence) between my hallucinating a book, Macbeth-style, and my really seeing it? In such a case, I am uncertain whether the object I pick out is external (part of the world) or internal. The Phenomenalist has his own way of explicating such uncertainty. . . . We might say that the Phenomenalist distinguishes two kinds of pattern or sequence of internal objects: external object patterns and internal object patterns. The Macbeth-type uncertainty can then be represented as uncertainty about which kind of pattern, external or internal, this object belongs to.331 Now, says Valberg, my point is this. Once we have a Phenomenalistic interpretation of the problematic reasoning, the conclusion will be not just that the object present in experience is always internal (that goes without saying), but that the object present is always part of an

330 331

Valberg, The Puzzle of Experience, 163. ibidem.

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internal object pattern. And clearly, this conclusion is, for the Phenomenalist, just as impossible to accept as it is for us . . . to accept that the object present in experience is always internal.332 But what Valberg misses here is that for the theistic Phenomenalist the problematic reasoning would not so much as arise. Let us hark back to 4.4. and recall what Valberg says in expaining one of its steps: God (it is handy to bring God in here) . . . might eliminate the object while maintaining the activity in my visual cortex. Is that not a coherent state of affairs, something God might bring about? The theistic Phenomenalist, taking God utterly seriously (and not just as a handy peg to hang a philosophical point on), says: No, God might not bring that about. He (the theistic Phenomenalist) believes that God, being no deceiver, would never actualize this logical possibility, never eliminate the object while maintaining the activity in my visual cortex, unless perhaps He wished to teach us a moral lesson.333 Thus, if theistic Idealism (Phenomenalism) is correct, the puzzle of experience is solved simply because the problematic reasoning does not go through. James Cornman holds that Berkeleian phenomenalism is plausible enough to be one of the leading contenders for the most reasonable theory of perception and the external world, but he thinks that it faces an objection from the time gap as revealed by the following argument: If Berkeleian phenomenalism is true, then someone, s, sees a star at time t, if and only if at t he sesnses a sensum that is in the group of sensa which is identical with the star. But if at t someone senses a sensum that is in a group of sensa which is identical with a star, then the group and, therefore, the star exists at t. But just as some stars exist unseen, some stars are seen at times they do not exist. Therefore Berkeleian phenomenalism is false. It seems that a Berkeleian has at most two ways to counter this argument: he can either deny that some things are seen when they do not exist, or deny that every sensum sensed when an external object is perceived is in the group of sensa that is identical with the object.334 This is absolutely right, and what our Berkeleian does is take the first alternativehe denies that some things are seen when they do not exist. He says that all things are seen when and only when they exist (if not by finite beings, then by God) and that what I see when I see something in the case of the no-longer existent (because exploded) star is its light. More exactly, since star is ambiguous as between tangible star, visible star, and physical star, what no longer exist (and therefore can no longer be felt or otherwise observed) are the tangible star and

ibidem, 163-164. But in that case, for the lesson to take hold, He presumably would have to let us know when we are hallucinating something and when the object seen is really there. This would involve (1) producing internal object patterns in the case of a visually hallucinated book (so that if I tried to pick it up my fingers wouldnt grasp it or feel anything book-like) and (2) producing external object patterns in case the book was really there (so that I could pick it up and handle it). 334 Cornman, Perception, Common Sense, and Science, 353-354.
333

332

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the physical star; but the visible star still exists; it is seen; and it is nothing but a speck of light. That, by the way, is what we human beings always see in the way of physical stars, even when theyre not exploded and still exist: in all cases we see just pinpricks of twinkling yellowish lightvisible stars that have been emitted or caused (vulgarly speaking) by the physical stars. And as Len Carrier has said, this saves what is correct in Berkeley.335 Len Carrier is another Non-Idealist Direct Realist who accepts the simultaneity-requirement but, because of his deep Australian Materialist convictions, cannot follow Berkeley all (or even much of) the way. Still, by taking the TGA as proving that we always see light he plays directly into Berkeleys hands. He stops where he does because he thinks (a) light is physical and (b) physical things do not depend on being perceived. But Berkeley would have no trouble accepting (a); he only denies (b), and his arguments for that denial are familiar and controversial. In the imagined Berkeleian TGA, some of them would come as support for premises (7), (8), (9), (11), (12), (14), (15), (19), (20), and (21). I hope I have said enough to show that had Berkeley deployed his arguments against (b) in the course of presenting and defending something like the TGA, i.e., had he used TGA as a scaffold or framework for all his relevant arguments, his case for Idealist Direct Realism would have been even stronger and more perspicuous. In any event, the perceptual time-gap is an ace in the hole for any metaphysics in the vicinity of Berkeley. But can Berkeleian Idealist Direct Realism be proven? One way would be by continuing on the way I started in this workby providing more support for all the insufficiently supported or altogether unsupported premises of this Berkeleian TGA. Another way would be to follow Foster. I think he has, in effect, already proven Idealism. In The Nature of Perception he has shown, with arguments that I think are absolutely conclusive (as conclusive as any arguments for an initially unobvious and complex conclusion can be) that Non-Idealist Direct Realism and Indirect (Representative) Realism are false insofar as they cannot account for the fact that we do see things and have perceptual knowledge of them. Therefore, since it is absurd to deny the latter fact and since Non-Idealist Direct Realism, Indirect Realism, and Idealism are the only options for explaining this fact, it follows that if the first two views are false, the third has got to be true! This reasoning, I think, is perfectly cogent. Of course, it says nothing about the specific nature of the Idealism that has been shown to be true. Foster fills this lacuna as well, and also gives additional arguments for Idealism (basically varieties of one specifically Fosterian argument) in the last part of The Nature of Perception and in the whole of The Case for Idealism and of A World For Us. Shorter versions of these

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Carrier, The Time-Gap Argument, 271.

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arguments appear in several of the papers he left behind. In addition, there is the defense of idealism in the last chapter of Robinsons Perception, a defense prepared for in the books earlier chapters, as well as in (some of) his papers and those of John Bolender. All in all, the proposition that Idealism with respect to the material world is the right view has been, I believe, adequately supported. Problems for further investigation, of course, remain in droves. I mention just one. The Berkeleian TGA I constructed contains the following premise: (19) Then in the very act of immediately seeing the visible sun I am also perceiving, whether immediately or mediately, the undestroyed sun of physics, which is a larger collection of, or a more complex fiction of our own brain dependent on, ideas of which collection or fiction the visible sun is a part. How is that to be understood? In my dissertation, I do not explain this, but leave it as a task for future investigation. Chapters 12 and especially 13 of Fosters Case for Idealism provide the (difficult) materials for one answer, to some extent distinct from the answer suggested by the last three chapters of A World For Us. Then there is the completely different account of how physical objects can be constructed out of sense-data given in Chapters Three (Berkeleyan Phenomenalism) and Five (Theoretical Phenomenalism) of Cornmans Perception, Common Sense, and Science. None of these accounts is straightforward. Building on them, an Idealist worth his salt would try as best they can to make it clear how physical objects are related to the sense-data that consitute them. Thus, to finally conclude, I hope I have given good reasons for my thesis that when we go through the world with open eyes we always see present sense-data which much more often than not make up physical objects. What we invariably and always see are sense-data of light; almost always we also see other sense-data as well as the physical objects they constitute. That sensedata exist is certainly proven by the Time-Gap Argument, but it is also proven by the Argument from Illusion and the Causal Argument, and probably by other arguments (i.e., OShaughnessys) as well. Therefore, on the basis of the Time-Gap Argument and other considerations there is much more to be said for Idealist Direct Realism than for either NonIdealist Direct Realism or Representative Realism. But both the Representational Theory of Perception and the Adverbial Theory of Perception especially have little plausibility, though the former is compatible with the Time-Gap Argument.

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