The Well-Ordered Republic Frank

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The Well-Ordered Republic
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The Well-Ordered
Republic
F R AN K LOV ET T
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For Caroline
Who can in reason then assume monarchy over such as live by
right his equals?
— John Milton
 Preface

I was first introduced to civic republicanism twenty-five years ago, during my

first semester of graduate school, in a small philosophy seminar taught by Philip
Pettit. From the beginning I was captivated, and by the end convinced. Since then
the field has grown enormously, both in scope and sophistication. Many new and
promising applications of republican theory have emerged, but so too have new
debates and critiques. The time has come to take stock, so to speak: to attempt
to present the theory comprehensively in its many aspects and dimensions, so as
to determine whether the various parts fit together in a coherent and attractive
whole. Something like this represents my motivation and ambition for writing
this book.
Do we need another big book on republicanism? One might think not. Af-
ter all, hasn’t Pettit written that book already? In fact, hasn’t he written three?¹
Yes and no. While Pettit is undoubtedly one of the more important and persua-
sive contemporary advocates of republican political theory, his voice remains one
among many. Moreover, it is a distinctive voice. His writings sometimes reflect
a philosopher’s temperament for abstraction over application; given his particu-
lar interests, some topics are not covered, while others are covered only briefly
or partially; and he does not always pause to address in detail many significant
debates and critiques now found in the extensive republican literature. These
remarks should not be seen as objections, of course. His aims are different from
mine. In his central writings, Pettit gives expression to his own personal vision
of republican theory. And a powerful vision it is, to which my own work has
obviously been indebted.
The present work is different. It attempts to comprehend the diverse and rich
range of republican ideas in a way that Pettit has not specifically aimed to do. It is
no mere descriptive review, however.² Rather, I deliberately try to fit these many
contributions together into a single coherent theory. While striving to give voice
to diverse views and alternative interpretations within the field, I do not avoid
stating my own sense of the best way forward whenever that way is clear to me.
Nor is the best way always Pettit’s way, to my mind. Although I do not mean to set
up a version of republicanism to rival his, there are important issues on which we
disagree. Even were there not, however, there would still be considerable value in

1 To say nothing of the important book-length contributions of other scholars such as J. G. A.

Pocock, Quentin Skinner, Maurizio Viroli, or Cécile Laborde.
2 Besides, excellent reviews by Iseult Honohan and Rachel Hammersley already exist.
viii PREFACE

having a similar matrix of ideas presented in a different way and from a different
perspective.
It is my overriding hope that this book will be useful, not only for those in-
terested in and attracted to republican ideas, but also for those unpersuaded or
opposed. Precisely because of this hope, I have tried to engage with (and cite) as
many contributions as possible—both from republicans and from their critics. For
the same reason, the bibliography is more extensive and the index more detailed
than typical, or perhaps even advisable under other circumstances.³ Many have
helped me: not only research assistants diligently combing through databases,
but also colleagues generously sharing their works-in-progress, and journal edi-
tors sending me new research to review. Even so it has not been easy. Inevitably,
there are contributions and critiques which, for all my efforts, I have missed,
forgotten, or neglected. For any and all such oversights, I apologize in advance.
Naturally, I have built on my own previous work in various ways. Loosely
speaking, Chapters 2 and 3 cover ground similar to that covered in my first two
books, but the presentation and formulation of ideas has evolved considerably: in
particular, I now rely heavily on the theoretical framework I recently developed
in joint work with Sean Ingham. In consequence, many complexities are newly
addressed that did not occur to me previously, and in several cases I have had to
revise my earlier views or correct mistakes. I also now engage with important re-
cent work by other scholars—on workplace domination and identity politics, for
example. Chapter 4 ventures into new territory for me. Not for Pettit, of course,
who has been centrally concerned with issues of popular control for many years.
In writing this chapter, I not only achieved a deeper appreciation of his views,
but also discovered some unexpected areas of disagreement. Chapter 5 draws
heavily on my article, “Algernon Sidney, Republican Stability, and the Politics of
Virtue,” which appeared in The Journal of Political Science 48 (2020): 59–83; and
to a lesser extent on “Republicanism, Perfectionism, and Neutrality,” co-authored
with Gregory Whitfield, which appeared in The Journal of Political Philosophy 24
(2016): 120–134. Finally, Chapter 6 draws substantially on my article, “Should
Republicans be Cosmopolitans?” which appeared in Global Justice: Theory Prac-
tice Rhetoric 9 (2016): 28–46. I am grateful to the publishers of these journals for
allowing me to reuse the relevant materials.
As much as the field of contemporary republican theory has grown, many ar-
eas remain underexplored. Republicans have not yet addressed the problem of
historical injustice, and they have only begun to tackle the challenges of doing
justice to future generations. Although republicans have a very sophisticated nor-
mative theory of popular control, the concrete institutional implications of that
theory necessarily depend on the resolution of difficult empirical questions that

3 The bibliography has also been sorted into groups, again simply in the pragmatic hope that others
will find this helpful.
 PREFACE ix

remain wide open to future research. The discussion of political obligation of-
fered in Chapter 5 remains preliminary to a fully-developed treatment, and only
very recently have some authors started to think about a republican theory of
political action. Throughout this work I try to note gaps and flag opportunities
like these as they become apparent to me.
I have incurred many debts writing this book. Matt Mancini, Julia Maskivker,
Chad Flanders, Tim Sellers, and Philip Pettit advised me on Chapter 1; Daniel
Layman, Lori Watson, Sam Arnold, Hallvard Sandven, and Alex Gourevitch on
Chapter 2; Daniel Layman, Robert Taylor, Hiba Hafiz, and Andreas Schmidt on
Chapter 3; Randy Calvert, Clarissa Hayward, Amy Gais, Fannie Bialek, and Brian
Tamanaha on Chapter 4; Richard Dagger, Victoria Costa, Julia Maskivker, Alan
Houston, and Jessica Rosenfeld on Chapter 5; José Luis Martı́, Miriam Ronzoni,
Michael Sevel, and Corey Katz on Chapter 6. In those cases where I have built on
previously published work, I also benefitted greatly from anonymous reviews of
that work; and in those cases where I have presented parts of what became this
book at conferences and workshops, I have likewise benefitted from engagement
with many discussants and audience members. Ian Carter, Sean Ingham, and two
anonymous readers at Oxford University Press read the manuscript as a whole,
and provided extraordinarily perceptive and detailed commentary: not only have
they pushed me to make the book much better, they have also saved me from
many foolish mistakes. Tennyson Holmes, Rahul Kanna, Adam Lake, Kris Wilson,
and Viola Wu provided invaluable research and editing assistance. I am grateful to
Dominic Byatt for expertly guiding this book through review and publication at
Oxford University Press, and also to Will Kymlicka and David Miller for agreeing
to include it in the Oxford Political Theory series. And of course none of my work
would be possible without the love, encouragement, and support of my family
and friends—especially during the very unusual times in which this book was
written.
Finally, special thanks are due to Philip Pettit, who first inspired my interest in
republican political theory so many years ago, and who has continued to nurture
my work in many ways ever since. It is difficult to imagine where my path would
otherwise have led, but I am deeply grateful it has led me here.
 Contents

1. Introduction 1
1.1 Republicanism: Principles 3
1.2 Republicanism: Historical Sketch 9
1.3 Republicanism and Liberalism 17
1.4 Method and Approach 20
1.5 The Big Picture 23

2. Non-domination 26
2.1 Agency, Groups, Teams 27
2.2 Single Agent Domination 33
2.3 Plural Agent Domination 40
2.4 Domination and Structure 44
2.5 Suitable Controls, Part One 51
2.6 Suitable Controls, Part Two 57
2.7 From Non-domination to Freedom 63

3. Law and Policy 73

3.1 The Value of Non-domination 74
3.2 The Priority of Non-domination 81
3.3 Ideal and Non-ideal Theory 89
3.4 The Empire of Law 95
3.5 Republicanism and Punishment 101
3.6 Domination and Markets 104
3.7 Workplace Domination 112
3.8 Race, Gender, and Identity 119
3.9 Future Generations 122

4. Popular Control 128

4.1 The Grounds for Popular Control 130
4.2 Implementing Popular Control 137
4.3 The Limits of Popular Control 145
4.4 The Problem of Discretion 150
4.5 Domination and Legislation 156
4.6 Constituting Legislative Authority 161
4.7 Basic Rights and Judicial Review 170
4.8 Emergency Powers 177
xii CONTENTS

5. Stability 182
5.1 Political Obligation and Legitimacy 183
5.2 Imperfect Compliance 191
5.3 Civic Virtue 194
5.4 Republican Stability 202
5.5 The Well-Ordered Republic 206
5.6 Education, Toleration, and Neutrality 211
5.7 Republics in Crisis 219

6. Global Republicanism 225

6.1 The Global Basic Structure 227
6.2 International Law 232
6.3 Borders and Migration 239
6.4 Global Economic Justice 243
6.5 Republican Foreign Policy 251
6.6 Concluding Remarks 255

Appendices 259
A. On the Boundaries of the Republican Tradition 259
B. The Runaway Slave 263
C. Is Pettit’s View Democratic? 264
D. Multi-agent Domination and Suitable Control 266
E. On the Limits of Republicanism 268
Bibliography 271
Classical Republican Writings 271
Contemporary Republican Writings 273
Other Works Cited 277
Index 287
 1
Introduction

This is a book about republicanism. Its aim is to expound as rigorous and com-
prehensive an account of republican political theory as possible, given our present
state of knowledge and constraints of space.
For the purposes of this work, I take republicanism to be the political doctrine
expressed in canonical republican writings. This is less circular than it sounds.
By analogy, when contemporary moral philosophers debate the meaning and
implications of utilitarianism, they are not usually debating how to interpret the
writings of Bentham and Mill, but rather how to understand the utilitarian the-
ory itself: in other words, they aim for the understanding of that theory which is
most consistent, most persuasive, most useful, and so forth. In working out the
best understanding of utilitarianism, the specific claims expressed in the writings
of Bentham and Mill are always relevant, but never decisive. That said, the best un-
derstanding of utilitarianism must in some plausible sense fit with at least the most
distinctive and central ideas found in Bentham and Mill: no matter how good our
theory, if it does not capture the main commitments in the canonical utilitarian
writings, it would not be utilitarianism, but something else.
Thus, just as we uncontroversially regard ‘utilitarianism’ as the best articulation
of the moral theory expressed, more or less perfectly, in the canonical utilitarian
writings, so we should regard ‘republicanism’ as the best articulation of the political
doctrine expressed, more or less perfectly, in the canonical republican writings.
To extend the parallel, once we have the best version of the moral theory ex-
pressed in the canonical utilitarian writings in hand, we can use our articulation
of that theory to decide whether or not to count as utilitarians other writers about
whom we are less certain. For example, we might decide that Hume should not
properly be considered a utilitarian, whereas Paley should. In much the same way,
once we have the best version of the political doctrine expressed in the canonical
republican writings in hand, we can use our articulation of that doctrine to de-
cide whether or not to count as republican other writers about whom we are less
certain. There should be nothing especially controversial about this approach. It is
recursive, but not circular. In truth, it is simply an application of the procedure of
reflective equilibrium, as described by John Rawls.¹

1 See Rawls (1971, 46–53).

The Well-Ordered Republic. Frank Lovett, Oxford University Press.

© Frank Lovett (2022). DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780192859556.003.0001
2 THE WELL-ORDERED REPUBLIC

Initially, I will stipulate two sets of canonical republican authors. In so doing,

my aim is not to exclude any authors as inferior or unworthy, but rather to de-
fine a coherent tradition: it permits me to plausibly claim that these authors, at
least, share a set of commitments. It is perfectly legitimate, depending on one’s
aims, to define ‘republicanism’ more broadly, but then there may be no shared
commitments, only family resemblances.²
The first are a core set of early modern political writers, who by convention we
may term the classical republicans. These are: Machiavelli; the English republicans
Milton, Harrington, and Sidney; Thomas Paine; and the American founders John
Adams, Jefferson, and Madison. Sometimes I refer to the writings of these authors
as the ‘Machiavelli to Madison canon.’ In addition to this core, there are many
other authors—some well-known, others less so—who on our working out of the
best version of the republican theory will be found to properly count as members
of the tradition as well.³ More ambiguous, however, will be the status of Black-
stone, Montesquieu, and the authors of Cato’s Letters. Because of their importance
in transmitting republican ideas across the eighteenth century, I will refer to their
writings from time to time, but without regarding them as canonical. Likewise
various ancient authors, such as Cicero and the Latin historians Sallust and Livy,
who exerted a strong influence on the tradition, but without necessarily being re-
publicans themselves. I discuss these issues further in Appendix A. Rousseau and
Kant, in contrast, are definitely not republicans, for reasons that will become clear
in subsequent chapters.⁴
The second set of canonical republicans authors are a core group of con-
temporary writers, namely, Philip Pettit, Quentin Skinner, and Maurizio Viroli.
Sometimes these authors are referred to as the ‘civic’ or ‘neo-Roman’ republicans
so as to distinguish them from J. G. A. Pocock and others, who are referred to as
‘civic humanists’ or ‘neo-Athenian republicans.’ In this work I will simply refer to
them as the contemporary republicans. Many others have contributed to the de-
velopment of contemporary republican theory, of course, and their contributions

2 For example, Honohan (2002) and Hammersley (2020) both adopt a family resemblances ap-
proach.
3 Among these I would include renaissance Italian republicans such as Leonardo Bruni, Alamanno
Rinuccini, and Francesco Guicciardini; seventeenth-century English republicans such as Henry Vane,
John Streater, Marchamont Nedham, John Hall, and Henry Neville; Dutch republicans such as Pieter
de la Court; eighteenth-century ‘Real Whigs’ such as Robert Molesworth and Walter Moyle; some of
the English philosophical radicals such as Richard Price and Mary Wollstonecraft; many Americans
from the founding period, including James Wilson and Benjamin Rush; some of the early, more mod-
erate French revolutionaries, such as Jacques Pierre Brissot; the American labor republicans, including
Thomas Skidmore, Ira Steward, and George McNeill; and some nineteenth-century African-American
political writers, such as David Walker and Frederick Douglass.
⁴ Rousseau sounds his most republican in the Second Discourse’s dedication to the citizens of Geneva;
Kant comes closest to republicanism in the ‘Rechtslehre,’ part one of the Metaphysics of Morals. If we
accept the interpretations of these authors offered by Viroli (1988) and Ripstein (2009) respectively,
then we might regard Rousseau and Kant as offering important variants on republicanism, but doing
so in my experience is apt to produce more confusion than insight.
 INTRODUCTION 3

will be discussed as relevant and appropriate.⁵ But no political doctrine, no matter

how compelling on the merits, could properly count as republican if it did not cap-
ture reasonably well the main commitments expressed in the central writings of
Pettit, Skinner, and Viroli.⁶
I argue below that the classical and contemporary republicans together con-
stitute a coherent political tradition. By no means is this to say that classical and
contemporary republicans agree on everything, or even on most things. This too
should not be controversial. By analogy, consider the relationship between Rawls
and the classical social contract writers Locke, Rousseau, and Kant. Rawls claims
his theory is built on a core set of ideas found in those earlier writers and, in that
sense, that both he and they belong to a shared tradition. No one finds this claim
objectionable, even though there are many points, both large and small, on which
Rawls departs from his predecessors. That is because what everyone really cares
about is the best version of the social contract theory itself. Rather than com-
plain that Rawls has abandoned the tradition, we praise him for expressing the
best possible version of the central ideas distinctive of that tradition. In the same
way, contemporary republicans depart in many ways from their classical prede-
cessors; in doing so, far from abandoning the tradition, they express its best and
most persuasive features.
To properly constitute a coherent political tradition, it is plausible to say three
conditions should be met. First, there should be a set of shared principles that,
implicitly or explicitly, can be found in the writings of all members of that tra-
dition. Second, that set of shared principles should together (if not individually)
be distinctive and thus clearly separate the tradition from other related or nearby
traditions. And third, there should be some plausible story about the transmission
of those distinctive shared principles over time. In the following sections, I argue
that republicanism meets these conditions.

1.1 Republicanism: Principles

Let us say that a political doctrine or public philosophy is a reasonably coherent

set of normative principles for evaluating public laws, policies, institutions, and so
forth as better or worse. To be reasonably coherent, of course, a political doctrine

⁵ Significant contributions to the development of contemporary republican theory have been made
by Richard Bellamy, Jim Bohman, Victoria Costa, Richard Dagger, Alex Gourevitch, Sean Ingham,
Cécile Laborde, Jean-Fabien Spitz, Robert Taylor, and perhaps myself, among many others too nu-
merous to list in this footnote. In fairness, we should also note that many developments in republican
theory have been spurred by its most perceptive critics. Among the most important of these critics, I
might include Patten (1996), Carter (2008), Kramer (2008), Vinx (2010), Dowding (2011), and Simpson
(2017).
⁶ The ‘central writings’ here refer to Pettit (1997, 2012, 2014), Skinner (1986, 1998), and Viroli (2002).
I will of course cite as appropriate many other works by these authors as well.
4 THE WELL-ORDERED REPUBLIC

must supply relative weights or ranks to its various principles, otherwise it would
provide no guidance in cases where the principles conflict. Both the principles and
their weighting should also be supported by some sort of justificatory apparatus
purporting to show why these principles ordered in this way represent the best
political doctrine on offer.
A suitable model might be Rawls’s theory of justice as fairness. Its main princi-
ples are the two principles of justice, the principles are lexically ordered, and the
original position argument supplies a justification for both the principles and their
lexical ordering. For the moment, I concentrate on specifying the main shared
principles distinctive of republicanism, postponing a detailed consideration of
ranking and justification.
All republicans, classical and contemporary, are committed to the following
claim:

Non-domination principle: In designing public laws, policies, institutions, and

so forth, priority should be given to reducing domination.

As stated, the principle is compatible with different interpretations of ‘priority’ and

‘reducing.’ One might hold that reducing domination should be given lexical prior-
ity over other considerations, for example, or merely that it be given greater weight
than other considerations. Likewise, one might argue that sum total domination
should be minimized, or that everyone should enjoy at least a sufficient degree of
non-domination, or something else. Republicans have differing views about these
issues, which I discuss in Chapter 3, but these debates are not presently relevant.
The non-domination principle should not be confused with its somewhat
weaker near-cousin which holds that priority should be given to reducing non-
consensual domination. Most republicans have not given a full consideration to
the various dimensions of this issue, no doubt because in practice it will not often
be relevant: usually, people do not willingly submit themselves to domination. But
in those specific cases where republicans have considered the issue, they have con-
sistently maintained that domination is bad even when consented to. For example,
the classical republicans often encountered the claim that hereditary monarchy
was unproblematic insofar as the people consented to that form of government, a
claim they strenuously rejected. Later republicans encountered the claim that the
domination of women in traditional marriage was unproblematic because women
consent to marriage, and they rejected that claim too. Likewise the claim that the
domination of workers is unproblematic because workers consent to the condi-
tions of their employment. In Chapter 3 I argue that on the best version of the
theory, we should indeed endorse the general conclusion that domination is always
bad, whether consented to or not.
Contemporary republicans actually endorse a stronger version of the non-
domination principle, which holds that we should give priority to reducing
 INTRODUCTION 5

domination counting the domination of all persons the same. No classical repub-
lican argued explicitly against this view, and a few argued for it, at least in part.⁷
But we should be wary of attributing this view to most classical republicans, for
it is difficult to see how they might have reconciled it with the unreflective oblivi-
ousness they exhibited toward the claims of women, the working classes, and other
oppressed or disadvantaged persons.⁸ In this respect, however, they did not differ
in any remarkable way from most of their contemporaries.
All republicans also endorse:

Empire of law principle: Every public use of coercive force, whether by public
officials or ordinary citizens, should be controlled by law.

Here ‘coercive force’ means roughly the direct use or threat of violence or physical
restraint. By the ‘public’ use of coercive force, I mean to exclude the use of coer-
cive force in the so-called private or domestic sphere. For the most part, classical
republicans ignored the physical coercion that occurred within households, as did
nearly all early modern political writers.⁹ Later, I argue that republicans should
actually endorse a stronger version of the empire of law principle—one that drops
this restriction, and thus holds that every use of coercive force, public or private,
should be controlled by law.¹⁰
The empire of law principle entails rejecting anarchism, here meaning the view
that there should be no law—i.e., that we should govern ourselves by social norms
or conventions alone. More importantly, it entails rejecting the sovereignty prin-
ciple, held by Hobbes and some others, as well as weaker principles such as the
prerogative principle, typically endorsed by early modern royalists. The preroga-
tive principle holds that at least some top public officials (monarchs, for instance)
should have the authority to depart from law whenever, in their judgment, there
are good reasons for doing so. The sovereignty principle holds not only that
sovereigns have the authority to depart from law, but indeed that the will of the
sovereign is law.¹¹ The prerogative principle follows trivially from the sovereignty
principle for, as Hobbes says, “having power to make, and repeal laws,” a sovereign
“may when he pleaseth, free himself from that subjection, by repealing those laws

⁷ Here I refer to Wollstonecraft, who advocated for women; and the American labor republicans,
who advocated for the working classes. See Halldenius (2015) and Gourevitch (2015) respectively.
⁸ Many have complained about the parochialism of the classical republican authors: see Maddox
(2002), Goodin (2003), or Ando (2010), among others. See Chapter 3 for further discussion.
⁹ Wollstonecraft again being the main exception.
1⁰ Note that, if I am correct, no distinction between public and private spheres will be necessary, and
accordingly, I make no attempt in this work to defend such a distinction. It is introduced here purely
for the purpose of characterizing the view of classical republicans.
11 The sovereignty principle might seem less dangerous, and less contrary to republicanism, when
combined with a doctrine of popular sovereignty, as in the writings of Rousseau. However, the excesses
of the French revolution and our experience with various forms of authoritarian populism suggest the
reverse. For further discussion, see Chapter 4.
6 THE WELL-ORDERED REPUBLIC

that trouble him” (1651, 176). Contrary to a common assumption, most early
modern royalists did not endorse the sovereignty principle: they did not generally
hold that kings make law, only that they have the right to break it.¹² The empire of
law principle need not be incompatible with the existence of emergency powers,
provided those powers are themselves suitably controlled; whether there should
be any such powers, however, remains an open question. More on this topic in
Chapter 4.
The argument for the empire of law principle is basically that domination cannot
be reduced to anything like an acceptable minimum without at least subjecting the
use of coercive force to legal control: “the liberty of a commonwealth consisteth in
the empire of her laws,” as Harrington says (1656, 170). Importantly, republicans
do not usually believe that satisfying the empire of law principle is sufficient for
securing the full measure of non-domination we should aspire to, only that it is
necessary for doing so, and that it goes part way all on its own. There are many
other forms of coercion (economic, cultural, ideological, etc.) that might properly
concern us, and the empire of law as such does not address these directly. But pub-
lic policies as might address them cannot be built except on the platform provided
by an empire of law. More on these points in Chapter 3.
Finally, all republicans endorse:

Popular control principle: Top public officials at least must be subject to suffi-
cient popular control.

Republicans, classical and contemporary, disagree on how many public officials

ought to be subject to popular control, but they all agree that at least the top-
most ones must be. ‘Top public officials’ here refers in the first instance to those
highest-ranking executive officials who in practice direct the coercive apparatus of
the government (or state)—namely, monarchs, presidents, prime ministers, chan-
cellors, councils of state, and so forth.¹³ As Milton writes, “they that shall boast …
to be a free Nation, and not have in themselves the power to remove, or to abolish
any governour supreme” have only “a ridiculous and painted freedom,” and are in
truth “under tyranny and servitude” (1649, 82).¹⁴
Republicans, classical and contemporary, also disagree on the degree and char-
acter of popular control that would count as ‘sufficient.’ Contemporary republicans

12 Here see Allen (1938, 3–12) or Zagorin (1954, 189–196).

13 Why not top lawmaking authorities? Two reasons: first, because the political significance of law-
making presupposes a general respect for the law we cannot always take for granted; second, because
there can be governments (or states) without law, but not without instruments of coercion. The proper
constitution of legislative authority is an important issue, but a downstream one: see Chapter 4.
1⁴ Cf., Streater: only through “the yearly election of all Officers in greatest trust” did the Romans for
so long prevent their magistrates from “obtaining to those advantages of making themselves Masters
of the common Liberty” (1653, 1); or Nedham: the “people never had any real Liberty, till they were
possess’d of the power of … changing Governments … as often as they should judge expedient, for
their own well-being, and the good of the Publike” (1656, 10).
 INTRODUCTION 7

generally endorse a strong version of the principle that insists on democratic pop-
ular control. In contrast, the classical republicans were not generally enthusiastic
about democracy as an implementation of popular control. Some claimed they
would be satisfied with a very weak degree of popular control indeed.¹⁵ Impor-
tantly, however, even the latter insisted that popular control must be institutionally
endogenous to the political system to count as sufficient. In other words, it must be
possible for the people to redirect or replace wayward top public officials through
the operation of ordinary political processes, without resort to violence or the
threat of violence. As Milton writes, public officials in a republic

… are perpetual servants and drudges to the public …; [they] are not elevated
above thir brethren …, [they] walk the streets as other men, may be spoken to
freely, familiarly, friendly, without adoration … [because] in a free Common-
wealth, any governor or chief counselor offending, may be remov’d and punishd
without the least commotion.
(1660, 422–423)

While the classical republicans had no problem endorsing popular resistance, they
did not believe (as did John Locke, for example) that the threat of popular re-
sistance alone constitutes a sufficient degree of popular control over top public
officials.¹⁶
The popular control principle entails rejecting constitutional indifferentism, the
claim that the constitutional form of a political order does not matter, inde-
pendently of how well or poorly the society is actually governed.¹⁷ Hobbes, for
example, held that the amount of freedom a people enjoy is not a function of how
their political order is constituted, but rather of the choices made by their rulers,
whoever those happen to be: good rulers might grant more freedom, bad rulers
less. “Whether a commonwealth be monarchical, or popular,” he says, “the free-
dom is still the same” (1651, 143). Republicans reject this view. Their argument for
popular control is roughly that in practice it will be necessary to secure an empire
of law, and therefore to advance non-domination. As Harrington writes,

[T]he magistracy … is different in different commonwealths; nevertheless, there

is one condition of it that must be the same in every one, or it dissolves the com-
monwealth where it is wanting. And this is no less than that, as the hand of the

1⁵ For instance, Molesworth would apparently have been satisfied with a head of state who is elected
by elites and holds office for life, provided there is a constitutional mechanism for impeachment.
1⁶ It follows that republicans must deny there is an unlimited right of self-determination, if we sup-
pose that right to include the right of a people to constitute themselves as, say, an hereditary monarchy:
“no people can lawfully surrender or cede their liberty” says Price (1778, 89).
1⁷ I borrow this term from Vinx (2010).
8 THE WELL-ORDERED REPUBLIC

magistrate is the executive power of the law, so the head of the magistrate is
answerable unto the people that his execution be according unto the law ….
(1656, 174)

I discuss the details of this argument in Chapter 4.¹⁸

In the following sections, I argue that these three principles are in fact shared by
the canonical republican writers, and that together they are sufficient to distinguish
republicanism from other traditions—from liberalism, most importantly.¹⁹ Before
moving on, however, I should mention a few other ideas commonly associated
with republicanism.
The first is the doctrine of the mixed constitution—roughly, the idea that po-
litical systems should be designed so that the various powers and authorities of
government are dispersed among a plurality of departments or agencies, each
having at least some ability to block or restrain the activities of the others. This
doctrine was first clearly articulated in Polybius’s famous analysis of the Roman
constitution, and it was restated near the opening of Machiavelli’s Discourses.²⁰
Throughout the early modern period it was a popular theme among many re-
publican writers, and for a time some contemporary historians regarded it as a
suitable litmus test for who belongs in the classical republican tradition.²¹ The
doctrine evolved over time, and by the end of the classical republican period
was often somewhat misleadingly described as the doctrine of the separation of
powers.²²
There are two reasons, however, for not including it among the core repub-
lican commitments. The first problem is that some republican authors appear
ambivalent about the mixed constitution, such as Vane, De la Court, or Price; and
others actively resisted it, such as Milton and Paine. At the same time, the mixed
constitution was endorsed by many authors who were not republicans, such as
Locke; or who were only doubtfully republican, such as Montesquieu. The second
is that, even if the mixed constitution were a part of standard republican politi-
cal doctrine, it would be a downstream principle. That is to say, our reasons for

1⁸ Since the popular control principle derives its support from the non-domination principle, repub-
licans are not committed to democracy for its own sake: this marks a difference between republicans
and many democratic theorists. Again, see Chapter 4.
1⁹ One might plausibly distinguish narrow republicanism, defined as those writers who endorse all
three principles, from broad republicanism, which includes all those who endorse at least the non-
domination principle. The main difficulty with this is that it would count as republican some writers
who do not believe having a republic is necessary! (See below.)
2⁰ Polybius’s analysis was also enthusiastically embraced by Cicero, but this was of limited historical
significance because his De re publica was lost until the nineteenth century, and thus unavailable to the
classical republicans.
21 See for example Fink (1962).
22 Misleadingly because the important part of the doctrine is that the different departments of
government operate as restraints on one another, not that the powers of government be formally
distinguished into legislative, executive, and judicial functions. The later is merely one more or less
convenient device for implementing a dispersion of power across multiple departments.
 INTRODUCTION 9

endorsing the mixed constitution must surely derive from the more fundamental
core principles described above, together with contingent facts about specific po-
litical and historical contexts. If it turns out that republican aims are not well served
by mixed constitutions under certain conditions, this fact would not undermine
the coherence or continuity of the republican tradition. See Chapter 4 for further
discussion, however.
The second idea commonly associated with the republican tradition is civic
virtue. Chapter 5 discusses these issues in greater detail, but for now we may regard
civic virtue as roughly the disposition of citizens to conduct themselves in ways
that support rather than undermine republican political institutions. All repub-
licans have been concerned to ensure that civic virtue is sufficiently prevalent in
society to achieve stability in this sense, and all republicans are prepared to de-
sign institutions and public policies with the express aim of securing such stability.
This sets republicans apart from those contemporary liberals committed to strong
principles of neutrality (see below).
Again, however, a commitment to actively promoting civic virtue should not be
counted among the core republican commitments. It is a downstream principle,
derived from the core principles above, together with contingent facts about the
political and historical context. I here merely assert what is actually my sense of
the conclusion of an extensive and sometimes contentious debate between civic
republicans and civic humanists.²³ Whether one fully endorses this view, however,
is less important for present purposes. To reiterate what was said earlier, the aim of
this book is to expound as rigorous and comprehensive an account as possible of
the republican political doctrine expressed in the central writings of Pettit, Skinner,
and Viroli, together with their classical republican forbearers. Since they, along
with many other contemporary civic or neo-Roman republican authors, are firmly
committed to the instrumental view of civic virtue, that is the version of republican
theory this book aims to elaborate. My own sympathies with this interpretation are
matter of public record.²⁴ My hope, however, is that this work will be of value to
anyone interested in what the best available articulation of this interpretation of
republicanism might look like, even if their ultimate aim is to critique, or indeed
reject, the theory.

1.2 Republicanism: Historical Sketch

The classical republicans do not count among their ranks any truly great systematic
political thinkers on a par with, say, Hobbes or Locke. The bulk of their writings

23 Among the works decisive in bringing about the ‘instrumental turn’ from civic humanism to civic
republicanism, see especially Skinner (1984, 1986), Sunstein (1988), Spitz (1995), Dagger (1997), and
Pettit (1997).
2⁴ See Lovett (2005, 469–472) and (2010, 215–217).
10 THE WELL-ORDERED REPUBLIC

were timely interventions in specific local political controversies.²⁵ It follows that

we do not often find in those writings the sort of rigor or comprehensiveness we
now expect from sophisticated political theories, and so we should be wary of
attributing to the classical republicans detailed views regarding technical issues
that did not occur to them. Nevertheless, the core republican ideas are assuredly
present in the tradition, and they are interesting to trace over time. What follows
is only a sketch, drawing on the considerable historiographical contributions of
many others.²⁶ It does not aspire to originality; its aim is only to persuade the
reader that classical republicanism does indeed constitute a coherent political
tradition, according to the criteria suggested earlier.
Of course the classical republicans did not express their views in the proposi-
tional language of the previous section. Indeed, they more nearly expressed their
views in the reverse order of the presentation above. The popular control principle
usually appears front and center as an emphatic rejection of monarchy:

Had they but once tasted the sweets of peace and liberty both together, they would
soon be of the opinion of Herodotus and Demosthenes that there is no difference
between king and tyrant ….
(Nedham 1650, 127)

[A] king must be ador’d like a Demigod, with a dissolute and haughtie court about
him, of vast expense and luxurie … . Certainly … that people must needs be madd
or strangely infatuated, that build the chief hope of thir common happiness or
safetie on a single person: who if he happen to be good, can do no more then
another man, if to be bad, hath in his hand to do more evil without check, then
millions of other men.
(Milton 1660, 422–423)

To the evil of monarch we have added that of hereditary succession; and as the
first is a degradation and lessening of ourselves, so the second, claimed as a matter
of right, is an insult and an imposition on posterity.
(Paine 1776, 15)

It is impossible for any man, when the most favourable circumstances concur,
to acquire sufficient knowledge and strength of mind to discharge the duties

2⁵ Naturally, there are partial exceptions: Machiavelli wrote after his retirement from public life,
Harrington aspired to a degree of philosophical detachment, and so on.
2⁶ To give a very partial list: on Italian republicanism, see Skinner (1983, 1984), Viroli (1998), and Ju-
rdjevic (2001); on seventeenth-century English republicanism, Dzelzainis (1995), Skinner (1998, 2000),
Lovett (2005), (2012a), and Hamel (2013); on Dutch republicanism, Velema (2002); on eighteenth-
century English republicanism, Robbins (1959); on French republicanism, Hammersley (2010); on
early American republicanism, Bailyn (1965) and Sellers (1994); on Wollstonecraft, Coffee (2012) and
Halldenius (2015); on the American labor republicans, Gourevitch (2015); and on nineteenth-century
African-American republican thought, Coffee (2020) and Rogers (2020).
 INTRODUCTION 11

of a king, entrusted with uncontrouled power; how then must they be violated
when … all the feelings of a man are stifled by flattery, and reflection shut out
by pleasure! Surely it is madness to make the fate of thousands depend on the
caprice of a weak fellow creature, whose very station sinks him necessarily below
the meanest of his subjects!
(Wollstonecraft 1792, 83)

The rejection of monarchy is nearly as good a litmus test as any for who in the early
modern period properly counts as a republican.²⁷ Outside that period, of course,
it is unreliable on its own, insofar as other political traditions rejected monarchy
as well.
Having rejected monarchy, the classical republicans characterize its alternative
as a ‘free state’ or ‘republic,’ expressions they use interchangeably for reasons that
will soon become clear.²⁸ Either from the examples they give, the definitions
they propose, or some combination of these, it is evident that by a republic
they mean any political order answering to what we have termed the empire
of law and popular control conditions. In this respect, the deep influence of
Livy’s history of Rome is no doubt centrally responsible. At a crucial junc-
ture early in his narrative, the Romans expel their kings, abolish the monarchy,
and institute a republic. The opening lines of the second book then run as
follows:

Liberi iam hinc populi Romani res pace belloque gestas, annuos magistratus,
imperiaque legum potentiora quam hominum peragam.

This passage might fairly be regarded as the urtext of classical republicanism.²⁹ All
the early modern republican authors are certain to have read Livy, and to have
been familiar with these memorable lines. Translations were available, though no
doubt for the most part they read it in Latin. In contemporary English the passage
reads:

2⁷ More precisely, the rejection of any monarchical constitution in which the monarch is in practice
the head of state and not subject to popular control. Some classical republicans would reassure their
readers that they had no objection to monarchy, but an attentive reading reveals that they mean only
as a ceremonial office, or as the title for some public official who is actually elected and thus subject to
popular control. Henry Neville’s Plato Redivivus illustrates this rhetorical strategy. Nelson (2014) errs
in assuming that the distinctive republican worry concerns the concentration of executive power in a
single person, rather than the lack of popular control over that person. The passage from Harrington
quoted earlier should disabuse us of this notion: he explicitly notes that a variety of executive forms are
consistent with republican principles, provided only that they are subject to popular control.
2⁸ Prior to the renaissance, the term ‘republic’ referred more expansively to any good regime: as
Hankins (2010) shows, it was only in the fourteenth century that it came to denote more specifically
non-monarchical free states. For this reason, among others, it is anachronistic to refer to ancient authors
such as Cicero as ‘republicans’ in the sense of the early modern tradition. See Appendix A.
2⁹ Though Skinner (2000, 2002) has suggested a similar status for the opening sections of the Digest
of Roman law, where freedom and slavery are defined as antonyms.
12 THE WELL-ORDERED REPUBLIC

Henceforth my theme will be the history in peace and war of the free people
of Rome, with annual magistrates, and the authority of law greater than that
of men.³⁰

Here notice the two features Livy specifically highlights as marking the beginning
of Rome’s republican period: the fact that top public officials are now elected an-
nually, and thus subject to popular control; and the fact that no one is above the
law. Also note that before these changes, the Romans were not a free people, but
after they were: being a free people and being a republic amount to the same thing.
The classical republicans unanimously regarded ancient Rome as the leading
example in history of a republic. Commonly they cited also Athens and Sparta,
though with varying degrees of conviction. (Athens certainly satisfied the popular
control condition, and perhaps also the empire of law condition; Sparta probably
satisfied the empire of law condition, but only doubtfully the popular control con-
dition.) Some added biblical Israel prior to the monarchy. For modern examples,
they referred most often to Venice, Florence, and the Dutch Republic. England was
a republic during the interregnum; it should also have been recognized as such by
the middle of the eighteenth century onward, though few other than Montesquieu
actually said as much.³¹ The American states were republics after their break from
England, but not before.³²
When attempting to offer more abstract definitions of a republic or free state,
the classical republicans always reproduce in some form or other the basic idea in
Livy—namely, that a republic is a political order answering to the popular con-
trol and empire of law conditions. Sometimes they lean more toward the popular
control aspect:

I give the name of popular governments to those of Rome, Athens, Sparta, and
the like … [where] power is conferr’d upon the chief magistrates … by the free
consent of a willing people, and such a part as they think fit is still retained and
executed in their own assemblies … .
(Sidney 1698, 189)

3⁰ In Holland’s translation, available to the English republicans, the passage reads: “Now will I de-
scribe from henceforth, the acts both in war and peace of the people of Rome, a free state now from this
time forward: their yearely Magistrates and governours: the authoritie and rule of laws, more powerfull
and mightie than that of men” (1600, 44).
31 Partly this was due to the dangerously revolutionary connotations of the term ‘republic’ in Eng-
land, and partly to the backdoor process by which the transition ultimately occurred: the shift of
executive authority from crown to cabinet meant that the de facto top public officials were now subject
to popular control in the form of parliamentary elections. Montesquieu, correctly, described England
as “a republic, disguised under the form of monarchy” (1748, 68).
32 Not before, insofar as colonies are not republics even if they are the colonies of a republic: colo-
nial status as such violates the popular control condition. A republic that “governs by its will” various
territories, says Price, is “an empire consisting of one free state, and the rest in slavery” (1778, 35). In
agreeing with Price, the American revolutionaries were perfectly in line with Machiavelli’s analysis two
centuries before: “the colonies sent out either by a republic or a prince … are not at the outset free,”
and seldom “make great progress” (1531, 101).
 INTRODUCTION 13

By the word Republik… I understand thereby such a State wherein an Assembly

… hath the Power to cause all their Resolutions, Orders, and Laws, to be obeyed
and put in execution.
(De la Court 1702, 369)

[W]e may define a republic to be … a government which derives all its powers
directly or indirectly from the great body of the people; and … that the persons
administering it be appointed, either directly or indirectly, by the people … .
(Madison 1788a, 100–101)

At other times, they lean more toward the empire of law condition:

[A] commonwealth is an empire of laws and not of men.

(Harrington 1656, 170)

For as in absolute governments the King is law, so in free countries the law ought
to be King; and there ought to be no other.
(Paine 1776, 34)

[N]o man will contend, that a nation can be free, that is not governed by
fixed laws. All other government … is the government of mere will and plea-
sure, whether it be exercised by one, a few, or many. Republican writers in
general … have maintained … that legitimate governments, or well-ordered
commonwealths, … were those where the laws prevailed.
(Adams 1797, 124)

And sometimes, both aspects appear in more or less equal balance:

There, without any particular person or prince to give them a constitution, they
[the Republic of Venice] began to live as a community under laws which seemed
to them appropriate for their maintenance.
(Machiavelli 1531, 101)

[It] does declare the governed to be in the state of free Citizens … [that they] agree
to be subject and yield obedience to the Laws, that are from time to time made
amongst them by their own free and common consent. So as this sort of Empire
or Government is that of Laws, and not of men … .
(Vane 1659, 4)

[W]e have no other way of distinguishing between free nations and such as are not
so, than that the free are governed by their own laws and magistrates according
to their own mind … .
(Sidney 1698, 440)
14 THE WELL-ORDERED REPUBLIC

Reading in context, there is rarely any doubt as to what these authors mean,
especially if we keep the passage from Livy firmly in mind.
Having characterized the republican alternative to monarchy, the classical re-
publicans then go on to extol republican government on the grounds that it is the
only political order in which people genuinely enjoy freedom or liberty:

[P]eople never had any real Liberty, till they were possess’d of the power of …
changing Governments, enacting and repealing Laws, together with a power of
chusing and deputing whom they pleased to this work, as often as they should
judge expedient, for their own well-being, and the good of the Publike.
(Nedham 1650, 10)

[Filmer asserts] that the greatest liberty in the world is for a people to live un-
der a monarch… . If it be liberty to live under such a government, I desire to
know what is slavery. … [T]he Grecians, Italians, Gauls, Germans, Spaniards,
and Carthaginians … were esteemed free nations, because they abhorred such a
subjection. They were, and would be governed only by laws of their own making.
(Sidney 1698, 17)

It is not … the mere possession of liberty that denominates a citizen or commu-

nity free, but that security for the possession of it which arises from … a free
government … .
(Price 1778, 82)

A free republic is the best of governments, and the greatest blessing which mortals
can aspire to. … [And] an empire of laws is a characteristic of a free republic only.
(Adams 1797, 87)

Hence the habitual tendency of these authors to employ the terms ‘republic’ and
‘free state’ interchangeably: in effect, they mean the same thing, because to en-
joy freedom is precisely to live in a society answering to the popular control and
empire of laws conditions.
The final step is to observe that when the classical republicans praise the freedom
or liberty enjoyed by the citizens of a republic, they mean freedom in a particu-
lar sense—specifically, they mean freedom from domination.³³ Sidney expresses
this perhaps most clearly. As he says, “the liberty asserted is not a licentiousness
of doing what is pleasing” (1698, 9).³⁴ Rather, “liberty solely consists in an inde-
pendency upon the will of another,” whereas “by the name of slave we understand

33 On this point, see especially Skinner (1984, 1986, 1998), Pettit (1997), and Viroli (2002).
3⁴ Compare Milton: “none can love freedom heartilie, but good men; the rest love not freedom, but
licence” (1649, 53); or Nedham: “Freedom … consists not in a License to do what you list, but … in
having wholesome Laws suted to ever Man’s state and condition” (1650, 9); or Price: “Licentiousness,
which has been commonly mentioned, as an extreme of liberty, is indeed its opposite” (1778, 27).
 INTRODUCTION 15

a man, who can neither dispose of his person nor goods, but enjoys all at the will
of his master” (1698, 17).³⁵ In other words, freedom does not mean the absence of
constraint or interference, but the absence of domination. The relevant distinction
is most clearly drawn in the case of the kindly master who frequently lets his ser-
vant do as he please, without intervening. On the republican view, the subject of
the kindly master remains unfree: the “weight of chains, number of stripes, hard-
ness of labour, and other effects of a master’s cruelty, may make one servitude
more miserable than another,” but nevertheless “he is a slave who serves the best
and gentlest man in the world, as well as he who serves the worst” (1698, 441).³⁶
While often couched in a rhetorical contrast between freedom and slavery, it was
monarchy that the early modern republicans most centrally had in mind. The real
teeth in the theory was the claim the subjects of a monarch are not free, even when
some particular monarch happens to be benevolent. “I denie not but that ther may
be such a king, who may regard the common good before his own,” writes Milton,
but “it behoves not a wise nation to commit the sum of thir wellbeing, the whole
state of thir safeie to fortune” (1660, 434).³⁷ Later, the same reasoning could be used
to argue that even the wives of benevolent husbands are not free, and later still that
even the employees of benevolent employers are not free. Properly understood,
the republican conception of freedom has radical implications, as indeed its more
perceptive critics plainly recognized (more on this shortly).
Notice, however, that while the classical republicans present their views very
differently from contemporary republicans, their main ideas are structurally the
same. The classical republicans talk about liberty, by which they mean non-
domination; and they hold that people cannot enjoy liberty except in a republic,
which they define as a political order answering to the empire of law and pop-
ular control conditions. This is logically equivalent to the three core principles
articulated in the previous section.
Now for the transmission story.³⁸ The basic materials for republican theory
were latent in ancient sources readily available to early modern readers with a
humanistic education—most especially, Cicero, Sallust, Livy, and the Corpus Ju-
ris. It was the writers actually living in the renaissance republics of Northern Italy
who began to fit the pieces together. Of these, by far the most profoundly influ-
ential was Machiavelli, whose Discorsi on Livy may be regarded as the founding
text of the classical republican tradition: most of the main ideas circulating in
republican literature for the next two centuries could be found in at least some

3⁵ Compare Trenchard and Gordon: “Liberty is, to live upon one’s own terms; slavery is, to live at
the mere mercy of another” (1755, 430).
3⁶ Compare Price: “while held under the power of masters,” people “cannot be denominated free
however equitably and kindly they may be treated” (1778, 77).
3⁷ “I could never be perswaded,” says John Hall, that it would be “happy for a people … to be numbred
as the herd and Inheritance of One to whose lust and madness they were absolutely subject” (1651, 1).
3⁸ Many have contributed to the telling of this story, including most famously Robbins (1959),
Pocock (1975), and Skinner (1998). Hammersley (2020) provides an excellent recent overview.
16 THE WELL-ORDERED REPUBLIC

embryonic form in that work.³⁹ The Discorsi were translated into English and
widely read in the seventeenth century. Their tremendous influence is apparent
from the frequency with which English republicans such as Harrington and Ned-
ham heap praise on the ‘divine Machiavel’ and deploy his ideas in their political
writings.
After the restoration, some of the English republicans more or less retired from
public life, while others such as Sidney fled to Holland, where they influenced and
where influenced in turn by the Dutch republicans. Republican ideas resurfaced
during the Exclusion crisis, especially in the writings of Sidney and Neville, both of
whom drew on Machiavelli directly, as well as on Harrington and the other earlier
English republicans.
After the revolution of 1688, republicanism entered a period of relative intel-
lectual stagnation, but the tradition was nevertheless kept alive by the so-called
‘real Whigs’—an expression which derived from Molesworth’s preface to the 1721
edition of his translation of Fracogallia.⁴⁰ One of the more important vehicles by
which republican ideas bridged the eighteenth century consisted of repeated re-
publications of the classic republican texts. John Toland published new editions
of Milton, Hall, Harrington, Neville, and Sidney around the turn of the century;
and about the same time, John Darby published works by Milton, Sidney, Har-
rington, and the Dutch republican Pieter de la Court.⁴¹ These volumes would
have been found on the bookshelves of republican sympathizers throughout Eng-
land and America. Among these, the wealthy Thomas Hollis was later moved to
publish new, handsomely bound critical editions of the canonical texts around
mid-century. Sidney, Nedham, Harrington, Molesworth, and others came out in
this series.
Hollis was lavish in distributing these editions to libraries throughout England
and America, and so it was that when the American revolution came, republican
ideas were ready to hand.⁴² Adams reprinted extensive passages from Machiavelli
and Sidney in his Defense of the Constitutions, and Jefferson praised Sidney as one
of the two most important inspirations for American political ideas (Locke be-
ing the other). Even Madison—who of all the American framers was most cagey
about his sources—clearly betrays the influence of Machiavelli in a 1792 editorial
attacking Hamilton’s nascent federalist party, which he titled “Who Are the Best
Keepers of the People’s Liberties?”⁴³

3⁹ Ironically, it was only just as the classical tradition was coming to a close that Madison, Woll-
stonecraft, and the American labor republicans began to move beyond Machiavelli in a decisive
manner.
⁴⁰ The preface was subsequently published independently as the Principles of a Real Whig.
⁴1 Presumably to enhance sales, Darby’s 1702 edition of Pieter de la Court’s True Interest and Political
Maxims of the Republick of Holland claims the more famous John De Witt as its author.
⁴2 For a detailed study of the influence of republican ideas on the framers, see Sellers (1994).
⁴3 Machiavelli’s Discourses, book one, Chapter 5, is titled “Whether the Safeguarding of Liberty
can be more safely entrusted to the Populace or to the Upper Class.” Madison’s editorial agrees with
Another random document with
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 No. 20. A PIGEON.

The breast and wings of a pigeon may be raised in the same way
as those of a partridge (see No. 18); or the bird may be carved
entirely through in the line a b. For the second course, pigeons
should be dished upon young delicate water-cresses.
 No. 21. A SNIPE.

This bird is trussed, roasted, and served exactly like a woodcock.

It is not of a size to require any carving, beyond dividing in two, if at
all.
 No. 22. A GOOSE.

The skin below the breast, called the apron, must first be cut off in
a circular direction as indicated by the letters a a a, when a glass of
port-wine or of claret, ready mixed with a teaspoonful of mustard,
may be poured into the body or not, at choice. Some of the stuffing
should then be drawn out with a spoon, and the neck of the goose,
which ought to be to the right and not to the left hand, as here, being
turned a little towards the carver, the flesh of the breast should be
sliced in the lines from b b b to c c c, on either side of the bone. The
wings may then be taken off like those of any other bird, and then
the legs, which, in the engraving No. 22, are trussed so completely
under the apron as to render their outline scarcely distinguishable.
Graceful and well-skilled carvers never turn birds on their sides to
remove any of the joints, but those of a goose, unless it be very
young, are sometimes severed from it with difficulty; and the
common directions for assisting the process in that case are, to turn
it on its side, and with the fork to press down the small end of the
leg; then to pass the knife quite under it from the top down to the
joint, when the leg should be turned back from the bird with the fork,
while the thigh-bone is loosened from its socket with the knife. The
end of the pinion marked d is then held down in the same manner, to
facilitate the separation of the bones at e, from which point the knife
is drawn under the wing, which it takes off. The merrythought of a
goose is small, and, to remove it the knife must first be turned a little
from the neck, after the flesh has been cut through, and then passed
under it, back towards the neck. For the remainder of the carving,
the directions for that of a fowl will suffice.
 DUCKS.

Tame ducks are served with the feet (which are liked by many
people) left upon them and trussed up over the backs. If large they
may be carved like a goose, but when very young may be disjointed
like chickens; the only material difference between them being the
position of the thigh-joints, which lie much further towards the back-
bone than those of a fowl.
 No. 23. A WILD DUCK.

The breasts of wild-fowl are the only parts of them held in much
estimation, and these are carved in slices from the legs to the neck
The legs and pinions may, if required, be taken off exactly like those
of a pheasant.
 No. 24. A TURKEY.

The carving of a turkey commences by taking slices off the breast,

from the letters b b quite through the forcemeat, which lies under the
letter a, to c c: the greater part of the flesh of the wings is thus taken
off likewise. When the bird is boned and filled with sausage or other
forcemeat, the breast is carved entirely across in the direction d e,
nearly, or quite down to the back, which it is better not altogether to
divide at first, as the appearance of the turkey is not then so good.
When it has been prepared in the ordinary manner, after the breast
has been disposed of, the pinions and the legs may be taken off, the
first in the line from f to g, and the latter by passing the knife under it
at h, and bringing it down to the joint at i j, where it must be taken off
in the line shown. The whole of the joints being in form exactly like
those of a fowl, may be separated in the same manner. The gizzard
is more commonly eaten broiled after having been scored, and very
highly seasoned with cayenne and with a sufficiency of salt, than in
any other way. A slice or portion of the liver should be served with
the white flesh of the turkey as far as possible.
 No. 25. A HARE.

A hare should be placed with its head to the left of the carver,
therefore the engraving No. 25 shows it turned in the wrong
direction. It is so very great an improvement to take out the back-
bone before a hare is roasted, that we would recommend it to be
done wherever it can be so without difficulty: it may then be carved in
the line a b quite through, or only partially so at choice. When the
bone remains in, slices may be taken down the whole length of the
back from c c to d d; the legs, which, next to the back, are
considered the best eating, may then be taken off in the direction e f
and the flesh divided from or served upon them, after the small
bones have been parted from the thighs. The shoulders, which are
not generally much esteemed, though sometimes liked by
sportsmen, may next be taken off by passing the knife at the letters g
h between the joint and the body. When a hare is young, the back is
sometimes divided at the joints into three or four parts, after being
freed from the ribs and under-skin.
 No. 26. A FRICANDEAU OF VEAL.

This is usually stewed, or rather braised sufficiently tender to be

divided with a spoon, and requires no carving; but the fat (or
underpart of the fillet) attached to it, marked a a a, which is
sometimes, but not invariably served with it now, may be carved in
even slices. The larding differs somewhat from that which we have
described, but the mode shown here allows the fricandeau to be
glazed with more facility.
The engraving of the entrée No. 26 is intended merely to show the
manner of dishing the cutlets. They may be of mutton, lamb, veal, or
pork; and the centre may be filled with the sauce or stewed,
vegetable appropriate to either; as soubise, purée of asparagus, of
mushrooms, or of tomatas; or green peas à la Française, stewed
cucumbers, or aught else that is suited to the kind of meat which is
served.
 Plate 1.

1
COD’S HEAD.

2
TURBOT.
 3
MIDDLE OF SALMON.

H. Adlard, sc.
 Plate 2.

4
SADDLE OF MUTTON.

5
HAUNCH OF VENISON.
 6
SIRLOIN OF BEEF.

H. Adlard, sc.
 Plate 3.

7
LEG OF MUTTON.

8
QUARTER OF LAMB.
 9
SHOULDER OF MUTTON.

H. Adlard sc.
 Plate 4.

10
SUCKING PIG.

11
BREAST OF VEAL.

H. Adlard, sc.
 Plate 5.

12
OX-TONGUE.

13
CALF’S HEAD.
 14
HAM.

H. Adlard, sc.
 Plate 6.

15
PHEASANT.

18
PARTRIDGE.

19
WOODCOCK.
 16
BOILED FOWL.

20
PIGEON.

21
SNIPE.
 17
ROAST FOWL.

H. Adlard, sc.