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Essays in Real Estate Research Band 13
Nico B. Rottke · Jan Mutl Hrsg.
Philip Radner
Edited By
N. B. Rottke, Eschborn, Germany
J. Mutl, Wiesbaden, Germany
Die Reihe „Essays in Real Estate Research”, herausgegeben von Professor Dr. Nico
B. Rottke FRICS und Professor Jan Mutl, Ph.D. umfasst aktuelle Forschungsarbe
iten der Promovenden der Lehrstühle und Professuren des Real Estate Manage
ment Institutes der EBS Business School. Forschungs- und Lehrschwerpunkte des
Institutes bilden die interdisziplinären Aspekte der Immobilientransaktion sowie
die nachhaltige Wertschöpfungskette im Immobilienlebenszyklus. Die Kapital
märkte werden als essenzieller Bestandteil der Entwicklung der Immobilienmärkte
aufgefasst.
Die in der Regel empirischen Studien betrachten transaktions- und kapitalmark
tnahe Themenbereiche aus dem Blickwinkel der institutionellen Immobiliengew
erbe- und -wohnungswirtschaft, wie bspw. Finanzierung, Kapitalmarktstruktur,
Investition, Risikomanagement, Bewertung, Ökonomie oder Portfoliomanage
ment, aber auch angewandte Themen wie Corporate Real Estate Management,
Projektentwicklung oder Unternehmensführung. Die ersten 11 Bände der Reihe
erschienen bis 2014 auch im Immobilien Manager Verlag, Köln.
The series “Essays in Real Estate Research”, published by Professor Dr. Nico B.
Rottke FRICS and Professor Jan Mutl, Ph.D., includes current research work of
doctoral students at the chairs and professorships of the Real Estate Management
Institute of EBS Business School. The research and teaching focus of the Institute
constitutes the interdisciplinary aspects of real estate transactions as well as the
sustainable value creation chain within the real estate life cycle. The capital markets
are regarded as essential components of the development of the real estate markets.
The mostly empirical studies consider transactional as well as capital market topics
from the point of view of the institutional commercial and residential real estate
industry, such as finance, capital market structure, investment, risk management,
valuation, economics or portfolio management, but also applied topics such as
corporate real estate management, real estate development, or leadership issues in
the property industry. The first 11 volumes of the series appeared up until 2014 in
Immo-bilien Manager Publishing, Cologne, as well.
Edited by
Prof. Dr. Nico B Rottke Jan Mutl
Ernst & Young Real Estate GmbH EBS Business School
Eschborn, Germany Wiesbaden, Germany
Philip Radner
Springer Gabler
© Springer Fachmedien Wiesbaden GmbH 2017
This work is subject to copyright. All rights are reserved by the Publisher, whether the whole or part
of the material is concerned, specifically the rights of translation, reprinting, reuse of illustrations,
recitation, broadcasting, reproduction on microfilms or in any other physical way, and transmission
or information storage and retrieval, electronic adaptation, computer software, or by similar or
dissimilar methodology now known or hereafter developed.
The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc. in this
publication does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such names are exempt
from the relevant protective laws and regulations and therefore free for general use.
The publisher, the authors and the editors are safe to assume that the advice and information in this
book are believed to be true and accurate at the date of publication. Neither the publisher nor the
authors or the editors give a warranty, express or implied, with respect to the material contained
herein or for any errors or omissions that may have been made. The publisher remains neutral with
regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations.
1 Introduction .......................................................................................1
1.1 Motivation and Problem Environment ........................................1
1.2 Composition and Structure of the Dissertation ............................1
% percent
AD Announcement Date
CAR Cumulative Abnormal Return
CRSP Center for Research in Security Prices
DCF Discounted Cash Flow
e.g. for example
EREIT European Real Estate Investment Trust
et al. et alii (and others)
etc. et cetera
FFO Funds From Operations
i.e. that is
IPO Initial Public Offering
OBRA Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act
OLS Ordinary Least Squares
p. page
Propco Property Company
PV Present Value
REIT Real Estate Investment Trust
ROE Return on Equity
S&P Standard and Poor’s
SEC Securities and Exchange Commission
SEO Seasoned Equity Offering
UK United Kingdom
US United States (of America)
USA United Sates of America
USD/$ United States/American Dollar
vs. Versus
1 Introduction
IPO underpricing in the real estate industry. Real estate and non-real estate relat-
ed underpricing studies are summarized and classified under existing theories.
The studies highlight amongst others that the lower underpricing of REITs com-
pared to industrial companies is not only consistent across geographies, but also
over time. Moreover, in addition to the REITs’ asset base underpricing is deter-
mined also by other factors such as country-specific regulatory and market char-
acteristics. The most explanatory power in the REIT IPO context seems to have
Rock’s winner’s curse model followed by information extraction theory, signal-
ing as well as prospect theory.
Chapter three (paper two) analyzes the influence of information disclosure
in the IPO prospectus on IPO underpricing. It introduces a different approach for
measuring information disclosure and then quantifies its effect on initial returns.
The IPO prospectuses of 72 US REIT companies are analyzed on key words and
then tested on abnormal return patterns with regard to the frequent use of these
key words. Moreover, future tense is taken as a proxy for the number of promis-
es in an IPO prospectus and we test a risk-based interpretation. Firms that make
fewer promises put less information in the marketplace. Consequently, investors
should be rewarded for having less information to correctly value the issue by
underpricing. Generally, we analyze the impact of the IPO prospectus on under-
pricing and examine the relationship between the use of key words as well as
promises made by a firm in its IPO prospectus and its underpricing level.
Chapter four (paper three) analyzes valuation effects around the announce-
ment date of SEOs by US-REITs after the subprime crisis. It is expected that
higher asymmetric information will lead to stronger price changes, albeit declin-
ing in magnitude over time. The results of our empirical investigation are con-
sistent with these expectations. We find announcement effects of approximately -
3%, which are greater in magnitude than previous research would suggest. Fur-
thermore, our regression analysis confirms the decreasing effect over time.
Chapter five concludes the dissertation and gives an analysis of our main re-
sults. It also discusses room for further research in the economic literature on
REIT IPOs and SEOs.
2 IPO Underpricing in the Real Estate Industry:
Analytical Review of the Literature
2.1 Introduction
Capital structure and the various options of raising capital have continuously
been a research topic in the real estate literature. Especially initial public offer-
ings (IPOs) have raised a lot of research attention due to the fact that the decision
and the process of going public is a major step of any corporation.
Literature typically documents as advantages and major reasons of being a
publicly traded company among others improved access to capital and increased
liquidity (e.g., Brau and Fawcett, 2006). Hence, being a public company gener-
ates various advantages for companies in the real estate industry. The raised
equity can be used for major investments and helps companies to act more inde-
pendently from banks and debt financing.
In particular, studying IPOs of REITs offers a remarkable research oppor-
tunity due to a number of motives. First, examining REIT IPOs could disclose
evidence which has not yet been studied. This might challenge present going
public theories and moreover challenge their applicability. Additionally, study-
ing IPOs of REITs allows mitigating cross-industry effects. Those effects are
typically apparent in comparable research on industrial companies. Hence, REIT
IPOs offer a promising opportunity to study the real industry where the issues of
managerial opportunism and asymmetric information can be prevented through
(a) significant regulatory constraints, (b) operating structure, and (c) the trans-
parency of the underlying real estate asset market. Lastly, it is an interesting
opportunity to analyze (under “laboratory” conditions) empirical results on IPOs
as the US REIT significantly changed during the past 25 years. Therefore, inves-
tigating IPOs of REITs might draw implications which could have importance
for the general corporate finance industry.
Amongst the first to study a substantial rise of the stock price on the IPO
date were Stoll and Curley (1970). High initial returns indicate that the firms
going public left significant amounts of money on the table and the analyzed
IPOs were considerably underpriced. The formerly described phenomenon of
first day opening price exceeding the offer price (underpricing) has been system-
atically observed in economic literature. Reilly (1973) – similar to Stoll and
Curley (1970) – found significant underpricing, too. Moreover, he reveals that
first day returns occur in both declining and rising equity markets. Ibbotson
(1975) confirms these results and investigates that if investors invest in initial
2.2 Introduction
Underpricing – i.e. the offer price is lower than the share price of the first trade
at IPO – is a widely researched phenomena in the economic literature. Several
theories which try to explain underpricing exist. The most prominent ones are
asymmetric information theories. Further underpricing theories are institutional
theories and behavioral explanations.
Asymmetric information theories explain underpricing by assuming that one
of the parties, which are involved in the IPO (the issuing firm, the underwriting
bank, and the investors), is more informed than the others. Thus, these theories
base on the fact that IPOs are typically characterized by informational disparities
2.2 Introduction 5
superior information with regard to the true value of the firm – in contrast to the
assumption of Rock’s model that a group of outside investors has more and bet-
ter information than less informed investors and firm insiders. The first who
developed a signaling intuition on IPOs was Ibbotson (1975). Signaling theories
which base on Ibbotson furthermore assume that companies use underpricing
with the intention to signal the firm’s high value. Underpricing represents an
expensive and thus strong signal of company value and quality.
Grinblatt and Hwang (1989), Allen and Faulhaber (1989), and Welch (1989,
1996) have formalized Ibbotson’s intuition. Their main reasoning is that issuers
typically have an informational advantage towards investors as they have private
information about future cash flows and the general outlook of the company.
They show that it is not feasible for low quality companies to underprice their
issuing with the intention of imitating high quality firms since these firms face a
significant risk that the true value or nature of the firm will be disclosed follow-
ing the offering. Hence, the companies would not be able to offset the costs that
were caused by underpricing their offering through SEOs. In general, signaling
theories forecast a positive connection between underpricing and the speed, size,
announcement effect, as well as probability of secondary offerings. This also
holds true for ex ante uncertainty.
However, compared to other asymmetric information theories, signaling
theories seem to receive less empirical support. For example, the statistical rela-
tionship in the paper of Jegadeesh, Weinstein, and Welch (1993) is rather weak
and does not really support signaling theories although it confirms that the prob-
ability and size of SEOs increase with underpricing. This is in line with
Michaely and Shaw (1994). Their paper also shows that there is no statistical
relationship between the choice to engage in secondary offerings and to under-
price. Additionally, the analysis of Spiess and Pettway (1997) shows further
conflicting evidence. Contrary studies by Slovin, Sushka, and Bendeck (1994),
and by Francis, Hasan, Lothian, and Sun (2010), however contradict these re-
sults. These studies support the main reasoning behind signaling theory that
some companies are willing to leave money on the table so that they can later
regain the costs through SEOs.
Another asymmetric information theory bases on the assumption that
Rock’s (1986) model holds true and on the underlying theory that a group of
informed investors has superior information about the true company value than a
group of less informed investors. This is the so called information extraction or
bookbuilding theory.
If it is true that a group of investors exists which has high quality infor-
mation, underwriters and the issuing firm have a significant interest in extracting
information from this group. With this information they are able to increase the
offering price and thus to maximize the proceeds from the IPO. Yet, since inves-
2.2 Introduction 7
tors typically are not willing to reveal information, underwriters need to design a
mechanism, which extracts information and forces investors to disclose their
information with appropriate incentives. The major IPO models of Spatt and
Srivastava (1991), Benveniste and Wilhelm (1990), as well as Benveniste and
Spindt (1989) show that appropriately designed bookbuilding can be an adequate
mechanism for information extraction. The studies price an issue in a model
which can be described as a two stage auction process which potentially allows
them to effectively extract information and adjust the offer price. Nevertheless,
the underwriter still needs to underprice the issue as an investor incentive for
revealing information. Hence, according to information extraction theory, under-
pricing is a consequence of the intention to reward investors for truth telling.
Moreover, this theory shows that, if regulations do not allow underwriters to
discriminately allocate and price new issues, underpricing increases since non-
regulated bookbuilding is essential for the information extraction process.
Empirical evidence on the information extraction/bookbuilding process as a
reason for underpricing mostly supports this theory. Hanley (1993) indirectly
tests the model of Benveniste and Spindt (1989) and finds that issues with final
offer prices exceeding the limits of the offer range show larger underpricing than
other issues. Economic literature typically describes this evidence as the partial
adjustment phenomenon. Cornelli and Goldreich (2001, 2003) also back the
theory that underwriters use bookbuilding for information extraction purposes.
Further evidence that supports information extraction/bookbuilding theory
comes, for example, from Chemmanur, Hu, and Huang (2010), Binay, Gatchev,
and Prinsky (2007), Aggarwal, Prabhala, and Puri (2002), and Hanley and Wil-
helm (1995). In contrast, Jenkinson and Jones (2004, 2009) do not reveal any
evidence which would support this theory. Further analyses on information ex-
traction theories and IPO allocation include Chiang, Qian, and Sherman (2010),
Boehmer, Boehmer, and Fishe (2006), Sherman and Titman (2002), Ljungqvist
and Wilhelm (2002) Sherman (2000), and Lee, Taylor, and Walter (1999). Gen-
erally, empirical evidence on information extraction theory is relatively strong in
the literature.
Basically, Rock’s (1986) model as well as information extraction/book-
building theories assume that a group of investors is more informed than other
parties involved in the IPO whereas signaling theories assume that the issuing
firm has better information about the true value of the firm than other parties.
The principal-agent theory, however, assumes that the underwriting investment
bank has more and better information than the issuing firm and investors. The
first to model such a relationship were Baron and Holmström (1980) and Baron
(1982). The main conflict results from the fact that the issuing company is not
able to observe the effort which an underwriter employs for distributing and
marketing the issue without incurring costs. Therefore, the issuing firm typically
8 2 IPO Underpricing in the Real Estate Industry: Analytical Review of the Literature
has to give incentives so that the underwriter optimally uses its superior infor-
mation about investor demand and by linking the underwriter’s compensation to
the offer price. Alternatively, the issuer could monitor the underwriter’s effort
which is costly. Simultaneously, the underwriter has to be discouraged from
underpricing the issue. This would reduce the bank’s efforts of selling the shares.
This conflict can be solved by a contractual relationship in which incentives for
the underwriter play a major role. However, Baron (1982) shows in his study that
such a contractual relationship still leads to underpricing. In this case underpric-
ing is necessary as it compensates the underwriter for revealing its information.
Moreover, the model implies that the higher the information asymmetry and the
higher the uncertainty about the value of the firm, the higher the demand for
underpricing and investment banking services. This backs the positive relation
between ex ante uncertainty as well as underpricing – a fact which plays a key
role in all asymmetric information theories.
Empirical evidence supports the principal-agent theory. However, the evi-
dence is not as clear as for the winner curse of Rock (1986) and bookbuilding
theories. For example, Ljungqvist and Wilhelm (2003) show evidence for the
hypothesis that monitoring reduces underpricing. In addition, Ljungqvist (2002)
tests the hypothesis that contractual relationships between issuer and underwriter
(i.e. contracting on higher commissions which are dependent on IPO proceeds)
reduce underpricing and finds support for this hypothesis. However, Muscarella
and Vetsuypens (1989) challenge the model of Baron (1982). They find that self-
underwritten IPOs show underpricing which would contradict Baron’s (1982)
model since in self-underwritten IPOs no information asymmetry exists. On the
other hand, Hsuan-Chi and Sheng-Hung (2010) contradict this finding by adding
issuers’ incentives into the regression model.
In contrast to asymmetric information theories, institutional theories de-
scribe underpricing as a phenomenon which is caused by actions of underwriters.
Moreover, institutional theories show that litigation avoidance and stabilization
activities can explain underpricing.
Subsequent to findings of Ruud (1993), Benveniste, Busaba, and Wilhelm
(1996) developed a theoretical approach with the intention to explain the rela-
tionship between price stabilization and underpricing. In their model they show
that the investment bank has a natural incentive to overprice IPOs and exagger-
ate interest of investors as the compensation of the investment bank rises with
the proceeds. Under such circumstances investors possibly will not cooperate in
the bookbuilding process. To incentivize investors, the investment bank can offer
stabilization measures. Since stabilization activities are costly and substantially
grow when the initial offering price exceeds the true value of the company, stabi-
lization is a bonding mechanism to convince investor groups of the fact that the
issuance is not purposely overpriced. As typically only institutional investors
2.2 Introduction 9
take part in the bookbuilding process, they are the key beneficiaries of price
support. In particular, the model demonstrates that compared to Benveniste and
Spindt (1989) stabilization measures lead to less underpricing as it enables un-
derwriters to increase the offering price when they commit to stabilization. Con-
trasting the approach of Benveniste, Busaba, and Wilhelm (1996), Chowdhry
and Nanda (1996) employ the model of Rock (1986) and illustrate that stabiliza-
tion significantly benefits less informed investors that are compensated for ad-
verse selection. Thus, stabilization decreases the problem of the winner’s curse
and by this underpricing.
Economic literature implies that stabilization is regularly applied in prac-
tice. The work of Hanley, Kumar, and Seguin (1993) as well as of Schultz and
Zaman (1994) investigate bid-ask spreads and provide market evidence for wide-
spread price stabilization. Those findings are furthermore supported by Ellis,
Michaely, and O’Hara (2000) and Lewellen (2006) by suggesting that underwrit-
ers execute considerable price stabilization activities. As far as the relationship
between underpricing and price support is concerned, the results of Ruud (1993)
are challenged by Asquith, Jones, and Kieschnick (1998). They do not reveal any
relation between price support and underpricing. Benveniste, Erdal, and Wilhelm
(1998) show that in stabilized offerings primarily large traders execute sell or-
ders. Since typically large traders are mandated by institutional clients this sug-
gests that stabilization measures mostly benefit institutional investors. In con-
trast, Lewellen (2006) finds in his study that underwriters engage in stabilization
activities more often than other banks when they own their own retail brokerage
operations. This supports the view that less or uninformed investor groups bene-
fit from stabilization activities. In general, stabilization seems to be a factor that
is able to explain underpricing patterns.
A second institutional theory usually is referred to as lawsuit avoidance the-
ory. The main principle of this theory is based on Ibbotson (1975). He shows that
underwriters underprice since they intend to reduce the risk of being sued by
various investor groups who are upset by the post-IPO performance. However,
lawsuit avoidance theory is more prominent in the US as a number of similar
studies illustrate that the risk of being sued is more or less irrelevant in other
countries (Ljungqvist, 1997; Kunz and Aggarwal, 1994). Nevertheless, lawsuit
avoidance seems to be a significant reason for initial returns, although locally
dependent. Tinic (1988) was one of the first who who analyzed the lawsuit
avoidance hypothesis. The researcher found that an IPO sample during the years
1923-1930 was less underpriced than an IPO sample during the years 1966-1971.
This was in line with Tinic’s expectations due to the fact that underwriters were
largely protected against law suits prior to the 1933 Securities Act. However,
underpricing can change over time (Loughran and Ritter, 2004). Hence, it is not
possible to prove that the only factor for increasing initial returns was increased
10 2 IPO Underpricing in the Real Estate Industry: Analytical Review of the Literature
litigation risk. Actually, the study of Drake and Vetsuypens (1993) causes even
more doubt on the results of Tinic as their IPO sample between 1972 and 1977
indicates lower underpricing than the sample of IPOs between 1923 and 1930.
Moreover, Drake and Vetsuypens (1993) study if there is a negative relationship
between underpricing and the risk of being sued. Hughes and Thakor (1992)
maintain such a relationship. The authors find that there is no difference in being
sued between overpriced and underpriced companies. This is not in line with
legal avoidance theory. On the contrary, Lowry and Shu (2002) show that com-
panies which have a greater probability of being sued typically engage in higher
underpricing and that an underpriced issue reduces the risk of being sued. Hanley
and Hoberg (2012) demonstrate in their study that issuers use strategic disclosure
and underpricing as potential hedging methods against the risk of litigation.
Additionally, to underprice IPOs seems to be an appropriate hedge in relation
with Section 11 lawsuits that are harmful to underwriters while strategic disclo-
sure effectively protects towards all types of lawsuits. The analysis above shows
the difficulties when examining the influence of the risk of litigation on under-
pricing.
A third prominent theory which tries to explain underpricing are behavioral
explanations. Three different behavioral explanation approaches are typically
referred to in the economic literature: information cascades, prospect theory, and
investor sentiment. Researchers that support behavioral explanations typically
argue that theories based on institutional factors and information asymmetry
cannot plausibly explain the magnitude of underpricing which is empirically
documented.
The IPO model of Welch (1992) is based on sequential learning and is the
first prominent study which tries to explain underpricing by including behavioral
factors into the IPO process. He assumes that underwriters cannot reach all in-
vestors simultaneously and have limited distribution channels, and thus demon-
strates that information cascades can develop during the IPO process. The con-
sequence of limited distribution channels is that underwriters need more time in
order to attract interested investor groups. Hence, later investors are able to ana-
lyze if an IPO offering is attractive or not. A successfully sold IPO in the first
stage apparently functions as evidence to subsequent investors that previous
investors had generally positive valuations of the stocks and the firm, which
typically motivates them to also invest. The reverse holds true if initial sales are
unsatisfactory. As a consequence, later investors in the firm condition their bids
on the bids of earlier investors. Hence, demand accelerates or vanishes quickly.
Since the behavior of early investor groups therefore determines the failure or
success of the issue, they have to be compensated for their earlier and “riskier”
actions by underpricing. In his study Welch (1992) moreover demonstrates that
information cascades and their effects are actually not negative for the issuing
2.2 Introduction 11
company, as they reduce asymmetric information between the issuing firm and
investors. The bid of earlier investors will not provide any information for later
bidders, if he relies completely on the information of the earlier bidder. This may
lead to an increase in proceeds of the issuer. As a matter of fact, the model of
Rock (1986) is not consistent with the model of Welch (1992).
Indeed, there is no support for the model of Welch (1992) in academic liter-
ature. Nevertheless, the work of Amihud, Hauser, and Kirsh (2003) presents
empirical evidence that is in line with the theory of Welch (1992). Their analysis
indicates the existence of negative as well as positive cascade effects. Other
studies provide support that sequential learning is a driver of IPO market cycles
(Lowry and Schwert, 2002). This means that investors seem to exhibit infor-
mation cascade effects and that individual investors, in contrast to institutional
investor groups, are affected by the performance of previous investments in
initial offerings (Chiang, Hirshleifer, Qian, and Sherman, 2011). Yet no clear
support exists to explicitly prove these effects. This makes the model of Welch
(1992) one of the least researched theories in IPO literature.
A different approach follow Loughran and Ritter (2002). They apply Tha-
ler’s (1980) concept of mental accounting and Kahneman’s and Tversky’s
(1979) prospect theory to explain underpricing. The respective studies demon-
strate that executives of issuing companies experience behavioral biases which
usually prevent them from worrying or being concerned about the fact that they
leave money on the table with an underpriced IPO. Moreover, managers have a
tendency to mentally offset wealth losses which result from initial day returns
against wealth gains on their retained shares which result from underpricing. The
company’s managers are typically satisfied with the underwriter and the perfor-
mance of the initial offering, if the perceived gains exceed the underpricing loss.
By implementing this approach, Ljungqvist and Wilhelm (2005) find that if
the CEO’s perception of the issue’s outcome is positive, he is less likely to
change underwriters for SEOs. Moreover, since underwriters can negotiate high-
er fees for SEOs, they seem to profit from this behavior. More research is needed
to further apply and develop prospect theory to IPOs, though the model seems to
have some explanatory power.
Investor sentiment explanations are a third theory within the construct of
behavioral explanations for underpricing in the economic literature. In their IPO
model Ljungqvist, Nanda, and Singh (2006) specifically assume the presence of
optimistic sentiment investors in a bullish market. Consequently, an issuer at-
tempts to maximize his wealth and tries to take advantage from the optimistic
and positive valuation of sentiment investors. The model illustrates that if the
underwriter allocates the stocks to institutional investors, the issuer achieves his
objective. The institutional investors will then resell the stocks to sentiment in-
vestors who arrive in the market over time. They sustain share prices at high
12 2 IPO Underpricing in the Real Estate Industry: Analytical Review of the Literature
levels by not flipping the stocks immediately but rather restricting the availabil-
ity of stocks and keeping inventory. This leads to a surplus extraction from sen-
timent investors. The model suggests that if sentiment investors are existent in
the market, the issuer can realize a higher offer price. However, institutional
investors must be compensated for inventory losses. Those losses can arise when
the demand of sentiment investors ceases unpredictably and results in falling
share prices. Thus, the issue still needs to be underpriced. The investor sentiment
model moreover shows that the stock price drops back to the fundamental value.
This results in negative long-run performance. This is in line with the analysis of
Ritter (1991).
The fact that the IPO offer price can exceed fundamental value prove
Purnanandam and Swaminathan (2004) and thus confirm Ljungqvist, Nanda, and
Singh (2006). In their analysis they reveal a median overvaluation of 14% to
50% at time of IPO in the years 1980-1997. Another study of Ofek and Richard-
son (2003) found significant initial returns during the dotcom crisis, a time in
which institutional investors traded IPO stocks to very optimistic retail investors
following the issue of internet shares. The results of the previous study are sup-
ported by Dorn (2009). He highlights that retail demand in initial offerings is
mainly driven by sentiment. Cornelli, Goldreich, and Ljungqvist (2006) present
additional support which reveals evidence that institutional investor groups take
advantage of sentiment investors. Their study of the European grey market for
stocks shows that small investors are usually willing to pay prices that exceed
fundamental value. In general, the evidence notably supports the model of
Ljungqvist, Nanda, and Singh (2006). The model seems to be able to explain
both the existence of hot and cold IPO markets as well as underpricing.
underwriter ranking system, Wang, Chan, and Gau (1992) show that a negative
relationship between underwriter reputation and the magnitude of overpricing
exists. This evidence suggests that more reputable underwriters tend to price
REIT IPOs more accurately. Moreover, the results indicate that underpricing is
lower if REITs are floated via a best effort agreement, or if IPOs are conducted
by Equity REITs. The results are not consistent with Ritter’s (1987) findings,
who shows that best efforts IPOs have higher initial returns than firm commit-
ment underwriting agreements. Additionally, the authors find that usually institu-
tional investors do not overpay for initial offerings of REITs. IPOs that are over-
valued are typically marketed to less informed retail investors.
In contrast to this study, the researchers Below, Zaman, and McIntosh
(1995) argue that REIT offerings should not experience first day returns as the
valuation of REIT assets leaves no room for uncertainty. Their sample consist of
58 US REIT offerings during the years 1972-1988. They find a rather low un-
derpricing of -0.89% (in fact overpricing), that is in line with the results before.
A further analysis of a Mortgage REIT subsample reveals that overpricing disap-
pears if you use ask prices or the means of bid and ask prices for calculating
initial returns. Therefore, investors are indifferent between buying Mortgage
REIT stocks on the initial offering or in the immediate aftermarket. Hence, the
authors argue that MREIT IPOs are priced correctly. Apparently, they do not use
bid prices to calculate initial return. Bid prices, however, are used in the study of
Wang, Chan, and Gau (1992) and IPO literature overall. Below, Zaman, and
McIntosh (1995) argue that due to the fact that it is not possible to sell IPOs
short, investors could only profit from an overpriced IPO market if they wait to
buy new stock until the share price has decreased in the IPO aftermarket. Thus,
the returns due to overpricing in the study of Wang, Chan, and Gau (1992) seem
to be driven by calculating initial returns employing bid prices. The earlier rea-
soning of using bid-ask averages or ask prices as an alternative of bid prices is
doubtful. Basically, the key assumption behind calculating underpricing is that
investors sell the IPO stocks within the first trading day. However, Below, Za-
man, and McIntosh (1995) generate confusing results by dropping this concept.
Using bid-ask averages and ask prices demonstrates if and how investor groups
can profit from overpriced issues. However, it does not demonstrate if investor
groups exhibit negative or positive underpricing implying a mispriced offering.
Thus, the key outcome of the study seems to be doubtful.
Further evidence regarding the pricing of REIT IPOs provide Ling and
Ryngaert (1997). In contrast to the studies before, which use pre-1990 data, they
take a sample of 85 US Equity REIT IPOs between the years 1991 and 1994. In
the early 1990s, REITs turned into fully integrated operating companies (from
more or less passively managed portfolios before). The researchers assume that
compared to REIT IPOs of the pre-1990 era, offerings after 1993/1994 have a
14 2 IPO Underpricing in the Real Estate Industry: Analytical Review of the Literature
sults in a somewhat different way. They argue that the rather low level of under-
pricing of REITs might also be seen as evidence against investor sentiment and
information asymmetry theories; sentiment investors lead to stronger underpric-
ing than is in fact documented. The interpretation of such findings is difficult,
however. Assuming that REIT IPOs are more transparent than industrial firms
IPOs, the authors argue that REIT IPOs should exhibit lower initial returns as
they are associated with less uncertainty. Thus, there is no reason to assume that
REIT IPOs show similar underpricing as industrial firms. This is also true if
sentiment investors exist in the market. Although sentiment investors are overop-
timistic and non-rational, it is not reasonable to assume that sentiment investors
misprice REIT offerings similarly to industrial firm offerings since the uncertain-
ty level of REIT IPOs is substantially lower. Hence, sentiment investors are
over-optimistic, however they are not unintelligent. Nevertheless, a market with
a lot of sentiment investors should experience stronger underpricing in compari-
son to an IPO market without sentiment investors. Yet, Buttimer, Hyland, and
Sanders (2005) do not control for uncertainty and thus it is difficult to compare
underpricing across market periods and industries.
Since all studies above analyze REIT IPOs alone, the studies do not include
a direct comparison between REIT offerings and industrial firm offerings. With a
sample of 209 REIT and 5,397 traditional IPOs during the period 1986-2004
Dolvin and Pyles (2009) try to fill this gap. They argue that REIT offerings are
more transparent compared to traditional firm IPOs and should thus show less
initial returns. In fact, their results prove this hypothesis. Offerings of industrial
firms are underpriced by 22.9%, whereas REIT offerings experience a mean
initial return of solely 3.7%. Interestingly, the authors also find that REIT IPOs
experience smaller price revisions prior to the IPO. Hanley (1993) demonstrates
that greater price revisions imply a higher level of uncertainty; hence, a positive
relationship between initial returns and price revisions exists. On this basis, Dol-
vin and Pyles (2009) give further evidence that investor groups typically experi-
ence less uncertainty around IPOs of REITs. Moreover, a regression of under-
pricing of the sample versus several factors reveals that offerings of REITs
exhibit first day returns of 4.6% less than traditional offerings.
Joel-Carbonell and Rottke (2009) exclude in their study all pre-1990 issues.
Their sample of 90 REIT IPOs during the period 1991-2008 discloses similar
results. The market-adjusted initial return is significant and totals 4.3%. It seems
that larger IPOs are more underpriced than smaller issues. Moreover, the sample
gives evidence that more reputable underwriters (using an underwriter ranking
adopted from Loughran and Ritter (2004)) are associated with less underpricing,
consistent with previous findings. In general, the analysis shows that underpric-
ing seems to be relatively stable since 1990 and that the overpricing phenomenon
disappeared.
16 2 IPO Underpricing in the Real Estate Industry: Analytical Review of the Literature
The study of Bairagi and Dimovski (2011) is one of the most recent anal-
yses regarding the pricing of REIT IPOs. The researchers examine 123 REIT
IPOs in the US between 1996 and 2010 and thus cover the global financial crisis.
They expect initial returns to be stringer in bullish markets. Regarding the finan-
cial crisis, that is associated with a high level of uncertainty, the researchers are
not clear on the phenomenon of initial return patterns. A further factor includes
the interest rate of 10-year treasury securities that has shown a negative drift
after the financial crisis, too. Ling and Ryngaert (1997) claim that low yields on
fixed-income investments are triggered by falling interest rates in treasury secu-
rities. This results in a relatively higher attractiveness of securities of real estate
firms. Their evidence shows, in fact, that the activity of REIT IPOs is correlated
with the 10-year Treasury bond yield. IPO volume
Similar evidence provide Bairagi and Dimovski (2011). Initial returns
amounted to 4.7% between 1996 and 1999 and averaged at 3.4% from 2002 to
2006. IPOs of REITs were overpriced by -1.19% during the financial crisis
(2007-2010). This is the first time that the overpricing phenomenon could be
observed in the modern REIT era. This might be explained by the fact that the
subprime crisis led to lower investor confidence regarding REIT offerings in this
period. In general, the analysis support the view that initial returns were higher in
the 1990’s and decreased later on. Furthermore, the authors show that larger
IPOs experience more underpricing. Moreover, they illustrate that underpricing
is negatively correlated to underwriter reputation. Both findings are in line with
the findings of Joel-Carbonell and Rottke (2009) as well as other studies. The
results also indicate that higher fees of underwriters are associated with IPOs of
higher uncertainty, which leads to higher underpricing. These results are con-
sistent with the study of Beatty and Welch (1996). The paper also supports the
findings of Ling and Ryngaert (1997) regarding the influence of the 10-year US
treasury rate, suggesting that interest levels have an impact on the demand for
REIT securities. In addition, one novel result concerns “intended use of pro-
ceeds”, a variable commonly used as a proxy for uncertainty in IPO literature
(e.g., Ljungqvist and Wilhelm (2003)). A further finding of Bairagi and Dimov-
ski (2011) relates to REITs disclosing in their IPO prospectus that they will fi-
nance working capital with their IPO proceeds instead of investing them to buy
new properties. Those REITs typically experience higher underpricing. Using
IPO proceeds to finance working capital, however, causes doubts on the financial
stability of the REIT and results in increasing uncertainty. In addition, the paper
supports the view that initial returns peak in times of IPO waves. This coincides
with bullish market patterns – described in the study of Helwege and Liang
(2004). Finally, Bairagi and Dimovski (2011) show that Equity REITs seem to
experience more underpricing than Mortgage REITs and that REITs, whose
2.3 IPO Underpricing in the Real Estate Literature 17
investment focus are property types which require more active management
(e.g., industrial and office), show higher underpricing.
The evidence described before show that IPOs of REITs experience under-
pricing that is significantly lower in comparison to industrial firm IPOs. More
precisely, REIT IPOs show average initial returns between 1% and 5%, whereas
traditional IPOs are, on average, underpriced by more than 10%. Moreover, it
seems that this pattern cannot only be observed in the USA but underpricing of
REITs is lower also in other countries, such as Australia and Japan. It will be
interesting to analyze if this conclusion also holds true in further emerging REIT
industries and is supported through additional evidence in those developing
REIT regimes. Since the underpricing of REITs has never been higher than the
underpricing of industrial companies during the last 30 years, it can be assumed
that lower underpricing is consistent across geographies as well as over time. It
seems, as suggested by above evidence, that the lower underpricing of REIT
offerings reflects market fundamentals.
Authors Sample size Sample period Mean initial return Result Initial return calculation
Table 2:
Wang, Chan, and Gau 87 IPOs 1971-1988 -2.82% Overpriced Linear initial return
(1992)
Below, Zaman, and McIn- 58 IPOs 1972-1989 -0.89% Overpriced Linear initial return
tosh (1995)
Ling and Ryngaert (1997) 85 IPOs 1991-1994 3.60% Underpriced Market-adjusted initial
return
Buttimer, Hyland, and 205 IPOs 1980-1999 2.00% Underpriced Linear initial return
Sanders (2001) 49 IPOs 1980-1988 -1.61% Overpriced
98 IPOs 1990-1994 2.70% Underpriced
58 IPOs 1994-1999 3.87% Underpriced
Chan, Erickson, and 24 IPOs 1970-1979 -3.10% Overpriced Linear initial return
Wang (2003) 78 IPOs 1980-1989 -3.14% Overpriced
159 IPOs 1990-2000 2.36% Underpriced
Average underpricing of US REIT IPOs
Buttimer, Hyland, and 163 IPOs 1980-2001 2.47% Underpriced Continous initial return
Sanders (2005) 13 IPOs 1985 -1.27% Overpriced
84 IPOs 1993-1994 3.21% Underpriced
30 IPOs 1997-1998 5.57% Underpriced
Joel-Carbonell and Rottke 90 IPOs 1991-2008 4.30% Underpriced Continous initial return
(2009)
Dolvin and Pyles (2009) 209 IPOs 1986-2004 3.72% Underpriced Linear initial return
Bairagi and Dimovski 123 IPOs 1996-2010 3.18% Underpriced Linear initial return
(2011) 48 IPOs 1996-1999 4.72% Underpriced
55 IPOs 2002-2006 3.43% Underpriced
20 IPOs 2007-2010 -1.19% Overpriced
2 IPO Underpricing in the Real Estate Industry: Analytical Review of the Literature
2.3 IPO Underpricing in the Real Estate Literature 19
An important question, however, is, if the REITs’ asset base – the real estate
holdings – is the key factor which causes reduced valuation uncertainty and leads
to lower underpricing. The review of literature on Propcos is helpful to answer
that question. Chan, Stohs, and Wang (2001) analyze 399 offerings in Hong
Kong during the period 1986 to 1997. In their sample the researchers include 343
industrial firm offerings and 56 real estate offerings. In contrast to the results
obtained on REITs, their study shows similar returns for both subsamples. The
researchers then split the real estate sample into 23 construction firms, 7 hotel
businesses, and 26 Propcos. Surprisingly, the 26 Propco offerings show the
strongest underpricing of about 19%. This is in line with the results on industrial
firm offerings. Hotel and construction offerings have initial returns of 3.0% and
16.5%, respectively. Chan, Stohs, and Wang (2001) argue that the asset base of
REITs cannot be the only reason for the low underpricing. Further analyses on
initial public offerings of Propcos show rather mixed results. In a review of 51
IPOs of Propcos in the UK during the period 1981-1994 Gerbich, Levis, and
Venmore-Rowland (1995) find, on average, an underpricing of 11.1%. A further
study of Sahi and Lee (2001) examines a sample of 48 Propco IPOs in the UK
from 1986 to 1995 and finds that the offerings show mean initial returns of 7.8%.
Brounen and Eichholtz (2002), however, analyze 54 French, Swedish, as well as
British Propcos that went public during the period 1984-1999. The authors find
that initial returns tend to vary across geographies. However, underpricing fluc-
tuates more or less insignificantly. Unexpectedly, they find that that the IPOs in
their sample were correctly priced in the era before 1992 (initial returns of 0.1%)
and show initial returns of 4.9% after 1992. Brounen and Eichholtz (2002) ex-
plain these results with the increasing integration of the market in Europe, which
started in the year 1992. A similar sample (1994-2006) of European Propcos
examine Freybote, Rottke, and Schiereck (2008) and compute underpricing of
7.3%. In particular, Propcos with an investment focus on Eastern Europe show
the highest initial returns (17.6%) while Propcos with a focus on Western Europe
and the UK experience initial returns of 5.9% and 3.4%, respectively. The evi-
dence given above clarifies that IPOs of Propcos show higher underpricing com-
pared to REIT IPOs. Thus, it seems reasonable to argue that REITs experience
less uncertainty around the IPO event in comparison to offerings of Propcos.
Moreover, the results suggest that underpricing is not only be determined by the
asset base of the REITs. It is also determined by additional factors, such as coun-
try-specific regulatory as well as market characteristics.
With the exception of Wang, Chan, and Gau (1992) all researches argue that
REIT IPOs show less underpricing since there is lower uncertainty around the
date of REIT offerings. A typical reasoning is that it is easier to forecast the cash
flows of REITs and therefore to calculate value of the firm due to the fact that
REITs typically invest in real estate asset assets and those assets commonly have
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Nitrogenous Foods
As previously stated, in a mixed diet meat and eggs are the chief
sources of nitrogenous foods. Next to these come the legumes.
Corn (maize) is a native of America and has been one of the most
extensively used cereals. Corn bread and corn meal mush were
important foods with the early settlers, partly because they are
nutritious and partly because the corn meal was easily prepared at
the mill and was cheap. The germ of the corn is larger in proportion
than the germs of other grains, and it contains much fat; therefore it
is heating. For this reason, it is strange that corn bread is so largely
used by inhabitants of the southern states. It is a more appropriate
food for winter in cold climates.
Because of the fat in the germ, cornmeal readily turns rancid, and,
on this account, the germ is separated and omitted from many
cornmeal preparations.
Hulled corn, sometimes called lye hominy, is one of the old-
fashioned ways of using corn. In its preparation, the skin is loosened
by steeping the corn in a weak solution of lye, which gives it a
peculiar flavor, pleasing to many.
Cornmeal mush is a valuable breakfast food.
Pop corn. The bursting of the shell in popping corn is due to the
expansion of the moisture in the starch, occasioned by the heat.
Green sweet corn does not contain the same proportion of starch
as cornmeal, it being, in its tender state, mostly water. It is laxative,
because it is eaten with the coarse hull, which causes more rapid
peristalsis of the intestines.
Oatmeals are the most nutritious cereals. The oat contains more
fat than other grains and a larger proportion of protein. It is,
therefore, the best adapted to sustain life in the proportion of nutrient
elements. On account of the fat, oats are especially well adapted for
a breakfast food in winter. Another advantage oatmeal, or rolled oats,
have as a breakfast food is in their laxative tendency, due to the
coarse shell of the kernel.