CHAPTER I EGJEMONIA Egjemonia eshte nje fjale qe merr ngjyrim negativ ne perdorim ne ditet e sotme.

Ky imazh negativ krijohet pasi shpesh perdoret per pershkrimin e ngjarjeve negative pergjate rrjedhes se histories si per shembull egjemonia e Bashkimit Sovietik ne Europen Perendimore. Ne te vertete egjemonia eshte nje term neutral. Ne fjalorin Websters New World Dictionary egjemonia percaktohet si lidership apo dominance vecanerisht kur flasim per shtete apo kombe. Duke pasur parasysh ngjyrimin negativ te fjales hegjemoni dhe percaktimin e sakte te perkufizimit te termit eshte thelbesore te percaktohet menyra e perdorimit te kesaj fjale ne kete studim. Nje menyre per ta bere kete e gjejme ne studimin e marredhenieve nderkombetare te kryer nga Raymond Aron, Paqja dhe Lufta. Aron pohon se jane tre lloje paqeje: ekuilibri, egjemonia dhe perandoria. Me fjale te tjera forcat e bashkimeve politike jane ne balance, ose ne te kundert dominohen nga forca te tjera qe jane mbi ta, apo menjanohen nga forcat mbi ta deri ne piken ku gjenden te gjitha njesite e tjera, humbasin pavaresine e tyre dhe jane te prirura te zhduken apo zbehen si qendra te vendimeve politike, Kur ndonje factor behet kercenues per te shqetesuar strukturen ekzistuese te paqes (ekuilibrin, egjemonine, apo perandorine), konflikte dhe luftra te fuqishme jane rezultate te mundshme. Ekuilibri, i ngjashem me konceptin e balancimit te fuqise, eshte rasti kur nje shtet nuk duhet te zoteroje nje fuqi te madhe aq sa shtetet fqinje nuk mund te mbrojne te drejtat e tyre perkundrejt tij. Koncerti i Europes eshte nje shembull i nje sistemi te qendrueshem qe eshte ne ekuiliber prej shume vitesh. Kombet e bashkuara pergjate luftes se Pare Boterore u

perpoqen maksimalisht te parandalonin nje egjemoni te mundshme te Gjermanise dhe te ristabilizonin ekuilibrin Europian. Aron shruan Si perkufizim, shtetet sovrane shohin si armik cdo shtet qe kerkon egjemoni, qe do te thote sejcili qe mund ti privoje nga e drejta e pavaresise ose nga e drejta per tu veteqeverisur e per te marre lirisht vendime. Egjemonia eshte nje nje situate ku shteti ne egjemoni eshte i afte te dominoje shtetet e tjera te sistemit. Ne nje sistem paqe me egjemoni, superioriteti i shtetit egjemon eshte i tille qe shtetet e pakenaqura i humasin shpresat per te ndryshuar status quo-ne e tyre, dhe shteti egjemonik nuk perpiqet te perthithe njesite e reduktuara ne pafuqi. Pra nuk behet nje abuzim me egjemonine, por respektohen format e jashtme te pavaresise shteterore; pra nuk aspiron ne krijimin e nje perandorie. Ne paqe nepermjet perandorise, Paqja e perandorise nuk vecohet nga paqja civile: mund te jete rendi i brendshem i nje perandorie. Shembulli me i mire eshte unifikimi i Perandorise Kineze ne vitin 221. Duke qene se edhe provincat e fundit u vendosen nen kontrollin e Perandorise, qellimet kaluan nga krijimi i nje perandorie ne ruajtjen e rendit te brendshem. Nje percaktim i qarte i egjemonise eshte disi kritik ndaj debatit rreth pikesynimeve te Kines ne te ardhmen. Per ta ilustruar, nje raport i koheve te fundit i Departamentit te mbrojtjes se SHBA komenton se Kina nuk eshte ne kerkim te Egjemonise ne Azi apo tjeterkund, edhe pse lideret e saj shpresojne ne arritjen e nje pozicioni ku shtetet Aziatike dhe shtetet me interesa ne Azi te mos ndermarrin veprime qe bien ndesh me interesat e Kines. Ky koment ne fakt eshte disi kontradiktor pasi e emerton Kinen si shtet qe nuk kerkon egjemoni dhe me pas pohon se Kina deshiron nje paqe nepermjet egjemonise, ky eshte komenti i Aron. Nje kofuzion i tille i krijuar nga ngjyrimet e fjales egjemoni eshte jo pak i njohur. Kina nuk kerkon perandori, por egjemoni ne Azine Lindore. Kjo eshte nje situate ku Kina mund te

kete liri te plote per te shqyrtuar interesat e saj, perfshire ketu pikesynimet territoriale ne Taiwan dhe Detin e Veriut te Kines. Kjo eshte arsyeja pse Kina lufton kunder cdo perpjekje per te ndertuar aleanca mbrojtje dy apo shume paleshe ne Azine Lindore. Kina shpreson te krijoje nje situate ku mund te dominoje cdo shtet ne Azine Lindore ne baze te marredhenieve dypaleshe. Faktori kyc qe i pengon ne arritjen e ketij pikesynimi eshte prezenca e fuqishme ushtarake e SHBA ne Azine Lindore, e perforcuar nga aleancat dypaleshe te mbrojtjes. Kjo situate ruan ekuilibrin ne azine Lindore dhe ka nxitur zhvillimin rajonal. Qe prej momentit kur Kina ka perfituar dukshem nga ky ekuiliber, natyrshem lind pyetja: Pse do te donte ta ndryshonte nje sistem te tille te qendrueshem per arritjen e egjemonise? Perse e kerkon egjemonine Kina? Kina e kerkone egjemonine ne Azine Lindore per tre arsye. Se pari, edhe pse udheheqja e Kines do ta mohonte, ata deshirojne qe ta kthejne Kinen ne pozitat dominuese qe gezonte ne kohet lashta. Kjo deshire e Kines ushqehet nga ndjesia e forte e superioritetit kulturor. Kinezet e te gjitha koherave i kane konsideruar popujt jashte zones se tyre kulturore si barbare. Admirali Joseph Prueher n shkurt 1999, pas daljes n pension e tij si komandant suprem i Komands s Paqsorit SHBA, ka verejtur se "kinezt besojn se ata jan qendra e rajonit .... N nje moment n t ardhmen ata do te donin qe t gjitha vendet n rajon t krkonin miratimin e Kins pr do gj q ata mund t dshirojne t bjne. " S dyti, kinezt jan t etur pr t fshir turpin e t dominimit perndimor shekuj me rradhe. Pr fat t keq pr kto ambicie, pjesa tjetr e Azis Lindore nuk sht e gatshme pr tiu kthyer statusit t haracpaguesit pr ta ndihmuar t fshij kt turp. S treti, Kina krkon egjemoni sepse pr

her t par n shekuj kjo sht nj komb i bashkuar q sht aktualisht nj fuqi me zhvillim t mjaftueshem pr tu br egjemor. Samuel Huntington shpjegon se, "Shfaqja e fuqive t mdha t reja sht gjithmon faktor destabilizimi, dhe nse kjo ndodh, shfaqja e Kins si nj fuqi e madhe do t minimizoje cdo fenomen me te cilin do te mund te krahasohej ne nje periudhe qe prej gjysms s fundit t mijvjearit t dyt." Rritja e shpejte e fuqise se Kines do ve ne rrezik ekuilibrin e tanishem ne Azine Lindore. Duke pasur parasysh se Kina dshiron egjemonin n Azin Lindore, pyetja tjetr sht: "far forme t marr hegjemonina kineze?" Pikpamja e pranuar prgjithsisht per regjimin e ardhshm te nje Kine si egjemoni mund te konsiderohet si nje paralele e Kins gjat historis s saj perandorake. Gjat ksaj periudhe, Kina e konsideronte veten "Mbretri e Mesme", mes t qiellit dhe toks. Kultura kineze mbretroi sovrane ne pjesen derrmuese t Azis Lindore. Mbretrit e shteteve bashkepunetore, t tilla si Korea, perligjen sundimin e tyre nepermjet perandorit te Kines. N prputhje me teorin e egjemonise sipas Aron, Kina nuk u prpoq t perthithe kto shtete n perandorin e saj. Nga ana tjetr, kinezt nuk hezituan t "disiplinonin" ushtarakisht fqinjt e tyre, kur ata dshtuan n mbshtetjen e praktikave te Mbretris s Mesme. Ky sistem ka ekzistuar pr shekuj me radh, por do t ishte nj gabim i madh t supozojm se shtetet bashkepunetore "e kane plqyer" kt situate ose qe do t donin t ktheheshin nen te njejtin regjim. Si komententon edhe e ish-kryeministri i Singaporit Lee Kuan Yew, " shum vende t vogla dhe t mesme n Azi jan t shqetsuara mos Kina mund t doje t rifitoje statusin perandorak qe kishte n shekujt e mparshm dhe t ket dyshime se mund te trajtohen si shtete vasal q duhet t drgojn harae Kins si n shekujt e kaluar. " N t

kaluarn e largt, shtetet harapaguese ishin subjekt i egjemonis kineze sepse ishin shum t dobt pr t bere rezistence. Nn mbrojtjen e ushtris amerikane keto shtete mund te ishin zhvilluar t pavarura e t lira nga kontrolli i Kines. Frika pashprehur brenda Azis Lindore sht trheqja e amerikes kombinuar me zgjerimin e ne rritje te pushtetit kinez do ti hapte dyert rigjallerimit te egjemonise kineze. Tani q koncepti i hegjemonis kineze n Azin Lindore sht zhvilluar plotsisht, sht e nevojshme q t prshkruajme se ku Kina ne rrugen pergjate se ciles do tia arrije qellimit.

1.1 VENDI I KINES NE RRUGEN DREJT EGJEMONISE Egjemonia eshte nje produkt i fuqis. Kjo fuqi sht trhequr nga shum burime t krkuara, duke prfshir forcn gjeopolitike, forcn ekonomike, forcn ushtarake dhe aftsia e parashikimit te forces, si dhe stabilitetin politik. Analiza e t gjithe ktyre faktorve na tregon se Kina ka br progres t jashtzakonshm n zhvillim disa nga elementeve qe krkon nj egjemoni. N fusha t tjera, me mundim, ka br shume pak progres. Me pak fjal, Kina sht vite larg ushtrimit te nje egjemonie ne Azis Lindore perballe pushtetit t vazhduar ushtarak te Amerikane dhe ndikimi rajonal. N ann tjetr, fuqia potenciale e Kins n t ardhmen nuk mund t neglizhohet. Mungesa e aleancave t forta shumpalshe t siguris bn t mundur q Kina te mund t ndajn dhe dominojn pjesn tjetr t Azis Lindore, nse SHBA-t do te trheq pranin e saj ushtarake. Analiza e elementeve t krkuara t hegjemonis nxjerr n pah jo vetm shkalln n t ciln fuqia kineze sht rritur n 20 vitet e fundit, por edhe shkalln n t ciln Kina sht ende nj shtet i dobt dhe i ndar.

Nga pikpamja gjeopolitike, Kina ka potencial t pabesueshem. sht nj shtet i madh - i treti m i madh i zons, me numrin me te madh te popullsise n bot. Popullsia e saj sht etnikisht 93 prqind Han Kineze dhe ndan nj ndjenj te prbashkt te kulturs dhe gjuhs. Shtrirja e madhe gjeografike e Kines ka nje sasi marramendese pasurish natyrore. Pozicioni gjeografik i Kins e vendos at n qender, pozicion ishullor brenda Azise q e lejon at t veproj kudo n Azi me linjat e brendshme t komunikimit. Pavarsisht nga shum avantazhe gjeopolitike, Kina gjithashtu prballet me sfida t mdha gjeopolitike. Popullsia e saj e madhe sht nj sfid e pabesueshme pr t ushqyer dhe veshur, t punsohet dhe edukohet. Zgjerimi i shpejt ekonomik ka konsumuar sasi tw mwdha burimesh natyrore - Kina ka nj varsi n rritje n importin e energjis. Edhe pozicioni gjeografik i Kins sht nj shpat me tehe t dyfisht - Kina prballet me armiq potencial (disa tw armatosur me armw brthamore) n do skaj tw saj. Rritja e shpejtw e nw zgjerim e ekonomisw sw Kinws qw ka nisur qw prej vitit 1978 sht fenomen q drejtoi analistt tw parashikojn rritje t saj si nj fuqi egjemoniste nw t ardhmen. Rritja ekonomike nn Deng Xiaoping ishte e pabesueshme. T ardhurat pr frymw janw katrfishuar gjat 18 vjecarit tw kaluar. Kina i ka dyfishuar t ardhurat e saj pr frym n vetm 9 vjet krahasuar me Shtetet e Bashkuara tw cilave iu deshwn 47 vjet pwr t dyfishuar tw ardhurat pwr frym. Q nga fillimi i rritjes sw saj tw shpejt ekonomike mw 1978, Kina ka pwrjetuar norma interesi nw rritje te shkallwve 10 deri n 12 prqind. Megjithat, mrekullia ekonomike kineze po humbet shkwlqimin e saj. Rritja sht ngadalsuar n mnyr t qart. Zyrtart e Partisw Komuniste Kineze (PKK) pohojn nj rritje t GDP-s pr vitin 2013 nw njw shkallw prej 7.8 prqind, dhe kanw pwr qllim t

arrijnw njw rritje ekonomike nw shkallwn 8 pwrqind. Parashikimi pr vitin 2014 sht vetm 7 pwrqind. Kto shifra tw rritjes mund t jen orientuese. Ka spekulime se zyrtart lokal mund t ken ndjer presionin pr falsifikimin e statistikave tw tyre pr t treguar se ata e kanw pwrmbushur objektivin e tyre tw rritjes prej 8 pwrqind. Greg Mastel i Institutit t Strategjis Ekonomike vren se, "Shifrat e ekonomsw kineze kan qen gjithmon t dyshimta. Ato pasqyrojn dshirat politike n krahasim me realitetin ekonomik. " Bazuar n indikacione t tilla si rritja e ngadalt n prdorim t energjis elektrike dhe mimet n rnie t shitjes me pakic, nj diplomat perndimor vlerson se rritja reale mund t ket qen e njw shkalle 4 deri n 5 pwrqind. Prve ksaj, ajo far rritja e ekonomisw kineze ka arritur sht stimuluar nga shpenzimet masive qeveritare n projektet e infrastrukturs dhe investimeve n ndrmarrjet shtetrore (NSH). Investimet n NSH-tw u rritwn me 22 pr qind n maswn 260 bilionw dollarw, edhe pse NSH-t shihen si elementi m i dobt i ekonomis. Mbi 49 pr qind e NSH-ve jan jofitimprurwse. Zhvillimi ekonomik sht thelbwsor pwr egjemoninw e Kins, sepse nj ekonomi e shndosh sht baza e modernizimit ushtarak. Fuqia ekonomike e Kins (dhe rezervat monetare) jan zgjeruar n mas t madhe prmes inkorporimit paqsor t Hong Kong nw Republikn Popullore t Kins (RPK). Edhe pse rritja e Kins ka qen mbreslnse, ajo sht ende nj vend i varfr. N kontrast t fort me ideologjin komuniste, ka nj ndryshim t madh midis t pasurve dhe t varfrve n vend. Kjo shprndarje e pabarabart e pasuris sht e prbr nga elementwt e saj gjeografikw - zonat ekonomike bregdetare kan prparuar shum m tepr sesa zonat rurale n brendwsi. Kina deri tani ka shmangur efektet e keqja e krizs ekonomike aziatike, sepse nj prqindje e madhe e investimeve t huaja

jan investime direkte, monedha e saj sht e pakonvertueshme, ka rezerva t konsiderueshme n valut, borxhet e saj jan kryesisht afatgjat, dhe ka njw kurbw tw lartw tw kursimeve vendase. Ekonomia e Kins, megjithat, ka gati t gjithw faktorwt q shkaktuan krizn n vendet e tjera - duke prfshir klientelizmin, kredit e kqija bankare, shpwrndarje joefikase tw kapitalit. Zyrtart kinez haptazi pranojn se rreth 20 deri n 25 pr qind e kapitalit prej 1 biliarde dollare dhwnw nga bankat shtetwrore si kredi, janw kredi tw kwqia. Krahasimisht, Tajlanda kishte njw pwrqindje shum m tw vogl tw kredive tw kwqia, vetwm 5 pr qind, dhe kjo situatw e oi n nj kriz traumatike bankare n 1997. N 17 qershor t vitit 1998, Banka pr Zhvillimin Hainan u b banka e par q t dshtoi n historinw e modernizimit Kinez. N janar t vitit 1999, bota financiare u trondit kur Kina shpalli falimentimin e Trustit Guangdong ndrkombtar dhe Korporatws sw Investimeve, shoqwria e dytw m e madhe financiare nw Kin. Dshtimet e institucioneve t tilla t mdha mund ti shkaktojn sistemit financiar tw Kins, humbje nw tregjet ndrkombtare. Q prej marsit tw vitit 1999, lidert kinez jan duke luftuar pr t gjetur nj plan pr t mbajtur nj institucioni sekondar t madh financiar qw wshtw Guangzhou Ndrkombtar i Mirbesimit dhe Korporata e Investimeve. Edhe pse ekonomia e Kins ende nuk e ka arritur fazn e krizs, po tendencat jan ogurzeza. Potenciali se rritja ekonomike mund t ngadalsohet sht nj shqetsim i madh pr udhheqjen kineze pr shkak t efekteve tw fuqishme qw kjo do tw jepte mbi sigurin e brendshme. Analistt kinez dhe t huaj kan vlersuar se minimumi i rritjes vjetore e PBBs pr t parandaluar shprthimin e paknaqsis s qytetarve n krkesat pr ndryshime politike sht 5 pwrqind. Duke qenw se normat e parashikuara tw rritjes mezi e tejkalojn

kt nivel, perspektiva e trazirave politike t shkaktuara nga nj ngadalsim ekonomik sht nj arsye pr shqetsim t madh. N prgjithsi, rritja e fuqis ekonomike tw Kins sht mbreslnse, por e brisht dhe e pabarabart. N mnyr domethnse, ajo siguron fondet q ushqejnw modernizimin ushtarak tw Kins, dhe ky wshtw njw tjetr element i egjemonis qw lw vend pwr diskutime. Udhheqja e Kins vazhdon t shoh si nj krkes absolute pasjen e nj force moderne ushtarake, gjqw qw do ti sigurojw njohjen si nj fuqi e madhe rajonale. Forca ushtarake dhe aftsia pr ta projektuar kt forc jasht kufijve t vendit jan krkesat themelore t nj pushteti egjemonist. Kina sht tashm fuqia dominuese ne trupa toksore n Azin Lindore, pr shkak t popullsis s saj t madhe dhe ushtris. Ajo ka i mungon Kinws sht nj aftsi e besueshme pr t punsuar dhe t mbshtetur forcat konvencionale ushtarake jasht kufijve t saj. Prve ksaj, shumica e ushtris sw madhe t Kins sht e pajisur me armatime tashmw t vjetruara. Megjithat faktet tregojnw se Kina po ndwrmerr hapa t mdha pr t rritur potencialin e saj ushtarak. Kina qllimisht errson shumn totale tw shpenzimeve qw ajo bwn pr mbrojtjen e vendit. Buxheti zyrtar kinez i mbrojtjes pr vitin 1997 ishte vetm 9.8 bilion dollarw. Agjencia Qendrore e Inteligjencs vlerson se shpenzimet e mbrojtjes sw Kins jan "pothuajse me siguri dy ose tri her mw tepwr se buxheti i publikuar." Shifrat zyrtare tregojn se buxheti i Ushtrisw lirimtare Popullore (UP) u rrit me rreth 150 prqind nga 1989 nw 1995.

UP mbetet nj forc kryesisht e vjetruar, por disa modernizime tw rndsishme nuk mund tw mohoet qw kanw ndodhur. Forcat toksore kanw dukshwm prirjen pwr t patur prparsin m t ult n prpjekjet e modernizimit. Megjithat struktura e tanishme e forcave tw armatosura sht absolutisht mbreslnse pr nga madhsia. Forcat toksore tw UP prfshijn 24 grupe ushtarake, tw prbr nga 73 divizione kmbsorie, 9 divizione kryesore qw janw forcat e ndwrhyrjes sw shpejtw, 11 divizione te tanqeve, dhe 5 divizione artilerie. Forcat toksore UP jan t pajisura me 8,500 tanke kryesore luftimi dhe 1,200 tanke t lehta. Mangwsia e kwti numri masiv forcash sht sht e paisja e tyre me arm t vjetruara, mungesa e nje trajnimi te rreptw si dhe mungesa e mirmbajtjes. Numri i forcave toksore UP shtw ulur ndjeshm, por nj numr i vogl njsish t przgjedhura do t modernizohen. Kto njsi, t njohura si Njsit e Reagimit t Shpejt, prbjn vetm rreth 15 pr qind t fuqis totale Forcs Toksore tw UP. Njw vmendje e konsiderueshme ka qen e fokusuar edhe n blerjet pwr UP-n e Forcave Ajrore (e UPFA), ku u blenw 50 aeroplanw ushtarakw tw tipit SU 27 dhe u nwnshkrua marrwveshje pwr blerjen edhe tw 200 tw tjwrwve. Ndwrsa kta aeroplan prfaqsojn nj rritje t konsiderueshme t aftsive tw UPFA, pjesa dwrrmuese e UPFA ka pajime dhe avion t vjetr. Trajnimi, mirmbajtja, dhe logjistika jan primitive. UPFA sht gjithashtu i kufizuar pr shkak t mungess s mundwsive tw furnizimit me karburant nw fluturim ose mungesws sw aftwsive tw Sistemit tw Paralajmrimit dhe Kontrollit (SPK) ajror. SPK tw Marins (SPKM) ka nisur nj program modernizimi t konsiderueshwm. Ata blenw katr nndetse tw pazhurmshme Kilo class diesel . Dy nga kto jan tw llojit 363s, t cilat jan raportuar t jenw po aq tw pazhurmshme sa ato Amerikane tw Los Angeles class.

SPKM ka bler edhe dy anije ruse tw llojit shkatwrrues Sovremenny. Kto arm t avancuara, t pajisura me raketat me djegie diellore SS-N-22, lnw pas cdo lloj anije tw pranishme n arsenalin e Tajvanit. Pavarsisht nga kto prmirsime, SPKM nuk mund tw krahasohet me marinn amerikane. SPKM gjithashtu ka probleme me trajnimet e trupave, mirmbajtjen, dhe logjistikn. Tani q forca ushtarake e Kins sht skicuar, sht e nevojshme t vlersohet aftsia projektuese e forcws ushtarake tw UP -s pr t arritur objektivat e saj n Tajvan dhe Detin e Kins Jugore. Aftesia e projektimit konvencional tw fuqisw - aftsia pr t projektuar dhe mbshtetur forcat jasht kufijve miqsorw - sht nj element kritik ushtarak i nj pushteti egjemonist. Kina posedon vetm nj aftwsi projekstuese tw fuqisw shum t kufizuar. Nj Raport i DOD SHBA pwr Kongresin vlerson se SPK ka aftsi t mjaftueshme pr transportin ajror pr t evakuar rreth 6,000 trupa apo dy regjimentet ajrore n njkohsisht. SPKM sht e dobt qoftw n anije t mdha, dhe nw anije amfibe tw logjistiks. Sipas t njjtit raport DOD tw SHBA, PLA ka nj aftsi t kufizuar pr t vendosur maksimumi 1-3 divizione tw kmbsoris, n varsi t przierje sw pajisjeve dhe pikave pr rifurnizimin e menjhershem." Edhe kjo aftsi sht praktikisht e padobishme pa mbulim nga ajri. Pr mw twpwr, kinezt nuk shfaqin shenja t ndrtimit t numrit t madh tw vendzbarkimeve q do t krkoheshin pr t pushtuar Tajvanin. Raporti i DOD m tej pwrfundon se "Kina nuk ka zhvilluar asnjwherw nj strvitje nwnujore n shkall t gjer, koordinuar kjo me mbshtetje ajrore dhe operacione ajrore." Bazuar mbi kt munges t rnd t t gjitha elementeve t aftsive tw projektimit t energjis konvencionale, Instituti Ndrkombtar pr Studimet strategjike n prfundimin se "Aktualisht, Kina nuk kan burime pr t projektoj nj forc t madhe konvencionale

prtej territorit t saj." 38 Ky gur mund t ndryshoj, nse SHBA vendos t trhiqet ushtarakisht nga Azia Lindore. Kjo shkakton shqetsim t madh pr kombet e Azis Lindore q ndajn nj kufi t prbashkt toks me Kinn, ku krkesat e projektimit aftsin e energjis jan m pak komplekse. Armt brthamore jan karta e fuqisw sw egwr n forcn ushtarake t Kins. Forcat e rndsishme tw Kins brthamore t prfshij mbi 20 ICBMs, 80 IRBM, nj SSBN, dhe 120 bombardues nuklearw nw gadishmwri. Forcat brthamore t Kins jo vetm q mund t krcnojn fqinjt e saj n lindje t Azis, por disa prej tyre mund edhe t prbj nj rrezik t konsiderueshm pr n SHBA kontinentale. Ndrsa analisti Thomas Woodrow ka vrejtur se: "Kina aktualisht ka m shum fuqi luftarake tw raketave balistike q mund t ken n shnjestr Shtetet e Bashkuara se sa forca e Bashkimit Sovjetik gjat Krizs Kubane t Raketave." Edhe pse forcat brthamore t Kins kan nj aftsi sulmuese, roli i tyre sht kryesisht mbrojts. Ata ndoshta prfaqsojn garancin prfundimtare kundr pushtimit t Kins nga nj krcnimi i mundshwm nga jasht. Duke pasur parasysh kt siguri prfundimtare ofruar nga armt brthamore, pyetja e natyrshme q vijon sht "Prse Kina wshtw nw kwrkim tw njw rritje t konsiderueshme n aftsin e saj konvencionale, kur nuk ka pasur rritje t krcnimit konvencional nga jasht?" Ka vetm nj shpjegim tw arsyeshm - zgjerimi konvencional i fuqisw ushtarake tw Kinws sht projektuar pr t mbshtetur qllimin e ardhshm tw Kins qw wshtw ndikimi hegjemonist n Azin Lindore. Dhe tanimw wshtw momenti i duhur pwr tw pr t prshkruar krkesn prfundimtare t pushtetit hegjemonist, stabilitetin politik. N mnyr q t ruhet rendi brenda nj sistemi hegjemonik t Azis Lindore, situata e politikws sw brendshme tw Kins duhet t jet e qndrueshme. Qysh prej triumfit t

Revolucionit Komunist n vitin 1949, Kina wshtw torturuar disa her nga trazira t mwdha t brendshme t tilla si Hapi i Madh Prpara dhe Revolucioni Kulturor. Stabiliteti i brendshm u rrit n mnyr t konsiderueshme pas ardhjes n pushtet tw Deng Xiaoping n vitin 1978. Deng ndoshta e "shptoi" Partin Komuniste Kineze (PKK), duke refuzuar parimet ekonomike Marksiste. Duke e orientuar Kinn drejt nj ekonomie tregu t hapur, Deng Xiaoping ishte ai qw bwri tw mundur zgjerimin ekonomik tw pabesueshwm t Kins. Edhe pse kjo ishte sigurisht nj rezultati pozitiv, ai hapi rrugn pr paqndrueshmrin e politikws nw tw ardhmen, sepse kjo politikw minon krejtwsisht legjitimitetin e ideologjis s PKK-s. Komunizmi n kuptimin e tij m themelor sht nj teori ekonomike. sht nj kontradikt fatale ideologjike pr nj regjim "komunist" t braktisw teorin ekonomike marksiste n favor t asaj q m s miri mund t prshkruhet si kapitalizwm i drejtuar shtetror. N Kongresin e 15tw tw Partis, n Mars t vitit 1998, presidenti i Kins, Jiang Zemin, angazhoi PKKnw pr sa mposhtw vijon: "... Shoku Deng Xiaoping na udhwheq e marshon pwrpara triumfalisht prgjat rrugws sw duhur." Duke vepruar kshtu, Jiang Zemin e angazhoi PKKnw pr t mbshtetur Deng Xiaoping nw rrugw drejt nj ekonomie tregu - "socializmi me karakteristika kineze". Rreziku n kt rrugw sht mbshtetja totale e regjimit n prparimin ekonomik pr legjitimitetin. Papunsia po bhet nj sfid gjithnj e m e rndsishme pr stabilitetin, sidomos nw prirjen e Kins pr privatizimin e NSHve. Instituti Ndrkombtar pr Studime Strategjike ka vrejtur se NSHtw jan privatizuar, "Potenciali pr prarje sociale sht i pamas, pasi n Bashkimin Sovjetik, NSHt nuk ishin vetm njsi prodhimi, por ofronin strehim dhe t gjitha format e sigurimeve shoqrore pr puntort e tyre t cilt mendonin se gzonin punsim tw pwrhershwm. "

Duke qenw se ekonomia u ngadalsua dhe papunsia u prkeqsua n vitin 1998 dhe n fillim t 1999, udhheqsit e Kins jan br gjithnj e m jotolerues ndaj kundwrshtimeve. Jiang Zemin ka deklaruar n Kongresin e 9tw Kombtar Popullor, n mars 1999, "Reforma ka hyr n nj periudh kur duhet t bhen prparime dhe stabiliteti prballet me sfida t reja ..." Prpjekjet e Jiang Zemin pr t luftuar paqndrueshmrinw mund t bjn m shum dm sesa dobi. Si vren Arthur Waldron, Embargo nuk do t zgjidhw ndonj nga problemet qw po destabilizojnw Kinnnga themelet e saj. Papunsia industriale e Kins dhe sektorwt e saj numwrojnw rreth 80 milion tw papunw. " do dshtim pr t mbshtetur rritjen ekonomike mund t hap dern pr trazira politike. Kjo mund t ket dy efektet tw mundshme mbi planet hegjemoniste Kineze. Nga njra an, paqndrueshmria mund t shkaktoj nj fokus t brendshm, si ndodhi gjat Revolucionit Kulturor. Nga ana tjetr, trazirat e brendshme mund t shkaktojn qw regjimi t prqndrojw energjin e tij pasive n aventura ushtarake t krijuara pr t nxitur njerzit tw rendin pas nacionalizmit, duke fajsuar perndimin pwr vshtirsit e tyre ekonomike. Ose rezultati sht i mundur edhe pse nuk sht i mir nga pikpamja e interesave amerikane apo tw Azisw Lindore. Progresi i Kins drejt arritjes ka elementet e krkuara t nj pushteti hegjemonist qw mund t karakterizohet nga prmirsime t mdha n shum nga fushat kye. M e rndsishmja, sado tw fuqishme tw jenw kto prmirsime, mbeten sfidat me t cilat Kina prballet pr t fituar statusin si nj fuqi e madhe plotsisht e zhvilluar, dhe kjo wshtw ajo ka e bwn mw tronditwse situatwn. Parashikimet e rritjes s vazhdueshme ekonomike t Kinws bazuar n 20 vitet e fundit jan tepr optimiste. Pwr Kinwn ky sht vetm fillimi pr i prballjes me sfidat e industrializimit t shpejt qw SHBA dhe shtete tw tjera janw prballur n shekullin

e 20t. Rritja ekonomike e Kins nuk ka qen pa kosto. Si do t diskutohet m von, dmet mjedisore kan qen t mdha. Kina sht ende nj vend i varfr q mezi sht n gjendje pr t ushqyer t gjith popullsin e saj. Struktura e saj shoqrore ka ende nevoj pr tiu prshtatur industrializimit dhe t urbanizimit tw vrullshwm. Prafrsisht 270 milion kinezw jetojn n varfri. PKK sht duke luftuar pr t ruajtur stabilitetin dhe legjitimitetin. Ndrsa aftsia e Kins pr t ushtruar dominimin rajonal sht zgjeruar n mnyr dramatike, aftsia e saj pr t ushtruar ndikim t till do t jen minimale pwrballw fuqis ushtarake t SHBA. Mundwsia e vetme e Kins pwr tu brw hegjemon i Azis Lindore n t ardhmen e afrt sht q t detyroj SHBA-t shkput nga Azia Lindore.

1.2 RREZIQE TE MUNDESHME Ky kapitull do t diskutoj gjasht pikat kye tw rrezikut ku politikat Kineze dhe politikat Amerikane mund t hyjnw n konflikt t drejtprdrejt: Kriza ekonomike aziatike, Tajvani, Korea, Deti i Kins Jugore, nevojn e Kins pr burime natyrore, dhe mjedisi. Kriza ekonomike aziatike sht sigurisht nj ndwr pikat delikate dhe qw paraqet rrezik. Si u diskutua m par, legjitimiteti dhe mbijetesa e lidershipit t PKKs varet nga rritja e vazhdueshme ekonomike. Nse kriza ekonomike aziatike u prhap n Kin, qoftw edhe n nj shkall t kufizuar, rreziqet jan t dukshme. Rreziku m i dukshm sht kaosi i brendshm dhe njw mundwsi shembje tw regjimit q mund t prkeqsojn m tej jostabilitetin rajonal. Nj rrezik m pak dukshwm sht se udhheqja e PKKsw, prballet me njw rritje ekonomike n rnie dhe destabilizim i brendshwm nw rritje, ajo do t prdorw nacionalizmin dhe Ksenofobin anti-amerikane pr tw "fajwsuar" kapitalistt e pangopur Amerikan pwr rnien ekonomike si edhe pwr tw mbajtur fajin larg vetes. Si Denny Roy

v n dukje, "Kwmbengulja pwr tu pwrballur me tw huajt sht njw ndwr taktikat tipike tw qeverive qw shpresojn t bindin qytetart e tyre t paknaqur t pranoj vshtirsi apo brohorasin n mbshtetje t regjimit." Politika aktuale dashamirwse e Kins pwrkundrejt Hong Kongut mund t kthehet nw njw politikw grabitqare. Ushtria mund t prfitojn nga njw paqndrueshmri e till dhe t ushtroj ndikim edhe m t madh n politikn e Kins. N do rast, do reduktim i ndjeshm i norms s rritjes ekonomike t Kins sht nj metrik e rrezikshme jo vetm pr Kinn, por edhe pr rajonin. Nse politika e Kins ka marr nj kthes drejt nacionalizmit, objektiv i dukshm sht njw tjetr pikw rreziku pr t diskutuar - Tajvan. Incidenti i vitit 1996, n ngushticn e Tajvanit tregon shkalln n t ciln politikat e SHBA dhe tw Kinws mund t hyjn n konflikt. Amerika kmbngul se do ndryshim n statusin e Tajvanit duhet t zgjidhet paqwsisht. Kjo politik sht e pwrcaktuar n ligjet amerikane nga Akti i Marrdhnieve me Tajvanin, i vitit 1979. Kina argumenton forcwrisht se Tajvani sht nj shtje e brendshme dhe pr kt arsye nuk hyn nw kompetencat e Shteteve t Bashkuara t Ameriks. Ajo nuk e prjashton prdorimin e forcs pr t arritur bashkimin me Tajvanin. Incidenti i 1996 tregoi edhe gatishmrin e SHBA pr t prdorur ushtrin e vet pr t mbrojtur Tajvanin dhe paaftsin e Kins pr t projektuar fuqin e saj brenda territorit tw Tajvanit pwrballw fuqis ushtarake tw tij dhe tw SHBA. M e rndsishmja, wshtw qw ky incident tregoi gatishmrin e Kins pr t'u angazhuar n nj aventur t rrezikshme ushtarake pwr t mbrojtur krkesn e vet pa ndrprerje t sovranitetit mbi Tajvan. Nj qasje e arsyetuar pr marrdhniet midis RPK dhe Tajvanit argumenton se rezultati m i mir pr t dyja palt sht q t vazhdoj status quo-n. Pr t gjitha qllimet praktike,

Tajvani sht tashm nj shtet i pavarur, megjithse i integruar ekonomikisht nw kontinent. Tajvani ka vetm nj histori t kufizuar t kontrollit nga shtetet e tjera tw kontinentit. Kina ka pak pr t humbur prmes negociatave t pavarsis s Tajvanit prve shansit pr t prmbushur dshirat e saj nacionaliste pr t prfunduar revolucionin e 1949 dhe potencialit pr t fituar bazat ushtarake Taivaneze me qwllim kontrollin e tregtis nw Azis Lindore. Kina ka treguar se ajo do t rrezikonte me moskokwcarje konfrontim t drejtprdrejt ushtarak me SHBA pr t fituar kto prfitime t kufizuara. SHBA dhe Kina duket se kan arritur nj nivel t ri bashkpunimi dhe mirkuptimi pwr Tajvanin me 1998 pas vizits s presidentit Klinton n Kin. Ky dialog mori nj kthes t madhe pr keq n fillim t vitit 1999, kur SHBA filloi t diskutojw haptazi pwr ti siguruar Tajvanit me nj mbrojtje raketore tw tipit Theater Missile Defense (TMD). Gjat nj takimi ndrmjet zyrtarve amerikan dhe kinez q kanw marr pjes n nj vizite t marsit 1999 n Pekin, zyrtart kinez deklaruan se dhnia e TMD n Tajvan sht "barabart me pushtimin" dhe na paralajmruan se "ne nuk do t lejojm q kjo t ndodh." sht e qart, Tajvani do t mbetet nj pikw rreziku pr t ardhmen e parashikueshme. Njw tjetr pikw potenciale rreziku qw duhet diskutuar dhe qw sht po aq e rrezikshme sa te sipwrpwrmendurat: Gadishulli Korean. Korea ka gzuar nj periudh t paqndrueshme t paqes q nga pwrfundimi i Lufts s Kores n vitin 1953. Ushtrit e mdha jan prballur me njra-tjetrwn mbi DMZ pr breza. N nj mas t madhe, rreziku i prtritjes sw lufts n gadishullin Korean u mbajt n kontroll nga interesat e Bashkimit Sovjetik dhe Shteteve t Bashkuara n konfliktin kufizues. Nn kt paqe t pasigurt, Koreja e Jugut wshtw zhvilluar nw rrugwn e duhur, ndrsa zhvillimi i Kores s Veriut (megjithse i konsiderueshwm) nuk ka mundur ta

ndjekw ritmin. Kolapsi i Bashkimit Sovjetik, mungesa e mbshtetjes nga Kina, dhe mirmbajtja e nj ekonomie t mbyllur Staliniste kan shkatrruar shanset pr zhvillim ekonomik t Kores s Veriut. Kjo ka uar Koren e Veriut n prag t kolapsit dhe nw kaos. Sot rreziku n gadishull sht "fjala e fundit" e "Shprthimit" ushtarak tw Koresw sw Veriut apo (sipas gjasave) nj "dwshtim" i qeveris s Kores s Veriut dhe i shoqris. Secili nga kto skenare paraqet rreziqe pr marrdhniet Sino-SHBA. N rastin e nj shprthimi t Kores s Veriut, ushtria amerikane do t prfshihet pr shkak t angazhimit t saj t madh t forcave n gadishull. sht gjithashtu e sigurt se do prgjigje ndaj nj shprthimi me siguri nuk do t mjaftohet nj kthim n status quo. Kjo do t rris prsri shtjen e prgjigjes kineze ndaj trupave tw SHBA dhe Koresw sw Veriut e Korean tw cilat lvizin n veri t paralelit tw 38. Kjo shtje do t jet gjithashtu parwsore n rastin e nj dwshtimi tw Kores s Veriut. N rast t nj situate tw tillw tw Kores s Veriut, ndihma humanitare dhe ekonomike qw nevojitet mund t vij vetm nga SHBA dhe Koreja e Jugut. Edhe nj her, Kina do t ballafaqohet me njwe forc t re dhe potencialisht armiqsore n kufirin e saj. Pyetja m afat gjat sht se si do t riprcaktohen balanca e Azis Lindore pas ribashkimit Korean. A do t vazhdoj Korea e ribashkuar t mirpresw pranin ushtarake amerikane q kontribuon drejtprdrejt n stabilitetin rajonal? Si do t sillen Kina dhe SHBA ndaj nj Koreje tw ribashkuar q kombinon fuqin e Veriut dhe ushtrinw e Kores s Jugut, me aftsin pr t prodhuar dhe zotwruar arm brthamore dhe raketa me rreze t gjata? Prgjigjet jan problematike, por potenciali pr konflikt t rrezikshm Sino-SHBA sht i dukshwm. Hedhja e nj raket Taepodong nga Korea e Veriut mbi Japoni n gusht 1998 shkatrroi perceptimin pwr sigurin rajonale. Kjo detyroi SHBAnw tw marrw n konsiderat vendosjen

e nj "koracw" t Theater Missile Defense n Azin Lindore gjw q ka zemruar Kinn (sidomos nse kjo koracw mbulon Tajvan). Korea sht e sigurt qw wshtw nj burim i jostabilitetit t Azis Lindore dhe ka potencial ndikimi nw konfliktin Sino-SHBA deri nw momentin qw gadishulli do tw bashkohet prfundimisht. Njw tjetr pikw Rreziku sht m larg nga kufijt e Kins, por prfaqson nj test t rndsishm t qllimeve ekspansioniste t Kins - Deti i Kins Jugore. Ndrgjegjsimi pwr interesat e Kins n Detin e Kins Jugore u zgjua nga sekuestrimi qw ajo i bwri Ishujve Vietnamezw Paracel n vitin 1974. Analistt t cilt pretendojn se Kina ka qllimet hegjemoniste jan t shpejt pr t vn n dukje se Kina pretendon gati tr Detin e Kins Jugore si territorin e tyre - nj rishikim i shpejt i nj harte Kineze e ksaj zone sht shum sugjeruese. Fokusimi aktual i vmendjes nw zgjerimin e menjwhershwm tw Kinws janw Ishujt Spratly, shumw tw pasur nw burime natyrore. Kina, Vietnami, Malajzia, Brunei, Tajvani dhe Filipinet gjithashtu pretendojn pronwsinw pwr kto ishuj. Politikat zyrtare tw Shteteve tw Bashkuara nuk pwrcaktojne se kujt i takojnw meritat e ktyre krkesave, por t kmbngulin n lirin e lundrimit n kt zon. N vitin 1994, Kina ndrtoi nj instalim t hershm paralajmrues mbi Firey Cross Reef kryq n Spratlys. Pushtimi ushtarak i Kins e Mischief Reef vitin 1995 (q sht nw brendwsi tw territorit prej 200 miljesh mbi tw cilin Filipinet pretendojnw pronwsinw), edhe njher theksoi interesin e Kins n zon. Kina ndrtoi strukturat konkrete n kufij, antena satelitore, anti-ajrore, artileri dhe nj port pwr tu prdorur nga anijet luftarake kineze. Kto ishuj n Detin e Kins Jugore nuk kan asnj dobi pr banim apo zhvillim bujqsor. Interesi i Kins n kto ishuj shrben vetm pr dy qllime mundshme: pr t zgjeruar ndikimin rajonal dhe pr t siguruar burimet e

nevojshme. Pushtimi i ishujve Spratly zgjeron ndikimin e Kins pr shkak se kto ishuj jan t vendosura n afrsi t vijave detare me mw tepwr nw bot dhe pr shkak se ajo i demonstron bots (sidomos Tajvanit) aftsin e Kins dhe gatishmrin pr t projektuar fuqin ushtarake. do zgjatje e mtejshme e pushtetit t besueshm ushtarak kinez n Detin e Kins Jugore nw mnyr t pashmangshme do t sjell politika kineze dhe amerikane n konflikt t drejtprdrejt dhe t rris rrezikun e paqndrueshmris. Aktualisht, dominimi detar i SHBA n Detin e Kins Jugore bllokon do pritshmri realiste tw suksesit Kinez (si n ngushticn e Tajvanit). Si nw ngushticn e Tajvanit, Kina mund t dal n "logjikn" e fuqis ushtarake amerikane nwse provohet se Ishujt Spratly prmbaj burimet natyrore qw pretendohen nga disa zwra. Rreziku n Detin e Kins Jugore, pra, sht prkeqsuar nga krkimin e i kwtyre resurseve, nje tjetr pikw rreziku pr t diskutuar.

Chinas incredible economic expansion has been fueled so far by substantial Chinese supplies of domestic resources needed for industrialization. China has historically been self sufficient in resources. As Chinas need for resources (particularly oil and other energy sources) increases, the inability to sustain this growth with domestic resources becomes clear. About 75 percent of Chinas energy consumption comes from the burning o f As

domestic coal with a high sulfur content that is destroying Chinas environment.11

Nicholas Kristof observed in 1993, If, within a few decades, each Chinese uses as much energy as every South Korean does now, then China will use more energy than the United States.12 Why should Chinas increasing need for resources be dangerous? As Denny Roy observed, The combination of a growing population, demands for higher living standards, loss of arable land, and depletion of other Chinese resources, compels Beijing to

seek other sources of food and energy.13

This drive for the resources needed to sustain

the economy and sustain the regime may inflame the forces striving for hegemony. Denny Roy further observes, As Chinas relative power increases, Beijing might attempt to control additional land and sea areas beyond Chinas historical boundaries (even as defined by the Chinese) because of their economic value. Controlling vital supplies rather than buying them has the advantage of reducing exploitation by foreigners, a danger to which the Chinese leadership is highly sensitive.14 It is arguable whether China

would resort to territorial expansion in order to sustain its economy. What is inarguable is that Chinas growth is based upon cheap labor and resources. As domestic resources decline, China will need to get additional cheap resources from elsewhere. They will have to meet this challenge in the face of rising expectations from Chinese society for an increased standard of living that the regime will not be able to deliver. This competition for resources can develop along dangerous paths. Closely intertwined with the exhaustion of Chinas natural resources is the final danger area to discuss: the environment. Chinas environmental devastation is the price of current Chinese economic growth. As David Lampton observed, The human and economic costs of air and water pollution in China are staggering.15 The impact of Chinese economic expansion at the expense of

environmental destruction is dangerous in two ways. First, it threatens Chinas internal stability by bringing into question the long term viability of Chinese economic growth and raising the prospect of internal discontent. David Lampton further observed that more

than three quarters of Chinas real GDP growth has been offset by the costs incurred from air and water pollution.16 Second, Chinese environmental devastation is dangerous

because of its external impact throughout the region.

Chinas immense pollution has a

regional (and potentially global) impact due to the effects of acid rain and carbon dioxide emissions.17 East Asian neighbors and the US will view Chinas environmental banditry This can lead to potentially dangerous regional conflict and

with extreme disdain. instability.

Now that the key danger areas in Sino-US relations are outlined, whats the proper US policy to deal with unpredictable Chinese behavior? The task of prescribing future policy is obviously more difficult than analyzing past and current events. Despite the challenges

involved, especially the uncertainty of future events, the next chapter will present some general normative guidelines for future US East Asian policy. 1.3 EGJEMONIA DHE AZIA Before entering any assessment of Chinas security objectives and strategy, it is necessary to provide an operational definition of hegemony.1 For the purpose of this assessment, a state will be granted the status of hegemon when it is the single great power in its region. When a region contains more than one great power, there cannot be a hegemon. An assessment of Beijings security objectives also raises the question of China as a potential hegemon. A potential hegemon is a state that has the capability to dominate a region by overpowering its great-power neighbors. Nonetheless, as John Mearsheimer notes, hegemony is rare because the costs of expansion usually outrun the benefits before domination is achieved.2 Consequently, potential hegemons only domination when the anticipated costs are low.3 Therefore, whereas Chinas economic development and military modernization seek to achieve

programs may in the future grant it the status of a potential hegemon, the decision to

become the regions hegemon does not directly derive from the capacity to dominate. The costs and risks of achieving domination must be perceived as lower than the benefits derived from hegemony. These definitions require an appraisal of Asia as a region. The most important strategic characteristic of Asia is that it has two parts: continental and maritime. To be the regional hegemon, a state must be dominant over the both the continental and maritime components of Asia. The disintegration of the former USSR and the ensuing Russian economic crises and degradation of its military capabilities essentially removed from contention the only power that could challenge Chinas continental pre-eminence. In maritime Asia, the United States functions as the countervailing power to China. With alliances and access to military facilities along Asias littoral from South Korea and Japan in the north, down to Australia in the south and Diego Garcia in the Indian Ocean, the United States performs the role of offshore balancer to Chinas continental dominance. Certainly from the US perspective, the United States with its alliances and access maintains the current continental-maritime military balance in East Asia.4 As long as there is a second regional great power in Asia, by definition China cannot become the regions hegemon. With its strong alliances and access to naval and air facilities along Asias periphery together with its diplomatic and economic influence within the region, the United States is in an extremely robust offshore position. In this sense, as Robert Ross has suggested, East Asia has become bipolar; China and the United States share the regional balance of power.5 The question therefore becomes whether of the United States as Asias other great power. This question becomes important when it is

recognized that Chinas principal objection to the current distribution of global and regional

power is focused on the role of the United States. China resents the manner in which the United States employs the dominant military, economic and diplomatic power it achieved with the Cold Wars end in global as well as regional affairs. Before evaluating Beijings perceptions of the United States, however, it is necessary to assess Chinas security priorities. 1.4 INTERESAT E POLITIKES SE KINES NE AZINE LINDORE During the last 30 years, the Peoples Republic of China (PRC) has embraced globalization at an unpredictably fast pace. From being a marginalized, underdeveloped and in-looking country, it evolved to be an export-oriented economy, fully integrated into international community. The changes proved its usefulness, and today China is probably the most dynamic country in the world in economic, political and military terms. But being a globalized country also has domestic implications. In the case of Foreign and Security Policy (FSP), China faces the challenges of being part of a more global system which may limit its capabilities and affect its actions. In the domestic area, Chinas society in one of the most complex in the world; not only for demographic reasons but also for the wide variety of actors both institutionalized and not that seek to influence its policy, in spite of officially being a centralized, one-party system. At the end of the day, Chinese leaders have to take into account a number of factors when deciding Chinas FSP in its nearer area (Kim, 2006: 300). What does it mean in relation to Chinas sovereignty? Does globalization restrict or increase Chinas range of maneuver? The two theories provide different explanations to these fundamental questions. Both coincide in the assumption of

rationality of the State and neglecting the role of internal politics. It does not matter at all if we speak about an autocratic State (like the PRC) or a democratic one. The ultimate driving

forces of Chinas FSP are to be found solely on its domestic national interests, as interpreted by the political leadership. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs and, more important, the Partys Committee of Foreign Affairs are the main bodies who design the main directions of FSP (Manion, 2010: 410). Nevertheless, realism and neoliberalism have an opposite idea of what is globalization and which are its consequences for the role of States. For realism, globalization has increased the risk of conflict worldwide and created a more insecure international system (Mearsheimer, 2007: 86). As policy-makers seek to maximize their power, Chinese goal will be to establish a sphere of influence and eventually become the hegemon in its natural region: East Asia. And that makes conflict with other regional powers unavoidable (Saich, 2004: 306). Chinas priority in Korea is the continuation of the North regime, which acts as a buffer State next to the threatening US forces (Saich, 2004: 313, 321) (Goldstein, 2007: 661). Norths denuclearization and economic reforms based on the Chinese model could be seen from China as a guaranty that stability would be secured. In Taiwan, the main goal is to prevent the government of the Republic of China (ROC) to declare independence by any means, including the use of force (Goldstein, 2007: 661) (Manion, 2010: 416). The territorial disputes in East China Sea between China and Japan concern sovereignty over Senkaku Islands and the oil resources of its continental shelf, and the Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) rights over Cunxiao gas field (Peterson, 2009). China wants to secure access to the gas and oil resources it needs to sustain its huge economic growth. Finally, in the South China Sea, PRC demands sovereignty over the whole Spratly archipelago and the maximum territorial and maritime claims for geostrategic and economic purposes (Odgaard, 1999). In both East and South China Sea, PRC bases its claims on the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (Zou, 2008: 147).

Neoliberal institutionalist globalization theory, on the other side, tends to be hyperglobalist, in the sense that it emphasizes the impact of globalization, not only on States but also on every societal actor, like enterprises, organized groups and individuals. The more

radical academics herald the emergence of a new era in world history in which the Nation State would lose its central position as the sole tenant of political authority, thus effectively undermining the very bases of the modern Weberian State (Kim, 2006: 278). A moderate version, nonetheless, argues that the State may continue to exist although they will have to share power with a myriad new actors, both supra and subnational, public and private. This is the basis of multilevel governance theories. From this point of view, Chinas FSP is the result of the aggregation of multiple interests coming from the domestic, regional and global level. Chinese leaders have nothing but to transform these interests into political actions in spite that they do not have as much independence as one could think. If we look at the domestic level, we see how Chinas development has brought a mass of new actors who want to participate in the policymaking of FSP (Kim, 2006: 299). Bankers, investors, exporters and middle- classes have eroded governments authority while mass population are now able to exercise a lot of pressure (Johnston & Ross, 2006: 8) (Kleine-Ahlbrandt & Small, 2008). Being a regional power in East Asia would provide Chinese government with enormous legitimacy (Kim, 2006: 300). By the contrary, a war with Taiwan or a Fourth Strait Crisis could endanger internal stability and give arguments to an already organized middle-class opposition (Kim, 2006: 299). The regional factor also influences. Unlike what could seem at first glance, East Asia has common identity feelings based on culture and values and it is on this base that regional cooperation is increasing. Some have even put into discussion if an East Asian Community, modeled after the European Community and

based on Sino-Japanese economic cooperation, would be a feasible project (Minohara, 2010). The influence of regional and global dynamics in Chinese East Asian policy is not questioned among neoliberal theorists. And there are many political and economic reasons by which Chinas rise may be an opportunity rather than a threat for the region. (Kim, 2006: 290). All this would make China extremely interested in peace and stability. In fact, neoliberalism founds no indications that China wants hegemony in East Asia (Kim, 2006: 290). 1.5 STRATEGJITE DHE MJETET E KINES NE POLITIKEN RAJONALE China exercises its political, economic and military influence in multiple forms. In fact, these three elements cannot be strictly separated, and are usually combined in Chinas policy towards each specific country. Multilateral organizations can also be a useful tool for China to pursue its regional goals. That could explain the interest it has taken for regional fora like ASEAN+3, Six Party Talks or Asia Pacific Economic Community, among others (Saich, 2004: 318). Structural realism and neoliberal institutionalism differ strongly about Chinas use of its capabilities to meet its goals. For realists, Chinas regional influence is mainly based on its increasingly large military capabilities. Since the mid-80s, the Peoples Liberation Army is developing a modernization program (Manion, 2010: 416). These improvements in hard power are a clear indication that Beijing is able to put pressure in the tension points where it has some interests. In the issue of Taiwan, the PRC has several dozens of strategic ballistic missiles and even the threat of blockade to reach unification by force if it was necessary (Ross, 2006: 22). The three Strait crises showed how China is strongly determined to use force if peaceful resolution is not possible and how Chinas military was an effective

deterrent for both the ROC government and the US. For realism, there might be a time in which these crises will enable China to challenge the status quo and impose a solution that fits its objective of one China policy (Goldstein, 2007: 668). In the Korean theatre, China has privileged access to North Korean leadership because of the special relationship and because it is its main supplier of goods and raw materials as well as valuable diplomatic support (Ross, 2006: 37). Notwithstanding, deterrence also plays a role in the peninsula. The region is the most highly militarized in the world (Ross, 2006: 38), which decreases the possibility of dialogue and mutual cooperation and increases the risk of open confrontation, as in the crises of March 2003 and October 2006. China knows an armed conflict could end in the collapse of Kim Jong-il regime, forced reunification, and the presence of US troops at Chinese borders (Ross, 2006: 26). China fears this and, if it was the case, it would probably intervene as it intervened in 1950 (Ross, 2006: 29). In East China Sea, PRC has never threatened with use of force, but cooperation with Japan to reach a diplomatic solution to territorial disputes is far from being granted. Several incidents with Japanese military and strong popular anti- Japanese sentiments in China act as

impediments for a negotiated agreement. In the South China Sea, PRC is confronted with ROC, Vietnam, Phillipines, Malaysia and Brunei in a vital are for its supply routes. Despite the agreement with Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN), signed in November 2002, naval skirmishes are still common and use of force not impossible (Zou, 2008: 152). In general terms, realism depicts an image of an aggressive China, with high potential to be a threat for peacekeeping in East Asia. While acknowledging the multilateral efforts China has made in Korea and South China Sea, some realists point out this can be a diversion strategy from the main priority: reunification with Taiwan (Goldstein, 2007: 658, 665).

Neoliberalism shows a completely different picture, based on Chinas economic interests in the region and use of soft power tools. Chinas growing economy basically depends on its integration in the East Asian system (Bijian, 2005) (Saich, 2004: 319) and this raises the costs of armed conflict and creates incentives for China to involve in peaceful conflict

resolution. Furthermore, institutionalists point out that Chinas crescent involvement in international organizations is an unequivocal sign that it wants to be seen as a responsible great power and to cooperate with the international community (Kim, 2006: 292) (Kleine-Ahlbrandt & Small, 2008). The fact that Taiwan is becoming more integrated with mainland, with mutual investments, trade and joint ventures increases the likelihood of a diplomatic solution (Ross, 2006: 22) (Saich, 2004: 316). The recent Chiang-Chen Agreements of June 2008 to December 2009, establishing direct flights, trade, economic and financial cooperation among others, widely support this vision (Straits Exchange Foundation, 2010). Chinas reputation as a responsible power would also be affected if it was to use force against Taiwanese fact the first promoter of multilateral dialogue to meet the objective of denuclearization (Goldstein, 2007: 660, 663), a goal shared with the US (Saich, 2004: 320). Before its (definitive) failure in 2009, the Six Party Talks were a useful forum for high-level discussion of the North Korean nuclear problem (Yinhong, 2008: 92). In 2004, China and Japan started several negotiating rounds to agree on the limits between their respective Special Economic Zones in the East China Sea. They ended in the June 2008 Arrangement to jointly develop the disputed areas (Peterson, 2009: 458, 462). Although the agreement is far from being complete as it does not solve the dispute and is not legally binding, there are hopes of mutual cooperation. In the South China Sea, China accepted to

participate in multilateral discussions since 1995, when ASEAN (which has four members involved in the dispute) made a joint declaration against use of force in the Spratly Islands (Goldstein, 2007. 655) (Odgaard, 1999: 212). China-ASEAN negotiations ended in a Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea, signed in November 2002, that banished use of force and established cooperation in some areas between China and the four ASEAN contenders (Moore, 2008: 36) (Zou,2008: 153). KAPITULLI II POLITIKAT E BASHKEPUNIMIT SHBA KINE Policymaking is an iterative, non-linear process. In most cases, any reaction is based upon the last action within the system. As such, its impossible to predict with any specificity, every situation that may arise which will determine American policy. What is possible, however, is to develop general policy norms based upon history and the probable future course of events. Key US general policy guidelines toward China will be discussed in three key areas: Sino-US diplomacy, US East Asian military presence, and Sino-US trade relations. The guidelines for these three policy areas are all relevant, in varying degrees, to the danger spots discussed in the previous chapter, although none is a panacea by itself. Engagement is the key element of Sino-US policy. US efforts at engagement continue to vacillate between coddling and confrontation. The US must engage China firmly as a

fellow great power, not confront it on issues that lead only to conflict without producing results. As Robert Ross asserts, Engagement must mean more than simply offering China the opportunity to follow the rules. It requires acknowledging Chinese interests and The

negotiating solutions that accommodate both American and Chinese objectives.2

US should make its vital national interest unambiguously clear to China and defend these interests with all its elements of national power. Failure to do so may have contributed to Chinas 1996 adventurism in the Taiwan Strait. What US policy must avoid is the use of threats of sanctions that it cant back up with credible action. For example, continual threats to deny China Most Favored Nation (MFN) trading status if human rights improvements are not made has only produced humiliation for the US with no improvement in human rights. It is not that the goal of making human rights progress is wrong this goal is proper and should be pursued through other less confrontational means. The error is to threaten sanctions that are not credible. This forces the US to

repeatedly back down from sanctions and look inept and weak in the process. Instead, China should be continually engaged in a positive, yet firm manner at all levels of interaction. The goal of US diplomacy with China should be consistency of policy across the spectrum of engagement. The US must clearly articulate its policy and stand by the policy with

consistent action. For instance, US policy on Taiwan is clearly stated in law by the Taiwan Relations Act. The US response to the 1996 crisis in the Taiwan Strait was consistent with that policy. In contrast, when President Clinton became the first US President to publicly reject Taiwans independence, during his 1998 visit to China, it seemed to reflect acceptance of Beijings position on Taiwan. This didnt appear to be consistent with the long standing US commitment to the peaceful transition of Taiwan. In early 1999, when open discussion began of possibly including Taiwan under a US TMD umbrella, it seemed to indicate another policy shift towards renewed support for Taiwan. Whether intentioned or not, apparent policy shifts such as this are confusing and could lead to serious

miscalculations of US intent and resolve. The US position on Taiwan should remain committed to the three Sino-US joint communiqus and the Taiwan Relations Act unless the US government makes a clear decision to change its policy on Taiwan and alter the law that directs that policy. Any other path could be dangerous. Through continued engagement from a position of power, China can be encouraged to become part of a stable East Asian system. At the same time, the US must continue its policy of engagement with the other states of East Asia besides China. US policy should avoid the trap of becoming too Sino-centric and alienating other key regional states in the process. By engaging on a regional basis, the US strengthens its claim as both a Pacific nation and a full partner in the East Asian system. The key to long term stability in East Asia is a continued policy of US military presence in East Asia. Policy must be developed, therefore, to cope with the changing East Asian environment. As this paper has continually stressed, the abdication of US presence in East Asia would create a vacuum that only China has the power and desire to fill. As Robert Ross clearly expresses, U.S. strategic retrenchment would do far more to alter the Sino American bilateral balance of power and the regional balance of power than any combination of Chinese military and economic policies.3 Japan and other East Asian states would have to rearm in the face of Chinese hegemony. The Japanese-US military alliance is critical to containing Chinese designs for hegemony. Japan and the US must work together to cooperate on trade and financial issues, not only to create astable trading relationship, but to create continued support for US military forces in Japan. The US should not encourage Japan to expand its military influence outside of its own self defense region. East Asia is still not ready for an expanded Japanese military presence. US

policymakers must also plan ahead for a reunified Korea and the prospects for continued US military presence on the peninsula. Can and should the US presence on the Korean peninsula continue after reunification? If US forces must leave Korea, can they be These options should be studied now and

redeployed to another location in East Asia?

decisions must be made considering the vital importance of the continued US military presence in East Asia. Finally, US trade policy with China must be firm and fair. It must avoid the pitfalls that caused the Japanese-American trade relationship to degenerate into a near trade war in the early 1990s. Unfortunately Sino-US trade relationships already bear similarities to the Japanese model. American entrepreneurs, blinded by the prospect of Chinas

virtually unlimited markets, have showed little restraint in investment in China. Chinas ready availability of cheap labor has flooded the US market with cheap goods with little penetration of the Chinese markets. The Sino-US trade imbalance threatens to exceed the trade imbalance with Japan.4 The US should work to facilitate Chinas entry into the World Trade Organization (WTO). On the other hand, the US should not accommodate Chinas wishes to enter as a developing country. China should not be allowed to use the WTO as a shield to protect it from sanctions, while at the same time it refuses to open its economy to imports. US trade policy must do more than just encourage trade with China. It must control US direct investment in China and technology transfers. Direct investment must be controlled to ensure that US East Asian security policy does not become a hostage to our Chinese investments. than China. The US already seems to be more susceptible to economic sanctions

Technology transfer is critical to control in both the civil and military sectors. The US cant afford to transfer technologies developed after years of basic research to a potentially hostile power. Failure to control technology transfer may allow the Chinese to quickly close the technological gap without paying their share of the cost. Once again, policy should aim at achieving vital national interests, not confrontation. 2.1 PERCEPTIMI I KINES PER SHBA Beijings 2000 defense white paper portrayed a threatening security environment. The United States was the primary source of concern in China, which did not attempt to mask its apprehension over the menace seen in US power and purpose.16 Negative developments

in the Asia-Pacific region were attributed to the United States.17 The strengthening of US military alliances, revision of US-Japan defense guidelines, planned deployment of ballistic missile defenses, and the supply of advanced American arms to Taiwan were identified as detrimental to Chinas interests. In the South China Sea territorial disputes, the United States is clearly the most important of the extra-regional countries seen as interfering in this issue. Beyond Asia, although only by the use of code words, the United States was condemned for threatening world peace and security in a variety ways. Using the pretext of humanitarianism, the United States was criticized for resorting to the threat or use of force in violation of the UN Charter. The US- led NATO attack on Yugoslavia was particularly condemned for bypassing the UN Security Council. Overall, the United States was charged with maintaining a Cold War mentality and using hegemonism and power politics to undermine UN authority, enlarge its military blocs through NATO expansion and seek even greater military superiority.18 Given this security environment, especially the US transfer

of advanced weaponry to Taiwan, Beijings defense white paper concluded that China will have to enhance its capability to defend its sovereignty and security by military means.19 Chinas 2002 defense white paper reflected the warming of Sino-American relations following the tragic terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. The United States was not named as the primary source of Chinas concerns, but the issues remained. Chinas

apprehension over the expanding military relationship between the United States and Taiwan was seen in the white papers statement that by continuing to sell weapons and military equipment to Taiwan and elevating relations with Taiwan authorities, a handful of countries have interfered in Chinas internal affairs, inflated the arrogance of the separatist forces and undermined Chinas reunification.20 Similarly, the white paper noted that Certain countries are stepping up their military deployments and strengthening their military alliances in the Asia-Pacific region. The US-Japanese security arrangement was the obvious subject of the white papers observation that other countries have time and again enlarged the terms of reference and scope of operations of their armed forces.21 Thus, while the vitriol was removed, Chinas apprehension over US strategic intentions remained. Mistrust of US strategic intentions goes back more than a decade to the deterioration of Sino-American relations in the aftermath of the 1989 Tiananmen Square protests and their violent suppression. At its core, Beijings wariness is rooted in the belief that despite Washingtons public commitment to a strong, peaceful and prosperous China, 22 the United States security objective is to restrain Chinas emergence as a strategic competitor and uphold at least the de facto independence of Taiwan. In Beijings eyes, China need look no further than the US Department of Defense 2001 Quadrennial Defense Report (QDR) to

confirm this suspicion. Although not mentioned by name, the reports reference to a possible military competitor with a formidable resource base emerging in Asia can refer only to China.23 PERCEPTION SINCE SEPTEMBER 2001 The US response to the September 11 attacks served to heighten Beijings apprehensions. Chinas concern over American diplomatic influence and military capability was reinforced by the speed with which the Bush administration built a coalition against terrorism and initiated military operations inside Afghanistan. Although China was among the first to pledge support for the United States actions, the ease with which the US gained access to bases for military operations in Pakistan and several Central Asian states created misgivings in Beijing. This was perceived as another demonstration of the United States ability to surround and possibly contain China.25 Furthermore, US forces and political

influence had moved into Chinas inner Asian backyard, where Beijing had exerted considerable diplomatic effort to create a security system that excluded the United States. Since 1996, China had worked with Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan to establish a Central Asian security framework. In June 2001, this Shanghai Five became the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), adding Uzbekistan to its membership. While not a formal alliance, presidential summits have been held annually and their joint statements have indicated steady cooperative progress in military and security matters together with trade and cultural affairs. Summit statements, including those of the annual meetings held by defense and foreign ministers, have also introduced common views on international security matters that are outside the members borders. Past summits had expressed opposition to US withdrawal from the Anti- Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty

with Russia, to American ballistic missile defense programs and support for Beijings stance on Taiwan.26 It is difficult not to conclude that the SCO was viewed by China as

offsetting the US presence in Central Asia, slight though this was before Operation Enduring Freedom. The cooperation and warmth emerging in Russo-American relations undoubtedly undermined Chinas confidence in the SCOs potential to counter US influence. Not only did Putin and Bush seem to get along, but also Russia did not strongly object when the United States withdrew from the ABM Treaty. Moreover, in agreeing to an American

military presence in Central Asia, Putin had demonstrated a lack of concern over US inroads into Russias near abroad. US progress in its relations with Russia was

accompanied by a reversal of its opposition to General Musharrafs military rule when he agreed to allow US military operations to be based in Pakistan and to suppress his own Islamic militants. In South Asia, Beijing saw the US war against terrorism contribute to an accelerating improvement in American relations with India, including arms sales and military exercises with Indian forces.27 Beijings apprehension over the growing US military presence and diplomatic influence in Central Asia and South Asia was expressed in such journals as Liaowang, a weekly published by Chinas official news agency, and Qingnian Cankao, a weekly publication of the CCPs China Youth League.28 The arguments presented suggested that the United States is using the war on terrorism to gain strategic advantage in Central Asia, adding to its ability to contain both Russia and China. Furthermore, there is the expectation that the US presence is not temporary but will endure for many years. This concern was undoubtedly enhanced by the congressional

testimony of the Assistant Secretary of State for European and Eurasian Affairs, Elizabeth Jones, in December 2001. She stated that the United States did not intend to depart Central Asia when the anti-terrorism operations are completed. Rather, that American interests in preventing terrorism, assisting in political and economic reform, establishing the rule of law, and developing the Caspian Sea energy resources required a sustained American regional presence.29 Thus, from Beijings point of view, the US presence in Central Asia may not be permanent but it will not quickly fade. To what extent arguments seen in official Chinese media present the view of Chinas political leadership is uncertain. It is clear, however, that an enduring US presence in Central Asia is not what Chinas leadership would prefer. As long as the United States military presence is a function of anti- terrorism operations, then it is acceptable. Continuing a military presence beyond this operational requirement and becoming a strategic presence makes the United States a competitor for regional influence with Beijing. Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfelds August 2002 annual report to Congress will not ease Beijings perception that the United States views China as the principal potential regional threat to US interests. The report reasserted the QDRs assessment made a year earlier by stating that Asia was emerging as a region susceptible to large -scale military competition and that this required the United States to improve both its access to regional facilities and its capability to conduct long-range operations with only minimal theater support.30 Such an assessment will confirm Beijings perception that despite the Bush

administrations focus on terrorism the US views China as a potential threat. Nonetheless, the Bush administrations determined concentration on terrorism had some positive consequences for Beijing. President Bushs meetings with President Jiang Zemin

at the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperations (APEC) Shanghai meetings in October 2001 and in Beijing four months later indicated that both Washington and Beijing were using the war on terrorism to ease the tensions in Sino-American relations and find common ground for cooperation. In their October meeting, Presidents Bush and Jiang agreed that their common goal was to develop a cooperative, constructive relationship, with President Bush adding that he sought a relationship that was candid, constructive and cooperative.31 Both leaders recognized the disagreements

between their two countries. Both raised the Taiwan issue, with President Bush adding disagreements over the proliferation of missile technologies and weapons of mass destruction. The tone suggested that both sides believed their differences should be and could be discussed with mutual understanding and respect. Notwithstanding the positive tone of these meetings, the Chinese press and journals continued to portray the United States as Beijings most difficult foreign security problem. In the post-Cold War era, the United States is seen as overwhelmingly superior to any other state in its military, economic, political and scientific power, and with unmatched influence in international politics. With this superior position, the United States is expected to increase its power and thereby its ability to intervene in world affairs and sustain its role as the worlds leader.32 This perception can only be confirmed by the 2002 release of The

National Security Strategy of the United States, which commits the Bush administration to maintaining military forces so strong that no state can surpass or match them.33 The

question for Beijing became how to respond to the United States now domi nant military, economic and political power, especially when China is identified as the single potential challenger to American military pre-eminence in maritime Asia.

2.2 LUFTA KUNDER NDIKIMIT TE SHBA In seeking to counter US influence in Asia, Beijing fully recognizes that the United States is the pre-eminent global power. The multi-polarization of world power and politics that Chinese analysts had been assessing and hoping for over the past 20 years is seen now as possible only in the distant future. Not only is the world unipolar, but those states that could form poles are most often aligned with the United States. In Asia, Japan is allied with the United States and India is putting great value on its emerging ties with America. Despite their disagreements on a number of economic and security issues, the European Unions members are aligned with the United States. Russias economy is too feeble and its military too demoralized and growing weaker by the year to be considered a pole. More importantly, Russia under President Putin has no intention of challenging American pre-eminence, States.34 but would rather foster a new strategic relationship with the United

Beijing has accepted the reality that US ascendance in world politics will

continue, most likely for decades. This recognition has led to what appears to be a strategic debate in China over how to respond effectively to this functionally unipolar world.35 Nonetheless, directly challenging US pre-eminence does not appear to be at the heart of Chinas strategy and policy. As Bonnie Glaser has written, the consensus in Beijing is that a confrontational policy toward the US while it occupies a position of unparalleled strength would be counterproductive and should be avoided if possible.36 Accepting the reality of Americas strength, Chinas current strategy is to restrain the United States exploitation of its political, military and economic strength. To achieve this goal, Beijing is pursuing two parallel courses of action, both of which antedate the second Bush administration. First, Beijing is sustaining a two-decade policy of active diplomacy

designed to expand Chinas regional political and economic influence.37

Enlarging

Chinas influence is seen as the most effective way to counter the United States while avoiding direct confrontation. Second, the modernization of Chinas armed forces is being of

maintained and perhaps accelerated by the double-digit percentage augmentation

defense allocations that have permitted increasing acquisitions of advanced weaponry from Russia. Countering American power and influence over the next decade or two could well be a near-term objective. Beijings long-term purpose could be to engage the United States in a strategic competition with the objective of supplanting US influence in maritime Asia. If displacing US influence is Chinas long-term objective, Beijing faces an extremely difficult task. Most of the states on Asias maritime periphery view Chinas growing power, especially its growing military capabilities, as their major potential external challenge.38 Their approach to China is therefore one of hedging against the worst possible outcome. Only South Korea, with its security focuses on North Korea and Japan, does not view China as a probable security problem. The hedging strategy pursued by Tokyo consists of engaging Beijing economically and politically while relying on its own extremely competent forces and Japans security alliance with United States to offset Chinas increasing military strength. Nonetheless, Japans apprehension is mitigated by the fact that Chinas military power, especially its force-projection capabilities, is far less threatening than that of the former USSR in the 1980s.39 Tokyos public policy does not define China as a potential military threat, and China continues to be the leading recipient of Japanese aid.40 Moreover, Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi has set as policy the principle that Tokyo would work with Beijing to

ensure regional stability. In part, this reflects Chinas status as one of Japans most important economic partners. Japanese businesses and bureaucrats view Chinas economy as complementary to Japans. Beyond providing raw materials and parts, China is Japans second largest trading partner and the preferred offshore production base for Japanese firms. Political dialogue has intensified as economic ties have deepened. In 1997, Japan and China agreed to cooperate in the then-new ASEAN + 3 (the three being China, Japan and South Korea) meetings, and in 1998 they agreed to annual heads of state meetings and to expand their consultations to include security matters. In large part, Japans hedging strategy is rooted in the belief that China will not be openly confrontational, but for the foreseeable future will continue to emphasize economic development and its attendant cooperative approach to the world. The hedging strategy pursued by the major states of Southeast Asia is also based on the political and economic engagement of China. Relations with Beijing are generally cordial, with trade and commerce expanding. Beijing is politically engaged through its participation as a full dialogue partner of the ten-member ASEAN (Association of South East Asian Nations), as a member of the security-oriented ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) and the ASEAN + 3 ministerial sessions. Despite the progress the ASEAN states believe they have achieved in persuading Beijing to be a cooperative and responsible partner in the region, there remains apprehension over Chinas growing military, political and economic power. Beijings claims to the Spratly Islands and the South China Sea are of primary concern.41 Currently, however, with the exception of the Philippines, the ten states of ASEAN are not overly worried about Chinas gradual military buildup. Beijings defense modernization programs are seen as focused on Taiwan. The South China Sea territorial disputes are not

expected to become critical until the question of Taiwan is settled. There is, however, concern that Chinese military capabilitiesdriven by Taiwans US-supported defense modernization and in anticipation of American ballistic missile defenseswill one day be employed by China in the South China Sea. Consequently, in a manner similar to that of Japan, a sustained US military presence in the region is viewed as offsetting Chinas burgeoning military strength. India has long viewed China as its greatest potential military threat; this was the driving force behind its ties with the former USSR in the era of Sino- Soviet enmity. Border disputes and Chinas relationship with Pakistan, especially its military assistance and covert support of Islamabads missile and nuclear weapons program, have been a constant security concern. These longstanding tensions have been joined more recently by Chinas inroads into Burma (Myanmar), which have aroused Indias sensitivity to a Chinese presence in the Bay of Bengal. New Delhis recently developed Look East policy is driven by this unease over Chinas growing influence in Southeast Asia.42 India is the only

South Asian state to be a full dialogue partner of ASEAN and a member of ARF, and seeks to counter Chinas influence by expanding its political, military and economic ties in Southeast Asia. New Delhis hedging strategy, however is distinctly different from that pursued by Japan and ASEAN.43 Whereas the Japanese and Southeast Asian strategies ultimately rely on the United States to offset Chinas growing military capabilities, Indias goal is to remain as South Asias hegemon and an independent power on Chinas periphery. The political and economic aspects of Indias engagement strategy place foremost emphasis on the political component. New Delhi wants to avoid being locked into an antagonistic relationship with

Beijing and has therefore sought to diplomatically manage its longstanding border disputes with China. Economically, Indias focus is inward. New Delhi wants to revitalize its economy to provide a strong base for its political ambitions and to ensure internal stability. Despite the political and military initiatives now embraced by Washington and New Delhi, the place of the US in Indias strategy is not as an ally. New Delhi wants a close working relationship with Washington, especially access to US military technology, doctrine and training, but primarily seeks recognition that Indias hegemonic role in South Asia is in the US interest. At the heart of New Delhis strategy is a commitment to establish India as an autonomous regional and global powernot a junior partner in any alliance or security arrangement. Despite Chinas constant criticism of US alliances and utilization of Asian bases and port facilities as demonstrating American Cold War mentality, Beijing recognizes that the United States military presence is welcome in the region. Similarly, although Beijing blames the United States for sponsoring the image of China as a military threat, its active program of military-to-military capabilities are the primary cause of regional apprehensions.44 Countering the exercise of US political and military strength has

therefore involved seeking to allay maritime Asias fear that Chinas growing power will ultimately result in an attempt to dominate the region. Chinas efforts have been made easier by the regions own strategy of engagement. Beijings participation in regional multilateral organizations and its push to increase mutually beneficial trade and investment with the region have been welcomedespecially following East Asias 1997 financial crisis.

China desire to present itself as a good neighbor and responsible member of Asias multilateral organizations led to Beijings introduction of the New Security Concept (NSC).45 Formulated in the spring of 1997, and occupying a prominent place in

Beijings 1998, 2000 and 2002 defense white papers, the NSC is Chinas proposal for a post-Cold War security system. Beijing made clear that the principles China espouses are in distinct contrast to the United States Cold War mentality seen in its use of military power and alliances as the bedrock of Washingtons approach to regional security. In the place of military arrangements, Beijing recommends mutual trust, dialogue between sovereign states as equals, mutually beneficial economic cooperation, and no resort to military threats. Beijings 2002 defense white paper summarized Chinas approach as based on mutual trust, mutual benefit, equality and cooperation.46 Given the apprehensions driving

maritime Asias hedging strategy, it is very unlikely Chinas NSC will supplant the confidence derived from US forward deployed forces and the alliances and facilities that enable their presence. 2.3 PERFSHIRJA E POLITIKAVE AMERIKANE Despite the present spirit of rapprochement, mutual apprehension remains the fundamental characteristic of Sino-American relations. The United States has good reason to be

apprehensive over the course China may follow when it achieves the level of economic, technological, scientific and military capability it seeks. Although currently obscured by Beijings pragmatic response to Washingtons overwhelming political, economic and military power and its need for US trade and investment, Chinas opposition to American pre- eminence is clear. Not only is Chinas opposition to the United States evident, but Beijings military modernization programs also appear to be specifically focused on

countering the US maritime strategy and the foreign-hosted bases enabling that strategy in the Western Pacific. Chinas apprehension over US strategic intentions may well be misplaced, but Beijing has good reason to be suspicious. Much of US policy and strategy goes against Beijings interests. American arms transfers to Taiwan have been accelerated and the Bush

administration is pursuing much closer military ties with Taipei than any administration since the mutual security pact between Taiwan and the United States was terminated in 1979. The high priority the Bush administration has placed on developing national and theater ballistic missile defenses does threaten the credibility of Chinas small nuclear deterrent and its much larger inventory of theater weapons. Until the recent thaw in SinoAmerican relations, the Bush administrations hostility toward China was evident. Nonetheless, the pragmatic approach adopted by Washington and Beijing as they now approach each other can be sustained as they develop strategies and policies for Asia. Longstanding US policy and strategy in Asia has been to prevent hostile domination of the East Asian littoral.52 The United States has never had the strategic objective of becoming

the hegemon of Asia. Asia is simply too vast and complex to set such a goal. US policy has been to prevent the rise of a regional hegemonic power or coalition of powers. Thus, whereas the United States would oppose a Chinese thrust for hegemony, a multipolar Asia would be, or should be, as acceptable to the United States as the current bipolar Asia. Whether Beijing would find a future multipolar Asia acceptable for its security interests cannot be determined at this time. To the extent that a multipolar Asia has diminished US influence, there is good reason to believe that China would find that arrangement acceptable.

What does seem to be evident is that the United States must sustain its strategy and capability to function as the offshore balancer to Chinas growing power. Beijings progress toward an effective area-denial strategy does more than complicate US plans to provide Taiwan assistance in the event of an unprovoked attack. It also can raise doubt in Asia about the willingness and ability of the United States to sustain its offshore balancing role. A robust US military presence is therefore essential if Asia is to maintain its confidence in the United States. This, however, will entangle the United States and China even further in the present security dilemma, in which actions taken by one as defensive are seen by the other as offensive. Purely military responses to each others military deployments will not resolve this dilemma. As the United States adjusts its force deployments in response to Chinas

increasing military capabilities and the need to reassure Asian allies and friends, it must also engage Beijing in high-level discussions of Asian security. Without such discussions, the mutual apprehension underlying Sino-American relations will only increase bilateral tensions and arms proliferation and enhance the potential for military conflict. The recent decision by Washington and Beijing to revive their suspended Defense Consultative Talks is an encouraging step toward restoring the high-level strategic dialogue required to ease the risks of mutual apprehension.53 CHAPTER III ROLI I KINES NE POLITIKEN GLOBALE Until recently, the Chinese have only paid certain attention to Chinas integration with the world, namely the expansion of its membership in a variety of international and transnational organizations, but not given much thought to Chinas role in global governance. However,

China as a new participant in global governance could draw lessons and gain experience from the former successes and failures in the course of transnational governance and contribute to global governance.

3.1 QENDRIMI I MATUR I KINES Several factors have contributed to Chinas prudence in its involvement into global governance. First and foremost, China is still a new player on global arena and is a rising power in the world, and Chinese government lacks knowledge of the existing rules and mechanisms of various international regimes. Therefore China maintains a low profile in dealing with world affairs and taking part in multilateral activities. In addition, in the shadow of the so-called China threat, Chinese leaders were very cautious and reluctant to take an active position on many international issues. They tried to emphasize that Chinas rise was and would continue to be peaceful and carried out several cooperation with other Asian neighboring countries. However, some Chinese scholars argue that with the continued growth of economy and deeper integration into the international system, China should change its prudent attitude and low-profile position. The strategy of hiding ones capacity and biding for time to develop (Tao Guang Yang Hui) is no longer viable and China must consider what role it should play in the world.

3.2 NJE QIND VJET POSHTERIM

As a developing country, which has won full independence from imperialist states, China treasures sovereignty and protects the right to deal with domestic affairs independently. While participating in global governance is in Chinas national interests, Cai states that

since Chinese participation has been in the name either of the government or of the state116, so for China there is little difference between global governance and international government. He continues that developing countries, being relatively novices in the architecture of global governance, are apprehensive of both Western developed nations and global civil society because of the challenges they pose to the state as well as national sovereignty.

Why China is so sensitive and so much concerns with national sovereignty? The idea of Bainian Guochi (100 years of national humiliation) could explain. Starting with Chinas defeat in the Opium Wars in the mid-nineteenth century and the humiliated treatment of Chinese migrants in the United States, a particularly important element in the formation of Chinas modern identity has been the legacy of the countrys humiliation at the hands of foreigners.117 It was only till the end of the Second World War, the New China was founded and had overturned the three big mountains, namely imperialism, feudalism and bureaucratic capitalism. As Mao Zedong famous declaration goes that China will no longer be a nation subject to insult and humiliation. Chinese people had stood up. However, the sense of victims has not faded over times but it is still lingering on Chinese mind. The national humiliation narrative is still reproduced in textbooks, museums, movies, journal and exhibitions. Moreover, strong emotion of anti-Japan is still prevailing among many Chinese people. References to the Century of Humiliationboth reflect and powerfully shape Chinas relations with the West today,118 writes Peter Gries. By evoking the people, events, and symbols of Chinas early modern encounter with the West, Chinese continually return to this unresolved trauma. 119 However, feelings of humiliation

live on, he concludes. Neither Communisms victory over the Nationalist Party in the Civil War, nor the declaration of Liberation in 1949 appears to have exorcised the past.

In the past, China was weak and poor, so many parts of land were lost and its rights were violated by foreign powers. Now, China is rising and gaining power, therefore it can no longer stand separation of any parts of China or issues of interference in national sovereignty. The theme of victimization could construct collective identity in order to keep foreign forces at bay. The priority of sovereignty still weights heavily in the Chinese official view, and to restore Chinas territorial integrity is one of their dreams. In Chinese peoples eyes, China is a multiethnic country with Han (central Chinese), Man (Manchurians), Meng (Mongolians), Hui (Muslims), and Zang (Tibetans) and China should reunify all lands, which have been broken away by imperialist powers during the times of Chinas weakness. Therefore, China insists on sovereignty priority on issues of Taiwan, let alone Xingjiang and Tibet.

Global governance inevitably put challenges to the concept of national sovereignty, which China understands. Moreover, it contradicts to Chinas strong attachment to national sovereignty that grew out of the 100 years of humiliation from the mid-nineteenth to the mid-twentieth century. Any governance arrangement that might reduce state sovereignty will be difficult for China to contemplate.

3.3 QENDRUESHMERIA E SHTETIT DHE RRITJA EKONOMIKE

Since the late 1980s economic reform and opening up, Chinas economy grows rapidly and becomes the second largest economic entity in the world. However, the robust growth is achieved at the expense of income equality and the environment. Besides the huge economic gap between countryside and urban, the gap between different cities or even within one city is widening as well. The inequality does not only reflect in income, but also in education, healthcare, social welfare, and so on. Imbalanced distribution will bring chaos in the society. In consequence, to keep the states stability and make the monopoly of power unchallenged are big concerns of CCP. It is understandable that social stability is very significant to a state, particularly a state like China, with 1,4 billion population and 55 ethnic minority groups.

Nevertheless, the Chinese elites recognizes that global governance would blur the distinction between international and domestic politics and some of them are cautious that global governance may open the door to foreign interference in Chinas domestic affairs and undermine its political stability.122 While attempting to shoulder more responsibilities, some Chinese analysts suggest that the Chinese government should also be alert and prevent some western conspiracy of anti-China propaganda and actions. Even today, after 20 years from the end of the Cold War, some western forces have not yet given up some kind of conspiracy of peaceful transformation. Chinas participation into global governance should never at the expense of national security and social stability. So it is necessary that the Chinese government first find out the true intention of its cooperators. To them, there is always the danger that Western powers will use global governance as pretext to pose threat to CCPs regime.

In consequence, if Chinas participation in global governance puts challenges to the communist regime, such as issues of Xingjiang or Tibet, freedom of press, internet censorship and AIDS epidemic, the Chinese government would dampen its enthusiasm for involvement in global governance or even might not be willing to take part in it anymore.

3.4 KINA DHE TEKNIKAT E DUHURA TE QEVERISJES 3.4.1 PERGJEGJESIA PER MBROJTJEN

In dealing with foreign relations, China still takes the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence124, which was formed in 1954, as one of its main diplomatic strategies. In 2005, on the report by the Secretary-Generals High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change entitled A more secure world: Our shared responsibility, China emphasizes that the rights and responsibilities of sovereign states should be respected. It argues that it is inadvisable to make hasty judgment that the State concerned is unable or unwilling to protect its own citizens and rush to intervene and believes that there must be strict respect non-interference and disagrees with the 5 criteria for use of force on principle. China has affirmed the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) principle and issued corresponding statements in favor of bolstering the UNs capacity. However, in the governments Position Paper on the United Nations Reforms in 2005, it shows Chinas understanding about the norm of responsibility to protect. China maintains that each state shoulders the primary responsibility to protect its own population. However, internal unrest in a country is often caused by complex factors. Prudence is called for in judging a governments ability and will to protect its citizens. Even if a massive humanitarian crisis occurs, the opinions of the country and the regional organization concerned should be respected.126 In addition,

China remains persistently averse to non-consensual force and is reticent to apply sanctions, particularly when these measures are not fully backed by relevant regional organizations.127 In Chinese academic community, the notion of responsibility to protect is not given certain attention on national literatures either and humanitarian intervention is also viewed with much suspicion. Gao Feng, one of the editors of the Chinese Yearbook of International Law, takes issue with the proponents of humanitarian intervention over the double standard of intervention.128 And he concludes that global governance would be possible only if the principle of sovereign equality is closely observed.129 When the responsibility to protect is tested by issues of Darfur or Myanmar, Chinas actions are disappointing. It does not align itself with the West in attaching the political conditionality of good governance to its commercial deals and its financial assistance to less developed countries, particularly those in Asia and Africa which have notorious human-rights records.

3.4.2INTERESAT EKONOMIKE: RASTI I SUDANIT DHE MYANMARIT

Chinas no strings attached foreign policy, which excludes political issues from the enthusiastic economic cooperation between the two sides, neglected existing problems among some African regimes, which the West deem as rogue nations that are corrupted, authoritarian and irresponsible for the prevailing civil wars that kill hundreds of thousands. Western analysts accuse China of undermining the efforts to promote democracy, human rights and good governance in the worlds poorest continent. In this scenario, Chinas stance on several issues, especially the Darfur crisis, takes the main brunt of the attacks from the West. For instance, the Chinese permanent membership in the United Nations Security

Council has offered protection to the Sudanese government against the imposition of sanctions over Khartoums action in Darfur. Moreover, criticisms also come to Chinas military exports to Sudan, which fuel the conflicts in the chaotic region.

Sudan is in list of the top worst government by Freedom House and was called one of the worst dictatorship governments in the world by Parade magazine. This country excluded other foreign countries and rejected United Nations supervision of its human rights situation. Sudanese government supported for genocide against the people in Darfur. The United States had taken sanctions to Sudan, in the meantime, Chinas influence has infiltrated in its many aspects. China has become Sudans largest investor and the biggest purchaser of its resources. At the beginning, China supplied arm forces to Sudan, and then, tens of thousands of migrant workers flew into there.

China has been criticized for its unfair trade with the Sudan, as China is the largest investor in Sudans oil industry and its largest customer, taking approximately 80 percent of its output and owning a 40 percent stake in the major oil consortium drilling in Sudan.132 It could be argued why China tries to maintain good relationship with Africa is because 10 percent of the worlds oil is produced on the Africa continent annually. Therefore it is not surprising to hear criticism over Chinas role in Africa, The last decade has seen China sweep across Africa in search of raw materials to fuel its booming economy. Having invested in more than 27 oil and gas projects in some 14 African countries, Chinas attention fell on oil reserves, writes Foreign Affairs correspondent Mary Fitzgerald.133 China has been blamed for deteriorating Sudans political situations as China repeatedly blocked attempts of the United Nations to punish Sudan for failing to stop atrocities in its Darfur

region. In 2008, from French Presidential candidates to Hollywood celebrities to Australian college students increasingly had been made for a boycott of the Beijing Olympic Games.

Then come to the case of Myanmar, China had vetoed a 2007 draft Security Council resolution on Myanmar on the grounds that violent repression in Myanmar was not a threat to international peace and security. According to International Coalition for Responsibility to Protect, much more needs to be done to engage reluctant actors, such as China and Russia, and to unify the international community of states behind policies to engage, and put pressure on, the government to fulfill its responsibility to protect the people of Burma (Myanmar).

Myanmar is rich in oil storage capacity, and the basic control of its oil exploration rights is in the hands of China. According to Chinese domestic media reports, China National Petroleum Exploration and Development Corp. signed a formal contract with the Myanmar Oil and Gas Company in Yangon. China gained the right of oil and gas exploration in Myanmars three deepwater blocks. Chinas three major corporations, including China Petroleum & Chemical Corporation (Sinopec), China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC) and China National Offshore Oil Corporation (CNOOC), have fully launched their oil projects in Myanmar. This can explain Chinas supportive attitude towards Myanmar military junta. Shwe Gas Movement, a human rights organization in Myanmar, wrote an open letter to the government of China on October 28, 2009 to express its grave concerns of Chinas planned construction of 980km natural gas and oil pipeline corridor from western Myanmar to Yunnan province in China. This pipeline will bring oil and gas of Middle East and Africa from Myanmar to China. The human rights organization estimated that this

investment would bring 29 billion US dollars to the Myanmar military junta in coming 30 years.

In fact, when China declares non-interference into other countries internal affairs, its economic cooperation, trades and investments do influence in many aspects of a country. Politically unconditional aid might encourage repressive governments to sustain a policy of corruption and human rights violations, and whether the local population will really profit from the investments is in question. Economically, some countries urgently need money for reconstruction, but a heavier debt burden can again hamper the reconstruction process.

However, on the one hand, at least China is doing something visible in Africa, something might help poor countries to some degree. Serge Mombouli, a longtime adviser to Congos president, says the West pushes for intangible achievements like better government, while China supports tangible things. Tangible development means you can see, you can touch, Mombouli continues, We need both. We cannot be talking just about democracy, transparency, and good governance. At the end of the day the population does not have anything to eat, does not have water to drink, no electricity at night, industry to provide work, so we need both. People do not eat democracy.135 Mauro de Lorenzo, a research analyst at the very conservative think tank of the American Enterprise Institute, pointed out Chinese are doing profitable business, but westerners are blinded in the view of humanitarian. However, humanitarian is also a trick of controlling: it maintains a kind of relationship of dominance. He mentioned that the story of Africa in western world, it all derived from Heart of Darkness of Joseph Conrad. It was about massacre, horrible diseases, rape and genocide. The most terrible thing is that one can force the other one to obey. On

the contrary, he said, Chinese do not have this kind of ideas, and they just make their money here. It made our view opened and we followed it, because humanitarian brings harmfulness.

On the other hand, to create a sound environment for development is very important to China since she has lots investments, companies and workers in other Asian and African countries. Therefore, China will also put efforts on making the society stable and security. Chaos and large scale of insurrections will cause Chinas interests suffered.

5.5 Chinese Intellectual History Guanxi

Since the French revolution, individual rights and freedoms had been spread out. Autonomy, individualism, and the rights of a legal personality were concepts that created both the sociology of citizens in society and the political sociology of states in an international system.137 However, the Chinese culture ranks very low on individualism, but scores very high on collectivism. In the meantime, Gannon argues that Chinese culture should be better characterized as relational, rather than individualist or collectivist.138 A web of relations in Chinese is called guanxi. Recently, the Chinese term guanxi frequently appears in English popular and academic writings. The word guan can be translated as referring to a juncture, a conjunctive point which connects otherwise separate entities.139 And xi means to tie up. Chen and Chen defines guanxi as an indigenous Chinese construct and define it as an informal, particularistic personal connection between two individuals who are bounded by an implicit psychological contract to follow the social norm

of guanxi such as maintaining a long term relationship, mutual commitment, loyalty, and obligation.140 Guanxi can describe relations between individuals, and in the Chinese international relations, it is also a different form. Gold views guanxi as typifying the purely instrumental and particularistic dimension of interpersonal relationships, which contrasts with the affective and expressive dimension of friendship on one hand and the universalistic, equality oriented dimension of comradeship on the other.

The base of guanxi can be various and the most common one is kinship and family. The guanxi base can consist of contemporaneous experiences as well. In terms of relationship between China and the so-called The Third World - Asian, African and Latin American countries, both of them were invaded by imperialist powers, suffered from colonialism and became independent after continuous fights and struggles. This sense of similarities makes China feel closer with other countries and have to meet their demands to some extents.

According to Chen and Chen, there is another type of base that was called anticipatory bases, which has received little attention. It is future oriented and becoming more and more important. If two countries do not share similar experience or history in common, guanxi can also be initiated by creating potential future bases through expressing an intention or even a promise to engage in future exchanges, collaborations, or joint ventures.142 This kind of guanxi can be formed by interactions. Of course, these different types of bases are not mutually exclusive.

One of the significant principles of operating guanxi is reciprocity. Besides people should help those who have helped them, which seem to be universal, there are some particular features of reciprocity in China. First, because guanxi is the cornerstone of the Chinese society, reciprocity of favor exchanges is the most pervasive rule guiding Chinese social and economic interactions. Second, reciprocity in China stresses a long-term orientation. It means the response or return does not necessarily be immediate in most cases. Third, what is reciprocated must be indeed of great value to the receiver. And the last feature of reciprocity is its unequal exchange.143 It always happens that the receiver returns more than he/she has received, especially for the richer party.

For instance, Chinas aids and trade agreements with lots of benefit to African countries, is an expression of guanxi. Guanxi creates obligations for continued exchange of benefits. China might not ask for immediate or equal return, but builds a way or base for future relationship. Chan states that Chinese international political sociology becomes a series of interactions and it is each action that propose a balance the number of reciprocities, not the weight of alliances, determines the Chinese sense of satisfaction with their international relations.

5.6 Lack of Non-State Actors

Global governance aims at cross-border cooperation and coordination, and encourages institutions like NGOs and civil society, which may or may not attain full legitimacy and authority to share responsibility with governments. Its form of cooperation, which lets states and non-state actors participate in mixed public and private policy networks, has to some

extent confronted with the traditional mentality to protect sovereignty of developing countries.

The role of Chinas NGOs, companies, private sectors, civil society and individual is still limited in global governance. Unlike the international governance, the role of government alone is not enough in global governance. NGOs and civil society are equally important.

China has implemented the opening up policy to the world for less than three decades. She used to adopt a relatively conservative attitude towards newly emergent non-governmental activities. Local NGOs and civil society in China are to some extent disconnected with the international NGOs and global civil society. Their size, amount, capacity, accountability, and the ability to influence social conventions are quite limited in comparison with their counterparts in Western countries and even some developing countries such as India. The scope of governance is more at the national level. Now it seems that the Chinese government (mainly central government) is the principal actor on behalf of Chinas participation in global governance. However, how to make Chinas NGOs and civil society play important roles in global governance, is one of the key factors of whether China will succeed in playing the role in global governance finally.

KAPITULLI IV KINA E SE ARDHMES NEN KORNIZEN E QEVERISJES GLOBALE

In line with the needs of global governance, which emphasizes on equity, coordination and cooperation, self-regulation, and network management, Chinese government has tried to

develop multiple ways to achieve its goals, rather than traditional hierarchic management, monopoly on decision-making, and coercive enforcement on the execution of directives and orders. Decision makers have begun to weigh more and more on negotiation and coordination on multi-levels and voluntary participation.

In transferring part of authority from government to governance, from being confined to the national territory to going beyond the national border, Chinese government has let in NGOs, international civil society and global advocacy network, and has signed up treaties on environmental protection, anti-landmine, and standardization, such as ISO9000 on quality management.

Whats more, social networks in different subject areas have replaced the single top-bottom interaction between actors from higher and lower levels. Instead, decisions are to be made among a varied array of public, semi-public and private actors in a global policy network.

Chinas approach to global governance tries to focus on major global issues, such as poverty, AIDS, and environmental pollution. These kind of issues are typically global and of public good. Through participation in the settlement of these issues, China will be exposed to the whole process of communication, cooperation, negotiation, and coordination with other governmental and nongovernmental actors. Throughout this process, Chinese government establishes a platform for actors from multi-levels to set agenda and contribute feasible solutions together. The global issues, especially those related to security, environment, drugs and diseases, have been solved with multilateral efforts, whereas before 1980s they were approached either under unilateral actions or had hardly drawn attention

from the Chinese central government.147 Moreover, these issues are less complicated and sensitive than issues like human right and international terrorism, and are less likely to provoke conflict and ideological contradictions among different actors. Without causing a variety of debates and disputes, and making the status quo more complex and involved with worries on legitimacy and etc., choose the above mentioned issues will soon have consequences, and thus encourages Chinese government to stick more focus, courage, and confidence to global governance.

In addition, education on citizens in order to cultivate analytical skill and waken the awareness to take part in global governance is another important issue. Chinese government is now promoting citizens to join in the self-regulatory committee at neighborhood level. On one hand, this has enhanced the level of self-regulation and the analytical skill of individuals. On the other hand, government facilitates democratization on grass-root level of the society, which in turn leads to increasing demand for democracy of higher level.

PERFUNDIME: VULLNETI I POLITIKES SE KINES, KAPACITETET DHE E ARDHMJA E SAJ

KONTRIBUTI NE QEVERISJEN GLOBALE

One of Mao Zedongs famous quotes in the mid of last century is: China is a country with 9,6 million square kilometers of land and six hundred million people, so she should make a greater contribution to humanity. But such a contribution, in the long past period, is too little. It makes us feel ashamed.148 There is no doubt that China has the political

willingness, intention and motivation to participate in global governance. This sense can be summarized as follows:

First, China is a maintainer of the todays international order, while China also seeks, or tries to shape the futures global order. China is working to safeguard the international order that on behalf of the United Nations and objectives and principles of the UN Charter. China is already a part of the international system, which is the insider of the system, rather than complete outsider like what it was before 1980s, so China has no reason not to maintain this order. Moreover, China has made many contributions to the current international system. For example, Chinese officials put forward a series of new international concepts, such as a responsible state (during 1997-1998 Asian financial crisis), new security concept (1999), and effective multilateralism (2004). Chinas President Hu Jintao gave a speech on Strive to Establish a Harmonious World of Lasting Peace and Common Prosperity at the summit meeting of the sixtieth anniversary of the United Nations, in which formally proposed the idea of harmonious world. China chooses and pursues regionalism as a new way of dealing with Asian countries. China endeavors to understand and accept multilateralism, change the past incorrect and negative attitude to multilateralism, and actively promote multilateralism.

Second, China began to carefully explore how to shape the new world order under globalization. In the current international order, after all, due to lack of real influences, China still continue to believe that there is somehow injustice and unreasonable in this

order. Therefore, in the long term, China will inevitably have to seek further changes in the international system.

However, these self-willingness, desire, attempt, intention and motive are still subject to the following long-term factors.

First, the growth of national strength does not necessarily lead the immediate change of the states position in the international system. Chinas rise is difficult to transform smoothly into international influence, that is, the ability to participate in global affairs. China still believes that the current international system is basically controlled by the United States and Europe. China feels undemocratic of the international system and requires the democratization and democracy of international relations.

Second, since the early 1990s, the Chinese government has been particularly worried and concerned about the so-called China threat from major Western countries and some Asian countries. China is very careful to handle (including rebuttal, explanation, etc.). In this case, if taking more responsibility in the world, China fears China threat will be strengthened.

Third, since the end of the Cold War, Chinas overall diplomatic strategies are TaoGuangYangHui. There are many different interpretations on the so-called

TaoGuangYangHui. One of the common understandings is not show off ones own power and influence, keep low profile in the international community, do more and talk less, do not

involve in trouble, but the aim is to bide time for further development.150 In these years, with accession to various international organizations and focusing on multilateral diplomacy, many Chinese people are beginning to talk about the rise of China, or even have different views on TaoGuangYangHui. However, many domestic analysts think that this strategy cannot be changed shortly, because China is still in a weak position in the world today, while the survival wisdom of the weak one is never claim leadership.151 Some Chinese foreign affairs strategists said China should adhere to TaoGuangYangHui strategy for long run.

Fourth, the concept of national sovereignty is still dominant in China. Although China has been a part of the global economy thoroughly, politically, China still very much adheres to the principle of national sovereignty and non-interference under the UN Charter. To some extents, it constrains the willingness of China to participate in global governance.

Fifth, in terms of identity politics, ethnic identity and nationalism rather than regional identity, global identity, or internationalism still play the leading role in China. Of course, the regional environment in East Asia or Asia is almost the same case, like the upholding and strengthening of national identity in other East Asian countries (especially Japan and South Korea).153 In China, national interest, national strength, balance of power and so on are dominating the thoughts of Chinas international politics.

A I KA KINA KAPACITETET PER PJESEMARRJE NE QEVERISJEN GLOBALE?

To successfully play the role in global governance, the actors involved must have sufficient capacity, and this is a very critical issue. Chinas economy has been developing rapidly over the past 20 years. Under the peaceful conditions, China chooses the way of economic construction-centered in order to further enhance comprehensive national strength. This is laid an objective material foundation for Chinas participation in global governance. Nevertheless, China still faces problems with capacity building in participation in global governance.

Generally China still is a developing country that economy, society and human are in a low level of development. China itself has been the object of international governmental organizations and international non-governmental organizations aid 154 ; the task of modernization and development is far from completing. China has to use the major part of the increment of its national strength to solve domestic problems rather than solving the problem of global issues.

China has paid attention to hard power for a long-term and neglected soft power. In the past 30 years, the economic construction-centered growth mainly led to the development of Chinas hard power, which is a tangible and physical force. But the invisible and intangible force of soft power, such as knowledge, innovation, national morale, morality, concept, strategy, diplomatic skills do not grow correspondingly. Chinas economy relies heavily on foreign trade, foreign investment and external resources.

That means that Chinas economy is driven by foreign trade and foreign investment

154 Till the 21st century, China had been out of the list of aiding countries of World Bank and other international economic organizations.

China is the world factory and provides production base for global multinational companies. The main benefits China gains from the global trade are limited to employment and government revenue.

Economic growth does not necessarily mean social development. In some cases, one-sidedly emphasizing on economic growth, or promoting economic development on expense of social development, would make social development stagnate or even decline. In the past, during rapid economic growth period, China witnessed a series of serious social problems, such as the huge gap between rural and urban, western and eastern region. Whats worse, this gap will continue existing in the foreseeable future and this problem is difficult to solve fundamentally. Moreover, large cities and super-large cities with very rapid pace of modernization in eastern part (Beijing, Shanghai, Guangzhou, etc) suffer from extremely serious urban disease, such as crime, pollution, unemployment, and other very significant problems in developing process. China has paid the price of enormous ecological and natural resources for development and modernization. Chinas environment shows the trend of long-term deterioration, resulting in a growing number of serious social, political and international problems.

Non-state actors, especially NGOs is lacking in China. For Chinese officials, currently China has to deal with economic development, state building and tries to keep the society stable. Therefore, the state needs to play the leading role in global governance. And all other non- state actors are required to support and coordinate themselves with the state in order to make all actors as a whole while facing to the outsiders.

Last but not least, China promotes international multilateralism, but there is a serious shortage of human resources that could really take part in multilateral diplomacy. Almost the whole Chinese are learning English and languages of other developed countries, just like in 1950s, the whole country learned Russian. However, in terms of other countries, especially Asian and African countries, their language, religion, social, historical, ethnic and national research have not been given due attention. China is lack of professionals, who indepth know in neighboring countries, like Afghanistan, Iran or India, let alone the number of qualified research personnel of African or Central American studies.

Although with many universities and research institutions, it is still doubtful whether China can become a provider of concepts, rules, projects, values and ideas, which global governance needs.

Till now, China is not the knowledge production center of the world, but the consumer country of mainly Western-based knowledge products. In the global knowledge structure, China is basically in an inferior position. Chinas universities are, as matriculation of Western higher education system in general, and the most outstanding Chinese young

people prefer universities in the United States and Europe to pursue their further studies. Chinas own colleges and universities have not yet been international, and the so-called internationalized universities, in fact, become subsidiary body of famous Western university, namely, partner of Western universities, who want to access to Chinese higher education market.

Chinas understanding of globalization still remains in the stage of making profit, or views globalization mainly from perspective of interests. Knowledge and demands of globalization are very little. Universitys courses, public opinion and mass media often concentrate on national interest, balance of power, national sovereignty, national security, and relations with powers, rather than on global issues, global threats, or global governance.

Chinas knowledge system is losing creativity, which leads to constantly desire of independent innovation. In order to keep up with Western knowledge system, China desperately introduces Western scientific knowledge. This kind of open and learning may be necessary and inevitable in the very beginning, however, that makes China to become a country that only can study, understand and digest from others, even imitates the concept of others countries without innovation or its own understanding of world issues.

In general, Chinas capacity in global governance is inadequate. China urgently needs to strengthen the capacity building of global governance.

HowdoesChinamakeagreatercontributiontoglobalgovernanc e?

First, in accordance with general ideas of governance, if China could govern itself well, it is already a contribution to global governance. Chinas domestic governance is an important component of global governance. China itself accounts for one fifth of the worlds population. With large land area, she has a decisive influence on development of East Asia, Central Asia, South Asia and North Asia. Since China has become economically open and socially gradually open, her domestic governance no longer only has a narrow meaning, and she will closely integrate with the global governance. Economically, China can improve the efficiency of resource use, and reduce dependence on international resources. Environmentally, it can strengthen domestic environmental standards, reduce greenhouse gas emissions, pay more attention to sustainable development between economy and society, and do its utmost to protect the global environment. Intellectually, China should produce global knowledge, values, concepts and standards step by step, and provide more Chinese- style proposals for global governance. These would be contributions to global governance.

However, to properly deal with domestic affairs, China just assists global governance, which means China only plays a supporting role in global governance. Beyond Chinas domestic governance, despite the limitations of capacity, China is still able to play a greater role in global governance. It is necessary to combine Chinas political willingness of participating in global governance, accumulated governance capacity and sharing

knowledge, ideas, and values that consistent with the international community together, and transform it into Chinas global relations.

China should bring forward more specific, actionable principles, recommendations and proposals in global governance, and give full play to specific role in the United Nations, the United Nations system and reforms of international economic organizations.

Regional governance is an important intermediate link in global governance. Governance in Asia, particularly East Asia, is part of global governance that needs to improve. China should further promote the integration of the Asian region, and strengthen cooperation in Asia. In this process, China should not be overly worried about the so-called China threat theory from some US political conservatisms and strategist. China has to play as a responsible leader in integration of Asian regions. Moreover, China-based NGOs, civil society, and even individuals who have ability and willingness, should be encouraged to participate in global governance activities.

As a permanent member of the United Nations Security Council, Chinas role is very important in safeguarding world peace and regional peace. China needs to consider how to better prevent and overcome the global and regional crisis. In peace-maintaining and peace-building operations of the United Nations, China could further strengthen its impact.

Chinas environmental problems will continue to put pressure on the worlds environment. China needs to stick to sustainable development. To improve environmental standards is a sign of modernization, and also makes a greater effort the health of the global ecosystem.

China is in the critical moment of economic and political development. Globalization has profoundly changed Chinas economy and the society. To play a greater role in global governance should be one of the next major goals of Chinas foreign policy and international strategy. The global governance will create further favorable and peaceful international environment to the modernization and development of China. Chinese people must realize that the solution of more and more domestic problems depends on the outside global issues, and to resolve many global problems requires strong and effective policy and actions of China.

Nevertheless, China still needs in-depth understanding of global governance. China is lack of sense of urgency of global governance. Many Chinese people still think they live in an international world rather than a global world, so it is necessary to further emancipate the mind. The rapid economic development has not only brought China with economic prosperity, but also brought many social, environmental, human rights and other problems. These problems have serious global consequences. Chinas pursuit is to be a responsible state, and a responsible globalized country needs to continue to strengthen its capacity, not only for Chinas own problems, but also for assuming greater responsibility for solutions of global problems.