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Global Rogues and Regional Orders
Global Rogues
and Regional Orders
The Multidimensional Challenge
of North Korea and Iran

Il Hyun Cho

1
1
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Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Cho, Il Hyun, author.
Global rogues and regional orders : the multidimensional challenge of North
Korea and Iran / Il Hyun Cho.
p. cm.
Includes bibliographical references and index.
ISBN 978–0–19–935547–1 (hardback : acid-free paper)
1. Nuclear nonproliferation—Korea (North) 2. Nuclear nonproliferation—Iran.
3. Nuclear nonproliferation—Middle East. 4. Nuclear nonproliferation—East
Asia. 5. Regionalism. 6. Security, International. 7. United States—Foreign
relations—East Asia. 8. United States—Foreign relations—Middle East. I. Title.
JZ5675.C455 2015
327.1’747095193—dc23
2015016972

9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1

Printed in the United States of America on acid-free paper

CONTENTS

Acknowledgments   vii

1. Nuclear Proliferation and Regional Order: A Framework

for Analysis    1
2. The Global Proliferation Approach    27
3. The North Korean Challenge and Regional Role Conceptions
in East Asia    49
4. The Clinton Administration and the East Asian
Regional Order    77
5. The Bush Doctrine and the East Asian Regional Order    99
6. Iran’s Nuclear Pursuit and the Shifting Regional Order
in the Middle East    124
7. Proliferation and Future Regional Orders in East Asia
and the Middle East    147
Epilogue    165

Notes   177
Index   233
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

One of the key messages that I wanted to convey in this book is that polit-
ical actors perceive a seemingly common problem in starkly different
ways. In the process of envisioning, conducting, and writing this research,
I have benefited enormously from many individuals. Like many political
actors discussed in this book, they were often drawn to vastly different
aspects of the project. Unlike the diverse and competing political actors
examined in this book, however, the people that I have met were invaria-
bly helpful. It is their guidance, criticism, and encouragement that helped
me navigate the bewildering and at times seemingly never-ending process
of completing this book.
This project began as a doctoral dissertation written at Cornell Uni-
versity, where I had the privilege of having Peter Katzenstein as my dis-
sertation supervisor. Peter’s scholarly achievements and commitment to
students are legendary in the field of International Relations. However, I
am still in awe of his uncanny ability to offer the perfect mix of prodding
and encouragement, always at the right time. Peter has deeply shaped my
thinking on global and regional dynamics and my scholarly endeavors
more generally. Even after my Ph.D. studies, Peter has continued to in-
spire me as scholar and co-author. I will strive to pay back to my students
what I learned from him.
Matthew Evangelista was also inspirational in many ways and offered
tremendous help with his careful reading of and extensive suggestions on
numerous drafts of the dissertation. Matt’s insightful comments on do-
mestic politics in particular were crucial to sharpening the book’s argu-
ment. I am also grateful to Jae-Jung Suh who provided penetrating
feedback on numerous occasions, including several times from the other
side of the world during his own research trips to Asia. My thanks also go
to Allen Carlson who not only offered useful advice on my field research in
China but also provided invaluable comments on multiple versions of the
dissertation.
 Apart from my dissertation committee members, I am grateful to Jona-
than Kirshner, Chris Way, Valerie Bunce, Richard Bensel, and Elizabeth
Sanders for their advice and encouragement for this project. Prior to my
study at Cornell, it was Professor Jung-Hoon Lee, my advisor at the Grad-
uate School of International Studies at Yonsei University in Seoul, who
introduced me to the study of International Relations and encouraged me
to pursue doctoral studies. I owe a great deal of appreciation to him for
sparking my interest in international politics and profoundly shaping my
career plans. At Yonsei, Professors Jongryn Mo and Chung Min Lee also
provided helpful and timely guidance for which I am deeply grateful.
I wish to acknowledge with gratitude financial support for my research
from the following institutions: Cornell University’s Graduate School,
Mario Einaudi Center for International Studies, Peace Studies Program,
the Department of Government, and Harvard University’s Belfer Center
for Science and International Affairs (BCSIA). The Institute of Social Sci-
ences at the University of Tokyo and the Department of Political Science at
Stanford University facilitated my research and writing by granting me
visiting and exchange scholar status. I thank in particular Kenji Hi-
rashima of the University of Tokyo and Stephen Krasner, Gi-Wook Shin,
and Jessica Weeks of Stanford University. Some of the early findings were
presented at various conferences, including the annual meetings of the
American Political Science Association and the International Studies As-
sociation. I also presented portions of my research at the International
Security Program seminar and the Managing the Atom Project seminar at
the Belfer Center, where I received helpful feedback from Steven Miller,
Sean Lynn-Jones, Richard Rosecrance, Matt Bunn, Jeffrey Lewis, and
other participants.
Although I began drafting the book manuscript at Cleveland State Uni-
versity, I have completed most of the revisions for the book at Lafayette
College. I would like to thank my former colleagues in the Department of
Political Science at Cleveland State, especially Dave Elkins, Rodger Govea,
Chuck Hersch, and Jeff Lewis. I am also grateful to my current colleagues
in the Government and Law Department and the Asian Studies Program
at Lafayette, in particular Paul Barclay, Michael Feola, Ingrid Furniss,
Josh Miller, Bruce Murphy, Ilan Peleg, Robin Rinehart, Helena Silverstein,
and David Stifel, for their support and encouragement. I would like to
thank the Academic Research Committee at Lafayette for providing finan-
cial support for indexing. Melanie Furey provided helpful research assis-
tance for the chapter on Iran.
Beyond my home institutions, I owe a great deal of debt to many indi-
viduals and institutions. For this research I conducted numerous interviews

[ viii ] Acknowledgments
with government officials and regional experts at various governmental,
semi-governmental, and other research institutions in China, Japan, and
South Korea. I am grateful for their generous time and candid views. I had
many helping hands during my yearlong field research in East Asia. The re-
search for this book would have not been possible without their timely sup-
port and guidance. I am particularly grateful to Professor Gong Shaopeng of
the Chinese Foreign Affairs University and Professor Tang Shiping of the
Chinese Academy of Social Sciences and now at Fudan University. In South
Korea, I would like to thank Professors Jung-Hoon Lee and Sukhee Han of
Yonsei University, Professor Taeho Kim of Hallym University, Professor
Jaewoo Choo of Kyunghee University, and Professor Young Nam Cho of
Seoul National University. In Japan, Professor Norihito Kubota of the Na-
tional Defense Academy and Professors Kenji Hirashima and Gregory Noble
of the Institute of Social Sciences at the University of Tokyo were particu-
larly helpful.
For their friendship and moral support, I thank colleagues and friends
at Cornell and other institutions: Minhyo Bae, Tom Bielefeld, Munchul
Cho, Wooyoung Cho, Hong Duan, Jennifer Erickson, Dev Gupta, Stepha-
nie Hofmann, Hyeran Jo, Jai Kwan Jung, Hyunwook Kim, Junga Kim,
You-jin Kim, Tomas Larsson, Gun Lee, Col. Jong Bong Lee, Jay Lyall, Barak
Mendelsohn, Jae Jeok Park, Margarita Petrova, Andrew Phillips, Lisa San-
soucy, Scott Siegel, Moeun Sung, Yuriko Takahashi, Israel Waismel-Manor,
Steve Watts, Jessica Weeks, Hyunsik Woo, Andrew Yeo, Rong Yu, and
Maria Zaitseva.
Special thanks go to Angela Chnapko and her team at Oxford Univer-
sity Press. As a first time author, I was very fortunate to have Angela as my
editor, who patiently and skillfully shepherded this project into publica-
tion. I would also like to thank Princess Ikatekit, B. Gogulanathan, and
Susie Hara for their timely and valuable help in the copyediting and pro-
duction process. I am deeply grateful to two anonymous reviewers for
Oxford University Press, who provided insightful and detailed sets of
comments that helped me sharpen this book’s central argument and em-
pirical analysis. Needless to say, I am solely responsible for any errors that
remain in the book.
My parents, Gyu Yeol Cho and Seok Rye Kim, and parents-in-law,
Myung Soo Park and Young Ju Kim, have been enormously supportive
throughout my doctoral studies, and they deserve special thanks. They
not only provided comfortable places to stay during my field trips in Seoul,
their homes also served as invaluable research base camps from which I
made subsequent research trips to and from Beijing and Tokyo. Further-
more, they made several visits to the other side of the world to provide

Acknowledgments [ ix ]
care for my infant daughter and son in times of need. For that and more, I
am eternally grateful to them. I also wish to thank my sisters, Mi Young
and Mi Kyoung, and siblings-in-law, Seo-Jin and Chang-Seo, for their sup-
port and smiles.
More than anyone else, Seo-Hyun Park knows what the completion of
this book means to me. But she has no idea how much I admire her as a
scholar, a parent, and a person. Her intellect, love, and support have sus-
tained me throughout the long and arduous process of completing this
book. We have also shared great memories during our peripatetic journey
through various places in East Asia and the United States. The best we
share, of course, is our children, Emily Yuna and Jason Youngwu. Our
deepest sources of joy and pride, they have grown up so much while I was
working on this book and have now become avid readers themselves. I
hope they keep turning the page for more great stories. I dedicate this
book to Emily and Jason and their incredible mom and my irreplaceable
companion in life, both academic and otherwise, Seo-Hyun.

[x] Acknowledgments
Global Rogues and Regional Orders
CH A P TER 1

Nuclear Proliferation and Regional

Order
A Framework for Analysis

1.1 INTRODUCTION

The 2010 U.S. National Security Strategy singled out nuclear proliferation
as one of the gravest threats confronting the United States.1 In the past
decade, no other proliferation challenges have garnered more global atten-
tion than the nuclear ambitions of North Korea and Iran, two interna-
tional pariahs accused of accumulating or seeking nuclear weapons. These
“archetypal rogue states” not only violated numerous global nonprolifera-
tion rules and UN Security Council resolutions but also engaged in a series
of provocative actions, including nuclear or ballistic missile tests. The con-
ventional view about the decade-long nuclear conundrum is thus premised
on the presence of what is believed to be the uniquely dangerous and defi-
ant nature of the communist regime in Pyongyang and the clerical regime
in Tehran. This is why coercive measures, such as “crippling” sanctions or
preemptive strikes, are often deemed to be the most effective solution to
the current stalemate over the two global proliferation challenges.
This book contends that this “global” narrative, which is widespread in
the United States and other regions of the world, is fundamentally mis-
guided. It tends to downplay the views of North Korea’s and Iran’s regional
neighbors, and, in its fixation on the nuclear question, neglects ­larger—
and arguably more important—regional dynamics surrounding the two
states. Contrary to the seemingly unified global concern about the prob-
lem of nuclear proliferation, regional perceptions of North Korea and Iran
reveal a far more complex picture. For instance, various regional actors
have blamed U.S. policy toward North Korea as the main problem, while
often challenging the U.S. position even at the risk of jeopardizing strate-
gic ties with the United States. In various regional surveys, Arab respon-
dents in the Middle East, including some of U.S. allies such as Egypt and
Jordan, selected Israel and the United States as the greatest threats to
their security, while only a fraction cited Iran. In fact, no Persian Gulf
state has engaged in civil defense planning in anticipation of an Iranian
strike.2
What shapes the perceptions and policies of regional actors in the face
of the North Korean and Iranian nuclear challenges? Why do some re-
gional actors cooperate with the United States in nuclear diplomacy, while
others do not? What are the consequences of such varying responses for
regional order and global security? These questions have yet to be ad-
dressed in a comprehensive manner in the literatures on nuclear prolifer-
ation and regional security. Lacking in the current scholarly debate on
proliferation in general and the North Korean and Iranian crises in partic-
ular is a realization that global efforts to address the two nuclear chal-
lenges have coincided with a shift in the political landscape in the two
regions. In the Middle East, the collapse of Iran’s two enemies, Saddam
Hussein in Iraq and the Taliban in Afghanistan, has led to Tehran’s grow-
ing regional influence. In East Asia as well, a rising China raises questions
about the future of the U.S.-led regional order, prompting the Asia “pivot”
strategy of the Obama administration.3
This suggests that prior to seeking solutions to each of the nuclear
crises, we need to locate these nuclear challenges in specific regional con-
texts and empirically examine the sources and consequences of the re-
gional understandings of the nuclear proliferation challenge.4 In this vein,
Joseph Cirincione called for greater attention to regional security situa-
tions that are often a main driver behind nuclear proliferation.5 In fact,
the origin of Iran’s nuclear pursuit was due in large part to considerations
of regional order in the Middle East in the 1970s. During the Shah’s rule,
then U.S. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger pushed for substantial arms
sales to Iran and helped Iran launch its own nuclear weapons program.
These efforts were made in consideration of Iran’s regional strategic role
vis-à-vis the Soviet Union.6 Similarly, North Korea’s nuclear pursuit inten-
sified in the early 1990s when the regional strategic landscape surround-
ing the Korean Peninsula was transformed in the wake of Russia’s and
China’s diplomatic normalization with South Korea.
However, the plea for exploring the regional underpinnings of nuclear
crises has not been systematically taken up by the vast literatures on the

[2] Global Rogues and Regional Orders

North Korean and Iranian nuclear challenges.7 Instead, analysts have fo-
cused almost solely on the question of how best to solve the nuclear situa-
tions in North Korea and Iran, with little discussion on how regional
countries themselves understand, and grapple with, the North Korean
and Iranian challenges. This analytical oversight in turn has complicated
both the resolution of nuclear crises and the stable maintenance of re-
gional order in East Asia and the Middle East.
To remedy this analytical shortcoming common in the proliferation
and regional security literatures, this book poses two questions: (1) What
are the sources of regional understandings of the North Korean and Ira-
nian challenges? and (2) What are the regional consequences of such un-
derstandings with respect to alliance politics and regionalism in East Asia
and the Middle East? In addressing these questions, this book aims to
unpack the interplay between the U.S.-led global nuclear proliferation ap-
proach and regional orders surrounding North Korea and Iran. It seeks to
provide context and meaning to the seemingly clear-cut global problems
as the two countries interact with the domestic politics of regional coun-
tries and affect the regional order in East Asia and the Middle East, re-
spectively, in unexpected ways.

1.2 ARGUMENT IN BRIEF

This book contends that the regional role conceptions of North Korea’s
and Iran’s neighbors—the pursuit of new regional roles and status in the
changing regional and global environments—shape regional actors’
threat perceptions and policy preferences vis-à-vis North Korea and
Iran, which in turn affects alliance relations and regionalism in East
Asia and the Middle East. Despite the U.S. frame of North Korea and
Iran primarily as the global nuclear menace, the two countries present a
dual challenge as newly nuclear or nuclear-seeking global rogue states
and, at the same time, traditional regional security issues. At the global
level, the two countries are the remaining members of what President
George W. Bush called the “axis of evil,” a band of global rogues bent on
disrupting the international nonproliferation regime. Hence, Bush offi-
cials contended that the two countries represented one of the two major
security challenges against which a widespread global campaign should
be pursued.8
In East Asia and the Middle East, however, the global rogue frame did
not take root. This is because the global narrative is fundamentally at
odds with the regional debate centered on multiple understandings of

Nucle a r Prolifer at ion a nd R egiona l Or der [3]

what North Korea and Iran respectively mean for the regional order. De-
spite North Korea’s and Iran’s nuclear provocations and latent threats to
regional stability, their geostrategic location and importance in each
region and their potential to boost the regional roles of their neighbors
have been central to the regional narratives about North Korea and Iran.
Both civilizational and contemporary political differences notwithstand-
ing, countries in East Asia and the Middle East also share dissatisfaction
with the current regional order premised on the dominance of an external
superpower, the United States, even after the Cold War’s demise. In their
efforts to gain greater regional status and foreign policy autonomy in the
shifting post–Cold War context, East Asian and Middle Eastern states
have been seeking new regional roles.
The regional countries’ drive to enhance regional roles in turn led them
to recast previous—often precarious—relations with North Korea and
Iran. In this context, North Korea and Iran are hardly an unambiguous
security threat as depicted at the global level and in the proliferation liter-
ature but instead are key moving parts of the shifting regional order, and
the nature of their threats is regionally contested.9 As a result, while some
regional actors, such as Israel and Saudi Arabia in the Middle East and
conservatives in Japan and South Korea in East Asia, side with the United
States, others seek to challenge, or dissociate from, the U.S. position as a
means to enhance their countries’ regional status and foreign policy au-
tonomy. Such political contestation over North Korea and Iran in turn
shapes the regional order by influencing alliance politics and regional
cooperation in East Asia and the Middle East.
This distinctive regional pattern is evidenced in contrasting regional
responses to what appear to be similar North Korean problems in the past
two decades. Although North Korea sparked two nuclear crises, the first in
the early 1990s and the second since 2002, regional reactions to the crises
are a study in contrast. The first nuclear standoff between North Korea
and the United States began in 1993 when North Korea started processing
at the Yongbyon nuclear reactor and threatened to withdraw from the Nu-
clear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT). The first post–Cold War nuclear
crisis, however, was resolved in less than two years in October 1994, when
North Korea and the United States signed the Agreed Framework in which
North Korea promised to dismantle the Yongbyon reactor in return for a
number of U.S. concessions, including provision of heavy-fuel oil and con-
struction of two weapon-resistant light water reactors. During this period,
regional countries, including Japan and South Korea, not only supported
the bilateral agreement but also provided funding for the construction of
the light water reactors pledged by the United States.

[4] Global Rogues and Regional Orders

 Less than a decade after the first crisis, North Korea triggered another
nuclear standoff with the United States, or what Michael McDevitt called
“an instant replay” of the first crisis, involving similar provocative steps.10
In response, the Bush administration launched a systematic campaign
aimed at pressuring the Kim Jong Il regime through the Six Party proc-
ess.11 As documented in this book, however, regional support was conspic-
uous by its absence this time around. Despite heightened tension arising
from North Korea’s repeat performance, most regional actors did not
share the threat perception of the United States. Instead, East Asian coun-
tries were united in their opposition to the Bush administration’s efforts
to “globalize” the North Korean problem.
Given America’s status in East Asia as a de facto hegemon since the end
of World War II and the widespread regional support for the United States
during the first crisis, the regional resistance to the U.S. approach during
the second crisis is particularly puzzling and not fully explained by exist-
ing accounts informed by power and material interest considerations.
While keeping diplomatic channels open with North Korea, each East
Asian country pressed the Bush administration to discard its coercive ap-
proach.12 Regional reactions in the early rounds of the Six Party Talks un-
derscored the breadth of challenge to America’s policy on North Korea and
regional influence.
After the first Six Party meeting in August 2003, for instance, China’s
chief delegate Wang Yi declared, “America’s policy toward the D.P.R.K.,
that is the main problem we are facing.”13 South Korean President Roh
Moo-hyun also warned that “taking too tough a stance against North
Korea could cause friction and disagreement between South Korea and
the United States.”14 Despite his close friendship with President Bush,
Japanese Prime Minister Koizumi Junichiro also urged Bush to have
direct talks with North Korea: “[U]nless you open the negotiation process,
there will be no improvement on the issues.”15 The region’s collective re-
sistance to the hardline U.S. approach and North Korea’s nuclear test
eventually led to the February 2007 agreement between the United States
and North Korea. In an apparent about-face, the Bush administration dis-
carded its previous position of “comprehensive, verifiable and irreversible
dismantling” (CVID) of North Korean nuclear programs and showed
greater flexibility toward North Korea.16
The regional response had implications for the regional order as well.
Following successful resolution by the Clinton administration, the first
North Korean nuclear crisis was a catalyst for the renewal and strength-
ening of U.S. alliances in the region, manifested in the so-called Nye Ini-
tiative in 1995 to maintain U.S. force levels in East Asia and the 1997

Nucle a r Prolifer at ion a nd R egiona l Or der [5]

agreement on a revision of the U.S.-Japan Defense Cooperation Guide-
lines. Along the way, the U.S. regional influence increased substantially,
enabling its crucial role in the Taiwan Strait Crisis of 1995–1996 and the
North Korean missile crisis in 1998. During the second North Korean nu-
clear crisis, however, alliance management and regionalism have faced
increasing difficulties, while the U.S. regional role has been in question
and its regional influence in decline.17
In the Middle East as well, the Iranian challenge has sparked domestic
and regional debates, significantly affecting regional dynamics. Israel’s
depiction of Iran as an “existential threat” has been a key rationale for its
aggressive approach, including its repeated calls for a preemptive strike
on Iran’s nuclear sites.18 Saudi Arabia and Bahrain also highlighted the
specter of Iran’s regional ascendancy and suspected ties between Iran and
Shia dissidents in their own countries. On the other hand, Turkey and
most Gulf states, which are all U.S. allies in the region, expressed little
concern about Iran’s nuclear pursuit and called for a moderate approach
toward Iran. For instance, Oman maintained “balanced relations with
Iran and continued to advocate the re-integration of Tehran into both the
Gulf and the international community.”19 As a result, alliance relations
with the United States became strained and regional relations splintered.
More broadly, the overarching narrative emerging in the two regions
suggests that the nuclear question itself is not even the main focus of re-
gional debates. In fact, the regional discourse centers instead on the evolv-
ing regional order in East Asia and the Middle East, as well as changing
relations with the United States. Hence, examining the relationship be-
tween nuclear proliferation and regional order in the two strategically im-
portant regions, as this book seeks to do, has the potential to yield valuable
lessons for both nuclear diplomacy and regional security. As the North
Korean and Iranian nuclear crises have passed the ten-year mark, the time
is ripe for a systematic reexamination of both regions. By turning the
focus onto regional actors and the regional dimension of nuclear prolifer-
ation, this book offers a novel way to analyze global proliferation chal-
lenges and provides new insights into the making of regional orders in
East Asia and the Middle East.

1.3 EXISTING LITER ATURES ON PROLIFER ATION

AND REGIONAL SECURIT Y

Global nuclear proliferation and regional orders in East Asia and the
Middle East are among the most crucial topics in world politics in the

[6] Global Rogues and Regional Orders

twenty-first century. However, few existing works in both proliferation
studies and the vast literatures on East Asian and Middle Eastern security
systematically explore the link between them.20 Students of proliferation
have focused on the causes and consequences of nuclear proliferation, ex-
amining the motivations of nuclear aspirants and their global and re-
gional effects.21 Largely absent in this debate is an empirical analysis of
how nuclear proliferation is actually perceived and responded to by local
actors and with what regional consequences. Studies of regional order in
East Asia and the Middle East pay greater attention to local dynamics sur-
rounding North Korea and Iran but tend to neglect the complex interplay
between U.S.-led global proliferation efforts and regional approaches that
has evolved in the past decade. By examining the relationship between
nuclear proliferation and regional order, this book draws on and chal-
lenges existing analyses in both the proliferation and regional security
literatures.
Realist scholars highlight the importance of strategic interests in re-
sponding to proliferation challenges. For instance, Matthew Kroenig
offers a valuable analytical framework for understanding varied responses
to proliferation.22 With respect to the North Korean and Iranian chal-
lenges, he argues that different strategic implications of nuclear prolifera-
tion for a global superpower, the United States, and smaller regional states
may explain varied global and regional responses.23 While helpful in un-
derstanding different strategic payoffs behind nuclear proliferation, his
book lacks empirically grounded, regionally specific analyses of North
Korea and Iran.24 The assumption of objective strategic logics held by local
actors also ignores the subjective and multiple understandings of the nu-
clear challenges in different regional contexts and is therefore unable to
capture regional dynamics that go beyond the issues of immediate strate-
gic benefits and costs.
More sensitive to inter-regional and intra-regional variations is Etel
Solingen’s analysis, which systematically examines regional proliferation
patterns in East Asia and the Middle East.25 She argues that the different
types of dominant domestic coalitions in the two regions have led to op-
posite regional outcomes on questions of nuclearization. When states are
export-driven and internationalizing domestic coalitions prevail, then,
according to Solingen, the nuclear option is rejected because it would
cause a negative regional externality. In contrast, states with inward-­
looking, nationalistic domestic coalitions will be prone to nuclear pursuit.
While pathbreaking in its analytical rigor and empirical scope, Solingen’s
analysis unduly privileges domestic consensus centered on a prevailing
political coalition and tends to overestimate regional contrasts between

Nucle a r Prolifer at ion a nd R egiona l Or der [7]

East Asia and the Middle East. Her account is also insufficient to explain
divergent responses to the proliferation challenges by different adminis-
trations in the same export-seeking, internationally oriented U.S. allies,
such as South Korea, Japan, or Turkey. More important, both Kroenig and
Solingen uncritically accept the fixed material interests of policymakers
or coalitional leaders (i.e., military–strategic or economic interests), while
overlooking the ideational sources of national interests (e.g., search for a
greater regional role and foreign policy autonomy), which may at times
reinforce or counteract the effects of material interests in influencing
strategic outcomes.
Another alternative account for the different regional responses to the
nuclear challenge concerns threat perception: specifically regional threat
perceptions of North Korea and Iran.26 In fact, all the East Asian coun-
tries are, albeit to varying degrees, concerned about the threat coming
out of North Korea (e.g., missiles, artillery shells, or refugees). In the
Middle East, Iran’s threat also comes in many forms (e.g., missiles, sup-
port for its political proxies and radical Islamists, nuclear accidents,
speedboats, and sea mines that can be used to block the Strait of Hormuz,
etc.). Given the East Asian alliance posture that is arrayed to address
North Korean contingencies, in this view, North Korean aggressive inten-
tions manifested in its nuclear provocation should serve to strengthen
alliance ties between the United States and its Asian allies. 27 However,
not only did the East Asian countries resist the U.S. approach, alliance
coordination faced mounting difficulties during the second crisis.28 In the
Middle East as well, the increasing U.S. military presence and provision
of unprecedented arms transfer to its regional allies did not lead to greater
alliance cooperation, and its regional standing has been increasingly
damaged throughout the region. Moreover, the fact that South Korea’s
threat perception of North Korea has been lowered substantially in spite
of North Korea’s increasing nuclear capabilities and aggressive behavior
begs an explanation.29
Apart from the proliferation studies, the vast literature on North
Korea and Iran can be divided into three camps. The first category uncrit-
ically assumes the North Korean and Iranian threats and seeks to explain
their motivations and global ramifications.30 Tanya Ogilvie-White, for
instance, argues that as the two defiant regimes face greater pressures
and criticism from the international society, they tend to resist such
pressure even more in an effort to rally domestic and international sup-
port.31 While the defiance of the two regimes is certainly a factor in
making the situation more intractable, this explanation fails to appreci-
ate the evolving nature of the North Korean and Iranian challenges.

[8] Global Rogues and Regional Orders

As detailed in chapter 4, North Korea’s current tension with the United
States cannot obscure its earlier records of cooperation with the United
States in the early 1990s and the late 1990s. Similarly, in 2003 the Mo-
hammed Khatami regime in Tehran offered to cooperate with the United
States over terrorism, its role in Iraq and Lebanon, and nuclear programs
in return for the end of U.S. sanctions and improved relations with the
United States. 32 More importantly, this line of inquiry—while helpful in
understanding the inner workings of the two regimes—has little to say
about the regional dimension of the North Korean and Iranian nuclear
challenges.
A second group of analyses on this subject devotes greater attention to
the complex, multi-layered nature of the North Korean and Iranian chal-
lenges.33 These studies stress domestic, political, or historical factors as
the main reason for failed diplomacy. Prominent examples include Charles
Pritchard’s scathing criticism of the ideologically based diplomatic failure
of the Bush administration in its approach to North Korea and Trita Par-
si’s penetrating indictment of both the Obama administration and the
Iranian regime’s domestic political dynamics as the root cause of the nu-
clear stalemate. While useful in dissecting the domestic political processes
behind the U.S. approaches and informative in their chronicles of the two
nuclear crises, these works remain largely descriptive and policy-driven,
lacking an analytical framework to illuminate the sources of different na-
tional interests and threat perceptions among regional actors and their
consequences for regional order.
The third category looks at the regional dimension in a systematic
manner. In the East Asian context, Gilbert Rozman and Yoichi Funabashi
provide detailed analyses of North Korea’s regional neighbors as their na-
tional approaches coincided with the U.S. approach to North Korea.34 In
the Middle Eastern context, several recent works provide a welcome re-
gional perspective.35 With the empirical focus on either one of the two
nuclear challenges, however, these books are oblivious to similar regional
patterns surrounding proliferation challenges in the two regions, instead
highlighting varied national priorities. These analyses echo the prolifera-
tion expert Gary Samore’s observation that North Korea’s neighbors are at
times “reluctant to hold their bilateral relations with Pyongyang com-
pletely hostage to the nuclear issue.”36 However, the seemingly disparate
interests of the regional actors share a common thread centered on re-
gional role and foreign policy autonomy. As a consequence, all the regional
actors are concerned far more about what Iran and North Korea respec-
tively mean for the regional order than about how to address the nuclear
challenge.

Nucle a r Prolifer at ion a nd R egiona l Or der [9]

 A systematic comparison of the two regions not only offers a fuller ac-
count of the regional underpinnings of nuclear proliferation challenges
but also provides an invaluable window into the nature and forms of the
emerging regional order in East Asia and the Middle East. This book’s
analysis suggests that the success of future global nonproliferation cam-
paigns hinges less on a coercive approach aimed at the target states than
on grasping the complexities of the regional dimension surrounding the
proliferators. It also argues that given the salience of North Korea and
Iran in the regional visions of their neighbors, the regional actors’ under-
standings of both the nuclear and non-nuclear dimensions of the North
Korean and Iranian challenges should be carefully considered. By focusing
only on the nuclear aspects, the United States runs the risk of complicat-
ing nuclear diplomacy and losing its regional influence in the two vitally
important regions.

1.4 REGIONAL ROLE CONCEPTIONS, THREAT PERCEPTIONS,

AND REGIONAL ORDER

The regional patterns illustrated above highlight the significance of do-

mestically or regionally contested ideas about threat perceptions and nu-
clear proliferation. Instead of assuming a priori the shared threat
perception of global rogues and a common interest in resolving the nu-
clear crisis, we need to examine empirically the ways in which regional
actors articulate and grapple with the North Korean and Iranian chal-
lenges. This analytical move also provides a window into how national in-
terests are forged at the domestic level and affect regional order in East
Asia and the Middle East.37 In this vein, this book is part of a larger effort
to bring constructivist insights, especially ideational sources of foreign
policymaking, into security and proliferation studies.38
Jacques Hymans is among a few exceptions in the proliferation liter-
ature, as he explores an ideational factor (i.e., top leaders’ national iden-
tity conceptions) as a key variable shaping nuclear decision. 39 In this
book, I seek to broaden the analytical scope to examine not just prolif-
erators themselves but also their regional neighbors. Specifically, I
argue that the East Asian and Middle Eastern responses to the North
Korean and Iranian nuclear challenges are shaped by regional role con-
ceptions, defined as a set of ideas held and articulated by domestic po-
litical elites about their nation’s proper roles and status in a given
region. Along with material power and economic considerations, how
political actors envision their nation’s role on the regional or world stage

[ 10 ] Global Rogues and Regional Orders

has important consequences for their threat perception and national
interest formation.
In fact, several scholars have explored the pursuit of international
status as a key source of the state’s foreign policy behavior.40 Deborah
Larson and Alexei Shevchenko, for instance, contend that the search for
an “appropriate role in the world” is a primary driver of China and Russia’s
international behavior.41 Specifically, they point to China’s hosting of the
Six Party Talks as a textbook example of China’s quest for a “new identity
as a responsible great power.”42 Highlighting both the global and regional
dimensions of status-seeking behavior, Yong Deng also argues that the
Six Party process has served as “a multilateral instrument for Beijing to
earn diplomatic capital in and beyond Northeast Asia.”43 What is missing
in their analyses, however, is a realization that status seeking is neither
confined to emerging great powers nor unproblematically accepted at the
domestic level. As Japan, South Korea, Turkey, and Gulf states pursued
greater regional status in their respective regions, they have also been de-
bating competing regional roles linked to North Korea and Iran, problem-
atizing the earlier threat perceptions of, and policies toward, Pyongyang
and Tehran.
In advancing regional role conceptions as a key variable affecting re-
gional actors’ national interest and threat perception, this book builds on
the earlier and under-examined literature on role conceptions in the fields
of political science and sociology.44 In his seminal article on role concep-
tions, K. J. Holsti defined national role conceptions as policymakers’ per-
ceived “image” of “the appropriate orientations or functions of their state
toward, or in, the external environment.”45 Along the line of role concep-
tions, international relations scholars have used various concepts, such as
national self-image or elite belief systems, as key variables shaping for-
eign policy behavior.46
The focus on individual policymakers, however, raises questions
about the generalizability of a particular individual leader’s self-image
to the national level.47 Similarly, the earlier literature on role concep-
tions focused on the “psychological” rather than “social” dimensions of
foreign policymaking. Foreign policy, by definition, assumes relation-
ships with other nations, and each nation’s social position is inherently
intertwined with that of others.48 Hence, we need to go beyond the
earlier focus on the individual and cognitive dimensions of decision-
making to capture the social and “constitutive” dimensions through
which actors “define the boundaries and distinctive practices of a
group.”49 Put differently, instead of analyzing idiosyncratic views of par-
ticular national leaders, one needs to examine a larger domestic debate

Nucle a r Prolifer at ion a nd R egiona l Or der [ 11 ]

on the nation’s proper role as contested in each country and its manifes-
tation in specific policy contexts.
East Asian countries’ understanding of the North Korean challenge il-
lustrates this point. For the regional countries, the North Korea question
is inescapably linked to their pursuit of new regional roles and greater re-
gional status. Specifically, South Korea’s “sunshine” policy of engaging
North Korea and promoting inter-Korean reconciliation began in the late
1990s when the Kim Dae-jung administration sought to expand South
Korea’s regional role in the wake of the Asian financial crisis and the rise
of multilateral regional frameworks such as the ASEAN Plus Three (APT).
His regional strategy not only culminated in the inter-Korean summit in
2000 but also was consolidated into a broader regional vision that was
adopted by his successor Roh Moo-hyun. The regional master plan, Dong-
buka Jungsim Gukga-ron (or the strategy of transforming the Korean Pen-
insula into the focal point of Northeast Asia), sought to position South
Korea at the hub of regional economic integration and security coopera-
tion.50 North Korea, in this vision, is a key partner for greater regional
integration centered on the Korean Peninsula rather than the main enemy
to fight.
Similarly, even before the second North Korean nuclear crisis, Japan’s
pursuit of a greater regional role was also tied to the North Korean ques-
tion. As an enduring controversy over Japan’s past role as colonizer and
the regional suspicion of its future role cause its regional diplomatic space
to narrow,51 Japan’s deep involvement in the North Korean question pro-
vides it with a unique opportunity “to rejuvenate its troubled regional
status.”52 By participating in the Six Party process, a former senior Japa-
nese diplomat reasons, Japan can redefine its relations with participating
countries, opening “a new strategic position in the region.”53 In this con-
text, the Korean Peninsula is “the gateway to Asia or even to ‘normalcy’ in
international relations,” where Japan can “solidify a longstanding role in
the emergent Northeast Asian regionalism.”54 Former Japanese Prime
Minister Koizumi Junichiro’s efforts to normalize Japan’s diplomatic rela-
tions with Pyongyang were the epitome of that yearning and an impor-
tant steppingstone to becoming an independent regional player.55
In China as well, maintaining ties to North Korea is part and parcel of
its larger efforts to enhance Beijing’s regional clout. From a Chinese per-
spective, the Korean Peninsula represents a place where China’s ambitions
to become a regional “hegemon” will be tested.56 In this view, the Six Party
process can serve as a launch pad for an alternative regional security struc-
ture that would go beyond the current U.S.-centered regional order and
enhance China’s regional status accordingly. As Figure 1.1 illustrates57, for

[ 12 ] Global Rogues and Regional Orders

 China

Regional Powerhouse

North Korea
as a
platform
Major Regional
East Asian Hub
Player

South Korea Japan

Figure 1.1:
North Korea and Regional Roles

the East Asian states, North Korea is not a clear-cut threat but a staging
ground for each nation’s respective new regional role and vision.58
In a close parallel with the East Asian case, Iran’s nuclear pursuit and
the global response led by the Bush administration also intersected with
Middle Eastern states’ search for a new regional role. In contrast to the
familiar narrative of Iran’s nuclear ambition as a key global proliferation
challenge, most of Iran’s neighbors not only improved their diplomatic re-
lations with Tehran but also expanded economic and social exchanges
with Iran in the hopes of playing a greater regional role and enhancing
their regional status.
Turkey, for instance, has pursued a new regional vision centered on An-
kara’s active involvement in regional affairs and Turkey’s independent re-
gional role. In this strategic shift, Turkey’s threat perception also changed
as the ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) deemphasized “Is-
lamic threat” in the region and engaged Iran and Iraq as regional neigh-
bors.59 Moreover, despite Turkey’s status as a U.S. ally, its efforts to
improve ties with anti-Western regional players such as Iran, Hamas, and
Syria also strengthened Ankara’s status within the Middle East.60
Similarly, Gulf states such as Oman, Qatar, and the United Arab Emir-
ates have intensified their engagement with Iran with the larger goal of
enhancing their regional status and promoting their regional autonomy.
This regional drive continued in the face of the nuclear standoff between
Washington and Tehran and the threat of the U.S. military strikes on Iran.
While expanding their ties with Tehran both politically and economically,

Nucle a r Prolifer at ion a nd R egiona l Or der [ 13 ]

Turkey and the Gulf states refused to follow the hardline position of the
Bush administration and Israel. Overall, given the salience of North Korea
and Iran in the local actors’ regional role conceptions, it is difficult to
assume that they would unproblematically accept the U.S. threat percep-
tion of North Korea and Iran as global rogues and follow whatever path
the United States would take in dealing with the nuclear question.

Role Conf lict and Domestic Contestation over the Meaning of North
Korea and Iran

In advancing an argument based on role conceptions, this book does not

assume that the mere presence of certain role conceptions would dictate
policy outcomes in a deterministic fashion. The domestic process of artic-
ulating the nation’s roles is often a competitive one, since various political
groups may have different, contending ideas about the role of their nation
in a region.61
While some scholars during the first wave of role theory noted the pos-
sibility of conflict among various roles, they did not investigate role con-
flict in a systematic manner.62 Michael Barnett’s study on pan-Arabism is
a notable exception.63 Based on the case study of the pre–1967 Arab states
system, he demonstrates the way “overlapping institutions produce con-
tradictory demands on Arab states’ foreign policy and contribute to re-
gional instability.”64
Breaking from the earlier role analyses that tended to assume elites as
a single unit, recent scholars also maintain that internal discords among
policy elites over a proper role can trigger role conflict.65 Examining the
EU’s role in the post–Cold War context, for instance, Rikard Bengtsson
and Ole Elgstrom identify “the complex and dynamic interplay between
an actor’s own role conception, on the one hand, and the structurally
guided role expectations of others, on the other hand.”66 Similarly, Cris-
tian Cantir and Juliet Kaarbo argue that different regional roles can be
“generated from different institutional contexts, both domestic and inter-
national.”67 While insightful in their plea for going beyond the first-wave
role analyses’ rather deterministic stance on the effects of role concep-
tions on policymaking, their analysis nonetheless stop short of exploring
how such competing roles are domestically contested, with consequences
for policymaking and regional relations.
In unpacking the domestic political process behind contending regional
roles, it is helpful to reflect on the relationship between agent and struc-
ture in world politics.68 In this vein, a group of scholars made a worthwhile

[ 14 ] Global Rogues and Regional Orders

effort to link political psychology, which privileges individual agencies,
and systemic constructivism, which stresses structural domains.69 This
book’s analytical framework builds on this insight by examining the in-
teraction between regional states and external structure with respect to
regional role conceptions. Specifically, while this book highlights the im-
portance of particular regional roles pursued by regional actors them-
selves, it does not overlook the structural dimension in which regional
actors have to consider the roles expected of their nations by ­external—
often more materially capable—powers.
Specifically, two such regional roles are of particular importance in
both East Asia and the Middle East: internally shaped regional roles,
which are conceived and pursued internally by local actors themselves,
and externally shaped regional roles, which are expected by external
actors (e.g., strategically important external powers such as the United
States).70 The question that naturally arises is: Which types of role prevail,
and under what conditions? Early role theorists generally assumed that in
case of role conflict, internally shaped roles would be more influential
than externally expected ones in shaping state behavior.71 Without empir-
ical testing, however, we cannot be certain whether internally or exter-
nally shaped roles will triumph at a given moment in time.
In East Asia, the existing power structure, in which the United States
maintains a substantial military and economic presence, powerfully con-
ditions regional role conceptions through the U.S.-centered roles. In fact,
even the region’s biggest power, China, focuses on the state of Sino-­
American ties as a main foreign policy priority because “the United States
holds the key to China’s international recognition.” 72 Given this structural
reality of the region, evidenced in the U.S.-led hub-and-spokes system, all
the regional countries, albeit to varying degrees, seek approval from the
de facto regional hegemon, the United States, by cooperating with it on
various security issues, including the North Korean nuclear challenge.
At the same time, however, they seek foreign policy autonomy by en-
gaging North Korea in their own ways. As a consequence, rather than in-
ternally generated role conceptions dictating policy behavior in a
predictable manner (as the early literature on role conceptions assumed),
a constant balancing act between seeking U.S. recognition and pursuing
regional autonomy characterizes regional role conceptions in East Asia, a
pattern echoed in the Middle East over the Iranian challenge. The higher
the levels of congruence between internally shaped regional roles (e.g., in-
dependent regional player or regional powerhouse) and externally shaped
regional roles (e.g., U.S. ally or strategic partner), the more likely that the
regional countries will support the U.S. approach toward North Korea. But

Nucle a r Prolifer at ion a nd R egiona l Or der [ 15 ]

if there were a conflict between the two roles, regional actors would either
resist or try to weaken the U.S. approach.
In East Asia, domestic debates on regional role conceptions began to
intensify in the post-9/11 era as America’s regional role changed.73 As the
Bush administration zeroed in on the role of global counterproliferation
enforcer, resorting to coercive means and rhetoric, its traditional role as
regional stabilizer was increasingly in question. The role shift worried the
regional actors who prized regional stability and their respective regional
visions tied to North Korea. In fact, during the first North Korean nuclear
crisis, the Clinton administration adopted a strategy of gradual escala-
tion, seeking regional understanding and support in the process and thus
fulfilling its role as regional stabilizer. In contrast, the Bush administra-
tion turned to a simplifying, unilateral approach in its global strategy and
applied it to the North Korean situation, often with little consideration
for regional views and repercussions. Rejecting the rogue frame, the re-
gional countries soon moved to challenge the Bush administration’s ap-
proach toward North Korea.
The stage was then set for a battle between the United States and re-
gional countries on the proper handling of the North Korean challenge.
As one Chinese expert succinctly put it, while there was “no regional
agreement on the North Korean threat, there [was] a regional consensus
on maintaining regional stability.” 74 A senior South Korean defense ana-
lyst of a government-affiliated research institute observed that in the
process of preventing a U.S. preemptive strike on North Korea in the early
period of the second crisis, “China, South Korea and Japan got much
closer, while alliance coordination between the U.S. and its allies, Japan
and South Korea, became much more difficult.”75 A senior Chinese expert
predicted in 2004 that as long as the Bush administration maintained an
aggressive approach toward North Korea, “the regional consensus [on
North Korea] would be maintained.”76 Against this backdrop, as explored
in chapter 5, regional cooperation among the East Asian countries im-
proved during the early rounds of the Six Party talks.
However, as the Six Party talks reached a stalemate with no signs of
immediate resolution, the prolonged crisis gradually gave rise to domestic
contestation over the North Korean threat and competing regional roles
in each East Asian country.77 This regional uncertainty pushed domestic
actors to “compete to frame the event because how the event is under-
stood has important consequences for mobilizing action and furthering
their interests.”78 Once changing external circumstances called into ques-
tion the prevalent regional vision, other groups challenged the hitherto
dominant view, leading to a domestic jostling for a prevailing narrative

[ 16 ] Global Rogues and Regional Orders

Another random document with
no related content on Scribd:
 ERICA imbricata.

CHARACTER SPECIFICUS.

Erica, antheris muticis, exsertis; corollis urceolatis; calycibus duplicatis,

viscosis, imbricatis, coloratis, corollam sub-æquantibus; foliis ternis,
lævibus, truncatis, linearibus.

DESCRIPTIO.

Caulis fruticosus, erectus, spithamæus; rami et ramuli frequentissimi,

foliosi, erecti.
Folia terna, linearia, recta, truncata, plana, lævia, petiolis brevissimis
adpressis.
Flores in ramulis terminales, sub-terni, umbellati, cernui; pedunculis
longitudine calycis.
Calyx. Perianthium duplicatum, adpressum, imbricatum: foliolis ovatis,
viscosis, incarnatis.
Corolla urceolata, apice incarnata, laciniis obtusis, minutis, erectis.
Stamina. Filamenta octo capillaria, incurvata. Antheræ muticæ, exsertæ.
Pistillum. Germen subrotundum. Stylus filiformis, longitudine
staminum. Stigma tetragonum.
Habitat ad Caput Bonæ Spei.
Floret a mense Julii in Octobrem.

REFERENTIA.

1. Calyx et Corolla.
2. Corolla et Stamina.
3. Calyx lente auctus.
4. Stamina a Pistillo diducta, antherâ unâ lente auctâ.
 5. Stylus et Stigma, lente aucta.

SPECIFIC CHARACTER.

Heath, with beardless tips without the blossoms, which are pitcher-shaped;
cup double, clammy, tiled, coloured, and almost the length of the blossoms;
leaves grow by threes, even, appearing cut off at the point, and linear.

DESCRIPTION.

Stem shrubby, upright, a span high; the larger and smaller branches are
numerous, covered with leaves, and upright.
Leaves grow by threes, straight out, appearing cut off at the point, flat,
even, and having their footstalks pressed to the branches.
Flowers grow in bunches, generally three together, at the ends of the
smaller branches, hanging downward; footstalks the length of the cup.
Empalement. Cup double, pressed to the blossom, tiled: the leaves are
egg-shaped, clammy, and flesh-coloured.
Blossom pitcher-shaped, flesh-coloured at the mouth, which has its
segments blunt, small, and upright.
Chives. Eight hair-like threads, bent inwards. Tips beardless, and without
the blossom.
Pointal. Seed-bud nearly round. Shaft thread-shaped, the length of the
chives. Summit four-cornered.
Native of the Cape of Good Hope.
Flowers from July till October.

REFERENCE.

1. The Empalement and Blossom.

2. The Blossom and Chives.
3. The Empalement magnified.
4. The Chives detached from the Pointal, one tip magnified.
5. The Shaft and its Summit, magnified.
 ERICA incarnata.

CHARACTER SPECIFICUS.

Erica, antheris cristatis, subinclusis; corollis subovatis, carneis; pedunculis

longissimis, coloratis; foliis quaternis.

DESCRIPTIO.

Caulis suberectus, pedalis ramosissimus, rami, et ramuli, flexuosi,

divaricato patente.
Folia quaterna, obtusa, linearia, glabra, subtus sulcata; petiolis
brevissimis, adpressis.
Flores terminales, racemum densé formantes; pedunculi longissimi,
purpurei, bracteis tribus instructi.
Calyx. Perianthium tetraphyllum, foliolis ovatis, carinatis, acuminatis.
Corolla subovata, cernua, carnea, ore contracto, lævissime quadrisido,
laciniis erectis.
Stamina. Filamenta octo capillaria, receptaculo inserta. Antheræ cristatæ,
sub-inclusæ.
Pistillum. Germen subrotundum. Stylus filiformis, exsertus. Stigma
tetragonum.
Habitat ad Caput Bonæ Spei.
Floret a mensi Julii, in Octobrem.

REFERENTIA.

1. Calyx, et Corolla.
2. Calyx lente auctus.
3. Stamina, et Pistillum.
4. Stamina a Pistillo diducta; anthera una lente aucta.
 5. Stylus, et Stigma, lente aucta.

SPECIFIC CHARACTER.

Heath, with crested tips, nearly within the blossoms, which are almost egg-
shaped, and flesh-coloured; the foot-stalks are very long, and coloured; the
leaves grow by fours.

DESCRIPTION.

Stem nearly upright, a foot high, and very much branched; the larger and
smaller branches grow zigzag, and spread outward.
Leaves grow by fours, are blunt, linear, smooth, and furrowed
underneath; with short foot-stalks pressed to the branches.
The Flowers grow at the end of the smaller branches, forming a close
bunch; the foot-stalks are very long, and purple, having three floral leaves.
Empalement. Cup four-leaved, which are egg-shaped, keeled, and
pointed.
Blossom nearly egg-shaped, bending downward, and flesh-coloured, the
mouth contracted, but slightly cut into four upright segments.
Chives. Eight hair-like threads, fixed into the receptacle. Tips crested,
nearly within the blossom.
Pointal. Seed-vessel nearly round. Shaft thread-shaped, and without the
blossom. Summit four-cornered.
Native of the Cape of Good Hope.
Flowers from July, till October.

REFERENCE.

1. The Empalement, and Blossom.

2. The Empalement magnified.
3. The Chives, and Pointal.
4. The Chives detached from the Pointal; one tip magnified.
5. The Shaft, and its Summit, magnified.
 ERICA jasminiflora.

CHARACTER SPECIFICUS.

Erica, antheris basi bicornibus, inclusis; stylo exserto; corollis ampullaceis,

sesquipollicaribus, laciniis cordatis, patentibus; floribus subternis; foliis
ternis, trigonis, subulatis, patenti-erectis.

DESCRIPTIO.

Caulis filiformis, erectus; rami simplicissimi, filiformes, longi, patenti.

Folia terna, trigona, acuta, subulata, margine serrata, basi adpressa,
apicem versus patula, sexfariam imbricata.
Flores terminales, sub-terni, horizontales, umbellati; pedunculi purpurei,
bracteis tribus, ovatis, coloratis, instructi.
Calyx. Perianthium tetraphyllum, foliolis ovatis, viscosis, purpureis.
Corolla viscosa, sesquipollicaris, summa cylindracea, ad basin inflata,
ore arctata; laciniis expansis, sub-ovatis, maximis.
Stamina. Filamenta octo capillaria; antheræ basi bicornes, apice
acuminatæ, inclusæ.
Pistillum. Germen ovatum, sulcatum. Stylus filiformis, exsertus. Stigma
tetragonum.
Habitat ad Caput Bonæ Spei.
Floret a mensi Julii, in Novembrem.

REFERENTIA.

1. Folium unum, lente auctum.

2. Calyx, lente auctus.
3. Calyx, et Corolla.
4. Stamina, et Pistillum.
 5. Stamina a Pistillo diducta, anthera una, lente aucta.
6. Stylus et Stigma lente aucta.

SPECIFIC CHARACTER.

Heath with tips two horned at the base and within the blossom, the shaft
without; blossoms flask-shaped, an inch and a half long, the segments heart-
shaped and spreading; flowers growing by threes mostly; leaves grow by
threes, are three-sided, awl-shaped, upright and spreading.

DESCRIPTION.

Stem thread-shaped and upright; the branches are quite simple, thread
shaped, long, and spreading.
Leaves grow by threes, are three-sided, sharp, awl-shaped, sawed at the
edge, pressed to the stem at the base, spreading towards the end, and forming
six angles.
Flowers terminate the branches generally by threes, grow horizontal,
and in bunches; the foot-stalks are purple, having three oval, coloured floral
leaves.
Empalement. Cup of four leaves, which are egg-shaped, clammy, and
purple.
Blossom, clammy, an inch and a half long, the upper part cylindrical,
swelled at the base, and pinched in at the mouth; the segments spreading,
nearly egg-shaped and very large.
Chives. Eight hair-like threads. Tips two horned at the base, tapered to
the points and within the blossom.
Pointal. Seed-bud egg-shaped and furrowed. Shaft thread-shaped and
without the blossom. Summit four-cornered.
Native of the Cape of Good Hope.
Flowers from July, till November.

REFERENCE.
1. A Leaf, magnified.
2. The Empalement, magnified.
3. The Empalement, and Blossom.
4. The Chives, and Pointal.
5. The Chives detached from the Pointal, one tip magnified.
6. The Shaft and its Summit magnified.
 ERICA lateralis.

CHARACTER SPECIFICUS.

Erica antheris cristatis, inclulis; corolla purpurea, urceolato-campanulata, ad

basin plana; pedunculis longissimis; floribus umbellatis, ternminalibus,
fecundis, cernuis; foliis quaternis, obtusis, glaberrimis.

DESCRIPTIO.

Caulis fruticosus, erectus, pedalis; rami sub-simplices, virgati, filiformes.

Folia quaterna, linearia, obtusa, sub-trigona, crassiuscula, brevissime
petiolata, petiolis adpressis.
Flores ad apices ramorum ramulorumque umbellati, cernui, secundi,
purpurei; pedunculi florum triplo longitudine colorati, bracteis tribus minutis
instructi.
Calyx. Perianthium tetraphyllum, foliolis minutis, adpressis, ciliatis,
subulatis.
Corolla sub-campanulata ad basin plana, purpurea; laciniis limbi
obtusis, suberectis.
Stamina. Filamenta octo, capillaria, apice incurvata. Antheras cristatæ,
atro-purpureæ, inclusæ.
Pistillum. Germen turbinatum, sulcatum, ad basin glandulosum. Stylus
staminibus longior, exsertus. Stigma tetragonum, virescens.
Habitat ad Caput Bonæ Spei.
Floret a mense Augusti, in Decembrem.

REFERENTIA.

1. Calyx et Corolla.
2. Calyx, auctus.
 3. Corolla.
4. Stamina, et Pistillum.
5. Stamina a Pistillo diducta, anthera una lente aucta.
6. Pistillum, lente auctum.

SPECIFIC CHARACTER.

Heath with crested tips, within the blossom; which is purple, between bell
and pitcher-shaped, flat at the base; foot-stalks very long; flowers grow in
umbels at the end of the branches, point all one way and hang down; leaves
grow by fours, are blunt and very smooth.

DESCRIPTION.

Stem shrubby, upright, grows a foot high; branches nearly simple, twiggy
and thread-shaped.
Leaves grow by fours, linear, blunt, almost three-sided, thickish, very
short foot-stalks, which are pressed to the stem.
Flowers grow in umbels, at the end of the larger and smaller branches,
nodding, all pointing one way, and are purple; foot-stalks thrice the length of
the flowers, coloured, and three small floral leaves upon them.
Empalement. Cup four-leaved, leaflets small, pressed to the blossom,
fringed and awl-shaped.
Blossom approaching to bell-shape; the lower part flat, and purple; the
segments of the border are blunt and rather upright
Chives. Eight hair-like threads, turned inwards at the upper part. Tips
crested, deep purple, and within the blossom.
Pointal. Seed-bud turban-shaped, furrowed, glandular at the base. Shaft
longer than the chives, without the blossom. Summit four-cornered and
greenish.
Native of the Cape of Good Hope.
Flowers from August, till December.

REFERENCE.
1. The Empalement, and Blossom.
2. The Empalement, magnified.
3. The Blossom.
4. The Chives, and Pointal.
5. The Chives detached from the Pointal, one Tip magnified.
6. The Pointal, magnified.