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Ethics and Self-­Cultivation

This book makes an important contribution to the growing body of literature

on the cultivation of virtue. It focuses on the influence of Hellenistic tradition,
with its emphasis on the continued development of the self, on modern
philosophy, and also includes a number of contemporary perspectives on moral
self-­cultivation. The volume will be of interest to scholars and graduate students
in moral philosophy, moral psychology, philosophy of mind and epistemology.
—­Liezl van Zyl, University of Waikato, New Zealand

The aim of Ethics and Self-­ Cultivation is to establish and explore a new
‘cultivation of the self’ strand within contemporary moral philosophy. Although
the revival of virtue ethics has helped reintroduce the eudaimonic tradition
into mainstream philosophical debates, it has by and large been a revival of
Aristotelian ethics combined with a modern preoccupation with standards
for the moral rightness of actions. The essays comprising this volume offer a
fresh approach to the eudaimonic tradition: instead of conditions for rightness
of actions, they focus on conceptions of human life that are best for the one
living it. The first section looks at the Hellenistic schools and the way they
influenced modern thinkers like Spinoza, Kant, Nietzsche, Hadot, and Foucault
in their thinking about self-­cultivation. The second section offers contemporary
perspectives on ethical self-­cultivation by drawing on work in moral psychology,
epistemology of self-­knowledge, philosophy of mind, and meta-­ethics.

Matthew Dennis is a doctoral researcher on the joint-­ PhD programme of

the universities of Warwick (UK) and Monash (Australia), specialising in
philosophical accounts of character-­ development and self-­ cultivation. His
current work draws on French and German philosophy, exploring how these
traditions have the resources to contribute to debates in Anglophone ethics. He
has published on Nietzsche, Kant, and virtue theory, and is currently writing on
the philosophy of technology.

Sander Werkhoven is an Assistant Professor of Ethics at the Department of

Philosophy at Utrecht University and a member of the Ethics Institute. His
main research areas are the philosophy of medicine and psychiatry, normative
ethics, and meta-­ethics. He has published on theories of health and well-­being in
international journals, and has papers forthcoming on Nietzsche and Canguilhem.
Routledge Studies in Ethics and Moral Theory

Virtue’s Reasons
New Essays on Virtue, Character, and Reasons
Edited by Noell Birondo and S. Stewart Braun

In Defense of Moral Luck

Why Luck Often Affects Praiseworthiness and Blameworthiness
Robert J. Hartman

Risk, Technology, and Moral Emotions

Sabine Roeser

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Edited by Rashef Agam-­Segal and Edmund Dain

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Explaining Right and Wrong

A New Moral Pluralism and Its Implication
Benjamin Sachs

Determined by Reasons
A Competence Account of Acting for a Normative Reason
Susanne Mantel

Ethics and Self-­Cultivation

Historical and Contemporary Perspectives
Edited by Matthew Dennis and Sander Werkhoven

For a full list of titles in this series, please visit www.routledge.com

Ethics and Self-­Cultivation
Historical and Contemporary
Perspectives

Edited by Matthew Dennis and

Sander Werkhoven
First published 2018
by Routledge
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and by Routledge
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Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
Names: Dennis, Matthew (Doctoral Researcher), editor.
Title: Ethics and self-cultivation : historical and contemporary
perspectives / edited by Matthew Dennis and Sander Werkhoven.
Description: 1 [edition]. | New York : Routledge, 2018. | Series:
Routledge studies in ethics and moral theory ; 45 | Includes
bibliographical references and index.
Identifiers: LCCN 2017061296 | ISBN 9781138104372 (hardback :
alk. paper)
Subjects: LCSH: Ethics. | Virtue. | Philosophy—History. | Self (Philosophy)
Classification: LCC BJ21 .E856 2018 | DDC 170—dc23
LC record available at https://lccn.loc.gov/2017061296
ISBN: 978-­1-­138-­10437-­2 (hbk)
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Contents ContentsContents

Preface vii
MICHAEL SLOTE
Acknowledgements xi

Introduction 1

PART I
Historical Perspectives 13

1 Roman Stoic Mindfulness: An Ancient Technology of the Self 15

JOHN SELLARS

2 Affective Therapy: Spinoza’s Approach to Self-­Cultivation 30

AURELIA ARMSTRONG

3 ‘Was I Just Lucky?’: Kant on Self-­Opacity and Self-­Cultivation 47

IRINA SCHUMSKI

4 Nietzsche and Kant on Epicurus and Self-­Cultivation 68

KEITH ANSELL-­P EARSON

5 Nietzsche’s Ethics of Self-­Cultivation and Eternity 84

MICHAEL URE

6 Ilsetraut Hadot’s Seneca: Spiritual Direction and the

Transformation of the Other 104
MATTHEW SHARPE

7 Foucault, Stoicism, and Self-­Mastery 124

KATRINA MITCHESON
vi Contents
Part II
Contemporary Perspectives 141

8 Neo-­Aristotelianism: Virtue, Habituation, and Self-­Cultivation 143

DAWA OMETTO AND ANNEMARIE KALIS

9 Formal Excellences and Familiar Excellences 162

EDWARD HARCOURT

10 Cultivating an Integrated Self 174

LUKE BRUNNING

11 Moral Perception and Relational Self-­Cultivation:

Reassessing Attunement as a Virtue 197
ANNA BERGQVIST

Epilogue: Reflections on the Value of Self-­Knowledge for

Self-­Cultivation 222
QUASSIM CASSAM WITH THE EDITORS

Contributors 230
Index 233
Preface PrefacePreface

This volume is a very welcome addition to the literature of ethics. Much

philosophical discussion of human development focuses on moral develop-
ment and tends to assume that this is largely or substantially a matter of
moral self-­cultivation; but the editors of the present volume have deliber-
ately chosen a wider focus. Self-­cultivation can not only include trying to
find a way toward a morally better or happier life for oneself, but can also
be a matter of seeking to develop certain non-­moral excellences in one-
self, and the essays of this volume attest widely and fully to these enlarged
possibilities.
Even if most of us ethicists are mainly interested in moral issues, we have
to acknowledge that there are important ethical issues beyond the moral
as well. But the very breadth and scope of this volume raises issues that
could not be addressed in a single collection. Perhaps the most important
such issue concerns a major difference between moral development and the
development of non-­moral excellences and of the capacity for a happy life.
The desire for happiness comes more naturally to us than the desire to be
morally good to others; it runs deeper and is less in need of cultivation than
moral motives are. To be sure, and as Bishop Butler pointed out long ago,
many of us thwart our own happiness in various ways, but for most of us
the desire to lead a happy life is always there. So when we become convinced
that certain practices or efforts will serve to make us happier, our motiva-
tion doesn’t have to change in order for us to have some desire to implement
those practices or efforts. Similarly, with certain excellences. According to
much of the psychology literature, human beings are born with a strong
desire for mastery or competence. This means that when an adult or ado-
lescent learns of a way in which they can become more competent at some
skill they already to some degree possess, there is an antecedent motive for
making the relevant change.
Self-­cultivation in such cases has a strong foothold in or on our basic
psychology, but morality seems different. To be sure, there are studies indi-
cating that 2-­year-­old children can have empathy for the needs of others and
can want to help people who need help. But when moral philosophers talk
about moral self-­cultivation, they typically refer to ways in which maturing
viii Preface
or adult individuals can go beyond such beginnings, and this is problematic
for reasons that the self-­cultivation of many excellences and the pursuit of
one’s own happiness are not. Those who recommend moral self-­cultivation
assume, for example, that an individual who is not very (or sufficiently)
benevolent or virtuous can be motivated to try to become more benevolent
or virtuous, but it is not clear how such a desire for change can actually be
motivated. As David Nivison once wisely pointed out, the desire to become
more virtuous seems, paradoxically, to somehow involve already being the
more virtuous person one supposedly wishes to become.
Now Aristotelians who recommend moral self-­cultivation often claim
that moral virtue is like a skill, something that practice can make perfect.
But a skill like reading is something that, given the desire for competence
(and for the esteem of others, another basic human desire), most children
will understandably want for themselves. So, for example, when they prac-
tice reading skills either on their own or with the help of teachers, their
underlying motivation doesn’t have to change. Memory and the nervous
system (roughly) cooperate with the effort to learn to read and help reading
emerge as a skill. But virtue is not a skill that one can withhold or make
use of as one wills; rather (and as Aristotle made clear) it is a disposition to
act in certain ways, and this kind of disposition depends on motivation. In
that case, when someone who is less virtuous becomes more virtuous, their
motivation has to change, and the theoretical question arises as to why any
individual on her or his own should be motivated to change their motivation
in the necessary way.
This then leads to a further question as to how, even assuming such moti-
vation to change one’s motivation, a child’s, adolescent’s, or adult’s efforts
could actually and practically realise the desired change. One sees a moral
exemplar and let’s say one wants to be like them. But how is this going to
work? Copying their actions doesn’t seem enough because the desire to copy
or emulate is not the same as the moral motivations of the exemplar that
one wishes to develop in oneself. How, exactly, do the morally admirable
motivations develop out of acts of imitation? Not enough attention has been
paid to such questions, and though I think limited moral self-­cultivation can
sometimes occur, I don’t think moral self-­cultivation can have the sweep-
ing influence for good that its advocates have believed possible (I argue
this point at greater length in Slote 2016).1 Which makes it all the more
interesting, from my point of view, to recognise and explore forms of ethical
self-­cultivation that are not specifically moral and that may be less motiva-
tionally and implementationally problematic.
For example, the desire for a happy or fulfilling life seems to provide a good
basis for possible and possibly realistic ethical self-­cultivation. Although cir-
cumstances can make such a life nearly impossible for one (I disagree with
the Stoics about this), there is still a lot one can do with intelligent planning,
self-­discipline, and self-­reflection to improve one’s chances of happiness;
 Preface ix
and here one is working with something more psychologically guaranteed
than one is when one speaks of moral self-­development. Lots of people want
to have better, happier lives and try to do something about that, but almost
no ordinary person both wants to become morally better and makes deliber-
ate efforts to cause that to happen. The latter fact is one that the literature
of moral self-­cultivation never faces squarely, but it is a fairly obvious fact,
once one thinks about it, and in my opinion it points toward what I have
been saying in this preface, namely, that there is something problematic
about moral self-­cultivation that is not problematic about certain other
forms of ethical self-­cultivation.
But we have to be careful here. Our natural curiosity is relevant to the
cultivation of the excellence of self-­knowledge, but the desire to think well
of oneself and to have the esteem of others is also basic to our psychology.
(On these points, see my Human Development and Human Life 2016.) And
these can conflict when self-­knowledge is at issue. To really pursue self-­
knowledge is to risk finding out very unpleasant things about oneself, so I,
for one, think that the desire for the excellence of self-­knowledge is moti-
vationally and implementationally more problematic than overly optimistic
philosophers (most notably, Socrates) have assumed.
In other cases, the self-­cultivation may be less problematic. Nietzsche
asserts an ideal of individual strength, power, and self-­control that has anti-­
moral connotations we can find it difficult to accept. But if his ideal is a
distortion of what human beings on the whole are all about (he never rec-
ognised how naturally empathy and sympathy enter our lives), still one can
also think of it as a distortion of what is valid and psychologically motivat-
ing within all normal human beings: the desire, as I have said, for compe-
tence and mastery within (not necessarily over) one’s environment. Getting
a university education and/or going to a professional school can be ways of
cultivating these excellences for oneself, and there is nothing unrealistic or
problematic about this kind of ethical self-­cultivation.
A final form of self-­cultivation would be trying to make one’s life more
unified or more of a harmonious whole, and this, certainly, is an ideal that
many philosophers have viewed as worth pursuing. But is a high degree
of unification or harmony within one’s life so uncontroversially a form of
excellence? I am not sure. The same considerations that make some philoso-
phers believe in plural values and even moral dilemmas could tempt them or
us to believe that too much harmony or oneness is not a good thing because
it fails to realistically reflect and/or reckon with the messiness of the world
surrounding us and within us.
To return to the issue with which I began, if my criticisms of the idea of
moral self-­cultivation are on the right track, then the moral development
and education of individuals depends more on outside factors than on what
they can or want to do for themselves. This is a disappointing, perhaps
even a maddening, result for those who believe in the importance of moral
x Preface
self-­cultivation. But what we learn in and from the present volume is that
issues of self-­cultivation extend well beyond any preoccupation with moral
self-­cultivation. It will be interesting to see what the fruits of thinking over
this larger ethical terrain will be in the future.

Michael Slote
University of Miami, 2017

Note
1 Michael Slote (2016). ‘Moral Self-­Cultivation East and West: A Critique,’ Journal
of Moral Education, 45.2, 192–­206.
Acknowledgements AcknowledgementsAcknowledgements

Collective philosophical endeavours such as this volume merit a comprehen-

sive list of acknowledgements. We have many people to thank for making
this publication possible. First, we must thank the contributors for their
articles, especially those who presented papers at the two conferences we
held on self-­cultivation at the University of Warwick (2014) and at Monash
University’s Prato campus (2015). Second, we wish to thank the project’s
longstanding mentors, Keith Ansell-­ Pearson and Michael Ure, for their
advice, unwavering enthusiasm, and contribution to all the stages of the
project. This volume would be impossible without their tireless work on
our behalf, and we owe them a debt of gratitude for this. Debt should also
be acknowledged to John Sellars, for advising and supporting us when we
first had the idea of starting a research project on self-­cultivation. Third, we
wish to thank Andrew Weckenmann at Routledge for his guidance with the
publishing process, Thom Ryan for his input at the beginning of the project,
and the Monash-­Warwick Alliance for their generous funding award which
enabled us to bring academics from all over the world to discuss the theme
of self-­cultivation face to face during the two conferences mentioned above.
Finally, we wish to thank Michael Slote for his preface to the volume, espe-
cially for his kind and encouraging words regarding our idea for a volume
on this theme.
Introduction IntroductionIntroduction

When Elizabeth Anscombe wrote her scathing assessment of the state of

moral philosophy in her seminal 1958 paper ‘Modern Moral Philosophy’,
she tentatively suggested that once the dust had settled and core concepts
like action and intention had been further clarified, ‘it might be possible
to advance to considering the concept of virtue; with which, I suppose, we
should be beginning some sort of a study of ethics’ (Anscombe 2005: 188).
Anscombe’s proposal proved prophetic: half a century later philosophical
interest in virtue has surged and virtue ethics has been established as a legiti-
mate alternative to Kantian deontology and consequentialist approaches in
moral philosophy.1 Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics has been at the heart of
the resurgence of interest in virtue, so much so that it is only a minor over-
statement to say that the revival of virtue ethics over the last decades has
been a renaissance of Aristotelianism in contemporary ethics.
Nevertheless, turning virtue ethics into a genuine rival to consequential-
ism and deontology—­requiring that it addresses the same questions, but
provides better answers—­has come at a price. One drawback has been the
continued preoccupation with standards for morally right action, which
saturates contemporary discussions about virtue. Despite the approach-­
defining focus on character rather than actions (or the consequences of
actions), current discussions about virtue remain primarily concerned with
questions about the moral rightness of actions. The question whether the
reasoned choices of exemplary agents can serve as a suitably general and
sufficiently action-­guiding standard for morally right action has, by now,
become the central bone of contention in debates about virtue. Especially
Rosalind Hursthouse’s (1996; 1999) work on normative virtue ethics and
Michael Slote’s (1995) account of agent-­basing have given rise to a rapidly
expanding literature on normative virtue ethics. The starting point of this
volume is that the focus on conditions for morally right actions comes at
the expense of understanding all the relevant aspects of individual human
flourishing—­including non-­moral dimensions—­as well as the ways in which
non-­moral human excellence can be cultivated.
In addition to focusing on questions pertaining to moral rightness,
the dominance of Aristotle’s virtue ethics has overshadowed alternative
2 Introduction
non-­ Aristotelean conceptions of human flourishing and excellence. The
pioneers who reintroduced virtue ethics into mainstream moral philoso-
phy largely adopted Aristotle’s picture of human flourishing, including his
catalogue of the ethical and intellectual virtues that he viewed as neces-
sary to achieve it. This has overshadowed alternative conceptions of human
flourishing and excellence, including those found in Hellenistic and modern
European philosophical tradition.
Another Aristotelian doctrine which appears to have been accepted as the
default view is that the cultivation of virtue takes place mostly during child-
hood, meaning that practices of self-­cultivation in adulthood are considered
less important by comparison. This has led to a relative neglect of practices
of self-­cultivation and self-­transformation that can be employed in adult
life, despite the wealth of resources for such practices that can be found in
the Western philosophical tradition. This especially applies to the Hellenistic
philosophers, who developed a great number of practices of self-­cultivation
and forms of training designed specifically for adolescents and adults, in
which contemporary virtue ethicists have shown relatively little interest.
The present volume offers a variety of perspectives on human excellence
and practices of self-­cultivation that challenge these limitations and ortho-
doxies of current virtue theory. Above all, the essays collected in this volume
aim to present a more inclusive set of philosophical perspectives on human
flourishing and connected practices of self-­cultivation, thereby seeking to
contribute to ethics in the broadest sense of the term. The motivation behind
this inclusive approach is that, at present, a large array of philosophical per-
spectives on human flourishing and practices of self-­cultivation remain out-
side of mainstream moral philosophy. Where, one might wonder, do works
like Baruch Spinoza’s Ethics, Immanuel Kant’s Doctrine of Virtue, and
Friedrich Nietzsche’s middle period works on Free Spirits belong—­to name
some of the texts figuring in this volume—­if not under the rubric of human
flourishing? And how about Michel Foucault’s analyses of ancient practices
aimed at self-­mastery, the existential philosophers’ work on authenticity, or
Harry Frankfurt’s analyses of freedom and psychological self-­integration?
Each in their own way, these are works that develop and defend perspec-
tives on how human beings can flourish and acquire excellence in at least
one dimension of character and psychological make-­up. If so, they belong
under the umbrella of ethics, and the heavy focus on Aristotle’s account of
excellence needs open itself up to a more inclusive approach.
A great deal of philosophical work has been done on non-­Aristotelian
accounts of virtue, of course, and it is important we acknowledge a debt
of gratitude to this literature. This collection is certainly not the first to try
and widen our perspective on virtue and practices of self-­cultivation. Julia
Annas’s (1993) and Martha Nussbaum’s (2009) seminal work on Helle-
nistic philosophy, together with Pierre Hadot’s (1995, 2002), Michel Fou-
cault’s (1988), Lawrence Becker’s (1998), and John Sellars’s (2003, 2014)
studies of this period—­to mention only some of the most influential—­have
 Introduction 3
done much to revive an interest in Hellenistic ethics. Honourable mentions
in this regard are also owed to Christine Swanton’s work (2003, 2015)
which brings out the virtue-­ethical dimensions of Nietzsche’s and Hume’s
work, Robert Johnson’s (2011) and Nancy Sherman’s (1997) book-­length
analyses of Kant’s account of virtue and self-­improvement, and, of course,
Macintyre’s (1988) account of tradition-­bound forms of practical rational-
ity. Eastern perspectives on human flourishing and self-­cultivation have
also been re-­introduced. Here we should especially mention the collection
on virtue ethics and Confucianism edited by Michael Slote and Stephen
Angle (2013), as well as Ivanhoe’s (2000) book on Confucian ideas about
moral self-­cultivation. Given that the perspective on virtue has in fact been
widened and that interests in virtue and self-­cultivation are indeed slowly
reaching beyond Aristotelian parameters, what makes the perspectives on
self-­cultivation contained in the present volume of special interest?
Each of the following essays on human flourishing and forms of self-­
cultivation share three core characteristics. First, a central concern is what
an individual flourishing life looks like, and the underlying premise is that
‘flourishing’ corresponds to a significantly wider range of features than exer-
cising morally relevant qualities. Rather than confining discussion of virtues
to character traits that reliably result in morally appropriate behaviour, this
volume countenances perspectives on self-­cultivation that have—­at least at
face value—­relatively little to do with what we normally recognise as mor-
ally right behaviour. This signals the volume’s move away from the attempt
to identify the conditions for morally action towards a more comprehensive
study of the ways in which a person might improve him or herself so as
to live the best possible life. Second, this volume focuses on processes of
self-­cultivation that a person can impose onto him or herself, either indi-
vidually or with the help of others. Self-­cultivation involves a relation of
oneself to oneself, as Foucault (1988: 43) pointed out, so that the indi-
vidual presides over his or her own development and practice. This requires
a self-­reflexivity and level of awareness that is only present in adolescence
and adulthood. The forms of self-­cultivation investigated in this volume
therefore do not belong to pedagogics, as the Aristotelian account of virtue
development would have it; they are active processes of self-­transformation
that can be undertaken in adulthood. And third, relatedly, the essays in this
collection not only investigate what a fully-­flourishing life looks like, but
also the techniques and practices that enable one to bring about this state.
Pierre Hadot (1995: 127) has re-­introduced the term ‘spiritual exercises’ to
denote these techniques, and this volume investigates these forms of exercise
or training alongside descriptions of their aim.
The basic ambition of this volume, then, is to expand our ways of think-
ing about virtue and practices of self-­cultivation, challenging the reader to
think outside the contours of the familiar Aristotelian conception of virtue
and ways by which it is acquired. The larger ambition of this volume, how-
ever, is to help introduce a new strand of thinking into contemporary ethics,
4 Introduction
one which we shall provisionally call ‘cultivation of the self’—­a phrase
taken from Foucault (1988: 37–­68). This strand of thinking may be incor-
porated into virtue theory, provided that virtue theory is not definitionally
restricted to the thesis that excellence in character results in morally right
action. Alternatively, cultivation of the self could denote a new strand in
ethics, pointing to the wider sense in which people can shape and develop
their own selves and forms of subjectivity. Self-­cultivation thus understood
can provide a framework to interpret past philosophical works, as well as
guide future research into new and uncharted directions.
Each of the three characteristics mentioned above may be challenged, of
course, both from an Aristotelian perspective as well as from a more gen-
eral ethical point of view. In fact, in Chapter 8 Annemarie Kalis and Dawa
Ometto present a Neo-­Aristotelian response to the premises of this volume,
arguing that Aristotelianism can equally be squared with the characteristics
of self-­cultivation mentioned previously. It may be worth anticipating some
challenges, and to clarify the larger aims of the volume by offering some
provisional responses.
A first concern may arise from the effort to expand discussions of vir-
tue beyond the familiar moral virtues, shifting attention away from con-
ditions for right action to a more inclusive account of individual human
flourishing—­including its non-­moral features. This may strike the reader as
unnecessary and potentially problematic, especially from a Platonic or Aris-
totelian point of view. One of the main messages in both Plato’s Republic
and Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics is that being just and acting rightly to
others coincides with living in a way that is best for oneself. Both Plato and
Aristotle hold that one is best with a character and intra-­psychic harmony
that leads one to act in morally appropriate ways. Alternative forms of psy-
chological make-­up and behavioural dispositions will result in chaos, tur-
moil, if not psychic tyranny, preventing one from living up to the ideal of a
successful, happy, and blessed life. This is indeed one of the main attractions
of their respective views: there is no rub, we are told, between cultivating a
state that is best for oneself and one that makes one disposed to morally act
appropriately to others. Why then, one might wonder, emphasise the need
to also study forms of self-­cultivation that are not directly related to condi-
tions for morally right action and merely good for oneself, and consider
them to be part of a wider conception of ethics?
The response to this question is relatively straightforward: certain forms
of self-­cultivation might be worth pursuing even though they don’t stand in
any discernible relation to morally appropriate action. We may think here
of something like pursuing self-­integration, a psychological characteristic
that will be further analysed by Luke Brunning in Chapter 10. At least some
versions of self-­integration appear to be worthy of pursuit, though it is not
obvious that greater self-­integration makes someone more disposed to act
morally rightly. The same holds for traits like singularity and unicity, closely
examined by Michael Ure in Chapter 5. Singularity may constitute an
 Introduction 5
important aspect of human flourishing, though it need not result in morally
desirable behaviour. Edward Harcourt’s contribution in Chapter 9 attempts
to categorise a number of traits as ‘formal’ or ‘structural’ virtues, which he
defines as traits that don’t directly translate into any form of action—­so also
not morally right action—­and that aren’t confined to the capacity of regu-
lating other virtues.2 These and other perspectives on self-­cultivation would
be excluded the moment virtues are defined as traits that, also when oper-
ating together, result in morally right action. This is not to say that certain
forms of self-­cultivation may well result in capacities for finer moral discern-
ment and morally better behaviour, just as Plato and Aristotle argued. The
starting-­point of the present volume, however, is that in addition to moral
development other worthwhile forms of self-­cultivation are possible that
do not necessarily stand in such a relation to morally right action—­and
yet, they also contribute to a flourishing life in the full sense of the term.
The conceptions of self-­cultivation explored in this volume, therefore, aren’t
restricted to that which will result in morally right action.
The forms of self-­cultivation explored in the chapters of this volume can
therefore be viewed as compatible with familiar moral theories. One might
think, for instance, that one of Kant’s formulations of the categorical imper-
ative best characterises all actions of moral worth, and yet also believe that
forms of self-­cultivation are worthwhile pursuing even though they have
relatively little to do with morally right action. Similarly, a consequentialist
may hold her particular account of moral rightness, but accept that there
are excellences of character that can be cultivated through practices and
exercises that, ultimately, are not directly related to the actions she considers
morally best. For roughly these reasons, Nussbaum (1999) has argued that
‘virtue ethics’ could even be viewed as a ‘misleading category’: theories of
virtue need not constitute a competing moral theory, but may also be viewed
as an important supplement to existing moral theories. Although just as a
conception of virtue can supplement a moral theory, it may also conflict
with it, and we may recall Nietzsche’s trenchant insistence that morality can
directly oppose the furthering of individual human excellence. Either way,
the point is that worthwhile forms of self-­cultivation need not be restricted
to moral development, and, as Nussbaum contends, may even be compatible
with, and supplementary to, non-­virtue based theories of moral rightness.
This line of response might remind the reader of the distinction between
‘ethics’ and ‘morality’ that Bernard Williams introduced in his Ethics and
the Limits of Philosophy (1985). Indeed, Williams’s distinction is instruc-
tive to clarify the general direction of the papers collected in this volume.
For Williams, morality concerns a relatively small set of principles aimed
at regulating conduct, especially behaviour that affects others—­instructing
people what they ought to do, regardless of their own identity, interests, and
life projects. Ethics, by contrast, concerns the totality of answers that can be
given to the question ‘how ought one to live’, of which morality and condi-
tions for morally right action only constitutes a small part. Just as Williams
6 Introduction
tried to push practical philosophy beyond the narrow confines of morality
by recasting ethics as the wider and more inclusive field of philosophical
reflection on the fully-­flourishing life, so the present volume aims to redirect
discussions of virtue beyond the qualities required for morally right action.
The forms of self-­cultivation that this volume explores therefore belong to
ethics in Williams’s sense of the term.
The second core characteristic mentioned earlier is that this volume
considers forms of self-­cultivation that are possible in adult life, breaking
with the Aristotelian doctrine that most of the relevant development occurs
in childhood. From an Aristotelian perspective, one might challenge this
starting point in at least two ways. On the one hand, Aristotle does advo-
cate moral development throughout adult life, as virtue is something that
requires continuous practice and refinement. Indeed, it is one of the central
features of his ethics that good behaviour is a form of craft or art (τέχνη,
or technē) that has to be learned, practised, and finessed throughout one’s
life. Furthermore, a virtuous agent not only performs the right actions in
the right circumstances, but does so for also the right reasons. The cognitive
capacity to recognise why certain actions are indeed the right actions, is a
capacity one can only develop in (early) adulthood. Finally, also if one isn’t
so lucky to have had wise tutors and mentors early in life, it still remains
possible to emulate virtuous people in adult life, although Aristotle is gener-
ally pessimistic how likely this is to be successful. All this indicates it would
be overly hasty to insist that Aristotle confines the cultivation of character
to childhood. On the other hand, one might claim that a good upbringing
is also required for the forms of self-­cultivation presented in this volume. It
requires that one already recognises that certain goals are worthy of pursuit,
and that one has enough self-­discipline and courage to be able to engage in
practices of self-­cultivation. Hence, one might think, pedagogics remains of
pivotal importance in the non-­Aristotelian approaches to human flourishing
explored in this volume.
In response to these concerns, it is of course true that for Aristotle ethical
development does not finish at the end of childhood. Those who are well-­
raised still need to undergo an intellectual development in early adulthood
in order see why the types of actions to which they are already well-­disposed
are indeed the right actions. One way of reading the Nicomachean Eth-
ics is precisely as a book that enables this intellectual development of the
already well-­disposed. But this rational dimension of virtue acquirement
does not take away the fact that Aristotle believes cultivating the fundamen-
tal building blocks of one’s character is restricted to one’s childhood. The
recently published collection The Cultivation of Virtue (2016) illustrates
this rather starkly. In both Daniel Russell’s and Michael Slote’s essays of that
volume, for example, the crucial importance of early upbringing is strongly
emphasised in the cultivation of moral virtue. The forms of self-­cultivation
explored in the present volume, then, are of a quite different nature given
that they can be pursued in adult life. They concern forms of training and
 Introduction 7
meditative exercises that persons can actively impose on themselves, inten-
tionally pursuing a process of self-­transformation and growth. It is doubtful
whether such a perspective is present in the Aristotelian account of the vir-
tue acquirement, though Chapter 8 below will make an interesting case that
such an account of self-­cultivation can in fact be found in Aristotelianism.
Whether the forms of self-­cultivation explored in this volume also have
requirements that can only be met after a certain upbringing is an empirical
question, though one that is most likely to be answered affirmatively. Nev-
ertheless, as will become clear shortly, most of the forms of self-­cultivation
considered in this volume have their roots in the Hellenistic tradition, espe-
cially in Stoicism and Epicureanism. One of the central breaks between Aris-
totelian ethics and the Hellenistic schools is the latter’s denial of Aristotle’s
conviction that luck, or good fortune, plays an ineliminable role living a
eudaimonic life. The Sceptics, Stoics, and Epicureans thought that brute
luck ought not to determine one’s degree of happiness—­in fact, they consid-
ered it essential to make one’s happiness immune to factors outside of one’s
own control. The pedagogical aptitude of one’s family and early tutors lie
outside of one’s own control, so one’s degree of flourishing should not be
allowed to be determined by it. The Hellenistic schools and the modern phi-
losophers who took their inspiration from them therefore shift away from
pedagogics to an investigation about what one can do to oneself once one
has reached the point of self-­reflective adulthood. The present collection fol-
lows this move away from early pedagogics to practices of self-­cultivation
available in adult life, and considers this an essential element in the ‘cultiva-
tion of the self’ strand of ethics it seeks to explore.
The third core characteristic of the forms of self-­cultivation explored in
this volume are the techniques, exercises, and practices required for the cul-
tivation of virtue. It has largely been due to the work of Michel Foucault
and Pierre Hadot that an active philosophical interest in such an art of liv-
ing has returned.3 In Philosophy as a Way of Life (1995: 126) and What is
Ancient Philosophy (2002) Pierre Hadot suggests that ancient philosophy
shouldn’t be approached as a series of theoretical doctrines, but instead,
must be read as exercises that enable the moral and spiritual development
of the soul, making it well-­disposed to a life of excellence and happiness.4
Just as gymnastics is the art that takes care of the body, so philosophy is an
art that trains and takes care of the soul—­indeed making it appropriate to
speak of a ‘mental gymnastics’ (see Sellars 2003: 111; cf. 36–­50). Foucault,
in turn, included a chapter with the title ‘The Cultivation of the Self’ in the
third volume on his history of sexuality, The Care of the Self (1988). In this
chapter, Foucault describes techniques that he found in texts from the first
and second century CE, directed at the cultivation of self-­mastery and self-­
control—­techniques he elsewhere calls ‘technologies of the self’ (Foucault
1994: 223–­251). A more detailed analysis of Foucault’s texts is offered in
Chapters 1 and 6 of the present volume. Although texts from this Socratic
tradition may indeed be best approached as proposing or even constituting
8 Introduction
‘exercises for the soul’, as Foucault and Hadot suggest, one might wonder
whether modern and contemporary texts can also be read in this vein. It is
less clear that figures like Spinoza, Nietzsche, Kant, or even Foucault him-
self, describe such exercises—­or the stronger claim, that carefully reading
their texts constitutes a spiritual exercise. A final worry might be, then,
that the role and function of philosophy in the classical period is illegiti-
mately transposed onto modern philosophy when we speak of a ‘cultivation
of the self’ strand in ethics that extends into modern and contemporary
philosophy.
Several of the chapters contained in this volume, however, make an explicit
effort to show that certain modern philosophers can be read as proposing
spiritual exercises that aim to promote forms of human excellence, or at
least try to revitalise such a conception of philosophy. In Chapter 2 Aurelia
Armstrong analyses Spinoza’s intellectual therapy, showing how removing
the cognitive errors that underpin the passions can liberate people from a
state of bondage. In Chapter 3 Irina Schumski focuses Kant’s discussion of
self-­opacity, arguing that the painstaking task to acquire knowledge about
our motives is essential to the very possibility of self-­cultivation. Chapters 4
and 5, in turn, focus on Nietzsche’s philosophy and develop the idea that
elements of Nietzsche’s thought are best taken as exercises directed at pro-
moting individual flourishing. In Chapter 6, Matthew Sharpe examines
Ilsetraut Hadot’s reading of Seneca, bringing out the ‘spiritual direction’
that Seneca’s work embodies and arguing for a resuscitation of this form
of philosophy and attitude towards ethical writing. In Chapter 7, finally,
Katrina Mitcheson argues that Foucault’s analysis of Stoic practices of self-­
cultivation can be used to constitute a non-­subjugated form of subjectivity
in our present day. These serve as examples to indicate that a ‘cultivation
of the self’ strand in philosophy is not necessarily limited to classical texts,
and that both modern authors and contemporary writing can contribute to
this form of philosophy. The extent to which techniques of self-­cultivation
can be meaningfully identified in modern thinkers and further developed in
contemporary philosophical debates is therefore very much an open ques-
tion. We hope this volume goes some way to establishing that at least certain
modern philosophers can be approached in this way, that this makes for a
very rewarding engagement with these thinkers, and that it opens fascinat-
ing possibilities for future research, drawing insights from the tradition as
well as core areas of contemporary analytic philosophy.
As mentioned before, the shadow of the Hellenistic philosophers looms
large over this volume. The Stoics, Sceptics, and Epicureans broke with
Aristotelean ethics by denying the role of luck and fortune, as well as many
other material pre-­conditions like wealth and education, as requirements for
living a eudaimonic life. As a result, they focused their attention on the tech-
niques and exercises that can be employed in adult life to conquer the pas-
sions and bring about excellence in character. Martha Nussbaum describes
the entire corpus of Hellenistic philosophy as ‘a way of addressing the most
 Introduction 9
painful problems of human life’, seeing ‘the philosopher as a compassionate
physician whose arts could heal many pervasive types of human suffering’,
and practicing ‘philosophy not as a detached intellectual technique dedi-
cated to the display of cleverness but as an immersed and worldly art of
grappling with human misery’ (Nussbaum 2009: 4). Nussbaum’s seminal
work on Hellenism, together with Hadot’s work on ancient philosophy and
Foucault’s investigation of the Hellenistic period, have been of great value
to reintroduce the intricacies of various forms of non-­Aristotelian virtue
ethics. Although the present collection of papers is by no means a collec-
tion on Hellenistic philosophy, the perspectives on self-­cultivation discussed
in the various chapters often find their roots in the form of philosophy to
which the Hellenistic philosophers collectively adhered, as well as the types
of techniques of self-­cultivation they taught and imposed upon themselves.
The modern philosophers figuring in this volume were all deeply influ-
enced by Hellenistic thought. Spinoza, Hume, Nietzsche, Kant, and Marx
all respond to ideas promulgated by the Sceptics, Stoics, and Epicureans,
and were often more familiar with the works of Roman authors like Seneca,
Cicero, and Plutarch, than those of Plato and Aristotle (Nussbaum 2009:
5). Two of these modern philosophers recur more frequently in the first,
historical section of this book, viz. Nietzsche and Foucault, and it is worth
mentioning why this is so. It was Foucault’s work in the early 1980s that
helped revive the interest in the Hellenistic philosophy, especially by high-
lighting the fact that the Hellenistic texts he studied described practices for
the formation of a certain type of self, i.e. processes of self-­cultivation and
self-­formation that required a constant attention, awareness, and work on
oneself by oneself—­though always undertaken within a community of peo-
ple. Nietzsche, in turn, not only comments in all his published and unpub-
lished works on Hellenistic thought, he also seems to take on the form of
philosophising common to the Hellenistic thinkers. Rather than a distant
intellectual theorising, he offers challenges, meditative exercises, and humor-
ous confrontations, thereby directly speaking to the reader’s inclinations,
convictions, and deep biases. Above all, Nietzsche tried through his works
to create the conditions for people to make something great and admirable
out of themselves. Of the modern philosophers, Nietzsche is perhaps the
philosopher of self-­cultivation par excellence, and it is for this reason that
both Keith Ansell-­Pearson’s and Michael Ure’s chapters are dedicated to
his work.
The historical perspectives on self-­ cultivation provide a platform for
the contemporary perspectives on this theme offered in Part II. Annemarie
Kalis and Dawa Ometto open this section by considering a neo-­Aristotelian
response to the basic premises of the volume, especially its emphasis on
expanding virtue theory beyond Aristotelianism. Edward Harcourt, then
focuses in Chapter 9 on a number of non-­Aristotelian virtues that have
appeared in recent philosophy and public discourse, and typifies those as
‘structural’ or ‘formal’ virtues and explores their defining characteristics.
10 Introduction
This is followed by a chapter by Luke Brunning that questions how self-­
cultivation relates to the goal of psychic integration, to be understood either
in a ‘structural’ or ‘mental’ sense, concluding that only the latter kind of inte-
gration is worthy of pursuit. To do this, Brunning explores self-­cultivation
from the perspective of psychoanalysis, focusing especially on the analytic
transference scenario. In Chapter 11, Anna Bergqvist turns to the work of
Iris Murdoch and examines self-­cultivation from the perspective of moral
perception and capacity for concept application, focusing thereby on the
relational dimension of concept application. The volume concludes with
an epilogue written by Quassim Cassam and the editors, which provides
a critical overview of several contributions and relates the theme of self-­
cultivation to that of self-­knowledge.
In sum, this volume aims to open the philosophical debate on self-­
cultivation, to describe its historical development, and to demonstrate
how a wide range of contemporary debates can contribute to this fascinat-
ing field of philosophical inquiry. Not only is the philosophical tradition
self-­cultivation worth investigating for its own sake, but the fact it has the
resources to contribute to a wide range of debates in psychoanalysis, philo-
sophical anthropology, linguistics, empirical psychology, as well as those in
philosophy itself, should encourage us to read the contributions with intense
interest.

Notes
1 See especially Hursthouse (1996, 1999); Annas (1993, 2011); Slote (2001); Rus-
sell (2009; and Foot (2001).
2 A virtue that displays itself in the regulation of other virtues would be a so-­called
‘executive virtue’, of which Aristotle’s account of courage is the most famous
example. See Chapter 9 for further discussion, and Pears (1978) for the original
analysis of executive virtues in Aristotle’s ethics.
3 See Sellars (2003) for further analysis.
4 Hadot says that by ‘spiritual exercises’ he means ‘practices which could be physi-
cal, as in dietary regimes, or discursive, as in dialogue and meditation, or intuitive,
as in contemplation, but which were all intended to effect a modification and a
transformation in the subject who practiced them’ (Hadot 2002: 6).

References
Annas, J. (1993). The Morality of Happiness. New York: Oxford University Press.
Annas, J. (2011). Intelligent Virtue. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Anscombe, G. E. M. (2005). ‘Modern Moral Philosophy,’ in Mary Geach and Luke
Gormally (eds.), Human Life, Action and Ethics. Exeter: Imprint Academics,
169–­194.
Becker, L. C. (1998). A New Stoicism. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
Foot, P. (2001). Natural Goodness. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Foucault, M. (1988). The Care of the Self: Volume 3 the History of Sexuality, trans.
Robert Hurley. London: Allen Lane the Penguin Press.
 Introduction 11
Foucault, M. (1994). ‘Technologies of the Self,’ in Ethics, Subjectivity and Truth:
The Essential Works of Michel Foucault 1954–­1984 Volume One, trans. Robert
Hurley and others. New York: The New Press, 223–­251.
Hadot, P. (1995). Philosophy as a Way of Life: Spiritual Exercises From Socrates
to Foucault, Arnold I. Davidson (ed.), trans. Michael Chase. Oxford: Blackwell.
Hadot, P. (2002). What Is Ancient Philosophy?, trans. Michael Chase. Cambridge,
MA, London: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press.
Hursthouse, R. (1996). ‘Normative Virtue Ethics,’ in Roger Crisp (ed.), How Should
One Live? Oxford: Oxford University Press, 19–­33.
Hursthouse, R. (1999). On Virtue Ethics. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Ivanhoe, P. (2000). Confucian Moral Self Cultivation. Indianapolis, Cambridge:
Hackett Publishing Company.
Johnson, R. (2011). Self-­Improvement: An Essay in Kantian Ethics. Oxford: Oxford
University Press.
Macintyre, A. (1988). Whose Justice, Which Rationality. Notre Dame: University
of Notre Dame Press.
Nussbaum, M. (1999). ‘Virtue Ethics: A Misleading Category?,’ The Journal of Eth-
ics, 3, 163–­201.
Nussbaum, M. (2009). The Therapy of Desire: Theory and Practice in Hellenistic
Ethics. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Pears, D. F. (1978). ‘Aristotle’s Analysis of Courage,’ Midwest Studies in Philosophy,
3.1: 273–­285.
Russel, D. C. (2009). Practical Intelligence and the Virtues. New York: Oxford Uni-
versity Press.
Sellars, J. (2003). The Art of Living: The Stoics on the Nature and Function of Phi-
losophy. Aldershot: Ashgate.
Sellars, J. (2014). Stoicism. New York: Routledge.
Sherman, N. (1997). Making a Necessity of Virtue: Aristotle and Kant on virtue.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Slote, M. (1995). ‘Agent-­Based Virtue Ethics,’ Midwest Studies in Philosophy, 20,
83–­101.
Slote, M. (2001). Morals From Motives. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Slote, M., and Angle, S. (2013). Virtue Ethics and Confucianism. New York:
Routledge.
Snow, N. E. (ed.). (2016). Cultivating Virtue: Perspectives From Philosophy, Theol-
ogy, and Psychology. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Swanton, C. (2003). Virtue Ethics: A Pluralistic View. Oxford: Oxford University
Press.
Swanton, C. (2015). The Virtue Ethics of Hume & Nietzsche. Chichester:
Wiley-­Blackwell.
Williams, B. (1985). Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy. London: Fontana Press.
Part I

Historical Perspectives
1 Roman Stoic Mindfulness John SellarsRoman Stoic Mindfulness

An Ancient Technology of the Self

John Sellars

1. Cultivation of the Self

In recent years there has been a renewed interest among philosophers in the
notion of cultivation of the self, inspired in large part by the later work of
Michel Foucault and in particular the section entitled ‘The Cultivation of
the Self’ in the third volume of his history of sexuality, The Care of the Self
(1988: 37–­68).1 Foucault was especially interested there in what he called an
‘attitude of severity’ towards the self that flourished in the first two centuries
AD, and in particular a mistrust of pleasures that prefigured and informed
early Christian attitudes towards the body. Although initially motivated by
a desire to understand shifts in sexual attitudes between pagan and Chris-
tian cultures, Foucault’s concerns quickly broadened to focus on ‘the insis-
tence on the attention that should be brought to bear on oneself’ (Foucault
1988: 41) that he found in the ancient philosophical texts he was reading.
This widening of his interest led Foucault to develop a distinct but related
project concerned with the genealogy of the modern subject (Foucault 2016:
22). Indeed, at one point his reflections on cultivation of the self in The Care
of the Self were intended to become a publication distinct from his history
of sexuality project (Foucault 1997: 255). In that separate project concerned
with the modern subject, Foucault wanted to explore the origins of the idea
that there is a truth about the self that is hidden within and can only be
uncovered via some form of hermeneutic process. Foucault traced this atti-
tude back through the Christian tradition to the early Church Fathers. How-
ever, when he turned to Greco-­Roman sources he thought that the situation
there was quite different. Although he saw practices that superficially shared
something in common with the early Christian emphasis on confession, Fou-
cault claimed that these were not aimed at the recovery of some hidden,
deeper truth within the subject but, rather, were part of a process designed
to transform the self (2016: 29–­37, 1997: 276). In particular, he became
interested in a famous passage by the Stoic philosopher Seneca in which the
Roman Stoic describes a process of self-­examination at the end of each day:

The mind must be called to account every day. This was Sextius’s prac-
tice: when the day was spent and he had retired to his night’s rest, he
16 John Sellars
asked his mind, “Which of your ills did you heal today? Which vice
did you resist? In what aspect are you better?” Your anger will cease
and become more controllable if it knows that every day it must come
before a judge. Is there anything finer, then, than this habit of scrutiniz-
ing the entire day? [. . .] When the light has been removed and my wife
has fallen silent, aware of this habit that’s now mine, I examine my
entire day and go back over what I’ve done and said, hiding nothing
from myself, passing nothing by.
(Seneca, De ira 3.36.1–­3)2

In this passage Seneca is not concerned with confessing his sins in the way in
which subsequent Christian writers were, Foucault claimed, but rather with
identifying his faults and addressing them. Seneca’s motivation is not to
uncover a hidden truth about himself; it is to live a more consistent, virtuous
and happy life. The process of self-­examination he describes here is simply
a tool or technique put to work in the service of that goal.
Foucault became especially interested in Greco-­Roman techniques such as
this. He called these ‘technologies of the self’, by which he meant practices
aimed at self-­transformation (Foucault 2016: 25, cf. 1997: 225). Some of
these practices, such as the one described by Seneca, presupposed an attitude
of self-­monitoring, through which the individual could identify mistakes in
order to fix them. Central to this, Foucault suggested, was an attitude of
constant vigilance (Foucault 1988: 41, cf. 1997: 232).3
In his accounts of these Greco-­Roman practices Foucault drew on a wide
range of texts from the first two centuries AD but Stoic authors predominate:
alongside Seneca he discusses or mentions Musonius Rufus, Epictetus, and
Marcus Aurelius.4 The attitude of attention to the self that he found in the
works of these Roman Stoics drew, he suggested, on an earlier Greek tradi-
tion of thought that had its origins in Socrates’s famous pronouncement that
one ought ‘to take care of oneself’ (epimeleisthai heautou).5 However it was
the Roman imperial period that became ‘a kind of golden age in the cultiva-
tion of the self’ (1988: 45). In what follows I want to focus on one aspect of
this Roman Stoic attitude of attention that Foucault placed at the heart of the
idea of cultivation of the self. I shall call this ‘mindfulness’. My primary aim is
simply to examine the attitude of attention or mindfulness that we find in the
Roman Stoics Epictetus and Marcus Aurelius. In order to do this, I shall con-
trast it with modern versions of mindfulness, suggesting that it differs from
the latter both in terms of its object of attention and the scope of its goal. This
will lead me to differ from some of the existing literature that touches on the
topic but also to confirm the account that Foucault gives in his later works.

2. Mindfulness
Foucault has not been the only person to return to the Stoics in recent years.
Since the time he was writing there has been an upsurge in popular interest
Another random document with
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The Project Gutenberg eBook of The Cambridge natural history, Vol. 01 (of
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Title: The Cambridge natural history, Vol. 01 (of 10)

Author: Marcus Hartog

Sydney J. Hickson
E. W. MacBride
Igerna Brünhilda Johnson Sollas

Editor: S. F. Harmer
Sir A. E. Shipley

Release date: September 18, 2023 [eBook #71677]

Language: English

Original publication: New York: MacMillan & Co, 1906

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The Internet Archive)

*** START OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK THE CAMBRIDGE NATURAL HISTORY, VOL.
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 THE

CAMBRIDGE NATURAL HISTORY

EDITED BY

S. F. HARMER, Sc.D., F.R.S., Fellow of King's College, Cambridge; Superintendent of the University
Museum of Zoology

AND

A. E. SHIPLEY, M.A., F.R.S., Fellow of Christ's College, Cambridge; University Lecturer on the
Morphology of Invertebrates

VOLUME I

PROTOZOA
By Marcus Hartog, M.A., Trinity College (D.Sc. Lond.), Professor of Natural History in the Queen's College, Cork

PORIFERA (SPONGES)
By Igerna B. J. Sollas, B.Sc. (Lond.), Lecturer on Zoology at Newnham College, Cambridge

COELENTERATA & CTENOPHORA

By S. J. Hickson, M.A., F.R.S., formerly Fellow and now Honorary Fellow of Downing College, Cambridge; Beyer
Professor of Zoology in the Victoria University of Manchester

ECHINODERMATA
By E. W. Macbride, M.A., F.R.S., formerly Fellow of St. John's College, Cambridge; Professor of Zoology in McGill
University, Montreal
 London
MACMILLAN AND CO., Limited
NEW YORK: THE MACMILLAN COMPANY
1906

All rights reserved

And pitch down his basket before us,

All trembling alive
With pink and grey jellies, your sea-fruit;
You touch the strange lumps,
And mouths gape there, eyes open, all manner
Of horns and of humps.

Browning, The Englishman in Italy

 CONTENTS

PAGE
Scheme of the Classification adopted in this Book ix

PROTOZOA
CHAPTER I
Protozoa—Introduction—Functions of Protoplasm—Cell-division—Animals and
Plants 3
CHAPTER II
Protozoa (continued): Spontaneous Generation—Characters of Protozoa—
Classification 42
CHAPTER III
Protozoa (continued): Sarcodina 51
CHAPTER IV
Protozoa (continued): Sporozoa 94
CHAPTER V
Protozoa (continued): Flagellata 109
CHAPTER VI
Protozoa (continued): Infusoria (Ciliata and Suctoria) 136

PORIFERA (SPONGES)
CHAPTER VII
Porifera (Sponges)—Introduction—History—Description of Halichondria Panicea as
an Example of British marine Sponges and of Ephydatia Fluviatilis from Fresh
Water—Definition—Position in the Animal Kingdom 165
CHAPTER VIII
Porifera (continued): Forms of Spicules—Calcarea—Homocoela—Heterocoela—
Hexactinellida—Demospongiae—Tetractinellida—Monaxonida—Ceratosa—Key
to British Genera of Sponges 183
CHAPTER IX
Porifera (continued): Reproduction, Sexual and Asexual—Physiology—Distribution
—Flints 226

COELENTERATA
CHAPTER X
Coelenterata—Introduction—Classification—Hydrozoa—Eleutheroblastea—
Milleporina—Gymnoblastea—Calyptoblastea—Graptolitoidea—Stylasterina 245
CHAPTER XI
Hydrozoa (continued): Trachomedusae—Narcomedusae—Siphonophora 288
CHAPTER XII
Coelenterata (continued): Scyphozoa = Scyphomedusae 310
 CHAPTER XIII
Coelenterata (continued): Anthozoa = Actinozoa—General Characters—Alcyonaria 326
CHAPTER XIV
Anthozoa (continued): Zoantharia 365

CTENOPHORA
CHAPTER XV
Ctenophora 412

ECHINODERMATA
CHAPTER XVI
Echinodermata—Introduction—Classification—Anatomy of a Starfish—Systematic
Account of Asteroidea 427
CHAPTER XVII
Echinodermata (continued): Ophiuroidea = Brittle Stars 477
CHAPTER XVIII
Echinodermata (continued): Echinoidea = Sea-Urchins 503
CHAPTER XIX
Echinodermata (continued): Holothuroidea = Sea-Cucumbers 560
CHAPTER XX
Echinodermata (continued): Pelmatozoa—Crinoidea = Sea-Lilies—Thecoidea—
Carpoidea—Cystoidea—Blastoidea 579
CHAPTER XXI
Echinodermata (continued): Development and Phylogeny 601
INDEX 625
 SCHEME OF THE CLASSIFICATION ADOPTED IN THIS BOOK
The names of extinct groups are printed in italics.

PROTOZOA (pp. 1, 48).

SARCODINA Lobosa (p. 51).

Rhizopoda (p. 51)
(p. 51) Filosa (p. 52).
Allogromidiaceae (p. 58).
Astrorhizidaceae (p. 59).
Lituolidaceae (p. 59).
Miliolidaceae (p. 59).
Textulariaceae (p. 59).
Foraminifera (p. 58)
Cheilostomellaceae (p. 59).
Lagenaceae (p. 59).
Globigerinidae (p. 59).
Rotaliaceae (p. 59).
Nummulitaceae (p. 59).
Aphrothoraca (p. 70).
Chlamydophora (p. 71).
Heliozoa (p. 70)
Chalarothoraca (p. 71).
Desmothoraca (p. 71).
Radiolaria Collodaria Colloidea (p.
(p. 75) (p. 77) Beloidea (p. 7
Sphaeroidea
Spumellaria (p. 77).
= Peripylaea Prunoidea
(pp. 76, 77) Sphaerellaria (p. 77).
(p. 77) Discoidea
(p. 77).
Porulosa
Larcoidea
= Holotrypasta
(p. 77).
(p. 76)
Actinelida
(p. 78).
Acanthonida
(p. 78).
Acantharia = Actipylaea (pp. 76, 78)
Sphaerophrac
(p. 78).
Prunophracta
(p. 78).
Osculosa Nassoidea
= Monotrypasta (p. 78).
(p. 76) Plectoidea
(p. 78).
Stephoidea
Nassellaria = Monopylaea (p. 78).
(pp. 76, 78) Spyroidea
(p. 78).
Botryoidea
(p. 79).
Cyrtoidea
(p. 79).
Phaeodaria = Cannopylaea Phaeocystina
 = Tripylaea (pp. 76, 79) (p. 79).
Phaeosphaer
(p. 79).
Phaeogromia
(p. 79).
Phaeoconchia
(p. 79).
Zoosporeae (p. 89).
Myxoidea (p. 89)
Proteomyxa (p. 88) Azoosporeae (p. 89).
Catallacta (p. 89).
Acrasieae (p. 90).
Mycetozoa (p. 90) Filoplasmodieae (p. 90).
Myxomycetes (pp. 90, 91).

Schizogregarinidae (p. 97).

Gregarinidaceae
Acephalinidae (p. 97).
(pp. 97, 98)
Dicystidae (p. 97).
Telosporidia (p. 97)
Coccidiidae (pp. 97, 99).
SPOROZOA Coccidiaceae
Haemosporidae (pp. 97, 102).
(p. 94) (pp. 97, 99)
Acystosporidae (pp. 97, 102).
Myxosporidiaceae (pp. 98, 106).
Neosporidia (p. 97) Actinomyxidiaceae (p. 98).
Sarcosporidiaceae (pp. 98, 108).

Pantostomata (p. 109).

Distomatidae (p. 110).
Oikomonadidae (p. 111).
Bicoecidae (p. 111).
Craspedomonadidae
(pp. 111, 121).
Phalansteridae (p. 111).
Protomastigaceae
Monadidae (p. 111).
(p. 110)
Bodonidae (p. 111).
Amphimonadidae (p. 111).
Trimastigidae (p. 111).
Polymastigidae (p. 111).
FLAGELLATA (p. 109) Trichonymphidae (pp. 111, 123
Opalinidae (pp. 111, 123).
Chrysomonadaceae
Coccolithophoridae (p. 114).
(pp. 110, 125)
Cryptomonadaceae (p. 110).
Chlamydomonadidae
Volvocaceae
(pp. 111, 125).
(pp. 110, 111)
Volvocidae (pp. 111, 126).
Chloromonadaceae (p. 110).
Euglenaceae (pp. 110, 124).
Silicoflagellata (pp. 110, 114).
Cystoflagellata (pp. 110, 132).
Dinoflagellata (pp. 110, 130).

INFUSORIA Ciliata (p. 137) Gymnostomaceae (pp. 137, 152).

(p. 136) Aspirotrichaceae (pp. 137, 153).
Heterotrichaceae (pp. 137, 153).
Oligotrichaceae (pp. 137, 155).
 Hypotrichaceae (pp. 137, 138).
Peritrichaceae (pp. 138, 155).
Suctoria = Tentaculifera (p. 158).

PORIFERA (p. 163).

Class. Sub-Class. Order. Family. Sub-Fa
Leucosoleniidae (p. 185)
Homocoela (p. 185)
Clathrinidae (p. 185).
Sycettidae (p. 187).
Grantiidae (p. 192).
Heteropidae (p. 192).
MEGAMASTICTORA Calcarea
Amphoriscidae (p. 192).
(pp. 183, 184) (p. 184)
Heterocoela (p. 187) Dialytin
Pharetronidae (p. 19
(p. 192) Lithonin
(p. 19
Astroscleridae (p. 194).

Myxospongiae (p. 196).

Amphidiscophora (p. 203).
Hexactinellida
Hexasterophora (p. 203).
(p. 197)
Receptaculitidae (p. 207)
Octactinellida (p. 208).
Heteractinellida (p. 208).
MICROMASTICTORA
(pp. 183, 195) Tetractinellida Choristida (p. 212).
(pp. 211, 212) Lithistida (pp. 212, 215).
Monaxonida Halichondrina (p. 217).
Demospongiae
(pp. 211, 216) Spintharophora (p. 217).
(p. 209)
Dictyoceratina Spongidae (p. 220).
Ceratosa
(p. 220) Spongelidae (p. 220).
(pp. 211, 220)
Dendroceratina (pp. 220, 221).

COELENTERATA (p. 243).

Class. Order. Sub-Order. Family. Sub-Family.
HYDROZOA (p. 249) Eleutheroblastea (p. 253).
Milleporina (p. 257).
Gymnoblastea (Anthomedusae) Bougainvilliidae (p. 269).
(p. 262) Podocorynidae (p. 270).
Clavatellidae (p. 270).
Cladonemidae (p. 270).
Tubulariidae (p. 271).
Ceratellidae (p. 271).
Pennariidae (p. 272).
Corynidae (p. 272).
Clavidae (p. 272).
Tiaridae (p. 273).
Corymorphidae (p. 273).
Hydrolaridae (p. 273).
 Monobrachiidae (p. 274).
Myriothelidae (p. 274).
Pelagohydridae (p. 274).
Aequoreidae (p. 278).
Thaumantiidae (p. 278).
Cannotidae (p. 278).
Sertulariidae (p. 278).
Calyptoblastea (Leptomedusae) Plumulariidae Eleutheroplea (p. 27
(p. 275) (p. 279) Statoplea (p. 279).
Hydroceratinidae (p. 279).
Campanulariidae (p. 280).
Eucopidae (p. 280).
Dendrograptidae (p. 281).
Monoprionidae (p. 282).
Graptolitoidea (p. 281) Diprionidae (p. 282).
Retiolitidae (p. 282).
Stromatoporidae (p. 283).
Stylasterina (p. 283) Stylasteridae (p. 285).
Olindiidae (p. 291).
Petasidae (p. 294).
Trachynemidae (p. 294).
Trachomedusae (p. 288)
Pectyllidae (p. 294).
Aglauridae (p. 294).
Geryoniidae (p. 295).
Cunanthidae (p. 296).
Peganthidae (p. 296).
Narcomedusae (p. 295)
Aeginidae (p. 296).
Solmaridae (p. 296).
Monophyidae Sphaeronectinae (p
(p. 306) Cymbonectinae (p.
Amphicaryoninae
(p. 306)
Prayinae (p. 306)
Desmophyinae
(p. 307)
Calycophorae
Diphyidae Stephanophyinae
(p. 305)
(p. 306) (p. 307)
Galeolarinae
Siphonophora
(p. 307)
(p. 297)
Diphyopsinae
(p. 307)
Abylinae (p. 307)
Polyphyidae (p. 307).
Agalminae (p. 307)
Physonectidae
Apoleminae (p. 307
(p. 307)
Physophorae Physophorinae (p. 3
(p. 307) Auronectidae (p. 308).
Rhizophysaliidae (p. 308).
Chondrophoridae (p. 308).

SCYPHOZOA Charybdeidae (p. 318).

= SCYPHOMEDUSAE Cubomedusae (p. 318) Chirodropidae (p. 319).
(pp. 249, 310) Tripedaliidae (p. 319).
Stauromedusae (p. 320) Lucernariidae (p. 320).
 Depastridae (p. 321).
Stenoscyphidae (p. 321).
Periphyllidae (p. 322).
Coronata (p. 321) Ephyropsidae (p. 322).
Atollidae (p. 322).
Pelagiidae (p. 323).
Semaeostomata
Cyanaeidae (p. 324).
(p. 323)
Ulmaridae (p. 324).
Cassiopeidae
= Arcadomyaria (p.
(p. 324)
Cepheidae
= Radiomyaria (p. 3
Discophora (p. 324)
(p. 323) Rhizostomatidae
Rhizostomata (p. 325)
(p. 324) Lychnorhizidae
(p. 325)
= Cyclomyaria (p. 3
Leptobrachiidae
(p. 325)
Catostylidae
(p. 325)

Class. Sub-Class. Grade. Order. Sub-Order. Family.

ANTHOZOA Alcyonaria Protoalcyonacea (p. 342) Haimeidae (p. 3
= ACTINOZOA (p. 329) Synalcyonacea Cornulariidae
(pp. 249, 326) (p. 342) (p. 344).
Clavulariidae
Stolonifera (p. 342)
(p. 344).
Tubiporidae (p.
Favositidae (p. 3
Heliolitidae (p. 3
Helioporidae (p.
Coccoseridae
Coenothecalia (p. 344)
(p. 346).
Thecidae (p. 34
Chaetetidae (p.
Xeniidae (p. 348
Telestidae (p. 34
Coelogorgiidae
(p. 349).
Alcyonacea (p. 346)
Alcyoniidae (p. 3
Nephthyidae (p.
Siphonogorgiida
(p. 349).
Gorgonacea Briareidae (p. 35
(p. 350) Sclerogorgiidae
Pseudaxonia
(p. 351).
(p. 350)
Melitodidae (p. 3
Coralliidae (p. 3
Axifera (p. 353) Isidae (p. 353).
Primnoidae (p. 3
Chrysogorgiidae
(p. 355).
Muriceidae (p. 3
Plexauridae (p.
 Gorgoniidae (p.
Gorgonellidae
(p. 357).
Pteroeididae (p.
Pennatuleae Pennatulidae
(p. 361) (p. 361).
Virgulariidae (p.
Funiculinidae
(p. 362).
Anthoptilidae
Pennatulacea Spicatae (p. 362).
(p. 358) (p. 362) Kophobelemnon
(p. 362).
Umbellulidae
(p. 362).
Verticilladeae (p. 363)
Renilleae
Renillidae (p. 36
(p. 363)
Veretilleae (p. 364)
Zoantharia (pp. 329, 365) Edwardsiidae
(p. 377).
Edwardsiidea (p. 375)
Protantheidae
(p. 377).
Halcampidae
(p. 380).
Actiniidae (p. 38
Actiniina Sagartiidae (p. 3
(p. 380) Aliciidae (p. 382
Phyllactidae (p.
Bunodidae (p. 3
Actiniaria
Minyadidae (p. 3
(p. 377)
Corallimorphida
(p. 383).
Discosomatidae
Stichodactylina
(p. 383).
(p. 383)
Rhodactidae (p.
Thalassianthida
(p. 383).
Madreporaria Cyathophyllidae
(p. 384) (p. 394).
Cyathaxoniidae
(p. 394).
Cystiphyllidae
(p. 394).
Madreporidae
Entocnemaria
(p. 395).
(p. 394)
Poritidae (p. 396
Cyclocnemaria Aporosa (p. 397
(p. 397) Turbinoliidae (p.
Oculinidae (p. 3
Astraeidae (p. 3
A. Gemmantes (p
A. Fissiparantes (
Trochosmiliacea
[Sub-Fam.] (p. 40
 Pocilloporidae
(p. 401)
Fungacea (p. 40
Plesiofungiidae
(p. 403)
Fungiidae (p. 40
Cycloseridae (p
Plesioporitidae
(p. 404)
Eupsammiidae
(p. 404)
Zoanthidae (p. 4
Zoanthidea (p. 404) Zaphrentidae
(p. 406).
Antipathidae (p.
Leiopathidae
Antipathidea = Antipatharia
(p. 409).
(p. 407)
Dendrobrachiida
(p. 409).
Cerianthidea (p. 409).

CTENOPHORA (p. 412).

Class. Order. Family.
Mertensiidae (p. 417).
Cydippidea (p. 417) Callianiridae (p. 417).
Pleurobrachiidae (p. 418).
Lesueuriidae (p. 419).
Bolinidae (p. 419).
Deiopeidae (p. 419).
Eurhamphaeidae (p. 419).
TENTACULATA (p. 417) Lobata (p. 418)
Eucharidae (p. 420).
Mnemiidae (p. 420).
Calymmidae (p. 420).
Ocyroidae (p. 420).
Cestoidea (p. 420) Cestidae (p. 420).
Ctenoplanidae (p. 421).
Platyctenea (p. 421)
Coeloplanidae (p. 422).

NUDA (p. 423) Beroidae (p. 423).

ECHINODERMATA (p. 425).

Sub-Phylum. Class. Order. Sub-Order. Family.
ELEUTHEROZOA Asteroidea Echinasteridae (p. 462).
(p. 430) (pp. 430, 431) Solasteridae (p. 462).
Asterinidae (p. 463).
Spinulosa (pp. 461, 462)
Poraniidae (p. 464).
Ganeriidae (p. 464).
Mithrodiidae (p. 464).
 Velata (pp. 461, 464)
Paxillosa (pp. 461, 466)
Valvata (pp. 461, 471)
Forcipulata (pp. 462, 473)
Streptophiurae (p. 494)
Zygophiurae (pp. 494, 495)
Ophiuroidea
(pp. 431, 477)
Cladophiurae (pp. 494, 500)
Echinoidea
(pp. 431, 503)
Endocyclica (pp. 529, 530)
Protoclypeastroidea (p. 548).
Clypeastroidea
Euclypeastroidea
(pp. 529, 542)
(p. 549)
Spatangoidea (pp. 529, 549)
Pythonasteridae (p. 464).
Myxasteridae (p. 464).
Pterasteridae (p. 466).
Archasteridae (p. 466).
Astropectinidae (p. 467).
Porcellanasteridae (p. 470
Linckiidae (p. 471).
Pentagonasteridae (p. 47
Gymnasteridae (p. 471).
Antheneidae (p. 471).
Pentacerotidae (p. 471).
Asteriidae (p. 473).
Heliasteridae (p. 474).
Zoroasteridae (p. 474).
Stichasteridae (p. 474).
Pedicellasteridae (p. 474)
Brisingidae (p. 474).
Ophiolepididae (p. 495).
Amphiuridae (p. 497).
Ophiocomidae (p. 499).
Ophiothricidae (p. 499).
Astroschemidae (p. 501).
Trichasteridae (p. 501).
Euryalidae (p. 501).
Cidaridae (p. 533).
Echinothuriidae (p. 535).
Saleniidae (p. 537).
Arbaciidae (p. 538).
Diadematidae (p. 538).
Tem
(p.
Echinidae (p. 539)
Ech
(p.
Fibularidae (p. 549).
Echinanthidae = Clypeast
(p. 549).
Laganidae (p. 549).
Scutellidae (p. 549).
Echinonidae
(p. 553)
Nucleolidae Aste
(p. 554) (p.
Cassidulidae
(p. 554)
Ananchytidae
(p. 554)
Palaeostomatidae
Ster
(p. 554)
(p.
Spatangidae
(p. 554)
Brissidae (p. 556)
Archaeocidaridae (p. 557
Melonitidae (p. 557).
 Tiarechinidae (p. 557).
Holectypoidea (p. 558).
Echinoconidae (p. 558).
Collyritidae (p. 559).
Aspidochirota (p. 570).
Elasipoda (p. 571).
Holothuroidea Pelagothuriida (p. 572).
(pp. 431, 560) Dendrochirota (p. 572).
Molpadiida (p. 575).
Synaptida (p. 575).

Hyo
(p.
Rhiz
(p.
Pen
(p.
Crinoidea
Holo
(p. 580)
(p.
PELMATOZOA Com
(pp. 430, 579)
(p.
Inadunata (p. 595).
Articulata (p. 595).
Camerata (p. 595).
Thecoidea = Edrioasteroidea (pp. 580, 596).
Carpoidea (pp. 580, 596).
Cystoidea (pp. 580, 597).
Blastoidea (pp. 580, 599).
 PROTOZOA

BY

MARCUS HARTOG, M.A., Trinity College (D.Sc. Lond.)

Professor of Natural History in the Queen's College, Cork.

CHAPTER I

PROTOZOA—INTRODUCTION—FUNCTIONS OF PROTOPLASM—CELL-DIVISION—ANIMALS AND PLANTS

The Free Amoeboid Cell.—If we examine under the microscope a fragment of one of the higher
animals or plants, we find in it a very complex structure. A careful study shows that it always consists of
certain minute elements of fundamentally the same nature, which are combined or fused into "tissues."
In plants, where these units of structure were first studied, and where they are easier to recognise, each
tiny unit is usually enclosed in an envelope or wall of woody or papery material, so that the whole plant
is honeycombed. Each separate cavity was at first called a "cell"; and this term was then applied to the
bounding wall, and finally to the unit of living matter within, the envelope receiving the name of "cell-
wall." In this modern sense the "cell" consists of a viscid substance, called first in animals "sarcode" by
Dujardin (1835), and later in plants "protoplasm"[1] by Von Mohl (1846). On the recognition of its
common nature in both kingdoms, largely due to Max Schultze, the latter term prevailed; and it has
passed from the vocabulary of biology into the domain of everyday life. We shall now examine the
structure and behaviour of protoplasm and of the cell as an introduction to the detailed study of the
Protozoa, or better still Protista,[2] the lowest types of living beings, and of Animals at large.

It is not in detached fragments of the tissues of the higher animals that we can best carry on this study:
for here the cells are in singularly close connexion with their neighbours during life; the proper appointed
work of each is intimately related to that of the others; and this co-operation has so trained and specially
modified each cell that the artificial severance and isolation is detrimental to its well-being, if not
necessarily fatal to its very life. Again, in plants the presence of a cell-wall interferes in many ways with
the free behaviour of the cell. But in the blood and lymph of higher animals there float isolated cells, the
white corpuscles or "leucocytes" of human histology, which, despite their minuteness (1⁄3000 in. in
diameter), are in many respects suitable objects. Further, in our waters, fresh or salt, we may find similar
free-living individual cells, in many respects resembling the leucocytes, but even better suited for our
study. For, in the first place, we can far more readily reproduce under the microscope the normal
conditions of their life; and, moreover, these free organisms are often many times larger than the
leucocyte. Such free organisms are individual Protozoa, and are called by the general term "Amoebae."
A large Amoeba may measure in its most contracted state 1⁄100 in. or 250 µ in diameter,[3] and some
closely allied species (Pelomyxa, see p. 52) even twelve times this amount. If we place an Amoeba or a
leucocyte under the microscope (Fig. 1), we shall find that its form, at first spherical, soon begins to
alter. To confine our attention to the external changes, we note that the outline, from circular, soon
becomes "island-shaped" by the outgrowth of a promontory here, the indenting of a bay there. The
promontory may enlarge into a peninsula, and thus grow until it becomes a new mainland, while the old
mainland dwindles into a mere promontory, and is finally lost. In this way a crawling motion is effected.[4]
The promontories are called "pseudopodia" (= "false-feet"), and the general character of such motion is
called "amoeboid."[5]
 Fig. 1.—Amoeba, showing clear ectoplasm, granular endoplasm, dark nucleus, and lighter contractile vacuole. The
changes of form, a-f, are of the A. limax type; g, h, of the A. proteus type. (From Verworn.)

The living substance, protoplasm,[6] has been termed a "jelly," a word, however, that is quite
inapplicable to it in its living state. It is viscid, almost semi-fluid, and may well be compared to very soft
dough which has already begun to rise. It resembles it in often having a number of spaces, small or
large, filled with liquid (not gas). These are termed "vacuoles" or "alveoles," according to their greater or
their lesser dimensions. In some cases a vacuole is traversed by strands of plasmic substance, just as
we may find such strands stretching across the larger spaces of a very light loaf; but of course in the
living cell these are constantly undergoing changes. If we "fix" a cell (i.e. kill it by sudden heat or certain
chemical coagulants),[7] and examine it under the microscope, the intermediate substance between the
vacuoles that we have already seen in life is again found either to be finely honeycombed or else
resolved into a network like that of a sponge. The former structure is called a "foam" or "alveolar"
structure, the latter a "reticulate" structure. The alveoles are about 1 µ in diameter, and spheroidal or
polygonal by mutual contact, elongated, however, radially to any free surface, whether it be that of the
cell itself or that of a larger alveole or vacuole. The inner layer of protoplasm ("endoplasm," "endosarc")
contains also granules of various nature, reserve matters of various kinds, oil-globules, and particles of
mineral matter[8] which are waste products, and are called "excretory." In fixed specimens these
granules are seen to occupy the nodes of the network or of the alveoli, that is, the points where two or
three boundaries meet.[9] The outermost layer ("ectoplasm" or "ectosarc") appears in the live Amoeba
structureless and hyaline, even under conditions the most favourable for observation. The refractive
index of protoplasm, when living, is always well under 1.4, that of the fixed and dehydrated substance is
slightly over 1.6.

Again, within the outer protoplasm is found a body of slightly higher refractivity and of definite outline,
termed the "nucleus" (Figs. 1, 2). This has a definite "wall" of plasmic nature, and a substance so closely
resembling the outer protoplasm in character, that we call it the "nucleoplasm" (also "linin"),
distinguishing the outer plasm as "cytoplasm"; the term "protoplasm" including both. Within the
nucleoplasm are granules of a substance that stains well with the commoner dyes, especially the "basic"
ones, and which has hence been called "chromatin." The linin is usually arranged in a distinct network,
confluent into a "parietal layer" within the nuclear wall; the meshes traversing a cavity full of liquid, the
nuclear sap, and containing in their course the granules; while in the cavity are usually found one or two
droplets of a denser substance termed "nucleoles." These differ slightly in composition from the
chromatin granules[10] (see p. 24 f.).

The movements of the leucocyte or Amoeba are usually most active at a temperature of about 40° C. or
100° F., the "optimum." They cease when the temperature falls to a point, the "minimum," varying with
the organism, but never below freezing-point; they recommence when the temperature rises again to
the same point at which they stopped. If now the temperature be raised to a certain amount above 40°
they stop, but may recommence if the temperature has not exceeded a certain point, the "maximum"
(45° C. is a common maximum). If it has been raised to a still higher point they will not recommence
under any circumstances whatever.

Again, a slight electric shock will determine the retraction of all processes, and a period of rest in a
spherical condition. A milder shock will only arrest the movements. But a stronger shock may arrest
them permanently. We may often note a relation of the movements towards a surface, tending to keep
the Amoeba in contact with it, whether it be the surface of a solid or that of an air-bubble in the liquid
(see also p. 20).

Fig. 2.—Ovum of a Sea-Urchin, showing the radially striated cell-membrane, the cytoplasm containing yolk-granules, the
large nucleus (germinal vesicle), with its network of linin containing chromatin granules, and a large nucleole (germinal
spot). (From Balfour's Embryology, after Hertwig.)

If a gentle current be set up in the water, we find that the movements of the Amoeba are so co-ordinated
that it moves upstream; this must of course be of advantage in nature, as keeping the being in its place,
against the streams set up by larger creatures, etc. (see also p. 21).

If substances soluble in water be introduced the Amoeba will, as a rule, move away from the region of
greater concentration for some substances, but towards it (provided it be not excessive) for others. (See
also pp. 22, 23.) We find, indeed, that there is for substances of the latter category a minimum of
concentration, below which no effect is seen, and a maximum beyond which further concentration
repels. The easiest way to make such observations is to take up a little strong solution in a capillary tube
sealed at the far end, and to introduce its open end into the water, and let the solution diffuse out, so
that this end may be regarded as surrounded by zones of continuously decreasing strength. In the
process of inflammation (of a Higher Animal) it has been found that the white corpuscles are so
attracted by the source of irritation that they creep out of the capillaries, and crowd towards it.

We cannot imagine a piece of dough exhibiting any of these reactions, or the like of them; it can only
move passively under the action of some one or other of the recognised physical forces, and that only in
direct quantitative relation to the work that such forces can effect; in other words, the dough can have
work done on it, but it cannot do work. The Amoeba or leucocyte on the contrary does work. It moves
under the various circumstances by the transformation of some of its internal energy from the "potential"
into the "kinetic" state, the condition corresponding with this being essentially a liberation of heat or
work, either by the breaking down of its internal substances, or by the combination of some of them with
oxygen.[11] Such of these changes as involve the excretion of carbonic acid are termed "respiratory."

This liberation of energy is the "response" to an action of itself inadequate to produce it; and has been
compared not inaptly to the discharge of a cannon, where foot-tons of energy are liberated in
consequence of the pull of a few inch-grains on the trigger, or to an indefinitely small push which makes
electric contact: the energy set free is that which was stored up in the charge. This capacity for liberating
energy stored up within, in response to a relatively small impulse from without, is termed "irritability"; the
external impulse is termed the "stimulus." The responsive act has been termed "contractility," because it
so often means an obvious contraction, but is better termed "motility "; and irritability evinced by motility
is characteristic of all living beings save when in the temporary condition of "rest."