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Coercion
 Coercion
The Power to Hurt in International
Politics

Edited by Kelly M. Greenhill

Peter Krause

1
1
Oxford University Press is a department of the University of Oxford. It furthers
the University’s objective of excellence in research, scholarship, and education
by publishing worldwide. Oxford is a registered trade mark of Oxford University
Press in the UK and certain other countries.

Published in the United States of America by Oxford University Press

198 Madison Avenue, New York, NY 10016, United States of America.

© Oxford University Press 2018

All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in

a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, without the
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address above.

You must not circulate this work in any other form

and you must impose this same condition on any acquirer.

CIP data is on file at the Library of Congress

ISBN 978–0–19–0–84634–3 (pbk.); 978–0–19–0–84633–6 (hbk.)

9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1
Paperback printed by WebCom, Inc., Canada
Hardback printed by Bridgeport National Bindery, Inc., United States of America
CONTENTS

Acknowledgments vii
List of Contributors ix
Introduction xi
Kelly M. Greenhill and Peter Krause

PART I | Coercion: A Primer

CHAPTER 1 Coercion: An Analytical Overview 3
Robert J. Art and Kelly M. Greenhill
CHAPTER 2 Intelligence and Coercion: A Neglected Connection 33
Austin Long

PART II | Coercion in an Asymmetric World

CHAPTER 3 A Bargaining Theory of Coercion 55
Todd S. Sechser
CHAPTER 4 Air Power, Sanctions, Coercion, and
Containment: When Foreign Policy Objectives
Collide 77
Phil M. Haun
CHAPTER 5 Step Aside or Face the Consequences: Explaining the
Success and Failure of Compellent Threats to Remove
Foreign Leaders 93
Alexander B. Downes
 PART III | Coercion and Nonstate Actors
CHAPTER 6 Underestimating Weak States and State Sponsors: The
Case for Base State Coercion 117
Keren E. Fraiman
CHAPTER 7 Coercion by Movement: How Power Drove the Success
of the Eritrean Insurgency, 1960–​1993 138
Peter Krause
CHAPTER 8 Is Technology the Answer? The Limits of Combat
Drones in Countering Insurgents 160
James Igoe Walsh

PART IV | Domains and Instruments Other than Force

CHAPTER 9 Coercion through Cyberspace: The Stability-​Instability
Paradox Revisited 179
Jon R. Lindsay and Erik Gartzke
CHAPTER 10 Migration as a Coercive Weapon: New Evidence from
the Middle East 204
Kelly M. Greenhill
CHAPTER 11 The Strategy of Coercive Isolation 228
Timothy W. Crawford
CHAPTER 12 Economic Sanctions in Theory and Practice:
How Smart Are They? 251
Daniel W. Drezner
CHAPTER 13 Prices or Power Politics? When and Why States
Coercively Compete over Resources 271
Jonathan N. Markowitz

PART V | Nuclear Coercion

CHAPTER 14 Deliberate Escalation: Nuclear Strategies to Deter or to

Stop Conventional Attacks 291
Jasen J. Castillo
CHAPTER 15 Threatening Proliferation: The Goldilocks Principle of
Bargaining with Nuclear Latency 312
Tristan Volpe

Conclusion 331
Kelly M. Greenhill and Peter Krause
Index 349

vi | Contents
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

T his book grew from a shared realization that the foundational scholar-
ship on coercion that we regularly read, taught, and utilized was no longer
adequate to explain much of the behavior we observed in the world around us.
From forced migration in the Middle East and North Africa to cyber threats
from Russia (and targeted sanctions on Russia), and from drone strikes in
South Asia to terrorist attacks across the globe, understanding contemporary
coercive dynamics clearly requires an expansion of our analytical toolbox to
include new concepts, theories, and analyses. We are enormously gratified to
be joined in this endeavor by a diverse array of experts who offer innovative
and penetrating contributions on a diverse array of coercive tools, actors, and
environments. Our editor, David McBride of Oxford University Press, offered
enthusiastic encouragement from the outset, and his and the external review-
ers’ sharp insights helped shape the final product into a more cohesive and
powerful book.
We thank the faculty and researchers of the MIT Security Studies Program,
where we first rigorously studied coercion and learned to appreciate its myriad
shades and manifestations. Kelly M. Greenhill further thanks Tufts University
and the International Security Program (ISP) at Harvard University’s Belfer
Center for their intellectual and financial support of her research and, in the
case of ISP, for its support of the Conflict, Security and Public Policy Working
Group, out of which a number of contributions to this volume grew. She also
thanks her besheryt for providing inimitable daily reminders that effective
persuasion and influence also come in noncoercive packages. Peter Krause
would like to thank all members of his research team, the Project on National
Movements and Political Violence, especially Eleanor Hildebrandt. He also
thanks his colleagues and administrators at Boston College, who provided aca-
demic and financial support for this volume. Finally, he thanks his parents and
sisters who, in addition to a great deal of love, gave him his very first lessons in
the causes, strategies, and effectiveness of coercion.
CONTRIBUTORS

Robert J. Art is Christian A. Herter Professor of International Relations at

Brandeis University.

Jasen J. Castillo is Associate Professor in the Bush School of Government and

Public Service at Texas A&M University.

Timothy W. Crawford is Associate Professor of Political Science at Boston

College.

Alexander B. Downes is Associate Professor of Political Science and

International Affairs at the George Washington University.

Daniel W. Drezner is Professor of International Politics at Tufts University’s

Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy.

Keren E. Fraiman is a member of the faculty at the Spertus Institute.

Erik Gartzke is Professor of Political Science and Director of the Center for
Peace and Security Studies at the University of California, San Diego.

Kelly M. Greenhill is Associate Professor and Director of the International

Relations Program at Tufts University and Research Fellow at Harvard
University’s Kennedy School of Government.

Phil M. Haun is Professor and Dean of Academics at the US Naval War College.

Peter Krause is Assistant Professor of Political Science at Boston College and

Research Affiliate at the MIT Security Studies Program.

Jon R. Lindsay is Assistant Professor of Digital Media and Global Affairs at the
University of Toronto’s Munk School of Global Affairs.

Austin Long is Senior Political Scientist at the RAND Corporation.

Jonathan N. Markowitz is Assistant Professor in the School of International
Relations at the University of Southern California.

Todd S. Sechser is Associate Professor of Politics at the University of Virginia.

Tristan Volpe is Assistant Professor of Defense Analysis at the Naval

Postgraduate School and Nonresident Fellow at the Carnegie Endowment for
International Peace.

James Igoe Walsh is Professor of Political Science at the University of North

Carolina.

x | Contributors
INTRODUCTION

Kelly M. Greenhill and Peter Krause

F rom the rising significance of nonstate actors to the increasing influence

of regional powers, the nature and conduct of international politics has
arguably changed dramatically since the height of the Cold War. Yet much
of the existing literature on deterrence and compellence continues to draw,
whether implicitly or explicitly, upon assumptions and precepts formulated
in a state-​centric, bipolar world. Although contemporary coercion frequently
features multiple coercers targeting state and nonstate adversaries with non-
military instruments of persuasion, most literature on coercion focuses pri-
marily on cases wherein a single state is trying to coerce another single state
via traditional military means.
This volume moves beyond these traditional premises and examines the
critical issue of coercion in the twenty-​first century, capturing fresh theoreti-
cal and policy-​relevant developments and drawing upon data and cases from
across time and around the globe. The contributions examine intrastate, inter-
state, and transnational deterrence and compellence, as well as both military
and nonmilitary instruments of persuasion. Specifically, chapters focus on
tools (e.g., terrorism, sanctions, drones, cyber warfare, intelligence, and forced
migration), actors (e.g., insurgents, social movements, and nongovernmental
organizations), and mechanisms (e.g., triadic coercion, diplomatic and eco-
nomic isolation, foreign-​imposed regime change, coercion of nuclear prolifer-
ators, and two-​level games) that have become more prominent in recent years
but have yet to be extensively or systematically addressed in either academic
or policy literature.
At the same time, there is also significant continuity in how states wield power
and exercise influence. Strategic and crisis deterrence, threats backed with mili-
tary force, and exercises of state-​on-​state coercive diplomacy are enduring features
of international politics. Consequently, there remains a great deal of relevant wis-
dom in existing scholarship on coercion. Therefore, this volume also features
chapters that proffer novel and innovative theoretical approaches to historical
exercises in coercion and highlight the contemporary implications of historical
cases. An introductory chapter offers an overview of the state of our knowledge
about the theory and practice of coercion and analyzes the extent to which previ-
ous theories and arguments apply to current and future coercion challenges.
The chapters in this volume employ a variety of analytical tools and meth-
ods, including rational choice modeling, deductive theory building and
extension, historical case study analysis, and large-​and medium-​N statistical
analysis to shed new light on an old issue. The authors are equally diverse in
their paradigmatic viewpoints, and several of the contributions wholly defy
ready categorization in this regard. Power and its distribution, institutions,
norms, ideas, and information all play analytically important roles, and several
of the chapters combine these well-​known variables in novel ways. In a similar
vein, some commonly recognized theoretical concepts are deployed in as yet
underappreciated yet analytically quite profitable ways. In sum, while no single
volume of several hundred pages can be truly comprehensive, this book offers
readers a hearty and edifying brew of old and new, of continuity and change,
and of the theory and practice of coercion.
The volume is organized into five sections that speak to our focus on
increasingly relevant actors, tools, and mechanisms in the study of coercion.
Taken as a whole, the contributors approach the topic of coercion with three
key questions in mind: What have we long known and still know to be true
about coercion? What did we once think we knew, but now know needs to be
revised or reconsidered? What did we simply not think about before now? The
next section offers a brief description of each of the chapters within the five
sections and their initial answers, grouped by relevant themes. The final sec-
tion offers some ideas for instructors and others seeking to use this book to get
smart about the power to hurt in today’s world.

A Preview of the Chapters in This Volume

Coercion: A Primer
The volume opens with an introductory essay by Robert J. Art and Kelly M.
Greenhill that lays the groundwork for the chapters that follow by offering
an analytical overview of the state of the art in the study of coercion. Their
chapter is loosely organized around the three key questions that motivate this
volume. Art and Greenhill systematically interrogate the premises that under-
gird our assumptions about coercion and explore issues of continuity, change,
and innovation in our understanding of coercion in the twenty-​first century.
In addition to identifying foundational insights from the traditional (state-​to-​
state, Cold War–​focused) coercion literature, the authors also highlight more
recent, post–​Cold War contributions as well as particular questions and hereto-
fore underexplored topics examined by the contributors to this volume.

xii | Introduction
 In ­chapter 2, Austin Long extends Art and Greenhill’s discussion of coer-
cion by analyzing its understudied yet integral connections with intelligence.
Drawing upon evidence from Iraq to illustrate his key propositions, Long
identifies three central ways in which intelligence and coercion are inextri-
cably linked. First, intelligence provides a coercer with an understanding of
a target’s values, resolve, and capabilities, and thus the capacity to evaluate
whether coercion is feasible. Second, intelligence effectively directs the tools of
coercion—​whether military force or economic sanctions—​at specific elements
of a target’s political, economic, or military assets. Third, intelligence provides
a discrete mechanism of influence—​covert action—​that lies between the overt
use of military force and other nonviolent mechanisms of coercion. In addition
to highlighting the underappreciated role of intelligence, Long sets the stage
for subsequent contributions that focus on the importance of information in
effecting successful coercion.

Coercion in an Asymmetric World

Coercion is often not a confrontation among equals. Instead, stronger states
regularly employ threats and the limited use of force against weaker ones. As
the chapters in this section demonstrate, however, superior strength is insuffi-
cient to guarantee coercive success and, in some cases, can even be an obstacle
to success. The authors in this section reveal that the coercer’s selection of tar-
get and specific policy demands—​often made amid significant uncertainty—​
drive the initiation, dynamics, and outcomes of coercion.
In ­chapter 3, Todd S. Sechser employs rational choice theory to delve into
the dynamic, iterative processes that characterize the bargaining game that is
coercive diplomacy. Sechser develops a model of crisis bargaining to evalu-
ate the strategic choices faced by coercers. He explores how coercers weigh
their desire for gains against the risk of war that inevitably rises when they
make threats and demand concessions of targets, as well as how power and
(often imperfect) information play into these calculations. Sechser’s analy-
sis generates two counterintuitive hypotheses that challenge conventional
wisdom about coercion. First, greater military power emboldens coercers to
make riskier demands, increasing the likelihood of coercion failure. Second,
coercers are motivated to attenuate their demands when target resolve is high,
thereby making coercion success against resolved adversaries more likely. Both
insights underscore the importance of the magnitude of coercers’ demands in
analyses of coercive bargaining.
Focusing on the employment of coercion using both military and nonmil-
itary instruments of influence, in ­chapter 4, Phil M. Haun makes a broadly
generalizable argument about how powerful states can squander their multi-
dimensional coercive advantages over weaker adversaries by treating coercion
as an exercise in brute force rather than as a bargaining game. Using the case
study of the 1994 Kuwaiti border crisis between the United States and Iraq
as a illustrative example, Haun demonstrates how, by failing to modify their

Introduction | xiii
own behavior in response to target concessions, strong states provide (weaker)
targets no incentive to sustainably modify their behavior, leading to coercion
failure, even by the most powerful of states. In such cases, states may accept
coercion failure as the price for an ongoing, successful containment strategy.
In ­chapter 5, Alexander B. Downes explores the puzzle of why compel-
lent threats that demand foreign leaders concede power seem to succeed so
often. Drawing upon data from the Militarized Compellent Threat (MCT) data
set, Downes argues that demands for regime change succeed so often (about
80 percent of the time) because, historically, such threats have largely been
made against highly vulnerable targets, namely when the coercer possesses
crushing material superiority, is geographically proximate to the target, and
the target is diplomatically isolated. However, Downes cautions that before
one concludes that regime change is easy, one should keep in mind that the
conditions that made regime change successful in the past are not features
of most recent attempts to persuade foreign leaders to step down. Thus in an
era in which leaders have grown more willing to issue such demands, they
have grown correspondingly less likely to engender the desired response and
coercive success.

Coercion and Nonstate Actors

Since the end of the Cold War, ongoing civil wars have outnumbered inter-
state wars by about 10 to 1. More people died in terrorist attacks in 2014 than
ever before, and Americans regularly identify terrorism as the most critical
threat to the nation. Nonetheless, we lack critical tools to understand and
address issues associated with the violence perpetrated by nonstate and sub-
state actors because the vast majority of existing studies still focus on states
coercing other states. The chapters in this section help address this lacuna
by exploring how states can coerce terrorists and insurgents via drones
and state sponsors, as well as how insurgents themselves effectively coerce
governments.
In ­chapter 6, Keren Fraiman explores “transitive compellence,” a method
of coercion whereby states that seek to affect the behavior of violent nonstate
actors (VNSAs) do so by targeting the states that host them. The expectation is
that the real and threatened costs imposed by the coercer on the base state will
then persuade the coercee to crack down on the VNSAs, leading to their con-
tainment within, or forceful eviction from, the base state. Fraiman argues that
this trilateral brand of coercion is both more common and more effective than
is generally recognized. This is because the conventional wisdom regarding
base state capabilities and motivations—​that they are both too weak and too
reluctant to take effective action against VNSAs—​is wrong. Rather, many base
states are in fact both capable and willing to effectively coerce VNSAs residing
within their territory.
Nonstate actors are themselves often practitioners of coercion, rather than
simply its targets. In ­chapter 7, Peter Krause explores the question of what

xiv | Introduction
makes nonstate coercion by national movements and insurgencies succeed
or fail. The balance of power within a movement drives its outcome, Krause
contends, and groups’ positions within that balance of power drive their behav-
ior. Although all groups prioritize their organizational strength and survival,
hegemonic groups that dominate their movements are more likely to pursue
the shared strategic objective of regime change and statehood because victory
moves them from the head of a movement to the head of a new state. The hege-
monic group’s dominance enables its movement to successfully coerce the
enemy regime by delivering a single clear, credible message about its objective,
threats, and guarantees that is backed by a cohesive strategy. Krause demon-
strates the viability of his generalizable argument with a longitudinal analysis
of the Eritrean national movement and its decades-​long insurgency against the
Ethiopian government from 1960 to Eritrean independence in 1993.
In ­chapter 8, James Igoe Walsh evaluates the efficacy of drones as instru-
ments of deterrence and compellence, especially in the context of counter-
insurgency operations. Drawing upon evidence from a variety of theaters,
including Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Iraq, Walsh argues that the use of drones
can be a double-​edged sword. On one hand, they offer noteworthy technologi-
cal, force-​protection-​related, and collateral-​damage-​limiting advantages. On
the other hand, the employment of drones often also catalyzes retaliatory and
signaling counterattacks by insurgents and other VNSAs, which can in turn
exercise deleterious effects on counterintelligence campaigns and undermine
efforts at coercion.

Domains and Instruments Other than Force

State-​to-​state coercion still dominates the headlines, but it has increasingly
taken on new forms and is transpiring in new domains. The United States is
actively sanctioning Russia and China in response to increasing cyber attacks.
The European Union (EU) and many Middle Eastern states are struggling,
even teetering, under the political and economic weight of an unprecedent-
edly large influx of migrants and of refugees forced from their homes. At the
same time, regional powers are scrambling to coercively compete over natural
resources in the Arctic and the South China Sea. The chapters in this section
provide powerful new theories and frameworks to explain how states coerce
others using often effective, but understudied, instruments other than force.
In Chapter 9, Jon R. Lindsay and Erik Gartzke analyze the relationship
between cyber means and political ends, an issue that was long neglected in
the popular focus on technological threats. The authors present typologies of
potential cyber harms in terms of costs and benefits and of political applica-
tions of these harms for deterrence and compellence. They then use the latter
to explain why the distribution of the former is highly skewed, with rampant
cyber frictions but very few attacks of any consequence. Specifically, they pro-
pose that a variant of the classic stability-​instability paradox operates to con-
strain cyber conflict: ubiquitous dependence on cyberspace and heightened

Introduction | xv
potential for deception expand opportunities to inflict minor harms, even as
the prospect of retaliation and imperatives to maintain future connectivity
limit the political attractiveness of major harms.
In ­chapter 10, Kelly M. Greenhill explains how, why, and under what con-
ditions (the threat of) unleashing large-​scale movements of people can be
used as an effective instrument of state-​level coercion. This unconventional
yet relatively common coercion-​by-​punishment strategy has been used by both
state and nonstate actors as a tool of both deterrence and compellence. After
outlining the precepts of the theory, Greenhill illustrates this unconventional
instrument in action with a longitudinal study of its serial use by the former
Libyan dictator Muammar Gaddafi against the EU, from 2004 until his deposi-
tion in 2011. The chapter concludes with a discussion of theoretical and policy
implications, observations about how this tool appears to be used increasingly
as an alternative to or complement of military force, and what such develop-
ments might portend both for the future and for its real victims, the displaced
themselves.
Timothy W. Crawford further expands our understanding of the dynam-
ics of coercion in ­chapter 11 with the introduction of the concept of “coercive
isolation.” Coercive isolation refers to an oft employed but undertheorized
nonmilitary instrument of coercive diplomacy that relies on manipulation and
exploitation of shifts in a target state’s alignments and alliances to influence
its cost-​benefit calculations and, by extension, the probability of coercive suc-
cess. After presenting the theory of coercive isolation and the logic that under-
girds it, Crawford offers a plausibility probe of six historical cases, from before
World War I through the end of the Cold War, that illustrate the logic of the
model and its key propositions. The chapter concludes with a discussion of
contemporary theoretical and policy implications of the role played by coercive
isolation in diplomacy in the post-​post–​Cold War world.
In ­chapter 12, Daniel W. Drezner examines the state of the literature on the
coercive power of economic sanctions, with a particular emphasis on the use
of targeted sanctions. Drezner argues that the development of smart sanctions
has solved many of the political problems that prior efforts at comprehensive
trade sanctions created. In many ways, these sanctions are, as advertised,
“smarter,” but there is no systematic evidence that smart sanctions yield bet-
ter policy results vis-​à-​vis the targeted country. When smart sanctions work,
they work because they impose significant costs on the target economy. It
would behoove policymakers and scholars to look beyond the targeted sanc-
tions framework to examine the conditions under which different kinds of
economic statecraft should be deployed.
In ­chapter 13, Jonathan N. Markowitz asks why some states coercively com-
pete militarily over the governance and distribution of natural resources, while
others favor reliance on market mechanisms. In this hypothesis-​generating
contribution, Markowitz argues that the choices states make lie in their domes-
tic political institutions and economic interests, which in turn determine their
foreign policy interests. Specifically, he posits that the more economically

xvi | Introduction
dependent on resource rents states are and the more autocratic their political
institutions, the stronger their preference to seek direct control over stocks
of resources. Conversely, the less economically dependent on resource rents
states are and the more democratic their political institutions, the weaker their
preference to directly control stocks of resources. He presents and demon-
strates the viability of his argument using a combination of deductive theoriz-
ing and historical analysis of recent jockeying over control of maritime seabed
resources in the East and South China Sea, Arctic, and Eastern Mediterranean.

Nuclear Coercion: Regional Powers and Nuclear Proliferation

The field of coercion studies was founded on the analysis of nuclear weapons
in the Cold War, and yet a number of related dynamics remain unexplained
as a consequence of the field’s traditional focus on strong states that already
possess nuclear weapons. The chapters in this section focus on two types of
significant coercive threats by relatively weaker states: the threat of nuclear
weapon use to resist demands and ensure regime survival, and the threat of
acquiring nuclear weapons to compel concessions.
In ­chapter 14, Jasen J. Castillo examines how the acquisition and threatened
use of nuclear weapons can be utilized by weaker states to resist the demands
of their more powerful counterparts. The uniquely destructive power of these
weapons allows conventionally weak states a method of guaranteeing their sur-
vival and, due to the dangers of escalation, a potentially potent countercoercive
tool. Employing an explicitly neorealist perspective, Castillo explores not only
how regional powers may use such weapons as a powerful deterrent but also
how they might theoretically employ them in war should deterrence fail.
In ­chapter 15, Tristan Volpe explores how states can use the threat of nuclear
proliferation as an instrument of coercion. He argues that while the conven-
tional wisdom suggests states reap deterrence benefits from nuclear program
hedging, many use the prospect of proliferation not to deter aggression but as
a means of compelling concessions from the United States. Some challengers
are more successful than others at this unique type of coercive diplomacy, how-
ever. When it comes to cutting a deal, Volpe argues, there is an optimal amount
of nuclear technology: with too little, the threat to proliferate is not credible,
but if a country moves too close to acquiring a bomb, a deal may be impossible
to reach since proliferators cannot credibly commit not to sneak their way to
a bomb. Volpe draws upon the cases of Libya and North Korea to demonstrate
the power of his theory in action.

Conclusion
The concluding chapter by Greenhill and Krause underscores the volume’s
key findings and their theoretical import, identifies policy implications and
prescriptions highlighted by the contributions to the volume, and points to
unanswered questions and directions for further research.

Introduction | xvii
Suggested Ways to Use This Volume

The contributions to Coercion: The Power to Hurt in International Politics were

solicited with a number of theoretical and pedagogical goals and approaches
in mind.
First, the chapters were selected to provide both historical and theoretical
perspectives on contemporary exercises of coercion from around the globe.
While many chapters unsurprisingly offer evidence from North Africa and the
Middle East, given recent history, the book also includes potent illustrations
from East Asia, Southeast Asia, sub-​Saharan Africa, Europe, and North and
South America.
Second, a number of the chapters are designed to speak to ongoing policy
debates. These include the efficacy of sanctions (Drezner and Haun) and other
nonmilitary instruments of influence (Crawford, Lindsay and Gartzke, and
Greenhill); the costs and benefits of using drones (Walsh); conflict over natu-
ral resources (Markowitz); the significance of failed and failing states in our
understanding of the twenty-​first-​century security environment (Fraiman and
Walsh); the virtues and vices of foreign-​imposed regime change (Downes and
Greenhill); the dangers of nuclear (counter)proliferation (Art and Greenhill,
Castillo, Volpe, and Sechser); and the viability of deterring and/​or quashing
terrorist and insurgent activity (Fraiman, Krause, Walsh, and Long).
Third, a number of the chapters apply classic security studies and coer-
cion-​related concepts to new domains. These include but are not limited to
Crawford’s expansion and extension of George and Simons’s “isolation of the
adversary” in his exploration of diplomatic coercion; Krause’s adaptation of bal-
ance-​of-​power theory to intragroup dynamics within insurgencies and national
movements; Lindsay and Gartzke’s application of traditional military force-​on-​
force concepts to the realm of cyberspace; Sechser’s expansion and relaxation
of some long-​accepted tenets about the nature of coercive bargaining and
the significance of coercers’ objectives, some of which are in turn profitably
illustrated in Haun’s case study; and Greenhill’s explication of how and why
cross-​border population movements can be an effective coercion by punish-
ment strategy. Markowitz draws upon traditional theories about institutions,
interests, and state behavior to make predictions about future competition and
conflicts, while Volpe integrates insights about the significance of credible
assurances in facilitating successful coercion to the realm of proliferation.
Fourth, the grouping of the chapters by theme permits instructors to teach
theoretical concepts in a fairly broad-​based way. In addition to the current
groupings of chapters by section, a number of other disparate chapters can
be effectively coupled. These include but are not limited to the study of cross-​
domain coercion (Lindsay and Gartzke, Greenhill, Markowitz, and Haun); the
critical role of information in coercion (Fraiman, Lindsay and Gartzke, Long,
and Sechser); the role of regime type in influencing coercion processes and/​
or outcomes (Downes, Drezner, Markowitz, and Greenhill); and the particular

xviii | Introduction
dynamics of multilateral and multilevel coercion (Crawford, Drezner, Fraiman,
Greenhill, and Krause). Finally, in addition to being an effective stand-​alone
overview of coercion, Art and Greenhill’s introductory essay can be usefully
assigned with any and all of the aforementioned units as a bridge from Cold
War precepts to twenty-​first-​century applications.
In sum, Coercion combines classic tenets with contemporary innovations
and applications. It is intended to connect and synergize scholarship on a
broad array of exciting and timely topics and, in the process, help reinvigorate
a crucial subfield of security studies and foreign policy. The volume has been
designed to appeal to scholars, practitioners, and instructors who engage with
coercion and foreign policy generally and with diplomacy, terrorism, sanc-
tions, protest, refugees, nongovernmental organizations, and proliferation
more specifically.

Introduction | xix
PART I Coercion
A Primer
 chapter 1 Coercion
An Analytical Overview
Robert J. Art and Kelly M. Greenhill

Just as the Cold war spawned a great deal of scholarly study about deterrence,
so too has the unipolar era spawned a great deal of study of compellence.1 The
Cold War featured a nuclear standoff between two superpowers, one in which
the survival of both countries was thought to be at stake. It is not surprising
that deterrence of war, the avoidance of escalatory crises, and the control of
escalation were paramount in the minds of academic strategists and political-​
military practitioners during this period. The bulk of the innovative theoretical
work on deterrence, especially nuclear deterrence, was produced from the late
1940s through the mid-​1960s. Most of the creative works during the subse-
quent years were, and continue to be, refinements of and elaborations on those
foundations.2
With the advent of the unipolar era, the United States found itself freed
from the restraints on action imposed by another superpower and began more
than two decades of issuing military threats against or launching conventional
military interventions into smaller countries, or both: Iraq (1990–​91), Somalia
(1992–​93), Haiti (1994), North Korea (1994), Bosnia (1995), Kosovo and Serbia
(1998–​99), Afghanistan (2001), Iraq again (2003–​11), Libya (2011), Syria (2014–​),
and Iraq yet again (2015–​). Unsurprisingly, strategists and practitioners dur-
ing the unipolar era became focused on various forms of compellence—​
compellent threats, coercive diplomacy, and the limited and demonstrative
uses of force—​and especially on the reasons those forms of compellence, when
employed by the United States, more often than not failed and subsequently

1
We thank Victoria McGroary for invaluable research assistance.
2
For an excellent overview of the state of knowledge about deterrence through the 1970s, see Robert
Jervis, “Deterrence Theory Revisited,” World Politics 31 (1979): 289–​324. For a representative view
of the nature of deterrence today, see Patrick M. Morgan, “The State of Deterrence in International
Politics Today,” Contemporary Security Policy 33 (2012): 85–​107.
required more robust military action for the United States to prevail. As a con-
sequence of the unipolar era’s change of focus, the literature on compellence
burgeoned.3
More recently, and particularly in the aftermath of the game-​changing ter-
rorist attacks on September 11, 2001, there has also been a heightened focus on
nonstate actors (NSAs). Academic works have focused on how NSAs employ
coercion against states and against other NSAs (see, for instance, ­chapter 7);
how states can most effectively deter and compel NSAs (and how such strat-
egies may differ from coercion wielded by states; see ­chapter 6); and how
NSAs attempt to compensate for their relative weaknesses through the use of
asymmetric means (see ­chapters 8–​10). In this period, there has been a nearly
simultaneous increase in the nuance and breadth of scholarship that examines
how coercion works when using tools other than (or in addition to) traditional
military force and by actors other than the unipole. Such tools include targeted
sanctions (see ­chapter 12), cyber weapons (see ­chapter 9), migration or demo-
graphic bombing (see ­chapter 10), and drones (see ­chapter 8). There has also
been a growth in research that examines how coercive tools in one domain (for
instance, cyber) can be used to influence outcomes in another (for instance,
military capabilities), which Erik Gartzke and Jon Lindsay refer to as cross-​
domain coercion.4
While not providing a comprehensive review of all the theoretical and
empirical scholarship on deterrence and compellence to date, this chapter does
highlight the big findings about coercion, and by extension the big gaps in our
understanding of it, as well as summarizes the contributions that the essays in
this volume make to our understanding of coercion. The chapter proceeds as
follows: Part one briefly defines coercion to include both deterrence and com-
pellence, and shows why it can be hard to distinguish between the two in prac-
tice. Part two highlights salient points about deterrence, distinguishes among
four types of deterrence, and discusses why deterrence can fail. Part three out-
lines the key contributions to our understanding of compellence that the past
three decades of scholarship have revealed. Finally, Part four concludes with
two sets of propositions about coercion—​one that summarizes the state of our
current collective knowledge and one that highlights new contributions prof-
fered in this volume.

Coercion

Coercion is the ability to get an actor—​a state, the leader of a state, a terror-
ist group, a transnational or international organization, a private actor—​to do
something it does not want to do. Coercion between states, between states
and nonstate actors, or between nonstate actors is exercised through threats or

3
For a partial list of works on compellence, see note 18.
4
Erik Gartzke and Jon Lindsay, eds., Cross-​Domain Deterrence, unpublished manuscript.

4 | Coercion: A Primer
through actions, or both, and usually, but not always, involves military threats
or military actions. Threats can be implicit or explicit. Coercive action may
also utilize positive inducements. Offering such inducements may increase
chances of success, but coercion is not coercion if it consists solely of induce-
ments. Coercion always involves some cost or pain to the target or explicit
threats thereof, with the implied threat to increase the cost or pain if the target
does not concede.

The Two Faces of Coercion

Coercion comes in two basic forms: deterrence and compellence. Often the
terms coercion and compellence are used interchangeably, but that errone-
ously implies that deterrence is not a form of coercion. This chapter therefore
reserves the term coercion for the broad category of behavior that can manifest
as either deterrence or compellence.
Used this way, deterrence is a coercive strategy designed to prevent a target
from changing its behavior. “Just keep doing what you are doing; otherwise
I will hurt you” is the refrain of deterrence. It operates by threatening pain-
ful retaliation should the target change its behavior. A state issues a deterrent
threat because it believes the target is about to, or will eventually, change its
behavior in ways that will hurt the coercer’s interests. Thus getting an actor not
to change its behavior, when its preference is to change its behavior, is a form
of coercion. Compellence, on the other hand, is a coercive strategy designed
to get the target to change its behavior.5 Its refrain is “I don’t like what you are
doing, and that is why I am going to start hurting you, and I will continue to
hurt you until you change your behavior in ways that I specify.” Compellence,
either through threat or action, is a form of coercion because the target’s pref-
erence is not to change its behavior, but it is being forced to do so. So deter-
rence is a coercive strategy, based on threat of retaliation, to keep a target from
changing its behavior, whereas compellence is a coercive strategy, based on
hurting the target (or threatening to do so), to force the target to change its
behavior. In both cases, the target is being pressured to do something it does
not want to do.

Is It Deterrence or Compellence?
Defining the analytical distinction between deterrence and compellence is
easy; applying the distinction in practice can be more difficult, for two rea-
sons. First, in confrontational situations, there is the eye-​of-​the-​beholder prob-
lem; second, particularly during crises, the deterrer may resort to compellent
actions to shore up its deterrent posture.

5
Thomas Schelling coined the term compellence. See Thomas C. Schelling, Arms and Influence (New
Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1966), 71.

an analy tical overview | 5

 In the eye-​of-​the-​beholder problem, two actors look at the same action
and see two different things. Just as one person’s terrorist can be another
person’s freedom fighter, so too can one actor’s deterrent posture look to
the deterrent target as a form of compellence. When this occurs, the target
of deterrence reasons thus: “With your threat to retaliate against me if I
attempt to alter the status quo, you are, in effect, forcing me to accept the
status quo, which I find illegitimate, disadvantageous, and unfair. It benefits
you, but it harms me.” Too often deterrence carries the connotation that the
deterrer is justified in its actions, whereas the actor trying to change the
status quo is viewed as the aggressor. (This is akin to asserting that he who
attacks first is the aggressor, which may or may not be true.) Determining
which actor is the aggressor hinges not on which actor is trying to overturn
the status quo but instead on making a judgment about the legitimacy of
the status quo. If the status quo is viewed by an uninvolved observer as just,
then the actor trying to alter it will be viewed as the aggressor; if the status
quo is viewed by the observer as unjust, then the actor trying to preserve it
will be viewed as the aggressor. Assessing who is the aggressor is a different
exercise than determining which state is the coercer and which the target.
To be analytically useful, therefore, the concepts of deterrence and compel-
lence must be separated from the exercise of assessing the legitimacy of the
status quo.
The second reason distinguishing between deterrence and compellence can
be difficult is that compellent actions are often undertaken in a crisis by a
coercer in order to shore up its deterrent posture. Thomas C. Schelling put
it well: “Once an engagement starts . . . the difference between deterrence
and compellence, like the difference between defense and offense, may disap-
pear.”6 For example, during the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis, President Kennedy
instituted a blockade around Cuba to prevent the Soviet Union from putting
more missiles on the island. This was meant to demonstrate that Kennedy was
serious about getting the missiles out by showing he was prepared to esca-
late the use of force. Blocking more missiles from coming in was a form of
compellence.
Although the distinction between deterrence and compellence can some-
times blur in specific situations, and although compellence can be resorted
to in order to shore up deterrence, the two concepts nevertheless retain their
analytical distinctiveness and validity. After all, there remains a fundamental
difference between trying to prevent changes to the status quo and trying to
stop or reverse changes to the status quo. Preventing a target from changing
its behavior is different from forcing a target to change its behavior. From these
differences flow many important consequences for the use of military force
and for its role in statecraft.

6
Ibid., 80.

6 | Coercion: A Primer
Deterrence

Deterrence can manifest in four distinct ways across space and time: homeland
and extended, general and immediate. The first pairing refers to the territory
being protected, the second to the temporal dimension in its use. Homeland
deterrence, which is sometimes referred to as “direct deterrence,” uses threats to
dissuade an adversary from attacking a state’s home territory and populace or any
territories that it may have abroad. What is being protected is the territory over
which the state exercises its sovereignty. Extended deterrence uses threats to pre-
vent an adversary from attacking an ally or another state over which the defender
is extending its security blanket. What is being protected is the territory of a third
party or parties, often called the client state. General deterrence is about the long-​
term state of the military balance between two adversaries; immediate deterrence
is about a specific crisis between them at a specific time.

Homeland and Extended Deterrence

One of the foundational propositions of deterrence theory is that homeland deter-
rence is easier to achieve than extended deterrence. The reason is that extended
deterrence has less inherent credibility than homeland deterrence to a potential
challenger. A potential challenger is more likely to believe that a deterrer will retal-
iate with force against the challenger if the challenger attacks the deterrer’s home-
land than if it attacks the client state’s homeland. This is because, in either case,
should the deterrer retaliate against the challenger’s attack, the challenger is likely
to counterretaliate against the deterrer. If this is the case, then which piece of terri-
tory is a deterrer likely to value more and, consequently, risk more: its own or that
of its client state? Put simply: dissuading an attack on one’s homeland is more
credible than dissuading an attack on a client’s homeland. Thus states that make
extended deterrent pledges struggle to make them credible to both the client state
and its potential attacker. Protectors have resorted to all sorts of mechanisms to
make their pledges credible, including stationing the protector’s troops (and in
the case of nuclear-​armed protectors, also tactical nuclear weapons) on the client’s
territory, providing reassurances through frequent policy pronouncements about
the importance of the client to the protector, bending military strategy to satisfy
political imperatives, and making shows of military force when necessary.
If homeland deterrence is inherently more credible than extended deter-
rence, then we should find fewer challenges to the former than to the latter.
Although there is a scarcity of empirical work on this foundational proposition,
a notable exception by Paul Huth, Christopher Gelpi, and D. Scott Bennett
found that, for all the deterrence encounters among Great Powers between
1816 and 1984, 69 percent were cases of extended deterrence and 31 percent of
homeland deterrence.7 This result comports with the logic of the foundational

7
See Paul Huth, Christopher Gelpi, and D. Scott Bennett, “The Escalation of Great Power Militarized
Disputes: Testing Rational Deterrence Theory,” American Political Science Review 87 (1993): Table

an analy tical overview | 7

proposition. Ideally we would also like to know how many would-​be challeng-
ers to homeland and extended deterrence decided, after assessing relative
costs and benefits, not to challenge the status quo. However, this is some-
where between difficult to impossible to determine because the incentives for
a would-​be challenger are to keep such calculations from public view.
There are two other interesting insights to be gleaned from Huth et al. First,
when the 1816–​1984 period is taken as a whole, there seems to be no essen-
tial difference between success rates in forcing a challenger to back down in
homeland deterrence cases and in extended deterrence cases. Of the 30 identi-
fied cases of homeland deterrence encounters, 17 were successful and 13 were
failures (a 56 percent success rate). For the 67 extended deterrence encounters,
36 were successful and 29 were failures (a success rate of 55.4 percent). This
success rate accords well with the pioneering work on extended deterrence
undertaken by Bruce Russett and Paul Huth, who, after examining the uni-
verse of 54 cases of extended deterrence between 1900 and 1980, found that
extended deterrence was successful 31 out of 54 times (a success rate of 57 per-
cent).8 Therefore the case for the inherently greater credibility of homeland
deterrence compared to extended deterrence rests on the greater frequency of
extended deterrence encounters, not on a difference in success rates once a
deterrence encounter or crisis is entered into, assuming Huth et al.’s data set
is valid.
The second insight is that extended deterrence was more successful from
1945 to 1984 than between 1816 and 1945. The data reveal not a trend over a long
period of time toward greater success but rather a distinct break after World
War II; extended deterrence was markedly more successful after 1945. The dif-
ference in success rates is most likely due to the impact of nuclear weapons
on Great Power politics: those weapons made the superpowers, which were
involved in the lion’s share of the extended deterrent encounters from 1945 to
1984, more cautious in challenging one another. Fearon confirmed the height-
ened success rate of extended nuclear deterrence after reanalyzing the Huth
and Russett data set. Fearon found that in the encounters where the deterrer

A-​1, 620–​21. The percentages are our calculations based upon the data in Table A-​1. There were 30
cases of homeland deterrence crises and 67 cases of extended deterrence crises, for a total of 97
of what Huth et al. refer to as “deterrence encounters among the great powers.” Danilovic found
even more striking results: in her data set of deterrence crises from 1895 to 1985, there were 44
cases of extended deterrence crises but only four cases of direct or homeland deterrence failures.
See Vesna Danilovic, When the Stakes Are High: Deterrence and Conflict among Major Powers (Ann
Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2002), 60 and Tables 3.2 and 3.3.
8
See Paul Huth and Bruce Russett, “What Makes Deterrence Work? Cases from 1900–​1980,”
World Politics 36 (1984): 505, Table 1. Also see Paul Huth and Bruce Russett, “Testing Deterrence
Theory: Rigor Makes a Difference,” World Politics 42 (1990): 466–​501, in which they updated their
data but with no substantial change in their conclusions. In their 1990 article, Huth and Russett
were responding to a critique of their 1984 article by Richard Ned Lebow and Janice Gross Stein,
“Deterrence: The Elusive Dependent Variable,” World Politics 42 (1990): 336–​69.

8 | Coercion: A Primer
Another random document with
no related content on Scribd:
 Li dessus dit signeur se nommèrent et disent: «Nous
sommes telz et telz. Venés parler à nous en ceste
15 porte, et nous prendés à prisonniers.» Quant li dis
messires Thumas oy ceste parolle, si fu tous joians,
tant pour ce que il les pooit sauver que pour ce qu’il
avoit, en yaus prendre, une belle aventure de bons
prisonniers, pour avoir cent mil moutons. Si se traist
20 au plus tost qu’il peut à toute se route celle part, et
descendirent li et seize des siens, et montèrent amont
en le porte; et trouvèrent les dessus dis signeurs et
bien vingt cinq chevaliers avoecques eulz, qui n’estoient
mies bien asseur de l’occision que il veoient
25 que on faisoit sus les rues. Et se rendirent [tous[336]]
sans delay, pour yaus sauver, au dit monsigneur
Thumas, qui les prist et fiança prisonniers. Et puis
mist et laissa de ses gens assés pour yaus garder, et
monta à cheval et s’en vint sus les rues. Et destourna
30 ce jour à faire mainte cruaulté et pluiseurs horribles
[145] fais qui euissent estet fait, se il ne [fust[337]] alés au devant:
dont il fist aumosne et gentillèce. Avoecques le
dit monsigneur Thumas de Hollandes avoit pluiseurs
gentilz chevaliers d’Engleterre qui gardèrent et esconsèrent
5 tamaint meschief à faire, et mainte belle bourgoise
et tamainte dame d’enclostre à violer. Et chei
adonc si bien au roy d’Engleterre et à ses gens que la
rivière qui keurt parmi le ville de Kem, qui porte
grosse navie, estoit si basse et si morte qu’il le passoient
10 et rapassoient à leur aise, sans le dangier dou
pont.
Ensi eut et conquist li dis rois le bonne ville de
Kem et en fu sires; mès trop li cousta aussi, au voir
dire, de ses gens. Car chil qui estoient monté en loges
15 et en soliers sus ces estroites rues, jettoient pières
et baus et mortiers, et en occirent le premier jour
que mehagnièrent plus de cinq cens: dont li rois
d’Engleterre fu trop durement courouciés au soir,
 quant on l’en dist le verité. Et ordonna et commanda
20 que, à l’endemain, on parmesist tout à l’espée,
et le ditte ville en feu et en flame. Mès messires
Godefrois de Harcourt ala au devant de ceste ordenance
et dist: «Chiers sires, voelliés affrener un
petit vostre corage, et vous souffise ce que vous en
25 avés fait. Vous avez encores à faire un moult grant
voiage, ançois que vous soiiés devant Calais, où vous
tirés à venir. Et si a encores dedens ceste ville grant
fuison de peuple qui se deffenderont en leurs hostelz
et leurs maisons, s’on leur keurt seure. Et vous poroit
[146] trop grandement couster de vos gens, ançois que la
ville fust essillie, par quoi vostres voiages se poroit
desrompre. Et se vous retournés sus l’emprise que
vous avés à faire, il vous tourroit à grant blasme. Si
5 espargniés vos gens, et saciés qu’il vous venront très
bien à point dedens un mois. Car il ne poet estre
que vos adversaires li rois Phelippes ne doie chevaucier
contre vous à tout son effort, et combatre à quel
fin que soit. Et trouverés encores des destrois, des
10 passages, des assaus et des rencontres pluiseurs, par
quoi les gens que vous avés et plus encores vous feront
bien mestier. Et, sans occire, nous serons bien
signeur et mestre de ceste ville. Et nous metteront
très volentiers hommes et femmes tout le leur en
15 abandon.» Li rois d’Engleterre, qui oy et entendi
monsigneur Godefroy parler, cogneut assés qu’il disoit
vérité, et que tout ce li pooit avenir qu’il li moustroit;
si s’en passa atant et dist: «Messire Godefroi,
vous estes nos mareschaus. Ordonnés ent en avant
20 ensi que bon vous samble, car dessus vous, tant c’à
ceste fois, ne voel je mettre point de regart.»
Adonc fist li dis messires Godefrois de Harcourt
chevaucier se banière de rue en rue, et commanda de
par le roy que nulz ne fust si hardis, dessus le hart,
25 qui boutast feu ne occesist homme ne violast femme.
 Quant cil de Kem entendirent ce ban, si furent plus
asseur, et recueillièrent aucuns des Englès dedens
leurs hostelz, sans riens fourfaire. Et li aucun ouvraient
leurs coffres et leurs escrins; et abandonnoient
30 tout ce qu’il avoient, mais qu’il fuissent aseur
de leur vie. Nonobstant ce et le ban dou roy et dou
mareschal, si y eut dedens le ville de Kem moult de
[147] villains fais, de mourdres, de pillemens, de roberies,
d’arsins et de larecins, car il ne poet estre que, en
une tèle host que li rois d’Engleterre menoit, qu’il
n’i ait des villains, des garçons et des maufaiteurs
5 assés et gens de petite conscience. Ensi furent li
Englès, de le bonne ville de Kem signeur, trois jours.
Et y conquisent et gaegnièrent si fier avoir que merveilles
seroit à penser. En ce sejour il entendirent à
ordonner leurs besongnes, et envoiièrent par barges
10 et par batiaus tout leur avoir et leur gaaing, draps,
jeuiaus, vaisselemence d’or et d’argent, et toutes aultres
rikèces dont il avoient grant fuison, sus le rivière,
jusques à Austrehem, à deux liewes ensus de
là, où leur grosse navie estoit. Et eurent avis et conseil,
15 par grant deliberation, que leur navie à tout leur
conquès et leurs prisonniers il envoieroient arrière
en Engleterre. Si fu ordonnés li contes de Hostidonne
à estre conduisières et souverains de ceste
navie, à tout deux cens hommes d’armes et quatre
20 cens arciers. Et achata li dis rois d’Engleterre le conte
de Ghines, connestable de France, et le conte de
Tankarville, à monsigneur Thumas de Hollandes et
à ses compagnons, et en paia vingt mil nobles tous
appareilliés.

25 § 263. Ensi ordonna li rois d’Engleterre ses besongnes,

estans en le ville de Kem, et renvoia se navie
cargie d’or et d’avoir conquis et de bons prisonniers,
dont il y avoit jà plus de soissante chevaliers, et trois
 cens riches bourgois, et avoech ce grant fuison de
30 salus et d’amistés à sa femme, la gentilz royne d’Engleterre,
madame Phelippe.
[148] Or lairons nous à parler dou conte de Hostidonne
et de le navie qui s’en reva vers Engleterre, et parlerons
dou dit roy comment il persevera en ce voiage.
Quant il eut sejourné en le ville de Kem, ensi que
5 vous avés oy, et que ses gens en eurent fait leurs
volentés, il s’en parti et fist chevaucier ses mareschaus
ensi comme en devant, l’un à l’un des lés et
l’autre à l’autre lés, ardant et essillant le plat pays.
Et prisent le chemin de Evrues, mès point n’i tournèrent,
10 car elle est trop forte et trop bien fremée.
Mais il chevaucièrent devers une aultre grosse ville
que on claime Louviers. Louviers adonc estoit une
ville en Normendie où on faisoit le plus grant plenté
de draperie, et estoit grosse et riche et moult marcheande.
15 Si entrèrent li Englès dedens et le conquisent
à peu de fait, car elle n’estoit point fremée. Si
fu toute courue, robée, pillie et gastée sans deport.
Et y conquisent li dit Englès très grant avoir. Quant
il en eurent fait leurs volentés, ils passèrent oultre,
20 et entrèrent en le conté d’Evrues, et l’ardirent toute,
excepté les forterèces: mais onques n’i assallirent
ville fremée ne chastiel, car li rois voloit espargnier
ses gens et sen artillerie; car il pensoit bien qu’il en
aroit à faire, ensi que messires Godefrois de Harcourt
25 li avoit dit et remoustré.
Si se mist li dis rois d’Engleterre et toute son host
sus le rivière de Sainne, en approchant Roem, où il
avoit grant fuison de gens d’armes de Normendie.
Et en estoient chapitainne li contes de Harcourt,
30 frères à monsigneur Godefroi, et li contes de Dreus.
Point ne tournèrent li Englès vers Roem, mais il alèrent
à Vrenon, où il y a bon chastiel et fort: si ardirent
[149] le ville; mès au chastiel, ne portèrent il point
 de damage. En apriès, il ardirent Vrenuel et tout
le pays d’environ Roem, et le Pont de l’Arce. Et vinrent
ensi à Mantes et à Meulent, et gastèrent le pays
5 d’environ. Et passèrent dalés le fort chastiel de Roleboise,
mais point n’i assallirent. Et par tout trouvoient
il sus le rivière de Sainne les pons deffais. Et
tant alèrent qu’il vinrent jusques à Poissi: si trouvèrent
le pont romput et deffait, mais encores estoient
10 les estaches et les gistes en le rivière. Si s’arresta là
li rois et y sejourna par cinq jours. Entrues fu li
pons refais bons et fors, pour passer son host aisiement
et sans peril. Si coururent si mareschal jusques
bien priès de Paris, et ardirent Saint Germain en Laie
15 et le Monjoie, et Saint Clo et Boulongne dalés Paris,
et le Bourch le Royne. Dont cil de Paris n’estoient
mies bien assegur, car elle n’estoit adonc point fremée.
Si se doubtoient que li Englès ne venissent par
oultrage jusques à là.
20 Adonc s’esmeut li rois Phelippes, et fist abatre tous
les apentis de Paris pour chevaucier plus aisiement
parmi Paris, et s’en vint à Saint Denis là où li rois
de Behagne, messires Jehans de Haynau, li dus de
Loeraingne, li contes de Flandres, li contes de Blois
25 et très grant baronnie et chevalerie estoient. Quant
les gens de Paris veirent le roy leur signeur partir,
si furent plus effreet que devant, et vinrent à lui en
yaus gettant en genoulz et disant: «Ha! chiers sires
et nobles rois, que volés vous faire? Volés vous
30 ensi laissier et guerpir vostre bonne cité de Paris?
lit se sont li ennemi à deux liewes priès: tantost
seront en ceste ville, quant il saront que vous en serés
[150] partis. Et nous n’avons ne n’arons qui nous deffendera
contre eulz. Sire, voelliés demorer et aidier
à garder vostre bonne cité.» Donc respondi li rois
et dist: «Ma bonne gent, ne vous doubtés de riens.
5 Jà li Englès ne vous approceront de plus priès. Je
 m’en vois jusques à Saint Denis devers mes gens
d’armes, car je voel chevaucier contre les Englès et
les combaterai, comment qu’il soit.» Ensi rapaisa li
rois de France le communalté de Paris, qui estoient
10 en grant doubtance que li Englès les venissent assallir
et destruire, ensi qu’il [avoient[338]] fait chiaus de
Kem. Et li rois d’Engleterre se tenoit en l’abbeye de
Poissi les Dames. Et fu là le jour de le Nostre Dame
en mi aoust, et y tint sa solennité, et sist à table, en
15 draps fourés d’ermine, de vermeille escarlatte, sans
mances.

§ 264. Ensi que li rois Edouwars d’Engleterre

chevauçoit et qu’il aloit sen host trainant, messires
Godefrois de Harcourt, li uns de ses mareschaus,
20 chevauçoit d’autre part d’un costet, et faisoit
l’avant-garde à tout cinq cens hommes d’armes et douze
cens arciers. Si encontra li dis messires Godefrois
d’aventure grant fuison des bourgois d’Amiens, à
cheval et à piet, et en grant arroi et riche, qui s’en
25 aloient, au mandement dou roy Phelippe, viers Paris.
Si furent assalli et combatu vistement de lui et de se
route. Et cil se deffendirent assés vassaument, car il
estoient grant plenté et de bonne gent, bien armé et
bien ordonné; et avoient quatre chevaliers dou pays
[151] d’Amienois à chapitainnes. Si dura ceste bataille assés
longement. Et en y eut de premières venues
pluiseurs rués jus, d’un lés et d’autre. Mès finablement
li Englès obtinrent le place, et furent li dit
5 bourgois desconfit et priès que tout mort et pris. Et
conquisent li Englès tout leur charoi et leur harnas,
où il avoit grant fuison de bonnes coses, car il
aloient à ce mandement devers le roy moult estoffeement,
pour tant qu’il n’avoient esté, en grant
10 temps avoit, hors de leur cité. Si en y eut bien mors
sus le place douze cens. Et retourna li dis messires
 Godefrois sus le viespre devers le grosse host dou
roy, et li recorda sen aventure, dont il fu moult liés
quant il entendi que la besongne avoit esté pour ses
15 gens.
Si chevauça li rois avant et entra ou pays de Biauvoisis,
ardans et exillans le plat pays, ensi qu’il avoit
fait en Normendie. Et chevauça tant en tèle manière
que il s’en vint logier en une moult belle et riche
20 abbeye, que on claime Saint [Lusiien[339]]. Et siet assés
priés de le cité de Biauvais; si y jut li dis rois une
nuit. A l’endemain, sitos qu’il s’en fu partis, il regarda
derrière lui; si vei que li abbeye estoit toute
enflamée. De ce fu il moult courouciés, et s’arresta
25 sus les camps, et dist que cil qui avoient fait cel oultrage
[oultre sa deffence, le comparroient[340]] chierement.
Car li rois avoit deffendu sus le hart que nulz
ne violast eglise, ne boutast feu en abbeye, ne en
moustier. Si en fist prendre juques à vingt de chiaus
[152] qui le feu y avoient boutet, et les fist tantost pendre
et sans delay, afin que li aultre y presissent exemple.

§ 265. Apriès chou que li rois d’Engleterre se fu

partis de Saint [Lusiien], il chevauça avant ou pays
5 de Biauvoisis, et passa oultre par dalés le cité de
Biauvais, et n’i veult point arester pour assallir ne
assegier, car il ne voloit mies travillier ses gens ne
alewer sen artillerie sans raison; et s’en vint logier
ce jour de haute heure à une ville que on claime
10 Milli en Biauvoisis. Li doi mareschal de l’host passèrent
si priès de le cité de Biauvais et des fourbours,
que il ne se peurent tenir que il n’alaissent assallir et
escarmucier à chiaus des barrières; et partirent leurs
gens en trois batailles, et assallirent à trois portes.
15 Et dura cilz assaulz jusques à remontière, mès petit
y gaegnièrent, car la cité de Biauvais est forte et bien
fremée, et estoit adonc gardée de bonnes gens et de
 bons arbalestriers. Et si y estoit li evesques, dont
la besongne valoit mieus. Quant li Englès perçurent
20 qu’il ne pooient riens conquester, il s’en partirent,
mès il ardirent tous les fourbours rés à rés des portes,
et puis vinrent au soir là où li rois estoit logiés.
L’endemain, li rois et toute son host se deslogièrent:
si chevaucièrent parmi le pays, ardant et essillant
25 tout derrière yaus; et s’en vinrent logier en un gros
village que on appelle Grantviller.
L’endemain, li rois se desloga et passa par devant
Argies. Si ne trouvèrent li coureur nullui qui [gardast[341]]
le chastiel; si l’assallirent, et le prisent à pau
[153] de fait, et l’ardirent. Et puis passèrent oultre, ardant
et essillant tout le pays d’environ; et vinrent ensi
jusques au chastiel de Pois, là où il trouvèrent bonne
ville et deux chastiaus. Mès nuls des seigneurs n’i
5 estoient, ne nulles gardes n’i avoit, fors deux belles
damoiselles, filles au signeur de Pois, qui tantost
euissent esté violées, se n’euissent esté doi gentil
chevalier d’Engleterre qui les en deffendirent et les
menèrent au roy pour elles garder: ce furent messires
10 Jehans Chandos et li sires de Basset. Li quelz
rois, pour honneur et gentillèce, leur fist bonne cière
et lie, et les recueilla doucement, et leur demanda où
elles vorroient estre. Elles respondirent: «A Corbie.»
Là les fist li rois mener et conduire sans peril. Si se
15 loga [li rois[342]] celle nuit en le ditte ville de Pois, et
ses gens là environ, ensi qu’il peurent.
Celle nuit parlementèrent li bonhomme de Pois et
cil des chastiaus as mareschaus de l’host, à yaus sauver
et non ardoir. Si se rançonnèrent parmi une
20 somme de florins qu’il deurent paiier à l’endemain,
mès que li rois fust partis. Quant ce vint à l’endemain
au matin, li rois se desloga et se mist au chemin
à tout son host. Et demorèrent aucun, de par les
mareschaus, pour attendre cel argent que on leur devoit
 25 delivrer. Quant cil de le ville de Pois furent
assamblet, et il veirent que li rois et toute l’ost s’en
estoient parti, et que li demoret derrière n’estoient
c’un petit de gent, il refusèrent à paiier, et disent
qu’il ne paieroient riens, et leur coururent sus pour
30 occire. Chil Englès se misent à deffense, et envoiièrent
[154] apriès l’ost querre secours. Chil qui chevaucièrent
devers l’ost, s’esploitièrent et fisent tant qu’il trouvèrent
l’arrieregarde, dont messires Renaulz de Gobehen
et messires Thumas de Hollandes estoient conduiseur;
5 si les retournèrent, et estourmirent durement
l’ost, en escriant: «Trahi! Trahi!» Si retournèrent
vers Pois cil qui les nouvelles entendirent, et trouvèrent
leurs compagnons qui encores se combatoient à
chiaus de le ville. Si furent cil de le ville de Pois
10 fierement envay et priès que tout mort, et la ville
arse, et li doi chastiel abatu; et puis retournèrent arrière
devers l’ost le roy qui estoit venus à Arainnes.
Et avoit commandé toutes manières de gens à logier,
et de point passer avant, et deffendu sus le hart que
15 nuls ne fourfesist riens à le ville, d’arsin ne d’autre
cose, car il se voloit là tenir un jour ou deux, et
avoir avis et conseil par quel pas il poroit le rivière
de Somme passer mieulz à sen aise. Et bien li besongnoit
qu’il y pensast, si com vous orés recorder
20 ensievant.

§ 266. Or voel je retourner au roy Phelippe de

France, qui estoit à Saint Denis, et ses gens là environ.
Et tous les jours li venoient gens de tous lés, et
tant en [avoit[343]] que sans nombre. Si estoit jà li dis
25 rois partis de Saint Denis o grant baronnie, en istance
de ce que de trouver le roy d’Engleterre et de combatre
à lui, car moult en avoit grant desir, pour contrevengier
l’arsin de son royaume et le grant destruction
[155] que li Englès y avoient fait. Si chevauça
 tant li dis rois de France par ses journées qu’il vint
à Copegni l’Esquissiet, à trois liewes priès de le cité
d’Amiens; et là s’arresta pour attendre ses gens qui
5 venoient de toutes pars, et pour aprendre le couvenant
des Englès.
Or parlerons dou roy d’Engleterre qui estoit arestés
à Arainnes, si com vous avés oy, et avoit moult
bien entendu que li rois de France le sievoit o tout
10 son effort; et si ne savoit encores là où il poroit passer
le rivière de Somme, qui est grande, large et parfonde.
Et si estoient tout li pont deffait, ou si bien
gardet de bonnes gens d’armes, que li rivière estoit
impossible à passer. Si appella li rois ses deux mareschaus,
15 le conte de Warvich et monsigneur Godefroi
de Harcourt, et leur dist que il presissent mil
hommes d’armes et deux mil arciers tous bien montés,
et s’en alaissent tastant et regardant, selonch le
rivière de Somme, se il poroient trouver passage là où
20 il peuissent passer sauvement. Si se partirent li doi
mareschal dessus nommet, bien acompagniet de gens
d’armes et d’arciers, et passèrent parmi Loncpret et
vinrent au Pont à Remi; et le trouvèrent bien garni
de grant fuison de chevaliers et d’escuiers et de gens
25 dou pays, qui là estoient assamblet, pour le pont garder
et le passage deffendre. Si vinrent là li Englès, et
se misent à piet et en bon couvenant, pour le pont et
le passage calengier, et les François assallir. Et y eut
très grant assaut et très fort, et qui dura dou matin
30 jusques à prime. Mès li dis pons et la deffense estoient
si bien batilliet, et furent si bien deffendu, que onques
li Englès n’i peurent riens conquerre; ançois se partirent,
[156] çascuns sans riens faire. Et chevaucièrent d’autre
part, et vinrent jusques à une grosse ville que on
claime Fontainnes sus Somme; si l’ardirent toute et
reubèrent, car elle n’estoit point fremée. Et puis vinrent
5 à une aultre ville, que on claime Lonch en Pontieu;
 si ne peurent gaegnier le pont, car il estoit
bien garnis et fu bien deffendus. Si s’en partirent et
chevaucièrent devers Pikegni, et trouvèrent le ville,
le pont et le chastiel bien garni; par quoi jamais ne
10 l’euissent gaegniet ne pris. Ensi avoit fait li rois de
France pourveir et garder les destrois et les passages
sus le rivière de Somme, afin que li rois d’Engleterre
ne sen host ne peuissent passer, car il les voloit
combatre à sa volenté, ou afamer par delà le rivière
15 de Somme.

§ 267. Quant li doi mareschal dou roy d’Engleterre

eurent ensi, un jour entier, tastet et chevauciet
et costiiet le rivière de Somme, et il veirent que de
nul lés il ne trouveroient point de passage, si retournèrent
20 arrière à Arainnes, devers le roy leur signeur,
et li recordèrent leur chevaucie et tout ce que trouvet
avoient. Che meismes soir, vint li rois de France
jesir à Amiens à plus de cent mil hommes, et estoit
li pays d’environ tous couvers de gens d’armes.
25 Quant li rois Edouwars eut oy le relation de ses deux
mareschaus, si n’en fu mies plus liés ne mains
anoieus. Et commença fort à muser et à merancoliier,
et commanda que l’endemain au plus matin il
fuissent tout, parmi son host, appareilliet, et que on
30 sievist les banières des mareschaus, quel part qu’il voloient
aler. Li commandemens dou roy fu fais. Quant
[157] ce vint au matin, [et] li rois eut oy messe devant
soleil levant, si sonnèrent les trompètes de deslogement.
Et se partirent toutes manières de gens, en
siewant les banières des mareschaus, qui chevauçoient
5 tout devant, si com ordonné estoit. Et chevaucièrent
tant en cel estat parmi le pays de Vismeu, en approçant
le bonne ville de Abbeville, qu’il vinrent à Oizemont,
où grant plenté des gens dou pays estoient recueilliet
sus le fiance d’un peu de deffense qu’il y
 10 avoit; et le cuidoient bien tenir et deffendre contre
les Englès, mais il fallirent à leur cuidier, car, en venant,
il furent assalli et envaï si durement qu’il perdirent
le place. Et conquisent li Englès le ville et tout
ce que dedens avoit. Et y eut mors et pris grant fuison
15 d’hommes de le ville et dou pays d’environ. Si
se loga li dis rois d’Engleterre ou grant hospital.
Adonc estoit li rois de France à Amiens, et avoit
ses espies et ses coureurs qui couroient sus le pays
et li raportoient le couvenant des Englès. Si entendi
20 li dis rois de France, ce soir, par ses coureurs, que li
rois d’Engleterre se deslogeroit le matin, si com il
fist, d’Arainnes, et chevauceroit viers Abbeville; car
si mareschal avoient tastet et chevauciet tout contremont
le rivière de Somme, et n’avoient nulle part
25 point [trouvé[344]] de passage. De ces nouvelles fu li rois
de France moult liés, et pensa bien que il encloroit le
roy d’Engleterre entre Abbeville et le rivière de
Somme, et le prenderoit, ou combateroit à se volenté.
Si ordonna tantost li dis rois un grant baron
30 de Normendie, qui s’appelloit messire Godemar de
[158] Fay, à aler garder le passage de le Blanke Take, qui
siet desous Abbeville, par où il couvenoit que li Englès
passassent, et non par ailleurs.
Si se parti li dis messires Godemars dou roy, à
5 tout mil hommes d’armes et cinq mil de piet, parmi
les Geneuois. Si s’esploita tant qu’il vint à Saint Rikier,
en Pontieu, et de là au Crotoi, où li dis passages
siet. Et encores emmena il, ensi qu’il chevauçoit
celle part, grant fuison des gens dou pays; et
10 manda les bourgois de Abbeville qu’il venissent là
avoecques lui, pour aidier à garder le passage. Si y
vinrent moult estoffeement, et en grant arroy. Et
furent audit passage au devant des Englès bien douze
mil hommes, uns c’autres, dont il y avoit bien deux
15 mil combatans à tournikiaus.
 § 268. Apriès ceste ordonance, li rois Phelippes,
qui durement desiroit à trouver les Englès et yaus
combatre, se departi d’Amiens o tout son effort, et
chevauça vers Arainnes, et vint là à heure de miedi
20 ou environ; et li rois d’Engleterre s’en estoit partis
à petite prime. Et encores trouvèrent li François
grant fuison de pourveances, chars en hastiers, pains
et pastes en fours, vins en tonniaus et en barilz, et
moult de tables mises, que li Englès avoient laissiet,
25 car il s’estoient de là parti en grant haste. Si tretos
que li rois de France fu à Arainnes, il eut conseil de
lui logier. Et li dist on: «Sire, logiés vous, et attendés
chi vostre baronnie. Il est vrai que li Englès ne
vous poeent escaper.» Donc se loga li rois en le ville
30 meismement; et tout ensi que li signeur venoient,
il se logoient.
[159] Or parlerons dou roy d’Engleterre, qui estoit en
le ville de Oisemont, et savoit bien que li rois de
France le sievoit o tout son effort, et en grant desir
de lui combatre. Si euist volentiers veu li rois d’Engleterre
5 que il et ses gens euissent passet le rivière
de Somme. Quant ce vint au soir, et si doi mareschal
furent revenu, qui avoient couru tout le pays
jusques ès portes d’Abbeville, et esté devant Saint
Waleri, et là fait une grande escarmuce, il mist son
10 conseil ensamble, et fist venir devant li pluiseurs
prisonniers dou pays de Pontieu et de Vismeu, que ses
gens avoient pris. Et leur demanda li rois moult
courtoisement se il y avoit entre yaus homme nul
qui sewist un passage, qui seoit desous Abbeville, où
15 nous porions et nostre host passer sans peril. «Se il
en y a nul qui le nous voelle ensengnier, nous le
quitterons de sa prison, et vingt de ses compagnons,
pour l’amour de lui.»
Là eut un varlet, que on clamoit Gobin Agace,
20 qui s’avança de parler, car il cognissoit le passage de
 le Blanke Take mieulz que nulz aultres, car il estoit
nés et nouris de là priés, et l’avoit passet et rapasset
en ceste anée par pluiseurs fois. Si dist au roy: «Oil,
en nom Dieu. Je vous prommeth, sus l’abandon de
25 ma tieste, que je vous menrai bien à tel pas, où vous
passerés le rivière de Somme, et vostre host, sans
peril. Et y a certainnes mètes de passage, où douze
hommes le passeroient bien de front, deux fois entre
nuit et jour, et n’aroient de l’aigue plus avant que
30 jusques as genoulz. Car quant li fluns de le mer est
en venant, il regorge le rivière si contremont que
nuls ne le poroit passer. Mais quant cilz fluns, qui
[160] vient deux fois entre nuit et jour, s’en est tous ralés,
la rivière demeure là endroit si petite que on y passe
bien aise, à piet et à cheval. Ce ne poet on faire
aultre part que là, fors au pont à Abbeville, qui est
5 forte ville et grande, et bien garnie de gens d’armes.
Et au dit passage, monsigneur, que je vous nomme,
a gravier de blanke marle, forte et dure, sur quoi on
poet seurement chariier, et pour ce appelle on ce
pas le Blanke Take.»
10 Quant li rois d’Engleterre oy les parolles dou varlet,
il n’euist mies estet si liés qui li euist donné vingt
mil escus, et li dist: «Compains, si je trueve en
vrai ce que tu nous dis, je te quitterai ta prison
et tous tes compagnons, pour l’amour de ti, et te ferai
15 delivrer cent nobles.» Et Gobins Agace respondi:
«Sire, oil, en peril de ma tieste. Mais ordenés
vous sur ce, pour estre là sur la rive devant
soleil levant.» Dist li rois: «Volentiers.» Puis fist
savoir par tout son host que cescuns fust armés et
20 appareilliés au son de le trompète, pour mouvoir et
partir de là pour aler ailleurs.

§ 269. Li rois d’Engleterre ne dormi mies gramment

celle nuit; ains se leva à mienuit, et fist sonner
 le trompette, en signe de deslogier. Cescuns fu
25 tantost appareilliés, sommier toursés, chars chargiés.
Si se partirent, sour le point dou jour, de le ville de
Oisemont; et chevaucièrent sur le conduit de ce varlet
qui les menoit. Et fisent tant et si bien s’esploitièrent
qu’il vinrent, environ soleil levant, assés
30 priès de ce gué que on claime le Blanche Take;
mès li fluns de le mer estoit adonc si plains qu’il ne
[161] peurent passer. Ossi bien couvenoit il au roy attendre
ses gens, qui venoient apriès lui. Si demora là
endroit jusques apriès prime, que li fluns s’en fu tous
ralés.
5 Et ançois que li fluns s’en fust tous ralés, vint d’autre
part messires Godemars dou Fay sus le pas de le
Blanke Take, à grant fuison de gens d’armes envoiiés
de par le roy de France, si com vous avés oy
recorder chi dessus. Si avoit li dis messires Godemars,
10 en venant à le Blanke Take, rassamblé grant
fuison des gens dou pays, tant qu’il estoient bien
douze mil, uns c’autres, qui tantos se rengièrent sus
le pas de le rivière, pour garder et deffendre le passage.
Mais li rois Edowars d’Engleterre ne laissa mies
15 à passer pour ce; ains commanda à ses mareschaus
tantost ferir en l’aigue, et ses arciers traire fortement
as François, qui estoient en l’aigue et sus le rivage.
Lors fisent li doi mareschal d’Engleterre chevaucier
leurs banières, ou nom de Dieu et de saint Gorge,
20 et yaus apriès; si se ferirent [en[345]] l’aigue de plains eslais,
li plus bacelereus et li mieulz monté devant. Là
eut en le meisme rivière fait mainte jouste, et maint
homme reversé d’une part et d’aultre. Là commença
uns fors hustins, car messires Godemars et li sien
25 deffendoient vassaument le passage. Là y eut aucuns
chevaliers et escuiers françois, d’Artois et de Pikardie
et de le carge monsigneur Godemar, qui pour
leur honneur avancier se feroient ou dit gués, et ne
 voloient mies estre trouvé sus les camps, mès avoient
30 plus chier à jouster en l’aigue que sus terre. Si y eut,
[162] je vous di, là fait mainte jouste et mainte belle apertise
d’armes.
Et eurent là li Englès, de premiers, un moult dur
rencontre. Car tout cil, qui estoient avoecques monsigneur
5 Godemar là envoiiet pour deffendre et garder
le passage, estoient gens d’eslitte; et se tenoient
tout bien rengiet sus le destroit dou passage de le
rivière: dont li Englès estoient dur rencontré, quant
il venoient à l’issue de l’aigue, pour prendre terre.
10 Et y avoit Geneuois qui dou tret leur faisoient moult
de maulz. Mais li arcier d’Engleterre traioient si fort
et si ouniement c’à merveilles; et toutdis, entrues
qu’il ensonnioient les François, gens d’armes passoient.
Et sachiés que li Englès se prendoient bien
15 priés d’yaus combatre, car il leur estoit dit notorement
que li rois de France les sievoit à plus de cent
mil hommes. Et jà estoient aucun compagnon coureur,
de le partie des François, venu jusques as Englès,
li quel en reportèrent vraies ensengnes au roy
20 de France, si com vous orés dire.

§ 270. Sus le pas de le Blanke Take fu la bataille

dure et forte, et assés bien gardée et deffendue des
François. Et mainte belle apertise d’armes y eut ce
jour fait, d’un lés et d’aultre; mès finablement li Englès
25 passèrent oultre, à quel meschief que ce fust, et
se traisent, ensi qu’il passoient, tout sus les camps.
Si passa li rois et li princes de Galles ses filz, et tout
li signeur. Depuis ne tinrent li François gaires de
conroy et se partirent, qui partir s’en peut, dou dit
30 passage, comme desconfit. Quant messires Godemars
vey le meschief, il se sauva au plus tost qu’il peut,
[163] et ossi fisent tamaint de se route. Et prisent li aucun
le chemin de Abbeville, et li aultre celui de Saint
 Rikier. Là eut grant occision et maint homme mort,
car cil qui estoient à piet ne pooient fuir. Si en y
5 eut grant plenté de chiaus de Abbeville, de Moustruel,
de Rue et de Saint Rikier, mort et pris; et dura
la cace plus d’une grosse liewe. Encores n’estoient
mies li Englès tout oultre sus le rivage, quant aucun
escuier as signeurs de France, qui enventurer se voloient,
10 especialement des chiaus de l’Empire, dou
roy de Behagne et de monsigneur Jehan de Haynau,
vinrent sus yaus, et conquisent sus les darrainniers
aucuns chevaus et harnas, et en tuèrent et blecièrent
pluiseurs sus le rivage, qui mettoient painne à passer,
15 afin qu’il fuissent tout oultre.
Les nouvelles vinrent au roy Phelippe de France,
qui chevauçoit fortement celle matinée, et estoit partis
d’Arainnes. Et li fu dit que li Englès avoient passet
le Blanke Take, et desconfit monsigneur Godemar
20 dou Fay et se route. De ces nouvelles fu li rois de
France moult courouciés, car il cuidoit bien trouver
les Englès sus le rivage de Somme, et là combatre.
Si s’arresta sus les camps, et demanda à ses mareschaus
qu’il en estoit bon à faire, et qu’il le desissent.
25 Il respondirent: «Sire, vous ne poés passer, fors
au pont à Abbeville, car li fluns de le mer est jà tous
revenus.» Donc retourna li rois de France tous courouciés,
et s’en vint ce joedi jesir à Abbeville. Et
toutes ses gens sievirent son train, et vinrent li
30 prince et li corps des grans signeurs logier en le ditte
ville, et leurs gens ens ès villiaus d’environ; car tout
n’i peuissent mies estre logiet, tant en y avoit grant
[164] fuison. Or parlerons dou roy d’Engleterre, comment
il persevera, depuis qu’il eut conquis sus monsigneur
Godemar dou Fay le passage de Blanke
Take.
5 § 271. Quant li rois d’Engleterre et ses gens furent
oultre, et qu’il eurent mis en cace leurs ennemis
 et delivré le place, il se traisent bellement et ordonneement
ensamble. Et aroutèrent leur charoi et chevaucièrent,
ensi qu’il avoient fait ou pays de Vexin
10 et de Vismeu, et en devant jusques à là; et ne s’effreèrent
de riens, puis qu’il sentoient le rivière de
Somme à leur dos. Et regratia et loa Dieu li rois
d’Engleterre ce jour pluiseurs fois, quant si grant
grace li avoit fait que trouvet passage bon et seur,
15 et conquis sus ses ennemis, et desconfis par bataille.
Adonc fist là venir li rois d’Engleterre le varlet
avant, qui le passage li avoit ensegniet; se le quitta
de se prison et tous ses compagnons, pour l’amour
de lui, et li fist baillier cent nobles d’or et un bon
20 roncin. De cesti ne sçai je plus avant.
Depuis chevaucièrent li rois et ses gens tout souef
et tout joiant; et eurent ce jour empensé de logier
en une bonne et grosse ville que on claime Noielle,
qui priés de là estoit. Mès quant il seurent que elle
25 estoit à la contesse d’Aumarle, sereur à monsigneur
Robert d’Artois qui trespassés estoit, il assegurèrent
le ville et le pays appertenans à la dame, pour l’amour
de lui: de quoi elle remercia moult le roy et les mareschaus.
Si alèrent logier plus avant ens ou pays, en
30 approçant La Broie; mès si mareschal chevaucièrent
jusques au Crotoi, qui siet sus mer, et prisent le ville
[165] et ardirent toute. Et trouvèrent sus le port grant garnison
de barges, de nefs et de vaissiaus, cargiés de
vins de Poito, qui estoient à marcheans de Saintonge
et de le Rocelle, mais il eurent tantost tout vendu.
5 Et en fisent li dit marescal amener et achariier des
milleurs en l’ost dou roy d’Engleterre, qui estoit logiés
à deux petites liewes de là.
L’endemain, bien matin, se deslogea li dis rois
d’Engleterre, et chevauça devers Creci en Pontieu.
10 Et si doi mareschal chevaucièrent en deux routes, li
uns à destre, et li aultres à senestre. Et vinrent, li uns
 courir jusques as portes d’Abbeville, et puis s’en retourna
vers Saint Rikier, ardant et exillant le pays;
et li aultres, au desous sus le marine; et vint courir
15 jusques à le ville de Saint Esperit de Rue. Si chevaucièrent
ensi, ce venredi, jusques à heure de miedi,
que leurs trois batailles se remisent ensamble. Si se
loga li dis rois Edowars, et toute son host, assés près
de Creci en Pontieu.

20 § 272. Bien estoit infourmés li rois d’Engleterre

que ses adversaires, li rois de France, le sievoit à
tout son grant effort, et avoit grant desir de combatre
à lui, si comme il apparoit, car il l’avoit vistement
poursievi jusques bien priès dou passage de le Blanke
25 Take, et estoit retournés arrière à Abbeville. Si dist
adonc li rois d’Engleterre à ses gens: «Prendons chi
place de terre, car je n’irai plus avant si arons veus
nos anemis. Et bien y a cause que je les attende, car
je sui sus le droit hiretage de madame ma mère, qui
30 li fu donnés en mariage. Si le vorrai deffendre et calengier
contre mon adversaire Phelippe de Vallois.»
[166] Ses gens obeirent tout à se intention, et n’alèrent
adonc plus avant.
Si se loga li rois à plains camps, et toutes ses gens
ossi. Et pour ce que il savoit bien que il n’avoit pas
5 tant de gens de le huitime partie que li rois de France
avoit, et si voloit attendre l’aventure et le fortune et
combatre, il avoit mestier que il entendesist à ses besongnes.
Si fist aviser et regarder par ses deux mareschaus,
le conte de Warvic et monsigneur Godefroi
10 de Harcourt, et monsigneur Renault de Gobehen
avoech eulz, vaillant chevalier durement, le lieu et
le place de terre où il ordonneroient leurs batailles.
Li dessus dit chevaucièrent autour des camps, et imaginèrent
et considerèrent bien le pays et leur avantage.
15 Si fisent le roy traire de celle part et toutes
 manières de gens. Et avoient envoiiés leurs coureurs
par devers Abbeville, pour ce que il [savoient[346]] bien
que li rois de France y estoit et passeroit là le Somme,
à savoir se ce venredi il se trairoit point sus les camps,
20 et [ystroit[347]] de Abbeville. Il raportèrent qu’il n’en estoit
nul apparant.
Adonc donna li rois congiet à toutes ses gens d’yaus
traire à leurs logeis pour ce jour, et l’endemain, bien
matin, au son des trompètes, estre tout apparilliet,
25 ensi que pour tantost combatre, en la ditte place.
Si se retraist cescuns sus ceste ordenance à son logeis;
et entendirent à remettre à point et à refourbir
leurs armeures. Or, parlerons nous un petit dou roy
[167] Phelippe, qui estoit le joedi au soir venus en
Abbeville.

§ 273. Le venredi tout le jour, se tint li rois de

France dedens la bonne ville d’Abbeville, attendans
5 ses gens qui toutdis li venoient de tous costés. Et
faisoit ossi passer les aucuns oultre le ditte ville, et
traire as camps, pour estre plus apparilliés à lendemain,
car c’estoit sen entention que de issir hors et
combatre ses ennemis, comment qu’il fust. Et envoia
10 li dis rois che venredi ses mareschaus, le signeur de
Saint Venant et monsigneur Charle de Montmorensi,
hors de Abbeville descouvrir sus le pays, pour aprendre
et savoir le vérité des Englès. Si raportèrent li
dessus dit au roy, à heure de viespres, que li Englès
15 estoient logiet sus les camps, assés priès de Creci en
Pontieu, et moustroient, selonch leur ordenance et
leur couvenant, qu’il attenderoient là leurs ennemis.
De ce raport fu li rois de France moult liés et dist,
se il plaisoit à Dieu, que l’endemain il seroient combatu.
20 Si pria li dis rois au souper, ce venredi, dalés
lui tous les haus princes, qui adonc estoient dalés lui