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Grammar,
P h i lo soph y,
and Logic
Bruce silver
Grammar, Philosophy, and Logic
Bruce Silver
Grammar,
Philosophy, and
Logic
Bruce Silver
Department of Philosophy
University of South Florida
Tampa, FL, USA
vii
viii Acknowledgments
Epilogue 179
ix
x Contents
S
elected Bibliography 193
Index 201
Introduction
William James suggests that the efforts of major philosophers and their
philosophies from at least the seventeenth century into the early twenti-
eth century take a back seat to the sciences where the issue is “practical
power.” The official position is that scientists develop theories, interrogate
nature, and frequently, though not always, arrive at empirically verified
answers that shape the world to human advantage. Not every scientist
sees things in just this way. C.S. Peirce (1831–1914), the most scientifi-
cally minded American pragmatist, insists that “True science is distinc-
tively the study of useless things. For the useful things will get studied
without the aid of scientific men. To employ these rare minds on such
work is like running a steam engine by burning diamonds.”1
Philosophers frequently deal with looming “Why?” questions that
provoke thought but that provide no concrete solutions to problems
that confront us as we try to get about in the world. No one can rea-
sonably doubt that James and his fellow pragmatists address philo-
sophical debates and tensions that the sciences and common sense
cannot helpfully address: is the world material or spiritual? In what
does self-consciousness or personal identity consist? Does God exist,
and if he does, what difference does his existence make in the lives of
believers? Are we free or determined when we choose? What is the
nature of truth?
xi
xii Introduction
These questions are fine as far as they go, but insofar as each of them
exceeds actual knowledge, we are left with James’s familiar reminder:
(1)
In a biting review of Pinker’s The Sense of Style, the critic John Preston
holds nothing back and after calling Pinker “a colossal windbag, never
using three words when 35 can be rammed into the breach,” he adds: “As
you hack through endless thickets of Dangling Modifiers and Possessive
Adjectives, it becomes increasingly clear that Pinker doesn’t have any-
thing new to say, and that anyone who follows his example is far more
likely to end up writing waffle and bilge than War and Peace.”6 I believe
that I have something new to say. I also believe Preston’s peevish assess-
ment of Pinker’s book is overstated, even though his complaint has led
me to reassess a good deal that Pinker and other grammarians and lin-
guists say about subpar English.
Preston objects to Pinker’s bias and criticizes him for approvingly
quoting the prose of his wife’s Betraying Spinoza (2009) and his friend
Richard Dawkins’s Unweaving the Rainbow (2006).7 Preston does not
gratuitously indulge in ad hominems or object to the style, syntax, and
grammar of these authors. He merely points out that Pinker is not entirely
even-handed in his treatment of authors who are his good friends, his
notable colleagues or his wife. I agree with Preston that when it comes to
detecting and correcting errors in speech and writing, being unusually
kind to friends, colleagues, and kin is inappropriate.
Readers of these chapters will find an analysis of overworked words,
constructions, and phrases that usually pass unnoticed but that are out of
place in fine prose. Pinker and I occasionally travel the same road, but I
strive to achieve the simplicity that I defend in good philosophical writ-
ing while Pinker’s arguments and justifications strike me as sometimes
more labored than they should be. This fact is surprising insofar as Pinker
frequently defends a phrase for its economy or criticizes a sentence that is
wordy and cumbersome. I try hard to issue my brief for simplicity and
economy in all the chapters that follow and deal almost exclusively with
these values in Chap. 7. And once more, my principal weapon is the
value of applied philosophy and Aristotle’s laws of thought to eliminate
constructions that miscarry in grammatical prose and word choice.
xvi Introduction
(2)
Many writers worry with just cause about the first sentence or page of their
manuscripts. What if that sentence is not intriguing? What if it immedi-
ately fails to capture the attention of acquisitions editors? What becomes of
these writers and their proposals? The answers are common and disap-
pointing. Competition for a place on every publisher’s list is fierce.
If authors are unknown, they fret that an editor will ignore their drafts
or will not read beyond the title or first paragraph of their proposal. They
worry nearly as much that an editor who looks beyond the opening page
will be unimpressed. They fear receiving a formulaic letter in a thin envelop,
a letter that politely begins “Thank you for submitting your proposal.
Unfortunately, your project does not fit our publishing list. We wish you all
the best in your search for another publisher.” This polite rejection leads the
author to the painful belief that an editor does not think much of her sub-
mission. The author believes correctly or incorrectly that editors, including
those whose budgets are tight, cannot find room for a manuscript that
strikes them as good, that earns favorable pre-publication peer reviews but
that has little chance of selling even a few hundred copies.
Established authors are somewhat less apprehensive that editors will
reject their proposals, but they have different worries. These authors
might have agents and notable publications. Their concern is different
from that of unknown authors but is serious. They wonder whether their
published essays will attract readers, whether their books will have favor-
able reviews in major journals, newspapers and online sites or, worse,
whether they will draw the attention of any reviewers. They belong to the
set of authors who, in the celebrated words of the David Hume (“My
Own Life,” April 1776), are apprehensive that their writing will fall
“dead-born from the press.”
What does my fretful prolog have to do with this book? Is it a digres-
sion? No. I am an academically trained professor of philosophy and pri-
marily a self-taught student of English language and literature. My
specialties are the history of modern philosophy, American philosophy
and formal logic, yet I have chosen to write about grammar, syntax, and
diction as they intersect with what we learn from philosophers and logi-
cians. I have suggested that what I have learned over many years of teach-
Introduction
xvii
(3)
My secondary worry is unsurprising and is one that I share with gram-
marians. Can I persuade readers that what passes for acceptable prose and
speech is too often unacceptable? Will they think that yet another book
about grammar, syntax, and diction enriches them in any way that mat-
ters? Will they agree that knowing what critical philosophers and logi-
cians demand in their fields of inquiry serves to develop their talents as
authors and lecturers?
If I am guilty of hubris in writing this book, I offer a partial defense by
recalling my high school and undergraduate college education. I belong to
a generation that had to master English and Latin grammar, learn how to
parse sentences, know how to identify parts of speech and distinguish them
from parts of a sentence. I learned the difference between the jussive and
potential subjunctive mood.8 My contemporaries and I were also required
to master at least one modern language and, preferably, two. The assump-
tion was that undergraduate students, graduate students and educators
who knew French, German, or Spanish were better equipped to grasp the
rules and subtitles of English. Today, in our multicultural world, there are
much better reasons to acquire fluency in languages other than English.
xviii Introduction
quote or to whom I refer, I favor “use” over “usage” and will not refer in this
book to “usage” in my attempt to do more than complain about the current
state of the English language.)
(4)
I think that Stanford Pritchard makes a compelling point in his updated
appendix to Strunk and White: “As I said..., grammar and usage are not
God-given and immutable; they go through changes and metamorpho-
ses. I just happen to think that if something works well, and has worked
well for a long time, there ought to be a good, convincing and logical
reason to change it.”10 I try hard to follow his lead.
I believe with Pinker that talking about fixed rules of grammar rou-
tinely involves appealing to the past and that what was regarded as fine
speech and writing in the mists of history sometimes seems arbitrary and
stylized to our twenty-first-century eyes, ears, and brains. His impatience
with dwelling on what once served well is unambiguous:
Most of the prescriptive rules of the language mavens make no sense on any
level. They are bits of folklore that originated for screwball reasons several
hundred years ago and have perpetuated themselves ever since. For as long
as they have existed, speakers have flouted them, spawning identical plaints
about the imminent decline of the language century after century. All the
best writers in English at all periods, including Shakespeare and most of
the mavens themselves, have been among the flagrant flouters.11
Still, agreeing with Pinker does not entail supporting all that he says. For
example, he writes in the Guardian (August 15, 2014), page 1:
Genuine descriptivists are like capable social scientists, and “should” falls
outside the scope of their proper concerns. They have no business admon-
ishing people to write or to speak in a specific manner. Their job is to
describe and to explain the facts. But urging people to speak and to write
“however they please” or as Chaucer wrote is not descriptivism. In fact,
urging or persuasion of any kind is not the business of descriptivists. They
must not play the role of descendants of the French Renaissance human-
ist Rabelais whose fraternal Thelemites’ motto was “Do What You Wish.
Do as You Will.”14
That the rules of English grammar and phrasing as well as declarations
about proper diction and syntax do not enjoy the status of immutable
truths or the fixity of mathematical equations is indisputable, but one
should not conclude that these grammatical rules are uniformly arbitrary.
Philosophers of science are fond of pointing out what scientists them-
selves have known for a long time: inductive generalities are the marrow
of the physical sciences, the life sciences, and the social sciences, but nei-
ther Charles’s law of the expansion of gases nor Newton’s inverse-square
law is a necessary truth that enjoys the same level of certainty as “The
interior angles of a Euclidean triangle equal 180 degrees.” If only one
exception to either of these scientific laws emerges and is objectively vali-
dated, the law must be modified or the law must die. What bearing does
this fact have on an analysis of English use?
Introduction
xxi
(5)
In the middle of the seventeenth century, the grammarian and mathema-
tician John Wallis declared, naturally in Latin (Grammatica Linguae
Anglicanae, 1653), that the first person singular and plural in English
requires us to express the future as “I shall” and “We shall” and that in the
second and third person future, “will” replaces “shall.”19 Somehow, this
entirely arbitrary pattern became Wallis’s rule. This rule acquired the sta-
tus of a law that many grammarians and fine writers still support. The
rule was unquestioned doctrine in my salad days.
Generations of British and American educators insist that Wallis’s rule
is binding and is an example of cultivated English. Those of us who vio-
late the rule are often penalized for our word choice. Apart from Wallis’s
authority as an influential man of letters in his day, there is no basis for
the rule, and for more than three centuries some stylists as well as sticklers
for correct grammar have been divided. Some of them have ignored
Wallis’s imperative while others have demanded that writers defer to
Wallis, presumably because his rule was binding for excellent writers of
the Enlightenment in England.
Twenty-first-century authors who disregard the rule are not always
contrarians. They ignore the rule because they believe that the basis for
Wallis’s imperative is arbitrary and elective. Other examples of what
Introduction
xxiii
(6)
The status of the rules of grammar is markedly different from that of
words. The contrast is stark between the principles that govern how we
ought to speak and write on the one hand and the vocabulary with which
we express ourselves on the other hand. Neologisms pop up constantly;
they always have. Purists and traditionalists dislike the quartet of “impact,”
“access,” “parent,” and “reference” as verbs. They maintain impatiently
but impotently that if these words are verbs, they should not be. They
wonder when, how, and why these nouns retain their substantive status
even as they lead a double life as verbs, and they dislike what they read
and hear. They object to “parenting” but might not be aware that before
men and women “parented” (“The horror! The horror!”) and “raised”
children, they “grew” wheat and “reared” their offspring. Just as “There is
no new thing under the sun,” nothing is remarkable about the constant
appearance of neologisms in English.
Purists or traditionalists deplore the use of “hopefully” as parenthetic
rather than as adverbial or modal but seem to be much less disturbed or
entirely undisturbed by the non-adverbial, parenthetic use of adverbs such
as “happily,” “sadly,” “luckily,” “regrettably,” “incidentally,” “honestly,”
“frankly,” and “thankfully.”24 Jason Gay misuses “Thankfully” when he
writes on the first page of The Wall Street Journal, January 6, 2014, “End of
an Era—Thankfully.” Is this headline any worse than “End of an Era—
Hopefully”? No. Neither of them improves the phase to which it is attached.
The list of selective corrections and objections to many words is long,
but I do not wish to end it just yet; therefore, I include a few additional
observations now and will not to return to them, except in passing, in
subsequent chapters.
Years ago an obscure linguist and political philosopher spoke elo-
quently on NPR about the entrenched racial divisions in the United
States and then closed his commentary by objecting to the slogan of the
United Negro College Fund: “A mind is a terrible thing to waste.” He
insisted that the correct slogan should have been “To waste and mind is a
terrible thing.” Was his plea for revision justified? Yes and no.
Introduction
xxv
familiar with their reminder and dislike “as it were” wherever and whenever
I encounter it. Aquinas was the greatest medieval philosopher. His influ-
ence in philosophy, Catholic theology, and literature is difficult to exagger-
ate. Dante’s Divine Comedy is underpinned by Aquinas’s Summae and so
too are portions of Milton’s Protestant Paradise Lost, but Aquinas’s Latin
has no bearing on my distaste for “as it were.” We do not have to be
reminded how important Aquinas was in shaping the philosophical con-
tent of the high Middle Ages and beyond. This reminder of Aquinas’s influ-
ence is irrelevant insofar as his philosophical talents and queries have no
bearing on my objection to “as it were.”
My riposte will leave critics unimpressed insofar as they believe the
most I can say is that I dislike empty phrases that add nothing to the
meaning of a sentence or statement in which they are written or spoken.
That these phrases are empty will not be enough. We know from contem-
porary philosophers and linguists, and before them from Bishop George
Berkeley (1685–1753), that language has many functions and that artic-
ulating meaningful propositions is only one of them. Expressing emo-
tions and venting passions is another function.
There are other ends, as the raising of some passion, the exciting to or
deferring from an action, the putting the mind in some particular disposi-
tion; to which the former is in many cases barely subservient, and some-
times entirely omitted, when these can be obtained without it, as I think
doth not infrequently happen in the familiar use of language. I entreat the
reader to reflect with himself, and see if it doth not happen, either in hear-
ing or reading a discourse, that the passions of fear, love hatred imagina-
tion, and disdain, and the like, arise immediately in his mind upon the
perception of certain words…25
Some of us can dislike words that are invented or phrases that leave us,
as Hume puts it, “discomposed and much ruffled,” but democracy trumps
what we dislike. Later in the book I will establish, not simply affirm, that
some phrases are a poor fit in refined English speech and writing. For
now I hope that readers will be open to my view that many phrases are
meaningless and add nothing but extra words and clutter to the sentences
in which we find them. No phrase is made more appealing merely because
Introduction
xxvii
Good words, whatever they are and however they have acquired their
credentials, are the ones that we keep even when they fall into disuse.
Liberal protests that language and its changes are inseparable and that
every word began its life as a newcomer are not enough to gain impartial
attention and agreement from the conservative literati. What William
James says about competing philosophies applies just as well to the vis-
ceral clash that separates grammatical conservatives from revisionists or
liberals: “In manners we find formalists and free-and-easy persons. In
government, authoritarians and anarchists. In literature, purists or aca-
demicals, and realists, In art, classics and romantics.”28
Temperamental preferences can never qualify as entry-level credentials
for debates. That we prefer what appeals to our tastes or sense of refinement
is beyond question, but arguing about preferences and tastes is no more
productive than the attempts by friendly combatants who try hopelessly to
persuade each other that Pepsi-Cola is better tasting than Coca-Cola or the
converse. The philosopher G.E. Moore established convincingly, and did
not merely affirm, that there really is no disputing tastes.29
Those of us who have the temerity to write and to lecture about gram-
mar, syntax, and style frequently wish that we had the authority to ignore
the vox populi and to proscribe the use of words and phrases that we do not
like. Since we do not have that authority, I will simply list some of the
words and phrases that I dislike so that they do not infect any of the argu-
ments to come. Again, nothing else that I say in the next seven chapters and
epilogue is simply an expression of my impatience. In them I disparage
taste as a guide to fine writing. Here I do nothing more than give my read-
ers a hint where I am coming from even as I dislike “I know where you’re
coming from.” None of these words, phrases or questions is at home in
what I write or say: “It is what it is,” “worse-case scenario,” “icon,” “surreal,”
“incentivize,” “behaviors,” “harms,” “ongoing,” “insightful,” “physicality,”
“presently” (for “currently”), “begs the question,” “hard copy,” “prioritize,”
“disambiguation,” “flunk,” “going forward,” “at the end of the day,” “the
bottom line,” “lack thereof,” “part of the equation,” “do the math,” “crunch
the numbers,” “on the same page,” “to gift,” “boots on the ground,” “inter-
national community,” “backs against the wall” (the cry of every baseball
player whose team faces elimination from the playoffs), “level playing
field,” “game changer,” “since day one,” “vocabulary words,” “What have
xxx Introduction
you got?” (What would television detective shows do without “got”?), “The
reality is,” “part of the puzzle,” “The reason is because,” “I would hope
that,” “vehicle” (When did dealers stop selling automobiles and trucks?), “a
disconnect,” “to dialogue,” “to task,” “quote/unquote,” “to interface,” “pub-
lic persona,” “talk with” instead of the stronger “talk to,” “conversation” (a
fine word until panelists on television and radio declare that an alternative
to armed attacks between nations and sects is for the combatants to have a
conversation), “the new normal,” “as of late,” “The thing of it is,” and “the
fact that.” Strunk insists “the expression the fact that should be revised out
of every sentence in which it occurs.”30 What has become of “lately”? When
did the adjective “late” come to be an object of the preposition “of”? I say
more about “as of late” in Chap. 7.
I add “partner” as another word with which I am impatient when it
refers to a couple who may or may not be married but who presumably
love each other. I find something cold and detached about the word for
such “entangling alliances” and think immediately of partners in a law or
accounting firm or a medical practice. Far from being in love, these part-
ners might dislike each other. They remain together only for the money.
Why do speakers and journalists who refer to “part of the equation”
rarely have in mind anything close to a mathematical equivalence? “Rising
grocery and prescription drug prices cause concern, but economists
maintain that in evaluating the GDP, retail sales are only part of the equa-
tion.”31 Why do writers who identify “part of the puzzle” almost never
mean a portion of a challenging newspaper crossword puzzle or a mounted
picture cut with a jigsaw into 500 interlocking pieces?
Respondents will answer that my list is too literal and that I have no
eye nor ear nor brain for metaphors, similes, and the colorful expansion
of English. I disagree. My best response, which is not enough to satisfy
critics, is that I welcome metaphors and similes that enrich language and
are far from numbing. I have no desire to deprive English of its color or
to behave as a strict traditionalist with respect to change. I hold, however,
that refusing to call an expression an “equation” when it fails to designate
a mathematical equivalence or some other expression a puzzle when it is
not a “puzzle” does nothing to diminish opportunities to craft appealing
sentences and declarations.
Another random document with
no related content on Scribd:
"Kun nainen sanoo vihaavansa miestä —"
Kymmenes luku.
"Aivan varma."
"Teillä näyttää olevan niin kovin kiire", sanoi hän epäröiden. "Minä
luulin — niin — ehkä teillä sittenkin oli jotakin määrättyä
mielessänne. Vai kuinka?"
"Brannon", sanoi hän, "kun te lähditte äsken ulos, oli teillä aikomus
etsiä Denver käsiinne ja tappaa hänet!"
"Enpä luule."
Yhdestoista luku.
Denver oli tappanut Brannonin, siitä hän oli varma. Sillä hän oli
lähettänyt Brannonin pois aseettomana, hyvin tietäen, että Denverillä
yhä oli sama ase vyöllään, jota hän oli yrittänyt käyttää Brannonin
ilmestyttyä akkunaan. Brannonista oli nyt tullut hänen järjettömän,
aseita kohtaan tuntemansa ennakkoluulon uhri. Hän tiesi nyt, että
hänen katsantokantansa oli ollut aivan väärä, sillä koska kaikki
Lännen miehet kantoivat asetta, niin oli Brannonkin siihen pakoitettu
jo itsepuolustuksenkin kannalta. Nyt saattoi Josephine käsittää
arvoituksellisen katseen, jonka hän Brannonin silmissä oli nähnyt
hänen jättäessään pistoolinsa pöydälle. Vallitseva sävy siinä oli ollut
jonkinlainen häikäilemätön vaaran halveksunta.
Josephine hätkähti sielussaan nousevaa kuvaa, kuinka Denver oli
ampunut Brannonin. Hän ei vähääkään epäillyt, että Brannon yhtä
kylmän tyynesti oli ottanut vastaan kuolettavan luodin kuin hän oli
jättänyt aseensakin pöydälle.
Kahdestoista luku.
Denveriä ei näkynyt.
Sittenkin Brannon odotti, sillä hän tunsi Denverin. Jos hän oli
päättänyt käyttää rihlaansa, jota hän erinomaisesti olisi voinut
käsitellä esimerkiksi asuntolan akkunassa, niin olisi rakennusten
välinen kenttä tullut hyvin vaaralliseksi liikkumapaikaksi.
Hän ei itse ollut varma, pitikö hän tytöstä. Ainakin hän häntä sääli
— sääli sen vuoksi, että jos tyttö yritti muuttaa sen seudun tapoja ja
tottumuksia, johon hän sattumalta oli tullut, niin oli hän varmasti
epäonnistuva aikeissaan. Hänellä oli rohkeutta puolustaa
mielipiteitään ja mielipiteethän ovat vallan paikallaan aatteina, vaikka
useimmat ihmiset pitävät mielipiteensä hämärässä puolitajussa ja
seuraavat jatkuvasti vain hetken mielijohteita. Sehän se tekeekin
ihmiset inhimillisiksi.
"Hän noudattaa omaa päätään liian paljon", oli Brannonin
seuraava ajatus. "Hän koettaa istuttaa tänne Idän ajatustapoja,
toivoen hävittävänsä meikäläiset, joko sitten tahdomme tai emme.
Hän olisi sietämätön, ellei —."
"Mutta Itä ei ole Länsi", ajatteli hän taas, "ja minä luulen että hän
pian pääsee siitä perille."
Brannon sai tämän käsityksen siitä, että miehen oikea polvi oli
vedetty eteenpäin ja oikea käsi oli aivan polven vieressä velttona ja
vääntyneenä.
Hän oli ilmeisesti juuri tullut tajuihinsa ja mietti mitä oli tapahtunut.