H

M
Davor Marijan - Ante Nazor - Zlatan Mijo Jelić - Petar Kolakušić
D
C
D
R
KNJIGA 1.
VOLUME 1

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 H
M
D
C
D
R

Domovinski rat 04-02-2020 Knjiga 1.indd 2 4.2.2020. 19:24:59

 DOMOVINSKI RAT I
ZLOČINI NAD HRVATIMA
U BOSNI I HERCEGOVINI,
1991. - 1995.
Pregled političkih i vojnih događaja u Hrvatskoj i BiH s posebnim
osvrtom na muslimansko-hrvatski sukob u BiH te popis ubijenih
H
civila Hrvata u BiH i zarobljenih pripadnika HVO-a, kao prilog
istraživanju zločina srpskih i muslimanskih snaga nad Hrvatima u
Bosni i Hercegovini od 1991. do 1995. godine
M
THE CROATIAN WAR OF
INDEPENDENCE AND CRIMES
D
COMMITTED AGAINST CROATS
IN BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA
1991 - 1995
C
An overview of political and military events in Croatia and
Bosnia and Herzegovina, with special emphasis on the Muslim-
Croat conflict in Bosnia and Herzegovina and a list of Croatian
civilians and HVO POWs killed in Bosnia and Herzegovina, as
D
a contribution to the research of crimes against Croats in BiH
committed by the Serb and Muslim forces 1991-1995
R
Zagreb – Mostar, siječanj 2020.
Zagreb – Mostar, January 2020

Domovinski rat 04-02-2020 Knjiga 1.indd 3 4.2.2020. 19:24:59

 Nakladnici Udruga Hrvatska zvona
Hrvatski memorijalno-dokumentacijski centar Domovinskog rata

Za nakladnika Marko Tokić

Ante Nazor

Urednici knjige Zlatan Mijo Jelić i Ante Nazor (Knjiga 1.)

Zlatan Mijo Jelić i Petar Kolakušić (Knjiga 2.)

Suradnici (Knjiga 2.) - Nika Pinter, Frano Piplović, Marko Tokić, Ivan Lozušić – Loza, Darko Kvesić,
dr. Jadranko Barišić, dr. Robert Šalinović, Udruga specijalne policije HR HB, Udruga
HVIDRA Grad Zagreb, Udruga specijalne policije iz  Domovinskog rata RH, Udruga
H
100%-tnih HRVI I. skupine, Zbor Udruga veterana hrvatskih gardijskih postrojbi;
- Mario Bradara, Miroslav Zelić, Zvonimir Čilić, Zrinko Tokić, Mladen Akrap - Macan,
Zdravko Bašić - Ljut, Željko Katava, Željko Marijanović, Marinko Matošević,
Miroslav Rašo, Zoran Slišković, Anto Spajić, Bogdan Šantić, te Udruga hrvatskih rat-
nih vojnih invalida općine Travnik i Udruga dragovoljaca i veterana HVO općina Vitez
(Županija Središnja Bosna);
- Pero Blažević, Josip Drežnjak, Zdenko Jurić - Major, Stanko Krezić - Stana,
M
Ilija Krtalić, dr. Zdravko Kuzman, Karlo Marić, Tomislav Mihalj, Zdravko Mikulić, Nedjel-
jko Obradović, Božo Pavlović, Miro Pavlović, Željko Planinić, Niko-Nino Vidović, Dra-
gan Vukić, Mirko Zelenika (Hercegovačko-neretvanska županija);
- Zdenko Marković, Darko Bodul (Županija sarajevska);
- Mario Andrić, Renato Buhić, Čedomir Franjkić, Željko Ljubanić, Zdravko Marošević,
Drago Tokmadžija te Koordinacija općinskih i županijskih udruga HVO-a ZD županije
(Zeničko-dobojska županija);
- Ivan Ančić, Josip Bevanda i Mario Tica (Županija zapadnohercegovačka);
D
- Ana Papić, Martina Ćurić, Željko Mihaljević – Best, Marko Radoš - Mara, Franjo Smoljo
i Željko Šiljeg (Hercegbosanska županija);
- Mario Bujanović, Marijan Mihić, Zoran Piličić i Frano Piplović (Sjeverozapadna Bosna);
- Ivo Anđelić, Mato Bilonjić, Tomislav Božić, Dinko Čutura, Ivo Đogaš, Ivo Filipović,
Marinko Geljić, Joso Leovac - Los, Pejo Janjić Lesi, Mijo Josipović, Zdravko Marinić,
Josip Marković - Sipe, Marinko Nikolaš, Ilija Ravlić, Pero Stanić, Anto Stopić
C
i Mirko Zečević-Tadić (Bosanska Posavina).
- Marin Banović, Ivan Brigović, Julija Barunčić Pletikosić, Janja Sekula Gibač, Ana Hol-
jevac Tuković, Željka Križe, Natko Martinić Jerčić, Ivan Radoš, Domagoj Štefančić,
Tomislav Šulj (HMDCDR).

Prijevod na engleski Michael Durgo

D
Recenzenti dr. sc. Mladen Ančić
Nika Pinter
dr. sc. Marko Tokić

Lektura Julija Barunčić Pletikosić

R
Tisak / dizajn Tiskara Dvornik

Naklada 2000

CIP zapis je dostupan u računalnome katalogu Nacionalne i sveučilišne knjižnice

u Zagrebu pod brojem 001054309.
ISBN 978-953-7439-95-8 (cjelina)
ISBN 978-953-7439-96-5 (Knjiga 1.)

Domovinski rat 04-02-2020 Knjiga 1.indd 4 4.2.2020. 19:25:00

 Publishers Hrvatska zvona Association
Croatian Memorial Documentation Center of the Homeland War

For the publishers Marko Tokić

Ante Nazor

Editors Zlatan Mijo Jelić and Ante Nazor (Volume 1)

Zlatan Mijo Jelić and Petar Kolakušić (Volume 2)

Collaborators (Volume 2) - Nika Pinter, Frano Piplović, Marko Tokić, Ivan Lozušić – Loza, Darko Kvesić, Jadranko
Barišić, Robert Šalinović, Association of Special Police of the HR HB, Croatian Disabled
Homeland War Veterans’ Association – City of Zagreb, Association of Special Police of
H
the RH, Association of Disabled Veterans of the Croatian War of Independence, Group
I disability, Assembly of Associations of War Veterans of Croatian Guards Brigades;
- Central Bosnia Canton: Mario Bradara, Miroslav Zelić, Zvonimir Čilić, Zrinko Tokić, Mladen
„Macan“ Akrap, Zdravko „Ljut“ Bašić, Željko Katava, Željko Marijanović,
Marinko Matošević, Miroslav Rašo, Zoran Slišković, Anto Spajić, Bogdan Šantić, as well as the
Association of Croatian Disabled War Veterans of the Travnik Municipality and the Associa-
tion of Volunteers and War Veterans HVO of the Vitez Municipality;
M
- Herzegovina-Neretva Canton: Pero Blažević, Josip Drežnjak, Zdenko “Major” Jurić, Stanko
“Stana” Krezić, Ilija Krtalić, dr. Zdravko Kuzman, Karlo Marić, Tomislav Mihalj, Zdravko Mikulić,
Nedjeljko Obradović, Božo Pavlović, Miro Pavlović, Željko Planinić, Niko-Nino Vidović, Dragan
Vukić, Mirko Zelenika;
- Sarajevo Canton: Zdenko Marković, Darko Bodul;
- Zenica-Doboj Canton: Mario Andrić, Renato Buhić, Čedomir Franjkić, Željko Ljubanić, Zdravko
Marošević, Drago Tokmadžija and the Coordination of Municipal and County HVO Associa-
tions of the Zenica-Doboj Canton;
D
- West Herzegovina Canton: Ivan Ančić, Josip Bevanda and Mario Tica;
- Herzeg-Bosnia Canton: Ana Papić, Martina Ćurić, Željko Mihaljević “Best”, Marko “Mara”
Radoš, Franjo Smoljo and Željko Šiljeg;
- Northwest Bosnia: Mario Bujanović, Marijan Mihić, Zoran Piličić and Frano Piplović;
- Bosanska Posavina: Ivo Anđelić (President of the Association of the Families of the Killed and
Missing Persons of the HR HB), Mato Bilonjić, Tomislav Božić, Dinko Čutura,
Ivo Đogaš, Ivo Filipović, Marinko Geljić, Joso “Los” Leovac, Pejo Janjić Lesi, Mijo Josipović
C
(President of the Association of Volunteers and Homeland War Veterans of the HVO HB
Ravne-Brčko), Zdravko Marinić, Josip “Sipe” Marković, Marinko Nikolaš, Ilija Ravlić, Pero
Stanić, Anto Stopić and Mirko Zečević-Tadić (President of the Croatian Disabled Homeland
War Veterans’ Association of Ravne-Brčko).
- Croatian Memorial Documentation Center of the Homeland War: Marin Banović, Ivan
Brigović, Julija Barunčić Pletikosić, Janja Sekula Gibač, Ana Holjevac Tuković, Željka Križe,
Natko Martinić Jerčić, Ivan Radoš, Domagoj Štefančić, Tomislav Šulj
D
Translated by Michael Durgo

Reviewers Mladen Ančić, Ph.D.

Nika Pinter
Mijo Tokić, Ph.D.
R
Proofreader Julija Barunčić Pletikosić

Printed by / design Tiskara Dvornik

Print run 2000

A CIP catalogue record for this book is available from the National and
University Library in Zagreb, under 001054309.

Domovinski rat 04-02-2020 Knjiga 1.indd 5 4.2.2020. 19:25:00

 Sadržaj

KNJIGA 1.
I
8 I Riječ urednika
H
14 I Uvod

17 I. dio: Davor Marijan, Rat za opstojnost Hrvata, 1991. - 1995.

(pregled političkih i vojnih događaja u Domovinskom ratu, s posebnim osvrtom
M
na muslimansko-hrvatski sukob u BiH)

467 Prilozi

469 - Humanitarna kriza i ratna šteta u Hrvatskoj u Domovinskom ratu

476 - O uzrocima i posljedicama rata u BiH

D
483 - Davor Marijan: Rat Hrvata i Muslimana u Bosni i Hercegovini
od 1992. do 1994. (dijelovi intervjua)

491 II. dio: Ante Nazor, Neke činjenice o zločinima nad Hrvatima u BiH i izvori
o muslimansko-hrvatskom sukobu u dijelu BiH
C
561 Iz recenzije (Nika Pinter)

566 Izvori

590 Zemljovidi
D
KNJIGA 2.
I
III. dio: Zlatan Mijo Jelić – Petar Kolakušić, Prilog istraživanju zločina
R
nad Hrvatima u Bosni i Hercegovini
- Uvod

- Zločini pripadnika JNA i srpskih snaga nad civilima Hrvatima i zarobljenim

pripadnicima HVO-a (popis ubijenih)
- Zločini muslimanskih snaga, odnosno pripadnika Armije RBiH, nad civilima
Hrvatima i zarobljenim pripadnicima HVO-a (popis ubijenih)

Domovinski rat 04-02-2020 Knjiga 1.indd 6 4.2.2020. 19:25:00

 Contents

VOLUME 1
I
8 I
EDITORS’ PREFACE
H
14 Introduction

17 Part I: Davor Marijan, The Croatian Nation’s Struggle for Survival, 1991-
1995: An Overview of Political and Military Events in the Croatian War of Inde-
M
pendence, with Special Emphasis on the Muslim-Croat Conflict in Bosnia and
Herzegovina.

467 Appendices

469 - Humanitarian Crisis and War Damage in Croatia in the

Croatian War of Independence

476
D
- On the Causes and Consequences of the War in Bosnia and Herzegovina

483 - Davor Marijan: Excerpts from an Interview about the Muslim-Croat Con-
flict in Bosnia and Herzegovina 1992-1994
C
491 Part II: Ante Nazor, Facts Regarding War Crimes and Crimes against Human-
ity Committed against Croats in Bosnia and Herzegovina and Sources Regard-
ing the Muslim-Croat Conflict in a Part of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

561 Excerpt from a review (Nika Pinter)

566 Sources
D
590 Maps

VOLUME 2.
I
R
Part III: Zlatan Mijo Jelić – Petar Kolakušić, Contribution to Research of
Crimes against the Croats in Bosnia and Herzegovina
- Introduction

- Crimes Committed by Members of the JNA and Serb Forces Against Croatian
Civilians and HVO POWs (list of those killed)
- Crimes Committed by the Muslim Forces – Members of the ARBIH – Against
Croatian Civilians and HVO POWs (list of those killed)

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 RIJEČ UREDNIKA

EDITORS’ PREFACE
H
M
D
C
D
R

Domovinski rat 04-02-2020 Knjiga 1.indd 8 4.2.2020. 19:25:00

 Riječ urednika • Editor’s preface
Ova knjiga sastoji se od tri dijela:
I. dio: pregled povijesti Domovinskog rata s de-
taljnijim prikazom događaja na području Bosne i Her-
cegovine (Rat za opstojnost Hrvata, 1991. - 1995. - pre-
gled političkih i vojnih događaja u Domovinskom ratu,
s posebnim osvrtom na muslimansko-hrvatski sukob u
BiH), autora dr. sc. Davora Marijana;
II. dio: prilog za raspravu o zločinima nad Hrvati-
ma u BiH i izvorima o sukobu između Bošnjaka-musli-
mana i Hrvata u dijelu BiH (Neke činjenice o zločinima
H
nad Hrvatima u BiH i izvori o muslimansko-hrvatskom
sukobu u dijelu BiH);
III. dio: popis civila Hrvata i zarobljenih pripadni-
ka HVO-a, koje su u spomenutom razdoblju u Bosni
i Hercegovini ubili pripadnici srpskih i muslimanskih
snaga (Zločini pripadnika srpskih snaga nad civilima
M
Hrvatima i zarobljenim pripadnicima HVO-a, te Zločini
muslimanskih snaga, odnosno pripadnika Armije RBiH,
nad civilima Hrvatima i zarobljenim pripadnicima
HVO-a). Podaci za spomenute popise prikupljeni su i
objedinjeni na inicijativu generala Zlatana Mije Jelića
i brigadira Petra Kolakušića, koji su i urednici ovoga
D
dijela knjige.
Potreba za objavljivanjem knjige s ovakvim sa-
držajem pojavila se prije desetak godina, kada se
počelo s istraživanjima zločina nad hrvatskim naro-
dom u Domovinskom ratu u Bosni i Hercegovini. Re-
alizaciju takvog projekta pokrenuo je general Zlatan
C
Mijo Jelić, uz pomoć i suradnju brigadira Petra Ko-
lakušića, a rad na knjizi započeo je prije tri godine
prikupljanjem podataka o ubijenim civilima Hrvati-
ma i zarobljenim pripadnicima HVO-a. Uz podatke
o ubijenima, prikupljene terenskim istraživanjem i
D
kontaktima sa suradnicima na ovoj knjizi, uglavnom
ratnim zapovjednicima HVO-a i članovima udruga
iz Domovinskog rata na lokalnoj razini, za stvaranje
spomenutoga popisa korišteni su i podaci iz izvora
(uglavnom gradivo HVO-a) te iz objavljenih knjiga.
Prikupljena imena složena su po općinama prema
datumu stradanja i abecednim redom imena ubi-
jenih, a sadržaj popisa potom je vraćen suradnicima
na lokalnim razinama na pregled i korekciju, odnos-
no nadopunu.
Zbog toga, osim urednicima trećeg dijela knjige,
Zlatanu Miji Jeliću i Petru Kolakušiću, na prikupljenim
podacima treba zahvaliti i njihovim suradnicima:
- Nika Pinter, Frano Piplović, Marko Tokić, Ivan Lo-
zušić – Loza, Darko Kvesić, dr. Jadranko Barišić,
Domovinski rat 04-02-2020 Knjiga 1.indd 9
This book consists of three parts:
- Part I: An overview of the Croatian War of Indepen-
dence with a detailed description of events in Bosnia and
Herzegovina (The Croatian Nation’s Struggle for Survival,
1991-1995: An Overview of Political and Military Events in
the Croatian War of Independence, with Special Emphasis
on the Muslim-Croat Conflict in Bosnia and Herzegovina,
by Davor Marijan, Ph.D.);
- Part II: A contribution to the debate on crimes com-
mitted against the Croats in Bosnia and Herzegovina and
on sources relating to the Muslim-Croat conflict in a part
of Bosnia and Herzegovina (Facts Regarding War Crimes
and Crimes against Humanity Committed against Croats in
Bosnia and Herzegovina and Sources Regarding the Mus-
lim-Croat Conflict in a Part of Bosnia and Herzegovina, by
Ante Nazor, Ph.D.);
- Part III: A list of Croats civilians and HVO POWs, who
were killed in Bosnia and Herzegovina by members of
Serb and Muslim forces during the war in Bosnia and
Herzegovina (Crimes Committed by Members of the Serb
Forces against Croatian Civilians and HVO POWs, and
Crimes Committed by the Muslim Forces, Members of the
ARBiH, against Croatian Civilians and HVO POWs). Data for
the list were collected and collated on the initiative of
General Zlatan Mijo Jelić and Brigadier Petar Kolakušić,
who are the editors of this part of the book.
The need to publish a book that deals with issues
which form the subject of this work arose some 10 years
ago, when historians started researching crimes that had
been committed against Croats in Bosnia and Herzegov-
ina during the Croatian War of Independence. General
Zlatan Mijo Jelić, with the help of and in collaboration
with Brigadier Petar Kolakušić, instigated the realization
of this project. The research for this book began three
years ago, by collecting data on the murdered Croatian
civilians and HVO POWs.
The data regarding the victims were collected
through field research and were provided by persons who
R
participated in the making of this book, mostly HVO com-
manders and members of various local associations that
had sprung up during the Croatian War of Independence.
Apart from these data, the authors used data contained
in the primary sources (mainly the HVO’s materials) and
in a number of published books. The names of the victims
were listed according to municipalities, alphabetically or
chronologically according to the date of death. The list
was then returned to the collaborators at local level for
review and correction, and, possibly, expansion.
4.2.2020. 19:25:00
 Riječ urednika • Editor’s preface
dr. Robert Šalinović, te Udruga Specijalne polici-
je HR HB i Udruga HVIDRA Grad Zagreb, Udruga
Specijalne policije iz Domovinskog rata RH, Udruga
100-postotnih HRVI I. skupine, Zbor Udruga vetera-
na hrvatskih gardijskih postrojbi;
- Županija Središnja Bosna: Mladen Akrap - Macan,
Zdravko Bašić - Ljut, Mario Bradara, Zvonimir Čilić,
Željko Katava, Željko Marijanović, Marinko Ma-
tošević, Miroslav Rašo, Zoran Slišković, Anto Spa-
jić, Bogdan Šantić, Zrinko Tokić, Miroslav Zelić, te
H
Udruga hrvatskih ratnih vojnih invalida općine
Travnik i Udruga dragovoljaca i veterana HVO-a
općina Vitez;
- Hercegovačko-neretvanska županija: Pero Blažević,
Josip Drežnjak, Zdenko Jurić - Major, Stanko Krezić -
Stana, Ilija Krtalić, dr. Zdravko Kuzman, Karlo Marić,
M
Tomislav Mihalj, Zdravko Mikulić, Nedjeljko Obra-
dović, Božo Pavlović, Miro Pavlović, Željko Planinić,
Niko-Nino Vidović, Dragan Vukić, Mirko Zelenika;
- Županija sarajevska: Zdenko Marković, Darko Bodul;
- Zeničko-dobojska županija: Mario Andrić, Renato
Buhić, Čedomir Franjkić, Željko Ljubanić, Zdravko
D
Marošević, Drago Tokmadžija te Koordinacija
općinskih i županijskih udruga HVO-a ZD županije;
- Županija zapadnohercegovačka: Ivan Ančić, Jo-
sip Bevanda, Darko Kvesić, Robert Šalinović i Ma-
rio Tica;
- Hercegbosanska županija: Ana Papić, Martina Ćurić,
C
Željko Mihaljević – Best, Marko Radoš - Mara, Franjo
Smoljo i Željko Šiljeg;
- Sjeverozapadna Bosna: Mario Bujanović, - Zenica-Doboj Canton: Mario Andrić, Renato Buhić,
Marijan Mihić, Zoran Piličić i Frano Piplović;
- Bosanska Posavina: Ivo Anđelić (predsjednik
Udruge obitelji poginulih i nestalih HR HB), Mato
Bilonjić, Tomislav Božić, Dinko Čutura, Ivo Đogaš, ica-Doboj Canton;
Ivo Filipović, Marinko Geljić, Joso Leovac - Los, Pejo
Janjić Lesi, Mijo Josipović (predsjednik Udruge
dragovoljaca i veterana Domovinskog rata HVO
HB Ravne - Brčko), Zdravko Marinić, Josip Markov-
ić - Sipe, Marinko Nikolaš, Ilija Ravlić, Pero Stanić,
Anto Stopić i Mirko Zečević - Tadić (predsjednik
HVIDRA-e Ravne - Brčko).
Radi razumijevanja konteksta, odnosno okolnos-
ti u kojima su počinjena ubojstva s obilježjem zloči-
na nad Hrvatima u BiH u Domovinskom ratu, knjiga
započinje pregledom vojne i političke povijesti Hr-
vatske i Hrvata od 1990. do 1995., odnosno pregle-
dom Domovinskog rata, s posebnim osvrtom na po-
10
Domovinski rat 04-02-2020 Knjiga 1.indd 10
Therefore, the authors would like to express their
gratitude to the editors of the third part of the book,
Zlatan Mijo Jelić and Petar Kolakušić, and also to their
collaborators, for their assistance in collecting the
above-mentioned data:
- Nika Pinter, Frano Piplović, Marko Tokić, Ivan Lozu-
šić – Loza, Darko Kvesić, Jadranko Barišić, Robert
Šalinović, Association of Special Police of the HR HB,
Croatian Disabled Homeland War Veterans’ Associa-
tion – City of Zagreb, Association of Special Police
of the RH, Association of Disabled Veterans of the
Croatian War of Independence, Group I disability,
Assembly of Associations of War Veterans of Croa-
tian Guards Brigades;
- Central Bosnia Canton: Mladen “Macan” Akrap,
Zdravko “Ljut” Bašić, Mario Bradara, Zvonimir Čilić,
Željko Katava, Željko Marijanović, Marinko Ma-
tošević, Miroslav Rašo, Zoran Slišković, Anto Spajić,
Bogdan Šantić, Zrinko Tokić, Miroslav Zelić, as well
as the Association of Croatian Disabled War Veter-
ans of the Travnik Municipality and the Association
of Volunteers and War Veterans HVO of the Vitez
Municipality;
- Herzegovina-Neretva Canton: Pero Blažević, Josip
Drežnjak, Zdenko “Major” Jurić, Stanko “Stana” Krezić,
Ilija Krtalić, dr. Zdravko Kuzman, Karlo Marić, Tomislav
Mihalj, Zdravko Mikulić, Nedjeljko Obradović, Božo
Pavlović, Miro Pavlović, Željko Planinić, Niko-Nino Vi-
dović, Dragan Vukić, Mirko Zelenika;
- Sarajevo Canton: Zdenko Marković, Darko Bodul;
Čedomir Franjkić, Željko Ljubanić, Zdravko Ma-
rošević, Drago Tokmadžija and the Coordination of
D
Municipal and County HVO Associations of the Zen-
- West Herzegovina Canton: Ivan Ančić, Josip Bevan-
da, Darko Kvesić, Robert Šalinović and Mario Tica;
- Herzeg-Bosnia Canton: Ana Papić, Martina Ćurić,
R
Željko Mihaljević – Best, Marko “Mara” Radoš, Franjo
Smoljo and Željko Šiljeg;
- Northwest Bosnia: Mario Bujanović, Marijan Mihić,
Zoran Piličić and Frano Piplović;
- Bosanska Posavina: Ivo Anđelić (President of the
Association of the Families of the Killed and Miss-
ing Persons of the HR HB), Mato Bilonjić, Tomislav
Božić, Dinko Čutura, Ivo Đogaš, Ivo Filipović, Marinko
Geljić, Joso “Los” Leovac, Pejo Janjić Lesi, Mijo Jo-
sipović (President of the Association of Volunteers
4.2.2020. 19:25:00
 Riječ urednika • Editor’s preface
dručje Bosne i Hercegovine, čiji je autor dr. sc. Davor
Marijan. Složenost problematike i problematičan pri-
kaz u medijima koji često zanemaruje izvore o ratu u
Bosni i Hercegovini, razlog je što je u knjizi, u odnosu
na vojne operacije u Hrvatskoj, malo detaljnije pri-
kazan vojni aspekt događaja u BiH, posebice musli-
mansko-hrvatski građanski rat u BiH, odnosno sukob
ARBiH i HVO-a.
Svoje zaključke u prvom dijelu ove knjige autor
Davor Marijan temelji uglavnom na primarnim iz-
H
vorima (arhivi u Hrvatskoj i arhiva Međunarodnog
kaznenog suda za bivšu Jugoslaviju u Haagu, izvori
MORH-a i vojski u BiH te drugi pisani izvori). No, poda-
ci u izvorima katkad nisu u skladu s podacima koje u
svojim radovima ili prigodnim kronologijama iznose
sudionici događaja, pa je u takvim slučajevima po-
M
trebno provjeriti i njihov kontekst. Primjerice, autor
svoju tvrdnju o osnivanju 111. xp brigade (Žepče) te-
melji na zapovijedi Zapovjedništva OZ-a Srednja Bos-
na od 18. studenoga 1992., a prema iskazu zapovjed-
nika 111. xp brigade, sve postrojbe HVO-a južno od
rijeke Save nosile su brojčane oznake koje su počinjale
D
brojevima od 101 (101. brigada Bosanski Brod) do 112
(112. brigada Tuzla), na temelju Odluke o mobilizaci-
jskom razvoju vojnih snaga Hrvatskog vijeća obrane
na cjelokupnom prostoru Bosne i Hercegovine, od 17.
travnja 1992. godine. U skladu s time, oni navode da
se od toga razdoblja brigada HVO-a na žepačkom po-
C
dručju naziva 111. xp brigada HVO-a. Dakako, spome-
nutu tvrdnju treba potkrijepiti konkretnim izvorom.
Uz izvore i literaturu o Domovinskom ratu, au-
tor je prilikom pisanja pregleda Domovinskog rata
sa zahvalnošću koristio i sugestije pojedinih ratnih
D
zapovjednika i sudionika zbivanja u Bosni i Hercego-
vini u spomenutom razdoblju: Zlatana Mije Jelića, Pe-
tra Kolakušića, Ivana Primorca, Miljenka Lasića, Željka
Šiljega, Daria Kordića, Nedjeljka Obradovića, Maria
Bradare, Zvonimira Čilića, Zrinka Tokića, Ive Filipovića,
Ivana Ančića, Radmila Jasaka i Petra Zelenike te člano-
va Zajednice udruga proisteklih iz Domovinskog rata
HVO-a Zeničko-dobojske županije. Posebnu zahval-
nost zaslužuje i gospođa Nika Pinter, odvjetnica čije
je iskustvo rada na Haškom sudu u obrani hrvatskoga
generala Slobodana Praljka bilo dragocjeno za sa-
držaj ove knjige.
Namjera knjige je objavljivanjem imena civila i
zarobljenih pripadnika HVO-a, koje su ubili pripad-
nici srpskih i muslimanskih snaga u Bosni i Herce-
11
Domovinski rat 04-02-2020 Knjiga 1.indd 11
and Homeland War Veterans of the HVO HB Ravne-
Brčko), Zdravko Marinić, Josip “Sipe” Marković,
Marinko Nikolaš, Ilija Ravlić, Pero Stanić, Anto Stopić
and Mirko Zečević-Tadić (President of the Croatian
Disabled Homeland War Veterans’ Association of
Ravne-Brčko).
In order to give the reader an insight into the context,
or the circumstances in which the crimes against Croats
in Bosnia and Herzegovina were committed during the
Croatian War of Independence, this book starts with an
overview of the military and political history of Croatia
and the Croats from 1990 to 1995, or in other words, with
an overview of the Croatian War of Independece, with
special emphasis on events in Bosnia and Herzegovina.
The author of this part of the book is Davor Marijan, Ph.D.
Due to the complexity of the topic and its problematic
representation in the media, which often gloss over writ-
ten sources on the war in Bosnia and Herezgovina, this
book provides, in comparison to the military operations
in Croatia, a more detailed account of the military aspect
of the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina, especially of the
Muslim-Croat civil war in Bosnia and Herzegovina, or the
conflict between the ARBIH and the HVO.
Davor Marijan’s conclusions in the first part of the
book are based, mostly, on primary sources (archives
in Croatia, ICTY court records and archives, MORH doc-
uments, ARBIH documents and other written sources).
However, information contained in the mentioned sourc-
es does not always match witness accounts. In such cases
it is necessary to double-check the context. For example,
the author bases his claim regarding the formation of the
111th xp Brigade (Žepče) on HQ Central Bosnia’s order of
November 18, 1992, but, according to statements made
by the commanders of the 111th xp Brigade, all HVO units
stationed to the south of the Sava River bore numerical
designations starting with the number 101 (101st Sla-
vonski Brod Brigade) and finishing with the number 112
(112th Tuzla Brigade), in accordance with the Decision on
R
Mobilization of the Armed Forces of the HVO in the Entire
Area of BiH reached on April 17, 1992. The commanders
claim that the Žepče Brigade, starting with the men-
tioned date, bore the designation the 111th xp Brigade
of the HVO. Of course, this claim has to be verified by a
valid source.
Apart from using primary sources relating to and
books about the Croatian War on Independence, the au-
thor, while composing an overview of the Croatian War of
Independence, consulted war commanders who partici-
4.2.2020. 19:25:00
 Riječ urednika • Editor’s preface

govini, upozoriti na stradanje hrvatskog naroda u
Domovinskom ratu u Bosni i Hercegovini, o čemu se,
zbog medijske blokade, malo zna. Moguće je da zbog
složenih okolnosti istraživanja u knjizi nisu navedeni svi
ubijeni civili Hrvati i zarobljeni pripadnici HVO-a, pa se
mole čitatelji da ako primijete da netko nije naveden ili da
navedeni podaci nisu točni, o tome obavijeste HMDCDR
na adresu e-pošte: centar@centardomovinskograta.hr.
Urednici
H
M
D
C
Crkva svetog Marka u Zagrebu. Prvotna struktura je izgrađena u
13. stoljeću, toranj je završen u 18. stoljeću, a krov između 1876.
i 1883. godine. Na krovu je srednjovjekovni grb Hrvatske, Dalma-
cije i Slavonije (na lijevoj strani), te grb grada Zagreba (na desnoj
strani krova). Crkva se nalazi na Trgu svetog Marka, između zgra-
de Sabora i Banskih dvora (sjedišta Vlade Republike Hrvatske).
St. Mark’s Church in Zagreb. The original structure was built in
the 13th century. The church tower was completed in the 18th
century and the roof between 1876 and 1883. The roof features
the medieval coat of arms of Croatia, Dalmatia and Slavonia on
the left side, and the emblem of the city of Zagreb on the right.
The church is located on Saint Mark’s Square, between the Croa-
tian Parliament building and the Banski Dvori building (the seat
of the government of the Republic of Croatia).
pated in the events in Bosnia and Herzgovina during the
mentioned period. The author owes a debt to gratitute
to the following individuals for putting forward their sug-
gestions: Zlatan Mijo Jelić, Petar Kolakušić, Ivan Primorac,
Milj, enko Lasić, Željko Šiljeg, Dario Kordić, Nedjeljko Ob-
radović, Mario Bradara, Zvonimir Čilić, Zrinko Tokić, Ivo Fi-
lipović, Ivan Ančić, Radmilo Jasak and Petar Zelenika and
members of the Union of the Croatian War of Indepen-
dence Associations of the HVO – Zenica-Doboj Canton.
Thanks should also go to Mrs. Nika Pinter, a laywer whose
experience of defending General Slobodan Praljak at the
Hague Tribunal provided an invaluable primary source
for the making of this book.
By publishing the names of Croatian civilians and
HVO POWs killed by members of Serb and Muslim
forces in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the authors aim to
bring to the reader’s attention the plight of the Croa-
tian Nation in Bosnia and Herzegovina during the Cro-
atian War of Independence, something that, thanks
to the media blackout, not many people know about.
Due to the complex circumstances surrounding the
research for this book, it is possible that not all names
of Croatian civilians and HVO POWs are listed. For that
reason, the authors kindly ask the readers to inform
the HMDCDR about any inconsistencies regarding the
list at centar@centardomovinskograta.hr.
Editors
D
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12

Domovinski rat 04-02-2020 Knjiga 1.indd 12 4.2.2020. 19:25:01

 H
M
D
C
D
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KRV/ATS / KA! / KROATIEN / CROATIA / CROATIE / 1991, Autor: Boris Ljubičić, Zagreb, 1991.; Zamjen-
om slova i riječi („krv”) izražena je hrvatska stvarnost 1991. godine.

KRV/ATS/KA!/KROATIEN/CROATIA/CROATIE/1991, Author: Boris Ljubičić, Zagreb, 1991; The grave sit-

uation Croatia was in during 1991 is expressed by the replacement of the letter “H” in HRV/ATSKA
(CROATIA) with the letter “K”, thus forming the word KRV (BLOOD).

Domovinski rat 04-02-2020 Knjiga 1.indd 13 4.2.2020. 19:25:10

 UVOD

INTRODUCTION
H
M
D
C
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 Uvod • Intruduction
Domovinski rat široko je prihvaćen naziv za raz-
doblje hrvatske povijesti u 1990-im godinama, u kojem
je stvorena, a potom u nametnutom ratu i obranjena
suvremena Republika Hrvatska. Zakonskim aktima Re-
publike Hrvatske (Zakon o pravima hrvatskih branitelja
iz Domovinskog rata i članova njihovih obitelji), Do-
movinski rat obuhvaća razdoblje od 5. kolovoza 1990.
(početak tečaja “prvih hrvatskih redarstvenika”) do
30. lipnja 1996. (s obzirom na prethodno ratno stanje,
primjereniji bi bio datum 23. kolovoza 1996., kada je
H
potpisan “Sporazum o punoj normalizaciji i uspostavi
diplomatskih odnosa između Republike Hrvatske i Sa-
vezne Republike Jugoslavije”).
Pod nazivom Domovinski rat podrazumijeva se:
• razdoblje završnih priprema srpskog agresora za
osvajački rat i pripajanje Srbiji znatnih dijelova Hr-
M
vatske i Bosne i Hercegovine (stvaranjem “srpskih
republika” na tim područjima, radi ostvarenja glav-
noga cilja velikosrpske politike – da “svi Srbi žive
u jednoj državi”, koju je tada provodilo srbijansko
vodstvo predvođeno Slobodanom Miloševićem);
• razdoblje protuustavnoga i terorističkog djelova-
D
nja te naoružavanja i oružane pobune dijela Srba u
Hrvatskoj od sredine 1990. (tzv. puzajuća ili prikri-
vena agresija);
• ustrojavanje hrvatske obrambene, odnosno oruža-
ne sile, što je proces koji je počeo u kolovozu 1990.,
prvo u okviru MUP-a RH, a završen je s okončanjem
C
rata;
• početak rata i otvorene agresije Srbije i Crne Gore,
odnosno Jugoslavenske narodne armije (JNA) i te-
ritorijalnih obrana i milicije Srbije, Crne Gore i di-
jela Bosne i Hercegovine te različitih srpskih para-
D
vojnih postrojbi na Hrvatsku, uz sudjelovanje dijela
Srba iz Hrvatske od ljeta 1991. (odmah nakon što je
Sabor RH 25. lipnja 1991. donio Ustavnu odluku o
suverenosti i samostalnosti RH);
• obrana Republike Hrvatske i oslobađanje najvećeg
dijela njezina privremeno okupiranog teritorija
vojnim putem od 1991. do kraja 1995. godine.
Dakle, prema zakonskim aktima Republike Hrvat-
ske, naziv Domovinski rat obuhvaća i razdoblje koje je
neposredno prethodilo otvorenom ratu u Hrvatskoj,
odnosno otvorenoj velikosrpskoj agresiji na Republiku
Hrvatsku, kao i razdoblje neposredno nakon završetka
ratnih operacija u Hrvatskoj i BiH.
S obzirom na to da je posljednji dio okupiranoga
međunarodno priznatoga hrvatskog državnog terito-
15
Domovinski rat 04-02-2020 Knjiga 1.indd 15
The Croatian War of Independence spans the period
of Croatian history from the beginning of the 1990s to
the middle of the decade. These years of the country’s
history were tumultuous, marked first by the creation of
the Republic of Croatia and then by a defensive war in
which the Croatian Army expelled the invader and en-
sured that the country would continue as a viable, polit-
ical entity within its internationally recognized borders.
Officially, by legislative acts of the Republic of Croatia
(the Law on the Rights of Croatian Homeland War Veter-
ans and Their Family Members) the Croatian War of Inde-
pendence started on August 5, 1990, and ended on June
30, 1996 (it could be argued that the war actually ended
on August 23, 1996, when the Agreement on Normaliza-
tion of Relations between the Republic of Croatia and
the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia was signed).
The term “the Croatian War of Independence” en-
compasses the following:
• a period during which the JNA concluded the fi-
nal phase of its preparations for an aggressive war
against Croatia for the purpose of joining to Serbia
a large portion of Croatia’s territory and Bosnia and
Herzegovina’s territory (by creating “Serbian repub-
lics” in these areas and for the purpose of realizing
the main objective of the Greater Serbian policy –
the creation of a Greater Serbian state; the Serbian
leadership, with Slobodan Milošević at its helm, was
determined to achieve the above mentioned main
objective);
• a period during which the JNA and armed Serb civil-
ians engaged in counter-constitutional and terrorist
activities. At that time a part of the Croatian Serbs
rebelled against the Croatian government. From
mid-1990 the JNA was arming the rebels;
• the formation of the Croatian defense force, that is,
Croatian Armed Forces. The process began in Au-
gust, 1990, first within the framework of the Ministry
of Internal Affairs (MUP) of the Republic of Croatia
R
and ended with the end of the war;
• the start of the war and Serbia and Montenegro’s
open aggression against the Republic of Croatia,
that is, open aggression of the JNA and Territorial
Defense forces and militias of Serbia, Montenegro,
parts of Bosnia and Herzegovina and various Serb
paramilitary formations against Croatia. A part of
the Croatian Serbs actively participated in the war
against Croatia from the summer of 1991 (immedi-
ately after the Croatian Parliament, on June 25, 1991,
4.2.2020. 19:25:10
 Uvod • Intruduction
rija vraćen političkim sporazumom, a ne vojnom op-
cijom, s političkog gledišta završetkom Domovinskog
rata može se smatrati 15. siječnja 1998., kada je završio
proces mirne reintegracije Hrvatskog Podunavlja (Ba-
ranja te dio istočne Slavonije i zapadni Srijem) u ustav-
nopravni poredak Republike Hrvatske.
Među Hrvatima u Bosni i Hercegovini, koji su u ve-
likom broju sudjelovali i u obrani Hrvatske, Domovin-
ski rat također je široko prihvaćen pojam za razdoblje
od 1991. (napad JNA i velikosrpskih snaga početkom
H
listopada 1991. na većinski hrvatsko naselje Ravno
u istočnoj Hercegovini) do kraja 1995., pod kojim se
podrazumijeva obrana od srpske agresije, sukob za te-
ritorij s bošnjačko-muslimanskim snagama, te sudje-
lovanje Hrvatskog vijeća obrane (HVO) i Specijalnih
postrojbi MUP-a Hrvatske Republike Herceg-Bosne
M
(SP MUP HRHB) s Hrvatskom vojskom i Armijom RBiH
u završnim operacijama oslobađanja jugozapadne i
zapadne Bosne.1
D
C
1 Domovinski rat – pregled političke i diplomatske povijesti,
priredili: Ante Nazor – Tomislav Pušek, NZ Globus – HM-
DCDR, Zagreb, 2018., 9.
16
Domovinski rat 04-02-2020 Knjiga 1.indd 16
reached the Constitutional Decision on Sovereignty
and Independence of the Republic of Croatia);
• the defense and liberation of most of the occupied
territory by the Croatian Army from 1991 to the end
of 1995.
Therefore, according to the legislative acts of the Re-
public of Croatia, the term “the Croatian War of Indepen-
dence” encompasses the period immediately preceding
Serbia’s open aggression against Croatia and the period
immediately following the end of military operations in
Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina.
Given the fact that the last chunk of the occupied
Croatian territory (the Croatian Danube region, Baranja
and a part of eastern Slavonia and western Sirmium) in
terms of the country’s internationally recognized bor-
ders was reintegrated into Croatia’s constitutional and
legal order by way of political agreement, it could be ar-
gued, from a strictly political perspective, that the war
ended on January 15, 1998.
The Bosnian Croats have adopted the term “the Cro-
atian War of Independence” for the period from 1991 (at-
tack by the JNA and greater Serbian forces at the begin-
ning of October, 1991, on the predominately Croatian
village of Ravno in eastern Herzegovina) until the end of
1995. For the Bosnian Croats the term, with the events
and developments described in the preceding para-
graphs, also encompasses the defense against Serb ag-
gression, conflict for territory against the Bosniak-Mus-
lim forces and the participation of the HVO and Special
Forces of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the HR HB,
with the Croatian Army and the ARBIH in the final opera-
tions for the liberation of southwest and western Bosnia.
D
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4.2.2020. 19:25:10
 Davor Marijan

RAT ZA OPSTOJNOST
H
HRVATA, 1991. - 1995.
Pregled političkih i vojnih događaja u
M
Domovinskom ratu, s posebnim osvrtom na
muslimansko-hrvatski sukob u BiH
D
THE CROATIAN NATION’S
C
STRUGGLE FOR
SURVIVAL, 1991-1995
D
An Overview of Political and Military
Events in the Croatian War of Independence,
with Special Emphasis on the Muslim-Croat
Conflict in Bosnia and Herzegovina)
R

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 Sadržaj / Contents

24 UVODNA NAPOMENA / AUTHOR’S PREFACE

27 I. POLITIČKA PODLOGA / THE POLITICAL BACKGROUND

29 RASPAD JUGOSLAVIJE I STVARANJE REPUBLIKE HRVATSKE / BREAK-UP OF

H
YUGOSLAVIA AND CREATION OF THE REPUBLIC OF CROATIA
29 Kriza i raspad Jugoslavije / Crisis and Break-up of Yugoslavia
34 Demokratski izbori u Hrvatskoj i proglašenje neovisnosti / Democratic Elections
in Croatia and Declaration of Independence
42 Srpska pobuna / Serb Rebellion
M
47 Pokušaj Hrvatske da srpski problem riješi na miran način / Croatian Attempts to
Solve the Serb Problem Peacefully
49 Neuspješni pregovori o budućnosti Jugoslavije / Unsuccessful Negotiations
on the Future of Yugoslavia
50 Iskorak Hrvatske na međunarodnu scenu / Croatia Appears on the
International Stage
D
59 Hrvatska 1992. – 1995. (1997./1998.) / Croatia from 1992 to 1995 (1997/1998)
61 Hrvatska i rat u Bosni i Hercegovini / Croatia and the War in
Bosnia and Herzegovina in 1992
63 Mirovna operacija Ujedinjenih naroda i međunarodni položaj Hrvatske /
United Nation Peacekeeping Mission and Croatia’s International Position
C
69 Okupirani teritorij Republike Hrvatske / The Occupied Areas
of the Republic of Croatia
76 BOSNA I HERCEGOVINA / BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA
78 Bosna i Hercegovina tijekom srpskog rata protiv Hrvatske / Bosnia and Herzegovina
during Serbia’s War against Croatia
D
81 Hrvatska zajednica / Hrvatska Republika Herceg-Bosna /
The Croatian Community / Croatian Republic of Herzeg-Bosnia
83 Bosna i Hercegovina – bošnjački dio / Bosnia and Herzegovina – The Muslims
84 Međunarodni aspekt rata u BiH / International Aspect of the War
in Bosnia and Herzegovina
R
87 II. SUDIONICI RATA / BELLIGERENTS

89 ORUŽANE SNAGE SFRJ / THE ARMED FORCES OF THE SFRY

89 Jugoslavenska narodna armija / The Yugoslav People’s Army
93 Teritorijalne obrane Srbije, Crne Gore i Bosne i Hercegovine /
Territorial Defense Formations of Serbia, Montenegro and Bosnia and Herzegovina
94 Srbijanske paravojne formacije / Serbian Paramilitary Formations

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 Sadržaj • Contents

96 ORUŽANA SILA REPUBLIKE HRVATSKE / ARMED FORCES OF

THE REPUBLIC OF CROATIA
97 Policija / Police
100 Hrvatska vojska / The Croatian Army
105 HRVATSKE OBRAMBENE SNAGE – HOS / THE CROATIAN DEFENSE FORCES – HOS
107 SRPSKA VOJSKA KRAJINE / THE SERBIAN ARMY OF KRAJINA
111 HRVATSKO VIJEĆE OBRANE / THE CROATIAN DEFENSE COUNCIL
114 HOS U BOSNI I HERCEGOVINI / HOS IN BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA
115 VOJSKA REPUBLIKE SRPSKE / THE ARMY OF THE REPUBLIKA SRPSKA
H
117 ARMIJA REPUBLIKE BOSNE I HERCEGOVINE /
THE ARMY OF THE REPUBLIC OF BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA
119 Mudžahedini / Mujahideen
120 ORGANIZACIJSKE PROMJENE VOJNIH SNAGA 1992. - 1995. /
THE ORGANIZATIONAL CHANGES OF THE ARMED FORCES 1992 – 1995
M
120 HRVATSKA / CROATIA
120 Hrvatske oružane snage / Croatian Armed Forces
128 Jugoslavenska narodna armija / The Yugoslav People’s Army
130/129 Srpska vojska Krajine / The Serbian Army of Krajina
134 BOSNA I HERCEGOVINA / BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA
D
134 Hrvatsko vijeće obrane / Croatian Defense Council
141/140 Armija Republike Bosne i Hercegovine / The Army of the
Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina
143 Vojska Republike Srpske / The Army of the Republika Srpska
C
145 III. 1990. - 1992. OD SRPSKE POBUNE DO SARAJEVSKOG PRIMIRJA /
1990 – 1992 FROM THE SERB REBELLION TO THE SARAJEVO CEASE-FIRE AGREEMENT

147 SRPSKA POBUNA I AGRESIJA / SERB REBELLION AND AGGRESSION

147 Razoružanje Teritorijalne obrane i prestrojavanje Jugoslavenske narodne armije za rat /
D
Disarming of the Territorial Defense and Gearing up the Yugoslav People’s Army for War
149 Srpska pobuna i hrvatske protumjere / Serb Rebellion and Croatian
Countermeasures
151 Pokušaj razoružanja hrvatske policije u siječnju 1991. godine /
Attempt to Disarm the Croatian Police in January 1991
R
155 Prvi sukobi / First Engagements
161 Od proglašenja hrvatske neovisnosti do rata za vojarne /
From the Declaration of Croatian Independence to the War for the Barracks
164 Reakcije na rat u Hrvatskoj / Reactions to the War in Croatia
167 RAT ZA VOJARNE / WAR FOR THE BARRACKS
173 ZAMISAO I PROPAST NAPADNE OPERACIJE JUGOSLAVENSKE NARODNE ARMIJE /
FAILURE OF THE YUGOSLAV PEOPLE’S ARMY’S OFFENSIVE
177 ISTOČNO BOJIŠTE / THE EASTERN THEATER OF OPERATIONS

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 Sadržaj • Contents

181 ZAPADNOSLAVONSKO BOJIŠTE / WESTERN SLAVONIA THEATER OF OPERATIONS

183 BOJIŠTE BANOVINE I SISKA / BANOVINA AND SISAK THEATER OF OPERATIONS
184 ŠIRE PODRUČJE ZAGREBA / THE WIDER ZAGREB AREA
185 BOJIŠTE KARLOVCA I KORDUNA / KARLOVAC AND KORDUN
THEATER OF OPERATIONS
187 ISTRA, HRVATSKO PRIMORJE, KVARNER I GORSKI KOTAR /
ISTRIA, CROATIAN LITTORAL, KVARNER AND GORSKI KOTAR
187 LIČKO BOJIŠTE / LIKA THEATER OF OPERATIONS
189 SJEVERNO I SREDNJODALMATINSKO BOJIŠTE /
H
NORTH DALMATIAN AND CENTRAL DALMATIAN THEATER OF OPERATIONS
191 JUŽNO BOJIŠTE / THE SOUTHERN THEATER OF OPERATIONS IN 1991
198 Zapadna Hercegovina / Western Herzegovina
199 POMORSKO BOJIŠTE / MARITIME THEATER OF OPERATIONS
199 ZRAKOPLOVSTVO U RATU / AIR FORCE IN WAR IN 1991
M
202 ZNAČENJE 1991. GODINE / SIGNIFICANCE OF EVENTS OF 1991

211 IV. 1992. - 1994.: OD SARAJEVSKOG PRIMIRJA DO ZAGREBAČKOG

SPORAZUMA / 1992 – 1994 FROM THE SARAJEVO CEASE-FIRE AGREEMENT
TO THE ZAGREB AGREEMENT
D
213 HRVATSKA 1992. GODINE / CROATIA IN 1992
213 Oslobodilački pothvati hrvatskih snaga / Offensive Operations of
the Croatian Armed Forces
214 Velebit / Velebit
C
214 Nos Kalik / Nos Kalik
215 Baranja / Baranja
216/215 Zadar (Podgradina i Križ) / Zadar (Podgradina and Križ)
216 Miljevački plato / The Miljevci Plateau
217 Razoružanje Srba u Gorskom kotaru / The Disarmament of the Serbs in Gorski Kotar
D
218 RAT U BOSNI I HERCEGOVINI 1992. GODINE / THE WAR IN
BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA IN 1992
221 JNA I VRS NA ZADATKU DRŽAVNOG RAZGRANIČENJA SRPSKOG ENTITETA/
JNA AND VRS’S EFFORTS TO ESTABLISH AND SECURE THE BOUNDARIES OF
THE SERB AUTONOMOUS AREA
R
223 ISTOČNA BOSNA / EASTERN BOSNIA
225 TUZLANSKA REGIJA / TUZLA REGION
226 OPSADA SARAJEVA / THE SIEGE OF SARAJEVO
229 BOSANSKA KRAJINA / THE BOSANSKA KRAJINA REGION
230 BIHAĆKI DŽEP / BIHAĆ POCKET
232 JUŽNO BOJIŠTE 1992. GODINE / SOUTHERN THEATER OF OPERATIONS IN 1992
233 Kupres i Šuica / Kupres and Šuica

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 Sadržaj • Contents

235 Livno / Livno

237 Mostar i Čapljina / Mostar and Čapljina
239 Travanjska ofenziva 4. vojne oblasti JNA / April Offensive Launched by
the 4th Military District of the JNA
242 Prodor HV-a u istočnu Hercegovinu i deblokada Dubrovnika /
HV’s Advance into Easter Herzegovina and Lifting the Siege of Dubrovnik
244/243 Operacija Čagalj i borbe za Mostar / Operation Jackal and Battles for Mostar
248 Osiguranje zaleđa Dubrovnika i operacija Tigar /
Securing Dubrovnik’s Hinterland and Operation Tiger
H
249 Operacija Oslobođena zemlja / Operation Liberated Land
249 Protuudar Hercegovačkoga korpusa u kolovozu 1992. godine /
Herzegovina Corps’s Counterattack in August 1992 186
250 Oslobađanje Konavala i zaleđa Dubrovnika / Liberation of Konavle
and Dubrovnik’s Hinterland
M
251 Operacija Bura / Operation Bura
253 SJEVERNA HERCEGOVINA / NORTHERN HERZEGOVINA
258 SREDIŠNJA BOSNA / CENTRAL BOSNIA
260 Bugojno i Gornji Vakuf / Uskoplje / Bugojno and Gornji Vakuf
264 Jajce – operacija Vrbas-92 / Jajce – Operation Vrbas-92
D
266/267 Dolina Lašve i Zenica / Lašva Valley and Zenica
270 Usora – Žepče – Maglaj / Usora – Žepče – Maglaj
273 Kakanj i Vareš / Kakanj and Vareš
274 Fojnica – Kiseljak – Kreševo / Fojnica – Kiseljak – Kreševo
276 BOSANSKA POSAVINA / THE BOSANSKA POSAVINA REGION
C
277 Početne borbe / First battles
279 Operacija Koridor / Operation Koridor
282 RATIŠTE NA KRAJU 1992. GODINE / THE THEATER OF WAR AT THE END OF 1992
285 OPERACIJE U HRVATSKOJ 1993. GODINE / OPERATIONS IN CROATIA IN 1993
D
285 OPERACIJA GUSAR (MASLENICA) / OPERATION GUSAR (MASLENICA)
286 Oslobađanje brane Peruče / Liberation of Peruča dam
287 OPERACIJA DŽEP-93 / OPERATION DŽEP-93
289 BOSNA I HERCEGOVINA 1993. – 1994. GODINE /
BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA IN 1993-1994
R
290 MUSLIMANSKO-HRVATSKI RAT U BiH / MUSLIM-CROAT WAR IN
BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA
296 SUKOBI U SIJEČNJU 1993. GODINE / BATTLES IN JANUARY 1993
296 Gornji Vakuf / Uskoplje / Gornji Vakuf/Uskoplje
299 Lašvanska dolina / Lašva Valley
302 ZATIŠJE PRED BURU / CALM BEFORE THE STORM
304 HERCEGOVINA / HERZEGOVINA
304 Konjic – Jablanica / Konjic – Jablanica

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 Sadržaj • Contents

311 Mostar / Mostar

322 Čapljina – Stolac / Čapljina – Stolac
324 SREDIŠNJA BOSNA / CENTRAL BOSNIA
324 Borbe u travnju 1993. godine / Fighting in April 1993
332 Travnik i Novi Travnik / Travnik and Novi Travnik
336 Kakanj / Kakanj
337 Dolina Lepenice / Lepenica Valley
341 Vareš / Vareš
H
344 Dolina Lašve / Lašva Valley
349 Žepče / Žepče
353 Sarajevo, Tuzla, Usora / Sarajevo, Tuzla, Usora
355 DOLINA VRBASA I RAMA / VRBAS VALLEY AND RAMA
355 Bugojno / Bugojno
M
357 Uskoplje (Gornji Vakuf) / Uskoplje (Gornji Vakuf)
363 Rama / Rama
365 WASHINGTONSKI SPORAZUM I ZAVRŠETAK RATA /
WASHINGTON AGREEMENT AND THE END OF THE WAR
366 ODNOS VRS-a PREMA MUSLIMANSKO-HRVATSKOM RATU U BiH /
D
THE VRS’S ATTITUDE TOWARDS THE MUSLIM-CROAT WAR
370 SRPSKI DIO RATA 1993. – 1994. GODINE / SERB PERSPECTIVE 1993 – 1994
376 MEĐUMUSLIMANSKI RAT U ZAPADNOJ BOSNI 1993. – 1994. GODINE /
INTER-MUSLIM CONFLICT IN WESTERN BOSNIA IN 1993
C
377 V. 1994. – 1995.: OD ZAGREBAČKOGA SPORAZUMA DO KRAJA RATA /
1994 – 1995 FROM THE ZAGREB AGREEMENT TO THE END OF THE WAR

378 REPUBLIKA HRVATSKA 1994. GODINE / THE REPUBLIC OF CROATIA IN 1994

378 Zagrebački sporazum / Zagreb Agreement
D
378 Gospodarski sporazum / Economic Agreement
379 Stanje na pobunjenom području / The Situation in the Rebel Areas
380 RASPLET RATA / THE WAR ENDS
380 BOSNA I HERCEGOVINA 1994. GODINE / BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA IN 1994
381 PRVA BIHAĆKA KRIZA / THE FIRST BIHAĆ CRISIS
R
383 OPERACIJA CINCAR / OPERATION CINCAR
384 OPERACIJA ZIMA-94 / OPERATION ZIMA-94 (WINTER-94)
386 ČETVEROMJESEČNO PRIMIRJE / FOUR-MONTH TRUCE
387 OPERACIJA SKOK-1 / OPERATION SKOK-1
388 OPERACIJA BLJESAK / OPERATION FLASH
390 POLITIČKO I SIGURNOSNO STANJE U RSK /
POLITICAL AND SECURITY SITUATION IN THE RSK

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 Sadržaj • Contents

393 OPERACIJA PLAMEN-95 / OPERATION PLAMEN-95

393 OPERACIJA SKOK-2 / OPERATION SKOK-2
394 PONIŽAVANJE UNPROFOR-a I SNAGE ZA BRZO DJELOVANJE /
HUMILIATION OF UNPROFOR AND RRF
395 BOŠNJAČKO-SRPSKE BORBE U LJETO 1995. /
BATTLES BETWEEN THE BOSNIAKS AND SERBS IN THE SUMMER OF 1995
396 Srebrenica i Žepa / Srebrenica and Žepa
397 DRUGA BIHAĆKA KRIZA – OPERACIJA MAČ-95 (ŠTIT-95) /
THE SECOND BIHAĆ CRISIS – OPERATION MAČ (SWORD) 95 (ŠTIT-SHIELD 95)
H
399 SPLITSKI SPORAZUM / SPLIT AGREEMENT
400 OPERACIJA LJETO-95 / OPERATION SUMMER-95
402 Srpske reakcije na Ljeto-95 / Serb Reactions to Summer-95
404 Politička priprema Oluje / Political Preparations for Operation Storm
406 OPERACIJA OLUJA / OPERATION STORM
M
410 ZAVRŠNE OPERACIJE U BIH / FINAL OPERATIONS IN BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA
410 Borbe u jugozapadnoj Bosni do kraja kolovoza 1995. /
Battles in Southwest Bosnia until August 1995
411 Masakr na tržnici Markale i operacija Deliberate force /
Massacre at the Markale market and Operation Deliberate force
D
412 OPERACIJA MAESTRAL / OPERATION MAESTRAL
412 OPERACIJA UNA / OPERATION UNA
415 Napadne operacije ARBIH i protunapad VRS-a u zapadnoj Bosni /
ARBIH’s Offensive Operations and VRS’s Counterattack in Western Bosnia
417 OPERACIJA JUŽNI POTEZ / OPERATION SOUTHERN MOVE
C
418 ZAVRŠNE BORBE I NEREALIZIRANI PLANOVI /
FINAL BATTLES AND UNREALIZED PLANS

419 VI. RATNI ZLOČINI I ETNIČKA ČIŠĆENJA /

WAR CRIMES AND ETHNIC CLEANSING
D
427 VII. PREDRASUDE I KONTROVERZE / PREJUDICES AND CONTROVERSIES

435 VIII. ZAKLJUČAK / CONCLUSION

R
445 IZVORI I LITERATURA / SOURCES AND BIBLIOGRAPHY

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 UVODNA NAPOMENA

AUTHOR’S PREFACE
H
M
D
C
D
R

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 Uvodna napomena • Author’s preface
Ovo je knjiga o vojnoj povijesti Hrvatske i Hrvata u
Domovinskom ratu 1990. – 1995. godine. Temelji se na
mojoj monografiji Domovinski rat iz 2016. godine, koja
je dijelom skraćena, ali i na par mjesta dopunjena novim
podacima, kao i ispravcima grešaka i propusta. Za ovu
prigodu tekst je prilagođen zahtjevu za utemeljenim
osvrtom na rat u Bosni i Hercegovini, s posebnim na-
glaskom na rat Hrvata i Muslimana (Bošnjaka) od 1992.
do 1994. godine. Sukobi u ostatku Bosne i Hercegov-
ine prikazani su u kratkim crtama jer bez njih stanje na
ratištu ne bi bilo potpuno, a izostao bi i kontekst nužan
H
za razumijevanje rata i na teritoriju Hrvatske. Politič-
ki pregled dan je u uvodu u najkraćim mogućim crta-
ma, taman toliko da omogući praćenje i razumijevanje
stanja na ratištu. Knjiga je utemeljena uglavnom na
dokumentima sukobljenih strana. Značajan dio tih do-
M
kumenata dostupan je na stranicama Međunarodnog
kaznenog suda za bivšu Jugoslaviju u Haagu (ICTY).
Kada je u pitanju rat Hrvata i Muslimana, glavni izvor
bila je web stranica generala Slobodana Praljka, koja je
postojala do rujna 2018. godine i na kojoj je bilo više od
100 tisuća dokumenata. U vrijeme pisanja knjige oko 90
posto korištenih dokumenata bilo je dostupno putem
D
Interneta. Korištena je literatura svih sukobljenih strana,
a prevladava ona koja je pisana na dokumentima ili je
memoarskog karaktera.
Knjiga je pisana kronološki i tematski, s trajnim nas-
tojanjem da, gdje god je to bilo moguće, pomirim ta dva
zahtjeva. Kronološki je podijeljena na temelju zbivanja u
C
Hrvatskoj, koja su relevantna i za Hrvate u BiH.
Sadržaj knjige preveden je i na engleski jezik, no
tekst na engleskom jeziku je bez znanstvenog aparata
koji je zadržan na hrvatskom jeziku i lako se može prov-
jeriti. Izuzetak su samo citati za koje su ostavljene pov-
eznice prema izvorima, odnosno literaturi. Namjera je
D
da čitatelj dobije informaciju o uzroku raspada SFRJ te
uvid u tijek događaja u RH i, malo detaljnije, u BiH, a da
pritom može razumjeti što se dogodilo na kojem bojištu,
bez da ga se optereti detaljima.
Na kraju jedna metodološka napomena. Nastojao
sam što više koristiti izvornu terminologiju sukobljenih
strana. Naziv Muslimani koristim za razdoblje do prol-
jeća 1994., do donošenja Ustava Federacije Bosne i Her-
cegovine, kojim je zakonski sankcionirana promjena u
ime Bošnjaci.
Davor Marijan
25
Domovinski rat 04-02-2020 Knjiga 1.indd 25
This book is a work of military history about the Re-
public of Croatia and the Croats as a nation during the
Croatian War of Independence 1990-1995. It is based on
my book entitled Domovinski rat (The Croatian War of In-
dependence), published in 2016. This work is broader in
scope and detail than Domovinski rat. Certain facts pro-
vided in Domovinski rat were wrong and/or incomplete
and I remedied those errors in this book. On the other
hand, some information contained in Domovinski rat
did not make it into the narrative of this book because
the main focus of this work is on the war in Bosnia and
Herzegovina with special emphasis on the Muslim-Cro-
at conflict in Bosnia from 1992 to 1994. The battles in
the other parts of the theater are dealt with only briefly
but in sufficient detail so as to help the reader put the
main thrust of the narrative into its proper context. For
that reason I decided also to include a short overview of
the political events underlying the developments on the
battlefield in the first part of the book.
The narrative is based, for the most part, on docu-
ments written by both warring parties. A fair portion of
these documents is available on the website of the ICTY.
I also used General Praljak’s website as my main source
for the Muslim-Croat conflict. The website, I think it is
worth pointing out, existed until September, 2018, and
contained more than 100,000 documents. About 90% of
the documents I used as sources while writing this book
were available on the Internet. I focused mostly on offi-
cial documentation and memoirs.
The narrative of this book is chronological but di-
vided into thematic categories. I tried to reconcile, as
much as possible, the conflicting demands of the two
concepts. The narrative also chronologically follows the
events in Croatia relevant with regard to Bosnian Croats.
To save space the footnotes citing sources have
been omitted in the English version of the book (most
of the sources are not in the English language).    The
footnotes directly explaining and clarifying the issues in
question are retained in the English text. Also, a number
of such footnotes were added in the English text for the
R
purpose of clarifying certain issues the readers in the En-
glish speaking world may not be familiar with.
Wherever I could I adopted the original terminology
used by the Croats and the Muslims/Bosniaks during the
war. I use the term Muslims for the period until spring,
1994, when the Constitution of the Federation of BiH
was passed and by which the ethnic Muslims were des-
ignated as Bosniaks.
Davor Marijan
4.2.2020. 19:25:10
 H
M
D
C
)EA.A~ ~dPoA.
]EA.MA Bo(bA
D
]EiH A APJf€dsd
R
Srpski plakat: „Jedan narod, jedna volja, jedna država”; na rubovima „cvijeta” ispisani su gradovi u
Hrvatskoj i BiH koje je srpska osvajačka politika željela pripojiti „Velikoj Srbiji” (Beli Manastir, Petrinja,
Knin, Banja Luka, Sarajevo, Trebinje...).

Serbian poster: “One people, one will, one state”; along the margins of the “flower” are the names of
towns in Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina to be annexed to “Greater Serbia” (Beli Manastir, Petrin-
ja, Knin, Banja Luka, Sarajevo, Trebinje...).

Domovinski rat 04-02-2020 Knjiga 1.indd 26 4.2.2020. 19:25:34

 POLITIČKA PODLOGA
I
H
M
POLITICAL BACKGROUND
D
C
D
R

Domovinski rat 04-02-2020 Knjiga 1.indd 27 4.2.2020. 19:25:34

 Davor Marijan • Rat za opstojnost Hrvata, 1991. - 1995.

ROMANIA
.Deva

Hunedoara•
.,
H
Petrosani 0
M
D
D
Adriatic
C
Sea
D
\
100 Kilometers

1 100 ~iles
~ otenza.
R
I
Ptolemais "

Socijalistička Federativna Republika Jugoslavija (SFRJ).

Socialist Federative Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY).

28

Domovinski rat 04-02-2020 Knjiga 1.indd 28 4.2.2020. 19:25:35

 The Croatian Nation’s Struggle for Survival, 1991-1995
RASPAD JUGOSLAVIJE I
STVARANJE REPUBLIKE
HRVATSKE
Kriza i raspad Jugoslavije
U svibnju 1980. umro je Josip Broz Tito, partijski i po-
litički čelnik Socijalističke Federativne Republike Jugosla-
vije (SFRJ) i vojni zapovjednik Jugoslavenske narodne ar-
H
mije (JNA). Njegova je smrt lišila Jugoslaviju najvažnijega
integrativnog čimbenika. Druga dva integrativna čimbe-
nika, Savez komunista Jugoslavije (SKJ odnosno Partija) i
JNA, 1980-ih izgubila su to obilježje. Partija se raspala na
republičke saveze, a JNA se priklonila Srbiji, čija je vojska
de facto postala najkasnije u srpnju 1991. godine.
M
U završnoj fazi postojanja Jugoslavija se sastojala od
šest socijalističkih republika: Bosne i Hercegovine (BiH),
Crne Gore, Hrvatske, Makedonije, Slovenije i Srbije, dviju
socijalističkih autonomnih pokrajina: Kosova i Vojvodine
u sastavu Srbije, koje su imale status republika, i JNA kao
općejugoslavenske institucije. Zbog brojnih aktera ras-
D
pad Jugoslavije bio je složen i trajao je godinama.
Jugoslavija se raspala u nekoliko ratova, od kojih su
dva – u Hrvatskoj i BiH – povezana i na ratištu koje je mo-
guće odvojiti samo političkim stajalištima. Prema ta dva
rata sukob u Sloveniji doima se kao puškaranje, te nisu
rijetka mišljenja da je to bila srpsko-slovenska predstava
C
na račun JNA i način da Slovenija brzo iziđe iz Jugoslavije.
Prvi vjesnik raspada Jugoslavije bila je gospodarska
kriza, koja je bila logičan odraz jugoslavenske dogovorne
ekonomije. Kriza je počela u drugoj polovini 1970-ih, a
krajem 1983. vanjski dug Jugoslavije narastao je na 20 mi-
D
lijardi i 501 milijun dolara, učinivši ju jednom od najzadu-
ženijih zemalja svijeta. Godinu poslije broj nezaposlenih
prešao je milijun. Stopa nezaposlenosti nije bila svugdje
ista: najveća je bila na Kosovu (24 %), a najmanja u Slo-
veniji (1,4 %). Prosječan osobni dohodak iz 1985. inflacija
je vratila na razinu koju je SFRJ imala 1967. godine. Tek je
1989. i početkom 1990. savezni premijer Ante Marković
konvertibilnim dinarom nakratko zaustavio gospodarsku
krizu, i to, kako su tvrdili neki u Hrvatskoj, na njezin račun.2
2 Branko PETRANOVIĆ, Istorija Jugoslavije 1918–1988,
knjiga 3, Nolit, Beograd, 1988., 445; Vladimir GOATI, Po-
litička anatomija jugoslovenskog društva, Naprijed, Za-
greb, 1989., 21; Branimir LOKIN, Razbijene iluzije: gospo-
darski uzroci pada velikosrpskog projekta, AGM, Zagreb,
1995., 12-13.
29
Domovinski rat 04-02-2020 Knjiga 1.indd 29
BREAK-UP OF YUGOSLAVIA
AND CREATION OF THE
REPUBLIC OF CROATIA
Crisis and Break-up of Yugoslavia
Josip Broz Tito, party leader, President of the Social-
ist Federative Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY) and com-
mander-in-chief of the Yugoslav People’s Army (JNA),
died in May, 1980. The SFRY was being kept together by
a combination of three cohesive factors; the main factor
was Josip Broz Tito himself, and the other two, not as
pivotal but no less important for that, were the League
of Communists of Yugoslavia (the Party) and the JNA.
Shortly after Tito’s death, during the 1980s, the former
disintegrated into republic leagues of Communists and
the latter overtly sided with Serbia. By July, 1991, the
JNA had become, for all intents and purposes, the army
of Serbia.
Yugoslavia, in its terminal phase, consisted of six
socialist republics: Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH), Mon-
tenegro, Croatia, Macedonia, Slovenia and Serbia, two
socialist autonomous provinces: Kosovo and Vojvodina,
enjoying the status of full-fledged republics but existing
as part of Serbia, and the JNA as a universal Yugoslav in-
stitution. The process of the dissolution of the SFRY was
complex and lasted for years, which is not surprising in
light of the fact that Yugoslavia was a conglomeration of
various disparate ethnic groups, nationalities and polit-
ical aspirations.
The origins of the break-up of Yugoslavia lie in a
myriad of determining factors, but the direct cause of
the country’s demise was a series of wars, two of which
– the one in Croatia and the other in Bosnia and Her-
zegovina – were connected in terms of geography and
military operations but separate from a strictly political
perspective. In comparison to these two wars, the war
in Slovenia can be seen as a short skirmish. There exists
R
a body of expert opinion according to which the war in
Slovenia was nothing but a sham staged by Slovenia
and Serbia for the purpose of providing a pretext to Slo-
venia to secede from Yugoslavia relatively painlessly and
giving justification to the JNA for vacating the country,
also relatively painlessly.
The initial harbinger of the inevitable break-up of
the SFRY was the economic crisis that started in the sec-
ond half of the 1970s. The crisis came about as a direct
4.2.2020. 19:25:35
 Davor Marijan • Rat za opstojnost Hrvata, 1991. - 1995.
Uz gospodarsku krizu, Jugoslaviji se 1981. dogodi-
la i pobuna Albanaca na Kosovu, koja je Partiju grubo
podsjetila na to da nacionalno pitanje nije riješeno,
napose ne onako kako se proklamiralo po svršetku
Drugoga svjetskog rata. Zahvaljujući angažmanu JNA,
albanska pobuna nije uspjela, a srpska ju je intelektu-
alna i znanstvena elita iskoristila da ponovno inicira
pitanje položaja Srbije u Jugoslaviji, odnosno pokuša
ograničiti autonomiju pokrajina i promijeniti Ustav iz
1974. godine.3 Položaj Srba na Kosovu srpska je poli-
H
tička, crkvena, kulturna i znanstvena elita iskoristila za
homogenizaciju Srba i većega dijela pravoslavnoga
stanovništva u Jugoslaviji. Iz tih je krugova lansirana
teza da se Srbima na Kosovu događa genocid, kao i
da je Srbija u Jugoslaviji neravnopravna u odnosu na
ostale republike.4
M
Tvrdnje o ugroženosti i neravnopravnosti Srbije
izložene su u Memorandumu, nedovršenom rukopi-
su Srpske akademije nauka i umetnosti objavljenom
1986. godine. Memorandum je u prvom dijelu uglav-
nom bio utemeljena kritika jugoslavenskoga društva
i SKJ. Osnovni je ton žal za jakom državom od koje se
D
odustalo 1965. godine. No u drugom je dijelu utvrđe-
no da je Srbija najveća žrtva socijalističke Jugoslavije,
da ona jedina u “novoj Jugoslaviji nema svoju državu” i
da se gori povijesni “poraz u miru ne da […] zamisliti”.
Pored Kosova, i Hrvatska je spomenuta, bez osjećaja
za realnost i činjenice, kao područje na kojem su Srbi
C
diskriminirani, i to – s iznimkom Nezavisne Države
Hrvatske – “nikada u prošlosti […] koliko su danas”.
Hrvatska i Slovenija posebno su prozvane da su zado-
voljne postojećim stanjem, što se dokazivalo tvrdnjom
o njihovoj odlučnosti kojom se “danas suprotstavljaju
svakoj ustavnoj promeni”.5 Premda je srbijanski politič-
ki vrh verbalno osudio Memorandum i njegove tvorce,
osuda nije dugo trajala.6 Memorandum je pak ostvario
3 Dušan BILANDŽIĆ, Hrvatska moderna povijest, Golden
marketing, Zagreb, 1999., 675, 676, 726-732.
4 Radmila RADIĆ, “Crkva i ‘srpsko pitanje’”, u: Srpska strana
rata, Republika, Beograd, 1996., 269-288; Olivera MI-
LOSAVLJEVIĆ, “Zloupotreba autoriteta nauke”, u: Srpska
strana rata, 305-322; Dušan PAVLOVIĆ, Akteri i modeli.
Ogledi o politici u Srbiji pod Miloševićem, Samizdat B92,
Beograd, 2001., 124-152.
5 “Memorandum SANU”, Naše teme, 33 (1-2), Zagreb,
1989., 128-163.
6 O. MILOSAVLJEVIĆ, “Zloupotreba autoriteta nauke”,
314-316.
30
Domovinski rat 04-02-2020 Knjiga 1.indd 30
result of the Yugoslav consensus economics. By the end
of 1983, Yugoslavia’s external debt had grown to 20.5
billion dollars. At that time, Yugoslavia was one of the
most indebted countries in the world. By the following
year, the number of unemployed persons in the country
had risen to over one million. However, the unemploy-
ment rate was not the same in all parts of the country:
the highest unemployment rate was in Kosovo (24%)
and the lowest in Slovenia (1.4%). The inflation reversed
the average income (1985) to the level it had been at in
1967. Only during 1989 and at the beginning of 1990
was Yugoslav Prime Minister Ante Marković able to tem-
porarily halt the rampaging economic crisis by introduc-
ing the convertible dinar. Some commentators in Croa-
tia claimed that this short-lived economic success was
achieved at the direct expense of Croatia.
The economic crisis was not the only calamity that
hit Yugoslavia during the 1980s: in 1981 the Albanians
in Kosovo rose in revolt. The revolt rudely reminded the
Party that the national issue in Yugoslavia was far from
resolved, contrary to what state propaganda had been
leading the citizens to believe ever since the end of
WWII. The JNA duly reacted and crushed the revolt. The
Serbian political and academic elites, at the same time,
took advantage of the situation and used the revolt as a
pretext to re-initiate the question of the position of Serbs
in Yugoslavia with the explicit aim of curbing Kosovo’s
and Vojvodina’s autonomy and changing the Yugoslav
Constitution of 1974. The Serbian political, ecclesiastical,
cultural and academic elites used the situation in Koso-
vo to homogenize the Serbs and most of the population
subscribing to Orthodox Christianity in Yugoslavia. The
leading lights of Serbia proclaimed that genocide was
D
being perpetrated against the Kosovo Serbs and that
Serbia did not enjoy equal status in comparison to the
other constituent republics of the SFRY.
These claims were also espoused in the Memoran-
dum, a draft manuscript of the Serbian Academy of Sci-
R
ences and Arts published in 1986. The first part of the
Memorandum consisted of a critique, for the most part
justified, of Yugoslav society and the Party. The tenor
of the text is one of a lament for the strong state that
was discontinued in 1965. But, the mainstay of the text
is its second part, in which the authors assert that Ser-
bia fell victim to Socialist Yugoslavia and that Serbia “is
the only republic in the new country that cannot be
called a state” and that “the very existence of the new
Yugoslavia means that Serbia has been utterly defeat-
4.2.2020. 19:25:35
 The Croatian Nation’s Struggle for Survival, 1991-1995
C11 e;111, 2•t . ce11T C)1Gap l!l Rfi .
lll 'f!\ ll!'T!\ !\ IIITA lll'Elll'T ,\I! ,\ II ,\ !ll'T ~1E,IOl'!\ ll ,"l)'.'1 A KO :,HI C l'IJ E
Ci' l !C i\. 1·'. .Hi. !\ ) l E.\IIIJf: JI .-\YK A II ~·:\t l-'. J'II OCT l1 0 C'ri\ 11, Y ,\ I J ~T OC."1.\-
HII J II
H
l? ,1.R.\ CY 1;.\PJt\l:A no.u KOJ1::,1A AY"'.'OPII H,\UP'L\ :-.1r.,:oP,\IUlY:.!A 110-3 1!-
8 ,\JJ II:\ OTU.\ P.\11,E 0 1 1!1JY· n:;t,\ 11 Jr. H.".U!1011:\:ll! J.n1. .i.1.P~'Tll )JI>·
iKABi\. A CH E 3AH'.j{HO 3U Y 1 1H KA O HOD! ! fl 0311B IL\ 1;r.\1 OYG ll:J.\ 111-
TBO 11 IL\ HOUO n ro.'1 :18 \l hE KPBI I
M
Naslovnica Večernjih novosti (Beograd, 24. rujna 1986.); komen-
tar novinara pod naslovom „Ponuda beznađa”: „Dva su barjaka
pod kojima autori nacrta Memoranduma pozivaju na otvaranje
očiju: jedan je nacionalizam, drugi država, a sve zajedno zvuči kao
novi poziv na bratoubilaštvo i na novo prolivanje krvi.”
The front page of Večernje novosti (Evening news; Belgrade,
September 24 1986 issue); the byline’s comment entitled “The
D
Hopelessness Bid”. The long subtitle reads: “The authors of the
draft Memorandum issue, under two banners, a call to people to
open their eyes: one banner represents nationalism and the oth-
er the state. It all sounds like an incitement to commit bloodshed
and fratricide.”
svoju svrhu – pitanje položaja Srbije spustio je iz poli-
tičke i znanstvene sfere u medije i dnevnu politiku.
Prozivanje Ustava iz 1974. kao glavnoga krivca za
krizu otvorilo je 1987. rasprave o ustavnim promjenama
i pitanje preraspodjele vlasti između savezne države i
republika. U vezi s centralizacijom najveći je raskorak
bio između Srbije i Vojvodine, što je dosegnulo vrhunac
u prvoj polovini 1988. godine. Nesuglasje republike i
pokrajina srpska je politička elita riješila politikom ulice,
demonstracijama zvanim „mitinzima solidarnosti“ (spo-
minju se i kao “mitinzi istine” ili “događanja naroda”).
Mitinzima se okoristio predsjednik Saveza komunista
Srbije, pravnik Slobodan Milošević. Njegov munjeviti
uspon počeo je 24. travnja 1987. u Kosovu Polju, kada je
smirio prosvjede kosovskih Srba i obećao promjene. Na
valu srpskoga nacionalizma Milošević se u rujnu 1987.
na 8. sjednici Saveza komunista Srbije nemilosrdno ri-
ješio prijatelja i političkoga mentora Ivana Stambolića,
predsjednika Predsjedništva Socijalističke Republike
Domovinski rat 04-02-2020 Knjiga 1.indd 31
1111J !' WII H (;,\llt.T
C. t<.) U IU TIIIII! 1- 1..0•
0',\ ! \ 11 1p,: •II'!! •
ed”. Kosovo is often mentioned in the text, as is Croatia.
),, U A T , 10 ·1.\ l\~ I II
J\ IIOCt<.>U.1 . ,11,•
The authors claim, with obvious and utter disregard for
nf,ciw. historic facts, that Serbs are discriminated against in
Rtal:tbE
Y Pt3tP6H
• , ......... , ... u
Kosovo and Croatia and “that never before in history,
u,
,.w ,.-_..,~,. .,•.
, . . .. } •• , • • .l-1
with the possible exception during the existence of the
H
P••• .,..,.,..,,.., ru
,w, ,,... .., ..... ,. ·~• ,
) , ....... ... 1·•. ~
Independent State of Croatia (NDH), have Serbs been
••" .,,,.,.~,• l • I
•110 .......... , 1•'·"
""''''
.,, ... ,.••"
.. . ·•n , r"""'
t- " '
"'"''"''"'°'""
• r r,.,t- ••••
It • , rJ•\ u, u
,l I'~•
t>u
so discriminated against”. The pace of accusations in
the text leveled at Slovenia and Croatia does not let up;
the authors complain that both republics are satisfied
with the existing situation and ground the grievance
in the assertion that Slovenia and Croatia “resist any
change in the Constitution” The political leadership
of Serbia criticized the Memorandum and its creators,
e Cl'l ' .\11 :\ t .
but only in a lukewarm and inconsistent manner. The
Memorandum had achieved its purpose though – dis-
cussions about and resultant initiatives regarding the
issue of the position of Serbia within the Yugoslav fed-
eration had moved from the academic and political
sphere into the arena of daily politics marred as it was,
and still is, by incompetence and sensationalism.
Presenting the Constitution of 1974 as the main
culprit for the economic crisis resulted, in 1987, in many
public debates about amending the Constitution and
about altering the governing dynamic between the fed-
eral state and constituent republics. Serbia was in favor
of a more centralized type of governance, but Vojvodi-
na opposed that point of view. This discord reached its
height in the first half of 1988. The Serbian political elites
C
had already started working hard to force Vojvodina into
conforming to their political agenda. In February, 1986,
the Serbian political elites started organizing rallies
dubbed “rallies of solidarity” popularly known as “hap-
penings of the people” or “rallies of truth”. It is safe to say
D
that the individual who benefited the most from the ral-
lies was Slobodan Milošević, at that time the President
of the League of Communists of Serbia. His rapid rise to
power began on April 24, 1987, in the village of Kosovo
Polje, when he calmed down the Kosovo Serbs attend-
R
ing the rally there by promising to institute changes.
Riding the wave of Serbian nationalism, Milošević re-
morselessly dealt with his erstwhile friend and political
mentor, Ivan Stambolić, President of the Presidency of
the Socialist Republic of Serbia, at the 8th Plenary Session
of the Central Committee of the League of Communists
of Serbia in September, 1987. Thus, Slobodan Milošević
became the most powerful politician in Serbia. For the
first time in Yugoslav political history a man not belong-
ing to the WWII generation of Yugoslav politicians, but
31
4.2.2020. 19:25:35
 Davor Marijan • Rat za opstojnost Hrvata, 1991. - 1995.
H
M
D
(SR) Srbije. Postao je najmoćniji političar Srbije, ujedno
prvi doista jak političar koji nije bio pripadnik ratne ge-
neracije jugoslavenskih komunista.7
C
Milošević je čelništvo Vojvodine srušio u listopadu
1988. uz pomoć kosovskih Srba na “mitinzima istine” i “jo-
gurt-revolucijom”.8 Na isti način, ali iz drugog pokušaja,
u siječnju 1989. riješio se rukovodstva Crne Gore. Izvoz
“antibirokratske revolucije” u drugu republiku izazvao je
negativne reakcije u ostalim republikama i odlučnost di-
jela njih da se obrane od srpskoga nacionalizma.9
Nakon pacifikacije Vojvodine i Crne Gore Srbija se
okrenula prema Kosovu. Uz potporu tenkova JNA, 28.
7 Laura SILBER, Allan LITTLE, Smrt Jugoslavije, Otokar Ker-
šovani, Opatija, 1996., 24-35; Dejan JOVIĆ, Jugoslavija:
država koja je odumrla, Prometej, Zagreb, 2003., 371-
417; Olivera MILOSAVLJEVIĆ, “Antibirokratska revolucija
1987. – 1989. godine”, Dijalog povjesničara/istoričara 8,
Friedrich Naumann Stiftung, Zagreb, 2004., 324-329.
8 D. JOVIĆ, Jugoslavija: država koja je odumrla, 419-423.
9 Raif DIZDAREVIĆ, Od smrti Tita do smrti Jugoslavije: sjeća-
nja, Svjetlost, Sarajevo, 2000., 220-224, 293-298; Olivera
MILOSAVLJEVIĆ, “Jugoslavija kao zabluda”, u: Srpska stra-
na rata, 79.
32
Domovinski rat 04-02-2020 Knjiga 1.indd 32
„Antibirokratska revolucija“ - srpski mitinzi u Vojvodini i na Ušću
u Beogradu, 19. studenoga 1988. (autor fotografija: Renato
Branđolica).
“Anti-bureaucratic revolution” - Serbian rallies in Vojvodina and
at Ušće in Belgrade, November 19, 1988 (Photographs by Renato
Branđolica).
whose political clout matched theirs, had stepped into
the political arena.
Milošević brought down the leadership of Vojvodi-
na in October, 1988. This success came about as a direct
result of the “meetings of truth”’ and “yogurt revolution”.
He also, using the same means, got rid of the leadership
of Montenegro in January, 1989. This exporting of the
“anti-bureaucratic revolution” to another republic pro-
D
voked an outcry in the other republics. Some political
leaders in the other republics decided to resist Serbian
nationalism.
Having pacified Vojvodina and Montenegro, Serbia
turned its attention toward to Kosovo. On March 28,
1989, JNA tanks rolled down the streets of Belgrade. This
R
show of force went a long way towards ensuring that
a number of amendments to the Serbian Constitution
be made. The amendments in question seriously curbed
the autonomy of Vojvodina and Kosovo. The Serbian
question in Serbia had been solved. Next on the agen-
da was the issue of the Serbs living outside Serbia, most
notably in Croatia. A short time later those Serbs living
in Bosnia and Herzegovina were also put on the agen-
da. The intention to accomplish this political goal was
4.2.2020. 19:25:36
 The Croatian Nation’s Struggle for Survival, 1991-1995
ožujka 1989. u Beogradu su proglašeni amandmani na
Ustav SR Srbije, koji su znatno ograničili autonomnost
Vojvodine i Kosova.10 Srpsko pitanje u Srbiji bilo je rije-
šeno. Na dnevni je red stavljen položaj Srba izvan Srbije,
najprije u Hrvatskoj, a malo poslije i u BiH. To je najav-
ljeno 22. lipnja 1989. izjavom srpskoga političkog ruko-
vodstva da “dijelovi srpskog naroda izvan Srbije moraju
imati pravo na punu nacionalnu afirmaciju, te na oču-
vanje nacionalnih i tradicionalnih osobina, kao i naci-
onalnog identiteta”.11 Sve do tada Srbija je mogla igrati
H
na kartu ravnopravnosti, no nakon toga više ne, napose
jer je zadržala glasove pokrajina, pa je u Predsjedništvu
SFRJ imala tri, a s Crnom Gorom i četiri glasa.
Slovenija je prva u srpskom nacionalizmu prepo-
znala opasnost za sebe i Jugoslaviju uređenu po Usta-
vu iz 1974. godine. U siječnju 1987. ljubljanski časopis
M
Nova revija objavio je poseban broj posvećen sloven-
skomu nacionalnom programu. Temeljna misao bila je
neovisnost Slovenije jer se, s pravom, nije vjerovalo da
je moguća modernizacija Jugoslavije. Time su u manje
od godinu dana političke elite Srbije i Slovenije osporile
Jugoslaviju. Povod za osporavanje bio je osjetno dru-
D
gačiji kod Slovenaca: oni, za razliku od Srba, krivca za
svoj položaj nisu vidjeli u drugim jugoslavenskim naci-
jama nego u karakteru sustava, i drugo, njihovo je os-
poravanje bilo individualno, a ne institucionalno.12 Tako
je počelo slovensko proljeće, čiji je vrhunac bio sukob
slovenske omladinske organizacije s JNA poznat kao
C
napad na općenarodnu obrambenu koncepciju i oruža-
ne snage. Krajem 1989. Slovenija je proglasila ustavne
amandmane kojima je omogućen prijelaz iz socijalistič-
koga na tržišno gospodarstvo i iz partijskoga sustava u
višestranačku demokraciju, ali i da se po volji združuje
D
ili razdružuje s drugim državama. Premda je prijetila,
JNA nije intervenirala u Sloveniji.13
Posljednji i najopasniji akter jugoslavenske krize
bila je JNA. Ona je krajem 1988. prema planu Jedinstvo
10 Odluka o proglašenju amandmana IX do XLIX na Ustav
Socijalističke Republike Srbije, Službeni glasnik Socijali-
stičke Republike Srbije, 28. 3. 1989.
11 D. JOVIĆ, Jugoslavija, 460.
12 Isto, 429-442; O. MILOSAVLJEVIĆ, “Jugoslavija kao zablu-
da”, 62-74.
13 Borisav JOVIĆ, Poslednji dani SFRJ: izvodi iz dnevnika, Po-
litika, Beograd, 1995., 46-58; Božo REPE, Jutri je nov dan:
Slovenci in razpad Jugoslavije, Modrijan, Ljubljana, 2002.,
177, 212-226.
33
Domovinski rat 04-02-2020 Knjiga 1.indd 33
actually announced on June 22, 1989, when the Serbi-
an political leadership stated that “parts of the Serbian
nation living outside Serbia need to enjoy the right to
self-affirmation and to preserve their national and tradi-
tional characteristics, as well as their national identity”.
Up until that moment, Serbia had been able to play the
equality card. That gambit was now no longer a viable
option because Serbia had retained the votes of the
provinces in the Presidency of the SFRY – Serbia now
had three votes in the Presidency and it could always
count on Montenegro to provide a fourth.
The political leaders of Slovenia were the first poli-
ticians in Yugoslavia who recognized the danger Serbi-
an nationalism posed both to their republic and to the
Constitution of 1974. In January, 1987, the Ljubljana
journal Nova Revija published a special issue devoted
to the Slovenian National Program. The central theme
of the special issue was the necessity of Slovenian inde-
pendence because of the inherent inability of Yugosla-
via to modernize its institutions. In less than 12 months
the political elites of Serbia and Slovenia had effectively
condemned Yugoslavia. However, the Slovenes’ motives
for doing that differed from those of their Serbian coun-
terparts. The Slovenes, unlike the Serbs, did not blame
other Yugoslav nations for the disastrous situation the
country was in; they recognized the cause of all the
country’s woes in the character of the system. Also, the
Slovenes’ condemnation of Yugoslavia was proclaimed
in an individual context, not an institutional one. The
Slovenian Spring was underway. The Slovenian Spring
reached its culmination when Slovenia’s Youth Organi-
zation criticized publically the JNA.1 This public criticism
was characterized by the Yugoslav authorities as an at-
tack on the Yugoslav armed forces and the concept of
general people’s defense. At the end of 1989 Slovenia
made amendments to the Constitution that made pos-
sible a shift from socialist to market economy and a shift
from one-party system of government to multiparty de-
R
mocracy. Also, the amendments gave Slovenia the right
to join with or dissociate itself from other states. The JNA
duly engaged in saber-rattling, but did not intervene.
The JNA was the most dangerous factor in the Yugo-
slav crisis. The JNA, at the end of 1988, according to the
plan Jedinstvo (Unity), changed its military and territori-
al organization – Armies were replaced with Military Dis-
1 This was the first time sicne the creation of Communist
Yugoslavia in 1945 that the JNA was publically criticized.
4.2.2020. 19:25:36
 Davor Marijan • Rat za opstojnost Hrvata, 1991. - 1995.
prešla na vojno-teritorijalnu organizaciju u kojoj su
armije zamijenjene vojištima odnosno vojnim (vojno-
pomorskim) oblastima, a Teritorijalna je obrana (TO),
suprotno ustavnim odredbama, podređena zapovjed-
ništvima JNA. Preustroj je prihvaćen nakon dugotraj-
nog lobiranja JNA i njezinih političkih saveznika.14
Hrvatska je do 1989. bila šutljivi promatrač krize,
zbog čega se o njezinoj politici iz tog razdoblja govori
kao o vremenu “hrvatske šutnje”. Tek se 1989., na učestale
pritiske iz Srbije, vladajuća nomenklatura stidljivo pokre-
H
nula iz dugogodišnjega političkog sna. No bilo je kasno
za promjene – nova politička strujanja pokazala su se
poduzetnijima. Bila su moguća jer je komunizam krajem
1980-ih potpuno nenadano doživio svjetski slom. Njego-
va propast otvorila je prostor za restauraciju kapitalizma i
demokratizaciju zemalja koje su do tada bile dio sustava
M
Saveza Sovjetskih Socijalističkih Republika (SSSR) ili su,
poput Albanije i Jugoslavije, bile izvan toga bloka.
Demokratski izbori u Hrvatskoj i
proglašenje neovisnosti
D
Promjene na svjetskoj političkoj sceni bile su poticaj
za političke promjene u zapadnim dijelovima Jugoslavi-
je. Novo vrijeme najavljeno je na samom početku 1990.
raspadom SKJ na 14. kongresu u Beogradu. Otvoreno je
polje za djelovanje novih političkih snaga. Među mno-
gobrojnim strankama koje su se pojavile na hrvatskoj
C
političkoj sceni bila je i Hrvatska demokratska zajednica
(HDZ), s političkom platformom nacionalnoga pomi-
renja. Jedan je suvremenik primijetio da u HDZ-u vidi
“dijapazon tendencija od lijevog populističkog kolekti-
vizma do konzervativne desnice. Ima tu i demokršćana
i liberala, nacionalkomunista i integralnih nacionalista,
socijalista i torijevaca, katolika i laicista”.15 Takva je mje-
šavina HDZ činila pokretom, a ne strankom.
Čelnik HDZ-a bio je povjesničar Franjo Tuđman. Do
kraja 1960-ih bio je tipičan primjer pripadnika povla-
štene komunističke elite. Bio je mladi sudionik Drugog
svjetskog rata na strani partizana, poslijeratni general
JNA i partizanski povjesničar. Politički je krenuo od Ra-
dićeve Hrvatske seljačke stranke, a u ratu se priklonio
komunističkoj opciji, za koju je duže vrijeme bio uvje-
ren da je u sklopu Jugoslavije riješila i hrvatsko pitanje.
14 B. MAMULA, Slučaj Jugoslavija, 59-68; D. MARIJAN, Slom
Titove armije, 107-123.
15 Ivo BANAC, Protiv straha, Slon, Zagreb, 1992., 100.
34
Domovinski rat 04-02-2020 Knjiga 1.indd 34
tricts, and Territorial Defense, contrary to the Constitu-
tion, was subordinated to JNA commands. The JNA and
its political backers had lobbied for this restructuring for
a long period of time. Now, finally, they got their way.
Up until 1989 Croatia had been a silent observer
of the events. This passive stance of the Croatian poli-
ticians during this particular period is popularly known
as “Croatian silence”. Only in 1989, prompted by repeat-
ed Serbian transgressions, did the leadership of Croatia
slowly wake up from its long and deep political slumber.
But, it was already too late for the Croatian leadership.
New political groups in Croatia were far more efficient
and active. The appearance of these groups in the po-
litical landscape of Croatia was facilitated by the break-
up of the Soviet Union and the collapse of Communism
in Eastern Europe in the late 1980s. The countries of the
former Soviet Bloc, or Communist countries outside the
bloc, like Yugoslavia and Albania, were free to restruc-
ture their economies and adopt democracy.
Democratic Elections in Croatia and
Declaration of Independence
The changes in the global political arena served as
an incentive to bring about political changes in the west-
ern part of Yugoslavia. At the beginning of 1990, the
Party split up at the 14th Extraordinary Congress of the
League of Communists of Yugoslavia. The split-up her-
alded a new political era in Yugoslavia. The playing field
was open for new political groups and parties. Many par-
ties appeared on the Croatian political scene and among
them was the Hrvatska Demokratska Zajednica (the Cro-
atian Democratic Union, [HDZ]). The political platform of
D
the HDZ was national reconciliation. One commentator
at the time observed that he saw in the HDZ “a spectrum
of tendencies ranging from left populist collectivism to
the conservative right. Demochristians and liberals are
there, also national communists and integral national-
R
ists, socialists, Tories, Catholics and laicists.” This incred-
ible mix meant that in reality the HDZ was more of a
movement than a political party.
The leader of the HDZ party was Franjo Tuđman, a
historian by profession. Until the late 1960s he had been
a typical example of a member of the privileged Com-
munist elite. He had been in Tito’s Partisans during WWII
and after the war attained the rank of general in the JNA.
His first political affiliation was with the Croatian People’s
Peasant Party founded by the Radić brothers. When WWII
4.2.2020. 19:25:36
 The Croatian Nation’s Struggle for Survival, 1991-1995
-.....,.
~--
14.IZVANREDNI
H
KONGRES
S K jJ
BJOGRAD, 20-22, 1, 1990
M
Slom probuđenih nacionalnih težnji izraženih tijekom
1971. (“Hrvatsko proljeće”) i represija komunističkih vla-
sti prema Hrvatima riješili su ga iluzije jugoslavenstva.
Odavao je dojam osobe s misijom, što je nesumnjivo i
bio. Najvažnija je osoba suvremene hrvatske povijesti i
D
državnik koji je osobnim primjerom pokazao što i „mali“
narod može napraviti kada vjeruje u sebe i svoje snage.
Premda su ga politički protivnici, posebice nakon nje-
gove smrti, sustavno demonizirali, vrijeme je pokazalo
da je uz sva formativna ograničenja koja je imao bio
veći demokrat od svih njih. Vjerovao je u pomirbu i bez
C
obzira na politička neslaganja spremno je pružao prili-
ku svima koji su željeli sudjelovati u stvaranju neovisne
Hrvatske. Mnogi kojima je on omogućio postkomuni-
stičku karijeru to su kasnije „zaboravili“.
Prvi krug izbora održan je 22. i 23. travnja, a drugi
D
6. svibnja 1990. godine. U oba je većinu glasova dobio
HDZ, koji je u Sabor ušao s 205 zastupnika, a drugopla-
sirani Savez komunista Hrvatske – Stranka demokrat-
skih promjena (SKH-SDP) sa samo 73. “Krivac” za izborni
rezultat bili su komunisti, jer su umjesto proporcional-
noga stvorili većinski izborni sustav kojim su namjera-
vali doskočiti ostalim konkurentima. Izgubili su, a HDZ
je profitirao. Tako se dogodilo da za SKH-SDP glasa tre-
ćina birača, a da dobije 15 – 20 % saborskih mjesta.16
U srpnju 1990. amandmanima na Ustav SR Hrvatske
sustav je očišćen od socijalističkoga nazivlja i upravne
16 Milan Jajčinović, “Kakav predznak demokraciji”, Danas,
1. 5. 1990., 8; Hrvatska u izborima '90., Naprijed, Zagreb,
1991., 202-207.
35
Domovinski rat 04-02-2020 Knjiga 1.indd 35
Plakat 14. kongresa Saveza komunista Jugoslavije
(SKJ). Zbog nametanja volje delegata iz Srbije i Crne
Gore te ignoriranja i odbijanja svakoga prijedloga del-
egata iz Slovenije, Kongres je 22. siječnja 1990. napus-
tila slovenska, a potom i hrvatska delegacija.
The poster of the 14th Congress of the League of Com-
munists of Yugoslavia (SKJ) The Serbian and Montene-
grin delegations forcibly asserted their own positions,
ignoring and refusing every proposal from the Slove-
nian delegation, and on January 22, 1990, the Slove-
nian delegation, followed by the Croatian delegation,
walked out of the Congress.
started, he joined the Communist party. Like many in Yu-
goslavia, he believed for a very long time that the League
of Communists of Yugoslavia had successfully solved the
national issue in the country. The Croats expressed their
dormant desire for political, fiscal and social reform in
the SFRY through a popular national movement called
the Croatian Spring. The Communist Party was not
amused, clamped down hard and stifled the movement
in the bud. The collapse of the Croatian Spring in 1971
permanently cured Franjo Tuđman of the Yugoslav bug.
He was truly a man on a mission and most people per-
ceived him as such. Franjo Tuđman is undoubtedly the
most important figure in the modern history of Croatia.
By his own example he showed what a small and, from a
strictly global and political perspective, insignificant na-
tion could achieve if the citizens believed in themselves
and their potential. Tuđman’s political opponents had
always been strongly inclined to demonize him. The cho-
rus of malign defamation reached fever pitch a few years
after his death. However, history has proved that Franjo
Tuđman was a true democrat, unlike most of his detrac-
R
tors. He believed in national reconciliation and was al-
ways ready to bring on board all those committed to the
creation of an independent Croatia, regardless of a given
person’s political affiliation or leanings. Many politicians
who owe their rise to prominence to Tuđman find it con-
venient nowadays to claim that they suffer from selective
amnesia, at least when it comes to the huge debt they
owe to the first president of the modern state of Croatia.
The first round of elections was held on April 22 and
23, and the second on May 6, 1990. The HDZ won both
4.2.2020. 19:25:36
 Davor Marijan • Rat za opstojnost Hrvata, 1991. - 1995.
H
M
terminologije.17 U Ustavu iz prosinca 1990. Hrvatska je
D
definirana kao “nacionalna država hrvatskog naroda i
država pripadnika inih naroda i manjina, koji su njezini
državljani: Srba, Muslimana, Slovenaca, Čeha, Slovaka,
Talijana, Mađara, Židova i drugih, kojima se jamči rav-
nopravnost s građanima hrvatske narodnosti i ostvari-
vanje nacionalnih prava u skladu s demokratskim nor-
C
mama OUN i zemalja slobodnog svijeta”.18
U podjeli dužnosti Tuđman je imenovan na mjesto
predsjednika Predsjedništva, od srpnja 1990. predsjed-
nika Republike. Dužnost predsjednika Izvršnog vijeća,
odnosno Vlade Republike Hrvatske dobio je Stjepan
Mesić, a potom u kolovozu iste godine Josip Manolić,
koji je kao i Tuđman bio komunistički kadar iz Drugoga
svjetskog rata, koji se borio u partizanima.19 Parlamen-
17 Odluka Sabora SRH od 25. 7. 1990. o proglašenju Aman-
dmana LXIV. do LXXV. na Ustav Socijalističke Republike
Hrvatske, Narodne novine, br. 31, 28. 7. 1990.
18 Ustav Republike Hrvatske od 22. 12. 1990., Narodne novi-
ne, br. 56, 22. 12. 1990.
19 Odluka Sabora SRH od 30. 5. 1990. o izboru predsjed-
nika Predsjedništva SRH, Narodne novine, br. 25, 1. 6.
1990.; Odluka Sabora SRH od 30. 5. 1990. o izboru pred-
sjednika Izvršnog vijeća Sabora SRH, Narodne novine,
br. 25, 1. 6. 1990.; Odluka Sabora RH od 24. 8. 1990. o
izboru predsjednika Vlade RH, Narodne novine, br. 34,
28. 8. 1990.
36
Domovinski rat 04-02-2020 Knjiga 1.indd 36
Utemeljen je novi hrvatski Sabor, slavlje na središn-
jem trgu u Zagrebu, glavnom gradu Hrvatske, 30.
svibnja 1990. (autor fotografije: Mario Jareb).
Konstituirajuća sjednica demokratski izabranoga,
višestranačkog Sabora SRH održana je 30. svibnja
1990. godine. Za predsjednika Predsjedništva SRH
izabran je Franjo Tuđman.
Celebration on Ban Jelačić Square, Zagreb, May 30,
1990 (Photograph by Mario Jareb). The democrat-
ic Croatian Parliament was constituted, based on
election results, on May 30, 1990. Franjo Tuđman
was elected President of the Presidency of the So-
cialist Republic of Croatia.
rounds, winning 205 seats. The League of Communists
of Croatia – Party of Democratic Reform (SKH-SDP) came
in second, winning only 73 seats. The Croatian Commu-
nists had no one to blame but themselves for their poor
showing in the election. Prior to the election they insist-
ed on a majority voting system. They figured the system
would ensure them a landslide victory in the elections.
They figured wrong and the HDZ benefited immense-
ly from the blunder. In the event, a third of the voters
actually voted for the SKH-SDP, but the party won only
15-20% of the seats.
In July, 1990, the Constitution of the Republic of
D
Croatia was amended. The amendments purged the
Constitution of socialist nomenclature and administra-
tive terminology. In the December 1990 Constitution
Croatia was defined as “the national state of the Croatian
nation and the state of members of the national minori-
R
ties: Serbs, Muslims, Slovenes, Czechs, Slovaks, Italians,
Hungarians, Jews and the others who are its citizens, and
who are guaranteed equality with citizens of Croatian
nationality and the realization of ethnic rights in accor-
dance with the democratic norms of the United Nations
and countries of the free world”.
Tuđman was appointed President of the Presidency,
and in July, 1990, President of the Republic. Stjepan Mesić
was given the post of President of the Executive Council,
that is, President of the Government of the Republic of
4.2.2020. 19:25:36
 The Croatian Nation’s Struggle for Survival, 1991-1995

H
M
D
C
D
R
Raskid s komunizmom – na hrvatskoj zastavi, umjesto komuni- Breaking free from Communism – the Croatian flag again fea-
stičkog simbola, opet je hrvatski grb. Podizanje hrvatske zastave tures the historic Croatian coat of arms. The five pointed red
na jarbol, između zgrade Hrvatskog sabora i crkve sv. Marka, 25. star is gone. Raising the Croatian flag on the square between
srpnja 1990. godine (autor fotografija: Renato Branđolica). the Croatian Parliament building and the Church of Saint Mark,
July 25, 1990 (Photographs by Renato Branđolica)

37

Domovinski rat 04-02-2020 Knjiga 1.indd 37 4.2.2020. 19:25:37

 Davor Marijan • Rat za opstojnost Hrvata, 1991. - 1995.
H
M
12·05·1991
tarna većina dala je HDZ-u mogućnost da sastavi jed-
nostranačku vladu. Ipak, vlade Stjepana Mesića i Josipa
D
Manolića nisu bile jednostranačke jer je u njima bilo i
ministara koji nisu bili članovi HDZ-a. Te su vlade po-
stojale od 30. svibnja 1990. do 2. kolovoza 1991., kada
je izabrana nova, višestranačka Vlada demokratskoga
jedinstva premijera Franje Gregurića, koju su podržale
saborske stranke.20
C
Specifičnost krize i raspada Jugoslavije dovela je do
stanja koje se često nije nazivalo pravim imenom, pa se
ni poduzete mjere nisu nazivale onime što su stvarno
bile. Hrvatska je morala prihvatiti rat s JNA, navodno sa-
veznom vojskom, a Srbija je kao pokretač rata tvrdila da
se ne miješa u taj rat. Da odgovori na taj izazov, hrvat-
sko je vrhovništvo bilo prinuđeno prihvatiti srbijanski
obrazac ponašanja i mirnodopskom organizacijom od-
govoriti na izazov rata. Od kraja srpnja 1991. na razina-
ma od općina do Republike osnivali su se krizni štabovi
radi organizacije i usklađivanja svih aktivnosti nužnih za
obranu Republike. Krizni štab Republike Hrvatske (RH)
bio je krovno državno tijelo dužno organizirati i uskla-
diti rad svih dijelova sustava obrane i sigurnosti RH.
Preko Kriznoga štaba Vlada demokratskoga jedinstva
djelovala je kao ratna vlada. Predsjednik Kriznoga štaba
bio je predsjednik Vlade dr. Franjo Gregurić, a članovi tri
20 Franjo GREGURIĆ, Vlada demokratskog jedinstva Hrvat-
ske 1991.–1992., Naklada Zadro, Zagreb, 1998., 13.
38
Domovinski rat 04-02-2020 Knjiga 1.indd 38
Plakat u povodu referenduma za prisa-
jedinjenje dijela hrvatskog teritorija Sr-
biji, s jasno izraženim ciljem zbog kojeg
će srbijansko vodstvo pokrenuti rat u Hr-
vatskoj: „Srpski narod u jednoj državi – za
prisajedinjenje”.
The poster for the referendum on the
annexation of a portion of Croatian ter-
ritory to Serbia. The referendum was set
up with the clear aim of justifying the
Serbian leadership’s decision to subse-
quently launch an all-out military offen-
sive against Croatia: The referendum
was “All Serbs in one state – vote ‘yes’
for annexation”.
Plakat: „REFERENDUM ZA HRVATSKU”.
Poster: “Referendum on Croatia’s inde-
pendence”.
Croatia. In August of the same year Josip Manolić took
over from Mesić. It has to be noted that Manolić, just like
Tuđman, had been a committed Communist and fought
on the side of Tito’s Partisans during WWII. The HDZ was
in a position to form a one-party government. But, the
governments of Mesić and Manolić consisted of a fair few
ministers not belonging to the HDZ party. These govern-
ments were in existence from May 30, 1990, to August 2,
1991, when the new government of national unity based
on a multi-party system headed by the Prime Minister
Franjo Gregurić was elected. This government enjoyed
the support of most of the parliamentary parties.
Due to the specific nature of the economic crisis and
D
subsequent break-up of Yugoslavia, political discourse
and resultant activities were based on euphemisms. No-
body, for reasons of political expediency, wanted to call
a spade a spade. Croatia was at war with the JNA but the
JNA was supposedly a federal army, and Serbia, the insti-
R
gator of the war and aggressor, feigned innocence. Cro-
atia was drawn into that high stakes game of political
theater. The country, if it wished to survive, simply had
to beat the Serbs at their own diplomatic game. From
the end of July, 1991, on all levels of government start-
ing with the municipalities, crisis staffs were formed.
The aim was to organize and synchronize the various
governmental strands that comprised the defensive
system of the country. The Crisis Staff of the Republic
of Croatia was an umbrella organization burdened with
4.2.2020. 19:25:37
 The Croatian Nation’s Struggle for Survival, 1991-1995
potpredsjednika Vlade i ministri obrane, unutarnjih po-
slova, zdravstva, prometa i veza, trgovine te predstojnik
Ureda za zaštitu ustavnoga poretka RH (Josip Manolić) i
zapovjednik Štaba Civilne zaštite RH.21
Ustavom Republike Hrvatske od 22. prosinca 1990.
ozakonjeno je stajalište da je suverenitet Republike
neotuđiv, nedjeljiv i neprenosiv, te da Republika saveze
s drugim državama „sklapa zadržavajući suvereno pra-
vo da sama odlučuje o prenesenim ovlastima i pravo
da slobodno iz njih istupa“. Odnos prema Jugoslaviji
H
određen je člankom 140. i stajalištem da „Republika Hr-
vatska ostaje u sastavu SFRJ do novog sporazuma jugo-
slavenskih republika ili dok Sabor Republike Hrvatske
ne odluči drugačije“.22
Potom je Sabor RH 21. veljače 1991. usvojio Rezo-
luciju o prihvaćanju postupka za razdruživanje od SFRJ
M
i o mogućem udruživanju u savez suverenih država.
Hrvatska je bila spremna za udruživanje samo s onim
republikama SFRJ koje se uzajamno priznaju temeljem
prava svake od njih na opstanak, samostalnost, suvere-
nost i štovanje. Sklapanje međurepubličkih saveza bilo
je moguće samo s onim državama koje jamče jedna
D
drugoj status suverene države i teritorijalni integritet te
se obvežu na uzdržavanje od postupaka koji bi mogli
nanijeti štetu državnom suverenitetu i prostornoj cjelo-
vitosti druge države.23
Predsjednik Tuđman je 25. travnja 1991. potpisao
odluku o raspisivanju referenduma na kojem se želio do-
C
biti odgovor na pitanja koja su bila u izravnoj vezi s pre-
govorima vođenim oko budućeg ustrojstva Jugoslavije.
Biračima je ponuđena opcija između saveza suverenih
država prema prijedlogu Republike Hrvatske i Republike
Slovenije, i ostanka u Jugoslaviji kao jedinstvenoj save-
D
znoj državi prema prijedlogu Republike Srbije i SR Crne
Gore. Srbima i pripadnicima drugih nacionalnosti za-
jamčena je kulturna autonomija i sva građanska prava.
Od građana je tražen odgovor na pitanje jesu li „za to da
Republika Hrvatska, kao suverena i samostalna država,
21 SVA MORH, GSHV: Odluka Predsjednika Republike Hr-
vatske od 27. 7. 1991. o osnivanju i djelatnosti kriznih
štabova u Republici Hrvatskoj; Zdravko TOMAC, Iza za-
tvorenih vrata, Organizator, Zagreb, 1992., 85.
22 Ustav Republike Hrvatske od 22. 12. 1990., Narodne novi-
ne, br. 56 od 22. 12. 1990.
23 Rezolucija Sabora Republike Hrvatske od 21. 2. 1991. o
prihvaćanju postupka za razdruživanje SFRJ i o mogu-
ćem udruživanju u savez suverenih republika, Narodne
novine, br. 8 od 21. 2. 1991.; B. REPE, Jutri je novi dan, 74.
39
Domovinski rat 04-02-2020 Knjiga 1.indd 39
the above mentioned task. The government of national
unity acted as a wartime government through the Crisis
Staff. The president of the Crisis Staff was Prime Minis-
ter Franjo Gregurić, and the members of the Crisis Staff
were the three deputy prime ministers and ministers of
defense, internal affairs, health, transport and infrastruc-
ture, trade minister, and the Head of the Office for the
Protection of the Constitutional Order of the Republic
of Croatia (Josip Manolić) and Head of Croatia’s Civil Pro-
tection Department.
The idea that the sovereignty and integrity of Cro-
atia were inalienable, indivisible and non-transferable
was given the force of law by the Constitution of the Re-
public of Croatia on December 22, 1990. The authors of
the Constitution asserted that Croatia could enter into
alliances with other states by “retaining its sovereign
right to decide upon the powers to be so delegated and
the right to freely withdraw therefrom”. Croatia’s stance
towards Yugoslavia was determined by Article 140 and
the notion that “the Republic of Croatia shall remain
part of the SFRY until a new agreement is reached by
the Yugoslav republics, or until the Croatian Parliament
decides otherwise”.
On February 21, 1991, the Croatian Parliament
passed the Resolution on Accepting Proceedings for
the Disassociation of the SFRY and the Possible Associa-
tion into an Alliance of Sovereign Republics. Croatia was
prepared to enter into a federation only with those re-
publics from the SFRY that recognized the right of each
constituent republic to survival, independence and sov-
ereignty. Entering into a federation would be possible
only if each constituent republic was prepared to guar-
antee sovereignty and territorial integrity to every other
constituent republic. Also, each republic would have to
agree to abstain from any action that might compro-
mise the sovereignty and territorial integrity of another
constituent state.
President Tuđman, on April 25, 1991, signed the de-
R
cision to hold a referendum on the issues that were the
subject of ongoing negotiations on Yugoslavia’s future
form of government. The voters could choose between
the option proposed by Slovenia and Croatia according
to which Yugoslavia would be restructured into a federa-
tion of sovereign states and the option proposed by Ser-
bia and Montenegro which called for staying in a unitary
Yugoslavia. It is important to point out that Croatia guar-
anteed to the Serbs and other ethnic minorities cultural
autonomy and all civil rights. These are the two questions
4.2.2020. 19:25:37
 Davor Marijan • Rat za opstojnost Hrvata, 1991. - 1995.

SABOR
REPUBLIKE
HRVATSKE
H
Sestoga dana ne-
Predsjednik Republike Hrvatske dr. prekidnbg zasje-
M
Franjo Tudman na svecanoj sjednici danja Sabora pri-
Sabora Republike Hrvatske obratio
se -zastupnicima i obrazlozio znace- hvai:eni su:
nje povijesnih odluka koje je donio
Hrvatski sabor • Ustavna odluka o
; NEZAVISNE NOVINE suverenosti i sa-
mostalnosti Re-
publike Hrvatske
• Ustavni zakon o
D
izmjeni i dopuni -
Ustavnog -zakona
za provedbu Us-
tava Republike
Hrvatske
• Deklaracija o us-
postavi suverene ·
C
i samostalne Re-
publike Hrvatske
• Povelja o pravima
Srba i drugim na-
cionalnostima u
Republici Hrvat-
D
skoj

SKUPSTINA REPUBLIKE SLOVENIJE

I SLOVENIJA
R
KAKO JE HRVATSKA METROPOLA DOCEKALA PROGLASENJE
SAMOSTALNE I SUVERENE HRVATSKE
SAMOSTALNA
• •
AUSTR SJ(I KANCELAR VRANITZKY O HRVATSKOJ I SLOVEN !
Grad je odjeknuo! l?riznanje cim s e
s teknu uvjeti , sTR. ~9.
.
Slavlje bez dogovora : zvonila su zvona, pucnji oznacili blag-
dan, fijukalo je odasvud na pozdrav Hrvatskoj STR. 1 1.

Naslovnica Večernjeg lista, srijeda, 26. lipnja 1991.: „Hrvatska samostalna država”.

The front page of Večernji List, Wednesday, June 26 1991 issue: “Croatia – An Independent State”.

40

Domovinski rat 04-02-2020 Knjiga 1.indd 40 4.2.2020. 19:25:38

 The Croatian Nation’s Struggle for Survival, 1991-1995

HRVATSKI
SABOR
JUCER JE
ZASJEDAO
U RATNIM
UVJETIMA
H
M
D
NEZAVISNE NOVINE
Republika Hrvatska ra-
C
r - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - =:=:;;;;_=aia::,,=:::=::::~ skida sve driavno-pravne
veze s dosadasnjom SFRJ
• Pravni poredak SFRJ
prestaje vrijediti na cije-
lpm teritoriju Republike
Hrvatske
• Republika Hrvatska po-
ziva Srbiju, Cmu Goru i
JNA da prestanu s ratom
D
protiv Hrvatske, a Bosnu i
Hercegovinu da ne dopusti
koristenje svog teritorija
za napade na Hrvatsku
• Tzv. JNA se proglasuje
~ okupatorskom i agresor-
skom vojskom i mora na-
pustiti teritorij Republike
Hrvatske
• Pozivaju se sve drzave,
R
posebno Europske zajedni-
ce, da priznaju Republiku
Hrvatsku
• Hrvatska ce u cijelosti
postovati obveze SFRJ u
dijelu u kojem se one od-
nose na nju
• Hrvatska ce nastaviti
sudjelovanje na Mirovnoj
konferenciji u Haagu
. · STR. 2- 5.

Naslovnica Večernjeg lista, srijeda, 9. listopada 1991.: „Neovisna Hrvatska”.

The front page of Večernji List, Wednesday, October 9 1991 issue: “Independent Croatia”.

41

Domovinski rat 04-02-2020 Knjiga 1.indd 41 4.2.2020. 19:25:39

 Davor Marijan • Rat za opstojnost Hrvata, 1991. - 1995.
koja jamči kulturnu autonomiju i sva građanska prava
Srbima i pripadnicima drugih nacionalnosti u Hrvatskoj,
može stupiti u savez suverenih država s drugim republi-
kama (prema prijedlogu Republike Hrvatske i Republike
Slovenije za rješenje državne krize SFRJ)?“. Na pitanje je
trebalo odgovoriti „za“ ili „protiv“, kao i za drugo pitanje
koje je glasilo: jesu li „za to da Republika Hrvatska osta-
ne u Jugoslaviji kao jedinstvenoj saveznoj državi (prema
prijedlogu Republike Srbije i Socijalističke Republike
Crne Gore za rješenje državne krize u SFRJ)?“.24 Referen-
H
dum je održan 19. svibnja 1991. godine. Glasovalo je
83,56 % od upisanog broja glasača, od kojih se 93,24 %
izjasnilo za savez suverenih država s tim da 92,18 % nije
podržalo ostanak u Jugoslaviji.25
Rezultati referenduma su bili osnova da se Republi-
ka Hrvatska 25. lipnja 1991. proglasi neovisnom drža-
M
vom.26 Slijedio je sukob između JNA i Slovenije, koja je
također toga dana proglasila neovisnost i preuzela nad-
zor državne granice, te posredovanje Europske zajed-
nice koje je 7. srpnja dovelo do prihvaćanja tromjeseč-
nog moratorija na odluku o neovisnosti. Nakon isteka
moratorija Hrvatski sabor je 8. listopada 1991. raskinuo
D
sve državnopravne veze na temelju kojih je Republika
Hrvatska zajedno s ostalim republikama i pokrajinama
tvorila SFRJ.27
Srpska pobuna
C
Umjesto da se bavi demokratizacijom društva i
gospodarskom krizom, HDZ se suočio s otvorenim ne-
prijateljstvom JNA i pobunom Srba. Po Ustavu iz 1974.,
Hrvatska je bila “nacionalna država hrvatskog naroda,
država srpskog naroda u Hrvatskoj i država narodno-
sti koje u njoj žive”.28 Ta je definicija od Hrvatske činila
24 Odluka predsjednika Republike Hrvatske od 25. 4. 1991.,
Narodne novine, br. 21 od 2. 5. 1991.
25 Arhiv Vlade Republike Hrvatske: Izvješće Republičke ko-
misije za provedbu referenduma od 22. 5. 1991.
26 Ustavna odluka Sabora Republike Hrvatske od 25. 6.
1991. o suverenosti i samostalnosti Republike Hrvatske,
Narodne novine, br. 31 od 25. 6. 1991.; Deklaracija Sabora
Republike Hrvatske od 25. 6. 1991. o proglašenju suvere-
ne i samostalne Republike Hrvatske, Narodne novine, br.
31 od 25. 6. 1991.
27 Odluka Sabora Republike Hrvatske od 8. 10. 1991., Na-
rodne novine, br. 53 od 8. 10. 1991.
28 Ustav Socijalističke Republike Hrvatske, članak 1., Narod-
ne novine, br. 8 od 22. 2. 1974.
42
Domovinski rat 04-02-2020 Knjiga 1.indd 42
presented to the voters in the referendum: “Do you be-
lieve that the Republic of Croatia, as a sovereign and inde-
pendent state, which guarantees cultural autonomy and
all civil rights to Serbs and members of other nationali-
ties in Croatia, should enter into an alliance of sovereign
states with other republics (according to the proposal by
the Republic of Croatia and the Republic of Slovenia for
the resolution of the Yugoslav crisis)?” and “Do you be-
lieve that the Republic of Croatia should remain part of
Yugoslavia as a united federal state (according to the pro-
posal by the Republic of Serbia and the Socialist Republic
of Montenegro for the resolution of the Yugoslav crisis)?”
The referendum was held on May 19, 1991. 83.56% per-
cent of the registered voters voted in the referendum.
93.24% voted for the option of entering into a federation
of sovereign states. It has to be noted that 92.18% of the
voters did not support the option of staying in Yugoslavia.
On the basis of the results of the referendum Croa-
tia proclaimed independence on June 25, 1991. Slove-
nia proclaimed its independence on the same day and
Slovenian police and TO units took control of the border
crossings. This watershed moment in the history of Cro-
atia was followed by the JNA’s attack on Slovenia which
directly led the European Community to insist that Cro-
atia impose a three-month moratorium on its decision
to proclaim independence. Croatia accepted the dictate
from the European Community on July 7, 1991. As soon
as the moratorium expired, on October 8, 1991, the Cro-
atian Parliament broke all legal ties on the basis of which
the Republic of Croatia, together with the other constitu-
ent republics and provinces, had formed the SFRY.
Serb Rebellion
D
The HDZ party had no time to deal with the econom-
ic crisis and focus its energies to launch initiatives that
could turn Croatia into a truly democratic society – the
country faced open aggression by the JNA and an armed
R
uprising of a part of the Croatian Serbs. According to the
Constitution of 1974, Croatia was “the national state of
the Croatian people, the state of the Serbian people in
Croatia and the state of other nationalities that live in it.”
That definition meant that the sovereignty of Croatia was
divided between the Croatian majority and Serb minori-
ty. Serbia, and the Serbs living outside Serbia’s borders,
chose to interpret the definition as meaning that the
difference between a nation and a national minority lay
in the right to self-determination. The formula according
4.2.2020. 19:25:39
 The Croatian Nation’s Struggle for Survival, 1991-1995
državu podijeljenoga suvereniteta. Prema srbijanskom
shvaćanju, koje su prihvatili ostali Srbi, razlika između
naroda i nacionalne manjine bila je u “pravu” na sa-
moodređenje, a to se tada tumačilo u prvom redu kao
pravo na odcjepljenje. Formuli da se narod ima pravo
odcijepiti dodalo se tumačenje da je to moguće samo
ako se radi o Srbima. Hrvati su samoodređenje mogli
realizirati jedino tako da odu iz Jugoslavije s dijelom
teritorija na koji Srbija nije imala aspiracije. Takva je
nakaradna logika svaki pokušaj rasprave sasijecala u
H
početku i otvarala polje za nasilan rasplet.
Za razliku od Srba, Arbitražna komisija osnovana u
rujnu 1991. u Haagu radi pravne pomoći u rješavanju
dvojbenih pravnih pitanja na Konferenciji o Jugoslaviji
i donošenja odluka u skladu s međunarodnim pravom,
sastavljena od petero predsjednika ustavnih sudova iz
M
država članica EZ-a, u svom Mišljenju (br. 2) od 11. si-
ječnja 1992., ustanovila je “da bez obzira na okolnosti
pravo na samoodređenje ne može polučiti promjenu
granica koje postoje u trenutku neovisnosti (uti possi-
detis juris), osim u slučaju suprotnoga sporazuma dr-
žava u pitanju”.
D
Srpsku politiku u Hrvatskoj tijekom 1990. obilje-
žila je Srpska demokratska stranka (SDS). Osnovana
je 17. veljače 1990. u Kninu i bila je jedna u nizu no-
vih antikomunističkih političkih snaga. Programski se
zalagala za višestranačje i federalno ustrojstvo Jugo-
slavije. Predsjednik stranke bio je psihijatar dr. Jovan
C
Rašković. Raškovića su već u kasno ljeto 1990. istisnuli
mlađi i agresivniji lideri, stomatolog Milan Babić i sus-
pendirani milicijski inspektor Milan Martić. U proljeće
se stranka rascijepila na SDS Hrvatske i SDS Krajine, čija
je predsjednica bila dr. Ljubica Šolaja. Po izbornim re-
D
zultatima, SDS je bio marginalna politička snaga. Po-
bijedio je samo u Donjem Lapcu, Gračacu i Kninu, što
je bilo dovoljno za pet zastupnika u Saboru.29 U ljeto i
jesen 1990. SDS se iz marginalne pretvarao u temeljnu
srpsku stranku u Hrvatskoj. Stranka je koristila rasulo
SKH-SDP-a i preuzimala dio Srba iz njega. Osim krize
SKH-SDP-a, drugi razlog pretvaranja SDS-a u političko-
ga predstavnika većine Srba u Hrvatskoj bio je taj što
ga je HDZ prihvatio kao glavnoga predstavnika srpske
29 Hrvatski memorijalno-dokumentacijski centar Domo-
vinskog rata (dalje HMDCDR): Programski ciljevi Srpske
demokratske stranke, Knin, 17. 2. 1990.; Nikica BARIĆ,
Srpska pobuna u Hrvatskoj 1990.–1995., Golden marke-
ting-Tehnička knjiga, Zagreb, 2005., 55-56, 61, 213-214.
43
Domovinski rat 04-02-2020 Knjiga 1.indd 43
to which a nation had the right to secede was modified
so that, according to the new interpretation, it was val-
id only if the nation in question was the Serbian nation.
Therefore, Croatia could secede only if the Croats agreed
to cede a significant portion of Croatian territory to Ser-
bia. This warped logic made every attempt to solve the
issue by dialogue pointless and ensured a violent resolu-
tion of the impasse.
The Arbitration Commission of the Peace Confer-
ence on Yugoslavia, formed in September, 1991, in The
Hague, for the purpose of providing legal advice and
help as regards solving contentious legal issues at the
Peace Conference on Yugoslavia and reaching decisions
in accordance to the international plan, composed of
five presidents of Constitutional Courts in the EEC, in its
Opinion No 2 of January 11, 1992, concluded that “what-
ever the circumstances, the right to self-determination
must not involve changes to existing frontiers at the time
of independence (uti possidetis juris) except where the
states concerned agree otherwise”.
The Serbian Democratic Party (SDS) determined the
Serbs’ political outlook in Croatia during 1990. The party
was formed on February 17, 1990, in Knin and was just
another in a string of new, anticommunist political move-
ments. Its political platform revolved around supporting
multipartism and the concept of a federal Yugoslavia.
The first president of the SDS was Doctor Jovan Rašković,
a psychiatrist by profession. In late summer 1990 he was
replaced by younger and more aggressive leaders – Mi-
lan Babić, a dentist by profession and Milan Martić, a sus-
pended police inspector. In the spring of 1990 the party
split into the SDS Croatia and the SDS Krajina. The pres-
ident of the SDS Krajina was Doctor Ljubica Šolaja. The
SDS, in terms of the election results, was a marginal po-
litical force. Only in Knin, Donji Lapac and Gračac did the
SDS win a majority in the multi-party elections held in
Croatia in May 1990. That success was enough to secure
five seats in the Croatian parliament. In the summer and
R
fall of 1990 the SDS was transformed from a marginal po-
litical force into a grassroots Serbian party in Croatia. The
SDS took advantage of the disarray that the SKH-SDP was
in and recruited a number of its Serb members. Another
reason why the SDS was fast becoming the political rep-
resentative of most Croatian Serbs was the fact that the
HDZ party perceived and treated the SDS as the main
champion of the Serb minority in Croatia. The SDS party
was offered the position of the president of the Croatian
parliament but Jovan Rašković declined the honor.
4.2.2020. 19:25:39
 Davor Marijan • Rat za opstojnost Hrvata, 1991. - 1995.
Nail sa
SSSR-om
za zlato
H
M
manjine. Srpskoj demokratskoj stranci nudilo se mjesto
potpredsjednika Sabora, koje je Rašković odbio.30
D
Uoči konstituiranja prvoga višestranačkog Sabo-
ra SDS je inscenirani napad na predsjednika mjesnoga
odbora SDS-a iz Benkovca 19. svibnja 1990. iskoristio za
suspenziju odnosa sa Saborom SR Hrvatske.31 Na počet-
ku demokratske tranzicije SDS je odbio prihvatiti pravila
C
novoga vremena i u Saboru se boriti za svoja politička
stajališta. U saborske klupe zastupnici SDS-a sjeli su u dru-
goj polovini lipnja 1990. godine.32 Njihovo sudjelovanje u
radu bilo je povremeno i incidentno, a osnivanjem Srpske
autonomne oblasti (SAO) Krajine prestali su dolaziti.33
Odmah nakon izbora SDS se upustio u prekrajanje
administrativne podjele Hrvatske da bi napravio teri-
torijalnu jedinicu. Na poticaj iz Knina, 27. lipnja 1990.
konstituirana je Zajednica općina sjeverne Dalmacije i
Like. Do 19. prosinca 1990. u Zajednicu su ušle općine
30 Hrvatski državni arhiv, UPRH: Brzojav Jovana Raškovića
od 27. 5. 1990. Predsjedništvu HDZ-a; HDA, UPRH: Pred-
sjedništvo Republike Hrvatske od 20. 8. 1990., Informa-
cija o uzrocima i posljedicama zaoštravanja nacionalnih
napetosti i nemira u nekim općinama u Hrvatskoj.
31 N. BARIĆ, Srpska pobuna, 63-65.
32 (TANJUG), “SDS odmrzava odnose sa Saborom”, Vjesnik,
10. 6. 1990., 3.
33 Dossier Knin, Ministarstvo informiranja Republike Hrvat-
ske, Zagreb, veljača 1991., 30.
44
Domovinski rat 04-02-2020 Knjiga 1.indd 44
Zemljovid s granicama „Velike Srbije”, duboko na
teritoriju Republike Hrvatske.
A map showing the western boundaries of “Greater
Serbia”, deep in the Republic of Croatia’s territory.
„Oružana pobuna“, naslovnica Slobodne Dal-
macije, 19. kolovoza 1990.; vijest u novinama o
postavljenim barikadama u zaleđu Knina i Zadra
17. kolovoza 1990., na kojima su naoružani Srbi
zaustavljali promet i maltretirali putnike.
“Armed Rebellion”. The front page of Slobodna
Dalmacija, August 19 1990 issue; article about
barricades and roadblocks set up between Knin
and Zadar on August 17 and manned by armed
Serbs who stopped vehicles and brutalized driv-
ers and passengers.
Just prior to the establishment of the first multi-par-
ty parliament the SDS used a staged attack on the
president of the local SDS committee in Benkovac,
which had occurred on May 19, 1990, as a pretext to
suspend its relations with the Croatian parliament. At
the very start of Croatia’s transition into a democratic
system of government the SDS rejected the values of
the post-communist era and refused to promote its po-
litical platform in the Croatian parliament. The SDS’ MPs
took their seats in the parliament for the first time in
the second half of June 1990. Their participation there
could best be described as disinterested, perfunctory
and occasional. When the  Serbian Autonomous Region
D
of Krajina  (SAO Krajina) was proclaimed they stopped
showing up altogether.
Immediately after the elections the SDS started tak-
ing actions to alter the administrative structure of the
Republic of Croatia for the purpose of creating a new
R
territorial unit. At the instigation of the Serb leadership
in Knin the Community of Municipalities of Northern
Dalmatia and Lika was constituted on June 27, 1990. By
December 19, 1990, the following municipalities had
joined the Community: Benkovac, Donji Lapac, Dvor na
Uni, Glina, Gračac, Knin, Kostajnica, Obrovac, Titova Ko-
renica and Vojnić.
At the All-Serbian Assembly held in Srb on July 25,
1990, the Declaration on the Sovereignty and Autono-
my of the Serbian Nation was accepted. The text of the
4.2.2020. 19:25:41
 The Croatian Nation’s Struggle for Survival, 1991-1995
Benkovac, Donji Lapac, Dvor na Uni, Glina, Gračac, Knin,
Kostajnica, Obrovac, Titova Korenica i Vojnić.34
Na srpskom saboru u Srbu 25. srpnja 1990. usvojena
je “Deklaracija o suverenosti i autonomiji srpskog naroda
u Hrvatskoj”. Sročena je kao ucjena i temeljila se na shva-
ćanju prava naroda na samoopredjeljenje i odcjepljenje.
Po njoj su Srbi u Hrvatskoj kao narod imali pravo na su-
verenost i da se zajedno s Hrvatima ili neovisno o njima
odluče za federativnu ili konfederativnu Jugoslaviju. Kao
političko predstavništvo Srba u Hrvatskoj konstituiran je
H
Srpski sabor, a izvršno tijelo Sabora bilo je Srpsko nacio-
nalno vijeće (SNV), kojem je povjerena organizacija refe-
renduma Srba o svim pitanjima bitnim za njihov položaj u
Hrvatskoj i Jugoslaviji “kao i drugim pitanjima koja se tiču
ostvarivanja srpskog suvereniteta i autonomnosti”.35
Sljedeći korak srpskih buntovnika bio je referen-
M
dum održan od 19. kolovoza do 2. rujna 1990. godine.
Centralna komisija za provođenje autonomije Srba u
Hrvatskoj objavila je da je na referendum izišlo 567.317
građana, od kojih se za srpsku autonomiju izjasnilo njih
567.127, protiv 144, a 46 listića bilo je nevažećih. Izvan
teritorija RH za srpsku autonomiju glasale su 189.422
D
osobe, protiv je bilo 28, a nevažećih je bilo 14 listića.36
U Kninu je 21. prosinca 1990. proglašena Srpska au-
tonomna oblast Krajina.37 Tijekom 1991. pojavile su se
još dvije srpske autonomne oblasti, u zapadnoj Slavoniji
i istočnoj Hrvatskoj. Najveća slabost samoproglašenih
autonomnih regija bila je u velikoj disperziji Srba u Hr-
C
vatskoj, što je dovelo do nerealnog političkog koncepta
identificiranja srpskih područja u Hrvatskoj. Ona su orga-
nizirana u srpske autonomne oblasti koje uopće nisu bile
etnički homogene. U sjevernoj Dalmaciji bilo je sjedište
SAO Krajine u tri općine s ukupno 87.000 stanovnika, od
D
kojih 73,4 % Srba. Istočna je Lika također tretirana kao dio
SAO Krajine i u tri je općine imala 30.000 stanovnika, od
čega 80,3 % Srba. Kordun i Banovina, kao najudaljeniji dio
SAO Krajine, imali su 113.000 stanovnika, od kojih 61,9 %
34 N. BARIĆ, Srpska pobuna, 65-66.
35 Pismohrana Ureda za suradnju s međunarodnim kazne-
nim sudovima Ministarstva pravosuđa Republike Hrvat-
ske (dalje: USMKSMP): Deklaracija o suverenosti i auto-
nomiji Srpskog naroda od 25. 7. 1990.
36 HMDCDR: Izvještaj Centralne komisije za provođenje izjaš-
njavanja od 30. 9. 1990. o provođenju izjašnjavanja srpskog
naroda u Republici Hrvatskoj o srpskoj autonomiji.
37 USMKSMP: Skupština Krajine, Rješenje br. 47/91-1 od 30.
4. 1991.
45
Domovinski rat 04-02-2020 Knjiga 1.indd 45
Declaration reads like a blackmail letter. The Serbs con-
veniently held the view that the term “self-determina-
tion” was synonymous with the term “sovereignty”. On
the basis of that logic the Serbs believed that they had
the right to decide, either together with the Croats or
independently of them, whether they wanted to live in
a federative or confederative Yugoslavia. The Serbian
Parliament in Croatia was constituted as the represen-
tative body of the Croatian Serbs. The executive branch
of government was Serbian National Council (SNV).
The Council was tasked with organizing a referendum
among the Croatian Serbs on all issues regarding their
position in Croatia and Yugoslavia and “all issues rele-
vant for achieving Serb sovereignty and autonomy”.
The Serb rebels’ next step was to hold a referendum.
The referendum was held from August 19 to September
2, 1990. The Central Committee for Holding a Referen-
dum on the Autonomy of Serbs in Croatia announced
that 567,317 citizens voted in the referendum and that
567,127 of them voted for Serb autonomy. According to
the same source, 144 people were against and 46 bal-
lot papers were invalid. Again, according to the Central
Committee for Holding a Referendum on the Autono-
my of Serbs in Croatia, 189,442 persons living outside
Croatia voted for Serb autonomy, with 28 persons vot-
ing against and 14 invalid ballot papers.
On December 21, 1990, the Serbian Autonomous
District of Krajina was proclaimed in Knin. During 1991
two more Serb autonomous districts sprang up; one
in western Slavonia and the other in eastern Croatia.
The biggest weakness of the self-proclaimed Serbian
statelets in Croatia was the fact that these territories
were not ethnically homogeneous. In that sense, the
whole concept of trying to carve out Serb areas with-
in the internationally recognized borders of Croatia
was untenable. Three municipalities in northern Dal-
matia formed the central part of the SAO Krajina. The
three municipalities together boasted a population of
R
87,000 people, 73.4% of them Serbs. The Serbs consid-
ered eastern Lika as part of the SAO Krajina. There were
also three municipalities in that area with a population
of 30,000 people. 80.3 % of that number were Serbs.
113,000 people lived in Kordun and Banovina, the most
remote part of the SAO Krajina. 61.9 % of that number
were Serbs. These areas, disconnected geographically,
accounted for only 13.2% of the whole territory of the
Republic of Croatia. Only 4.8 % of the population of
the Republic of Croatia lived in the areas in question.
4.2.2020. 19:25:42
 Davor Marijan • Rat za opstojnost Hrvata, 1991. - 1995.
Srba. Cijeli taj prostor, osim što nije bio povezan, obuhva-
ćao je 13,2 % ukupne površine RH i 4,8 % stanovništva, no
na njemu je živjelo 27,4 % srpskoga stanovništva. U istoč-
noj Hrvatskoj, u četiri općine na koje su Srbi pretendirali,
živjela je 401.000 stanovnika, od čega 22,6 % Srba. U za-
padnoj je Slavoniji u osam općina živjelo 250.000 stanov-
nika, od čega 26,9 % Srba. Kada se ta, navodno srpska, po-
dručja zbroje, dobiva se teritorij od 16.000 km², odnosno
28 % teritorija RH, s ukupno 881.000 stanovnika, od čega
316.000 odnosno 36 % Srba. U odnosu na populaciju u
H
cijeloj Hrvatskoj, radilo se o 55 % svih Srba, no problem je
bio što su oni i u “toj fragmentarnoj cjelini manjinsko, a ne
većinsko stanovništvo”.38
Nakon neuspjeha JNA, tj. glavnine Oružanih snaga
SFRJ (OS SFRJ) da porazi Hrvatsku napravljen je završni
korak u stvaranju pobunjene srpske oblasti na njezinu
M
teritoriju. Srpska autonomna oblast Krajina nije ispu-
nila zadatak koji joj je namijenjen i nije Srbima u Hr-
vatskoj dala legalitet i legitimitet na temelju kojeg su
planirali ostati u krnjoj Jugoslaviji. Učinili su ono što im
je preostalo – proglasiti srpsku državu u Hrvatskoj na
teritoriju koji je JNA okupirala. U Kninu je na svetoga
D
Nikolu 19. prosinca 1991. Skupština SAO Krajine pro-
glasila Republiku Srpsku Krajinu (RSK).39 Istoga je dana
u Belom Manastiru Velika narodna skupština SAO Istoč-
ne Slavonije, Baranje i Zapadnog Srijema donijela od-
luku o pripajanju “ove Srpske oblasti Republici Srpska
Krajina”. Završni čin stvaranja RSK bio je u Banjoj Luci,
C
gdje je 24. prosinca Skupština SAO Zapadne Slavonije
također donijela odluku o pripajanju RSK.40 Glavnina
RSK je bila na zapadu, na sjeveru je bila marginalna, a
na istoku druga po veličini, no čvrsto vezana uz Srbiju.
Osnivanjem RSK propao je pokušaj trenutnog pripaja-
nja dijela teritorija Hrvatske Srbiji odnosno Jugoslaviji.
Srbi u RH bili su prinuđeni preuzeti privremeni repu-
blički koncept nadajući se da će ga tijekom vremena
uspjeti sasvim realizirati.
38 Hrvatska između rata i samostalnosti, skupina autora, Hr-
vatska sveučilišna naklada – OKC, Zagreb, 1991., 53-55.
39 M. M., “Proglašena Republika Srpska Krajina”, Srpski glas,
29. 12. 1991., 1.
40 HMDCDR: Skupština SAO Zapadna Slavonija od 24. 12.
1991., Odluka o pripajanju SAO Zapadne Slavonije Re-
publici Srpskoj Krajini; HMDCDR: “Proglašena Republika
Srpska Krajina”, Bilten ratnog predsjedništva i Štaba TO op-
štine Glina, br. 5, januar 1992., 4-6.
46
Domovinski rat 04-02-2020 Knjiga 1.indd 46
27.4 % of the total number of Croatian Serbs lived in
the areas comprising the SAO Krajina. In eastern Cro-
atia there were four municipalities the Serbs wanted
to appropriate. 401,000 people lived there, 22.6 % of
them Serbs. The eight municipalities of western Sla-
vonia together had a population of 250,000, 26.9 %
of them Serbs. All these areas put together created a
geographical area of 16,000 square kilometers with a
population of 881,000 people. 316,000 of that number,
or 36 %, were Serbs. Only 55 % of all Croatian Serbs
lived in the areas mentioned above. Even in that “frag-
mented whole the Serbs did not make up a majority of
the population”.
The JNA, in these early stages of the conflict, failed
to defeat Croatia militarily. It is important to mention
that the JNA forces stationed in Croatia formed the
bulk of the Armed Forces of the SFRY. However, the
activities of the JNA during this period facilitated the
creation of the rebel statelet in Croatian territory. Still,
the creation of the SAO Krajina did not fulfill its main
intended function, which was to give the Serbs in Cro-
atia the legitimacy to demand that Croatia cede the
territory of the statelet to Serbia. Therefore, the rebel
Serbs opted for what they believed was the next best
thing; they proclaimed a Serbian state in those areas of
Croatia that were occupied by the JNA. On December
19, 1991, on Saint Nicholas Day, the Assembly of the
Serbian Autonomous District of Krajina proclaimed the
Republic of Srpska Krajina (RSK) in Knin. On the same
day in Beli Manastir the Great National Assembly of the
Serbian Autonomous District of Eastern Slavonia, Ba-
ranja and Western Sirmium decided to join “this Serbi-
an district to the Republic of Serbian Krajina”. The final
D
act of the creation of the RSK took place on December
24 in Banja Luka, where the Assembly of the Serbian
Autonomous District of Western Slavonia also decided
to join the RSK. The bulk of the territory of the RSK was
in the west. In the north the RSK held only a sliver of ter-
R
ritory. In the east the area under the control of the RSK
was significantly smaller than its all-important territo-
ry in the west but it shared its eastern boundary with
Serbia. The proclamation of the RSK was in reality an
admission of defeat – the attempt to force Croatia to
cede a portion of its territory to Serbia, i.e. Yugoslavia,
had failed. The Serbs in the Republic of Croatia had no
option but to accept a temporary political solution in
the hope that it would eventually lead to the realiza-
tion of their main objective.
4.2.2020. 19:25:42
 The Croatian Nation’s Struggle for Survival, 1991-1995
Pokušaj Hrvatske da srpski problem
riješi na miran način
Kod značajnog dijela Srba u Hrvatskoj izborna
pobjeda HDZ-a nije značila prekretnicu. Oni su već
prihvatili novu nacionalnu konstrukciju političkoga
vodstva Srbije i tvrdnje medija da je pobjeda HDZ-a
pobjeda ustaštva.41 Kod dijela Srba kao da nije bilo
dvojbe da je ponavljanje 1941. neminovno. S jedne
strane iracionalan strah, a s druge beskompromisno
H
prihvaćanje projekta “svi Srbi u jednoj državi” vodili su
do stvaranja brze i jasne taktike Srba u Hrvatskoj. To je
bila taktika, a ne politički program, jer je on već bio po-
stavljen. Srbi su djelovali po konstrukciji koju su sami
postavili o Hrvatima, a ne na temelju poteza hrvatsko-
ga vrhovništva.
M
Taktika SDS-a bila je jednostavna – tvrditi da su za
razgovore, a stvarno zaoštravati stanje ne upuštajući se
u ozbiljnu raspravu s hrvatskim vrhovništvom o položa-
ju Srba u Hrvatskoj. Svaki potez nove vlasti SDS je op-
struirao i koristio kao povod za sukob, a ne kao razlog
za suradnju. Na hrvatski prijedlog da se pismeno očitu-
D
ju o svojim zahtjevima nije odgovoreno.42 Osnivanjem
SNV-a u srpnju 1990. SDS teško da je i pomišljao na
nekakve razgovore. Hrvatska je preko saborske komisi-
je nastojala otvoriti dijalog s predstavnicima općina s
većinskim srpskim stanovništvom, a SDS-ova je vrhuška
C
kao svojega predstavnika gurala SNV, koji je Hrvatima
bilo neprihvatljiv jer nije imao nikakav legitimitet, a di-
jalog s vlastima bi mu ga dao.43
U općinama gdje su Srbi bili u većini SDS je do
kraja 1990. stvorio paralelnu vlast i paralelni pravni
poredak, a potom uspostavio isključivo svoju vlast.44
D
Politička je autonomija hrvatskomu vrhovništvu bila
neprihvatljiva, no Srbima se nudio način da očuvaju
41 D. BILANDŽIĆ, Hrvatska moderna povijest, 770, 772, 777;
D. JOVIĆ, Jugoslavija, 479.
42 HDA, UPRH: Predsjedništvo Republike Hrvatske od 20. 8.
1990., Informacija o uzrocima i posljedicama zaoštrava-
nja nacionalnih napetosti i nemira u nekim općinama u
Hrvatskoj.
43 HDA, UPRH: Zapisnik sa 17. sjednice Predsjedništva Re-
publike Hrvatske, održane 5. 9. 1990.; HDA, UPRH: Zapi-
snik s 20. sjednice Predsjedništva Republike Hrvatske,
održane 3. 10. 1990. Zapisnik je pogrešno datiran (3. stu-
denoga 1990. godine).
44 HDA, UPRH: Zapisnik s 2. sjednice Vrhovnog državnog
vijeća Republike Hrvatske, održane 25. 4. 1991.
47
Domovinski rat 04-02-2020 Knjiga 1.indd 47
Croatian Attempts to Solve the Serb
Problem Peacefully
The victory of the HDZ in the election did not mean
anything to a significant number of Croatian Serbs. They
had already swallowed lock, stock and barrel the nation-
al construction promulgated by the political leadership
of Serbia and the claims made by the state-run Serbian
media that an HDZ victory in the election would con-
stitute a triumph of Croatian fascism. Some Serbs, in-
explicably, truly believed that the events that had hap-
pened in 1941 would be reenacted. That irrational fear
coupled with the abiding acceptance of the “all Serbs
in one state” project quickly led the Croatian Serbs to
adopt a clear tactic of opposition to Croatia. And it was
a tactic, because the political program underlying it had
already been set. The Croatian Serbs acted on their pre-
conceived prejudices about Croats and not as a reaction
to the moves made by the Croatian government.
The tactic of the SDS was simple – pretend to be in
favor of a peaceful resolution of the crisis but in reality
do everything necessary to derail the peace process. It
was not in the SDS’s interest to engage in serious talks
with the Croatian government about the position of the
Serb ethnic minority in Croatia. The aim of every move
the SDS made was a further escalation of the crisis. The
SDS did not want to cooperate with the Croatian gov-
ernment. At one point, exasperated with the obstinate
attitude of the SDS, the Croatian government suggest-
ed that the SDS put all of their demands in writing. The
SDS ignored the suggestion. The forming of the SNV in
July, 1990, clearly showed that the SDS had no inten-
tion to engage in a serious dialogue with the Croatian
government. The Croatian government tried, through a
parliamentary committee, to open a dialogue with rep-
resentatives of the municipalities where Serbs made up
a majority of the population. However, the leadership of
the SDS insisted that the Serbs be represented by the
R
Serbian National Council. The Serbian National Council
was unacceptable to the Croatian government because
it held no legitimacy. The Croatian government did not
want to provide legitimacy for the SNV by engaging in
official talks with its members.
In the municipalities with Serb majorities the lead-
ers of the SDS had formed a parallel government and
parallel legal order by the end of 1990 and later com-
pletely imposed their own authority on the municipali-
ties. The Croatian government would not grant political
4.2.2020. 19:25:42
 Davor Marijan • Rat za opstojnost Hrvata, 1991. - 1995.
svoja etnička svojstva, tradiciju i nacionalnu fiziono-
miju. Na sjednici hrvatskoga Predsjedništva održa-
noj 25. listopada 1990. osnovan je Savjet za kulturnu
autonomiju Srba u Hrvatskoj, koji je trebao razmo-
triti prijedlog radne skupine koja je radila model
kulturne autonomije u Hrvatskoj. Radna je skupina
napravila tri elaborata na temu kulturne autonomije,
od kojih nije bilo koristi jer su SDS-u bili neprihvatlji-
vi. Srpskoj demokratskoj stranci kulturna je autono-
mija bila prihvatljiva jedino za područja Hrvatske na
H
kojima su Srbi u manjini, ali i u tom slučaju samo uz
suglasnost SNV-a.45
U prvim mjesecima 1991. stanje se ubrzano pogor-
šavalo u skladu s krizom i neuspješnim razgovorima o
budućnosti Jugoslavije. Hrvatska se odlučila za samosta-
lan put i 19. svibnja 1991. održala je referendum o svojoj
M
budućnosti. Nakon što su objavljeni rezultati referendu-
ma predsjednik Tuđman je 23. svibnja zajamčio “kulturnu
autonomiju i sva građanska prava Srbima i pripadnicima
drugih nacionalnosti u Hrvatskoj”.46 Mjesec dana poslije,
25. lipnja 1991., Hrvatska je proglasila osamostaljenje.
“Srbima u Hrvatskoj i svim nacionalnim manjinama koje
D
žive na njezinu tlu” jamčilo se “poštivanje svih ljudskih i
građanskih prava, a osobito slobodu izražavanja i nje-
govanja nacionalnog jezika i kulture, kao i političkog
organiziranja”.47 Krajem 1991., kada je priznanje hrvatske
neovisnosti postalo pitanje dana, Hrvatska je na zahtjeve
iz inozemstva 4. prosinca prihvatila Ustavni zakon o ljud-
C
skim pravima i slobodama i o pravima etničkih i nacio-
nalnih zajednica ili manjina u Republici Hrvatskoj.48 Zbog
zamjerki iz EZ-a i uvjetovanja s primanjem u UN, Hrvatska
ga je 8. svibnja 1992. dopunila. Umjesto općina u zakon
su uneseni kotarevi, pa je predviđano da na pobunje-
nom i okupiranom teritoriju zapadne Hrvatske budu
dva autonomna kotara, Knin i Glina, kao i dvije policijske
45 HDA, UPRH: Priopćenje sa sjednice Predsjedništva Repu-
blike Hrvatske od 25. 10. 1990.; N. BARIĆ, Srpska pobuna,
88-89.
46 Odluka Predsjednika Republike Hrvatske od 23. 5.
1991., Narodne novine, br. 24, 27. 5. 1991.
47 Deklaracija Sabora Republike Hrvatske od 25. 6. 1991. o
proglašenju suverene i samostalne Republike Hrvatske,
Narodne novine, br. 31, 25. 6. 1991.
48 Ustavni zakon o ljudskim pravima i slobodama i o pravi-
ma etničkih i nacionalnih zajednica ili manjina u Repu-
blici Hrvatskoj, Narodne novine, br. 65, 4. 12. 1991.
48
Domovinski rat 04-02-2020 Knjiga 1.indd 48
autonomy to the Serb ethnic minority. But, the Croatian
government intended to protect the Serbs’ traditions
and national identity. At a session of the Croatian Pres-
idency held on October 25, 1990, the Council for the
Cultural Autonomy of Serbs was formed. The Council for
the Cultural Autonomy of Serbs in Croatia was given the
task of analyzing the recommendation of the working
group that was engaged in creating models of cultur-
al autonomy in Croatia. The working group had created
three possible models of cultural autonomy, but none
was acceptable to the SDS. The SDS was willing to ac-
cept the concept of cultural autonomy only in relation
to those areas where Serbs were in a minority and that
only with the consent of the SNV.
The situation was deteriorating rapidly during the
first months of 1991. The talks regarding the future of
Yugoslavia were leading nowhere fast. The leadership
of Croatia realized that the country’s future lay outside
the scope of Yugoslavia. On May 19 the referendum on
Croatia’s future was held. After the results of the referen-
dum were made public, President Tuđman, on May 23,
guaranteed “cultural autonomy and all civil rights to the
Serbs and members of other ethnic minorities in Croa-
tia”. A month later, on June 25, 1991, Croatia declared in-
dependence. “The Serbs in Croatia and all ethnic groups
living in the territory of Croatia” were guaranteed “all hu-
man and civil rights, and especially the freedom of ex-
pression and freedom to express and foster the national
language and culture and also political freedom”. At the
end of 1991, when it was clear that the international rec-
ognition of Croatian independence was just days away,
Croatia, at the insistence of the international communi-
ty, adopted the “Constitutional Law on Human Rights
D
and Freedoms and Rights of National and Ethnic Com-
munities or Minorities in the Republic of Croatia” on De-
cember 4. The European Community found a number of
objections in the wording of the law and demanded that
Croatia amend the law. Worth noting is the fact that the
R
European Community made it clear that Croatia would
not be admitted into the United Nations unless the law
was accordingly amended. Croatia duly obliged and the
law was amended on May 8, 1992. The term “municipal-
ity” was replaced with the term kotar (district) and two
autonomous kotars (districts) were to be formed in the
occupied territory, Knin and Glina, as well as two police
administrations. The law was in keeping with the high-
est standards of the international community. However,
by the time it was adopted, a full-scale war had already
4.2.2020. 19:25:42
 The Croatian Nation’s Struggle for Survival, 1991-1995
uprave.49 Zakon je bio u suglasju s najvišim standardima
međunarodne zajednice, no prihvaćen je u vrijeme kada
se rat nije mogao zaustaviti i kada su u pitanju Srbi, ostao
je nerealiziran.50 Time je dio EZ-a bio spreman dati Srbima
široku političku autonomiju, što je moglo dovesti u pita-
nje teritorijalni integritet Hrvatske i dovesti do stvaranja
države u državi. No, zbog isključive srpske politike, zakon
nikad nije zaživio.
Neuspješni pregovori o budućnosti
H
Jugoslavije
Krajem svibnja 1990. Predsjedništvo SFRJ iniciralo
je političke razgovore s rukovodstvima svih republika
i autonomnih pokrajina da bi se stekao uvid u njihovo
gledište o budućim odnosima u SFRJ i njezinu društve-
M
nom uređenju. Razgovori su pokazali da se budućnost
Jugoslavije vidi u suprotstavljenim stajalištima između
federacije i konfederacije. Hrvatska i Slovenija zagovara-
le su konfederalnu, a Srbija i Crna Gora federalnu opciju.
Bosna i Hercegovina i Makedonija pokušavale su balan-
sirati između dvije opcije, s tim da im je glavni interes
D
ipak bilo očuvanje Jugoslavije. Stajališta JNA bila su slič-
na javnim stajalištima srpskoga bloka.51
Koristeći premoć u saveznim tijelima, srbijansko je
rukovodstvo u listopadu 1990. bezuspješno pokušalo
u Skupštini SFRJ nametnuti federalni koncept uređenja
Jugoslavije.52 Nakon tog neuspjeha Predsjedništvo SFRJ
C
nije imalo drugog izbora osim da u siječnju 1991. orga-
nizira novi ciklus razgovora o političkoj budućnosti SFRJ
i da u njima sudjeluju predsjednici (odnosno predsjed-
nici predsjedništava) republika i pokrajina, predsjednik
Skupštine SFRJ i predsjednik Saveznoga izvršnog vijeća
D
49 Ustavni zakon o izmjenama i dopunama Ustavnog zako-
na o ljudskim pravima i slobodama i o pravima etničkih
i nacionalnih zajednica ili manjina u Republici Hrvat-
skoj, Narodne novine, br. 27 od 8. 5. 1992.; Ustavni zakon
o ljudskim pravima i slobodama i o pravima etničkih i
nacionalnih zajednica ili manjina u Republici Hrvatskoj
(pročišćeni tekst), Narodne novine, br. 34 od 17. 6. 1992.
50 Siniša TATALOVIĆ, Tomislav LACOVIĆ, “Dvadeset godina
zaštite nacionalnih manjina u Republici Hrvatskoj”, Mi-
gracijske i etničke teme, 3/27, Zagreb, 2011., 379-380.
51 HDA, UPRH: Predsedništvo SFRJ, str. pov. br. 150/3-2-696
od 31. 5. 1990.; Vladimir Đuro DEGEN, Hrvatska država u
međunarodnoj zajednici, Nakladni zavod Globus, Zagreb,
2002., 225-226; B. REPE, Jutri je novi dan, 63-73.
52 B. JOVIĆ, Poslednji dani SFRJ, 208-215.
49
Domovinski rat 04-02-2020 Knjiga 1.indd 49
become inevitable. The provisions of the law relating
to the Serbs, therefore, became null and void. By insist-
ing that Croatia pass the law, the European Communi-
ty was prepared to grant a wide political autonomy to
the Serbs, putting in jeopardy the territorial integrity of
the Republic of Croatia. A scenario by which the Serbs
would create their state within Croatia was a real possi-
bility. However, due to the belligerent stance of Serbia
and the rebel Serbs, the law was never put into effect.
Unsuccessful Negotiations on the Future
of Yugoslavia
At the end of May, 1990, the Presidency of the SFRY
initiated talks with the leaders of all the constituent re-
public and autonomous provinces about future rela-
tions within the SFRY and the country’s future system
of government. The talks revealed one major fault line;
between those advocating a federative state and those
in favor of a confederation of states. Croatia and Slove-
nia favored the option of organizing the country along
confederative lines while Serbia and Montenegro insist-
ed on a federative Yugoslavia. Bosnia and Herzegovina
and Macedonia remained on the fence because their
main goal was to preserve the integrity of Yugoslavia.
The JNA’s point of view mirrored that of the Serbian bloc.
The leadership of Serbia, in October, 1990, unsuc-
cessfully attempted, using its influence in the federal
bodies, to impose their federal concept in the Assembly
of the SFRY. After this failed attempt the Presidency of
the SFRY had no choice but to organize a new round
of talks about Yugoslavia’s future in January, 1991. The
presidents (presidents of presidencies) of the republics
and provinces, the President of the Assembly of the SFRY
and President of the Federal Executive Council (SIV) par-
ticipated in the talks. These talks lasted until June, 1991,
and were conducted on two levels; within the framework
of extended sessions of the Presidency of the SFRY and
R
through direct discussions between the leaders of the
republics. These efforts bore no fruit. At the last meeting,
held on June 6, 1991, in Sarajevo, the representatives of
Bosnia and Herzegovina and Macedonia suggested an
asymmetric federation. According to their model, Serbia
and Montenegro would form the core of the (con)feder-
ation, Bosnia and Herzegovina and Macedonia would be
semi-independent but constituent republics and Croatia
and Slovenia would enjoy a confederate status with as
much sovereignty and autonomy as they desired. The
4.2.2020. 19:25:42
 Davor Marijan • Rat za opstojnost Hrvata, 1991. - 1995.
H
Susret predsjednika republika SFRJ na Brdu kod Kranja, 11.
travnja 1991. godine (autor fotografija: Renato Branđolica).
M
(SIV).53 Besplodni razgovori trajali su do lipnja 1991. na
dvije razine, u okviru proširenih sjednica Predsjedništva
SFRJ i kroz izravne razgovore čelnika republika. Na po-
sljednjem sastanku, održanom 6. lipnja 1991. u Sarajevu,
predsjednici BiH i Makedonije ponudili su asimetričnu fe-
deraciju. Srbija i Crna Gora bile bi stožer (kon)federacije,
BiH i Makedonija bile bi polusamostalne, ali konstitutiv-
D
ne republike, a Hrvatska i Slovenija imale bi konfederalni
status s onoliko suvereniteta i autonomije koliko drže da
im je nužno.54 Prijedlog nije prihvaćen i time su republič-
ki dogovori o budućnosti Jugoslavije završili s potpunim
neuspjehom. Slovenija i Hrvatska proglasile su 25. lipnja
C
1991. neovisnost. Slijedio je rat i miješanje međunarodne
zajednice, što nije zaustavilo raspad Jugoslavije. Na za-
htjev Europske zajednice (EZ) Hrvatska i Slovenija na tri
su mjeseca odgodile odluku o neovisnosti.55
Iskorak Hrvatske na međunarodnu scenu
Slom komunizma 1989. promijenio je političku
kartu Europe. Time je počelo dugogodišnje i mukotr-
pno integriranje Europe i širenje kapitalizma i liberalne
demokracije u istočnoeuropske zemlje. Oba su procesa
53 HDA, UPRH: Informacija Predsedništva SFRJ od 1. 4.
1991. o aktivnostima u Predsedništvu SFRJ koje se od-
nose na političku budućnost zemlje.
54 SVA MORH, ZHRZ: Predsjednik Predsjedništva SR Bosne
i Hercegovine, Predsjednik Republike Makedonije, maja
1991., Platforma o budućoj jugoslovenskoj zajednici; L.
SILBER, A. LITTLE, Smrt Jugoslavije, 139-141.
55 B. REPE, Jutri je nov dan, 430; Ivan PERIĆ, Godine koje će se
pamtiti, Školska knjiga, Zagreb, 1995., 102.
50
Domovinski rat 04-02-2020 Knjiga 1.indd 50
The presidents of the SFRY republics meet in Brdo near Kranj,
April 11, 1991 (Photographs by Renato Branđolica).
recommendation was not accepted and with that the
months-long talks ignominiously failed. Slovenia and
Croatia declared independence on June 25, 1991. The war
in Slovenia and intervention of the international commu-
nity followed but nothing could prevent the break-up of
Yugoslavia. At the request of the European Community
Slovenia and Croatia put a three-month moratorium on
their respective decisions to declare independence.
Croatia Appears on the International
Stage
The collapse of Communism in 1989 changed the
political map of Europe. The event marked the beginning
of the painstaking process of integrating the countries of
Eastern Europe into the sphere of Western Europe and
also the process of introducing capitalism and liberal de-
mocracy into the former countries of the Soviet Bloc and
D
Communist and socialist countries that existed outside
of the Soviet Bloc. Both processes had a profound impact
on the position of Yugoslavia and Croatia in the global
arena. The process of integration determined the need
to integrate Yugoslavia as a territorial and political whole
R
into the fabric of the new Europe. On the other hand,
the collapse of Communism necessitated the initiation
of the process of democratization in Yugoslavia. It soon
became apparent that the two processes, in the context
of Yugoslavia, were mutually exclusive. Serbia, backed by
Montenegro, resisted all initiatives from the West calling
for democratization. Croatia, and even more so Slovenia,
had no choice in such circumstances but to push for a
markedly different Yugoslavia. Both republics were pre-
4.2.2020. 19:25:42
 The Croatian Nation’s Struggle for Survival, 1991-1995
značajno utjecala na međunarodni položaj Jugoslavi-
je i Hrvatske. Integracijski procesi iskristalizirani su u
zahtjevu da se Jugoslavija kao teritorijalno-politička
cjelina integrira u arhitekturu nove Europe, a slom
komunizma postavio je zahtjev za njezinu demokra-
tizaciju. Brzo se pokazalo da se ta dva zahtjeva u Ju-
goslaviji isključuju. Srbija i uz nju Crna Gora najviše su
se protivile promjenama koje su strujale sa Zapada.
Za Hrvatsku i još više Sloveniju počinjalo je vrijeme u
kojem su tražile značajno drugačiju Jugoslaviju, pa i
H
po cijenu njezina opstanka. Samo je predsjednik SIV-a
Ante Marković, uz međunarodnu potporu, naivno po-
kušavao riješiti krizu navodnim reformama, koje nije
mogao provesti.
Rušenjem Berlinskoga zida i padom komunizma
u istočnoj se Europi očekivala radikalna reforma ko-
M
munizma ili njegovo potpuno nestajanje. U zapadnoj
Europi ubrzano se odvijalo političko i ekonomsko in-
tegriranje, kojemu je slom SSSR-a odmogao tako što
je ideju europskih integracija oslobodio pritiska koji
je ujedno bio vanjski integrativni element. U listopadu
1990. ujedinila se Njemačka. Od 19. do 21. studenoga
D
1990. na Konferenciji o europskoj sigurnosti i suradnji
(KESS) u Parizu prihvaćena je Pariška povelja za novu
Europu. Naznačila je osnove strukture Europe nakon
svršetka Hladnoga rata i novu ulogu KESS-a. U nizo-
zemskom gradu Maastrichtu članice EZ-a potpisale su
7. veljače 1992. ugovor o pretvaranju u Europsku uniju.
C
Ugovorom su postavljeni ciljevi gospodarske i mone-
tarne unije, jedinstvene valute, zajedničke vanjske i
sigurnosne politike, zajedničke obrambene politike,
suradnje u pravosuđu, unutarnjim poslovima i držav-
ljanstvu Unije.56
D
U jugoslavensku se krizu EZ uključio u ljeto 1991.
godine. Odnos dvanaesteročlane zajednice prema
SFRJ bio je proturječan, što nije čudno s obzirom na
sastav i prošlost zemalja članica Zajednice. U njihovoj
reakciji i kasnijem djelovanju teško je razlučiti motive.
Vodeće članice imale su svoje kratkoročne i dugoročne
interese. Nisu bile nevažne ni prijašnje “povijesne” veze
dijela republika sa zapadnoeuropskim državama, kao
ni utjecaj tih veza u nekim procjenama i motivima dje-
lovanja. Zajednica je podržavala mlade demokracije,
no s druge je strane bila za očuvanje Jugoslavije zbog
56 Povijest: Suvremeno doba (1985. – 2007.) i kronologija,
knjiga 19, Biblioteka „Jutarnjeg lista“, Zagreb, 2008.,
130-135.
51
Domovinski rat 04-02-2020 Knjiga 1.indd 51
pared to vie for independence should their initiatives fail.
Only the President of the Federal Executive Council, Ante
Marković, with the backing of the international commu-
nity, naively tried to solve the crisis by initiating reforms
he himself knew were doomed to failure.
With the collapse of the Soviet Union and the fall of
the Berlin Wall many political commentators expected a
radical reform of Communism in Eastern Europe. Some
experts predicted the utter collapse of Communism in
Europe. At that time, Western Europe was undergoing an
accelerated process of political and economic integration.
The collapse of the Soviet Union somewhat arrested the
momentum of that political and economic integration
because the existence of the Soviet Union had actually
been an important external integrative factor in relation
to Western Europe. In October, 1990, the German nation
reunited. At the Conference on Security and Co-opera-
tion in Europe (OSCE) held in Paris from November 19 to
November 21, 1990, the Charter of Paris for a New Europe
was signed. The Paris Charter provided the foundation
for the structure of a new, post-cold war Europe and for
a new role of the OSCE. On February 7, 1992, in the Dutch
city of Maastricht the member states of the European
Community signed the Treaty on European Union. The
Treaty created a common economic and monetary union,
and a common currency, established common security
and defense policies, cooperation, EU citizenship and co-
ordination as regards the judiciary and internal affairs.
The European Community became actively involved
in the Yugoslav crisis in the summer of 1991. The EC’s atti-
tude towards what was happening in Yugoslavia ranged
from completely ambivalent to staunchly partisan, de-
pending on the member state in question. With the ben-
efit of hindsight we now know that this chaotic response
of the EC to the Yugoslav crisis was inevitable given the
fact that 12 countries comprised the EC, countries with
differing and sometimes opposing political agendas. It
is important to mention that these agendas stemmed,
R
more or less directly, from the long and internecine histo-
ry of Europe in which the nations in question had played
pivotal roles. It is very hard to discern clear goals and mo-
tives behind any given initiative or move by the EC in re-
sponse and later on in dealing with the situation in Yugo-
slavia. The leading members of the community wanted
to protect both their short-term and long-term interests.
Another major factor in this complicated equation were
the ties that different Yugoslav republics had established
with different western European countries. Generally
4.2.2020. 19:25:42
 Davor Marijan • Rat za opstojnost Hrvata, 1991. - 1995.
uvriježena mišljenja da ni jedna od republika nije spo-
sobna za samostalan gospodarski život. Držalo se da
raspad vodi u građanski rat, što bi bio poguban primjer
za Sovjetski Savez.57
Poput EZ-a, i Sjedinjene Američke Države (SAD), čak
i duže, podržavale su cjelovitu Jugoslaviju. Ilustrativan
je primjer posjet zamjenika državnoga tajnika SAD-a
Lawrencea Eagleburgera Jugoslaviji krajem veljače
1990. godine. On je nedvosmisleno podržao predsjed-
nika SIV-a Antu Markovića. Sastao se i s predstavnicima
H
oporbe raznih boja iz svih republika, kojima je također
jasno dao na znanje da SAD neće poduprijeti raspad
Jugoslavije, ali će, ako se to ipak dogodi, prihvatiti za-
tečeno stanje. Ta je poruka, tvrdi američki veleposlanik
u SFRJ Warren Zimmermann, različito shvaćena, pose-
bice u Sloveniji.58
M
Uloga SSSR-a bila je uvjetovana problemima kroz
koje je prolazilo komunističko carstvo u raspadu i bila
je na razini statista koji se čak nije ni gurao među glav-
ne glumce u predstavi. Nesvrstani, skupina zemalja
Trećega svijeta čiji je Tito bio predvodnik, u svijetu ni
izbliza nisu imali važnost koja im se davala u Jugoslavi-
D
ji. Završetkom bipolarne podjele svijeta počela je ubr-
zana marginalizacija Pokreta nesvrstanih.59
Hrvatska je na međunarodnu scenu iskoračila u tre-
nutku kada se jedan poredak raspadao, a novi se nije ni
nazirao. Hrvatskomu je vrhovništvu bilo jasno da radi
iskorak u slabo poznato područje diplomacije. Hrvat-
C
ska nije imala tradiciju diplomatskoga pregovaranja i
tek ju je trebala izgraditi.60 Od prethodne vlasti nasli-
jeđen je Republički komitet za odnose s inozemstvom,
koji je postao osnova za Ministarstvo vanjskih poslova
RH. Diplomacija je počela raditi preko inozemnih ureda
57 HDA, UPRH: Savezni sekretarijat za vanjske poslove,
br. 415014 od 25. 4. 1991., Informacija o poseti pred-
sedavajućeg Evropske zajednice Ž. Santera i predsed-
nika Komisije EZ Ž. Delora Jugoslaviji, 8. i 9. 5. 1991.;
Stjepan MESIĆ, Kako smo srušili Jugoslaviju, Globus
International, Zagreb, 1992., 29-33; Josip GLAURDIĆ,
Vrijeme Europe. Zapadne sile i raspad Jugoslavije, Mate,
Zagreb, 2012., 90.
58 Warren ZIMMERMANN, Izvori jedne katastrofe, Globus –
Znanje, Zagreb, 1997., 77-82.
59 Radovan Vukadinović, “U procijepu”, Danas, 3. 7. 1990.,
53-54.
60 HDA, UPRH: Međunarodni aspekti “hrvatskog pitanja”, bi-
lješka od 19. 7. 1990. za sastanak grupe za izradu projekta
“Hrvatska i Sjedinjene Države Jugoslavije” (bilješka je ne-
potpisana, a sastanak se trebao održati 20. 7. 1990.).
52
Domovinski rat 04-02-2020 Knjiga 1.indd 52
speaking, the European Community supported the new
democratic states in Europe on the one hand, but on the
other it tried to preserve Yugoslavia because the official
wisdom at the time in Western Europe insisted that none
of the republics was capable to exist economically as an
independent state. This logic dictated that a break-up of
Yugoslavia would inevitably lead to civil war and that, it
was thought, would in turn unduly exacerbate the situa-
tion in the Soviet Union.
The United States of America also subscribed to the
notion that steps needed to be taken to preserve Yugo-
slavia. Interestingly enough, the USA continued to hold
that point of view even when the EC had jettisoned it.
In this context it is important to mention the visit Law-
rence Eagleburger, the US Deputy Secretary of State,
made to Yugoslavia at the end of February, 1990. On that
occasion he unequivocally showed support for the Pres-
ident of the Federal Executive Council, Ante Marković.
The US Deputy Secretary of State also met with repre-
sentatives of many opposition parties from all republics
and let them be known, in no uncertain terms, that the
USA would never support a break-up of Yugoslavia, but
he also stated that if the eventuality occurred then the
USA would accept the new situation. According to War-
ren Zimmerman, the American ambassador to the SFRY,
different republics interpreted Lawrence Eagleburger’s
words differently. Slovenia’s interpretation of what the
US Deputy Secretary of State said was markedly different
from those of the other republics.
The role the USSR played in relation to the Yugoslav
crisis was determined by the fact that its Communist em-
pire was in a state of collapse. For that reason, the USSR
was in no position to influence events in any important
D
way. Once a major, if not the major factor in the global
political landscape, the USSR, in political terms and es-
pecially as regards the political processes taking place in
Eastern Europe at the time, had been reduced to nothing
more than a bystander. The Non-aligned Movement, at
R
whose helm had been Josip Broz Tito, had been hailed
by Yugoslav propaganda as a force to be reckoned with
in the global geo-political arena. With the collapse of the
Soviet Union and effective discontinuation of the bipolar
world order, the impotence and irrelevance of the move-
ment was exposed for all to see.
Croatia made its debut as an independent country
in the community of nations when one world order was
collapsing and when no one could predict with any de-
gree of accuracy what would replace it. The Croatian lead-
4.2.2020. 19:25:42
 The Croatian Nation’s Struggle for Survival, 1991-1995
i odbora koji su osnivani za pojedine zemlje ili skupine
zemalja. Do proljeća 1992. na čelu hrvatske diplomaci-
je bili su mr. Zdravko Mršić, dr. Frane Vinko Golem, dr.
Davorin Rudolf i dr. Zvonimir Šeparović.61
Uoči proglašenja neovisnosti Slovenije i Hrvatske
ministri vanjskih poslova KESS-a u Berlinu su 19. lipnja
1991. poduprli demokratski razvoj i pozvali da se izlaz
iz jugoslavenske krize postigne bez uporabe sile, u
skladu s legalnom i ustavnom procedurom. Podržali su
jedinstvo i teritorijalni integritet Jugoslavije i tražili na-
H
stavak dijaloga među svim zainteresiranim stranama,
držeći da “mogućnosti za takav dijalog još nisu iscrplje-
ne”. Na tim je osnovama Zajednica bila voljna pomoći
Jugoslaviji da se ekonomski i politički transformira.62
Nekoliko dana poslije ministri EZ-a dogovorili su se 23.
lipnja u Luxembourgu da neće priznati neovisnost Hr-
M
vatske i Slovenije ako one jednostrano odluče napustiti
jugoslavensku federaciju te da će suspendirati sve po-
sjete predstavnika “secesionističkih” republika.63
Akciju EZ-a podržao je i SAD. Američki ministar
vanjskih poslova James Baker posjetio je 21. lipnja
1991. Beograd. Tijekom jednodnevnoga boravka Baker
D
se odvojeno sastao s čelnicima republika, premijerom
Markovićem i čelnicima kosovskih Albanaca. Nije uspio
odgovoriti Tuđmana i slovenskog predsjednika Milana
Kučana od namjere da proglase neovisnost. No posta-
vilo se pitanje je li njegov posjet ohrabrio JNA da upo-
rabi silu u zapadnim republikama.64
C
Upozorenja i posjeti predstavnika međunarodne
zajednice nisu spriječili Sloveniju i Hrvatsku da 25.
lipnja 1991. proglase neovisnost. Nakon debakla JNA
u Sloveniji EZ se uključio u jugoslavensku krizu. Bilo
D
61 Odluka Sabora SRH od 31. 5. 1990. o imenovanju repu-
bličkih sekretara i predsjednika republičkih komiteta,
Narodne novine, br. 25, 1. 6. 1990.; Odluka predsjednika
Republike Hrvatske od 18. 1. 1991. o inozemnim ure-
dima Republike Hrvatske, Narodne novine, br. 21, 2. 5.
1991.; Odluka Vlade RH od 19. 3. 1991. o imenovanju
Odbora za arapske zemlje u Ministarstvu inozemnih po-
slova, Narodne novine, br. 14, 25. 3. 1991.; Zapisnik sa 77.
(zatvorene) sjednice Vlade Republike Hrvatske, održane
30. travnja 1991.; F. GREGURIĆ, Vlada demokratskog je-
dinstva, 11, 660.
62 HDA, UPRH: Savezni sekretarijat za vanjske poslove, De-
klaracija o situaciji u Jugoslaviji br. 04797 od 21. 6. 1991.
63 Michael LIBAL, Njemačka politika i jugoslavenska kriza
1991.–1992., Golden marketing-Tehnička knjiga, Za-
greb, 2004., 23.
64 W. ZIMMERMANN, Izvori jedne katastrofe, 161-167.
53
Domovinski rat 04-02-2020 Knjiga 1.indd 53
ership was aware that the country’s nascent diplomatic
corps would have to act in completely uncharted waters.
Croatia had no tradition of diplomacy – it had to build one
from scratch. Croatia inherited from the former Yugoslav
government the Republic Committee for International
Relations, which became the foundation for the Ministry
of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Croatia. The first dip-
lomatic moves were conducted through foreign offices
and committees that were established for individual for-
eign countries or groups of countries. Until the spring of
1992 Croatian diplomacy was led by Zdravko Mršić, Frane
Vinko Golem, Davorin Rudolf and Zvonimir Šeparović.
Just prior to Slovenia’s and Croatia’s declaration of in-
dependence the OSCE foreign ministers expressed sup-
port for democratic development and called on all con-
cerned to strive for a peaceful resolution of the Yugoslav
crisis and in accordance with the legal and constitution-
al procedures, in Berlin on June 19, 1991. They also ex-
pressed support for the territorial integrity and unity of
Yugoslavia and requested all interested parties to contin-
ue with the dialogue, emphasizing that “the grounds for
dialogue have still not been exhausted”. On that basis the
European Community was prepared to help transform
Yugoslavia both economically and politically. A few days
later, on June 23 in Luxembourg, the ministers of the Eu-
ropean Community decide against supporting Croatia’s
and Slovenia’s decision to declare independence if the
two countries unilaterally decide to secede from the Yu-
goslav federation. The ministers also agreed to suspend
all visits of representatives of the “secessionist” republics.
The United States of America expressed support for
the European Community’s stance. The American For-
eign Affairs Minister James Baker visited Belgrade on
June 21, 1991. During his one-day stay Baker held sep-
arate meetings with the leaders of the republics, Prime
Minister Marković and leaders of the Kosovo Albanians.
He tried to talk Tuđman and the Slovenian President Mi-
lan Kučan out of their intention to declare independence
R
but his efforts were unsuccessful. Some commentators
proposed that Baker’s visit actually emboldened the JNA
to use force in the western republics of the SFRY.
The attitude of the EC, the international communi-
ty and the USA did not discourage Slovenia and Croatia
from declaring independence on June 25, 1991. After the
JNA’s attack on Slovenia had turned into an embarrass-
ing fiasco, the EC got actively involved in the Yugoslav
crisis. The EC had a number of motives for doing so; try-
ing to prove to the world that it could successfully deal
4.2.2020. 19:25:42
 Davor Marijan • Rat za opstojnost Hrvata, 1991. - 1995.
je više motiva za to, od potrebe dokazivanja da se Za-
jednica može nositi s krizom na svojem pragu, bojazni
da to postane presedan za SSSR, do očekivanja da će
izbjeglice iz Jugoslavije preplaviti zapadnu Europu.
Tijekom slovenskoga rata ministarska trojka EZ-a ne-
koliko je puta posjetila Jugoslaviju inzistirajući na tri
točke: prekidu vatre u Sloveniji i povlačenju JNA u
vojarne, tromjesečnom moratoriju na odluke o neovi-
snosti Slovenije i Hrvatske te izboru Stjepana Mesića
za predsjednika Predsjedništva SFRJ,65 koji je, iako se
H
radilo o redovnoj proceduri, opstruirao srpski blok u
Predsjedništvu.
Trojka se 7. srpnja 1991. na Brijunima sastala s
predstavnicima Federacije, JNA, Hrvatske i Slovenije.
Sudionici su potvrdili da u potpunosti prihvaćaju pri-
jedloge trojke od 30. lipnja 1991. o prekidu vatre, tro-
M
mjesečnom moratoriju na provedbu deklaracija o ne-
ovisnosti, slanju promatračke misije i obnavljanju rada
Predsjedništva SFRJ. Dogovoreno je da će pregovori o
budućnosti Jugoslavije početi brzo, odnosno najkasni-
je do 1. kolovoza 1991. godine. Zajednica se obvezala
pružiti pomoć pod uvjetom da se strogo poštuju načela
D
iz Završnoga dokumenta iz Helsinkija i Pariške povelje
o novoj Europi. Dogovoreno je i osnivanje promatrač-
ke misije radi praćenja stanja u Jugoslaviji, posebice u
Sloveniji, “a eventualno i u Hrvatskoj”.66 Ako su hrvatske
vlasti i očekivale da će nazočnost promatrača smiriti
stanje na terenu, to se nije dogodilo. Dobra je strana
C
bila što je misija postupno stekla uvid u stanje na tere-
nu. Ministarstvo vanjskih poslova poslalo je ministrima
EZ-a koji su 24. srpnja 1991. zasjedali u Bruxellesu služ-
beni zahtjev da donesu odluku o slanju promatrača u
Hrvatsku.67 Ministri vanjskih poslova EZ-a prihvatili su
u Bruxellesu 29. srpnja odluku o slanju promatrača u
Hrvatsku, za što se tražilo da Hrvatska i Srbija potpišu
sporazum koji bi to omogućio. Srbija se usprotivila sla-
nju promatrača u Hrvatsku, tvrdeći da Jugoslavija ima
dovoljno potencijala da sama nadzire prekid vatre.68
Usklađeno djelovanje JNA i pobunjenih Srba, posebice
65 S. MESIĆ, Kako smo srušili Jugoslaviju, 53-54; M. LIBAL,
Njemačka politika, 26-27.
66 ASH: Tajništvo Sabora RH, Zajednička deklaracija kl.
200-01/91-01/05, ur. br. 61-91-8225 od 29. 7. 1991.
67 Zapisnik s 96. zatvorene sjednice Vlade Republike Hr-
vatske, održane 24. srpnja 1991.
68 Henri VEJNANS, U žrvnju. Jugoslovenska hronika jul 1991
– avgust 1992, Radio B92, Beograd, 1996., 51-56.
54
Domovinski rat 04-02-2020 Knjiga 1.indd 54
with crises on its doorstep, preventing the situation in
Yugoslavia from turning into a blueprint for potentially
disastrous developments in the USSR and preventing
masses of refugees from Yugoslavia from flooding West-
ern Europe. During the war in Slovenia three EC ministers
visited Yugoslavia a number of times, insisting on three
things: cease-fire in Slovenia and withdrawal of the JNA
forces into the barracks, three-month moratorium on the
decision to declare independence in relation to Slovenia
and Croatia and that Stjepan Mesić be appointed Pres-
ident of the Presidency of the SFRY. The process of ap-
pointing Stjepan Mesić as President of the Presidency, a
mere technicality, was obstructed by the Serbian bloc in
the Presidency.
On July 7, 1991, on the Brijuni Islands the three minis-
ters met with representatives of the Federation, the JNA,
Croatia and Slovenia. The representatives confirmed that
they agreed with the ministers’ recommendations of June
30, 1991, about the cease-fire, three-month moratorium,
sending a monitoring mission and renewing the function
of the Presidency of the SFRY. It was also agreed that ne-
gotiations about Yugoslavia’s future would start soon, by
August 1, 1991, at the latest. The European Community
accepted the obligation to provide assistance but under
the condition that the principles from the Helsinki Final
Act and the Charter of Paris for a New Europe, be hon-
ored. In addition, it was agreed that a monitoring mission
would be sent to Yugoslavia to keep an eye on the situa-
tion, with special emphasis on Slovenia, and possibly on
Croatia as well. The advance contingent of the monitor-
ing mission arrived in Zagreb on July 15 and stated that
their mission was to monitor the implementation of the
Brijuni Declaration. There are indications that the Croa-
D
tian leadership thought that the presence of the moni-
toring mission on the ground would defuse the tensions.
That, however, did not happen. However, the monitoring
mission gradually became aware of the realities on the
ground. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of
R
Croatia sent an official request to the ministers of the EC
who were holding a conference in Brussels on July 24,
1991, to send the monitoring mission to Croatia. The EC’s
foreign ministers decided, on July 29, to send the moni-
toring mission to Croatia. However, both Serbia and Cro-
atia had to sign an agreement that would actually enable
the EC to send the monitoring mission to Croatia. Serbia
rejected to sign any such agreement, claiming that Yu-
goslavia had enough resources to oversee a cease-fire.
The JNA and rebel Serbs acted in concert, especially in
4.2.2020. 19:25:42
 The Croatian Nation’s Struggle for Survival, 1991-1995
u istočnoj Hrvatskoj, ponovno je dovelo do eskalacije
nasilja, za što su ministri vanjskih poslova EZ-a 20. ko-
lovoza prozvali sve sukobljene strane. Ministarsko vije-
će EZ-a upozorilo je 27. kolovoza Srbiju da se prestane
protiviti proširenju njihove misije za nadzor prekida
vatre u Hrvatskoj.69
Iako su Srbija i Crna Gora, a navodno i članovi
Predsjedništva SFRJ iz BiH i Makedonije, bili protiv
uključivanja EZ-a, prevagnuo je pritisak za održavanje
Mirovne konferencije o Jugoslaviji u Haagu u Nizo-
H
zemskoj. Za predsjedatelja je prihvaćen britanski di-
plomat lord Peter Carrington. Osnivanje konferencije
bilo je pokazatelj da se jugoslavenska kriza internaci-
onalizirala, čime je Hrvatska mogla biti zadovoljna, ali
ne i brzinom njezina djelovanja. Konferencija je bila
važna da na djelu pokaže da se može nositi s proble-
M
mom kao što je bio ratni raspad multinacionalne drža-
ve. Mirovna je konferencija počela 7. rujna, a završila
5. studenoga 1991. godine. Osnovna ideja iznesenih
prijedloga bilo je slobodno udruživanje republika koje
su tražile neovisnost, uz snažno jamstvo zaštite ljud-
skih prava i poseban status autonomije za određene
D
etničke skupine i područja. Najvažniji dio prijedloga
odnosio se na priznanje republika koje to žele u posto-
jećim granicama.70 Na sjednici 5. studenoga 1991. Slo-
bodan Milošević i Momir Bulatović tražili su da se uz
mogućnost stvaranja neovisnih država i njihova slo-
bodna udruživanja jednako tretira i opcija o želji nekih
C
republika i naroda da ostanu u Jugoslaviji kao svojoj
zajedničkoj državi. Taj zahtjev, da se jamči kontinuitet
srpsko-crnogorske Jugoslavije i nužnost promjene
granica u njihovu korist, ostale četiri republike nisu
prihvatile. Pregovori su pretrpjeli neuspjeh premda su
D
proglašeni privremeno prekinutim. Lord Carrington
prebacio je odluku o sudbini konferencije, konkretnoj
odgovornosti i mogućim sankcijama na ministre EZ-a i
njihov skori sastanak u Rimu.71
Jugoslavenskoj su krizi neslavan prilog 25. rujna
1991. dali i Ujedinjeni narodi (UN). Uz potporu tadaš-
69 M. LIBAL, Njemačka politika, 54-61.
70 Mario NOBILO, Hrvatski feniks. Diplomatski procesi iza
zatvorenih vrata 1990.–1997., Nakladni zavod Globus,
Zagreb, 2000., 211-212; M. LIBAL, Njemačka politika, 61-
63, 88, 93-96.
71 Zapisnik s 48. (zatvorene) sjednice Vlade Republike Hr-
vatske, održane 6. studenog 1991.; “Diktatom se ne uki-
da država”, Politika, 6. 11. 1991., 1; M. LIBAL, Njemačka
politika, 91-93.
55
Domovinski rat 04-02-2020 Knjiga 1.indd 55
eastern Croatia. That led to an escalation of violence and
the ministers of the EC made it clear, on August 20, that
they held all sides accountable for the situation. The EC’s
Council of Ministers warned, on August 27, Serbia to
stop preventing the EC to extend its mission to Croatia to
oversee a cease-fire there.
Even though Serbia and Montenegro, and possibly
the members of the Presidency of the SFRY from Bosnia
and Herzegovina and Macedonia, were against the EC’s
involvement, the determining factor in that particular re-
gard proved to be the pressure to hold the EC Peace Con-
ference on Yugoslavia in The Hague in the Netherlands.
It was agreed that the British diplomat Lord Peter Car-
rington would act as the chairman of the Conference. The
setting up of the conference showed that the Yugoslav
crisis had become an international problem and Croatia
was satisfied with that development. However, the deci-
sions made at the conference were implemented slowly,
and Croatia was less satisfied with that aspect of the situ-
ation. The conference proved that the EC was capable of
dealing with major problems because the violent break-
up of Yugoslavia, a multi-ethnic country, definitely fit into
the category of a major problem. The peace conference
started on September 7 and finished on November 5,
1991. The core idea behind all the recommendations put
forward at the conference was the right of the republics
that had been vying for independence to freely choose
to leave or to stay in the SFRY with the proviso that the
republics had to give strong guarantees that they would
respect human rights and give autonomy to certain
ethnic groups and to certain areas. The most important
recommendations, from the perspective of the republics
that wished to secede from Yugoslavia, were those that
called for international recognition of those republics’
independence and international recognition of their ex-
isting borders. At a meeting held on November 5, 1991,
Slobodan Milošević and Momir Bulatović insisted that
the wishes of those republics who wanted to leave Yu-
R
goslavia and the wishes of those republics who wanted
to stay in Yugoslavia as their common country be treated
equally. This was actually a craftily worded demand from
Serbia and Montenegro for guarantees that Serbia and
Montenegro would continue as a continued Yugoslavia.
Implicit in that demand was the necessity of altering the
internal boundaries of Yugoslavia for the benefit of Ser-
bia and Montenegro at the expense of other republics.
The other four republics rejected the demand. The talks
ended in a stalemate. Lord Carrington did not want to
4.2.2020. 19:25:42
 Davor Marijan • Rat za opstojnost Hrvata, 1991. - 1995.
njeg ministra inozemnih poslova SFRJ Budimira Lon-
čara Vijeće sigurnosti UN-a uvelo je embargo na uvoz
oružja u Jugoslaviju, što je – za razliku od JNA i Srbije
– pogodilo isključivo Hrvatsku.72
Nakon propasti Mirovne konferencije, S. Miloše-
vić je pokrenuo mehanizam da zaštiti područja pod
srpskim nadzorom u Hrvatskoj. Taj, kako ga je nazvao
Borisav Jović, “radikalni potez” počeo se uobličivati po-
četkom studenoga 1991., a tekst poziva prihvaćen je
9. studenoga na sjednici krnjega Predsjedništva SFRJ.
H
U njemu su Srbija i Crna Gora tražile slanje mirovnih
snaga UN-a u Hrvatsku da razdvoje sukobljene strane,
odnosno zaštite srpska osvajanja i omoguće izvlačenje
JNA. Vijeće sigurnosti počelo je 15. studenoga raspravu
o srpsko-crnogorskom pozivu nakon što su to “tražile”
Velika Britanija i Francuska.73
M
U prvoj polovini prosinca 1991. posebni izaslanik
generalnoga tajnika UN-a, američki diplomat Cyrus
Vance dogovorio je s čelnicima Hrvatske i Srbije da one
prihvate načela za razmještaj mirovnih snaga UN-a na
području Jugoslavije. Temelj za plan bio je sporazum
iz Ženeve od 23. studenoga 1991., u kojem je dogovo-
D
ren prekid vatre, deblokada vojarni i povlačenje JNA iz
Hrvatske. Suglasnost za mogući dolazak i razmještanje
mirovnih snaga UN-a u okupiranim dijelovima Hrvat-
ske, pod uvjetom da se poštuje potpisani prekid vatre,
Vijeće sigurnosti dalo je 27. studenoga u Rezoluciji
721. Područje pod zaštitom UN-a utvrđeno je u Anexu
C
III Plana Cyrusa Vancea od 11. prosinca 1991. godine.
Obuhvaćalo je 18 općina u cjelini i dijelove četiriju op-
ćina. Nakon toga je Vijeće sigurnosti 15. prosinca po-
tvrdilo Plan C, koji je po autoru nazvan Vanceov plan.
Krnje Predsjedništvo SFRJ prihvatilo ga je 31. prosinca
1991. godine.74
Njemačka je od početka studenoga 1991. pripre-
mala teren za priznanje Hrvatske i Slovenije. Naravno
72 Sudski spisi Međunarodnog kaznenog suda za bivšu Jugo-
slaviju u Den Haagu (dalje: ICTY): Rezolucija 713 Vijeća si-
gurnosti UN od 25. 9. 1991.; HDA, HUPMEZ: Vlada Republi-
ke Hrvatske, Izjava u povodu Rezolucije VS UN o Jugoslaviji
ur. br. 50302-91-1, kl. 010-02/91-01/13 od 27. 9. 1991.
73 B. JOVIĆ, Poslednji dani SFRJ, 407-411.
74 ICTY: Savet bezbednosti UN od 11. 12. 1991., Izveštaj
generalnog sekretara u skladu sa Rezolucijom Saveta
bezbednosti br. 721 (1991.); ICTY: Plan mirovne ope-
racije UN u Jugoslaviji (studeni-prosinac 1991.); ICTY:
Rezolucija 724 Vijeća sigurnosti UN od 15. 12. 1991.; B.
JOVIĆ, Poslednji dani SFRJ, 421.
56
Domovinski rat 04-02-2020 Knjiga 1.indd 56
accept the burden of deciding the faith of the confer-
ence itself, of deciding who would be responsible for
what and of deciding what possible sanctions might be
imposed on whom so he simply passed the buck to the
ministers of the EC. The ministers’ next scheduled meet-
ing was in Rome.
The United Nations also gave their ignoble contribu-
tion to the Yugoslav crisis on September 25, 1991. With
the backing of the Yugoslav Foreign Affairs Minister, Bu-
dimir Lončar, the UN Security Council placed an arms
embargo on Yugoslavia for all deliveries of weapons and
military equipment into Yugoslavia. The embargo did
not affect the JNA and Serbia but it had a debilitating ef-
fect on Croatia.
Slobodan Milošević, after the failed peace confer-
ence, made his move to protect the areas under Serb con-
trol in Croatia. That, in the words of Borisav Jović, “radical
move” started taking shape at the beginning of Novem-
ber, 1991. Slobodan Milošević wrote a request for the UN.
The text of the request was accepted at a meeting of the
rump Presidency of the SFRY on November 9. Milošević,
in the request, demanded on behalf of Serbia and Monte-
negro that the UN send a peacekeeping force to Croatia
to act as a buffer between the two warring parties and
to protect the Serbs conquests in Croatia and enable the
JNA to pull out of the area. The UN Security Council start-
ed deliberating on Milošević’s demand on November 15
at the “explicit request” of Great Britain and France.
During the first half of December, 1991, the Special
Envoy of the Secretary-General of the United Nations, the
American diplomat Cyrus Vance, made a deal with the
leaders of Serbia and Croatia according to which a UN
peacekeeping force would be deployed in Yugoslavia.
D
The basis of this deal and the subsequent plan for the de-
ployment of the peacekeeping force was the agreement
made in Geneva on November 23, 1991, which stipulat-
ed an immediate cease-fire, lifting the siege of the JNA
bases and barracks in Croatia and withdrawal of the JNA
R
from Croatia. The Security Council agreed, on November
27 in Resolution 721, that a peacekeeping force could
be sent to and deployed in Croatia on condition that the
signed agreement relating to the cease-fire was honored.
The area that would be under the protection of the UN
was determined in Annex III of Cyrus Vance’s plan of De-
cember 11, 1991. The area in question encompassed 18
municipalities in their entirety and parts of four addition-
al municipalities. On December 15 the Security Council
confirmed Plan C, which is also known as the Vance Plan.
4.2.2020. 19:25:43
 The Croatian Nation’s Struggle for Survival, 1991-1995

•
..
/'rmnhrli~m1, 'prosla11/i'
\'n,·ug,,dinu, •. .. _ , H 4
• S/un/, Pri;/lni rad,
Vjesnik, „Hrvatska priznata europska država“,
srijeda, 15. siječnja 1992.
b1irlimlr•hma
• (i,•ml,Mnu,,.J.r
u/Jrinorclma ...... _____ ,,·/r4
Vjesnik, “Croatia is a Recognized European
• .4/iJr, r,.,,-~n
br.,,idNookmri/11 Country”, Wednesday, January 15, 1992.
• i't'triniA, lalrnn
noi•i~nmr ......... _,. ....-<lr 4
e HTl:lll;/ubl',
rrklsmiraniano,·lnR7 ....,/r6
H
Yjes11ik JIIIIH . . mir u UljNbH:ko J
M
D
DNEVNIK ZA DEMOKRATSKU HRVATSKU

RRVATSKA POST ALA 178. CLANICA SVJETSKE ORGANIZACIJE

Prilog covjecanstvu,
miru i iivotnosti UN
Ameritki predstavnik osporio pravo Srbiji i Crnoj Gori da sjede u svjetskoj organizaciji
C
D
R
Vjesnik, subota, 23. svibnja 1992.: „Hrvatska (22. svib- Predsjednik RH Franjo Tuđman na kninskoj tvrđavi, 6.
nja 1992.) postala 178. članica svjetske organizacije kolovoza 1995. (autor fotografije: Bruno Vugdelija).
(UN-a)“.
Croatian President Franjo Tuđman at Knin fortress,
Vjesnik, Saturday, May 23, 1992: “Croatia (May 22, August 6, 1995 (Photograph by Bruno Vugdelija).
1992) Becomes 178th Member of the UN”.

57

Domovinski rat 04-02-2020 Knjiga 1.indd 57 4.2.2020. 19:25:44

 Davor Marijan • Rat za opstojnost Hrvata, 1991. - 1995.
da takvo stajalište nije naišlo na oduševljenje nekih
članica EZ-a, koje su inzistirale na zajedničkom pri-
stupu. No medijsko praćenje rata učinilo je svoje na
senzibiliziranju javnosti, posebice nakon srpskoga
osvajanja Vukovara. Nakon što su slike razorenoga
Vukovara obišle svijet i Državno tajništvo Svete Stoli-
ce je 26. studenoga 1991. zemljama članicama KESS-a
uputilo Memorandum s prijedlogom međunarodnoj
zajednici o priznavanju neovisnosti i suvereniteta Hr-
vatske i Slovenije.75 U takvim okolnostima, u Bunde-
H
stagu je 27. studenoga 1991. kancelar Helmut Kohl
najavio da su uvjeti za priznanje jugoslavenskih re-
publika nakon 10. prosinca poštovanje načela Pariš-
ke povelje i Helsinškoga završnog akta te posebice,
u skladu s tim dokumentima, jamčenje manjinskih
prava. Bila je to najava uvjeta pod kojima će Njemač-
M
ka priznati neovisnost Hrvatske i Slovenije ako ih one
jednostrano ispune.76 Hrvatska je to učinila 4. prosin-
ca 1991. prihvaćanjem Ustavnoga zakona o ljudskim
pravima i slobodama i pravima etničkih i nacionalnih
zajednica ili manjina u Republici Hrvatskoj.77 U među-
vremenu se i Arbitražna komisija očitovala o važnim
D
pitanjima prava na samoodređenje i pitanjima grani-
ca. Komisija je 20. studenoga dobila pitanja, na koja
je odgovorila 29. studenoga, a javnost je s njima bila
upoznata 7. prosinca 1991. godine. U Mišljenju br. 1,
Arbitražna je komisija zaključila da se Jugoslavija na-
lazi u procesu raspada, da republike pitanja državne
C
sukcesije trebaju riješiti u skladu s međunarodnim
pravom i da je na republikama koje to žele da izaberu
neku novu zajednicu, koja bi imala demokratske in-
stitucije po njihovu izboru.78
Mišljenje je bilo snažan udarac srpskim tvrdnjama
i dodatno je pojačalo njemačka gledišta o priznanju
Hrvatske. U Bruxellesu su ministri vanjskih poslova
EZ-a 16. prosinca 1991. uspjeli usvojiti zajedničko sta-
jalište o priznavanju jugoslavenskih republika. Repu-
blike koje ispune uvjete EZ-a i koje to žele mogle su
75 J. BARUNČIĆ PLETIKOSIĆ, Katolička crkva u Hrvatskoj i
Domovinski rat 1991. - 1995., Glas Koncila – HMDCDR,
Zagreb, 2017., 204.
76 M. LIBAL, Njemačka politika, 99-104.
77 Ustavni zakon o ljudskim pravima i slobodama i o pravi-
ma etničkih i nacionalnih zajednica ili manjina u Repu-
blici Hrvatskoj, Narodne novine, br. 65, 4. 12. 1991.
78 ICTY: Mišljenje Arbitražne komisije Konferencije o Jugo-
slaviji; M. LIBAL, Njemačka politika, 105-106; J. GLAUR-
DIĆ, Vrijeme Europe, 238-239.
58
Domovinski rat 04-02-2020 Knjiga 1.indd 58
The rump Presidency of the SFRY accepted the plan on
December 31, 1991.
Germany started preparing the ground for the inter-
national recognition of Croatian and Slovenian indepen-
dence at the beginning of November, 1991. The German
initiative did not sit well with some member states of the
EC. These states insisted on a joint approach to the issue,
but unfortunately for them, the events on the ground
had rendered any such approach impossible. Every ma-
jor world news network had been showing grim footage
of the escalating violence that had gripped the country
ever since the crisis started. The world public demanded
swift action to stop the carnage, especially after the JNA
and Serb paramilitaries, after a brutal three-month siege,
mercilessly sacked Vukovar. As a direct result of the Serbs’
depredations in Vukovar, the Secretariat of State of the
Holy See sent, on November 26, 1991, a memorandum to
the member states of the OSCE recommending that the
international community should recognize the indepen-
dence and sovereignty of Croatia and Slovenia. German
Chancellor Helmut Kohl did not hesitate. On November
27, 1991, he stated in the Bundestag that the indepen-
dence of the Yugoslav republics would be possible after
December 10 if the republics in question honored the
principles of the Charter of Paris for a New Europe and
the Helsinki Final Act and especially, in regard to said doc-
uments, the republics in question provided guarantees
that they would respect the rights of ethnic minorities.
Kohl’s announcement meant that each country had to
meet the stated conditions if it wanted its independence
to be internationally recognized. Croatia met all the de-
mands on December 4, 1991, by accepting the Constitu-
tional Law of Human Rights and Freedoms and the Rights
D
of National and Ethnic Communities or Minorities in the
Republic of Croatia. In the meantime, the Arbitration
Commission of the Conference on Yugoslavia had made
its position clear as regards the right to self-determina-
tion and the issue of boundaries. On November 20 a set of
R
questions was submitted to the Arbitration Commission.
On November 29 the Arbitration Commission gave its an-
swers to the questions. The general public was informed
of the Arbitration Commission’s position on December 7,
1991. In Opinion No. 1 the Arbitration Commission con-
cluded that “the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia
is in the process of dissolution; that it is incumbent upon
the Republics to settle such problems of state succession
as may arise from this process in keeping with the princi-
ples and rules of international law, with particular regard
4.2.2020. 19:25:44
 The Croatian Nation’s Struggle for Survival, 1991-1995
očekivati priznanje do 15. siječnja 1992. te su pozvane
da se do 23. prosinca izjasne žele li priznanje i prihva-
ćaju li uvjete EZ-a. Njemačka je 19. prosinca odlučila
priznati Sloveniju i Hrvatsku 23. prosinca te najavila
da će diplomatske odnose uspostaviti 15. siječnja
1992. godine.79
Nakon izvlačenja opreme i naoružanja nije bilo
zapreka da JNA zatraži konačni prekid borbi. Pod po-
kroviteljstvom međunarodne zajednice, u Sarajevu je
2. siječnja 1992. potpisan sporazum o prekidu vatre.
H
Za razliku od prethodnih prekida vatre, Sarajevski je
sporazum uglavnom zaživio, iako su razmjene vatre iz-
među sukobljenih strana bile česte. Ubrzo potom, 15.
siječnja 1992., Hrvatska je dobila međunarodno pri-
znanje, ali je dio njezina teritorija bio pod okupacijom.
Time je završila prva etapa rata.
M
Hrvatska 1992. – 1995. (1997./1998.)
U proljeće 1992. težište krize premjestilo se u BiH,
no ni Hrvatska nije ostala posve mirna. Okupirana su
područja bila trajan uzročnik nemira, posebice 1993.
D
i 1995. godine. Unutarnji politički život Hrvatske obi-
lježila je sustavna dominacija HDZ-a. Tuđman je 1992.
uvjerljivo pobijedio na predsjedničkim izborima, a
HDZ na izborima za Zastupnički dom Sabora 1992. i
1995., kao i za Županijski dom Sabora 1993. godine.80
Jedina jača oporbena stranka u tom razdoblju bila je
C
Hrvatska socijalno-liberalna stranka. Socijaldemokrat-
ska partija Hrvatske pala je na niske grane i bila je go-
tovo beznačajna stranka. U tom smislu nema govora o
nekom velikom stranačkom životu u Hrvatskoj. Oporba
vladajućemu HDZ-u nastojala se regrutirati iz redova
D
navodno lijevih intelektualaca i novinara oko udruga
poput Hrvatskog helsinškog odbora i Erasmusa te no-
vina poput Feral Tribunea.
Prestankom izravne ugroze od JNA i raspadom
Vlade demokratskoga jedinstva 1992., HDZ je tek tada
završio preuzimanje vlasti. Glavni politički čimbenik
bio je predsjednik Tuđman, s vrlo velikim ovlastima
79 M. LIBAL, Njemačka politika, 106-112.
80 Izvješće br. 30 Izborne komisije Republike Hrvatske od
11. 8. 1992.; Izvješće br. 32 Izborne komisije Republike
Hrvatske od 12. 8. 1992.; Izvješće Izborne komisije Repu-
blike Hrvatske o provedenim izborima za zastupnike u
Županijskom domu Sabora RH, veljača 1993.; Izvješće br.
23 Izborne komisije Republike Hrvatske od 14. 11. 1995.
59
Domovinski rat 04-02-2020 Knjiga 1.indd 59
for human rights and the rights of peoples and minorities;
that it is up to those Republics that so wish, to work to-
gether to form a new association endowed with the dem-
ocratic institutions of their choice.”
Opinion No. 1 constituted a serious blow to Serbia
and fortified Germany’s point of view about internation-
al recognition of Croatia. In Brussels, on December 16,
1991, the EC’s foreign ministers accepted a joint position
on recognizing the Yugoslav republics. Those republics
that sought recognition, provided they had met all the
necessary conditions, could expect to be recognized by
January 15, 1992, and were called upon to announce
whether they sought independence and accepted the
EC’s conditions by December 23. On December 19 Ger-
many decided to recognize Croatia and Slovenia on
December 23 and announced that it would establish
diplomatic relations with the two newly independent
countries on January 15, 1992.
The JNA forces in Croatia were allowed to withdraw
with all their weaponry. After that, there was nothing
preventing the JNA from agreeing to a cease-fire. On
January 2, 1992, under the auspices of the internation-
al community, a cease-fire agreement was signed in
Sarajevo. Unlike many other similar agreements signed
during the wars in the former Yugoslavia, the Sarajevo
Agreement was in effect for a considerable period of
time, even though exchanges of fire on a local scale were
frequent. Shortly thereafter, on January 15, 1992, Croatia
was internationally recognized but a part of its territory
was occupied. Thus ended the first phase of the war.
Croatia from 1992 to 1995 (1997/1998)
In the spring of 1992, the center of gravity of the cri-
sis shifted from Croatia to Bosnia and Herzegovina. How-
ever, this does not mean that peace reigned in Croatia.
Far from it. The occupied areas of Croatia were the cause
of a number of military operations, especially in 1993
R
and 1995. The internal political life in Croatia was marked
by the continued political domination of the HDZ party.
Tuđman won a landslide victory in the presidential elec-
tion in 1992. His overwhelming victory was mirrored by
those of the HDZ party in the elections for the Chamber
of Representatives in 1992 and 1995, and also in the elec-
tion for the Chamber of Counties in 1993. The only strong
opposition party at that time was the Croatian Social Lib-
eral Party. The fortunes of the Social Democratic Party of
Croatia were at their lowest ebb in the history of the par-
4.2.2020. 19:25:44
 Davor Marijan • Rat za opstojnost Hrvata, 1991. - 1995.

Papa Ivan Pavao II. u posjetu Crkvi u Hrvata i Republici Hrvatskoj i predsjednik
RH Franjo Tuđman, Zračna luka Pleso, Zagreb, 10. rujna 1994. godine (autor fo-
tografije: Marko Perić). Vatikanska diplomacija i tadašnji papa Ivan Pavao II. među
najzaslužnijima su za međunarodno priznanje Republike Hrvatske kao neovisne
države. Snažnu potporu traženju mirnog rješenja u okviru međunarodno priznatih
granica RH Papa je potvrdio dolaskom u Hrvatsku, u glavni grad Zagreb, 10. i 11.
rujna 1994. godine. S iskustvom života u komunističkom režimu, posebno je cijenio
ulogu hrvatskoga kardinala Alojzija Stepinca u komunističkoj Jugoslaviji, za kojeg
je kazao da je „najsvjetliji lik“, a nakon što je u zagrebačkoj katedrali služio svečanu
večernju misu, kleknuo je na njegov grob i pomolio se. Na euharistijsko slavlje koje
je predvodio drugoga dana boravka u Zagrebu hodočastilo je oko milijun vjernika
iz Hrvatske i Bosne i Hercegovine te iz drugih zemalja, koji su došli potvrditi svoju
odanost Sv. Stolici i iskazati zahvalnost papi Ivanu Pavlu II. Nikada u povijesti na
H
jednom mjestu nije bilo toliko Hrvata.

Pope John Paul II and President Tuđman during the Pope’s pastoral visit to Croatia,
Pleso Airport, Zagreb, September 10, 1994 (Photograph by Marko Perić). Croatia
owes a huge debt of gratitude to Vatican diplomacy and Pope John Paul II for its in-
dependence. John Paul II confirmed his unflinching commitment to Croatia’s inde-
pendence within its internationally recognized borders and to seeking a peaceful
solution to the crisis by a two-day visit to the country’s capital Zagreb (September
M
10 and 11, 1994). The pope, having lived under Communist rule, particularly re-
spected the Croatian Cardinal Alojzije Stepinac and his conduct in Communist Yu-
goslavia. John Paul II stated that Cardinal Stepinac was “a most venerable person”,
and, having held a Mass in the Zagreb Cathedral, the pontiff knelt on Stepinac’s
grave and said a prayer. On the second day of the visit the pope presided over
the Eucharistic celebration which was attended by about a million Catholics from
Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina and other countries who came to show their
loyalty to the Holy See and express their gratitude to the pontiff. Never, before or
D
since, have so many Croats gathered in one place.

koje su potpuno učvršćene u državi i stranci. Jedinu
C
krizu HDZ je preživio u prvoj polovini 1994., kada je
skupina predvođena Josipom Manolićem i Stjepanom
Mesićem pokušala preko Sabora preuzeti vlast u drža-
vi. Taj dvojac nije bio zadovoljan raspodjelom moći i
postupnim istiskivanjem od strane novih aktera, po-
sebice rastom važnosti ministra obrane Gojka Šuška,
koji je do smrti bio druga politička osoba u državi po
značenju. Pokušaj je propao i od tada u HDZ-u nije bilo
većeg nesuglasja.81
Operativne poslove države vodila je Vlada, koja je
nakon Franje Gregurića do kraja 1995. promijenila još
tri premijera: Hrvoja Šarinića (1992. - 1993.), Nikicu Va-
lentića (1993. - 1995.) i Zlatka Matešu (1995. - 2000.).
Sve je bilo podređeno ratu, što se nepovoljno odrazilo
na civilni život i demokratizaciju države.
81 Nino ŠKRABE, Branimir Pasecky: Olujne godine, Radio Ja-
ska d.o.o., Jastrebarsko, 2004., 198-202.
ty, before or since. During that period, the Social Demo-
cratic Party had no political influence worth the name.
Because of the overwhelming political dominance of the
HDZ party there was virtually no political discourse in the
country. The parties opposed to the HDZ tried to recruit
new members from the ranks of ostensibly left-leaning
D
intellectuals and journalists centered on NGOs like the
Croatian Helsinki Committee for Human Rights and Eras-
mus and publications like Feral Tribune.
The HDZ took power only when the direct threat the
JNA posed to the country’s existence had ceased and
when the government of national unity was dissolved in
R
1992. The main political player at that time was President
Tuđman who enjoyed wide-ranging executive authority.
The only danger to HDZ’s hold on power came in the first
half of 1994 from a group led by Josip Manolić and Stje-
pan Mesić. The group tried to use the Croatian parliament
to overthrow the HDZ and assume power. Manolić and
Mesić were not satisfied with the separation of powers in
the state and the fact that their roles in the government
had been sidelined during the preceding few years. They

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 The Croatian Nation’s Struggle for Survival, 1991-1995
Hrvatska i rat u Bosni i Hercegovini
1992. godine
Kada je početkom travnja 1992. bilo očito da Srbi
uz otvorenu pomoć JNA osvajaju Bosnu i Hercegovinu,
iz Hrvatske je dostavljana vojna pomoć i Muslimanima.
To je ustvari bio nastavak jer je već 1991. u Hrvatskoj
bila organizirana izobrazba pričuvnoga sastava mili-
cije BiH.82 U dogovoru s brigadirom Matom Šarlijom
Daidžom (Nijaz Batlak) u studenome je u Hrvatskoj
H
organizirana izobrazba za 106 vođa borbenih skupina
Zelenih beretki.83 Ta vrsta pomoći slabo je dokumenti-
rana. Tako se npr. u travnju pomoglo obrani Živinica
s oko 400 pušaka i nekoliko protuoklopnih sredstava.
Od 8. do 18. svibnja u Našicama i Novoj Gradiški obu-
čena je skupina od oko 550 ljudi iz Živinica, Gračanice,
M
Lukavca i Gradačca. Vratila se s obuke s oružjem za sve
i s oko 150 “cijevi viška”.84
Pojedine su akcije organizirali neki od najistaknu-
tijih članova Hrvatske vojske. Na prijedlog glavnoga
inspektora HV-a generala zbora Martina Špegelja odo-
breno je slanje vojnika s područja OZ-a Rijeka u BiH.85
D
Poslani vojnici zadržavali su sva prava vojnika HV-a,
“uključujući i mjesečna novčana primanja”, uz obvezu
skidanja oznaka HV-a i drugih identifikacijskih doku-
menata.86 Na Zagrebačkom je velesajmu početkom
lipnja ustrojen 1. krajiški bataljun TO BiH, koji je posli-
C
je otišao u Travnik i Jajce. U Klani kod Rijeke 21. lipnja
formirana je 7. krajiška brigada TO BiH. Prije odlaska u
središnju Bosnu brigada je prošla i izobrazbu u Klani.
Od njih je krajem 1992. formirana 17. krajiška brdska
brigada, najvažnija postrojba 3. korpusa Armije RBiH,
ujedno i najveći problem obrani HVO-a.87
D
General HV-a Mate Šarlija Daidža opskrbio je Mu-
slimane u Mostaru, Sarajevu i istočnoj Bosni većom
količinom oružja, a krajem 1991. osobno se u vezi s or-
82 Jusuf MALKIĆ, Bosnom slava pronijeta (ili: Živinički otpor
agresiji), Bosanski kulturni centar, Živinice, 2002., 91.
83 Zijad RUJANAC, Opsjednuti grad Sarajevo, Bosanski kul-
turni centar, Sarajevo, 2003., 93.
84 J. MALKIĆ, Bosnom slava pronijeta, 90-92.
85 ICTY: Glavni inspektor obrane MORH, kl. 822, ur. br. 512-
20-92-01 od 7. 4. 1992.
86 GSHV, kl. 8/92-01/23, ur. br. 5120-03-92-9 od 9. 4. 1992.
87 Amir KLIKO, Fikret ĆUSKIĆ, 17. Viteška Krajiška brdska
brigada ARBiH, Udruženje “17. VKbbr” Ključ, Institut za
istoriju, Sarajevo, 2010., 22.
61
Domovinski rat 04-02-2020 Knjiga 1.indd 61
were especially irked by the political clout of the Defense
Minister Gojko Šušak, whose political importance was
second only to that of Franjo Tuđman. The attempt failed
and the HDZ never again experienced a major crisis.
The government was in charge of all operational
activities of the state. After Franjo Gregurić, the govern-
ment was led by three more prime ministers until the
end of 1995: Hrvoje Šarinić (1992-1993), Nikica Valentić
(1993-1995) and Zlatko Mateša (1995-2000). Croatia’s
most important objective during those years was to lib-
erate the occupied areas of the country. Everything was
subordinated to that goal. For that reason, the processes
of democratization were stalled and quality of life was
not high. The country was at war.
Croatia and the War in Bosnia and
Herzegovina in 1992
At the beginning of April, 1992, it became obvious
that the Serbs, with the overt assistance of the JNA, were
trying to conquer Bosnia and Herzegovina. Croatia start-
ed providing military help to the Muslims of Bosnia and
Herzegovina. The ground for that course of action had
actually been already prepared; already in 1991 facilities
for training reserve police units of Bosnia and Herzegov-
ina were set up in Croatia. Croatia also assisted Brigadier
Mate “Daidža” Šarlija (Nijaz Batlak) to set up training for
106 leaders of Green Berets battle groups in November.
Not many documents exist about the above mentioned
help Croatia provided to Bosnia and Herzegovina. Croa-
tia assisted the defense of the town of Živinice, during
the month of April, by sending 400 assault rifles and a
number of anti-tank weapons to the Muslims defending
the town. From May 8 to 18 a group of 550 men from
Živinice, Gračanica, Lukavac and Gradačac were given
military training in Našice and Nova Gradiška. When they
completed the training course, the men returned to Bos-
nia and Herzegovina with about 700 assault rifles, cour-
R
tesy of the Croatian government.
Some of the most renowned officers of the Croatian
Army organized a number of actions. At the recommen-
dation of the Chief of Staff of the Croatian Army, Martin
Špegelj, a number of Croatian soldiers from Operative
Zone Rijeka were sent to Bosnia and Herzegovina. The
soldiers who were sent to Bosnia and Herzegovina re-
tained all rights they had as Croatian soldiers “including
monthly salaries”, but they had to remove the Croatian
Army insignia from their uniforms and leave all identifi-
4.2.2020. 19:25:44
 Davor Marijan • Rat za opstojnost Hrvata, 1991. - 1995.
ganizacijom obrane susreo s Izetbegovićem.88 General
Daidža i poslije je bio angažiran za pružanje pomoći
Armiji RBiH na dragovoljnoj osnovi. Za prikupljanje
pomoći i upućivanje ljudstva u BiH u Zagrebu je osno-
vana Logistička baza Handžar divizije. Logistički centar
odnosno Glavni štab za potporu bio je u Rijeci. Okru-
ženom Bihaću zračna veza sa svijetom i značajan izvor
opskrbe bio je Zagreb, odnosno Hrvatsko ratno zrako-
plovstvo. Pomoć iz travnja 1992. nastavila se i u konti-
nuitetu je trajala do napada bošnjačke Armije RBiH na
H
HVO u travnju 1993. godine.89
Unatoč hrvatskomu priznanju Bosne i Hercegovi-
ne i početnim korektnim međusobnim odnosima, do
vojnoga sporazuma nije došlo brzo. Sporazum o pri-
jateljstvu i suradnji između Hrvatske i BiH u Zagrebu
su 21. srpnja 1992. potpisali predsjednici Franjo Tuđ-
M
man i Alija Izetbegović. Unatoč očekivanjima, to nije
bio i vojni sporazum. Nakon potpisivanja sporazuma
Izetbegović je objasnio da još nije vrijeme za vojni
sporazum, koji bi srpski narod “sigurno shvatio kao pri-
jetnju”, i da bi “bilo bolje ostaviti još malo prostora za
djelovanje međunarodnih faktora”.90 “Izetbegoviću je
D
od početka nuđen sporazum o suradnji protiv zajed-
ničkog neprijatelja”, izjavio je u veljači 1993. hrvatski
general Janko Bobetko, kao i da je “predsjednik Repu-
blike Hrvatske nekoliko puta Aliji nudio rješenja, i to
ona koja su tada i za Hrvatsku i za BiH bila prihvatljiva.
Međutim, bosansko državno vodstvo nije to prihvaća-
C
lo”.91 Vojni sporazum Hrvatske i bošnjačkoga vodstva
u BiH potpisan je mnogo kasnije, tek u ljeto 1995. u
Splitu prije Oluje, a nakon genocida srpskih snaga nad
muslimanima u Srebrenici. O razlozima bošnjačkoga
odbijanja postoje različita tumačenja – je li to možda
bio strah od prevelikog utjecaja Hrvatske, što je moglo
spriječiti stvaranje bošnjačke nacije?
88 Ismet HADŽIOSMANOVIĆ, Bošnjačko-hrvatski politički
obračun, izdanje autora, Mostar, 2006., 67.
89 Davor MARIJAN, “Vještački nalaz: o ratnim vezama Hr-
vatske i Bosne i Hercegovine (1991. - 1995.)”, Časopis za
suvremenu povijest, 1/36, 2004., 227-228; B. FELIĆ, Peti
korpus, 22.
90 Dubravko MERLIĆ, Slika na sliku, Dual, Zagreb, 1994., 37.
91 J. BOBETKO, Sve moje bitke, 155.
62
Domovinski rat 04-02-2020 Knjiga 1.indd 62
cation documents in Croatia. At the beginning of June
on the Zagreb fair grounds the 1st Krajina Battalion of the
Territorial Defense Force of the Republic of Bosnia and
Herzegovina was formed. The battalion was later de-
ployed in Travnik and Jajce. On June 21 the 7th Krajina Bri-
gade, the most important unit of the ARBIH III Corps was
formed in Klana near Rijeka. Before departing for central
Bosnia, the brigade trained in Klana. Out of this brigade,
at the end of 1992, the 17th Krajina Mountain Brigade was
formed. The 17th Krajina Mountain Brigade was the most
important formation of the ARBIH III Corps and also the
formation that gave the most trouble to the HVO.
Mate “Daidža” Šarlija, a general in the Croatian army,
supplied the Muslims in Mostar, Sarajevo and eastern
Bosnia with a considerable amount of weaponry. At the
end of 1991 General Daidža met Izetbegović to help plan
defensive strategies. General Daidža was later tasked with
organizing help for the Army of the Republic of Bosnia
and Herzegovina. His help was officially treated as a vol-
untary endeavor. The logistics base of the Handžar Divi-
sion was set up in Zagreb for the purpose of sending men
and matériel to Bosnia and Herzegovina. The main logis-
tics base was located in Rijeka. Zagreb served as the only
air link and an important source of supplies with the be-
sieged town of Bihać. The Croatian Air Force continuously
transported supplies to Bihać from April, 1992, to April,
1993, when the Army of the Republic of Bosnia and Her-
zegovina attacked the Croatian Defense Council (HVO).
Despite Croatia’s recognition of Bosnia and Herze-
govina and initial good relations between the two coun-
tries, there was no military alliance between Croatia and
Bosnia and Herzegovina. On July 21, 1992, Presidents
Franjo Tuđman and Alija Izetbegović signed the Agree-
D
ment on Friendship and Cooperation between Bosnia
and Herzegovina and Croatia in Zagreb. Contrary to ex-
pectations, the agreement did not facilitate the creation
of a military alliance. After signing the agreement, Izet-
begović explained that the time was not yet ripe for a
R
military alliance because the Serb nation would surely
“interpret such a move as a threat” and that “it makes
sense to give it a bit more time for the actions of inter-
national factors to tell”. “Izetbegović was being offered
a military alliance against our common enemy from the
start,” the Croatian General Janko Bobetko stated in Feb-
ruary, 1993. Bobetko also said that “the president of Cro-
atia offered solutions acceptable and beneficial to both
countries to Alija. But, the Bosnian leadership turned him
down every time”. A military alliance between Croatia
4.2.2020. 19:25:44
 The Croatian Nation’s Struggle for Survival, 1991-1995
Mirovna operacija Ujedinjenih naroda i
međunarodni položaj Hrvatske
Sarajevsko je primirje bilo uvjet za dolazak mirov-
nih snaga Ujedinjenih naroda i aktiviranje Vanceovog
plana. One su došle da bi učvrstile primirje, a ne da bi
ga riješile kao što su u Hrvatskoj očekivali. Vanceov je
plan predviđao razmještaj mirovnih snaga na područji-
ma zahvaćenim sukobima, radi njihove demilitarizaci-
je i osiguranja civilnog stanovništva kako bi se stvorili
H
uvjeti za povratak prognanih i izbjeglih osoba. Na po-
dručju djelovanja mirovnih snaga mogle su biti samo
policijske snage ustrojene na temelju nacionalne struk-
ture stanovništva prema popisu iz 1991. godine. Prvot-
no je bila predviđena uspostava tri zaštićene zone, da
bi u veljači 1992. bilo odlučeno da se uspostave četiri
M
koje su nazvane prema stranama svijeta: Istok, Zapad,
Sjever i Jug. Izvan zaštićenih zona bili su dijelovi opći-
na koje je JNA okupirala i nije bila spremna povući se s
njih. Kompromisnim stavom hrvatskoga vodstva ta su
područja nazvana ružičastim zonama,92 a UN se obve-
zao vratiti ih „što je prije moguće“ pod hrvatsku vlast,
D
no zbog odbijanja srpskoga vodstva da povuče svoje
snage s toga područja, ta su područja pod hrvatsku
vlast vraćena vojnim putem.93
Mirovne snage nazvane su Zaštitne snage Ujedi-
njenih naroda (United Nations Protection Forces – UN-
C
PROFOR) i osnovane su 21. veljače 1992. Rezolucijom
743 Vijeća sigurnosti UN-a kojom su određeni uvjeti
njihovog angažmana u raspadnutoj Jugoslaviji. Istog je
dana počeo i njihov jednogodišnji mandat. Sporazum
o statusu snaga između Hrvatske i UN-a potpisan je tek
15. svibnja 1995. jer se Vijeće sigurnosti protivilo nasto-
D
janju Hrvatske da se njezin pravni sustav protegne i na
područje zaštićenih zona.94
UNPROFOR je počeo mirovnu operaciju s 14.389
osoba – 13.340 pripadnika oružanih snaga, 530 poli-
cajaca i 519 civila. Tri godine kasnije broj angažiranih
je bio veći – 15.479 mirovnjaka. Zapovjedništvo UN-
PROFOR-a smješteno je u Sarajevo, nakon eskalacije
92 Ivica MIŠKULIN, Imas puska, imas pistol? O mirovnim ope-
racijama Ujedinjenih naroda u zapadnoj Slavoniji, Hrvat-
ski institut za povijest, Podružnica za povijest Slavonije,
Srijema i Baranje, Zagreb – Slavonski Brod, 2014., 16-17.
93 Domovinski rat – pregled političke i diplomatske povijesti,
Nakladni zavod Globus – HMDCDR, Zagreb, 2018., 171.
94 Isto, 30-31, 33.
63
Domovinski rat 04-02-2020 Knjiga 1.indd 63
and the Bosnian leadership regarding operations in Bos-
nia and Herzegovina was signed, but much later, in the
summer of 1995, in Split, prior to Operation Storm and
after the genocide perpetrated by Serb forces against
Muslims in Srebrenica. There are many theories as to why
the Bosnian leadership refused to sign a military agree-
ment with Croatia. Most of the theories propose that the
main cause of the Bosnian leadership’s reluctance to es-
tablish a military cooperation with Croatia was their fear
that Croatia might start expanding its influence in Bosnia
and Herzegovina and thereby hamper their intention to
create a Bosniak nation.
United Nation Peacekeeping Mission and
Croatia’s International Position
The cease-fire signed in Sarajevo facilitated the arriv-
al of the UN peacekeeping force and the implementation
of the Vance Plan. The mandate of the UN peacekeeping
force, contrary to Croatian expectations, was to help
maintain the cease-fire. The Croatian leadership hoped
that the peace keepers would actually help eradicate
the causes of the war. The Vance Plan envisaged the de-
ployment of peacekeepers in the war zones. The peace-
keepers’ mission would be to demilitarize these areas,
protect the civilian population and create conditions for
the safe return of refugees. According to the plan, once
the peacekeepers were deployed, the zones would be off
limits to the armed forces of the belligerents – only po-
lice forces would be allowed to act in those areas and the
police force of a zone in question would be composed
in accordance with the national structure of the popu-
lation in relation to the 1991 census. Initially, three pro-
tected areas were to be established. In February, 1992, it
was decided that four zones should be established: East,
West, North and South. Outside these protected areas
were the parts of the municipalities occupied by the JNA.
The JNA refused to withdraw from these areas. The Croa-
R
tian leadership agreed to compromise on this issue and
these areas were consequently called pink zones. The UN
accepted the obligation to return the pink zones “as soon
as possible” to Croatia but the intransigence of the Serbi-
an leadership and their refusal to order the JNA troops to
withdraw eventually forced Croatia to use military force
to liberate those areas.
The peacekeeping force was named United Nations
Protection Forces – UNPROFOR – and formed on Febru-
ary 21, 1992, by Resolution 743 of the UN Security Coun-
4.2.2020. 19:25:44
 Davor Marijan • Rat za opstojnost Hrvata, 1991. - 1995.
rata premješteno je u Beograd, a regionalna zapovjed-
ništva bila su u Zagrebu i Beogradu. Zapovjedništvo
UNPROFOR-a premješteno je 3. kolovoza 1992. iz Be-
ograda u Zagreb. Zapovjedništvo Sektora Jug bilo je
u Kninu, Sektora Sjever u Topuskom, Sektora Zapad u
Daruvaru, a Sektora Istok u Erdutu. U početku se UN-
PROFOR sastojao od satnije iz Švedske pri Zapovjed-
ništvu UNPROFOR-a, postrojbe za nadzor kretanja iz
Norveške, saniteta iz Velike Britanije, miješane pješač-
ke bojne iz Belgije i Luksemburga, pješačkih bojni iz
H
Argentine, Češkoslovačke, Danske, Jordana, Kenije,
Nepala, Nigerije, Poljske i Rusije, građevinske bojne iz
Finske, po jedne logističke i pješačke bojne iz Francu-
ske, po jedne inženjerijske i pješačke bojne iz Kanade i
bojne veze iz Nizozemske.95
Mirovnim snagama UN-a zapovijedali su indij-
M
ski general Satish Nambiar do ožujka 1993., švedski
general Lars-Eric Wahlgren do početka srpnja 1993.,
francuski general Jean Cot do sredine ožujka 1994.,
francuski general Bertrand de Lapresle do ožujka
1995. i francuski general Bernard Janvier do siječnja
1996. godine.
D
Vanceov plan nije imao jasan mandat što treba uči-
niti, bio je kompromisno rješenje s čijim su dijelovima
bili nezadovoljni Hrvati, kao i Srbi. Hrvati su očekivali
postupnu reintegraciju okupiranih područja, demilita-
rizaciju, povratak prognanika i uspostavu ustavnoga
poretka na cjelokupnom teritoriju Republike. S druge
C
strane, Srbi su plan doživljavali kao priznanje suvere-
nosti na osvojenom i pobunjenom području. Za njih
su mirovne snage trebale samo zamijeniti JNA i biti sila
koja ih razdvaja od hrvatskih oružanih snaga. Oko toga
je nastao prvi veliki problem, pitanje primjenjivanja za-
kona, jer je stajalište glavnoga tajnika UN-a od 15. ve-
ljače 1992. bilo da se na okupiranim područjima privre-
meno neće primjenjivati zakoni RH, na što je Hrvatska
imala primjedbe jer je držala neprihvatljivim da se pri-
mjenjuju jugoslavenski i srbijanski propisi, napose jer
je dio njih u prvim mjesecima 1992. prihvatila nepot-
puna Skupština SFRJ. Vijeće sigurnosti 30. lipnja 1992.
proširilo je mandat UNPROFOR-a i na ružičaste zone, na
95 Plavi šlemovi – lična karta, Specijalno izdanje TANJUG-a,
mart 1992.; “Pitanje granica zaštitne oblasti još otvore-
no”, Narodna armija, 21. 5. 1992., 7-8; SVA MORH, GSHV:
Ured GSHV za koordinaciju s EM i UN, Informacija kl.
804-01/92-03/06, ur. br. 5120-27-92-153 od 18. 6. 1992.;
ICTY: Informativni list UNPROFOR-a od 14. 2. 1995.
64
Domovinski rat 04-02-2020 Knjiga 1.indd 64
cil. The mandate of UNPROFOR in the former Yugoslavia
was also determined by the resolution. The peacekeepers
were supposed to stay, under the provisions of Resolution
743, in the territory of the former Yugoslavia for one year.
The effective date of the mandate was the date of the
passing of Resolution 743. An agreement between Croa-
tia and the UN regarding the status of the peacekeeping
force was actually signed only on May 15, 1995, because
the UN Security Council had opposed Croatia’s initiatives
to extend its legal system to the protected areas.
UNPROFOR numbered 14,389 personnel – 13,340
members of the armed forces of various countries, 530
police officers and 519 civilians. Three years later the
number was somewhat higher – 15,479 peacekeepers.
UNPROFOR HQ was located in Sarajevo but after the
escalation of the conflict in Bosnia and Herzegovina it
was relocated to Belgrade. Regional HQs were in Zagreb
and Belgrade. UNPROFOR HQ, on August 3 1992, relo-
cated from Belgrade to Zagreb. The HQ of Sector South
was in Knin, the HQ of Sector North was in Topusko, the
HQ of Sector West was in Daruvar and the HQ of Sector
East was in Erdut. At first, UNPROFOR consisted of an HQ
company from Sweden, a movement control unit from
Norway, an ambulance unit from Great Britain, a mixed
infantry battalion from Belgium and Luxembourg, infan-
try battalions from Argentina, Czechoslovakia, Denmark,
Jordan, Kenya, Nepal, Nigeria, Poland and Russia, a con-
struction battalion from Finland, one logistics battalion
and one infantry battalion from France, one engineering
battalion and one infantry battalion from Canada and
one signals battalion from the Netherlands.
The commanders of UNPROFOR were: Indian Gen-
eral Satish Nambiar until March, 1993; Swedish Gener-
D
al Lars-Eric Wahlgren until the beginning of July, 1993;
French General Jean Cot until mid-March, 1994; French
General Bernard de Lapresle until March, 1995, and
French General Janvier until January, 1996.
The Vance Plan was not a coherent plan of action. It
R
was a compromise solution. The Croats were not satisfied
with some aspects of the plan, the Serbs opposed the
others, especially those at variance with their interpreta-
tions of what the plan was supposed to accomplish. The
Croats expected a gradual reintegration of the occupied
areas, demilitarization, return of refugees and establish-
ment of the constitutional order in the entire territory
of the Republic of Croatia. On the other hand, the Serbs
perceived the plan as recognition of their conquests and
political sovereignty of the areas in rebellion. The Serbs
4.2.2020. 19:25:44
 The Croatian Nation’s Struggle for Survival, 1991-1995
što je Hrvatska pristala zbog jakog diplomatskog pri-
tiska. U kolovozu je UNPROFOR, na hrvatsko traženje,
preuzeo nadzor na granicama.96
Demilitarizacija se predviđala u četiri faze. U pr-
voj se povlačilo teško naoružanje (dalekometno to-
pništvo, raketni sustavi, tenkovi, oklopni transporteri)
na udaljenost od 30 kilometara od crte bojišta. Dru-
ga je faza bila razoružanje pobunjenih Srba i drugih
paravojnih sastava. U trećoj se fazi izvlačilo preo-
stalo topništvo i teške strojnice na udaljenost od 10
H
kilometara. U četvrtoj se fazi predviđalo izvlačenje
pješaštva na 5 kilometara od bojišta, odnosno od
granica UNPA zona, nakon čega je trebalo početi raz-
miniranje. Razdvajanje sukobljenih snaga, odnosno
prva faza demilitarizacije počela je 15. svibnja, kada
je UNPROFOR preuzeo nadležnost u Sektoru Istok.97
M
U Sektoru Zapad UNPROFOR je preuzeo nadležnost
20. lipnja, a u sektorima Jug i Sjever 2. srpnja. Mirovne
su snage razmještene na crti razdvajanja što su Srbi
shvatili kao put prema konačnom teritorijalnom raz-
graničenju Hrvatske i Srbije.98 Jugoslavenska narodna
armija službeno se povukla iz Hrvatske, s iznimkom
D
dijela dubrovačkoga područja, gdje su ostali dijelovi
Podgoričkoga korpusa i Ratne mornarice Vojske Ju-
goslavije. Vojska Jugoslavije odbila se povući jer nije
željela da hrvatske snage dođu u priliku da s Prevlake
nadziru ulaz u Bokokotorski zaljev. Uz posredovanje
UNPROFOR-a Hrvatska i Savezna Republika Jugo-
C
slavija dogovorile su 15. rujna 1992. demilitarizaciju
Prevlake i povlačenje teškoga oružja iz okolice poluo-
toka. Nadzor nad Prevlakom preuzeli su 20. listopada
vojni promatrači UN-a i Promatračka misija Europske
zajednice. Zbog opasnosti da srpske snage unište
D
Peruču u zaleđu Sinja, UNPROFOR je 14. rujna 1992.
preuzeo nadzor nad branom.99
96 Predsjednik Državne komisije Vlade Republike Hrvatske
za UNPROFOR od 27. 3. 1992., Izvješće o mirovnoj ope-
raciji Ujedinjenih naroda u Republici Hrvatskoj – UN-
PROFOR; M. NOBILO, Hrvatski feniks, 250; I. MIŠKULIN,
Imas puska, imas pistol?, 35-36.
97 SVA MORH, GSHV: Ured MPRH za UN i EZ od 18. 12.
1992., Demilitarizacija kao segment plana C. Vancea.
98 I. MIŠKULIN, Imas puska, imas pistol?, 20-21.
99 ICTY: Dodatno izvješće Glavnog tajnika UN od 28. 9.
1992. sukladno s Rezolucijama Vijeća sigurnosti br. 743
(1992.) i 762 (1992.); ICTY: Završno izvješće Glavnog taj-
nika UN od 24. 11. 1992. sukladno s Rezolucijom Vijeća
sigurnosti br. 743 (1992.).
65
Domovinski rat 04-02-2020 Knjiga 1.indd 65
mistakenly believed that the peacekeepers would sim-
ply replace the JNA and act as a buffer between them
and the Croatian Army. This disparity in expectations led
to the first major problem caused by the Vance Plan –
the issue of the application of the law. The position of
the UN Secretary General was, from February 15, 1992,
that Croatian laws would be temporarily not applicable
in the occupied areas. That position was unacceptable
to Croatia because it meant that the applicable laws in
the occupied territories were those of Yugoslavia and
Serbia, especially in light of the fact that the rump As-
sembly of the SFRY had passed a number of the laws in
question at the beginning of 1992. The Security Council
extended the mandate of UNPROFOR to the pink zones
on June 30, 1992. Croatia, under considerable political
pressure from the international community, agreed to
that move. In August, at Croatia’s request, UNPROFOR
assumed control of the borders.
The demilitarization of the areas of Croatia under
Serb control was planned to take place in four phases. In
the first phase the heavy artillery, missile systems, tanks
and APCs were to be withdrawn to a distance no less than
30 kilometers from the front line. In the second phase
the rebel Serbs and other paramilitary formations would
be disarmed. In the third phase the remaining artillery
pieces and heavy machine guns would be moved to a
distance no less than 10 kilometers from the front line. In
the fourth phase all infantry units would be withdrawn
to a distance no less than 5 kilometers from the front line,
that is, as far as the boundaries of the UNPA zones. After
that, a process of mine clearance would commence in
the areas in question. The separation of the warring par-
ties, meaning the first phase of the demilitarization of the
areas under Serb control, commenced on May 15, when
UNPROFOR assumed control of Sector East. UNPROFOR
imposed its authority on Sector West on June 20, and on
Sectors South and North on July 2. Peacekeepers were
deployed along the line of separation. The Serbs per-
R
ceived the move as a stepping stone towards to the final
territorial separation between Croatia and Serbia. The
JNA officially withdrew from Croatia. However, elements
of the JNA Podgorica Corps and the Yugoslav Navy still
remained active in the area around Dubrovnik. The JNA
did not want to relinquish control of that area because
by doing so it would have given the Croatian Army an
opportunity to control the entrance to the Bay of Kotor
from positions on Prevlaka. On September 15, 1992, Cro-
atia and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia reached an
4.2.2020. 19:25:44
 Davor Marijan • Rat za opstojnost Hrvata, 1991. - 1995.
Do kraja 1992. Hrvatska je ispunila sve obveze
osim što južno od Osijeka u Sektoru Istok nije povu-
kla pješaštvo 5 kilometara jer to nisu učinile ni srpske
snage. Iako je UNPROFOR uspio preuzeti zaštićene
zone, a JNA se povukla, demilitarizacija je zapela jer
pobunjeni Srbi nisu predali oružje. Osnivanjem osam
brigada milicije s oko 16.000 ljudi oni su izigrali spo-
razum, čemu se UNPROFOR usprotivio jer je bilo oči-
to da se ne radi o lokalnoj policiji, nego o paravojnim
postrojbama naoružanim težim oružjem koje su se
H
predstavljale kao policija. U Sektoru Istok UNPROFOR
je pokušao uporabiti silu da oduzme oružje. Odustao
je zbog pogoršanja stanja i mogućnosti izbijanja su-
koba većih razmjera.100
Krajem 1992. Hrvatska je zatražila promjenu man-
data jer je demilitarizacija bila nedjelotvorna i nisu
M
stvoreni nikakvi uvjeti za povratak prognanika. Vijeće
sigurnosti je odbilo hrvatske zahtjeve nakon čega je
Hrvatska promijenila način djelovanja. U siječnju 1993.
je poduzela ograničenu vojnu operaciju u zaleđu Zadra
koja je okončana oslobađanjem Masleničkog mosta i
brane Peruča kod Sinja. Vijeće sigurnosti je 25. siječnja
D
1993. Rezolucijom 802 osudilo hrvatski napad, no nije
dovelo u pitanje uspostavu hrvatske državne vlasti na
oslobođenom prostoru.101
Hrvatska je i dalje nastavila pritiskati Vijeće sigur-
nosti shvaćajući da njena diplomacija mora tražiti što
više da bi dobila nekakav ustupak. Tako je 30. ožujka
C
1993. Rezolucijom 815 prvi put izrijekom navedeno
da su zaštićene zone UN-a integralni dio teritorija Hr-
vatske. Zbog te su Rezolucije pobunjeni Srbi ograničili
kretanje pripadnicima UNPROFOR-a.102
Najslabija hrvatska točka je bila pomaganje Hrva-
tima u BiH gdje je Hrvatska brzo gubila političke bo-
dove koje joj je međunarodna zajednica nevoljko bila
dala 1991. u vrijeme srpske agresije. To je bio razlog što
Hrvatska nije uspjela razdvojiti mandat UNPROFOR-a
od onoga u BiH i Makedoniji. Na hrvatske prijetnje ot-
kazom mandata UNPROFOR-a, Vijeće sigurnosti je 8.
listopada 1993. Rezolucijom 871 ustrojilo tri zapovjed-
100 ICTY: Dodatno izvješće Glavnog tajnika UN od 28. 9.
1992. sukladno s Rezolucijama Vijeća sigurnosti br. 743
(1992.) i 762 (1992.); Ured MPRH za UN i EZ od 18. 12.
1992., Demilitarizacija kao segment plana C. Vance-a.
101 I. MIŠKULIN, Imas puska, imas pistol?, 37.
102 Isto, 38-39.
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Domovinski rat 04-02-2020 Knjiga 1.indd 66
agreement, brokered by UNPROFOR, on the demilitariza-
tion of Prevlaka and removing all heavy weaponry from
the area surrounding the peninsula. On October 20 UN
military monitors and the EC Monitoring Mission were
sent to Prevlaka to monitor the situation. There existed
a real danger that Serb forces would destroy the Peruća
dam in the hinterland of Sinj. For that reason, on Septem-
ber 14, UNPROFOR forces took control of the dam.
By the end of 1992, Croatia had fulfilled all its obli-
gations stemming from the Vance Plan except one; the
Croatian Army did not withdraw its infantry units 5 ki-
lometers from the front line in the area to the south of
Osijek, in Sector East, because the Serbs in that area had
refused to withdraw their infantry units five kilometers
to the rear. UNPROFOR had assumed control of the pro-
tected areas and the JNA had withdrawn, but the process
of demilitarization was irreversibly arrested because the
rebel Serbs refused to relinquish their weapons. Instead
they formed eight militia brigades. This militia force con-
sisted of about 16,000 men. The Serbs had effectively
tricked UNPROFOR because it was obvious that the eight
brigades did not represent a local police force but a
heavily armed paramilitary force posing as a police force.
UNPROFOR challenged the stratagem and in Sector East
planned to use force to confiscate the rebel Serbs’ weap-
ons. In the event, UNPROFOR abandoned the plan for
fear of escalation.
At the end of 1992, Croatia demanded that UNPRO-
FOR’s mandate be changed because it was obvious that
the areas under Serb occupation had not been demilita-
rized and that conditions for the return of refugees had
not been created. The Security Council rejected Croatia’s
demands. Croatia, as a result, changed tack. In January,
D
1993, the Croatian Army launched a limited offensive
operation in the hinterland of Zadar. The operation was
successful – the Maslenica Bridge and the Peruća dam
near Sinj were in Croatian hands. The Security Council,
on January 25, 1993, issued Resolution 802 in which it
R
condemned the Croatian offensive. However, Resolution
802 did not challenge Croatia’s right to establish its legal
and constitutional order in the newly liberated territory.
Croatia continued to pile on the pressure on the
Security Council. The Croatian diplomats had finally re-
alized that their demands had to significantly exceed
what they were really after because the Security Council
had the habit of acceding to only a fraction of what was
asked for. The new diplomatic strategy immediately bore
fruit. On March 30, 1993, Resolution 815 was passed. The
4.2.2020. 19:25:45
 The Croatian Nation’s Struggle for Survival, 1991-1995
H
M
„Plave kacige” u zapadnoj Slavoniji, 1992. (autor fotografije:
Željko Gašparović).
“Blue helmets” in Western Slavonia, 1992 (Photograph by Žel-
jko Gašparović).
D
ništva UNPROFOR-a, za Hrvatsku, BiH i Makedoniju, što
nije utjecalo na stanje na terenu.103
Pomaka nije bilo ni nakon potpisivanja Zagrebač-
kog sporazuma kada je i Vijeće sigurnosti 31. ožujka
C
1994. Rezolucijom 908 produžilo mandat UNPRO-
FOR-a na šest mjeseci i najavilo da će se rješenje tražiti
u pregovorima. Osim prekida vatre ništa se nije mica-
lo s mrtve točke pa je Hrvatska ponovno posegnula
za pritiskom. U ljeto 1994. prognanici su blokirali sve
D
službene prijelaze i nadzorne točke mirovnih snaga.
Posljedica je bila Rezolucija 947 kojom je Vijeće sigur-
nosti 30. rujna 1994. potvrdilo teritorijalni integritet
Republike Hrvatske. Krajem 1994. Hrvatska je zabilje-
žila značajan uspjeh. Opća skupština UN-a je Rezolu-
cijom 49/43 sukob u Hrvatskoj definirala kao jugosla-
vensku (srpsku) okupaciju.104
Pregovori između Hrvatske i pobunjenih Srba su u
prosincu 1994. doveli do potpisivanja Gospodarskog
sporazuma. Osim njega ništa više nije dogovoreno
pa je Hrvatska 12. siječnja 1995. najavila da 31. ožujka
103 Isto, 39-41.
104 Isto, 44-48.
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Domovinski rat 04-02-2020 Knjiga 1.indd 67
text of the resolution clearly defined, for the first time
in any given official context, the UN protected areas as
integral parts of the territory of the Republic of Croatia.
In retaliation the rebel Serbs restricted movement to the
members of UNPROFOR.
The Croatian diplomatic initiatives during that time
suffered from one particular malady though: the need to
help the Croats in Bosnia and Herzegovina. All the politi-
cal concessions the international community had grudg-
ingly bestowed on Croatia in 1991 during Serbia’s attack
on Bosnia and Herzegovina had been steadily eroding.
This political game Croatia had been steadily losing was
the main reason why Croatia was unsuccessful in trying
to separate the mandate of UNPROFOR in Croatia from
those in Bosnia and Herzegovina and Macedonia. Croa-
tia even attempted to strong-arm the UN by threatening
to cancel UNPROFOR’s mandate. On October 8, 1993, the
Security Council responded to the threats with Resolu-
tion 871 by which three separate UNPROFOR commands
were set up – one for Croatia, one for Macedonia and one
for Bosnia and Herzegovina. That, however, did not alter
the situation on the ground.
The situation did not improve even after the signing
of the Zagreb Agreement when the Security Council,
on March 31, 1994, by passing Resolution 908 extend-
ed UNPROFOR’s mandate to six additional months and
announced that the crisis would be resolved by negoti-
ation. The new resolution simply maintained the status
quo. Croatia again had no choice but to up the ante. In
the summer of 1994, Croatian refugees who had been
expelled from their homes in the Serb-occupied areas of
the country blockaded all the UNPROFOR checkpoints.
As a direct result of that pressure the Security Council, on
September 30, 1994, passed Resolution 947 in which it
confirmed the territorial integrity of the Republic of Cro-
atia. At the end of 1994, Croatia achieved another nota-
ble diplomatic success when the UN General Assembly
defined the conflict in Croatia as Yugoslav (Serb) occupa-
R
tion in Resolution 49/43.
Croatia held negotiations with the rebel Serbs in
December, 1994. The result of the negotiations was the
signing of the Economic Agreement. The negotiations
did not produce anything else of notable substance and
for that reason Croatia, on January 12, 1995, announced
that it would cancel UNPROFOR’s mandate on March
31 because the peacekeepers had failed in their mis-
sion. In a letter sent to the UN Secretary General Boutros
Boutros-Ghali, President Tuđman emphasized that the
4.2.2020. 19:25:45
 Davor Marijan • Rat za opstojnost Hrvata, 1991. - 1995.
MAOARSKA
SLOVENIJA
H
B O S N A
I
HERCEGOVINA
M
Tumac znakova
• Naselja/
UNPA sjever/Nord
- UNPA istok/East
- UNPAjug/South
- UNPA zapad/West 'O
D Ruzicaste zone/Pink zones
D
otkazuje gostoprimstvo UNPROFOR-u jer nije ispunio
hrvatska očekivanja. U pismu glavnom tajniku Vijeća si-
C
gurnosti UN-a, Boutrosu Boutrosu Ghaliju, predsjednik
Tuđman je naglasio da otkazivanje mandata UNPRO-
FOR-u ne znači odustajanje od mirnog rješenja sukoba
s pobunjenim Srbima, nego nastojanje da se do dogo-
vora dođe izravnim pregovorima Zagreba i Knina.105 Di-
plomacija je našla kompromis i Vijeće sigurnosti UN-a
prihvatilo je 31. ožujka 1995. hrvatske zahtjeve te Re-
zolucijom 981 potvrdilo teritorijalni integritet Republi-
ke Hrvatske. Priznalo se da glavne postavke Vanceova
plana nisu provedene. Uloga mirovnih snaga je redefi-
nirana, naziv UNPROFOR promijenjen je u UNCRO (Uni-
ted Nations Confidence Restoration Operation in Croatia)
– Operacija UN-a za povratak povjerenja u Hrvatskoj, s
mandatom do 30. studenoga 1995. godine. U novom
mandatu snage UN-a bile su dužne uspostaviti učinko-
vit nadzor nad međunarodno priznatim granicama Hr-
105 Otkaz mandata UNPROFOR-u: Treća obljetnica međuna-
rodnog priznanja Republike Hrvatske, MORH, Politička
uprava, Zagreb, 1995., 12-18.
68
Domovinski rat 04-02-2020 Knjiga 1.indd 68
Zemljovid snaga UN-a s ucrtanim UNPA i tzv.
ružičastim zonama.
Map showing the deployment of UN forces, the
UNPAs and the so-called “pink zones”.
(f)
;u
OJ
cancellation of UNPROFOR’s mandate did not mean giv-
ing up on trying to find a peaceful solution to the crisis,
but constituted a move to reach that solution through di-
rect talks between Croatia and the rebel Serbs. On March
31, 1995, the UN Security Council accepted the Croatian
demands and passed Resolution 981 in which it again
confirmed the territorial integrity of the Republic of Cro-
D
atia. The Security Council also admitted in the Resolution
that the main objectives on the Vance Plan had not been
achieved. The role of the peacekeepers was redefined,
the name UNPROFOR was changed into UNCRO (United
Nations Confidence Restoration Operation in Croatia). The
mandate of the restructured and renamed force was to
R
last until November 30, 1995. In their new mandate the
UN forces were tasked with efficiently monitoring the in-
ternationally recognized borders of the Republic of Croa-
tia. The main activity in this particular regard would be to
ascertain whether men and matériel were being sent to
the protected areas from the Federal Republic of Yugo-
slavia or the Republika Srpska.
After Operation Storm the military contingent of UN-
CRO had become superfluous in the liberated areas. In
4.2.2020. 19:25:45
 The Croatian Nation’s Struggle for Survival, 1991-1995
vatske i nadzirati dolazi li u zaštićena područja vojna
oprema i ljudstvo s područja Savezne Republike Jugo-
slavije ili Republike Srpske.106
Nakon operacije Oluja vojna komponenta UN-
CRO-a je postala suvišna na oslobođenom teritoriju.
U sjeni borbi u zapadnoj Bosni, diplomatskim aktivno-
stima dogovoreno je reduciranje mandata UNCRO-a
na Sektor Istok, motrenje ljudskih prava te motrenje
državnih granica na području Prevlake. Nakon isteka
mandata UNCRO-a Vijeće sigurnosti UN-a je 15. si-
H
ječnja 1996. Rezolucijom 1037 uspostavilo Prijelaznu
upravu Ujedinjenih naroda u istočnoj Slavoniji (United
Nations Transitional Administration in Eastern Slavonia
– UNTAES). Na čelu Prijelazne uprave bio je američki
general Jacques Paul Klein. Uprava je okončana u si-
ječnju 1998. godine.107
M
Za Prevlaku je Vijeće sigurnosti 15. siječnja 1996.
Rezolucijom 1038 uspostavilo mandat Promatračke
misije Ujedinjenih naroda na Prevlaci (United Nations
Mission of Observers on Prevlaka – UNMOP) kojim se
njen položaj tretirao odvojeno od Hrvatskog Podunav-
lja. Za Hrvatsku je bilo bitno da je neizravno potvrđeno
D
da je Prevlaka dio RH.108
Okupirani teritorij Republike Hrvatske
Okupirani teritorij Hrvatske pobunjeni su Srbi u
veljači 1992. definirali kao tri oblasti RSK – Krajinu, za-
C
padnu Slavoniju i Slavoniju, Baranju i zapadni Srijem.
Radilo se o teritoriju površine od oko 15.000 km² s ko-
jeg je tijekom 1991. i kasnije protjerano gotovo sve ne-
srpsko stanovništvo. Po grubim procjenama iz sredine
1993., na okupiranom je teritoriju živjelo oko 433.000
D
osoba,109 no s toga je područja stanovništvo, posebice
ono mlađe dobi, masovno odlazilo, tako da je upitan
broj stanovnika koji je ostao do sredine 1995. godine.
Politički život u RSK obilježili su konstantni sukobi
koji su uz ideološke imali i regionalnu značajku. Počet-
kom 1992. to je bio sukob oko prihvaćanja Vanceovog
plana. Predsjednik RSK Milan Babić je bio protiv dola-
ska mirovnih snaga, nije prihvaćao da je RSK područ-
106 D. MARIJAN, Oluja, 50-51.
107 M. NOBILO, Hrvatski feniks, 491-493, 502-522; N. BARIĆ,
Srpska pobuna, 530.
108 M. NOBILO, Hrvatski feniks, 529-533.
109 N. BARIĆ, Srpska pobuna, 171-172.
69
Domovinski rat 04-02-2020 Knjiga 1.indd 69
the shadow of the fighting in western Bosnia and inten-
sive diplomatic activities, another agreement with the
UN was made according to which the mandate of UN-
CRO would be reduced to Sector East. Also, in the area of
Prevlaka, the peacekeepers were tasked with monitoring
the borders and ensuring that human rights were re-
spected. After the expiration of the mandate of UNCRO
the Security Council passed Resolution 1037 on January
15, 1996, and established the United Nations Transitional
Administration in Easter Slavonia – UNTAES. At the helm
of UNTAES was the American General Jacques Paul Klein.
The mission was concluded in January, 1998.
The Security Council, on January 15, 1996, passed
Resolution 1038 and established the United Nations
Mission of Observers on Prevlaka – UNMOP. According
to the Resolution, Prevlaka’s status differed from that
of the Croatian Danube region. With that, the Security
Council tacitly confirmed that Prevlaka was part of the
Republic of Croatia.
The Occupied Areas of the Republic of
Croatia
In February, 1992, the rebel Serbs defined the oc-
cupied areas of the Republic of Croatia as three districts
of the RSK – Krajina, Western Slavonia and Slavonia, Ba-
ranja and Western Sirmium. The total geographical area
of these districts was around 15,000 square kilometers.
During 1991 and later the rebel Serbs expelled almost
all non-Serbs from the districts. According to rough esti-
mates from mid-1993, 433,000 people lived in the occu-
pied areas of Croatia at that time. However, many people,
especially young adults, decided to move out from those
areas, and it is reasonable to assume that by mid-1995
the population of these areas was considerably smaller
than what the mentioned estimate had for 1993.
The political life in the RSK was marked by constant
quarrels. Different groups subscribing to different ideo-
R
logical concepts vied for position and political influence
and regionalism was, more often than not, the order of
the day regarding the internal political dynamics of the
RSK. At the beginning of 1992 a quarrel erupted over
the issue of whether to accept the Vance Plan or not. The
President of the RSK, Milan Babić was against the arrival
of the peacekeepers and against the notion that the RSK
should be an autonomous area in the Republic of Croa-
tia. He was also against the disarmament of the local Serb
forces. Milan Babić’s intransigent attitude caused him to
4.2.2020. 19:25:46
 Davor Marijan • Rat za opstojnost Hrvata, 1991. - 1995.
je u Republici Hrvatskoj i bio je protiv razoružanja lo-
kalnih srpskih snaga. Nepomirljivo Babićevo stajalište
odvelo ga je u sukob s Miloševićem u kojem nije mo-
gao pobijediti. U veljači 1992. je smijenjen, a političko
vodstvo pobunjenih Srba prihvatilo je Vanceov plan.
Babića je zamijenio Goran Hadžić koji je do siječnja
1994. bio predsjednik RSK, a potom do kolovoza 1995.
to je bio Mile Martić. Na dužnosti predsjednika Vlade
RSK promijenilo se više osoba: Risto Matković (veljača
1992.), Zdravko Zečević (veljača 1992. – ožujak 1993.),
H
Đorđe Bjegović (travanj 1993. – travanj 1994.), Borislav
Mikelić (travanj 1994. – svibanj 1995.) i Milan Babić (sr-
panj – kolovoz 1995.).110
Temeljno političko pitanje na okupiranom teri-
toriju bio je odnos prema Republici Hrvatskoj. Pobu-
njeni Srbi nisu pokazali ni minimum volje da se mir-
M
no reintegriraju u ustavnopravni poredak Republike
Hrvatske. Nisu pokazali nikakav interes za izmjenu
ustavnog zakona o ljudskim pravima i pravima etnič-
kih i nacionalnih manjina koji je Hrvatska izmijenila u
svibnju i lipnju 1992. i kojim je bilo predviđeno osni-
vanje dva samoupravna kotara sa sjedištem u Glini i
D
Kninu. Isti je učinak imao i Zakon o oprostu od krivič-
nog progona i postupaka za krivična djela počinjena
u oružanim sukobima i u ratu protiv Republike Hrvat-
ske koji je donesen 25. rujna 1992. godine. Tim su za-
konom abolirani svi sudionici srpske pobune od 17.
kolovoza 1990. do dana proglašenja Zakona o opro-
C
stu, osim onih koji su počinili ratne zločine.111 Unatoč
odluci Vijeća sigurnosti UN-a odbili su i da se „ružiča-
ste zone“ vrate pod hrvatsku vlast. Premda su sum-
njičili mirovne snage UN-a da su naklonjene Hrvati-
ma, pobunjeni Srbi su od njihove nazočnosti prigrlili
samo primirje koje su omogućili svojim razmještajem
na crti bojišta. Njihova nepopustljivost da pregovara-
ju s hrvatskim vlastima oko normaliziranja posljedica
rata i omogućavanja intervencija u porušenu promet-
nu infrastrukturu naišla je na hrvatski odgovor. U si-
ječnju 1993. hrvatske su snage oslobodile područje
na kojem je bio Maslenički most i dio zaleđa Zadra.
Sredinom srpnja 1993. sklopljen je Erdutski sporazum
kojim je dogovoren prekid vatre i povlačenje hrvat-
skih snaga s područja oslobođenog u siječnju 1993.
godine. Erdutski sporazum nije zaživio i borbe su na-
110 Isto, 150-162, 586-589; D. MARIJAN, Slom Titove armije,
331-333.
111 N. BARIĆ, Srpska pobuna, 165.
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Domovinski rat 04-02-2020 Knjiga 1.indd 70
quarrel with Slobodan Milošević. The result of the quarrel
was not difficult to predict. In February, 1992, Babić was
replaced by Goran Hadžić and the political leadership of
the rebel Serbs accepted the Vance Plan. Goran Hadžić
was the President of the RSK until January, 1994. He was
replaced by Mile Martić, who remained in the post un-
til August, 1995. A number of people served as prime
ministers of the RSK: Risto Matković (February, 1992),
Zdravko Zečević (February 1992 – March 1993), Đorđe
Bjegović (April 1993 – April 1994), Borislav Mikelić (April
1994 – May 1995) and Milan Babić (July – August 1995)
The pivotal political issue in the occupied territory
was the RSK’s stance in relation to the Republic of Cro-
atia. The rebel Serbs never showed even a hint of an in-
clination to reintegrate peacefully into the constitutional
and legal order of the Republic of Croatia. They showed
no interest in changing the Constitutional law on hu-
man rights and freedoms and the rights of national and
ethnic communities or minorities. It is worth mention-
ing that Croatia did change said law in May and June,
1992, and that the law envisaged the establishment of
two autonomous kotars (districts) with Glina and Knin as
their respective administrative centers. The rebel Serbs
completely ignored Croatia’s passing, on September 25,
1992, of the Law on abolition of criminal prosecution and
criminal proceedings for criminal acts perpetrated in the
armed conflicts and in the war against the Republic of
Croatia. The law granted amnesty to all those who par-
ticipated in the Serb rebellion that started on August
17, 1990, until the date of the passing of the law, with
the exception of those persons who had committed war
crimes. Despite the decision of the UN Security Council,
the rebel Serbs opposed the return of “pink zones” to Cro-
D
atian control. The rebel Serbs accused the peacekeepers
of sympathizing with Croatia even though they accepted
the cease-fire that the peacekeepers had made possible
by deploying on the front line and thus separating the
rebel Serbs and the Croatian Army. The rebel Serbs’ belli-
R
cose attitude and refusal to negotiate with Croatia about
normalizing the situation and initiating projects to repair
the devastated transport infrastructure forced Croatia’s
hand. In January, 1993, Croatian forces liberated the
area around the Maslenica Bridge and parts of Zadar’s
hinterland. In mid-July, 1993, the Erdut Agreement was
signed. According to the Agreement, a cease-fire would
be signed and the Croatia troops would withdraw from
the territory they had liberated in January, 1993. The Er-
dut Agreement was never put into effect and the fight-
4.2.2020. 19:25:46
 The Croatian Nation’s Struggle for Survival, 1991-1995
stavljene. Okončane su tek u ožujku 1994. stupanjem
na snagu Zagrebačkog sporazuma.112
Tijekom tog vremena nije bilo pomaka u pregovo-
rima između Hrvatske i pobunjenih Srba. Uhićenje Velj-
ka Džakule, jednog od čelnika srpske pobune u zapad-
noj Slavoniji, pokazuje da vodstvo RSK nije pristajalo ni
na kakvo popuštanje u svom stajalištu da su u odnosu
prema Hrvatskoj neovisna država. Džakula je optužen
da je htio odvojiti dio RSK i pripojiti ih Hrvatskoj. U ljeto
1994. RSK se našla u procijepu između Republike Srp-
H
ske koja joj je bila najveći saveznik, i Srbije koja je pre-
kinula odnose s njom zbog odbijanja da potpišu plan
Kontaktne skupine o okončanju sukoba u BiH.113
U sklopu nastojanja da se Srbija prikaže kao pobor-
nik mirovnih pregovora slijedili su pregovori pobunje-
nih Srba s RH oko uspostave gospodarskih, prometnih
M
i infrastrukturalnih veza u sklopu kojih je u Zagrebu 2.
prosinca 1994. potpisan Gospodarski sporazum. Spo-
razumom je regulirano pitanje korištenja vode, elek-
trične energije, autoceste i naftovoda. Po njegovim
odredbama, 21. prosinca 1994. za slobodan je promet
otvorena autocesta Zagreb – Lipovac. To je bilo sve na
D
što su pobunjeni Srbi pristali u pregovorima i izazvalo
je podjele jer je dio držao da je to čin kapitulacije pred
Hrvatskom. Nakon otvaranja autoceste povećalo se kri-
jumčarenje na području zapadne Slavonije. Duž trase
autoceste otvoreno je nekoliko ilegalnih ulaza, koji su
se održali iako ih je milicija pobunjenih Srba više puta
C
zatvarala. Najvažniji predmet krijumčarenja bilo je go-
rivo, po koje su pobunjeni Srbi dolazili s okupiranoga
dijela Hrvatske.114
U jesen 1994. američka je diplomacija predvođena
veleposlanikom SAD-a Peterom Galbraithom pokrenu-
D
la mirovnu inicijativu poznatu kao Plan Z-4. Prema tom
su planu hrvatski Srbi na području zaštićenih sektora
Sjever i Jug trebali dobiti autonomnu Srpsku krajinu
na području sa srpskom većinom prema popisu sta-
novništva iz 1991., odnosno kotarevima Glina i Knin.
Predviđeno je da Krajina ima zakonodavno tijelo, pred-
sjednika, novčanu jedinicu, pravo na ubiranje poreza i
sklapanje sporazuma u vezi s obrazovanjem, kulturom,
medijima, te turizmom s „drugim tvorevinama ili drža-
112 Isto, 184-193, 259-263.
113 Isto, 202-205, 463-464.
114 Isto, 265-269; Davor MARIJAN, Novska u Domovinskom
ratu, HVIDRA Novska, Novska, 2009., 369.
71
Domovinski rat 04-02-2020 Knjiga 1.indd 71
ing continued. The fighting only ended in March, 1994,
when the Zagreb Agreement came into effect.
In the interim no headway was made in the negoti-
ations between Croatia and the rebel Serbs. The arrest
of Veljko Džakula, one of the leaders of the Serb rebel-
lion in western Slavonia, shows that the leadership of
the RSK did not entertain any thoughts of softening
their intransigent attitude towards Croatia. Džakula was
accused of trying to separate a part of the RSK and join
the area in question to Croatia. In the summer of 1994
the RSK was caught between a rock and a hard place
– between the Republika Srpska that was the RSK’s
biggest ally and Serbia which severed all ties with the
RSK on account of the RSK’s refusal to sign the Contact
Group’s peace plan for a negotiated settlement of the
war in Bosnia and Herzegovina.
Serbia, at that time, needed to show the world that
it was willing to support peace initiatives. As a result, the
rebel Serbs agreed to negotiate with Croatia about build-
ing economic ties and starting infrastructure and trans-
port cooperation. On December 2, 1994, the Economic
Agreement was signed. The Agreement regulated the
issue of the use of water, electricity, highways and the
pipeline. According to the Agreement’s provisions, the
Zagreb – Lipovac freeway was open for traffic on Decem-
ber 21, 1994. That was the sum of what the rebel Serbs
had agreed to but even that caused serious rifts among
them because many rebel Serbs were of the opinion that
the opening of the freeway was tantamount to capitulat-
ing to Croatia. The opening of the freeway had one un-
foreseen negative consequence: it facilitated smuggling
activities in western Slavonia. A number of illegal exits
from the freeway were opened which the rebel militia
was unable to monitor permanently. Fuel topped the list
of smuggled commodities. Rebel Serbs would actually
go to Croatia to buy fuel for the purpose of reselling it at
inflated prices in the occupied area.
In the fall of 1994 the USA launched a peace initiative
R
known as Plan Z-4. The American Ambassador Peter Gal-
braith was in charge of the peace initiative. According to
Plan Z-4 the rebel Serbs in Sector North and Sector South
would be granted an autonomous Serbian Krajina in the
areas with majority Serb populations according to the
census from 1991, meaning the kotars (districts) Glina
and Knin. That Serbian Krajina would have its own legis-
lature, president, currency, the right to collect taxes, the
right to conclude agreements regarding education, cul-
ture, media and tourism with “other political entities or
4.2.2020. 19:25:46
 Davor Marijan • Rat za opstojnost Hrvata, 1991. - 1995.
vama s pretežno srpskim pučanstvom“, pod uvjetom
da takvi sporazumi ne budu nespojivi s interesima Re-
publike Hrvatske. Ostali dio okupiranog teritorija bio
bi u prijelaznom razdoblju od najmanje pet godina
reintegriran u sastav Hrvatske. Predsjednik Tuđman je
30. siječnja 1995. primio nacrt plana i izjavio da će ga
hrvatska strana razmotriti iako ima ozbiljnih primjedbi
na njega, posebice jer problem definira kao spor dvije
ravnopravne strane, a ne problem dijela manjine u jed-
noj nacionalnoj državi.115
H
Unatoč nepovoljnom položaju, kojeg su dijelom
bili svjesni, krajinski su Srbi odbili Plan Z4, kojim je me-
đunarodna zajednica Srbima na dijelu okupiranoga
teritorija RH de facto nudila „državu u državi“. Na izvan-
rednoj sjednici Skupštine RSK održanoj 8. veljače 1995.
u Kninu, prihvaćeno je Martićevo stajalište da se taj
M
plan uopće ne razmatra. Prihvaćen je prijedlog Vlade
RSK da se prekinu i odgode pregovori s RH o gospo-
darskim i političkim pitanjima “dok Hrvatska ne povuče
svoj zahtjev za otkazivanje mandata mirovnih snaga
UN-a ili dok Savjet bezbjednosti ne donese odluku o
produženju mandata mirovnih snaga UN-a u zonama
D
pod zaštitom na teritoriju Republike Srpske Krajine”.116
Istodobno, 10. veljače 1995., obrativši se „starešinama“
SVK riječima da se „rat između RH i RSK mora završiti
pobedom jedne i porazom druge strane“, Martić je po-
tvrdio da ne prihvaća ponude Vlade RH i međunarodne
zajednice o mirnoj reintegraciji okupiranoga područja
C
u sastav Republike Hrvatske.117
Početkom 1995. bilo je očito da RSK proživljava
tešku političku i gospodarsku krizu. Potpisivanje Gos-
podarskoga sporazuma s Hrvatskom u Zagrebu 2.
prosinca 1994., bez obzira na različita tumačenja, bio
je znak slabosti. Omogućio je porast krijumčarenja, a
otvorio je vrata hrvatskoj promidžbi.118 Nakon vojnih
115 H. ŠARINIĆ, 209-210; N. BARIĆ, Srpska pobuna, 474-479;
D. MARIJAN, Oluja, 379-399.
116 POA: Skraćeni zapisnik sa prve vanredne sjednice Skup-
štine RSK održane 8. 2. 1995.
117 Republika Hrvatska i Domovinski rat 1990. - 1995., Doku-
menti, knjiga 15., Dokumenti vojne provenijencije „Re-
publike Srpske Krajine“ (siječanj - travanj 1995.), ur. Mate
Rupić – Ilija Vučur, HMDCDR, Zagreb, 2014., 156-160.
118 POA: Sekretarijat unutrašnjih poslova Okučani MUP
RSK, br. 08-05/1-1086/1-95 od 16. 3. 1995.; POA: Tele-
gram podrške Zapadno-slavonskog korpusa SVK od 4.
3. 1995.; POA: Uprava javne bezbednosti, Naređenje br.
08/1-1-3366/1-95 od 21. 4. 1995.
72
Domovinski rat 04-02-2020 Knjiga 1.indd 72
states with majority Serb populations”, on condition that
such agreement did not conflict with the interests of the
Republic of Croatia. The remainder of the occupied area
would be reintegrated, over a period of at least five years,
into the legal and constitutional order of the Republic of
Croatia. On January 30, 1995, President Tuđman received
a draft plan and stated that Croatia would duly consider
it, but he also emphasized his reservations about certain
aspects of the plan, foremost among them the fact that
the plan defined the problem as a dispute between two
equal parties, and not as a problem concerning a part of
an ethnic minority in a nation state.
Most of the rebel Serbs were aware that they could
no longer negotiate from a position of strength but they
nevertheless rejected Plan Z-4, even though the plan
would have given them, in a part of the occupied territo-
ry of Croatia, a “state within a state”. At the Extraordinary
Session of the Assembly of the RSK held on February 8,
1995, in Knin, Martić’s position that the plan should not
even be taken into consideration was accepted. Also ac-
cepted was the recommendation of the government of
the RSK that the negotiations with the Republic of Cro-
atia about economic and political issues be postponed
“until that time when Croatia withdraws its demand for
the cancellation of the mandate of the UN peacekeeping
force or until such time when the UN Security Council
decides to extend the mandate of the UN peacekeep-
ing force in the protected areas in the territory of the
Republic of Serbian Krajina”. Then, on February 10, 1995,
Martić announced to the “elders” of the Serbian Army of
Krajina (SVK) that “the war between the Republic of Cro-
atia and the RSK has to end in a clear victory of one side
over the other”. With that statement Martić confirmed
D
that he would never accept the Croatian government’s
offer relating to a peaceful reintegration of the occupied
territories into the legal and constitutional order of the
Republic of Croatia.
At the beginning of 1995 it became clear that the
R
RSK was in the grip of a devastating economic and po-
litical crisis. The signing of the Economic Agreement
with the Republic of Croatia in Zagreb on December 2,
1994, was, according to most commentators, a sign of
weakness. The agreement facilitated smuggling activi-
ties on the one hand and on the other it did wonders for
the ability of Croatia to promote itself. After the military
successes of the Croatian Army in the Dinara area at the
end of 1994 and beginning of 1995 the way was clear for
offensive moves against Kninska Krajina from the direc-
4.2.2020. 19:25:46
 The Croatian Nation’s Struggle for Survival, 1991-1995

Svečanost u povodu završetka procesa mirne

reintegracije Hrvatskog Podunavlja, Borovo
naselje u Vukovaru, 15. siječnja 1998. godine
(autor fotografije: Marko Perić).

Celebrating the completion of the process of

peaceful reintegration of the Croatian Dan-
ube region, Borovo Naselje, Vukovar, January
15, 1998 (Photograph by Marko Perić).
H
M
Vukovar, 8. lipnja 1997., vlakom mira i povrat-
ka Hrvatska se simbolično vratila u Vukovar
(autor fotografije: Božo Biškupić).
D
Pobjednik koji ne zna praštati, taj sije klice
novih razdora i budućih zala. A hrvatski narod
to ne želi. Nije želio ni sve ono što smo ovdje
pretrpjeli u Vukovaru i u čitavoj Hrvatskoj. Sve
ovo što činimo nije samo u uskom lokalnom in-
teresu, nego i u opće hrvatskom, opće europ-
skom, u interesu mira, budućnosti ovoga kraja
i Europe. I neka nam živi suživot hrvatskoga
C
naroda sa srpskim i drugim etničkim zajedni-
cama na ovim područjima! Neka nam živi jedi-
na i vječna Hrvatska! (iz govora predsjednika
Republike Hrvatske Franje Tuđmana u Vuko-
varu, 8. lipnja 1997.)

Vukovar, 8 June 1997: the „Peace and Return

D
Train” symbolically brought Croatia back to
Vukovar (photograph by Božo Biškupić).
The victor who does not know how to forgive
plants the seed of discord and future ills. And
the Croatian people do not want this. They
did not want what they had suffered here in
Vukovar and throughout Croatia. Everything
R
we are doing now is not focused on parochial
local interests but on the overall interests of
Croatia and Europe, in the interest of peace, of
the future of this region and of Europe. Long
live the coexistence between the Croatian and
Serbian peoples and other ethnic communities
in this region! Long live our only and eternal
Croatia! (From the address of the President
of the Republic of Croatia Franjo Tuđman in
Vukovar, 8 June 1997).

73

Domovinski rat 04-02-2020 Knjiga 1.indd 73 4.2.2020. 19:25:46

 Davor Marijan • Rat za opstojnost Hrvata, 1991. - 1995.
uspjeha Hrvatske vojske na području Dinare krajem
1994. i početkom 1995., područje Kninske krajine naš-
lo se ugroženo s Dinare i Livanjskoga polja, s teritorija
koji je do tada bio u sastavu Republike Srpske. Pritisnu-
ti istom opasnošću, krajinski i bosanskohercegovački
Srbi osnovali su 20. veljače 1995. zajednički Savjet na-
rodne obrane.119 U mjesecima koji su slijedili njegovo
djelovanje nije se vidjelo.
U svibnju 1995. Republika Srpska Krajina je „skraće-
na“ za okupirani dio u zapadnoj Slavoniji, što je bio te-
H
žak udarac za nju. Njezin predsjednik Milan Martić po-
žalio se nakon nekoliko dana predsjedniku Republike
Srbije Slobodanu Miloševiću da “tragedija koja je za-
desila srpski narod najnovijom agresijom Hrvatske na
zapadnu Slavoniju ima teške i nesagledive posljedice
po rješenje cjelokupnog srpskog pitanja. Ne samo da
M
je izgubljen teritorij i ne samo da je stradalo na sto-
tine civila, ono što u ovom času užasa nespokoj čini
još i većim je toliko prošireno uvjerenje kod naroda
da je srpsko pitanje izdano, i to od strane samih Srba.
Duž cijele Krajine širi se glas o njenoj predaji; ljudi sa
nevjericom konstatuju da nas je zaboravila i Srbija i
D
Republika Srpska. U mnogim selima i gradovima na-
rod se pakuje i sprema za iseljavanje”.120
Aktualni predsjednik Vlade RSK Borislav Mikelić
bio je izložen nizu napada jer je dio političkih snaga
u njemu vidio eksponenta Slobodana Miloševića koji
čini sve da Krajina “ostane u okviru granica nekadaš-
C
nje Socijalističke Republike Hrvatske”. Nakon Bljeska
njegov je položaj postao neodrživ jer se suzdržano
ponašanje Savezne Republike Jugoslavije smatralo iz-
dajom. Konačno, 29. svibnja 1995. Mikelić je smijenjen
jer se usprotivio ujedinjenju RSK i RS.121 Ujedinjenju se
usprotivilo i vodstvo pobunjenih Srba u istočnoj Sla-
voniji, Baranji i zapadnom Srijemu. Ono je osnovalo
Koordinacioni odbor pet općina, na čijem je čelu bio
Goran Hadžić.122 Na političku scenu vratio se Milan Ba-
119 Dragan RADIŠIĆ, Hronologija događaja na prostoru pret-
hodne Jugoslavije 1990–1995, Glas srpski – Centar za ge-
ostrateška istraživanja Univerziteta u Banjoj Luci, Banja
Luka, 2002., 539.
120 USMKSMP: Molba Predsjednika Republike RSK od 6. 4.
1995. Iz konteksta dokumenta razvidan je pogrešan nad-
nevak. Pismo identičnog sadržaja dostavljeno je i pred-
sjedniku Savezne Republike Jugoslavije Zoranu Liliću.
121 N. BARIĆ, Srpska pobuna, 480-483.
122 Isto, 484.
74
Domovinski rat 04-02-2020 Knjiga 1.indd 74
tion of Dinara and the direction of the Livno field, areas
that, before the Croatian offensive late in 1994 and ear-
ly in 1995, had been parts of the Republika Srpska. The
Krajina Serbs and Bosnian Serbs saw the writing on the
wall and reacted by founding the Joint Council for the
Protection of the People on February 20, 1995. However,
the Joint Council for the Protection of the People did not
do much as regards bolstering the Serbian statelet’s de-
fenses in the months that followed.
In May, 1995, the Republic of Serbian Krajina lost
western Slavonia. That was a tremendous blow for the
Serb statelet. Its president, Milan Martić lamented to the
Serbian President Milošević a few days after western Sla-
vonia had been liberated that:
“the tragedy that befell the Serbian people as a re-
sult of the newest attack from Croatia against western
Slavonia has terrible and long reaching consequences.
Coming up with an overarching solution to the Serbian
problem has now become that much harder. Not only
did we lose territory, not only were hundreds of civilians
killed, we also now have to contend with the fact that
ordinary people are horrified by what’s happened, they
are scared and they believe that we have betrayed the
Serb nation. There are rumors making rounds the length
and breadth of Krajina that everything is lost; people say
with incredulity that Serbia and the Republika Srpska
have abandoned us. In many towns and villages people
are preparing to flee.”
The Prime Minister, Borislav Mikelić, was the subject
of a lot of criticism because a number of political players
in the statelet perceived him as Milošević’s lackey, and
bent upon “keeping Krajina within the boundaries of
the former Socialist Republic of Croatia”. After Operation
D
Flash Mikulić’s position was untenable because many in
the RSK believed that the Federal Republic of Yugosla-
via’s attitude of aloofness towards the RSK was a sure
sign that Yugoslavia had betrayed them. Finally, on May
29, 1995, Mikelić was replaced because he was opposed
R
to the unification of the RSK with the Republika Srpska.
The leadership of the rebel Serbs in Eastern Slavonia, Ba-
ranja and Western Sirmium also rejected the option of
unifying the RSK and the RS and formed the Coordina-
tion Commission of the five municipalities. At the helm
of this body was Goran Hadžić. Milan Babić staged a po-
litical comeback. His government was accepted on July
27 in Topusko. The General Staff of the Serbian Army of
Krajina had predicted, sometime before, that “the new
government and the departure of corrupt officials from
4.2.2020. 19:25:47
 The Croatian Nation’s Struggle for Survival, 1991-1995
bić, čija je Vlada prihvaćena 27. srpnja u Topuskom.123
U GŠ-u SVK-a još su ranije predviđali “da će izbor nove
vlade i odlazak kompromitovanih ličnosti takođe do-
neti bar malo jedinstva i političke sloge”.124 Nova Vlada
nije imala priliku da pokaže svoje sposobnosti. U ope-
raciji Oluja zapadni dio RSK je već 8. kolovoza 1995. oti-
šao u povijest.
Malo više od tri i pol godine RSK je životarila kao
nerealizirani projekt protiv kojeg je radilo vrijeme. Unu-
tarnje podjele i odricanje Srbije pretvorili su RSK u sli-
H
jepu ulicu: nisu uspjeli stvoriti učinkovit državni sustav
i adekvatnu vojnu organizaciju i to je bio ključ njihova
vojnoga i političkoga sloma u kolovozu 1995. godine.
Nakon toga bilo je više takta i osjećaja za stvarnost, što
je, uz pritisak međunarodnih čimbenika, dovelo do toga
da hrvatske vlasti i srpsko vodstvo u istočnoj Slavoniji,
M
Baranji i zapadnom Srijemu 12. studenoga 1995. pot-
pišu Erdutski sporazum o mirnoj i postupnoj reintegra-
ciji toga područja u ustavnopravni poredak Republike
Hrvatske. Dogovorena je potpuna demilitarizacija pod-
ručja, za koje je uvedena Prijelazna uprava Ujedinjenih
naroda u istočnoj Slavoniji (United Nations Transitional
D
Administration in Eastern Slavonia – UNTAES). U sklopu
tog procesa teritorij je demilitariziran, a oružje i oprema
povučena u Srbiju. Reintegracija je s uspjehom okonča-
na 1997., a Hrvatska je u siječnju 1998. preuzela punu
upravu na tom području.125
C
D
123 Isto, 486.
124 HMDCDR: GŠSV RSK, Vanredni operativni izveštaj, str.
pov. br. 3-412 od 9. 7. 1995.
125 N. BARIĆ, Srpska pobuna, 529-530.
75
Domovinski rat 04-02-2020 Knjiga 1.indd 75
the political arena will bring at least some stability and
political unity.” The new government never had a chance
to display its abilities. Operation Storm consigned the
western part of the RSK to history on August 8, 1995.
For more than three and a half years the RSK existed
in a limbo, as an unfulfilled project, a statelet doomed
to fail. The internal political divisions within and Serbia’s
abandonment of the RSK sealed the statelet’s fate; the
rebel Serbs were not able to create a viable state sys-
tem and military organization. The inevitable military
and political collapse came in August, 1995. Operation
Storm was a reality check for the rebel Serbs. Coming to
terms with reality, combined with international pressure,
forced the leadership of the rebel Serbs in Eastern Slavo-
nia, Baranja and Western Sirmium to reach a deal with
the Republic of Croatia. On November 12, 1995, the Erdut
Agreement on the peaceful reintegration of that area into
the legal and constitutional order of the Republic of Cro-
atia was signed. The area, according to the Agreement,
would be completely demilitarized and for that purpose
the United Nations Transitional Administration in East-
ern Slavonia – UNTAES – was formed. The area was duly
demilitarized and the weapons and matériel belonging
to the rebel Serbs shipped to Serbia. The reintegration
process was successfully completed in 1997. In January,
1998, Croatia assumed full control of the territory.
R
4.2.2020. 19:25:47
 Davor Marijan • Rat za opstojnost Hrvata, 1991. - 1995.
BOSNA I HERCEGOVINA
Do 1990. BiH je bila čvrsta komunistička država,
bastion ideološkoga pravovjerja veći no što je to bila
Hrvatska do 1989. godine. Premda je ustavno bila
određena kao država triju ravnopravnih naroda, Mu-
slimana, Srba i Hrvata, stvarno je bila nešto potpuno
drugačije. Funkcionirala je po rezultatima Drugoga
svjetskog rata i udjelu angažmana pojedinih naroda
na pobjedničkoj strani. To je Srbima u startu dalo go-
H
tovo nenadoknadivu prednost, pa je Narodna odno-
sno Socijalistička Republika BiH većim dijelom posto-
janja bila republika s dominantnom ulogom Srba.126
Priznavanjem Muslimana kao naroda počeo je rast
njihova utjecaja, pa je pred rat njihov udio, posebice u
M
vrhu Republike, bio značajan. Sve vrijeme postojanja
narodne, odnosno socijalističke republike Hrvati su
bili trećerazredan narod.127
U nizu stranaka koje su tijekom 1990. osnovane u
BiH samo tri zaslužuju pozornost: Stranka demokrat-
ske akcije (SDA), Srpska demokratska stranka i Hrvat-
ska demokratska zajednica. Sve tri nastale su na po-
D
ticaj smjernica iz Hrvatske, a HDZ i SDS u početku su
funkcionirali kao stranačke podružnice. Hrvatska de-
mokratska zajednica to je ostala i poslije, što nije bio
slučaj sa SDS-om.128 Bošnjačku politiku tijekom rata
vodio je čelnik SDA Alija Izetbegović, a srpsku čelnik
C
SDS-a Radovan Karadžić. Za razliku od njih, na čelu
HDZ-a promijenilo se nekoliko osoba: Davor Perinović,
Stjepan Kljujić, Miljenko Brkić, Mate Boban i Dario Kor-
dić. Najutjecajniji i najdugovječniji bio je Boban, koji
je dvije godine bio i predsjednik Herceg-Bosne (HB).
Srpska demokratska stranka i HDZ zastupali su
službena srpska odnosno hrvatska stajališta. Srpska
demokratska stranka bila je za očuvanje Jugoslavi-
je, a HDZ za konfederaciju ili savez suverenih država.
Stranka demokratske akcije funkcionirala je po shva-
ćanju vjere baštinjene iz osmanske tradicije i željela je
126 Detaljna studija o nacionalnom postotku u političkim i
upravnim strukturama Socijalističke Republike Bosne i
Hercegovine kod: Mirsad D. ABAZOVIĆ, Kadrovski rat za
BiH, Savez logoraša BiH, Sarajevo, 1999.
127 Ivica LUČIĆ, Uzroci rata. Bosna i Hercegovina od 1980. do
1992. godine, Despot Infinitus – Hrvatski institut za po-
vijest, Zagreb, 2013., 15-24, 372-373.
128 Ksavije BUGAREL, Bosna: anatomija rata, Fabrika knjiga,
Beograd, 2004., 72; I. LUČIĆ, Uzroci rata, 284-285.
76
Domovinski rat 04-02-2020 Knjiga 1.indd 76
BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA
Bosnia and Herzegovina was, until 1990, a rigid Com-
munist republic a bastion of ideological orthodoxy to a
degree considerably higher than Croatia had been until
1989 when it jettisoned its Communist nature. Constitu-
tionally, Bosnia and Herzegovina was determined as a
country of three equal peoples, Muslims, Serbs and Cro-
ats. The reality on the ground, however, was somewhat
different. Bosnia and Herzegovina actually functioned
according to the results of WWII, meaning according to
the percentages of Bosnia and Herzegovina’s peoples
taking part in WWII on the side of Tito’s Communists. The
Serbs, therefore, enjoyed an unassailable initial lead. The
People’s, that is, Socialist Republic of Bosnia and Herze-
govina2, throughout the better part of its existence, was
a republic dominated by Serbs. The playing field was
evened out a bit when the Muslims were granted the
status of a constituent nation. Over time the Muslims’
political influence grew. Before the outbreak of the war
in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the number of Muslims in
the leadership of the republic was substantial. Through-
out the existence of the People’s, later Socialist Republic
of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Croats were politically
and otherwise marginalized.
A myriad of political parties were formed in Bosnia
and Herzegovina in 1990. Only three of them, however,
are worthy of mention: The Party of Democratic Action
(SDA), the Serbian Democratic Party (SDS) and the Croa-
tian Democratic Union (HDZ). All three parties came into
existence as a direct result of the events in neighboring
Croatia. The HDZ and the SDS initially functioned as lo-
cal party branches. The HDZ remained at that level for a
D
long time after it had been formed, but the SDS quickly
became a political force in its own right. The leader of the
Bosniak party, the SDA, during the war was Alija Izetbe-
gović and the leader of the Serbian party, the SDS, during
the same period, was Radovan Karadžić. By contrast, a
R
number of individuals served as president of the Croa-
tian party, the HDZ, during the war in Bosnia and Her-
zegovina: Davor Perinović, Stjepan Kljujić, Miljenko Brkić,
Mate Boban and Dario Kordić. The most influential, and
longest lasting as president, was Mate Boban. He also
served as President of Herzeg-Bosnia (HB) for two years.
2 Until 1963 the official name of the republic was People’s
Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina. In 1963 the adejc-
tive socialist replaced the adjective people’s.
4.2.2020. 19:25:47
 The Croatian Nation’s Struggle for Survival, 1991-1995
H
M
Naslovnica tjednika Danas, 13. studenoga 1990.: “Bosanski izbori
– ISPIT ZA JUGOSLAVIJU”.
Front page of the November 13, 1990 issue of the Danas weekly
magazine: Bosnian elections – TEST FOR YUGOSLAVIA.
D
postati strankom jugoslavenskih Muslimana. Bila je za
očuvanje Jugoslavije i u njoj Bosne i Hercegovine.129
Nakon krvavog raspada Jugoslavije SDA je podr-
C
žao ideju unitarne Bosne i Hercegovine, što je presud-
no utjecalo na kasniji muslimansko-hrvatski sukob.
Protiv unitarnoga koncepta bio je i dio Muslimana u
zapadnoj Bosni i na tom je protivljenju 27. rujna 1993.
nastala Autonomna pokrajina (AP) Zapadna Bosna.
D
Washingtonski i Daytonski sporazum načelno su dali
prevagu decentralizaciji na štetu unitarne koncepcije
BiH, no u praksi SDA to nastoji ignorirati.
Višestranački izbori održani su u studenome
1990. godine. Koalicija SDA-a, SDS-a i HDZ-a uvjerlji-
vo je pobijedila. Nacionalna je koalicija osvojila svih
sedam mjesta za članove Predsjedništva i 84 % man-
data u Skupštini SR BiH. Članovi SDA-a u Predsjedniš-
tvu bili su Alija Izetbegović, Fikret Abdić i Ejup Ganić,
SDS-a Radovan Karadžić i Biljana Plavšić, a HDZ-a Stje-
pan Kljujić i Franjo Boras. U novoj je vlasti HDZ imao
predsjednika Vlade (Jure Pelivan), ministra obrane,
129 Stranke, programi, ličnosti, Izbori ‘90, „Oslobođenje“, Sa-
rajevo, listopad 1990., 66-67, 74-76.
77
Domovinski rat 04-02-2020 Knjiga 1.indd 77
Unsurprisingly, the SDS and the HDZ represented
the Serbian and Croatian interests respectively. The SDS
was in favor of preserving Yugoslavia whilst the HDZ
supported the option of creating a confederative Yugo-
slavia or a confederation of sovereign states. The SDA’s
policies were, in large measure, determined by the Mus-
lim tradition inherited from the Ottoman Empire and the
party strove to become the political party of all Yugoslav
Muslims. The SDA was in favor of preserving Yugoslavia
and Bosnia and Herzegovina’s place in it.
After the violent break-up of Yugoslavia, the SDA
supported the option of a unitary Bosnia and Herzegov-
ina. The SDA’s insistence on that policy inexorably put
the Bosniaks on a collision course with the Croats. Most
of the Muslims in western Bosnia actually opposed the
idea of a unitary Bosnia and Herzegovina. As a result, on
September 29, 1993, the Autonomous Region of West-
ern Bosnia was created. The Washington and Dayton
Accords in principle supported the notion of decentral-
ization at the expense of the unitary concept in relation
to Bosnia and Herzegovina. However, the SDA was de-
termined to conveniently ignore both the spirit and the
letter of said accords.
Multiparty elections were held in November, 1990.
The coalition of the SDA, SDS, and HDZ won a landslide
victory. The national coalition won all seven seats in
the Presidency and 84% of the seats in the Assembly
of the Socialist Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina.
The SDA’s members in the Presidency were Alija Izetbe-
gović, Fikret Abdić and Ejup Ganić. The SDS members
were Radovan Karadžić and Biljana Plavšić and the HDZ
members were Stjepan Kljujić and Franjo Boras. In the
new government the HDZ had a prime minister (Jure
Pelivan), a defense minister, a minister of transport
and infrastructure, two ministers without portfolio and
three deputy ministers.
The coalition’s victory created a political situation
without precedent in the world. The three parties were
R
unified in their desire to come to power but were divid-
ed in their visions for the future of Bosnia and Herzegov-
ina. It was a recipe for disaster. The newly formed gov-
ernment was unstable due to the conflicting interests
of the ruling parties regarding the future of Yugoslavia
and their resultant and differing agendas concerning
the governance of Bosnia and Herzegovina. The war in
Croatia only exacerbated the already divisively toxic po-
litical situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina.
4.2.2020. 19:25:48
 Davor Marijan • Rat za opstojnost Hrvata, 1991. - 1995.
ministra prometa i veza, dva ministra bez lisnice i tri
zamjenika ministra.130
Njihovom je pobjedom stvorena politička scena
bez pandana u svijetu. Koliko su bili jedinstveni u že-
lji da preuzmu vlast, toliko su bili različiti u shvaćanju
budućnosti BiH. Novoizabrana vlast bila je nestabilna
zbog različitih pogleda stranaka na organizaciju i pre-
uređenje SFRJ, a u sklopu toga i na BiH. Rat u Hrvatskoj
povećao je postojeće podjele.
H
Bosna i Hercegovina tijekom srpskoga
rata protiv Hrvatske
Od sredine kolovoza 1991. teritorij BiH igrao je
važnu ulogu u napadu JNA na Hrvatsku. Plan napad-
ne operacije temeljio se na ratnom planu Sutjeska-2, a
M
predviđao je presijecanje Hrvatske na nekoliko smje-
rova, odvojeno uništavanje okruženih hrvatskih sna-
ga, a potom diktat Srbije oko njezina budućega izgle-
da.131 Nije teško zaključiti gdje bi bilo mjesto BiH u
takvoj državnoj tvorevini. Doprinos BiH srpskomu po-
hodu bio je teritorijalni i kadrovski. Peta vojna oblast
D
u Hrvatskoj, Banjalučki, Tuzlanski, Kninski, Sarajevski,
Užički i dio Titogradskoga korpusa logistički su po-
državani preko bosanskohercegovačkih prometnica,
a znatan dio pričuvnika JNA i Teritorijalne obrane SR
BiH sudjelovao je u borbenim djelovanjima. Najveći
postotak angažiranog ljudstva bio je iz Bosanske kra-
C
jine i istočne Hercegovine. Korištenje BiH u ratu protiv
Hrvatske SDS je javno podržao u ljeto 1991. godine.
Bosanskohercegovački Hrvati bili su protiv rata, a dio
dragovoljaca sudjelovao je u ratu u nekim od hrvat-
skih oružanih formacija. U napadima na Hrvatsku
stradala su i bosanskohercegovačka mjesta naseljena
Hrvatima, Uništa na Dinari u kolovozu i kompleks sela
Ravno u Popovu polju u listopadu 1991. godine.132 U
dijelu hrvatskih općina poduzete su mjere obrane, di-
jelom kroz razoružani TO, a dijelom kroz pričuvni sa-
130 I. LUČIĆ, Uzroci rata, 286-287, 297.
131 Veljko KADIJEVIĆ, Moje viđenje raspada, Politika, Beo-
grad, 1993., 135-136.
132 Davor MARIJAN, “Expert opinion: On the War Connec-
tions of Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina (1991–
1995)”, Časopis za suvremenu povijest, 1/36, Zagreb,
2004., 252-255.
78
Domovinski rat 04-02-2020 Knjiga 1.indd 78
Bosnia and Herzegovina during Serbia’s
War against Croatia
From mid-August, 1991, Bosnian-Herzegovinian
territory played an important role in the JNA’s attack
on Croatia. The plan of the JNA’s offensive against Cro-
atia was based on the plan Sutjeska 2, which was de-
veloped in the 1970s for the purpose of determining
what the JNA’s response should be in case of an attack
of a foreign power coming from the east. According to
the plan, the JNA would rapidly move into Croatia on
a number of axes of advance, dislocate and encircle
the Croatian forces in isolated pockets of resistance
and then annihilate them. Then, Croatia would be
forced to accede to whatever Serbia cared to demand.
It is not hard to guess what the role of Bosnia and Her-
zegovina would have been had the JNA’s offensive
against Croatia succeeded. The contribution of Bos-
nia and Herzegovina to the JNA’s attack on Croatia
was considerable; the JNA used Bosnian territory as a
launch pad for its attack on Croatia. The Fifth Military
District in Croatia and Banja Luka Corps, Tuzla Corps,
Knin Corps, Sarajevo Corps, Užice Corps and elements
of Titograd Corps were logistically supported by using
Bosnia and Herzegovina’s road network. A significant
number of JNA reservists from Bosnia and Herzegovi-
na and members of the Bosnian-Herzegovinian Terri-
torial Defense were deployed in combat roles against
the Republic of Croatia. The vast majority of those
soldiers hailed from the Bosanska Krajina and east-
ern Herzegovina. In the summer of 1991, the SDS ex-
pressed public support for Bosnia and Herzegovina’s
assistance to the JNA in the war against Croatia. The
D
Bosnian Croats were against the war and some par-
ticipated, as volunteers, in the war in Croatia as mem-
bers of the Croatian Army. The JNA, during the course
of its aggression against Croatia, destroyed two Croa-
tian villages in Bosnia and Herzegovina; Uništa on Di-
nara in August, 1991, and Ravno on the Popovo field
R
in October, 1991. In some areas of the Croatian munic-
ipalities in Bosnia and Herzegovina people took de-
fensive measures with the help of either the disarmed
Territorial Defense or the auxiliary police or both.
These TO and the auxiliary police troops would later
form the core of the Croatian Defense Council (HVO).
The checkpoints and areas under their control would
later become the separation line between the Serbs
and Croats, that is, the first line of defense.
4.2.2020. 19:25:48
 The Croatian Nation’s Struggle for Survival, 1991-1995
stav milicije.133 Iz njih će poslije nastati Hrvatsko vijeće
obrane (HVO), a nadzorni punktovi i ophodna područ-
ja postat će crta hrvatsko-srpskoga razdvajanja, odno-
sno crta obrane.
Bosna i Hercegovina bila je tijekom rata protiv Hr-
vatske pošteđena iz nekoliko razloga. Najvažniji je bio
činjenica da su u BiH 1990. na vlast došle tri stranke
od kojih su dvije (SDS i SDA), svaka na svoj način, bile
za Jugoslaviju. Rješavanjem Hrvatske Beograd bi, kao
središte iz kojeg su se vukli konci rata i mira, riješio i
H
BiH bez trošenja ljudskih i materijalnih snaga i resursa.
Zbog toga je BiH od kraja 1990. do 3. siječnja 1992. u
ulozi statista, značajnog, ali ipak statista, u velikoj igri
koju je u ime Velike Srbije trebala provesti JNA.
Stranka demokratske akcije i znatan dio Bošnjaka
nisu se željeli miješati u rat u Hrvatskoj, što utjelovljuje
M
poznata dvosmislena izjava stranačkoga čelnika, ali i
predsjednika Predsjedništva SR BiH, Alije Izetbegovi-
ća, od 6. listopada 1991., da “to nije naš rat”.134 Izjava
se može tumačiti kao gledište na rat koji se doživlja-
va kao sukob susjednih republika, ali i sukob Hrvata
i Srba. Izetbegović je izjavu dao u vrijeme u kojem je
D
BiH polazište za napade na Hrvatsku, a dio njezinih
pričuvnika angažiran je u redovima JNA Hrvatske, kao
i nekoliko postrojba TO SR BiH.135 Izetbegović je nastu-
pio kao predsjednik i predstavnik nacionalne stranke,
a ne kao republički dužnosnik, a neutralnost koju je
njegova stranka pokušavala zauzeti nije bila mogu-
C
ća. Treba napomenuti da je SDA 1991. mogao učiniti
malo, a učinio je još manje. Te se godine on nije borio
za BiH, nije branio BiH – kupovao je vrijeme i dobio
nekoliko mjeseci koje, očito, nije iskoristio.
U drugoj polovini 1991. BiH je prolazila kroz nedo-
D
umicu ostanka u krnjoj Jugoslaviji ili stvaranja samo-
stalne države. Na ostanak BiH u krnjoj Jugoslaviji bo-
sanskohercegovački Srbi pokušali su utjecati zajedno
s pobunjenim Srbima iz Hrvatske raznovrsnim politič-
kim pritiscima. U Bosanskom Grahovu 27. lipnja 1991.
skupštine Zajednice općina Bosanske krajine i SAO Kra-
jine donijele su Deklaraciju o ujedinjenju dviju Krajina
u jedinstvenu političko-teritorijalnu cjelinu. I sadržaj
spomenute Deklaracije pokazuje da je krajnji cilj ob-
133 U ljeto 1991. osobno sam proveo kraće vrijeme u jednoj
takvoj postrojbi u Livnu.
134 Alija IZETBEGOVIĆ, Sjećanja: autobiografski zapis, Šahin-
pašić, Sarajevo, 2001., 95.
135 D. MARIJAN, “Expert opinion”, 253-254.
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Domovinski rat 04-02-2020 Knjiga 1.indd 79
The JNA and Serbia spared Bosnia and Herzegov-
ina the horrors of war during their aggression against
Croatia for a number of reasons. The most important
reason was the fact that in 1990 a coalition comprising
three parties came to power, two of which (SAS and
SDA) were in favor, each for its own reasons, of preserv-
ing Yugoslavia. By defeating Croatia, so the reasoning
went in Belgrade, Serbia would automatically solve the
Bosnian problem as well, without investing time, effort
and resources into the endeavor. Mainly for that reason
Bosnia and Herzegovina, from the end of 1990 until
January 3, 1992, was assigned by Serbia a supporting,
albeit important, role in the great game played by the
JNA in the name of Greater Serbia.
The SDA and a significant number of Bosniaks did
not want to be involved in the war in Croatia. On Octo-
ber 6, Alija Izetbegović, in his dual role as the leader of
the SDA and the President of the Presidency of Bosnia
and Herzegovina stated that the war in Croatia “is not
our war”. The inherent ambiguity of his statement was
deliberate. Some people interpreted it as Izetbegović’s
perception of the war in Croatia as a war between two
neighboring republics, but some people saw a touch of
Machiavelli in the statement – Izetbegović just might
have meant a conflict between the Serbs and Croats.
It is significant to observe that Izetbegović chose to
play with cryptic and potentially toxic remarks during
the period when the JNA was using Bosnia and Herze-
govina as a launchpad for its attacks on Croatia. Also
worth repeating, this time solely in the context of Izet-
begović’s statement, is the fact that a fair few Bosniaks,
JNA reservists or members of the Territorial Defense of
Bosnia and Herzegovina served in combat roles in the
JNA in the war in Croatia during that time. Izetbegov-
ić simply decided to act as the President and principal
representative of a national party and not as an offi-
cial of Bosnia and Herzegovina. His actions actually re-
vealed that the SDA’s position of neutrality was a sham.
R
It has to be mentioned that the SDA couldn’t do much,
one way or another, in 1991. Another important point
worth stressing in this particular regard is that the
SDA chose to do nothing in 1991. The SDA could have
fought for the interests of Bosnia and Herzegovina –
it did not. It could have taken steps to defend Bosnia
and Herzegovina – it did not. Instead, the SDA tried to
buy time. That effort was moderately successful – the
strategy secured a few extra months of peace in Bosnia
and Herzegovina. The problem was that the SDA did
4.2.2020. 19:25:48
 Davor Marijan • Rat za opstojnost Hrvata, 1991. - 1995.
novljene velikosrpske politike i srpske pobune u Hrvat-
skoj – izražen načelom “da svi Srbi žive u jednoj državi”
– bilo “stvaranje jedinstvene države u kojoj će živjeti svi
Srbi na Balkanu”.136 Sljedeći korak Srbi u BiH učinili su
16. rujna, kada su poslanici Skupštine Zajednice općina
Bosanske krajine u Banjoj Luci proglasili autonomnu
regiju Bosansku krajinu, koju su vezali za federativnu
Jugoslaviju i federalnu Bosnu i Hercegovinu.137
Na srpsko su izazivanje Muslimani i Hrvati odgo-
vorili 15. listopada u Skupštini SR BiH usvajanjem Plat-
H
forme o položaju BiH kao suverene i nedjeljive države
i prihvaćanjem buduće jugoslavenske zajednice čiji
će sastavni dijelovi biti i Republika Hrvatska i Srbija.138
Srpska demokratska stranka odbacila je Platformu i
odmah nakon toga, 24. listopada, osnovala Skupštinu
srpskog naroda u Bosni i Hercegovini.139 Slijedio je srp-
M
ski referendum u Bosni i Hercegovini 9. i 10. studeno-
ga, na kojem je prihvaćeno opredjeljenje za ostanak u
Jugoslaviji. Na temelju rezultata referenduma verifici-
rane su i 21. studenoga proglašene srpske autonomne
oblasti u Bosni i Hercegovini.140 Sljedeći je korak bila
Odluka o ustroju Srpske Republike Bosne i Hercegovi-
D
ne 21. prosinca, koja je oživotvorena 9. siječnja 1992.
godine.141 Time je dovršeno uvezivanje teritorija s ve-
ćinskim srpskim stanovništvom – ostalo je samo još
fizičko odvajanje teritorija, a za to je bio nužan rat. Pre-
imenovanje u Republiku Srpsku (RS) u kolovozu 1992.
bila je tek formalnost.142
C
136 HMDCDR: Zapisnik 1. zajedničke sjednice Skupš-
tine SAO Krajine i Zajednice općina Bosanska Krajina
održane 27. 6. 1991. u Bosanskom Grahovu.
137 ICTY: Odluka o proglašenju Autonomne oblasti Krajina
kao neodvojivom dijelu savezne države Federativne
Jugoslavije i kao integralnom dijelu federalne jedinice
BiH od 16. 9. 1991.; D. RADIŠIĆ, Hronologija događaja na
prostoru prethodne Jugoslavije 1990–1995, 133-134.
138 Miroslav TUĐMAN, Istina o Bosni i Hercegovini: dokumen-
ti 1991. - 1995., Slovo M, Zagreb, 2005., 72-74: Platforma o
položaju BiH u budućem ustrojstvu jugoslavenske zajednice.
139 ICTY: Odluka o osnivanju Skupštine srpskog naroda u
Bosni i Hercegovini od 24. 10. 1991.
140 ICTY: Odluka o verifikaciji proglašenih Srpskih au-
tonomnih oblasti u Bosni i Hercegovini od 21. 11. 1991.
141 ICTY: Odluka Skupštine srpskog naroda od 21. 12.
1991. da se pristupi formiranju Republike Srpske Bosne
i Hercegovine.
142 Odluka o proglašenju amandmana VII i VIII na Ustav
Srpske Republike Bosne i Hercegovine, Službeni glasnik
Republike Srpske, br. 13, 29. 9. 1992.
80
Domovinski rat 04-02-2020 Knjiga 1.indd 80
nothing with those few months of grace period once
it had secured it.
In the second half of 1991 Bosnia and Herzegovina
was torn between two options – to stay in a rump Yu-
goslavia or vie for independence. The Bosnian Serbs, in
collusion with the rebel Serbs from Croatia, applied a
lot of political pressure in support of the former option.
In Bosansko Grahovo on June 27, 1991, the Assembly
of the Association of Bosanska Krajina Municipalities
and the Serbian Autonomous District of Krajina passed
the declaration on the unification of the two Krajinas.
The text of the declaration clearly shows that the ulti-
mate goal of the resurrected policies of Greater Serbia
and the rebellion in Croatia – as exemplified by the no-
tion that “all Serbs should live in one state” – was the
“creation of one state in which all Balkan Serbs will live”.
The Bosnian Serbs made their next move in Banja Luka
on September 16, when representatives of the Assem-
bly of the Association of Bosanska Krajina Municipali-
ties proclaimed the Autonomous Region of Bosanska
Krajina. The representatives saw their new statelet as
politically tied to the Federal Yugoslavia and Federal
Bosnia and Herzegovina.
The Muslims and Croats responded to these Ser-
bian provocations on October 15 in the Assembly of
the Socialist Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina by
adopting the Platform on the position of Bosnia and
Herzegovina as a sovereign and indivisible state and
by accepting a future Yugoslav union whose integral
parts will be both the Republic of Croatia and Serbia.
The SDS rejected the Platform and immediately after,
on October 24, founded the Assembly of the Serbian
nation in Bosnia and Herzegovina. On November 9-10
D
the Serbs organized their own referendum in Bos-
nia and Herzegovina and opted to stay in Yugoslavia.
Based on the referendum’s results the Serbian autono-
mous regions in Bosnia and Herzegovina were verified
of November 21. The next step was the Decision on the
R
Establishment of the Serbian Republic of Bosnia and
Herzegovina reached on December 21. The Decision
was put into effect on January 9, 1992. With that, the
areas with majority Serb populations were bound to-
gether in a political whole – the only remaining thing
to do was to physically conquer those areas, and that
could only be achieved through war. Renaming the
statelet the Republika Srpska (RS) in August, 1992, was
but a formality.
4.2.2020. 19:25:48
 The Croatian Nation’s Struggle for Survival, 1991-1995
Hrvatska zajednica / Hrvatska
Republika Herceg-Bosna
Premda se ustalilo i Hrvate optuživati za istovje-
tan secesionistički postupak poput Srba, to nije bilo
isto. Kriza s kojom se središnja vlast u BiH nije uspi-
jevala nositi vodila je prema političko-obrambenom
organiziranju bosanskohercegovačkih Hrvata.143 U
sklopu tih priprema počelo je organiziranje triju re-
gionalnih zajednica HDZ-a na temelju zaključaka Sa-
H
vjeta sigurnosti HDZ-a od 18. rujna 1991. godine.144
U Derventi je 12. studenoga osnovana Hrvatska za-
jednica (HZ) Bosanska Posavina, a od druge dvije,
Travničke i Hercegovačke, 18. studenoga u Grudama
u zapadnoj Hercegovini proglašena je Hrvatska za-
jednica Herceg-Bosna (HZ HB). U Hrvatskoj je toga
M
dana JNA zauzela središte Vukovara, nakon što je ra-
zorila cijeli grad i počinila zločine, kao i u Škabrnji u
zaleđu Zadra, a dva dana prije zauzela je Slunj, gradić
s većinskim hrvatskim stanovništvom na Kordunu.
HZ Herceg-Bosna nastala je na podlozi točne procje-
ne da BiH ne može preživjeti rat i raspad Jugoslavije.
D
Osnovana je jer središnja vlast Bosne i Hercegovine
u Sarajevu nije funkcionirala, nije reagirala na strada-
nje Hrvata u dijelu Republike (zauzimanje i razaranje
hrvatskog sela Uništa u općini Bosansko Grahovo u
kolovozu 1991., kao i sela Ravno i njegovih zaselaka
C
u Popovu polju u listopadu 1991.), na korištenje teri-
torija BiH za rat protiv Hrvatske i zbog nepoduzima-
nja bilo čega vidljivog oko priprema za budući rat.
U “Odluci o uspostavi Hrvatske zajednice Herceg-Bo-
sna” rečeno je da će Zajednica “štovati demokratski
izabranu vlast Republike Bosne i Hercegovine dok
D
postoji državna nezavisnost Bosne i Hercegovine u
odnosu na bivšu ili svaku drugu Jugoslaviju”.145 To je
govorilo o njezinu privremenom karakteru. Do trav-
nja 1992. nema pokazatelja da je Hrvatska zajednica
Herceg-Bosna bila išta više od slova na papiru. To pak
upućuje na to da se – iako je postojala stvarna po-
treba za njezinim osnivanjem – u prvom redu držalo
143 ICTY: Izvod iz zapisnika Predsjedništva HDZ BiH br.
337/91 od 31. 7. 1991.
144 ICTY: Zaključci Savjeta sigurnosti HDZ BiH br. 431/91 od
18. 9. 1991.
145 Odluka o uspostavi Hrvatske zajednice Herceg-Bosna
od 18. 11. 1991., Narodni list HZ Herceg-Bosna, br. 1, ru-
jan 1992., 2-3.
81
Domovinski rat 04-02-2020 Knjiga 1.indd 81
The Croatian Community/ Croatian
Republic of Herzeg-Bosnia
According to popular opinion, the Bosnian Croats’
moves towards seceding from Bosnia and Herzegovina
were just as unscrupulous and venal as those made by
the Bosnian Serbs. The truth is different. The govern-
ment of Bosnia and Herzegovina, as we have seen, was
not capable of dealing with the crisis and the situation
was inexorably forcing the Bosnian Croats to political-
ly organize themselves and undertake defensive mea-
sures. These measures included organizing the three
regional communities of the HDZ according to the con-
clusions reached by the Security Council of the HDZ
on September 18, 1991. On November 12 the Croatian
Community of (HZ) Bosanska Posavina was founded
in Derventa. The other two communities, the Travnik
Community and the Herzegovina Community, were
organized, on November 18 in Grude in western Herze-
govina, into the Croatian Community of Herzeg-Bosnia
(HZ HB). On the same day in Croatia the JNA captured
the city center of Vukovar, having previously completely
destroyed the city and committed numerous war crimes
and crimes against humanity. The JNA had also commit-
ted war crimes in Škabrnja, in Zadar’s hinterland. Two
days before the Croatian Community of Herzeg-Bosnia
was proclaimed, the JNA had captured Slunj, a town
with a majority Croatian population in the Kordun re-
gion. The Croatian Community of Herzeg-Bosnia was
created on the basis of the correct assumption that Bos-
nia and Herzegovina would not survive the break-up
of Yugoslavia and the war. The Croatian Community of
Herzeg-Bosnia was founded because of the ineptitude
of the central government in Sarajevo – the central gov-
ernment had done nothing to prevent or react to the
crimes the JNA had committed against Croats in Bosnia
and Herzegovina (capturing and destroying the Croa-
tian villages of Ravno, Uništa…), it had allowed the JNA
R
to use Bosnian-Herzegovinian territory for its aggression
against Croatia and it had done nothing to prepare for
the inevitable war. In the “Decision on the Establishment
of the Croatian Community of Herzeg-Bosnia” it is stat-
ed that the Community “will respect the democratically
elected government of Bosnia and Herzegovina as long
as Bosnia and Herzegovina remains independent in re-
lation to the former or any future Yugoslavia”. This clearly
shows that the HZ HB was a temporary expedient. Until
4.2.2020. 19:25:48
 Davor Marijan • Rat za opstojnost Hrvata, 1991. - 1995.
nužnim odgovoriti na srpsko stvaranje teritorijalne
jedinice, premda, što se vidjelo, nije bilo kritične po-
litičke i administrativne snage za njezino učinkovito
djelovanje. Stvarno življenje Herceg-Bosne počelo je
u travnju 1992., eskalacijom rata u BiH. U svibnju, a
posebice od srpnja, Zajednica se pokušavala uprav-
no organizirati. Temeljno upravno tijelo bio je HVO,
na čijem je čelu u početku bio predsjednik HZ HB-
a, a od srpnja 1992. predsjednik HVO-a. Upravne su
poslove obavljali upravni odjeli obrane, unutarnjih
H
poslova, gospodarstva, pravosuđa i uprave, financi-
ja i društvenih djelatnosti.146 To je zapravo bila vlada
(HVO) i ministarstva (upravni odjeli).
Kao Zajednica je Herceg-Bosna postojala do 28.
kolovoza 1993., kada je u Grudama novoorganizi-
rani Zastupnički dom proglasio Temeljnu odluku
M
o uspostavi i proglašenju Hrvatske Republike Her-
ceg-Bosne (HR HB), koja je bila u skladu s među-
narodnim, tzv. Owen-Stoltenbergovom mirovnim
planom o uniji republika u BiH (predstavljen 20.
kolovoza 1993.). U uvodnom je dijelu utvrđeno da
postojeći “oblik političkog i državnog ustroja ne osi-
D
gurava hrvatskom narodu njegova prava u Bosni i
Hercegovini i na Bosnu i Hercegovinu” te da hrvatski
narod mijenja svoj položaj
“tako što na dijelu teritorija Bosne i Hercegovine
uspostavlja svoju državnu zajednicu, te prenosi dio
konstitutivnih prava na budući savez republika i pri-
C
staje na sudjelovanje u pojedinim zajedničkim insti-
tucijama i službama od zajedničkog interesa u Bosni
i Hercegovini kako se to uredi tripartitnim ustavnim
sporazumom konstitutivnih naroda”.147
U odnosu na HZ HB, jasno je definirana podjela
ovlasti. Pravna je vlast dodijeljena Zastupničkomu
domu, izvršna vlast Vladi HR HB-a, a pravosudna
vlast neovisnim sudovima. Glavnim gradom Re-
publike proglašen je Mostar. Do donošenja ustava
HR HB-a određeno je da ostaju na snazi propisi HZ
HB-a i propisi dotadašnje Republike BiH koji nisu u
146 Statutarna odluka Predsjedništva HZ HB od 15. 5. 1992.
o privremenom ustrojstvu izvršne vlasti i uprave na po-
dručju HZ HB; Statutarna odluka Predsjedništva HZ HB
od 3. 7. 1992. o privremenom ustrojstvu izvršne vlasti i
uprave na području HZ HB, Narodni list HZ Herceg-Bos-
na, br. 1, rujan 1992.
147 Temeljna odluka o uspostavi i proglašenju Hrvatske
Republike Herceg-Bosne od 28. 8. 1993., Narodni list HZ
Herceg-Bosna, br. 1, 11. 10. 1993.
82
Domovinski rat 04-02-2020 Knjiga 1.indd 82
April, 1992, the Croatian Community of Herzeg-Bosnia
existed only on paper. That fact clearly shows that the
Croatian Community of Herzeg-Bosnia was founded as
a reaction to the Serbs’ creation of their territorial unit.
The Croatian Community of Herzeg-Bosnia was not or-
ganized administratively or in any other regard, it only
became reality on the ground in April, 1992, with the
escalation of the conflict in Bosnia and Herzegovina. In
May, and especially after July, moves were made to ad-
ministratively organize the Croatian Community of Her-
zeg-Bosnia. The HVO was the supreme executive and
administrative body. Initially at the helm of the HVO was
the President of the HZ HB, and from July, 1992, at the
helm of the HVO was the President of the HVO. Adminis-
trative tasks regarding defense, internal affairs, trade, ju-
diciary, finances and social services were performed by
administrative departments. The HVO was the govern-
ment and the administrative departments functioned as
ministries.
The Croatian Community of Herzeg-Bosnia func-
tioned as a community until August 28, 1993, when the
newly formed Chamber of Representatives declared
the Fundamental Decision on the Establishment and
Proclamation of the Croatian Republic of Herzeg-Bosnia
(HRHB), which was in accordance with the internation-
al, that is, the Owen-Stoltenberg peace plan for a union
of three republics in Bosnia and Herzegovina (present-
ed on August 20, 1993). In the introductory chapter it
was concluded that the existing “model of political and
governmental system does not secure the rights of the
Croatian people in Bosnia and Herzegovina and the
right of the Croatian people in Bosnia and Herzegovina
to Bosnia and Herzegovina” and that the Croatian peo-
D
ple therefore change their status “by founding, in part
of the territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina its state and
transferring a part of its constitutional rights to a future
federation of republics and agreeing to participating in
certain joint institutions and services of common inter-
R
est in Bosnia and Herzegovina as per a tripartite consti-
tutional agreement of the constituent peoples”.
In relation to the Croatian Community of Her-
zeg-Bosnia, the separation of powers was clearly
defined. The legislative power was allocated to the
Chamber of Representatives. The executive power was
allocated to the government of the HR HB and the ju-
dicial power was in the domain of independent courts.
Mostar was the capital city of the republic. Pending the
adoption of the constitution of the HR HB the regula-
4.2.2020. 19:25:48
 The Croatian Nation’s Struggle for Survival, 1991-1995
suprotnosti s propisima HR HB-a. Postojeće su vlasti
nastavile obnašanje svojih dužnosti do novih izbora,
a predsjednik HZ HB-a ostao je predsjednik HR HB-
a.148 Herceg-Bosnu obilježilo je nekoliko političara, u
prvom redu Mate Boban, koji je 1992. združio stra-
načku i političku funkciju, a povukao se početkom
1994. na zahtjev iz Zagreba. Jadranko Prlić bio je
čelnik izvršne vlasti od 1992. do 1995. godine. U za-
vršnici rata istaknuto je mjesto imao Krešimir Zubak,
predsjednik Predsjedničkoga vijeća HR HB-a.
H
Bosna i Hercegovina – bošnjački dio
Stvaranjem Republike Srpske, a poslije i Hrvatske
zajednice Herceg-Bosne, preostali dio BiH postao je
teritorij pod nadzorom i organizacijom musliman-
M
ske, odnosno bošnjačke vlasti kao Republika Bosna
i Hercegovina (RBiH), jer je 8. travnja 1992. izbrisana
odrednica “Socijalistička”.149
Bošnjački je politički vrh po svaku cijenu nasto-
jao, i uz pomoć međunarodnih krugova uspio, održa-
ti status jedine “legalne” strane u ratu. Na taj se način
D
organizirala vlast i stvarao privid. Taj se privid stvar-
no održao do kraja rujna 1993., kada je uoči sjednice
Skupštine BiH Izetbegović na Svebošnjačkom sabo-
ru razmotrio Owen-Stoltenbergov plan, dajući pred-
nost etničkoj nad republičkom komponentom.150
Izetbegović je nezakonito zadržao i mjesto čelnika
C
Predsjedništva tijekom rata. Ispražnjena mjesta čla-
nova Predsjedništva iz redova Srba i Hrvata popunje-
na su u listopadu 1993. godine. No i toj su četvorki
bili neprihvatljivi Amandmani na Ustav RBiH po ko-
jima je predsjednika Predsjedništva BiH u ratu birala
D
Skupština, jer je to značilo da je to neupitna bošnjač-
ka funkcija.151 Privid Bošnjaka kao jedinih legitimista
srušio se prihvaćanjem sporazuma u Daytonu.
148 Isto.
149 I. LUČIĆ, Uzroci rata, 369.
150 Sead TURČALO, Političko-ustavna rješenja za Bosnu i
Hercegovinu. Od Lisabona do Daytona – Geopolitičke
naracije o mirovnim sporazumima za Bosnu i Hercegov-
inu 1992–1996, Open society foundations: Mediacentar,
Sarajevo, (bez godine izdanja), 23.
151 K. BUGAREL, Bosna: anatomija rata, 66-67.
83
Domovinski rat 04-02-2020 Knjiga 1.indd 83
tions of the HZ HB remained in force and also those
regulations of the former Republic of Bosnia and Herze-
govina that were not in contradiction to the regulations
of the HR HB. The existing authorities continued doing
their duties pending the new elections and the Presi-
dent of the HZ HB remained the President of the HR HB.
A number of politicians left their mark on Herzeg-Bos-
nia. First and foremost among them was Mate Boban.
In 1992, he combined his party and political function.
He left office at the beginning of 1994, at the request of
the Croatian government. Jadranko Prlić was the head
of the executive branch of government from 1992 until
1995. Towards the end of the war Krešimir Zubak came
to prominence. He was the President of the Presidential
Council of the HR HB.
Bosnia and Herzegovina – The Bosniaks/
Muslims
After the creation of the Republika Srpska and the
Croatian Community of Herzeg-Bosnia, the remaining
parts of Bosnia and Herzegovina were under the con-
trol of the Muslim, that is, Bosniak authorities. The name
of the Muslim part of Bosnia and Herzegovina was the
Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina – on April 8, 1992,
the term “socialist” was dropped from the official name
of the republic.
The Bosniak leadership tried very hard to retain
the status of the only “legal” side in the war in Bosnia
and Herzegovina. Thanks in very large measure to the
international community, the effort was successful. The
Bosniak leadership based all of their moves on that le-
gality and claimed to work in the interest of Bosnia and
Herzegovina as a whole. The claim was a ruse which was
finally exposed at the end of September, 1993, when
Izetbegović, just prior to the session of the Assembly
of Bosnia and Herzegovina, analyzed the Owen-Stol-
tenberg plan in the Bosniak Assembly and clearly sided
R
with the ethnic rather than republic component. Izet-
begović also kept, illegally, the post of the President of
the Presidency for the duration of the war. The vacant
posts in the Presidency previously occupied by Serbs
and Croats were filled with Muslims and those Serbs and
Croats who subscribed to the Muslims’ agenda in Octo-
ber, 1993. The newly composed presidency also found
the Amendments to the Constitution of the Republic of
Bosnia and Herzegovina according to which President
would be appointed by the Assembly unacceptable be-
4.2.2020. 19:25:48
 Davor Marijan • Rat za opstojnost Hrvata, 1991. - 1995.
Međunarodni aspekt rata u BiH
Zbog rata u Hrvatskoj budućnost BiH postala je
međunarodni problem. Uvjet za međunarodno prizna-
nje bio je referendum na kojem je glasačima postavlje-
no jednostavno pitanje: jesu li za suverenu i neovisnu
Bosnu i Hercegovinu. Referendum je održan 29. veljače
i 1. ožujka 1992. i na njega je izišlo 64,31 % upisanih
birača, od kojih je potvrdno glasalo 99,44 %. Muslimani
i Hrvati glasali su za, a Srbi su bili protiv. Srbi su pre-
H
glasani zahvaljujući Hrvatima, koji su se na to odlučili
na poticaj iz Zagreba i zbog Izetbegovićeva obećanja
da će dobiti neku autonomiju. Rezultat referenduma
je zemljama članicama EZ-a bio temelj da 6. travnja
1992. priznaju BiH neovisnom i suverenom državom u
postojećim granicama.152 Odluka nije zaustavila, nego
M
je razbuktala rat, koji je postupno tinjao od listopada
1991. godine.
Rasprave i pregovori o teritorijalnom uređenju
BiH počeli su u veljači 1992. u Lisabonu. Portugalski
diplomat José Cutileiro predstavio je prijedlog da BiH
ostane u okviru svojih granica, a da se njezino buduće
D
ustrojstvo zasnuje na nekoliko entiteta (konstitutivnih
jedinica), što je očito bila najava da će se legalizirati
Srpska Republika BiH i Hrvatska zajednica Herceg-Bo-
sna. Cutileirov je plan propao jer ga je krajem ožujka
1992. odbila muslimanska SDA.153
C
Drugi plan za BiH bio je projekt Cyrusa Vancea i
Davida Owena predstavljen na Londonskoj konferen-
ciji. Plan je predviđao stvaranje 10 etnički miješanih
provincija s relativnom autonomijom. Sva tri naroda
trebala su imati po tri kantona, a za Sarajevo je bilo
predviđeno da bude sjedište slabe središnje vlade koju
bi činili predstavnici triju naroda. Prijedlog je propao
kada su ga u travnju 1993. odbacili Srbi.154
U ljeto 1993. predstavljen je treći po redu plan za
BiH, čiji su tvorci bili David Owen i norveški diplomat
Thorvald Stoltenberg. Plan je predviđao tri republike
koje bi imale puni unutarnji i vanjski suverenitet s ogra-
ničenjem da stupaju u ugovorne odnose sa susjednim
državama ako bi to imalo negativne učinke na druge
152 I. LUČIĆ, Uzroci rata, 360-363, 368-369.
153 M. TUĐMAN, Istina o Bosni i Hercegovini, 146-150: Izja-
va o načelima za novo ustavno ustrojstvo Bosne i Her-
cegovine od 9. 3. 1992.; S. TURČALO, Političko-ustavna
rješenja, 10-15.
154 S. TURČALO, Političko-ustavna rješenja, 16-19.
84
Domovinski rat 04-02-2020 Knjiga 1.indd 84
cause the Bosniaks wanted to have a monopoly on the
function of appointing the country’s president. The illu-
sion that the Bosniaks were the only legitimate political
entity in the conflict came crumbling down by the sign-
ing of the Dayton Accords.
International Aspect of the War in
Bosnia and Herzegovina
The war in Croatia rendered the future of Bosnia and
Herzegovina uncertain. For that reason the situation in
Bosnia and Herzegovina became an international prob-
lem. The precondition for international recognition was
a referendum in which the voters were asked one simple
question: Are you in favor of a sovereign and independent
Bosnia and Herzegovina? The referendum was held on
February 29 and March 1, 1992. 64.31 % of registered
voters voted in the referendum. 99.44 % of those voted
in favor of a sovereign and independent Bosnia and Her-
zegovina. It is important to mention that more than 90 %
of the Serbs boycotted the referendum in the hope that
the referendum would be declared invalid due to insuf-
ficient number of voters. The ploy did not work because
most of the Croats, at the instigation of the Croatian gov-
ernment, voted in favor of a sovereign and independent
Bosnia and Herzegovina and because of Izetbegović’s
promise that the Croats would be granted some kind of
autonomy. The result of the referendum was everything
the member states of the European Community needed
to recognize, on April 6, 1992, Bosnia and Herzegovina
as a sovereign and independent state. The decision to
recognize Bosnia and Herzegovina’s independence, in-
stead of defusing tensions, fanned the flames of war
D
that had been smoldering since October, 1991.
The negotiations and talks about a territorial set-
tlement started in February, 1992, in Lisbon. The Portu-
guese diplomat José Cutileiro recommended that the
existing borders of Bosnia and Herzegovina remain in-
R
tact and that the country’s future system of government
be based on a number of entities (constituent units). The
recommendation heralded that the Serbian Republic of
Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Croatian Community
of Herzeg-Bosnia would be legalized. Cutileiro’s plan
was not put into effect because the Muslim SDA reject-
ed it at the end of March, 1992.
Another plan for Bosnia and Herzegovina was
made by Cyrus Vance and David Owen. It was pre-
sented at the London conference. The plan envisaged
4.2.2020. 19:25:48
 The Croatian Nation’s Struggle for Survival, 1991-1995
VJESNIK HRVATSK I
H
111 ,r. Fra.nlO T\>dlD.II.Dlp redsl«lnlk BIHAlljalwlbet<>>lt potplnlu.una20<' ""' 11 pred•~lkaSAD
"'• ominl otYAlln«ton•kolBllf.lojkutl
~'r==~~~; 5ft~~:;;~; ;:_..;~~~~';~ I..s_A_o_ -_e_1_H_ _ _ _ __,
M
Vjesnik, subota, 19. 3. 1994.: „Povijesni sporazum u Washing-
tonu – dr. Franjo Tuđman i Alija Izetbegović potpisali su u petak
(18. 3. 1994.) sporazum mira“.
Vjesnik, Saturday, March 19, 1994: “Historic Agreement in
Washington – Franjo Tuđman and Alija Izetbegović Signed an
Agreement for Peace on Friday (March 18, 1994)”.
D
republike unutar BiH. Muslimani, odnosno Bošnjaci su
ga odbili, tj. uvjetno prihvatili, tražeći vraćanje teritori-
ja na kojem je muslimansko stanovništvo bilo većinsko
do srpskih napada. U nastavku pregovora Srbi su u ve-
ljači 1994. odbili uniju triju republika.155
Upletanje SAD-a u rat rezultiralo je završetkom boš-
njačko-hrvatskoga rata i potpisivanjem Washington-
skoga sporazuma 18. ožujka 1994. godine. Dogovoreno
je osnivanje hrvatsko-bošnjačke Federacije. Sporazum
je predviđao da Federaciju čini 10 kantona na području
s većinskim bošnjačkim i hrvatskim stanovništvom. Fe-
deracija je trebala dobiti 55 % teritorija BiH, Republika
Srpska 42 %, a ostatak bi bio distrikt Sarajevo.156
Novi pokušaj uređenja BiH dogodio se u ljeto 1994.
godine. Kontaktna skupina, koju su činili SAD, Velika
Britanija, Francuska, Njemačka i Rusija, predložila je 5.
lipnja pregovaračkim stranama da se BiH organizira na
etničkom principu tako da Federacija dobije 49 %, Re-
155 Isto, 20-24.
156 Isto, 25-27.
Domovinski rat 04-02-2020 Knjiga 1.indd 85
DNEVNIK
CijenalSOO HRO
Uz dvojicu predsjednika, polpise na
dokumente stavili su i dr. Haris
SilajdZiC i Kre~imir Zubak, a
potpisani su sporazumi o
hrvatsko-muslimanskoj federaciji u
BiH , o stvaranju konfederacije
izmedu toga dijela BiH i Republike
Hrvatske, Ustav federacije BiH, kao
i dokumenti o joS nekim deta\jima
odnosa dviju zemalja
Hrvatska - SAD
Washington najavio
poseban paket
pomo~I za Hrvatsk'!1r. 3
C
D
85
the creation of ten ethnically mixed provinces with a
relative autonomy. Each of the three constituent na-
tions would have its own canton and Sarajevo would
be the seat of a central government which would be
composed of representatives of all three constituent
nations and whose federal authority would be signifi-
cantly curtailed. The plan was abandoned when, in
April, 1993, it was rejected by the Serbs.
In the summer of 1993 a third plan for Bosnia and
Herzegovina was presented. The plan was the brainchild
of David Owen and the Norwegian diplomat Thorvald
Stoltenberg. They recommended the creation of three
republics. These republics would enjoy full internal and
external sovereignty with the proviso that all agree-
ments they may make with neighboring countries must
not have detrimental effects on other republics within
Bosnia and Herzegovina. The Muslims, that is Bosniaks,
did not reject the plan outright. As the price of accept-
ing it, however, they demanded the return of those ar-
eas where Muslims had formed majorities before the
Serbian attacks on those areas. The talks continued until
the Serbs rejected the option of a union of the three re-
publics in February, 1994.
The USA’s interference in the war led directly to the
end of the conflict between the Croats and the Bos-
niaks and the signing of the Washington Agreement on
March 18, 1994. The Agreement stipulated the creation
of a Croat-Bosnian federation. That Federation was to
consist of ten cantons in the areas with majority Bosniak
and Croatian populations. Also, the envisaged federa-
tion would have 55% of Bosnia and Herzegovina’s terri-
tory, the Republika Srpska 42% and the Sarajevo district
would make up the remaining 3%.
Yet another attempt to impose a form of govern-
ment on Bosnia and Herzegovina took place in the sum-
mer of 1994. A contact group, consisting of the USA,
Great Britain, France, Germany and Russia, recommend-
ed, on June 5, to the negotiating parties that Bosnia and
R
Herzegovina be organized on an ethnic principle; the
Federation would receive 49% of the territory of Bosnia
and Herzegovina, the Republika Srpska 48% and the
Sarajevo district would get 3%. The UN would protect
the Sarajevo district. That meant that Bosnia and Herze-
govina would be organized according to the principle
of two-entity union, which would inherit the continuity
of the international personality of Bosnia and Herzegov-
ina. The recommendation was presented on the “take it
or leave it principle” and as such not subject to negoti-
4.2.2020. 19:25:49
 Davor Marijan • Rat za opstojnost Hrvata, 1991. - 1995.
publika Srpska 48 %, a distrikt Sarajevo imao bi 3 % te-
ritorija i bio bi pod nadzorom UN-a. To je značilo uređe-
nje BiH na načelu dvoentitetske unije koja bi naslijedila
međunarodnopravni kontinuitet BiH. Prijedlog je bio na
načelu “uzmi ili ostavi” i nije bilo pregovaranja o njemu.
Plan je propao jer su ga Srbi odbili.157
Posljednji u nizu sporazuma bio je Daytonski, za čije
su potpisivanje okupljena izaslanstva Republike BiH,
Republike Hrvatske i Savezne Republike Jugoslavije
(SRJ). Prihvaćen je nakon što su bosanskohercegovač-
H
ki Srbi dovedeni na rub vojnoga poraza. Sporazum je
nakon dužega pregovaranja potpisan 21. studenoga u
Daytonu, a parafiran 14. prosinca 1995. u Parizu. Potpi-
snici sporazuma, prema redu potpisivanja, bili su: za Re-
publiku BiH Alija Izetbegović, za Republiku Hrvatsku dr.
Franjo Tuđman i za Saveznu Republiku Jugoslaviju Slo-
M
bodan Milošević. Potpisivanju su svjedočili i to potvr-
dili svojim potpisima, prema redosljedu potpisivanja:
za Predsjedništvo Europske unije Felipe Gonzalez, za
Francusku Republiku Jacques Chirac, za Saveznu Repu-
bliku Njemačku Helmut Kohl, za Rusku Federaciju Viktor
Černomirdin, za Ujedinjeno Kraljevstvo John Major i za
D
Sjedinjene Američke Države William Clinton.158 Dayton-
skim je sporazumom BiH podijeljena na dva entiteta,
Federaciju BiH (51 %) i Republiku Srpsku (49 %), čime su
većim dijelom u praksu provedena početna nastojanja
međunarodne zajednice da se BiH podijeli po etničkim
načelima.159
C
157 Isto, 27-29.
158 M. TADIĆ, Ustavnopravni položaj Hrvata u Bosni i Hercego-
vini, Mostar, 2016., 239.
159 M. TUĐMAN, Istina o Bosni i Hercegovini, 648-649: Tekst
završne izjave u Daytonu 21. 11. 1995.; Isto, 693-694: Izv-
ješće predsjednika Tuđmana Hrvatskom državnom Sab-
oru 15. 1. 1996.
86
Domovinski rat 04-02-2020 Knjiga 1.indd 86
ation. Nothing came out of that plan because the Serbs
rejected it.
The last in line of the agreements was the Dayton
Agreement. It was signed by representatives of the
Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Republic of Croa-
tia and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. It has to be
pointed out that the Dayton Agreement was accepted
only after the Bosnian Serbs had been brought to the
brink of a complete military defeat. After protracted
negotiations, on November 21 in Dayton, the General
Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Her-
zegovina was reached. The Agreement was formally
signed on December 14, 1995 in Paris. The signatories
were, in order of signing: Alija Izetbegović for Republic
BiH, Franjo Tuđman for the Republic of Croatia and Slo-
bodan Milošević for the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.
The witnesses were, in order of signing: Felipe Gonzalez
for the Presidency of the EU, Jacques Chirac for France,
Helmut Kohl for Germany, Viktor Černomirdin for the
Russian Federation, John Major for the UK and William
Clinton for the USA. Bosnia and Herzegovina was divid-
ed into two entities, the Federation of Bosnia and Herze-
govina (51% of the territory) and the Republika Srpska
(49% of the territory). With the signing of the Dayton
Agreement Bosnia and Herzegovina had finally been
divided along ethnic lines, an outcome the internation-
al community had been attempting to effect ever since
the break-up of Yugoslavia.
D
R
4.2.2020. 19:25:49
 SUDIONICI RATA
II
H
M
BELLIGERENTS
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 Davor Marijan • Rat za opstojnost Hrvata, 1991. - 1995.

H
M
D
C
D
R
Balkan Battlegrounds: A Military History of the Yugoslav Conflict, 1990-1995, Volume I, Central Intelligence
Agency, Office of Russian and European Analysis, Washington, DC 20505, May 2002.

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 The Croatian Nation’s Struggle for Survival, 1991-1995
ORUŽANE SNAGE SFRJ
Oružane snage SFRJ činile su Jugoslavenska narodna
armija i Teritorijalna obrana. Jugoslavenska narodna ar-
mija bila je operativna i dobro naoružana federalna kom-
ponenta. Teritorijalna je obrana imala republički karakter,
bila je slabije naoružana i predviđena za nadzor teritorija i
borbu na pomoćnim dijelovima ratišta. Premda su socija-
lističke republike i pokrajine u mirnodopskom stanju bile
zadužene za organizaciju i opremanje TO-a, nisu imale
H
pravo zapovijedanja nad njim, nego je to, kao i u slučaju
JNA, bila obveza i pravo Predsjedništva SFRJ. U iznimnim
slučajevima postojala je mogućnost da zapovijedanje di-
jelovima TO-a preuzme republički (pokrajinski) komitet
za općenarodnu obranu i društvenu samozaštitu (ONO i
DSZ), što je bilo partijsko tijelo.160
M
Jugoslavenska narodna armija
Jugoslavenska narodna armija dijelila se na mirno-
dopsku i ratnu. Mirnodopska se sastojala od privremenog
(vojnici na služenju vojnoga roka) i stalnog sastava (oficiri,
D
mlađi oficiri, civili na službi u JNA i vojnici po ugovoru).
Mirnodopske su snage bile klasificirane po stupnju po-
punjenosti: A klasifikaciju imale su postrojbe popunjene
sa 60-100 % ljudi u odnosu na ratnu formaciju, B s 15-60
% i R do 15 % popunjenosti po ratnom ustroju postroj-
bi. Postrojbe A klasifikacije sastojale su se od vojnika na
C
redovnom služenju vojnoga roka i po potrebi su domo-
bilizacijom brzo postizale ratnu formaciju i bile spremne
za brzu uporabu. Takav je sustav bio glomazan i izrazito
neracionalan, jer je samo mali dio postrojbi u miru stvar-
no funkcionirao. Inače je zadatak mirnodopske JNA bio
D
prihvatiti prvi udar nekog od agresora i omogućiti brz
prelazak Jugoslavije na ratno življenje. Početkom 1990.
JNA je imala 275.341 pripadnika, od kojih je na teritoriju
Hrvatske bilo oko 60 tisuća.161
Od kraja 1988. JNA je, prema planu Jedinstvo, bila
organizirana u sustav korpusa Kopnene vojske, korpu-
sa Ratnoga vazduhoplovstva i protivvazdušne odbrane
(RV i PVO), vojnopomorskih sektora (VPS) i niz taktičkih
sastava koji su bili podređeni komandama vojnih oblasti
160 Strategija oružane borbe, Interno, SSNO, Beograd, 1983., 69,
109-110; Strategija općenarodne obrane i društvene samo-
zaštite SFRJ, Interno, SSNO, Beograd, 1987., 54-56, 73-77.
161 Davor MARIJAN, Slom Titove armije: JNA i raspad Jugo-
slavije 1987.–1992., Golden marketing-Tehnička knjiga
– Hrvatski institut za povijest, Zagreb, 2007., 53-54.
89
Domovinski rat 04-02-2020 Knjiga 1.indd 89
THE ARMED FORCES OF THE
SFRY
The Armed Forces of the SFRY consisted of the
Yugoslav People’s Army and the Territorial Defense.
The Yugoslav People’s Army was an effective and well-
equipped military force and a pivotal institution of the
SFRY. The Territorial Defense was organized along re-
public lines. It was not as well-equipped as the JNA be-
cause its primary role was to control territory, operate
in secondary theaters of operations and act as an auxil-
iary force in relation to the JNA. The Socialists republics
and autonomous provinces comprising the SFRY were,
in peacetime, responsible for organizing and equipping
the Territorial Defense. However, the republics and au-
tonomous provinces could not issue direct orders to the
Territorial Defense. That particular right and obligation,
as was the case with the JNA, was the sole preserve of
the Presidency of the SFRY. In exceptional circumstanc-
es it was possible for the Republic (province) Committee
for Total People’s Defense and Social Self-Protection of
the SFRY to issue direct orders to elements of the Territo-
rial Defense. It is important to stress that this committee
was an organ of the Communist Party.
The Yugoslav People’s Army
The Yugoslav People’s Army was divided into two
components: the peacetime contingent and the war-
time contingent. The peacetime contingent consisted
of temporary corps (conscripted soldiers fulfilling their
compulsory military service) and regular corps (officers,
NCOs, civilians working for the JNA and career soldiers).
The peacetime contingent was classified according to
the level of actual strength in relation to the nominal
level of a given unit: units with 60-100% of their nomi-
nal manpower strength were classified as Level A, units
with 15-60% of their nominal manpower strength were
R
classified as Level B and those with less than 15% of their
nominal manpower strength were classified as Level R.
The units in Level A consisted of conscripts but could be
swiftly, if needed, brought up to full strength through
mobilization and deployed in combat. The system was
cumbersome, unwieldy and ultimately irrational be-
cause only a small percentage of the JNA’s units func-
tioned in a viable manner during peacetime. This is an
important point to stress because the main role of the
4.2.2020. 19:25:49
 Davor Marijan • Rat za opstojnost Hrvata, 1991. - 1995.
odnosno Komandi Vojnopomorske oblasti (VPO) i Ko-
mandi RV i PVO, koje su bile strategijske skupine. Te su
komande formalno bile komande Oružanih snaga SFRJ,
no stvarno su bile u sustavu JNA. Vojne oblasti u miru
odnosno vojišta u ratu podrazumijevala su i nadležnost
nad postrojbama TO-a u njihovoj zoni djelovanja. Svrha
plana Jedinstvo bila je podređivanje TO-a komandama
JNA, što je vojni vrh uspio nakon višegodišnjega lobira-
nja kod partijskih struktura, koje je uvjerio da promjene
ne dovode u pitanje prava republika i pokrajina u poslo-
H
vima obrane. Premda protuzakonit, prijedlog je prihva-
ćen, pa je Predsjedništvo SFRJ u slučaju rata podredilo
republičke i pokrajinske štabove TO-a komandama vo-
jišta, a postrojbe TO-a komandama korpusa.162 Takva je
organizacija dijelom funkcionirala i u miru, što se vidjelo
u Sloveniji i Hrvatskoj tijekom 1990. godine.
M
SSNO je bio štabno i stručno tijelo Predsjedništva
SFRJ u poslovima vođenja i zapovijedanja oružanim sna-
gama. Na razini federacije i savezne uprave SSNO se bavio
provedbom saveznih zakona i drugih propisa i općih aka-
ta iz područja obrane. SSNO se sastojao od Generalštaba
Oružanih snaga, četiri sektora, tri uprave, dva odjeljenja i
D
tri druge organizacijske jedinice. Čelnik SSNO-a bio je sa-
vezni sekretar za narodnu obranu koji je uvijek bio djelat-
ni general. U ratu protiv Hrvatske to je bio general armije
Veljko Kadijević. Zamjenik saveznog sekretara bavio se
poslovima s civilnim strukturama društva na saveznoj i na
republičkim razinama. Načelnik Generalštaba Oružanih
C
snaga je bio pomoćnik saveznog sekretara u poslovima
zapovijedanja oružanim snagama, odnosno zamjenik u
slučajevima kada je savezni sekretar bio odsutan ili spri-
ječen za obavljanje dužnosti. Sljedeća na listi pomagača
saveznog sekretara bila su dva podsekretara, jedan za
personalne, a drugi za ekonomske poslove. Pomoćnici
saveznog sekretara rukovodili su organizacijskim dijelovi-
ma SSNO-a iz svog područja rada i nadležnosti za što su
bili odgovorni saveznom sekretaru. Pod izravnim zapovi-
jedanjem SSNO-a bili su školski centri, gardijska motori-
zirana brigada, brigada veze i nekoliko drugih postrojbi
ranga bataljun (divizijun) – puk.163
Vojna oblast je bila strategijski sastav razine skupine
162 Savezni sekretarijat za narodnu odbranu, Interno, edicija
Razvoj oružanih snaga SFRJ 1945.-1985., knjiga I, Beo-
grad, 1990., 375-376; Branko MAMULA, Slučaj Jugoslavi-
ja, CID, Podgorica, 2000., 59-68.
163 Privremeni pravilnik o nadležnostima organizacijskih jed-
inica Saveznog sekretarijata za narodnu odbranu u miru,
Poverljivo, III uprava GŠ OS SFRJ, 1989., 3-10; D. MARI-
JAN, Slom Titove armije, 113.
90
Domovinski rat 04-02-2020 Knjiga 1.indd 90
peacetime force was to absorb the first strike of a poten-
tial aggressor so that a full military mobilization could
be successfully implemented. At the beginning of 1990
the JNA had 275,341 members. In the territory of Croa-
tia, at that time, there were about 60,000 JNA personnel.
From the end of 1988 the JNA, according to the
Jedinstvo (Unity) plan, consisted of the ground forces,
organized into military districts, the Air Force and Air
Defense (RV and PVO), the Navy organized into military
maritime sectors (VPS) and a string of tactical systems.
subordinated to military districts’ commands in the case
of the ground forces, military maritime districts’ com-
mands in the case of the Navy and the Air Force and Air
Defense Command in the case of the Air Force. These
commands were formally the commands of the Armed
Forces of the SFRY but in reality they formed part of the
command structure of the JNA. The military districts
had direct control over the Territorial Defense forces
in their areas of responsibility. One of the purposes of
the Jedinstvo plan was to subordinate the Territorial De-
fense units to JNA commands. The military leadership
of the JNA had been trying very hard for years to con-
vince the Communist Party to support their intention to
subordinate the Territorial Defense to JNA commands.
The leadership of the JNA claimed, facetiously, that the
Jedinstvo plan did not bring into question the existing
rights of the republics and autonomous provinces in re-
lation to the Territorial Defense. It is important to men-
tion that the concept of the Jedinstvo plan ran counter
to the Constitution of the SFRY because the Presidency
of the SFRY, in accordance with the plan and in case of
war, subordinated the republic and province Territorial
Defense commands to the military districts’ commands
D
and Territorial Defense units to Corps commands. The
plan actually functioned, to a degree, in this manner
during peacetime. The events in Slovenia and Croatia in
1990 exposed the duplicitous nature of the plan, and, by
extension, of its creators and backers.
R
The Federal Secretariat of National Defense was a
professional and executive organ of the Presidency of
the SFRY regarding activities in relation to commanding
the armed forces. At the level of the federation and fed-
eral administration the Federal Secretariat of National
Defense was tasked with implementing federal laws and
other regulations and general acts regarding matters of
defense. The Federal Secretariat of National Defense
consisted of the General Staff of the Armed Forces, four
sectors, three administrations, two departments and
4.2.2020. 19:25:50
 The Croatian Nation’s Struggle for Survival, 1991-1995
armija. Uz četiri do šest korpusa i veći broj logističkih po-
strojbi i ustanova, imala je načelno dvije mješovite artilje-
rijske brigade, dvije mješovite protuoklopne artiljerijske
brigade, inženjerijsku brigadu, jedan do dva samohodna
srednja raketna puka protuzračne obrane, zaštitni moto-
rizirani puk i puk veze. Korpus KoV-a načelno se sastojao
od tri do četiri brigade KoV-a, jedne ili više partizanskih
divizija, mješovitog artiljerijskog puka, mješovitog pro-
tuoklopnog artiljerijskog puka, lakog artiljerijskog puka
PZO-a, inženjerijskog puka, bataljuna vojne policije, pon-
H
tonirskog bataljuna, sanitetskog bataljuna, automobil-
skog bataljuna, čete veze, izvidničke čete i čete ABKO-a.
Na teritoriju Hrvatske JNA je imala dijelove svih stra-
tegijskih skupina osim 3. vojne oblasti. Prva vojna oblast
glavne je snage imala u sjevernom dijelu Srbije, Vojvodini,
BiH bez područja Bihaća, i u Slavoniji. Sastojala se od 4.
M
korpusa sa sjedištem u Sarajevu, 5. korpusa u Banjoj Luci,
12. korpusa u Novom Sadu, 24. korpusa u Kragujevcu, 37.
korpusa u Titovu Užicu, 1. proleterske gardijske mehani-
zirane divizije u Beogradu i većega broja samostalnih bri-
gada, pukova i bataljuna. Područje Slavonije bilo je u zoni
nadležnosti Tuzlanskoga korpusa. Komanda oblasti bila
D
je u Beogradu, a komandanti su bili generali Aleksandar
Spirkovski, Života Panić i Vladimir Stojanović. Peta vojna
oblast obuhvaćala je Sloveniju, sjeverozapadnu Hrvatsku,
Gorski kotar, Liku, Kordun, Banovinu i područje Bihaća. Sa-
stojala se od 13. korpusa u Rijeci, 14. korpusa u Ljubljani,
31. korpusa u Mariboru, 32. korpusa u Varaždinu, 6. pro-
C
leterske pješačke divizije u Karlovcu i drugih samostalnih
postrojbi izravno podređenih Komandi oblasti. Sjedište
oblasti bilo je u Zagrebu, a komandanti su bili generali
Konrad Kolšek i Života Avramović.164
Vojnopomorska oblast je bila obalna varijanta vojne
D
oblasti. Obuhvaćala je Istru, jadransku obalu s otocima,
sjevernu Dalmaciju, dio jugoistočne Hercegovine i Boku
kotorsku. Komanda Vojnopomorske oblasti bila je u Spli-
tu, a komandanti su bili admirali Božidar Grubišić i Mile
Kandić. Vojnopomorska oblast se sastojala od Flote sa
sjedištem u Splitu, 5. vojnopomorskog sektora u Puli, 8.
vojnopomorskog sektora u Šibeniku, 9. vojnopomorskog
sektora u Kumboru, 9. korpusa u Kninu i manjih postroj-
bi izravno podređenih Komandi Vojnopomorske oblasti.
Vojnopomorski sektori su bili operativni sastav sastavljen
od plovnih i kopnenih snaga zaduženih za obranu i dje-
lovanje na dijelu istočnog Jadrana. Flota je bila plovni sa-
164 D. MARIJAN, Slom Titove armije, 115.
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Domovinski rat 04-02-2020 Knjiga 1.indd 91
three other organizational units. The head of the Federal
Secretariat of National Defense, always a general of the
JNA in active service, was the Federal Secretary of Na-
tional Defense. During the war against Croatia, the head
of the Federal Secretariat of National Defense was Gen-
eral Veljko Kadijević. The Deputy Federal Secretary dealt
with matters related to civil structures of society at the
federal and republic levels. The Chief of the General Staff
of the Armed Forces was the assistant to the Federal
Secretary in matters relating to commanding the Armed
Forces and assistant to Deputy Federal Secretary in cas-
es when the Federal Secretary was away or otherwise in-
disposed. The next in line of the assistants to the Federal
Secretary were two undersecretaries, one dealing with
matters regarding personnel and the other dealing with
economic matters. The assistants to the Federal Secre-
tary were in charge of organizational matters regarding
the Federal Secretariat of National Defense within their
spheres of responsibility and expertise. They were di-
rectly answerable to the Federal Secretary. Under the
direct command of the Federal Secretariat of National
Defense were also education centers, the Guards Motor-
ized Brigade, the Signals Brigade and a few other battal-
ion- to regiment-strength units.
The military district was a strategic concept at the
level of army group. Nominally, it consisted of four to
six corps and a large number of logistics units and in-
stitutions, two mixed artillery brigades, two mixed an-
ti-armor artillery brigades, an engineering brigade, one
to two Air Defense (self-propelled) regiments, one mo-
torized protection regiment and a signals regiment. The
Ground Forces nominally consisted of three to four bri-
gades of the land forces, one or more guerilla divisions,
one mixed artillery regiment, one mixed anti-armor
artillery regiment, one light Air Defense artillery reg-
iment, engineer regiment, a Military Police battalion,
pontoon battalion, ambulance battalion, automotive
battalion, signals company, reconnaissance company,
R
and an NBC company.
In the territory of Croatia the JNA had elements of all
strategic groups except the 3rd Military District. The bulk
of the forces belonging to the 1st Military District were
stationed in northern Serbia, Vojvodina, Bosnia and Her-
zegovina not including the city of Bihać and Slavonia.
It consisted of IV Corps with its HQ in Sarajevo, V Corps
with its HQ in Banja Luka, XII Corps with its HQ in Novi
Sad, XXIV Corps with its HQ in Kragujevac, XXXVII Corps
with its HQ in Titovo Užice, the 1st Proletarian Guards
4.2.2020. 19:25:50
 Davor Marijan • Rat za opstojnost Hrvata, 1991. - 1995.

Mechanized Division with its HQ in Belgrade and a num-

ber of independent brigades, platoons and battalions.
The region of Slavonia was in the area of responsibili-
ty of Tuzla Corps. The district’s HQ was in Belgrade and
the commanders were Generals Aleksandar Spirkovski,
Života Panić and Vladimir Stojanović. The 5th Military
District encompassed Slovenia, northwest Croatia, Gor-
ski Kotar, Lika, Kordun, Banovina and Bihać. It consisted
of XIII Corps stationed in Rijeka, XIV Corps stationed in
OS SFRJ Ljubljana, XXXI Corps stationed in Maribor, XXXII Corps
H
JNA+TO=OS
stationed in Varaždin, 6th Proletarian Infantry Division
stationed in Karlovac and other independent units di-
JNA - Yugoslav Army
TO - Territorial defence
OS- Armecffurces
<
rectly subordinated to the District’s HQ. The District’s
Armies have the signs of their respective republics
HQ was in Zagreb, and the commanders were Konrad
revealed intentions • •• • •• • •• • •• •• • •• • • •• •• • ••• ••• • ••• Kolšek and Života Avramović.
The concept of military maritime district was a vari-
M
ant of the concept of military district. The Military Mari-
time District encompassed Istria, the Adriatic coast with
the islands, northern Dalmatia, parts of southeast Her-
zegovina and the Bay of Kotor. The HQ of the Military
Maritime District was in Split and the commanders were
Admirals Božidar Grubišić and Mile Kandić. The Military
D
Maritime District consisted of the Fleet with its HQ in
Split, the 5th Military Maritime Sector with its HQ in Pula,
the 8th Military Maritime Sector with its HQ in Šibenik,
the 9th Military Maritime Sector with its HQ in Kumbor,
IX Corps with its HQ in Knin and smaller units directly
subordinated to the HQ of the Military Maritime District.
C
Military maritime sectors were operational groups con-
sisting of naval and ground forces tasked with defend-
ing and operating in the eastern Adriatic. The Fleet con-
sisted of frigates, corvettes, submarines, minesweepers,
stav, a 9. korpus u srednjoj Dalmaciji je bio sličan ostalim and missile, torpedo, and patrol boats. IX Corps in cen-
D
korpusima JNA, premda malo manji od većine njih.165 tral Dalmatia was similar in composition to other JNA
Ratno vazduhoplovstvo i protivvazdušna obrana je corps, but somewhat smaller in size in comparison.
grana koja se preklapala s ostalim snagama JNA. Sasto- The Air Force and Air Defense overlapped with the
jalo se od Komande i tri korpusa RV-a i PVO-a: 1. u Beo- other branches of the armed forces of the SFRY. It con-
gradu, 3. u Nišu i 5. u Zagrebu. Komanda RV-a i PVO-a je sisted of HQ and three Air Force and Air Defense Corps: I
R
bila u Zemunu, a komandanti su bili generali Zvonimir Corps in Belgrade, III Corps in Niš and V Corps in Zagreb.
Jurjević i Božidar Stefanović. Komanda RV-a i PVO-a je The HQ of the Air Force and Air Defense was in Zemun
bila zadužena za uporabu zrakoplovstva i za operativno and the commanders were Generals Zvonimir Jurjević
and Božidar Stefanović. The Air Force and Air Defense
HQ’s task was to direct the air force’s operations and co-
165 SVA MORH, Komanda 5. vojne oblasti: I uprava GŠ OS ordinate the air defense in the entirety of a given the-
SFRJ, Dogradnja i razvoj rukovođenja i komandovanja u ater of operations. The Air Force and Air Defense Corps
oružanim snagama, SP. br. 532-1 od 14. 3. 1989.; Davor were operational groups tasked, for the most part, with
MARIJAN, “‘Jedinstvo’ – posljednji ustroj JNA”, Polemos,
br. 11-12, Zagreb, 2003., 11-46; D. MARIJAN, Slom Titove operating in the area of responsibility of the military dis-
armije, 67-68. tricts. The main part of V Air Force and Air Defense Corps

92

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 The Croatian Nation’s Struggle for Survival, 1991-1995
objedinjavanje protuzračne obrane na cijelom ratištu.
Korpusi RV-a i PVO-a su bili operativni sastavi uglavnom
zaduženi za djelovanje u zonama vojišta. Na teritoriju
Hrvatske bila je glavnina 5. korpusa RV-a i PVO-a sa sje-
dištem u Zagrebu i zadatkom zrakoplovne potpore 5.
vojnoj oblasti. Za potporu VPO-u bila je zadužena Avija-
cijska brigada u Divuljama kod Splita koja je bila u sasta-
vu 1. korpusa RV-a i PVO-a.166
S takvom je strukturom JNA ušla u rat. Do kraja 1991.
hrvatske su snage zarobile Varaždinski korpus, Riječki je
H
premješten u istočnu Hercegovinu, a Komanda Zagre-
bačkoga korpusa u Bihać. Krajem 1991. i početkom 1992.
JNA je reorganizirana. Peta vojna oblast preimenovana
je u 2. vojnu oblast sa sjedištem u Sarajevu. Komandant
oblasti bio je general Milutin Kukanjac. U sastav oblasti
ušli su Sarajevski (4.), Banjalučki (5.), Kninski (9.), Bihaćki
M
(10.) i Tuzlanski (17.) korpus. Na području istočne Herce-
govine i Crne Gore osnovana je 4. vojna oblast. Sastojala
se od samo dva korpusa: Podgoričkog (2.) i Bilećkog (13.).
Komandant je bio general Pavle Strugar. Vojnopomorska
oblast je ukinuta i osnovana je Ratna mornarica. Sastojala
se od Vojnopomorskoga sektora Boka i Flote. Komanda
D
joj je bila u Kumboru, a komandant admiral Mile Kan-
dić. Takva se podjela zadržala do druge polovine svibnja
1992., kada je JNA formalno nestala s povijesne scene.167
Teritorijalne obrane Srbije, Crne Gore i
Bosne i Hercegovine
C
U sastavu JNA i pod komandama njenih komandi
djelovali su dijelovi Teritorijalnih obrana Srbije, Crne Gore
i Bosne i Hercegovine. Najzastupljenije su bile postrojbe
TO-a iz Srbije, odnosno Vojvodine. Krajem lipnja, odnosno
D
početkom srpnja 1991. mobiliziran je dio postrojbi TO-a
Vojvodine u Srijemu uz granicu s Hrvatskom. U rujnu je
mobiliziran dio postrojbi TO-a s namjerom da u sastavu
snaga 1. vojne oblasti sudjeluju u agresiji na Hrvatsku.
Radilo se o partizanskim brigadama TO-a: Panonskoj,
Podunavskoj, Centralnobačkoj, Fruškogorskoj i 60. parti-
zanskoj. Odredi TO-a angažirani su iz: Bečeja, Kragujevca,
Kikinde, Kraljeva, Kule, Leskovca, Niša, Požarevca, Sente,
Sombora, Srbobrana, Srijemske Mitrovice, Subotice, Šida,
Užica, Valjeva, Vršca i Zaječara. Sredinom studenoga 1991.
u sastavu 1. vojne oblasti u istočnoj Slavoniji, zapadnom
166 D. MARIJAN, Slom Titove armije, 112-113, 117.
167 Isto, 324-327.
93
Domovinski rat 04-02-2020 Knjiga 1.indd 93
was stationed in Croatia, with its HQ in Zagreb. Its task
was to provide air support for the units of the 5th Military
District. The Aviation Brigade in Divulje near Split, which
was part of I Air Force and Air Defense Corps, was tasked
with providing aerial support for the Air Defense.
The JNA, structured as described above, went to
war against Croatia in 1991. By the end of 1991 the Cro-
atian forces had captured Varaždin Corps; Rijeka Corps
had been relocated to eastern Herzegovina, and the HQ
of Zagreb Corps was moved to Bihać. The JNA was re-
structured in late 1991 and early 1992. The 5th Military
District was redesignated as 2nd Military District and its
HQ was in Sarajevo. The commander of the military dis-
trict was General Milutin Kukanjac. The 2nd Military Dis-
trict consisted of IV Sarajevo Corps, V Banja Luka Corps,
IX Bihać Corps and XVII Tuzla Corps. 4th Military District
was formed in eastern Herzegovina and Montenegro. It
consisted of only two corps: II Podgorica Corps and XIII
Bileća Corps. The commander of 4th Military District was
General Pavle Strugar. The Military Maritime District was
discontinued and the Navy was formed instead. It con-
sisted of the Boka Military Maritime Sector and the Fleet.
Its HQ was in Kumbor. Its commander was Mile Kandić.
This structure remained in place until the second half of
May, 1992, when the JNA officially ceased to exist.
Territorial Defense Formations of
Serbia, Montenegro and Bosnia and
Herzegovina
Some Territorial Defense units of Serbia, Montene-
gro and Bosnia and Herzegovina were under the direct
command of the JNA. Most of these units belonged to
the Territorial Defense force of Serbia and Vojvodina. At
the beginning of July, 1991, some Vojvodina Territorial
Defense units in the area of Sirmium, at the Croatian
border, were mobilized. In September, a number of Ter-
ritorial Defense units were mobilized and placed under
R
the command of the 1st Military District to take part in
the war against Croatia. The units in question were the
following guerrilla brigades: the Panonska Guerrilla Bri-
gade, the Podunavska Guerrilla Brigade, the Central Bač-
ka Guerrilla Brigade, the Fruškogorska Guerrilla Brigade
and 60th Guerrilla Brigade. The detachments forming the
brigades were from Bečej, Kragujevac, Kikinda, Kraljevo,
Kula, Leskovac, Niš, Požarevac, Senta, Sombor, Srbobran,
Srijemska Mitrovica, Subotica, Šid, Užice, Valjevo, Vršac
and Zaječar. In mid-November, 1991, there were 9,289
4.2.2020. 19:25:50
 Davor Marijan • Rat za opstojnost Hrvata, 1991. - 1995.
Srijemu, Bačkoj i Baranji bilo je 9289 srbijanskih teritorija-
laca, koji su, mobilizirani u Srbiji, sudjelovali u borbama
na teritoriju Republike Hrvatske.168
Iz sastava TO-a Crne Gore angažirano je nekoliko sa-
stava u napadu na jug Hrvatske u sastavu Druge operativ-
ne grupe. Radilo se o brigadi TO-a Titograd, 1., 2. i 3. par-
tizanskoj brigadi TO-a, te odredima TO-a Budva, Herceg
Novi, Kotor, kao i protudiverzantskim četama TO-a Bar,
Budva, Kotor i Herceg Novi.169
U agresiji na Hrvatsku angažiran je i dio snaga TO-a
H
BiH s područja naseljenih srpskim stanovništvom, uglav-
nom iz Bosanske krajine i istočne Hercegovine. Pod ko-
mandom 5. korpusa JNA bile su postrojbe TO-a koje su
sudjelovale u napadu na zapadnu Slavoniju i u blokadi
rijeka Une i Save. Radilo se o 2. partizanskoj brigadi iz
Banje Luke, 5. partizanskoj brigadi iz Prijedora i Odredu
M
TO-a Laktaši.170 Iz istočne Hercegovine su bile angažirane
snage 23. brigade TO-a iz Ljubinja te odred i bataljun TO-a
iz Trebinja.171
Srbijanske paravojne formacije
D
Iako je i TO pobunjenih Srba u Hrvatskoj stvarno
bila srpska paravojska, ovaj se naziv ustalio za sastave
izvan TO-a pobunjenih Srba, bez obzira na to je li se ra-
dilo o sastavima koji su organizirani i često naoružani u
Srbiji, Bosni i Hercegovini ili su organizirani na teritoriju
Hrvatske. Te su postrojbe nastajale u organizaciji ili na
C
poticaj Službe državne bezbjednosti MUP-a Republike
168 Davor MARIJAN, Obrana i pad Vukovara, Hrvatski institut
za povijest, Zagreb, 2013., 36.
169 ICTY: Komanda 2. OG, Direktiva za napad str. pov. br. 33-1
od 28. 9. 1991.; ICTY: Komanda 9. VPS, Borbeno naređenje
str. pov. br. 27-64/33 od 1. 10. 1991.; ICTY: Komanda 2. TG,
Naređenje str. pov. br. 2-18 od 8. 10. 1991.; ICTY: Redovni
borbeni izveštaj IKM 9. VPS od 3. 11. 1991. u 17,00.
170 ICTY: Komanda 5. korpusa, Naređenje str. pov. br. 1-433
od 22. 11. 1991.; Davor MARIJAN, “Organizacija i djelo-
vanje Jugoslavenske narodne armije i pobunjenih Srba
u zapadnoj Slavoniji 1991. godine”, u: Srpska pobuna u
zapadnoj Slavoniji 1990.–1995.: nositelji, institucije, posl-
jedice, Hrvatski institut za povijest, Podružnica za povijest
Slavonije, Srijema i Baranje – Hrvatski memorijalno-doku-
mentacijski centar, Slavonski Brod – Zagreb, 2012., 106.
171 ICTY: Komanda 472. mtbr str. pov. br. 86-4 od 11. 10.
1991.; ICTY: Komanda 9. VPS, Borbeno naređenje str.
pov. br. 27-64/80-266 od 20. 11. 1991.; ICTY: Komanda
Hercegovačkog korpusa, Naređenje za dalja dejstva, str.
pov. br. 229-90 od 25. 5. 1992.
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Domovinski rat 04-02-2020 Knjiga 1.indd 94
Serbian Territorial Defense soldiers in the order of battle
of 1st Military District in eastern Slavonia, Western Sirmi-
um, Bačka and Baranja. They were mobilized in Serbia
and participated in operations in the Republic of Croa-
tia’s territory.
A number of units belonging to the Territorial De-
fense force of Montenegro participated in the attack on
Croatia. These units were under the command of the 2nd
Operational Group. The units in question were: Territori-
al Defense Brigade Titograd, the 1st, 2nd and 3rd Guerrilla
Brigades of the Territorial Defense, squads of the Terri-
torial Defense forces of Budva, Herceg Novi, Kotor and
Commando Companies of the Territorial Defense forces
of Bar, Budva, Kotor and Herceg Novi.
A number of units belonging to the Territorial De-
fense force of Bosnia and Herzegovina also participated
in the JNA’s aggression against Croatia. Most of these
Territorial Defense units came from the predominantly
Serb areas of Bosnia and Herzegovina – Bosanska Kra-
jina and eastern Herzegovina. The Territorial Defense
units from Bosnia and Herzegovina that participated in
the attack on western Slavonia and blockading actions
on the Sava and Una Rivers were under the command of
V Corps of the JNA. The units in question were: the 2nd
Guerilla Brigade from Banja Luka, the 5th Guerilla Brigade
from Prijedor, the Laktaši Squad; units from eastern Her-
zegovina were the 23rd Territorial Defense Brigade from
Ljubinje and one squad and one battalion from Trebinje.
Serbian Paramilitary Formations
It has to be pointed out that the territorial defense
units of the rebel Serbs in Croatia were in reality paramil-
D
itary units but by dint of historiographical convention
the term paramilitary formations in the context of the
wars in the former Yugoslavia is reserved for those for-
mations not belonging to the Territorial Defense force
units of the rebel Serbs, regardless of whether they were
R
formed in Serbia, Bosnia and Herzegovina or in the Re-
public of Croatia’s territory. It is important to note that
most of these paramilitary formations were formed and
equipped in Serbia and Bosnia and Herzegovina. These
formations were either formed by the State Security Ser-
vice of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Republic of
Serbia or by other institutions at the instigation of the
State Security Service of the Ministry of Internal Affairs
of the Republic of Serbia. The purpose of these paramili-
tary formations was to create chaos and an atmosphere
4.2.2020. 19:25:50
 The Croatian Nation’s Struggle for Survival, 1991-1995

JNA - Yugoslav National Army $erbiaandMontenegrohaV(la$S<lrted Plan napada JNA na RH, 1991.
lh&torrnationofajolntilldep,)Odent
state,butlhisentilyhasnotbeen
!oimalfy recognized as a state by the
United States
JNA Strategic Offensive Plan, 1991
Hungary
H
•aanja
Luka

Bosnia and
Herzegovina
M
Operation SARAJEVO*
06 -operolionol group
0 Eastern Slovonia- Barania

0 Western Slavania
.Mostar
00 Combined Varozdin- Zagreb
0 Karlovac
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© Zador- Northern Dalmatia
0
@
@
Mastar- lplit/ Dubravnik
Mostar-lplit subaperatian
Dubrovnik subaperotian
-
C
Srbije. Njihova svrha je bilo stvaranje nemira i omogu- of fear in Croatia and thus enable the JNA to intervene,
ćivanje Jugoslavenskoj narodnoj armiji da glumi ar- ostensibly to prevent the situation from escalating but
bitra u krizi u Hrvatskoj i omogući opstanak i širenje in reality to protect the rebel Serbs and intervene on
srpske pobune. Slično su radile i po Bosni i Hercego- their behalf whenever the situation demanded. Serb
D
vini, posebice uoči izbijanja otvorenog rata. Službeno, paramilitary formations were engaged in similar activ-
Republika Srbija, odnosno njeno vodstvo, tvrdilo je da ities, and for the same purpose, in Bosnia and Herze-
nema ništa s njima. Najpoznatiji od tih skupina bili su govina just before the break-out of the war there. The
četnici Srpske radikalne stranke Vojislava Šešelja, Srp- leadership of the Republic of Serbia officially claimed
ska dobrovoljačka garda zvana Tigrovi beogradskog that the Serb paramilitary formations operating in Cro-
R
kriminalca Željka Ražnatovića Arkana i Srpska garda atia and Bosnia and Herzegovina were in no way, shape
Đorđa Božovića Giške.172 or form connected to the Republic of Serbia. The most
infamous of these formations were the Chetniks of the
Serbian Radical Party, founded by Vojislav Šešelj, the
Serb Volunteer Guard called Tigers, organized and led
172 “Divlji u srcu : Junak našeg doba”, Borba, 21.-22. 9. 1991.; by the Belgrade criminal Željko “Arkan” Ražnatović and
ICTY: Reynaud THEUNENS, “Vojni aspekt uloge Jovice the Serbian Guard led by Đorđe “Giška” Božović.
Stanišića i Franka Simatovića u Hrvatskoj i Bosni i Herce-
govini (1991–1995)”, Haag, 30. 6. 2007.; Davor MARIJAN,
Obrana i pad Vukovara, Hrvatski institut za povijest, Za-
greb, 2013., 38-39.

95

Domovinski rat 04-02-2020 Knjiga 1.indd 95 4.2.2020. 19:25:51

 Davor Marijan • Rat za opstojnost Hrvata, 1991. - 1995.
ORUŽANA SILA REPUBLIKE
HRVATSKE
Od komunističkoga je sustava nova Hrvatska for-
malno baštinila Teritorijalnu obranu, koja je osnovana
1968. kao jugoslavenski pokušaj ostvarenja koncepcije
naoružanoga naroda Karla Marxa. U odnosu na JNA, s
kojom je zakonski i doktrinarno bio ravnopravan, TO je
bio osuvremenjena verzija partizana, i to onih koji su
1944./’45. djelovali u zaleđu protivnika. U više od 20
H
godina postojanja zadatak TO-a nije se odmaknuo da-
lje od uopćene definicije da u eventualnom budućem
ratu djeluje u zaleđu protivnika, na pravcima manje
operativne važnosti, te da u dubini nadzire svoj teritorij.
Najvažnija značajka osnivanja TO-a bio je prelazak dijela
M
poslova obrane u ruke republika i pokrajina, što je do
tada bilo isključivo u rukama saveznih tijela i JNA.173
Razlika između JNA i TO-a bila je ogromna. Teritori-
jalna je obrana bila ratna vojska čiji je mirnodopski dio
bio vrlo malen i ograničen na štabove TO-a različitih
razina. Manji dio profesionalaca u TO-u bio je iz JNA, a
D
na nižim su razinama uglavnom prevladavali pričuvni
časnici. Teritorijalna se obrana sastojala od štabova, po-
strojba i ustanova. Postrojbe su se dijelile na manevar-
ske i prostorne. Manevarske su bile brigade, a prostor-
ne manje postrojbe (vodovi, čete, bataljuni i odredi),
vezane za zadaću nadzora prostora, i teško da su bile
C
nešto više od npr. seoskih odnosno gradskih straža. Uz
to je naoružanje kojim je TO raspolagao najvećim dije-
lom bilo zastarjelo, posebice u postrojbama prostorne
strukture. Veći dio toga oružja dolazio je iz JNA, koja se
tako rješavala zastarjelog oružja.
Budući da je Teritorijalna obrana bila ratna vojska,
zapovijedanje njome bilo je u nadležnosti Predsjedniš-
tva SFRJ i Saveznoga sekretarijata za narodnu obranu
(SSNO) kao njegove transmisije. No u miru je pitanje
zapovijedanja TO-om bilo složenije od zakonskih pro-
pisa. U Ustavu SRH iz 1974. postojala je odredba da
republike imaju pravo zapovijedanja TO-om, što je po-
sebnim amandmanom iz 1980. ograničeno na pitanje
rukovođenja, ali ne i zapovijedanja. Bez obzira na takvu
odredbu, Teritorijalna obrana SRH za svoj je rad dijelom
odgovarala Predsjedništvu SRH, odnosno Predsjedniš-
tvu Centralnoga komiteta Saveza komunista Hrvatske i
173 D. MARIJAN, Slom Titove armije, 30-33.
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Domovinski rat 04-02-2020 Knjiga 1.indd 96
ARMED FORCES OF THE
REPUBLIC OF CROATIA
The Republic of Croatia formally inherited from the
Communist regime the Croatian Territorial Defense force
which had been formed in 1968 in an attempt to bring
to life the Marxist concept of a people in arms. Legally
and doctrinally, the Croatian Territorial Defense force was
equal to the JNA. In terms of military doctrine, the Cro-
atian Territorial Defense force was a modern version of
Tito’s Partisans, a guerrilla army operating behind enemy
lines in 1944 and 1945. In more than 20 years of its exis-
tence, the Territorial Defense force remained firmly with-
in the scope of operating behind enemy lines, in areas of
secondary strategic importance and as a pivotal factor
in any defense-in-depth situation. The most important
facet of the forming of the Territorial Defense force was
the transfer of a number of tasks relating to the country’s
defense to the republics and autonomous provinces. The
tasks in questions had been the sole preserve of the fed-
eral organs and the JNA up to that point.
The Territorial Defense force differed greatly from
the JNA. The Territorial Defense force was a wartime
force whose peacetime contingent was small and re-
duced to territorial commands of varying importance.
Some TO professionals were from the JNA. On lower lev-
els the Territorial Defense force relied, for the most part,
on reserve officers. The Territorial Defense consisted of
HQs, units and institutions. The units were divided into
mobile units and territorially based static units. The mo-
bile units were brigade-strength formations, while static
units were smaller formations (platoons, companies, bat-
D
talions, squads), tasked with area control – their combat
value was negligible and in reality they were a glorified
neighborhood watch organization. The static units, and
for the most part the Territorial Defense force as a whole,
were equipped with obsolete weapons. Most of those
weapons came from the JNA. Equipping the Territorial
R
Defense force was a good way for the JNA to get rid of
outdated weaponry.
Because the Territorial Defense was a wartime force,
it was under the direct command of the Presidency of the
SFRY and Federal Secretariat of National Defense (SSNO)
as the Presidency’s executive organ. However, during
peacetime the issue of command regarding the Territori-
al Defense force was deliberately muddied. There existed
a provision in the Constitution of 1974 stipulating that
4.2.2020. 19:25:51
 The Croatian Nation’s Struggle for Survival, 1991-1995
posebice republičkomu Komitetu za ONO i DSZ SRH.174
Početkom 1990. Teritorijalna obrana SRH sastojala
se od Republičkoga štaba, 10 zonskih štabova, stotinjak
štabova TO-a, 30-ak brigada TO-a i većega broja manjih
sastava prostorne strukture. U Zagrebu je bio zajed-
nički štab s JNA u rangu korpusa. Republički štab TO-a
prihvatio je promjenu nazivlja te promijenio zaglavlja i
pečate, iz kojih je izbrisana odrednica socijalističkoga
razdoblja. Može se reći da je to bilo sve što je prihvatio
od novih, nekomunističkih vlasti. Takva TO, s ustrojem i
H
dijelom kadra koji nije prihvatio demokratske promje-
ne, nije bila od koristi Hrvatskoj pa je u rujnu 1991. uga-
šena, odnosno njeno ljudstvo prevedeno je u pričuvni
sastav Hrvatske vojske.175
Policija
M
Nakon što je JNA razoružala Teritorijalnu obranu
i nakon izbijanja srpske pobune u Hrvatskoj, tadašnja
milicija je postala glavni oslonac hrvatske vlasti. Teret
obrane Republike Hrvatske bio je na njoj do početka
srpnja 1991. godine. Krajem 1991. počelo je njezino
D
povlačenje iz borbi i angažiranje na poslovima koji su
zakonom bili predviđeni za nju. Iz policije je nastala
hrvatska vojna sila, odnosno Zbor narodne garde. Za
razliku od obrambenih struktura Hrvatske vojske (HV),
koje su stvarane gotovo od nule, s policijom to nije bio
slučaj. Kao milicija, ona je bez većih potresa prihvatila
C
demokratske izbore i smjenu vlasti, a krajem 1990. prei-
menovana je u policiju.
U organizacijskom smislu milicija je u drugoj polo-
vini 1990. djelovala prema stanju zatečenom u vrijeme
demokratskih izbora. Amandmanima na Ustav SRH pri-
D
hvaćenima 25. srpnja 1990., republički sekretari postali
su ministri u vladi, pa je tako i Republički sekretarijat za
unutrašnje poslove postao Ministarstvo unutarnjih po-
slova (MUP). Zvijezda petokraka zamijenjena je službe-
nim hrvatskim grbom 12. veljače 1991. godine. Prema
Zakonu o unutarnjim poslovima, poslove javne sigur-
nosti obavljala je milicija, odnosno policija. Organiza-
174 Davor MARIJAN, „Rukovođenje i komandovanje Oruža-
nim snagama SFRJ: Vrhovna razina“, ČSP, 3/41, Zagreb,
2009., 669-671.
175 SVA MORH, ZHRZ: Pregled RJ TO Republike Hrvatske po
općinama (nedatirano i nepotpisano); Zakon o obrani,
Narodne novine, br. 49 od 20. 9. 1991.; D. MARIJAN, Slom
Titove armije, 173-174.
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Domovinski rat 04-02-2020 Knjiga 1.indd 97
the republics had the right to command their respective
Territorial Defense forces. An amendment to the Consti-
tution was passed in 1980 which reduced that right to
managerial tasks. In spite of the mentioned provision,
the Territorial Defense force of the Socialist Republic of
Croatia was partly answerable to the Presidency of the
Socialist Republic of Croatia, to the Presidency of the
Central Committee of the League of Communists of Cro-
atia and to the Republic Committee for General People’s
Defense and Social Self-Protection of the Socialist Re-
public of Croatia.
At the beginning of 1990, the Territorial Defense
Force of the Socialist Republic of Croatia consisted of the
republic HQ, ten district HQs, about a hundred TO HQs,
about thirty TO brigades and a large number of static
units. The joint JNA – Territorial Defense HQ at corps level
was located in Zagreb. When the Croatian Constitution
was changed in July, 1990, the republic HQ of the Terri-
torial Defense force dropped the word “socialist” from
its official seal. It is safe to say that the jettisoning of the
term “socialist” was the only thing that the HQ accepted
from the new, non-Communist government of the Re-
public of Croatia. That Territorial Defense force, whose
structure and some personnel prevented it from accept-
ing the democratic changes, was of no use to the Repub-
lic of Croatia and was disbanded in September, 1991.
Many of its members were transferred to the Croatian
Army Reserve.
Police
The disarmament of the Croatian Territorial De-
fense force by the JNA and the start of the Serb rebel-
lion in Croatia were two potentially devastating blows
for the Croatian government. The militia force3, during
that precarious period, was the only thing the Croatian
government could rely on to protect the country. From
the beginning of July, 1991, to the end of 1991 the en-
R
tire police force4 was engaged in defending the country
against Serb aggression. Only towards the end of 1991
did the government start gradually withdrawing police
units from combat duties. The Croatian Army developed
out of the Croatian police force. Unlike the other defense
3 In the SFRY the word militia was used to denote the
police force.
4 At the end of 1990 the term militia was replaced with
police.
4.2.2020. 19:25:51
 Davor Marijan • Rat za opstojnost Hrvata, 1991. - 1995.
cijski se dijelila na sekretarijate za unutarnje poslove
(SUP) i stanice javne sigurnosti. Sjedišta SUP-ova bila
su u Bjelovaru, Dubrovniku, Gospiću, Karlovcu, Kutini,
Osijeku, Puli, Rijeci, Sisku, Slavonskom Brodu, Splitu,
Šibeniku, Varaždinu, Vinkovcima, Zaboku, Zadru i Za-
grebu. Prema odluci Sabora RH od 8. studenoga 1990.,
sekretarijati za unutarnje poslove postali su policijske
uprave (PU), a stanice javne sigurnosti – policijske po-
staje (PP). Policijske su uprave bile viša organizacijska
razina policije. Djelovale su na području dviju i više
H
općina. Njihov je zadatak bio pratiti stanje i pojave u
oblasti unutarnjih poslova, organizirati, koordinirati i
usmjeravati rad policijskih postaja te neposredno su-
djelovati u obavljanju složenijih poslova iz te oblasti za
područje za koje su osnovane. Policijska postaja kao
organizacijska jedinica policijske uprave osnivana je za
M
izravno obavljanje policijskih poslova i drugih unutar-
njih poslova na području jedne općine. Za obavljanje
određenih poslova na području policijske uprave po
potrebi su se mogle osnivati i policijske ispostave (PI),
što je tijekom rata bio čest slučaj.176
U drugoj polovini lipnja 1991. osnovana je Policij-
D
ska uprava Vukovar za područje istoimene općine, a
krajem kolovoza i Policijska uprava Županja, čime je
broj policijskih uprava narastao na 19. U svibnju 1993.
organizacija policije prilagođena je političko-teritori-
jalnom ustroju Republike Hrvatske. Policijske su uprave
imenovane po županijama i sjedištima županija. Bilo ih
C
je 20: Zagrebačka, Krapinsko-zagorska, Sisačko-mosla-
vačka, Karlovačka, Varaždinska, Koprivničko-križevač-
ka, Bjelovarsko-bilogorska, Primorsko- goranska, Lič-
ko-senjska, Virovitičko-podravska, Požeško-slavonska,
Brodsko-posavska, Zadarsko-kninska, Osječko-baranj-
ska, Šibenska, Vukovarsko-srijemska, Splitsko-dalma-
tinska, Istarska, Dubrovačko-neretvanska i Međimur-
ska. Istom je uredbom bilo predviđeno osnivanje dviju
policijskih uprava za kotareve s većinskim srpskim sta-
176 Odluka Izvršnog vijeća o sjedištu i području na kojem
se osnivaju sekretarijati za unutrašnje poslove, Narodne
novine, 30. 12. 1989.; Odluka o proglašenju Amandma-
na LXIV. do LXXV. na Ustav Socijalističke Republike Hr-
vatske, Narodne novine, 28. 7. 1990.; Zakon o izmjenama
Zakona o unutrašnjim poslovima, Narodne novine, 14.
11. 1990.; USMKSP MPRH: MUP RH, Naredba o zamjeni
zvijezde petokrake, br. 511-01-01-176/1-1991 od 12. 2.
1991.; Zakon o unutarnjim poslovima, Narodne novine,
17. 6. 1991.
98
Domovinski rat 04-02-2020 Knjiga 1.indd 98
structures of the Croatian Army (HV), the Croatian police
force was not created from scratch. The Croatian Militia
force was not unduly rocked by the democratic elections
and the change of government.
The organization and structure of the militia in the
second half of 1990 was the same as at the time of the
democratic elections in the country. By the amendments
to the Constitution of the Republic of Croatia accepted
on July 25, 1990, the republic secretaries became min-
isters and the Republic Secretariat of Internal Affairs
became the Ministry of Internal Affairs (MUP). The red
five-pointed star was replaced with the Croatian coat of
arms on February 12, 1991. According to the Law on In-
ternal Affairs, the militia, that is, the police, was in charge
of maintaining public order. The militia was organiza-
tionally divided into Secretariats of Internal Affairs (SUP)
and public security stations. The seats of the Secretariats
of Internal Affairs were in Bjelovar, Dubrovnik, Gospić,
Karlovac, Kutina, Osijek, Pula, Rijeka, Sisak, Slavonski
Brod, Split, Šibenik, Varaždin, Vinkovci, Zabok, Zadar and
Zagreb. According to the decision of the Croatian Parlia-
ment of November 8, 1990, the Secretariats of Internal
Affairs became police administrations (PU) and public
security stations became police stations (PP). Police ad-
ministrations constituted a higher organizational level of
the police. They operated in two or more municipalities.
Their task was to monitor the situation and develop-
ments regarding internal affairs, to organize, coordinate
and guide the work of the police stations and to directly
participate in conducting complex operations in relation
to the mentioned activities. Police stations, as organiza-
tional units, were set up for the purpose of directly con-
ducting policing activities and other activities relating
D
to internal affairs in the territory of one municipality. For
accomplishing certain tasks in the area of responsibility
of a police administration, police stations could be set up
as needed, as was often the case during the war.
In the second half of June, 1991, the Vukovar Police
R
Administration was set up for the Vukovar area. At the
end of August the Županja Police Administration was
also formed. With these two police administrations, there
were nineteen police administrations in Croatia. In May,
1993, the structure of the police was adjusted accord-
ing to the political-territorial structure of the Republic
of Croatia. The police administrations were named af-
ter the municipalities and administrative centers of the
municipalities. There were twenty of them: the Zagreb
County, the Krapina-Zagorje County, the Sisak-Moslavi-
4.2.2020. 19:25:51
 The Croatian Nation’s Struggle for Survival, 1991-1995
novništvom sa sjedištem u Glini i Kninu.177
Zbog nepovoljne nacionalne strukture policija se
počela popunjavati u ljeto 1990. godine. U Policijskoj
upravi Zagreb od 3500 zaposlenih 20. lipnja 1990., Srba
je bilo 1161 ili 33,2 %, a Hrvata 1620 ili 46,3 %. Devet
mjeseci poslije, 31. ožujka 1991., Policijska uprava Za-
greb imala je 4892 zaposlenika, od kojih 3222 ili 65,9
% Hrvata, a 854 ili 17,5 % Srba. Za usporedbu, u Zagre-
bu je prema popisu stanovništva iz 1991. bilo 49.965
ili 5,35 % Srba. Sa 6800 ljudi iz sredine 1990. Ministar-
H
stvo unutarnjih poslova naraslo je do sredine siječnja
1991. na 18.752 pripadnika. U pričuvnom je sastavu
bilo 22.865 ljudi.178
Posebna sastavnica MUP-a bile su postrojbe Speci-
jalne policije. U nadležnosti Ministarstva bila je Antite-
roristička jedinica (ATJ) Lučko, osnovana 7. rujna 1990.
M
godine. U ožujku 1991. počelo je osnivanje posebnih
jedinica policije (PJP) u sastavu policijskih uprava. Pri
svakoj policijskoj upravi bio je jedan PJP, a brojno je
stanje variralo ovisno o potrebama, veličini i važnosti
uprava. Nakon što je osnovan Zbor narodne garde, u
njega je prešao dio pripadnika PJP-a, pa su ih ponov-
D
no popunili. U policijskim upravama Bjelovar, Gospić,
Karlovac, Kutina, Osijek, Rijeka, Sisak, Slavonski Brod,
Šibenik, Vinkovci, Vukovar, Zadar i Zagreb određeno je
osnivanje PJP-a od 120 policajaca, a u policijskim upra-
vama Dubrovnik, Pula, Varaždin i Zabok od 80 policaja-
ca. U studenome 1991. brojno stanje PJP-a povećano
C
je na 180 ljudi u PU Gospić, Karlovac, Slavonski Brod
i Zagreb, na 150 u PU Bjelovar, Rijeka, Sisak i Šibenik,
na 120 u PU Kutina, Split, Vinkovci, Vukovar, Županja i
Zadar te na 100 u PU Dubrovnik, Pula, Varaždin i Zabok.
Tada je naređeno i formiranje pričuvnih postrojbi za
D
svaki PJP u istom brojnom stanju. Stvarno brojno sta-
177 Uredba Vlade Republike Hrvatske o sjedištu i području
na kojem se osnivaju policijske uprave, Narodne novine,
21. 6. 1991.; Uredba Vlade Republike Hrvatske o dopuni
Uredbe o sjedištu i području na kojem se osnivaju
policijske uprave, Narodne novine, 30. 8. 1991.; Uredba
Vlade Republike Hrvatske o sjedištu i području na ko-
jem se osnivaju policijske uprave, Narodne novine, 24. 5.
1993.
178 HDA, UPRH: Nacionalna zastupljenost zaposlenih u
MUP-u, PU Zagreb, stanje 20. 6. ‘90. u odnosu na stanje
31. 03. 91. godine; Narodnosni sastav stanovništva Hr-
vatske po naseljima, Republički zavod za statistiku, Za-
greb, 1992., 14-15, 42-43; HDA, UPRH: MUP RH, Zapisnik
o izvršenoj inspekciji br. 511-01-01-Sp. 12/1-1991. od
17. 1. 1991.
99
Domovinski rat 04-02-2020 Knjiga 1.indd 99
na County, the Karlovac County, the Varaždin County,
the Koprivnica-Križevci County, the Bjelovar-Bilogora
County, the Primorje-Gorski Kotar County, the Lika-Senj
County, the Virovitica-Podravina County, the Požega-Sla-
vonia County, the Brod-Posavina County, the Zadar-Knin
County, the Osijek-Baranja County, the Šibenik County,
the Vukovar-Sirmium County, the Split-Dalmatia Coun-
ty, the Istria County, the Dubrovnik-Neretva County and
the Međimurje County. Also, two police administrations
were envisaged for the predominantly Serb kotari (dis-
tricts) with their respective administrative centers in Gli-
na and Knin.
In the summer of 1990, the police force had no choice
but to start hiring new people due to its unsustainable
ethnic structure. On June 20, 1990, there were 3,500 peo-
ple working in the Zagreb Police Administration. Out of
that number 1,161 (33.2%) were Serbs and 1,620 (46.3%)
were Croats. Nine months later, on March 31, 1991, the
Zagreb Police Administration boasted 4,892 personnel,
3,222 (65.9%) of which were Croats and 854 (17.5%) were
Serbs. To put these numbers into perspective; according
to the census of 1991, 49,965 Serbs (5.35% of the whole
population of Zagreb) lived in Zagreb. The Ministry of
Internal Affairs employed 6,800 people in mid-1990. By
mid-January, 1991, that number had risen to 18,752. The
reserve consisted of 22,865 people.
The Special Police Force was an integral part of
the Ministry of Internal Affairs. The Lučko Anti-Terrorist
Unit (ATJ), formed on September 7, 1990, was also un-
der the auspices of the Ministry of Internal Affairs. In
March, 1991, the process of forming Special Police units
as part of the police administrations was initiated. Every
police administration had one Special Police unit. The
numerical strength of these Special Police units varied
according to what the present circumstances demand-
ed and according to the importance and size of a given
police administration. When the Croatian National Guard
was formed, many members of the Special Police units
R
joined the army. These members were replaced with
new personnel and the Special Police units were quickly
brought up to full strength. In the police administrations
of Bjelovar, Gospić, Karlovac, Kutina, Osijek, Rijeka, Sisak,
Slavonski Brod, Šibenik, Vinkovci, Vukovar, Zadar and
Zagreb the respective Special Police units numbered
120 men. The Special Police units attached to the police
administrations of Dubrovnik, Pula, Varaždin and Zabok
numbered 80 men. In November, 1991, the numerical
strength of the Special Police units in the police admin-
4.2.2020. 19:25:51
 Davor Marijan • Rat za opstojnost Hrvata, 1991. - 1995.
nje svakako je bilo manje zbog teškoća pri popuni.179
U ljeto 1993., u vrijeme prelaska na županijski ustroj
RH, Specijalne jedinice policije (SJP) imale su 2800 ljudi
u 18 postrojbi. U taj broj nije uračunata Antiteroristič-
ka jedinica Lučko. U SJP-u Dubrovnik, Koprivnica, Pula
i Zabok bilo je 100 policajaca, u SJP-u Gospić, Rijeka,
Split, Šibenik i Varaždin 120, u SJP-u Bjelovar, Osijek,
Požega i Slavonski Brod 150, u SJP-u Karlovac 200, a u
SJP-u Sisak, Vinkovci, Zadar i Zagreb 250 policajaca.180
Specijalnom policijom rukovodio je načelnik Odje-
H
la specijalne policije. Odjel je sredinom 1993. preime-
novan u Sektor specijalne policije. Načelnik Odjela od-
nosno Sektora bio je general Mladen Markač.181
Hrvatska vojska
M
Sredinom travnja 1991. od pričuvnoga i djelatnoga
sastava MUP-a RH osnovan je Zbor narodne garde.182
U početku je bio u sastavu MUP-a, s tim da je zbog za-
konskoga pokrića bio pod zapovjednom ingerencijom
Ministarstva obrane. U početnoj fazi postojanja ZNG je
bio sličan oružništvu i namijenjen u prvom redu slama-
D
nju srpske pobune, a ne ratu s JNA. Do kraja rujna 1991.
sastojao se od zapovjedništava i djelatnih i pričuvnih
postrojbi. Krovno je tijelo bilo Zapovjedništvo ZNG-a
RH u Zagrebu. Zapovjednik je bio Martin Špegelj, a
nakon njegova povlačenja do osnivanja Glavnoga sto-
žera Hrvatske vojske (GS HV) postrojbama su zapovije-
C
dali načelnik Štaba ZNG-a pukovnik Imra Agotić, kao i
ministri obrane Šime Đodan i Luka Bebić. U srpnju su
osnovana zapovjedništva ZNG-a za pojedine regije,
konkretno za istočnu Slavoniju, banijsko-kordunsko
područje, ličko područje, srednju i sjevernu Dalmaciju
179 Sudski spisi Međunarodnog kaznenog suda za bivšu
Jugoslaviju u Den Haagu (dalje ICTY): Antiteroristička
jedinica Lučko, Ratni put br. 511-01-33-VT-18/98 od 16.
2. 1998.; ICTY: MUP RH, Osnivanje Posebnih jedinica
policije br. 511-01-55-SP-297/1-91 od 6. 3. 1991.; ICTY:
MUP RH, br. 511-01-21-22750/1-91 od 19. 7. 1991.; ICTY:
MUP RH, br. 511-01-21-22750/1-91 od 19. 7. 1991.
180 HMDCDR: Broj djelatnika SJP PU MUP-a RH sukladno
županijskom ustroju Republike (bez nadnevka i broja,
parafiran 12. 7. 1993.).
181 ICTY: MUP RH, Zapovijed br. 511-01-34-485/93 od 17. 6.
1993.; SVA MORH, GSHV: MUP RH, br. 511-01-34570/93
od 8. 7. 1993.
182 Zakon o izmjenama i dopunama Zakona o unutarnjim
poslovima od 18. 4. 1991., Narodne novine, 23. 4. 1991.
100
Domovinski rat 04-02-2020 Knjiga 1.indd 100
istrations of Gospić, Karlovac, Slavonski Brod and Zagreb
was increased to 180 men; in the police administrations
of Bjelovar, Rijeka, Sisak and Šibenik to 150 men; in the
police administrations of Kutina, Split, Vinkovci, Vuko-
var, Županja and Zadar to 120 men and in the police
administrations of Dubrovnik, Pula, Varaždin and Zabok
to 100 men. Reserve units for every Special Police unit
were formed. The numerical strength of each reserve
units was equal to its active counterpart. However, the
real strength of any given unit was oftentimes below its
nominal strength due to a lack of adequately trained re-
placements.
In the summer of 1993, when the Republic of Cro-
atia was divided into counties, the Special Police units
boasted 2,800 personnel in 18 units. The number does
not include the members of the Lučko Anti-Terrorist Unit.
At that time there were 100 police officers in the Special
Police units in Dubrovnik, Koprivnica, Pula and Zabok;
120 police officers in the Special Police units in Gospić,
Rijeka, Split, Šibenik and Varaždin; 150 police officers in
the Special Police units in Bjelovar, Osijek, Požega and
Slavonski Brod; 200 police officers in the Special Police
units in Karlovac; 250 police officers in the Special Police
units in Sisak, Vinkovci, Zadar and Zagreb.
The Chief of the Special Police Department acted
as Chief of the Special Police. The department was re-
designated as the Special Police Sector in mid-1993.
The Chief of the department, or sector, was General
Mladen Markač.
The Croatian Army
In mid-April, the Croatian National Guard was formed
D
of reserve and active duty personnel of the Ministry of In-
ternal Affairs of the Republic of Croatia. At first, the Croa-
tian National Guard was an integral part of the Ministry of
Internal Affairs, but in order to satisfy legal requirements
it was placed under the direct command of the Ministry
R
of Defense. In the initial phase of its existence, the Croa-
tian National Guard (ZNG) was lightly armed and geared
towards dealing with the rebel Serbs, and not towards
fighting against the JNA. Until the end of September,
1991, the Croatian National Guard consisted of HQs and
active duty and reserve units. The Main HQ of the Cro-
atian National Guard was located in Zagreb. The com-
mander was Martin Špegelj and after he withdrew from
the function and until the forming of the General Staff of
the Croatian Armed Forces (GS HV) the units of the Croa-
4.2.2020. 19:25:51
 The Croatian Nation’s Struggle for Survival, 1991-1995
i južnu Dalmaciju. Dio je zaživio, no dio nije.183 U ko-
lovozu je osnovano i Zapovjedništvo Zagrebačkoga
korpusa ZNG-a, što je bio ekvivalent regionalnoga za-
povjedništva za šire područje glavnoga grada.184 Zapo-
vjedništvo za zapadnu Slavoniju osnovano je u drugoj
polovini kolovoza.185 Zapovjedno-borbene ovlasti imali
su i krizni štabovi, koji su se osnivali na svim razinama
upravne strukture od općine do Republike, što je često
stvaralo probleme pri uporabi snaga.186
Djelatni sastav ZNG-a sastojao se od četiri A bri-
H
gade: 1. sa sjedištem u Zagrebu, 2. u Trsteniku, 3. u
Vinkovcima pa Osijeku i 4. u Splitu, Specijalnoga ba-
taljuna Glavnoga stožera u Zagrebu i 63. samostalnog
bataljuna u Slavonskoj Požegi. Pričuvne su postrojbe
bile brigade i samostalni bataljuni. Pri svakoj policij-
skoj upravi osnovana je jedna do dvije brigade ZNG-a,
M
ovisno o mogućnostima i raspoloživom ljudstvu (nu-
merirane su od broja 99. do 120.). U nekoliko policij-
skih uprava osnovani su i samostalni bataljuni ZNG-a
(od broja 51. do 64.).187
U drugoj polovini rujna 1991. osnovana je Hrvat-
ska vojska. Zbor narodne garde zadržan je kao dje-
D
latni dio, a pričuvni je sastav bio spoj ljudstva TO-a i
pričuvnoga sastava ZNG-a. Zapovjedništvo ZNG-a je
preimenovano u Glavni stožer HV-a na čijem je čelu do
jeseni 1992. bio general zbora Anton Tus, potom do
ljeta 1995. stožerni general Janko Bobetko i na kraju
general zbora Zvonimir Červenko. Oružane snage RH
C
dobile su tada organizacijsku strukturu koja se s izmje-
nama zadržala do kraja rata. Sastojale su se od Glavno-
ga stožera HV-a s vrlo jakim postrojem podstožernih
postrojba, šest operativnih zona kopnene vojske, čija
su sjedišta bila u Osijeku, Bjelovaru, Zagrebu, Karlov-
D
cu, Rijeci i Splitu, Južnog bojišta, Hrvatske ratne mor-
narice (HRM) i Hrvatskoga ratnog zrakoplovstva (HRZ)
183 SVA MORH, GSHV: MUP RH, MORH, ZNG, Zapovijed kl.
8-01/91-01/05, ur. br. 512-01-91-1 od 18. 7. 1991.
184 SVA MORH, GSHV: MORH, Zapovijed kl. str. pov. 801-
01/91-01/07, ur. br. 512-06-05-91-03 od 6. 8. 1991.
185 SVA MORH, GSHV: Krizni štab zapadno-slavonske regije,
Dnevni izvještaj Op. br. 2 od 22. 8. 1991.
186 SVA MORH, GSHV: Odluka Predsjednika Republike Hr-
vatske od 27. 7. 1991. o osnivanju i djelatnosti kriznih
štabova u Republici Hrvatskoj.
187 SVA MORH, GSHV: MORH, Formiranje jedinica Narodne
garde, organizacijsko-formacijska zapovijest kl. str. pov.
801-01/91-01/07, ur. br. 512-05-91-3 od 29. 7. 1991.
101
Domovinski rat 04-02-2020 Knjiga 1.indd 101
tian National Guard were commanded by the command-
er of the Main HQ of the Croatian National Guard Colonel
Imra Agotić and the ministers of defense Šime Đodan and
Luka Bebić. In July Croatian National Guard HQs for par-
ticular regions were formed, namely for eastern Slavonia,
the Banija-Kordun area, the Lika area, central and north-
ern Dalmatia and southern Dalmatia. Some of these HQs
never functioned in an operational context. In August the
HQ of Zagreb Corps of the Croatian National Guard was
formed. The HQ was the equivalent of the regional HQ
for the wider Zagreb area. In the second half of August
the HQ for western Slavonia was formed. Crisis commit-
tees could also exercise command authority in relation to
units engaged in combat. They were formed on all levels
of the administrative structure from the municipality level
to the republic level. The structure was conducive to cre-
ating situations with overlapping responsibilities which
in turn created undue problems in relation to allocation
of tasks and operations to military formations.
The active duty contingent of the Croatian National
Guard consisted of four A brigades: the 1st Brigade sta-
tioned in Zagreb; the 2nd Brigade stationed in Trstenik;
the 13th Brigade stationed in Vinkovci and later in Osijek;
the 4th Brigade stationed in Split; the Special Operations
Battalion of the General Staff of the Croatian Army, sta-
tioned in Zagreb and the 63rd Independent Battalion
stationed in Slavonska Požega. One or two, depending
on availability of manpower, brigades (numerical desig-
nations from 99 to 120) of the Croatian National Guard
were formed at every police administration. Also, inde-
pendent battalions were formed at a number of police
administrations (numerical designations from 51 to 64).
In the second half of September, 1991, the Croatian
Army was formed. The Croatian National Guard contin-
ued its existence as an integral part of the active duty
contingent of the Croatian Army and the reserve was
an agglomeration of TO personnel and the Croatian Na-
tional Guard Reserve. The General Staff of the Croatian
R
National Guard was redesignated as the General Staff
of the Croatian Armed Forces. Until the fall of 1992, the
Chief of the General Staff was General Antun Tus. He was
replaced by General Janko Bobetko, who stayed in the
post until the summer, 1995. He was in turn replaced by
General Zvonimir Červenko. The organizational structure
set up at that point remained in place, with certain mod-
ifications, until the end of the war. The Armed Forces of
the Republic of Croatia consisted of the General Staff of
the Croatian Armed Forces with a large number of HQ
4.2.2020. 19:25:52
 Davor Marijan • Rat za opstojnost Hrvata, 1991. - 1995.
s protuzračnom obranom (PZO). Do siječnja 1992. HV
je narastao na više od 60 pričuvnih brigada i desetak
samostalnih bataljuna.188
U prosincu 1991. pričuvni je sastav pojačan osni-
vanjem Domobranstva. U početnoj fazi Domobranstvo
je bilo organizirano po satnijama i bojnama u sastavu
operativnih zona. U jesen 1992. osnovane su prve do-
mobranske pukovnije. Domobranstvo je do ljeta 1994.
imalo izraženu socijalnu značajku jer je značajan dio
domobrana bio s područja koja je JNA okupirala i pre-
H
dala pobunjenim Srbima.189
U studenome 1992. ukinut je ZNG, a A brigade pre-
imenovane su u gardijske brigade HV-a. Na kraju 1992.
profesionalni sastav HV-a sastojao se od sedam gar-
dijskih brigada (nazivi od 1. do 7., s tim da je 6. kasnije
preimenovana u 9. brigadu) i 8. lakojurišne brigade Voj-
M
ne policije, a u proljeće 1994. osnovano je pet samostal-
nih gardijskih bojni (nazivi od 80. do 84.), koje su nakon
godinu dana samostalnog postojanja uvedene u sastav
postojećih gardijskih brigada, s tim da je jedna zadržana
kao podstožerna postrojba Glavnoga stožera HV-a.190
U veljači 1993. operativne zone (OZ) preimeno-
D
vane su u zapovjedništva zbornih područja (ZP), s tim
da je od bivše Operativne zone Rijeka nastalo Zborno
područje Gospić. Zborna područja su usklađena s te-
ritorijalnom podjelom Hrvatske na županije. Zborno
područje Osijek obuhvaćalo je područje Osječko-ba-
ranjske, Vukovarsko-srijemske, Brodsko-posavske,
C
Požeško-slavonske i Virovitičko-podravske županije.
Zborno područje Bjelovar obuhvaćalo je područje
Bjelovarsko-bilogorske, Koprivničko-križevačke, Me-
đimurske i Varaždinske županije. Zborno područje
Zagreb obuhvaćalo je područje Grada Zagreba i Kra-
pinsko-zagorske, Sisačko-moslavačke i Zagrebačke
županije. Zborno područje Karlovac obuhvaćalo je po-
dručje Karlovačke županije. Zborno područje Gospić
188 Zdenko RADELIĆ, Davor MARIJAN, Nikica BARIĆ, Albert
BING i Dražen ŽIVIĆ, Stvaranje hrvatske države i Domov-
inski rat, Školska knjiga, Hrvatski institut za povijest, Za-
greb, 2006., 99.
189 Zvonimir Červenko, „Novo hrvatsko domobranstvo“,
Hrvatski domobran, Glasilo udruge Hrvatski domobran,
Zagreb, br. 1 (53), veljača 1999., 3-4.
190 SVA MORH, GSHV: Uprava za ustroj, popunu i mobi-
lizaciju OS RH, Ustroj br. 1104176 i Izmjene i dopune
mob. razvoja kl. SP 801-01/94-03/17, ur. br. 512-06-
07/24-94-24 od 8. 11. 1994.; SVA MORH, GSHV, kl. 023-
01/95-02/05, ur. br. 512-06-09-95-8 od 21. 6. 1995.
102
Domovinski rat 04-02-2020 Knjiga 1.indd 102
units, six operative zones of the land forces with their
HQs in Osijek, Bjelovar, Zagreb, Karlovac, Rijeka and
Split, the Southern Front, the Croatian Navy (HRM) and
the Croatian Air Force (HRZ) and Air Defense (PZO). By
January, 1992, the Croatian Army had grown to include
more than 60 reserve brigades and about a dozen inde-
pendent battalions.
In December, 1991, the Home Guard was formed,
thus strengthening the reserve contingent of the Croa-
tian Army. In the first phase the Home Guard was orga-
nized by companies and battalions under the command
of the operative zones. In the fall of 1992 the first Home
Guard regiments were formed. Until the summer of 1994
most Home Guard soldiers hailed from the areas which
the JNA had occupied and handed over to the rebel
Serbs. It is important to mention that many unemployed
men served in the Home Guard.
In November, 1992, the ZNG was disbanded and the
A Brigades were redesignated as Guards Brigades of the
Croatian Army. At the end of 1992, the professional con-
tingent of the Croatian Army consisted of seven Guards
brigades (designated 1st to 7th initially; later on the 6th
Guards Brigade was redesignated as the 9th Brigade) and
8th Light Brigade of the Military Police. In the spring of
1994 five independent guards battalions (designated
80th to 84th) were formed. These battalions existed as in-
dependent formations for one year and then they were
incorporated into the existing guards brigades except
one which was incorporated into the General Staff of the
Croatian Army as an HQ unit.
In February, 1993, the operative zones were redesig-
nated as military districts (ZP), with no changes relating
to place names apart from Operative Zone Rijeka which
D
became Military District Gospić. The military districts
were attuned to the territorial division of the territory
of the Republic of Croatia into counties. Military District
Osijek encompassed the Osijek-Baranja County, Vuko-
var-Sirmium, Brod-Posavina, Požega-Slavonia and the
R
Virovitica-Podravina counties. Military District Bjelovar
encompassed the Bjelovar-Bilogora, Koprivnica-Križev-
ci, Međimurje and Varaždin counties. Military District
Zagreb encompassed the City of Zagreb, the Sisak-Mo-
slavina and Zagreb counties. Military District Gospić
contained/encompassed the Istria, Lika-Senj and Primor-
je-Gorski Kotar counties and the districts of Donji Lapac,
Gračac, Lovinac, Smoljanac, Titova Korenica and Udbina
– the latter being located in the Zadar-Knin County, that
is the Kotar (District) of Knin.
4.2.2020. 19:25:52
 The Croatian Nation’s Struggle for Survival, 1991-1995
obuhvaćalo je područje Istarske, Ličko-senjske i Primor-
sko-goranske županije te općine Donji Lapac, Gračac,
Lovinac, Smoljanac, Titova Korenica i Udbina iz Zadar-
sko-kninske županije, tj. Kotara Knin. Zborno područje
Split obuhvaćalo je područje Dubrovačko-neretvanske,
Splitsko-dalmatinske, Šibenske i Zadarsko-kninske žu-
panije, osim općina Donji Lapac, Gračac, Lovinac, Smo-
ljanac, Titova Korenica i Udbina iz Kotara Knin.191
Operativna zona, odnosno zborno područje konci-
pirano je kao operativna skupina koja se sastojala od
H
djelatnih i pričuvnih postrojbi HV-a i Domobranstva.
Njihov sastav se mijenjao s ustrojem Hrvatske vojske.
OZ ili ZP načelno se sastojao od gardijske motorizirane
brigade (A brigada ZNG-a), tri i više pješačkih brigada
(pbr) HV-a, tri do šest domobranskih pukovnija (dp),
bataljuna (satnije) Vojne policije, jedne do dvije logi-
M
stičke baze, brigade ili divizijuna PZO-a, topničkih divi-
zijuna za potporu i protuoklopnu borbu, inženjerijskih
i pontonirskih bojni i drugih manjih postrojba (izvid-
ničko-diverzanstke satnije, satnije veze, voda ABKO).
Dio zbornih područja imao je u svojem sastavu jednu
(ZP Zagreb, Split i Gospić) odnosno dvije gardijske bri-
D
gade (ZP Osijek), a zborna područja Karlovac i Bjelovar
bila su bez njih. Ta dva zborna područja bila su i manja
od ostalih.
Premda je konstantno imalo posebno zapovjed-
ništvo, Južno bojište (odnosno jug Republike Hrvatske)
bilo je u sastavu OZ-a Split, odnosno ZP-a Split. U trav-
C
nju 1992. osnovano je Zapovjedništvo Južnoga vojišta,
koje je bilo strategijska institucija nadređena OZ-u Split,
dijelu HRM-a i snagama HVO-a. U jesen 1992., nakon ga-
šenja Zapovjedništva Južnoga vojišta, zapovijedanje je
preuzelo Zapovjedništvo Sektora Dubrovnik, koje je 1.
D
travnja 1993. preimenovano u Zapovjedništvo Južnoga
bojišta. Od 31. srpnja 1993. Zapovjedništvo Južnoga
bojišta imalo je zonu djelovanja u južnoj Dalmaciji od
crte Lastovo – Korčula – Makarska – Imotski. Podređene
su mu bile sve postrojbe HV-a jugoistočno od te crte.
Hrvatska ratna mornarica je bila odgovorna za pri-
obalje i sastojala se od podstožernih postrojbi, plovnih
i kopnenih snaga, te pomorskih zapovjedništava za sje-
verni Jadran u Puli, srednji Jadran u Šibeniku i južni Ja-
dran u Pločama.192
191 SVA MORH, KMO: Ured Predsjednika RH, Odluka o vojno-
područnoj podjeli RH br. PA7-3/1-93 od 2. 2. 1993.
192 Z. RADELIĆ i dr., Stvaranje hrvatske države i Domovinski
rat, 99.
103
Domovinski rat 04-02-2020 Knjiga 1.indd 103
The operative zones, i.e. military districts, were con-
ceptualized as operational groups consisting of active
duty and reserve units of the Croatian Army and the
Home Guard. The composition of these operational
groups changed with the changes in the structure of the
Croatian Army. The operative zones or military districts
nominally consisted of a guard motorized brigade, three
or more infantry brigades, three to six Home Guard reg-
iments, one Military Police battalion, one or two logis-
tics bases, an Air Defense brigade or battalion, artillery
battalions for support and anti-armor combat, engineer
and pioneer battalions and other smaller formations
(recon-commando companies, signals companies, NBC
platoon). Military Districts Zagreb, Split and Gospić con-
tained one guards brigade. Military District Osijek con-
tained two guards brigades. Military Districts Karlovac
and Bjelovar had no guards brigades. The latter two mili-
tary districts were smaller than the others.
The Southern Theater of Operations had its own
separate headquarters throughout, but it nevertheless
formed part of Operative Zone Split, and later of Military
District Split. In April, 1992, the Main HQ of the Southern
Theater of Operations was formed. It was a strategic in-
stitution to which Operative Zone Split, some elements
of the Croatian Navy, and the Croatian Defense Council
(HVO) were subordinated. In the fall of 1992, when the
Main HQ of the Southern Theater of Operations was
disbanded, the formations hitherto under its command
were placed under the command of the Sector Du-
brovnik HQ which was, on July 31, 1993, redesignated as
the Supreme Command of the Southern Theater of Op-
erations. The area of operations of the Southern Theater
was in southern Dalmatia. All the units deployed to the
southeast of the Lastovo – Korčula – Makarska – Imots-
ki line were under the direct command of the Supreme
Command of the Southern Theater.
The Croatian Navy operated along the whole length
of the Croatian coast and consisted of HQ units, naval
R
and ground forces and maritime HQs for the northern
Adriatic in Pula, the central Adriatic in Šibenik and south-
ern Adriatic in Ploče.
The Croatian Air Force and Air Defense became an
important branch of the Croatian Armed Forces only in
1992. The Croatian Air Force and Air Defense comprised
a system of air bases, air force units, one air surveillance
and navigation brigade and various institutions.
In mid-1994, the 1st Croatian Guards Corps was
formed out of elements of the professional units of the
4.2.2020. 19:25:52
 Davor Marijan • Rat za opstojnost Hrvata, 1991. - 1995.
H
M
Hrvatsko ratno zrakoplovstvo i protuzračna obrana
su tek 1992. postali značajnija grana HV-a. HRZ i PZO
su organizirani u sustav zrakoplovnih baza, zračnih po-
strojbi, brigade ZMIN i raznih ustanova.193
D
Sredinom 1994. od dijela profesionalnih postroj-
bi osnovan je 1. hrvatski gardijski zbor koji je bio spoj
počasne, osiguravajuće i borbene postrojbe, ali izvan
sastava Oružanih snaga RH. Bio je smješten u Zagrebu
i bližoj okolici, na poligonu Gakovo kod Grubišnog Po-
lja, u Puli i na Brijunima.194
C
Brojno stanje Hrvatske vojske razlikovalo se ovisno
o intenzitetu borbi. Najviše je ljudi HV imao početkom
1992. i u vrijeme operacije Oluja u ljeto 1995. godine.
Krajem 1991. i početkom 1992. pod oružjem je bilo oko
200.000 ljudi. Potkraj 1992. u vojsci je bilo 127.966, a
godinu poslije 116.237 ljudi. Krajem 1994. HV je imao
90.784 pripadnika. Tijekom 1995. brojno stanje Hrvat-
ske vojske bilo je od 96.800 do 205.397.195
193 Isto.
194 SVA MORH, GSHV: Predsjednik RH, Odluka br. PA7-61/1-
94 od 31. 3. 1994.; SVA MORH, GSHV: MORH, Izmjene i
dopune mobilizacijskog razvoja i ustroja OS RH kl. SP
801-01/94-03, ur. br. 512-01-94-1259 od 29. 3. 1994.
195 SVA MORH, GSHV: Izvješće GSHV o stanju borbe-
ne spremnosti HV u prosincu 1994. godine; Franjo
TUĐMAN, Stanje hrvatske države i nacije, Ministarst-
vo obrane, Politička uprava, Zagreb, 1995., 28; Franjo
TUĐMAN, Pet godina hrvatske pobjede, Ministarstvo
obrane, Politička uprava, Zagreb, 1996., 23.
104
Domovinski rat 04-02-2020 Knjiga 1.indd 104
Hrvatski vojnici.
Croatian soldiers.
Croatian Army. The 1st Croatian Guards Corps combined
ceremonial, security and combat roles and existed out-
side the chain of command of the Armed Forces of the
Republic of Croatia. It was stationed in Zagreb and in
the capital’s environs, in the Gakovo training center near
Grubišno Polje, in Pula and on the Brijuni Islands.
The numerical strength of the Croatian Army, at
any given moment, depended on the intensity of the
fighting during the period of time in question. At two
points during the Croatian War of Independence, the
Croatian Army had significantly more men under arms
than at any other; at the beginning of 1992 and in the
summer of 1995, just before the commencement of
Operation Storm. At the end of 1991 and beginning
of 1992, there were about 200,000 men serving un-
D
der arms in the Croatian Army. By the end of 1992, the
number of men serving under arms had been reduced
to 127,966. During the second half of 1993 the Croatian
Army consisted of 116,237 soldiers. At the end of 1994
the number was 90,784. During 1995 the numerical
strength of the Croatian Army steadily increased from
R
96,800 at the beginning of the year to 205,397 soldiers
prior to Operation Storm.
4.2.2020. 19:25:52
 The Croatian Nation’s Struggle for Survival, 1991-1995
HRVATSKE OBRAMBENE
SNAGE – HOS
Hrvatske obrambene snage, poznatije po kratici
HOS, bile su paravojni sastavi Hrvatske stranke prava
(HSP) koji su djelovali u Hrvatskoj i BiH. Arhivskoga gra-
diva o HOS-u vrlo je malo, što otvara mogućnost razli-
čitih tumačenja njihova postojanja. Hrvatske obrambe-
ne snage navodno su osnovane krajem lipnja 1991., a
jedva mjesec dana poslije, 20. srpnja, čelnik HSP-a Do-
H
broslav Paraga dao je intervju u kojem je najavio da u
stranci prestaju biti samo političari i postaju vojnici.196
Paraga je bio glavni zapovjednik HOS-a. Glavno tijelo
HOS-a bio je Ratni stožer, čiji je načelnik bio Ante Pa-
radžik, a nakon njegove smrti Ante Đapić.197
M
Zbog izgleda i pozivanja na Nezavisnu Državu
Hrvatsku HOS je dobio mnogo veći prostor no što je
značio na hrvatskom ratištu. Državna komisija koja
je istraživala uzroke pada Vukovara u prosincu 1991.,
pozivajući se na podatke MUP-a, procijenila je brojno
stanje HOS-a na oko 250 ljudi, iako je ono tada bilo za-
D
sigurno veće.198 Prema poslijeratnoj tvrdnji Vlade Juki-
ća, kroz HOS Hrvatske tijekom 1991. prošlo je oko 3100
ljudi, s tim da točno prosječno stanje nije poznato.199
Ustroj HOS-a u Hrvatskoj teško je pratiti, čini se da
ih je bilo svugdje gdje je postojala neka podružnica
HSP-a. Postrojbe HOS-a različite jačine dokumentirane
C
su u: Bjelovaru, Bogdanovcima, Jastrebarskom, Kopriv-
nici, Makarskoj, Novskoj, Ogulinu, Osijeku, Vinkovcima,
D
196 Krešimir PAVELIĆ, HSP – od obnove do slobode: politikan-
ti, karijeristi, demagozi, pseudopravaši, masoni i kosovci,
Krešimir Pavelić – Hrvatska demokratska stranka pra-
va, Zagreb, 1995., 88; “Hrvatske obrambene snage”, na:
http://hr.wikipedija.org/wiki/Hrvatske_obrambene_
snage (pristup 21. 5. 2013.).
197 Vrhovni zapovjednik HOS-a od 2. 2. 1992. Imenovanje;
Podružnica HSP-a Livno od 3. 2. 1992.
198 “Izravna prijetnja ustavnom poretku”, Vjesnik, 5. 12.
1991., 9.
199 Podatak dobiven u prosincu 2006. od Vlade Jukića,
tadašnjega saborskog zastupnika i člana Hrvatske
stranke prava.
105
Domovinski rat 04-02-2020 Knjiga 1.indd 105
THE CROATIAN DEFENSE
FORCES – HOS
The Croatian Defense Forces, popularly known by
the abbreviation HOS, were paramilitary formations of
the Croatian Party of Rights (HSP). The HOS was engaged
in operations in Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina.
There is a dearth of archival material regarding the HOS.
For that reason, various theories have been developed
in relation to the formation of the HOS and its role and
combat value during the war. It is not clear when the
HOS was formed; probably at the end of June, 1991. On
July 20, 1991, the leader of the Croatian Party of Rights,
Dobroslav Paraga, gave an interview to a leading Croa-
tian publication in which he stated that the members of
the party could no longer be called politicians because
they were now soldiers. Paraga was also the command-
er of the HOS. The ruling organ of the HOS was the War
Headquarters, headed by Ante Paradžik. When Paradžik
died, Ante Đapić assumed the role. In mid-November,
1991, the leadership of the Croatian Party of Rights is-
sued a document calling on its members to join the HOS.
The HOS subscribed to the ethos of the Independent
State of Croatia. Its members used every opportunity to
flaunt their allegiance to the tenets of the Independent
State of Croatia’s ideology. Consequently, the HOS got
much more media attention than its numbers and com-
bat value truly deserved. The state commission that in-
vestigated the causes of the fall of Vukovar concluded, in
December, 1991, and based on the information provided
by the Ministry of Internal Affairs, that there were about
250 HOS members in Vukovar during the siege. Howev-
er, not all HOS soldiers fought in Vukovar and it stands
to reason that the numerical strength of the HOS at that
particular time was considerably greater. Vlado Jukić
stated after the war that a total of 3,100 men had served
in the HOS during the course of 1991 but that due to a
lack of archival material and information about the HOS
R
it was impossible to accurately break the number down
in relation to specific months of 1991.
The organization, countrywide, of the HOS is dif-
ficult to reconstruct. It seems that wherever in Croatia
the HSP had a branch, there were also members of the
HOS. It is known that HOS units of varying strengths op-
erated in Bjelovar, Bogdanovci, Jastrebarsko, Koprivni-
ca, Makarska, Novska, Ogulin, Osijek, Vinkovci, Vukovar,
Zagreb and Županja. The largest and most famous HOS
4.2.2020. 19:25:52
 Davor Marijan • Rat za opstojnost Hrvata, 1991. - 1995.

Pripadnik HOS-a: Jean-Michel Nicolier (Vesel, Francuska, 1966. – Vukovar /Ovčara/, 1991.) – jedan
od stranih dragovoljaca koji je branio Hrvatsku, ranjen je u borbama i dovezen u vukovarsku bolni-
cu; nakon ulaska u bolnicu, pripadnici srpskih snaga odveli su ga na Ovčaru i ubili, a njegovo tijelo
do danas nije pronađeno.

Jean-Michel Nicolier (Vesoul, France, 1966 – Vukovar /Ovčara, 1991), a soldier in the HOS. He
was one of the foreign volunteers who defended Croatia. During the siege of Vukovar he was
wounded and treated at the Vukovar hospital. When the city fell Serb soldiers entered the hos-
pital and took more than 200 wounded soldiers and civilian patients to Ovčara and killed them
there, including Jean-Michel Nicolier. His body has not yet been found.
H
M
Vukovaru, Zagrebu i Županji.200 Najveća i najpoznatija formation was the 9th HOS Central Dalmatia Battalion
postrojba HOS-a bila je IX. srednjodalmatinska bojna “Rafael Vitez Boban” with its HQ in Split. The battalion
HOS-a Rafael vitez Boban sa sjedištem u Splitu. Bojna je consisted of at least four companies. The 4th Company of
D
imala najmanje četiri satnije, od kojih je 4. bila otočna. the 9th HOS Central Dalmatia Battalion “Rafael Vitez Bo-
Od siječnja do sredine ožujka 1992. bojna je na Korču- ban” was stationed on the island of Brač. From January
li imala svoj kamp, koji je ukinut na pritisak Hrvatske to mid-March, 1991, the battalion had its training camp
ratne mornarice.201 Nakon uhićenja Dobroslava Parage on Korčula. The camp was closed down at the insistence
i Mile Dedakovića Jastreba u studenome 1991. HOS se of the Croatian Navy. After the arrests of Dobroslav Para-
C
nastojalo ukinuti ili uklopiti u sastav ZNG-a i HV-a, što ga and Mile Dedaković in November, 1991, the Croatian
je do sredine 1992. i realizirano. government strove to disband the HOS and incorporate
its members into the ZNG and the Croatian Army. That
was achieved in mid-1992.
200 SVA MORH, ZOZB: 117. brigada ZNG, Izvješće pov. br.
136-2/91 od 31. 10. 1991.; SVA MORH, GSHV: MUP RH,
D
Izvještaji o obavljenoj inspekciji br. 511-01-21-30248/91
od 11. 12. 1991.; SVA MORH, ZOGV: ZOGVVŽ, pov. br. 525-
122-289/91 od 22. 11. 1991.; HDA, UPRH: Sigurnosno-in-
formativna služba MORH, Informacija br. 512-989/92 od
18. 2. 1992.; Raščlamba bojnih djelovanja na području
“Vukovar-Vinkovci-Županja” tijekom 1991., Osijek, 2000.,
26-28; K. PAVELIĆ, HSP – od obnove do slobode, 95; Mile
R
DEDAKOVIĆ-JASTREB, Alenka MIRKOVIĆ-NAĐ, Davor
RUNTIĆ, Bitka za Vukovar, Neobična naklada, Vinkovci,
2000., 175-176; Davor MARIJAN, Bitka za Vukovar, Hrvats-
ki institut za povijest, Podružnica za povijest Slavonije,
Srijema i Baranje, Zagreb – Slavonski Brod, 2004., 232;
Povjesnica zagrebačkih ratnih zapovjedništava i postrojbi
HV-a i MUP-a, Grad Zagreb, Zagreb, 2006., 27; D. MARI-
JAN, Novska u Domovinskom ratu, 65-66.
201 SVA MORH, GSHV: Zapovjedništvo Hrvatske ratne mor-
narice, Djelovanje HSP-a, odnosno HOS-a na otoku
Korčuli, kl. 035-01/92-01/398, ur. br. 6030-04/92-1 od
2. 4. 1992.

106

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 The Croatian Nation’s Struggle for Survival, 1991-1995
SRPSKA VOJSKA KRAJINE
Oružane snage pobunjenih Srba nastale su naj-
većim dijelom na organizacijskoj strukturi unutarnjih
poslova i narodne obrane SR Hrvatske. Prva oružana
formacija bila je Milicija SAO Krajine, koja je po svojem
vođi, inspektoru Milanu Martiću, prozvana Martićevom
milicijom. Nastala je odmetanjem ljudstva i policijskih
postaja iz sastava Ministarstva unutarnjih poslova RH.
Službeno je osnovana u siječnju 1991. kao Sekretarijat
H
za unutarnje poslove sa sjedištem u Kninu. U sastav su
ušle milicijske stanice Obrovac, Benkovac, Gračac, Tito-
va Korenica, Donji Lapac, Dvor na Uni, Glina, Kostajni-
ca, Vojnić i Knin. Početkom rujna 1991. milicija je imala
oko 2900 ljudi.202
M
Vojna organizacija pobunjenih Srba nastala je 1991.
na prostornoj strukturi TO RH. Njezin ustroj, odnosno
pozivanje ljudstva na oružje, bio je različit u pojedinim
pobunjeničkim krajevima. Početak je vjerojatno bio
u svibnju u istočnoj Slavoniji, nakon sukoba u Borovu
Selu, kada su u pojedinim selima sa srpskim stanovniš-
tvom osnovani ratni štabovi i postrojbe Teritorijalne
D
obrane. U srpnju je osnovan dio općinskih i regionalnih
štabova TO-a kao i dio postrojba TO-a. U kolovozu su od
regionalnih štabova osnovane tri operativne zone Teri-
torijalne obrane SAO Krajine: za područje sjeverne Dal-
macije i Like, za područje Korduna i za područje Banovi-
C
ne, no nema pouzdanih dokaza da su djelovale. Osnova
za ustroj bio je Zakon o obrani Republike Srbije, koji je 1.
kolovoza 1991. prihvaćen za područje SAO Krajine. Oru-
žane snage SAO Krajine postale su Teritorijalna obrana i
Postrojbe za posebne namjene Ministarstva unutarnjih
poslova. Od rujna 1991. Teritorijalna obrana SAO Kraji-
D
ne bila je sastavni dio posrbljenih Oružanih snaga SFRJ i
uglavnom je bila podređena komandama JNA. U sluča-
jevima bojnih zadaća Milicija SAO Krajine podređena je
početkom listopada zapovjednicima TO-a.203
202 HMDCDR: Izvršno vijeće SAOK, Obavijest o formiranju
Sekretarijata za unutrašnje poslove SAOK br. 01/91 od 5.
1. 1991.; Milisav SEKULIĆ, Knin je pao u Beogradu, Nidda
Verlag GmbH, Bad Vilbel, 2000., 31.
203 Odluka o primjeni Zakona o odbrani Republike Srbije
na teritoriji Srpske autonomne oblasti Krajine, Glasnik
Krajine, 26. 8. 1991., 1; HMDCDR: Predsjednik Vlade SAO
Krajine, Naređenje br. 179/91-1 od 8. 8. 1991.; HMDCDR:
Predsjednik Vlade SAO Krajine, Naređenje br. 2/1-91 od
9. 10. 1991.; D. MARIJAN, Slom Titove armije, 286-286; D.
MARIJAN, Obrana i pad Vukovara, 37.
107
Domovinski rat 04-02-2020 Knjiga 1.indd 107
THE SERBIAN ARMY OF
KRAJINA
The Armed Forces of the rebel Serbs were created,
for the most part, on the existing organizational struc-
ture of the internal affairs and national defense of the
Socialist Republic of Croatia. The first armed formation
of the rebel Serbs was the Militia of the SAO Krajina. Its
leader was Milan Martić, a former militia chief. The Militia
of the SAO Krajina was known as Martić’s Militia. Its mem-
bers were renegade police officers from the Ministry of
Internal Affairs of the Republic of Croatia. The Militia of
the SAO Krajina was formally formed in January, 1991, as
the Secretariat of Internal Affairs with its seat in Knin. It
consisted of the following police stations: Obrovac, Ben-
kovac, Gračac, Titova Korenica, Donji Lapac, Dvor na Uni,
Glina, Kostajnica, Vojnić and Knin. At the beginning of
September, 1991, 2,900 men served in the Militia of the
SAO Krajina.
The military of the rebel Serbs was formed in 1991.
Its organization was based on the territorial structure
of the Territorial Defense of the Republic of Croatia.
The process by which men were mobilized into the
military of the rebel Serbs differed from region to re-
gion. Generally speaking, it could be argued that the
mobilization process began in May in eastern Slavonia,
when War Headquarters units and Territorial Defense
units were formed in a number of Serb villages after
the incident in Borovo Selo. In July some municipal and
regional HQs of the Territorial Defense were formed
as well as some units of the Territorial Defense. In Au-
gust, three operative zones of the Territorial Defense
of the SAO Krajina were formed out of the regional
HQs: for the region of northern Dalmatia and Lika, for
the region of Kordun and for the region of Banovina.
There exists no evidence that these zones, in terms of
chain of command, were ever viable. The basis for the
R
formation of these zones was the Law on Defense of
the Republic of Serbia, adopted on August 1, 1991, for
the region of the SAO Krajina. The armed forces of the
SAO Krajina became the Territorial Defense and Special
Purpose Units of the Ministry of Internal Affairs. From
September, 1991, the Territorial Defense of the SAO
Krajina was an integral part of the Armed Forced of the
SFRY (effectively by this stage the Serbian army) and
was subordinated, for the most part, to various JNA
commands. In relation to combat duties, the Militia of
4.2.2020. 19:25:52
 Davor Marijan • Rat za opstojnost Hrvata, 1991. - 1995.
U rujnu 1991. JNA je kadrovski pojačala snage po-
bunjenih hrvatskih Srba. Veći broj oficira i mlađih ofi-
cira dobio je 20. rujna 1991. imenovanja i upućen je u
Hrvatsku da bi vodio srpske pobunjenike. U rujnu je u
Kninu osnovan Glavni štab TO-a, a komandanti su bili
general Ilija Đujić, pukovnik Radoslav Maksić i general
Milan Torbica. U studenome su općinski štabovi TO-a
preustrojeni i osnovane su brigade i odredi. Ukupno je
osnovana 21 brigada i 29 odreda TO-a. Novoustrojene
brigade operativno su podređene komandama JNA i
H
stavljene na njihovu opskrbu. Ustroj TO-a na području
Slavonije bio je drugačiji. U zapadnoj je Slavoniji bilo
šest općinskih štabova i Štab TO SAO Zapadne Slavo-
nije. U istočnoj Slavoniji, Srijemu i Baranji pobunjenički
je TO bio organiziran po sastavima do razine odreda,
koji su bili podređeni Štabu TO Slavonije, Baranje i Za-
M
padnog Srijema. U prosincu 1991. osnovan je Zonski
štab Teritorijalne obrane za istočnu Slavoniju, Baranju
i zapadni Srijem.204
Nakon što je u prosincu 1991. proglašena Republi-
ka Srpska Krajina, JNA je do svibnja 1992. preustrojila
Teritorijalnu obranu i izradila za nju planove obrane.
D
Oružana sila pobunjenih hrvatskih Srba organizirana
je u šest operativnih zona, Upravu posebnih jedinica
milicije i postrojbe izravno podređene Glavnomu šta-
bu Teritorijalne obrane i Ministarstvu obrane. Krajem
proljeća i ljeta 1992. pobunjeni su Srbi onemogućili
izvlačenje glavnine naoružanja i opreme Kninskoga i
C
Bihaćkoga korpusa JNA, zbog čega je bilo promjena u
organizaciji TO-a.205
U studenome 1992. TO je preimenovan u Srpsku
vojsku Republike Srpske Krajine, odnosno Srpsku voj-
sku Krajine. Najvažnija promjena bila je preimenovanje
operativnih zona u korpuse i ukidanje Uprave i poseb-
nih jedinica milicije, koje su s opremom i ljudstvom in-
tegrirane u SVK. Općinski štabovi TO-a ugrađeni su u
zapovjedništva i postrojbe po odlukama komandanata
204 HMDCDR: Naređenje, Štab TO SAO Zapadna Slavonija
od 2. 9. 1991.; HMDCDR: GŠTO RSK, Materijal za sedni-
cu Vlade RSK, juli 1992.; D. MARIJAN, Slom Titove armije,
287-288.
205 HMDCDR: Naredba, DT br. 892-1 Saveznog sekretara za
narodnu odbranu od 27. 2. 1992.; HMDCDR: Naređen-
je str. pov. br. 1349-1 Saveznog sekretara za narodnu
odbranu od 24. 3. 1992.; HMDCDR: Naređenje str. pov. br.
1943-1 Saveznog sekretara za narodnu odbranu od 28. 4.
1992.; HMDCDR: GŠ TO RSK, Organizacijsko-formacijske
promene u TO RS Krajina str. pov. br. 697-28 od 28. 8. 1992.
108
Domovinski rat 04-02-2020 Knjiga 1.indd 108
the SAO Krajina was under the command of the Com-
manders of the Territorial Defense.
On September 20 the JNA gave commissions in the
military force of the rebel Serbs in Croatia to a large num-
ber of JNA senior and junior officers. The purpose was to
increase the combat value of the Serb rebels in Croatia.
The HQ of TO was formed in Knin and its commanders
were General Ilija Đujić, Colonel Radoslav Maksić, and
General Milan Torbica. In November the municipal HQs
were restructured and brigades and detachments were
formed. In total, 21 brigades and 29 detachments of the
Territorial Defense were formed. The newly formed bri-
gades were placed under the command of JNA HQs and
were equipped and maintained by the JNA. The structure
of the Territorial Defense in Slavonia was different. There
were six municipal HQs and HQ of the Territorial Defense
of SAO (Serbian Autonomous District) Western Slavonia in
western Slavonia. In eastern Slavonia, Sirmium and Baran-
ja the rebel Territorial Defense was organized according
to units up to detachment-strength. These detachments
were under the command of the HQ of the Territorial De-
fense of Slavonia, Baranja and Western Sirmium. In De-
cember, 1991, Operative Zone HQ for Eastern Slavonia,
Baranja and Western Sirmium was formed.
After the Republic of Serbian Krajina had been pro-
claimed in December 1991, the JNA, by May, 1992, re-
structured the Territorial Defense and created operation-
al defensive plans for the Territorial Defense. The armed
force of the rebel Serbs in Croatia was organized into six
operative zones, the administration of the special militia
units (special police) and units directly subordinated to
the Main HQ of the Territorial Defense and the Ministry of
Defense. At the end of spring and beginning of summer,
D
1992, the rebel Serbs prevented the JNA from pulling out
most of the weapons and equipment belonging to Knin
and Bihać Corps. Consequently, the organizational struc-
ture of the Territorial Defense was changed.
In November, 1992, the Territorial Defense was
R
renamed the Army of the Republic of Serbian Krajina,
that is, the Serbian Army of Krajina. The most signifi-
cant changes, however, were redesignating the oper-
ative zones as corps and disbanding the Administra-
tion of the Special Militia units and the Special Militia
units which were incorporated into the Serbian Army
of Krajina. The municipal HQs of the Territorial Defense
were incorporated into units and HQs, according to
the orders of the corps commanders. The Main HQ of
the Territorial Defense was renamed the Main HQ of
4.2.2020. 19:25:52
 The Croatian Nation’s Struggle for Survival, 1991-1995
korpusa. Glavni štab Teritorijalne obrane preimenovan
je u Glavni štab Srpske vojske Krajine. Sjedište je bilo
u Kninu, a komandanti su bili generali Mile Novaković,
Milan Čeleketić i Mile Mrkšić. U sastavu Ministarstva
unutarnjih poslova RSK osnovana je Specijalna briga-
da Ministarstva unutarnjih poslova RSK, koja je trebala
imati oko 500 ljudi i biti izravno podređena ministru
unutarnjih poslova RSK.206
Zrakoplovstvo se u početku sastojalo od zrako-
plovne brigade i baze, a početkom 1994. osnovana je
H
divizija ratnoga zrakoplovstva i protuzračne obrane.207
Operativne zone Teritorijalne obrane RSK nisu bile
ujednačene, nego su formirane na temelju količine
oružja i opreme koje je ostavila JNA i demografskih
mogućnosti regije. Korpusi su naslijedili zone i bili su
sličnog sastava, s tim da je tendencija bila da se po
M
formaciji približe korpusima JNA, čemu je bio najbliži
Sjevernodalmatinski korpus.
Paralelno s ustrojem Teritorijalne obrane Republike
Srpske Krajine JNA je dala i personalnu potporu, šaljući
oficire i podoficire koji su trebali voditi novu srpsku voj-
sku izvan Srbije. Uglavnom su to bili oficiri i podoficiri
D
rođeni na području Republike Hrvatske. Njihov je an-
gažman trajao od šest mjeseci do jedne godine, a kon-
kretan zadatak i imenovanje određivao im je koman-
dant Glavnoga štaba Teritorijalne obrane RSK. Savezna
Republika Jugoslavija osnovala je u studenome 1993.
godine 40. kadrovski centar za personalnu potporu, a
C
potom i opskrbu pobunjenih Srba naoružanjem i voj-
nom opremom.208
Najveća organizacijska promjena u SVK-u bio je
pokušaj profesionalizacije dijela snaga. To se, nakon
propalog pokušaja u 1993., pokušalo učiniti u ljeto
D
1995. osnivanjem Korpusa specijalnih jedinica (KSJ) s
206 ICTY: GŠ SV RSK, Preformiranje TO i posebnih jedinica
milicije u Srpsku vojsku RSK, DT br. 947-23/1 od 27. 11.
1992.; ICTY: MUP RSK, Prijem u specijalnu brigadu MUP
RSK, konkurs pov. br. 08/4-1-269-1 od 30. 12. 1992.; M.
SEKULIĆ, Knin je pao u Beogradu, 36-39.
207 HMDCDR: GŠ SVK, Organizacijsko-formacijske promene
SVK, Naređenje str. pov. br. 8-14 od 15. 2. 1994.
208 HMDCDR: Ministarstvo odbrane RSK, Saopštenje br. 01-
33 od 10. 5. 1992.; ICTY: Naredba str. pov. br. 3087-1 od
15. 11. 1993. načelnika Generalštaba VJ od 15. 11. 1993.;
ICTY: Predsednik Savezne Republike Jugoslavije, Nared-
ba str. pov. br. 1/2-02-004/94-1 od 18. 2. 1994.; Davor
MARIJAN, Smrt oklopne brigade; Prilozi za istraživanje
rata za Hrvatsku i Bosnu i Hercegovinu 1990.-1992., Nak-
lada Zoro, Zagreb-Sarajevo, 2002., 24-25.
109
Domovinski rat 04-02-2020 Knjiga 1.indd 109
the Serbian Army of Krajina. Its base was in Knin and
its commanders were Generals Mile Novaković, Milan
Čeleketić and Mile Mrkšić. The Special Operations Bri-
gade of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Republic
of Serbian Krajina was formed. The Brigade was sup-
posed to consist of 500 men and be subordinated di-
rectly to the Minister of Internal Affairs of the Republic
of Serbian Krajina.
The Air Force at first consisted of one air brigade and
one air base. At the beginning of 1994, a division of the
Air Force and Air Defense was formed.
The operative zones of the Territorial Defense of
the RSK were not evenly balanced – they were formed
on the basis on how much weaponry the JNA had left
in a given locality and on the demographic picture of
a given region. The operative zones were replaced by
corps. The corps’ composition pretty much mirrored
that of the operative zones they replaced and the idea
was to make them as similar as possible to the JNA
Corps. The most successful RSK Corps in that regard
was North Dalmatia Corps.
The JNA organized the Territorial Defense of the
Republic of Serbian Krajina and sent its officers and
non-commissioned officers to the Republic of Serbian
Krajina to train and lead the statelet’s army. For the most
part the officers sent to the Republic of Serbian Krajina
were individuals of Serb ethnicity born in the Republic
of Croatia. Their tours of duty in the Republic of Serbi-
an Krajina lasted from six months to a year and they re-
ceived their orders and commissions directly from the
Commander of the Main HQ of the Territorial Defense of
the Republic of Serbian Krajina. In November, 1993, the
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia formed the 40th Person-
nel Center and set up a system whereby weapons and
matériel were sent to the rebel Serbs from the Federal
Republic of Yugoslavia on a regular basis.
The largest organizational change in the Serbian
Army of Krajina was an attempt to form professional
R
units. In the summer of 1995 Special Forces Corps (KSJ)
was formed. It is worth pointing out that the previous
attempt to form such units in 1993 had failed. The HQ
of the newly formed unit was in Slunj. The Corps was or-
ganized on the model of a similar JNA formation. Its pri-
mary envisaged task and purpose was rapid combat de-
ployment in combat zones of critical importance. It was
to consist of three small brigades (guards, armored and
special), one battalion and two independent battalions.
With Special Forces Corps becoming active, the other
4.2.2020. 19:25:53
 Davor Marijan • Rat za opstojnost Hrvata, 1991. - 1995.

komandom u Slunju. Korpus je formiran po uzoru na sli-

čan u Vojsci Jugoslavije i predviđao se kao brzopokretni
i borbeno spremni sastav za intervencije u zonama gdje
se odigravaju odlučujuća zbivanja. Trebao se sastojati
od tri manje brigade (gardijske, oklopne i specijalne),
jednog divizijuna i dva samostalna bataljuna. Specijalni
je korpus trebao ostale korpuse osloboditi obveze da
imaju jaču interventnu pričuvu.209
Po slomu SVK-a u zapadnom dijelu Hrvatske osno-
van je dobrovoljački bataljun od ljudstva iz zapadne
H
Slavonije, a bio je smješten na području Kozare. Uz Pripadnici Srpske vojske Krajine. / Members of the Serbian Army of
pomoć Generalštaba Vojske Jugoslavije (GŠ VJ) koman- Krajina (Army of Krajina – magazin, 11 July 1995)
dant Glavnoga štaba SVK-a planirao je stvaranje novog
SVK-a po načelu naoružanog naroda.210 Pokušaj nije us-
pio i 16. rujna 1995. Srpska vojska Krajine i službeno je
prestala postojati u zapadnom dijelu Hrvatske.211
M
U ratu 1991. – 1992. u sastavu TO SAO Krajine od- corps would not have to be burdened with the obliga-
nosno RSK bilo je 65.914 ljudi. U ljeto 1992., nakon tion to maintain a strong operational reserve.
formacijskih promjena, Teritorijalna obrana RSK imala After the defeat of the SVK in the western part of Cro-
je po formaciji 35.703 pripadnika. Bilo je to najmanje atia a volunteer battalion composed of men from west-
brojno stanje vojne sile pobunjenih Srba, s tim da u ern Slavonia was formed. It was deployed in the Kozara
taj broj nije bilo uračunato ljudstvo osam brigada mi- area. With the help of the General Staff of the Yugoslav
D
licije. Srpska vojska Krajine u proljeće 1995. po ratnoj Army (GŠVJ) the Commander of the Main HQ of the SVK
je formaciji imala 80.080 ljudi, a popuna je bila mogu- planned to restructure the SVK on the principle of a peo-
ća za 62.483 pripadnika. Po mirnodopskoj formaciji, ple in arms. The plan did not come to fruition and on Sep-
Srpska vojska Krajine imala je 15.486 ljudi, a stvarno tember 16, 1995, the SVK officially ceased to exist in the
14.865 pripadnika.212 western part of the Republic of Croatia.
During 1991 and 1992, 65,914 men served in TO SAO
C
Krajina and TO RSK. In the summer of 1992, after it had
been restructured, the TO of the RSK had 35,703 men un-
der arms. The armed force of the rebel Serbs was numer-
ically weaker at that point than at any given time before
or since during the war. It has to be noted, though, that
D
the number cited above does not include the personnel
of the eight militia brigades. The Serbian Army of Kraji-
na in the spring of 1995 had 80,080 men on active duty,
with an additional 62,483 men in reserve. The peacetime
contingent of the Serbian Army of Krajina numbered,
on paper, 15,487 men. Its actual strength, however, was
R
209 HMDCDR: GŠ SV RSK, Transformacija SVK, Naređenje str.
pov. br. 3-268 od 22. 5. 1995.; VSA MORH: Pregled korpusa 14,865 soldiers.
specijalnih jedinica (dokument bez urudžbenog broja i
nadnevka); M. SEKULIĆ, Knin je pao u Beogradu, 157.
210 ICTY: GŠ SVK, Stavovi GŠ SVK i VRS za službeni razgovor s
Načelnikom GŠ VJ br. 10/43 od 18. 8. 1995.
211 ICTY: Ratni dnevnik 1. krajiškog korpusa, zabilješka od
16. 9. 1995.
212 HMDCDR: GŠTO RSK, Materijal za sednicu Vlade RSK, juli
1992.; HMDCDR: Pregled popune ljudstvom SVK po rat-
noj formaciji sa stanjem na dan 1. 5. 1995.

110

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 The Croatian Nation’s Struggle for Survival, 1991-1995
HRVATSKO VIJEĆE OBRANE
Oružana sila Hrvata u BiH nazvana je Hrvatsko vije-
će obrane, isto kao i upravni sustav Hrvatske zajednice
Herceg-Bosne, što često izaziva nedoumice. Hrvatsko
vijeće obrane nastalo je na ostacima prostorne struktu-
re Teritorijalne obrane SR BiH. Ona je 1990. razoružana i
marginalizirana, pa je krajem 1991., s iznimkom nesrp-
skih područja, bila svedena na snagu simbolična zna-
čenja.213 Hrvatsko vijeće obrane formalno je osnovano
H
u Mostaru 8. travnja 1992., iako je već u ljeto 1991.
postojala izvjesna obrambena organizacija. U odluci o
formiranju, HVO je definiran kao “vrhovno tijelo obra-
ne hrvatskog naroda” čiji je zadatak zaštita hrvatskoga,
kao i drugih naroda u toj zajednici.214
M
Do kasnoga ljeta odnosno rane jeseni 1992. HVO
se temeljio na sustavu općinskih stožera. Oni su nastali
preimenovanjem iz kriznih štabova ili bivših štabova
TO-a. Općinski su stožeri ukinuti krajem 1992., nakon
što je završeno formiranje zapovjedništava operativnih
zona i brigada.215
Osnivanjem operativnih zona HVO je ustalio or-
D
ganizaciju koja je s manjim izmjenama postojala do
kraja rata. Sastojala se od Glavnoga stožera HVO-a s
podstožernim postrojbama, četiri operativne zone i
Vojne policije. Glavni stožer HVO-a službeno je osno-
van 10. travnja 1992. godine, a prethodio mu je Stožer
C
Herceg-Bosne u Grudama čiji je zapovjednik bio pu-
kovnik Ante Mikulić.216 Sjedište Glavnoga stožera bilo
je u Mostaru, potom u Čitluku i na kraju u Posušju. Za-
povjednici i načelnici Glavnoga stožera HVO-a bili su
generali Ante Roso i Milivoj Petković, Slobodan Praljak
i Tihomir Blaškić.
D
Od proljeća 1993. u sastavu HVO-a osnivale su se
domobranske postrojbe, čija je svrha bila zaštita terito-
213 Mesud ŠADINLIJA, Teritorijalna odbrana Bosne i Herce-
govine 1986–1992, Univerzitet u Sarajevu, Institut za
istraživanje zločina protiv čovječnosti i međunarodnog
prava, Sarajevo, 2013., 179-195.
214 Odluka predsjednika HVO i HZ HB od 8. 4. 1992. o
formiranju Hrvatskog vijeća obrane, Narodni list HZ Her-
ceg-Bosna, rujan 1992., 4.
215 Glavni stožer HVO, Zapovijed br. 01-92/92 od 10. 4.
1992.; Odjel obrane HZ HB, Ukidanje općinskih stožera,
zapovijed br. 03-294/92 od 26. 12. 1992.
216 Stožer Herceg-Bosne, Zahtjev za pomoć br. 04-41/92 od
7. 4. 1992.
111
Domovinski rat 04-02-2020 Knjiga 1.indd 111
THE CROATIAN DEFENSE
COUNCIL
The armed force of the Bosnian Croats was named
the Croatian Defense Council. The same name, confus-
ingly for those interested in the subject of the Bosnian
War 1991-1995, was given to the administrative system
and organization of the Croatian Community of Her-
zeg-Bosnia. The Croatian Defense Council was created
on the remnants of the territorial structure of the Ter-
ritorial Defense of the Socialist Republic of Bosnia and
Herzegovina. The Territorial Defense force of the Socialist
Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina was disarmed and
thus marginalized in 1990. At the end of 1991 its com-
bat value in non-Serb areas of the republic was virtually
nil. The Croatian Defense Council was formally formed in
Mostar on April 8, 1992. It is important to mention here
that the Bosnian Croats had had a defensive organization
in place since the summer of 1991. In the official decision
regarding the forming of the Croatian Defense Council,
the institution was defined as the “supreme organ of the
defense of the Croatian people” whose task was to pro-
tect the Croatian people as well as the other peoples in
that community of peoples.
Until the late summer and early spring fall, 1992,
the HVO’s structure was based on a system of municipal
headquarters. These headquarters were formed by re-
designating crisis headquarters or former TO headquar-
ters. The municipal headquarters were disbanded at the
end of 1992 when the process of forming the HQs of op-
erative zones and brigades had been completed.
The HVO based its structure on operative zones
and that organizational structure endured, with minor
changes, until the end of the war. It consisted of the Gen-
eral Staff of the HVO with HQ units, four operative zones
and the Military Police. The General Staff of the HVO was
formally formed on April 10, 1992, replacing the func-
tion of the HQ of Herzeg-Bosnia located in Grude, whose
R
commander had been Colonel Ante Mikulić. The seat of
the General Staff was initially in Mostar, then in Čitluk and
finally in Posušje. The commanders of the General Staff of
the HVO were Generals Ante Roso and Slobodan Praljak,
and the chiefs were Milivoj Petković and Tihomir Blaškić.
The Bosnian Croats started forming Home Guard
units in the spring of 1993. These units were under the
command of the HVO and its task and purpose was to
protect territories and facilities of crucial importance and
4.2.2020. 19:25:53
 Davor Marijan • Rat za opstojnost Hrvata, 1991. - 1995.
rija, objekata od posebne važnosti za obranu i potpora
oružanim snagama.217 Operativne su zone postojale do
14. listopada 1993., kada su preimenovane u Zborna
područja Mostar, Tomislavgrad, Vitez i Orašje.218 Zadrža-
la su isto područje i istu organizaciju do početka 1994.,
kada je počeo preustroj po uzoru na HV. Zborna se po-
dručja nastojalo koncipirati po uzoru na HV. Svako je
imalo zapovjedništvo, gardijsku brigadu, nekoliko do-
mobranskih postrojbi i prateće postrojbe.
Iako je po imenu i pripadnosti bio dio HVO-a, u Bi-
H
haću je to ipak bio samostalan postroj. U svibnju 1992.
se sastojao od 1. hrvatskog bataljuna Ante Vlašić, 2.
krupskog bataljuna, tri samostalne satnije i sedam sa-
mostalnih vodova. Od srpnja 1992. do travnja 1993.
HVO je bio u sastavu 2. bihaćke muslimansko-hrvatske
pješačke brigade. Nakon izdvajanja HVO je osnovao
M
Glavni stožer regije Bihać, na čijem je čelu bio general
Vlado Šantić.219
Na kraju 1992. HVO je, po procjeni, imao 45.000 lju-
di; u srpnju 1994. imao je 53.640 ljudi; nakon preustroja
1. siječnja 1995. imao je po formaciji 82.538, a stvarno u
postrojbama 45.455 ljudi.220
D
Kada je u pitanju HVO, treba istaknuti činjenicu da
je to bila jedina vojska nastala na razvalinama Jugo-
slavije a da gotovo ništa nije dugovala JNA. Nedosta-
tak stručnih ljudi, konkretno školovanih vojnika, bila je
kronična boljka HVO-a. Iz prethodnog sustava naslije-
đena je skromna ljudska baza. U HVO-u je bio angaži-
C
ran samo jedan general (Stanko Matić), i to tek 1993.,
a i on je umirovljen prije rata. Točan broj oficira JNA u
HVO-u nije poznat, no do jeseni 1993. bio je vrlo malen,
a otada nešto veći – dolaskom časnika HV-a. Prosječan
zapovjednik brigade HVO-a nije imao djelatnu, a najče-
šće ni pričuvnu časničku naobrazbu iz JNA. Jasno je da
je stanje na nižim razinama bilo mnogo lošije.
217 Odjel obrane HVO, Zapovijed br. 1, br. 02-1-15/93 od 5. 2.
1993.
218 Ured predsjednika HR HB, Zapovijed br. UP 00223/93 od
14. 10. 1993.
219 Općinski odbor HDZ i HVO Bihać od 29. 5. 1992. (doku-
ment na web-stranici Slobodana Praljka); Bejdo FELIĆ,
Peti korpus 1992.–1995., Ljiljan: Dokumenti, Sarajevo,
2002., 26-27; Ramiz DREKOVIĆ, U obruču, “Dom štampe”,
Zenica, 2004., 187.
220 GS HVO, Izvješće ur. br. 01-240 od 4. 2. 1993.; GS HVO,
Izvješće o popuni postrojbi OS HR HB kl. str. pov. 803-
02/94-03/01, ur. br. 02-10-09-94-24 od 5. 8. 1995.; Izv-
ješće o popuni HVO na dan 1. 1. 1995.
112
Domovinski rat 04-02-2020 Knjiga 1.indd 112
to act as an auxiliary force in relation to the armed forc-
es. The operative zones existed until October 14, 1993,
when they were redesignated as Military Districts Mo-
star, Tomislavgrad, Vitez and Orašje. The military districts
controlled the same areas and retained the same struc-
ture until the beginning of 1994. The leadership of the
Bosnian Croats then attempted to restructure the mili-
tary districts on the Croatian Army model. Each military
district consisted of HQ, a guards brigade, a few Home
Guard units and support units.
The HVO formations in Bihać were nominally part of
the HVO but in reality they formed an independent force.
That force, in May, 1992, consisted of the 1st Croatian Bat-
talion “Ante Vlašić”, the 2nd Krupa Battalion, three inde-
pendent companies and seven independent platoons.
From July, 1992, until April, 1993, the HVO was under
the command of the 2nd Bihać Muslim Croatian Infantry
Brigade. After that the HVO formed the Main HQ of the
Bihać region with General Vlado Šantić at its helm.
At the end of 1992, according to the most reliable
estimates, the HVO had 45,000 men under arms; in July,
1994, 53,640; after the restructuring, on January 1, 1995,
the HVO’s actual numerical strength was 45,455.
It has to be noted that the HVO was the only army
created out of the detritus of Yugoslavia without any as-
sistance, direct, indirect or inadvertent of the JNA. The
HVO, throughout its existence, suffered from a chronic
lack of professional cadres. Only one former JNA general
served in the HVO – Stanko Matić, retired from the JNA
before the war – and only in 1993. The exact number of
former JNA officers who served in the HVO is not known.
It is clear, however, that former JNA officers were few
and far between in the HVO by the fall of 1993. After that
D
time the number increased somewhat due to the arriv-
al of Croatian Army officers, some of whom were former
JNA officers. The average commander of an HVO brigade
had not gone through any kind of officer training (active
or reserve) in the JNA. On lower levels of command the
R
situation was even worse.
For a long time the HVO was the army with the high-
est number of soldiers of other nationalities. That fact,
unfortunately, is often glossed over for reasons of politi-
cal expediency. A significant number of Bosniaks served
in Operative Zones Southeast Herzegovina and the
Bosanska Posavina region. There were no Bosniaks serv-
ing in units comprising Operative Zone Central Bosnia. In
Operative Zone Northwest Herzegovina the largest per-
centage of Bosniak soldiers served in the HVO brigades
4.2.2020. 19:25:53
 The Croatian Nation’s Struggle for Survival, 1991-1995

H
HVO (fotografije darovao: Ivica Budimir, Uskoplje). HVO (Photographs donated by: Ivica Budimir, Uskoplje).
M
Hrvatsko vijeće obrane dugo je bilo vojska s naj- from Livno and Tomislavgrad. 767 Muslims (24.85%)
većim brojem pripadnika druge nacionalnosti, iako se served in the Petar Krešimir IV Brigade at the same time.
to konstantno prešućuje i negira. Značajan postotak The Kralj Tomislav Brigade was composed of men from
Bošnjaka bio je u operativnim zonama Jugoistočna Tomislavgrad, Kupres and Posušje. It also had 296 Mus-
D
Hercegovina i Bosanska Posavina. U OZ-u Srednja Bo- lim soldiers (9.69%). In May, 1993, Muslim soldiers start-
sna nije bilo Bošnjaka, a u Sjeverozapadnoj Hercegovini ed leaving the HVO and joining the ARBIH, in most cases
značajniji ih je postotak bio u brigadama HVO-a iz Livna taking their weapons with them. These acts of desertion
i Tomislavgrada. Brigada Petar Krešimir IV imala je 767 and treason prompted the HVO leadership to start dis-
Muslimana odnosno 24,85 %, a brigada Kralj Tomislav iz arming unreliable soldiers. The process was completed
C
Tomislavgrada, Kupresa i Posušja imala je u svojem sa- only by the end of 1993, with the exception of Military
stavu 296 ili 9,69 % Muslimana. 221 Nakon što su u svibnju District Orašje.
1993. počeli prelasci vojnika Muslimana u ARBiH, često
s oružjem i u obliku gdje je teško razlučiti dezerterstvo
od izdaje, počeo je ubrzani proces razoružavanja nepo-
uzdanih vojnika, koji je dovršen tek krajem 1993., osim
D
na području Zbornoga područja Orašje.222
R
221 Za brigadu Rama iz Prozora naveden je podatak da ima
471 Muslimana, odnosno 23,3 % vojnika u brigadi. No
taj podatak je navodno sporan, jer prema primjedbi čla-
na zapovjedništva brigade (iz siječnja 2019.), Muslimana
tada u brigadi nije bilo više od 10 posto. Zapovjedništvo
OZ S/ZH, Izvješće o popuni brigada, br. 01-5-260/93 od
8. 6. 1993.
222 ICTY: GS HVO, Izvješće br. 02-2/1-01-1245/93 od 30. 6.
1993.; OZ HVO “Bosanska Posavina”, Procjena br. 01-
01/93-1434/2 od 19. 4. 1993.

113

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 Davor Marijan • Rat za opstojnost Hrvata, 1991. - 1995.
HOS U BOSNI I HERCEGOVINI
U Bosni i Hercegovini HOS se pojavio 1991., a slje-
deće godine ga je bilo gotovo na svim područjima gdje
je bilo Hrvata, nerijetko i kod Muslimana. Postrojbe su
nosile zvučna imena premda su stvarno bile daleko
manjeg brojnog stanja. HOS se organizacijski dijelio
na sastave i zapovjedništva pod zapovjedništvom Sto-
žera za Bosnu i Stožera za Hercegovinu u Ljubuškom.
Zapovjednici Stožera za Hercegovinu bili su general
H
Blaž Kraljević i brigadir Stanko Primorac - Ćane, a za-
povjednik Stožera za Bosnu bio je Jadranko Jandrić. U
ljeto 1992. postojao je i ratni stožer HOS-a za lašvansku
regiju čiji je zapovjednik bio Darko Kraljević. U javnom
pozivu danom u Mostaru 28. svibnja 1992. Zapovjed-
M
ništvo Ratnog stožera za Mostar deklariralo je HOS kao
elitnu postrojbu TO-a, odnosno ARBiH. HOS je organi-
zacijski vrhunac imao u ljeto 1992., a kraj je počeo uoči
pogibije generala Kraljevića na punktu HVO-a u Kruše-
vu kod Mostara 9. kolovoza. U listopadu je Dobroslav
Paraga osnovao jedinstveno zapovjedništvo HOS-a za
BiH koje se zvalo Glavni stožer HOS-a. Sjedište je bilo
D
u Zenici, a načelnik je bio brigadir Mladen Holman. Do
kraja 1992. godine HOS se najvećim dijelom podijelio
na hrvatski i muslimanski dio i utopio u HVO i ARBiH.223
C
223 Odluka zapovjednika Ratnog stožera HOS-a za Herce-
govinu od 8. 1. 1992.; Vrhovni zapovjednik HOS-a od 2.
2. 1992., Imenovanje; Obavijest ratnog stožera HOS-a za
Mostar od 28. 5. 1992.; ICTY: Izvješće o radu Zapovjed-
ništva ratnog stožera HOS-a za lašvansku regiju od 19.
7. 1992.; Zapovijed Glavnog stožera HOS-a Zagreb od 9.
10. 1992.
114
Domovinski rat 04-02-2020 Knjiga 1.indd 114
HOS IN BOSNIA AND
HERZEGOVINA
The HOS made its first appearance in Bosnia and Her-
zegovina in 1991. By the following year the HOS soldiers
could be found in every locality where Croatian units op-
erated and in most areas where Muslim units were active.
The HOS units bore colorful names and too-optimistic
designations in terms of their real numerical strength.
Organizationally the HOS was divided into units and HQs
under the command of the HQ for Bosnia and HQ for Her-
zegovina in Ljubuški. The commanders of the HQ for Her-
zegovina were General Blaž Kraljević and Brigadier Stan-
ko “Ćane” Primorac. The commander of the HQ for Bosnia
was Jadranko Jandrić. In the summer of 1992 there also
existed the War HQ for the Lašva region commanded by
Darko Kraljević. The War Headquarters in Mostar, on May
28, 1992, distributed flyers and put up posters all over
the city characterizing the HOS as an elite formation of
the Territorial Defense, that is, the Army of the Republic
of Bosnia and Herzegovina. The HOS reached its peak
in terms of its organizational capacity in the summer of
1992. The death of General Kraljević at a HVO checkpoint
in Kruševo near Mostar August 9 marked the beginning
of the end of the HOS as a viable fighting force in Bosnia
and Herzegovina. In October Dobroslav Paraga formed
the unified HQ of the HOS for Bosnia and Herzegovina
called the General Staff of the HOS. It was located in Zeni-
ca and its chief was Brigadier Mladen Holman. By the end
of 1992 the HOS, for the most part, had divided into the
Croatian and Muslim contingents and merged with the
HVO and the Army of the Republic of Bosnia and Herze-
D
govina respectively.
R
4.2.2020. 19:25:53
 The Croatian Nation’s Struggle for Survival, 1991-1995

VOJSKA REPUBLIKE SRPSKE THE ARMY OF THE

REPUBLIKA SRPSKA
Srpska vojska u BiH – najprije Vojska Srpske Repu-
blike Bosne i Hercegovine, a potom Vojska Republike The Serbian army in Bosnia and Herzegovina – at first
Srpske (VRS) – nastala je kao spoj JNA u BiH i Teritori- called the Army of the Serbian Republic of Bosnia and
jalne obrane na područjima sa srpskom većinom. Kom- Herzegovina and later the Army of the Republika Srps-
ponenta Jugoslavenske narodne armije, 2. vojna oblast ka (VRS) – was created as an amalgamation of the JNA
i 13. korpus u Hercegovini, Srbima su donijeli naoruža- in Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Territorial Defense in
nje i opremu koji su VRS-u osiguravali nedostižnu pred- the predominantly Serb areas. The JNA component, the
nost u odnosu na ARBiH i HVO. Dio TO-a BiH u srpskim 2nd Military District and XIII Corps in Herzegovina, pro-
H
područjima proglašen je 16. travnja 1992. oružanom vided copious amounts of weapons and matériel for the
snagom Srpske Republike BiH.224 Ona je ubrzo, uz ne- VRS, giving the Serbs a marked and unassailable advan-
male teškoće, utopljena u komponentu JNA. tage over the Army of the Republic of Bosnia and Herze-
Vrhovni komandant VRS-a bio je predsjednik Re- govina and the HVO. On April 16, 1992, some elements of
publike Srpske Radovan Karadžić. Operativno zapovi- the Territorial Defense of Bosnia and Herzegovina in ar-
M
jedanje bilo je u rukama komandanta Glavnoga štaba eas with majority Serb populations were proclaimed the
u mjeri koju je na njega prenio vrhovni komandant.225 armed force of the Serbian Republic of Bosnia and Her-
Srpska vojska u BiH organizirana je u korpusnu zegovina. This armed force, with considerable difficulties,
strukturu po naslijeđu JNA, a Glavni je štab nastao pre- was soon incorporated in the JNA component.
imenovanjem Komande 2. vojne oblasti. Sjedište GŠ-a
The commander-in-chief of the VRS was the Presi-
u prvim danima postojanja bilo je u Sarajevu, a poslije
dent of the Republika Srpska Radovan Karadžić. Opera-
u Han Pijesku. Komandant Štaba bio je general Ratko
D
tional command was entrusted to the commander of the
Mladić. Preimenovanje korpusa JNA počelo je po za-
General Staff. However, the scope of the commander’s
povijedi Komande 2. vojne oblasti od 14. svibnja 1992.
brief was determined, at any given time, by the com-
godine. Banjalučki korpus postao je 1. krajiški, Bihaćki
mander-in-chief.
i dio Kninskoga korpusa postali su 2. krajiški, Sarajev-
The Serbian army in Bosnia and Herzegovina inherit-
ski je postao Sarajevsko-romanijski, Tuzlanski je postao
ed its Corps structure from the JNA. The General Staff was
C
Istočnobosanski, a Bilećki je postao Hercegovački kor-
created out of the HQ of the 2nd Military District. The seat
pus. U studenome 1992. osnovan je Drinski korpus. S
of the General Staff during the first days of its existence
iznimkom 2. krajiškog korpusa, ostali su nastavili funk-
was in Sarajevo, and later in Han Pijesak. The command-
cionirati s već formiranim postrojbama, kojima su se
er of the General Staff was General Ratko Mladić. The re-
imena davala po područjima na kojima su osnovane.
naming of the JNA Corps was initiated by the HQ of the
Nove su postrojbe uglavnom bile lake pješačke briga-
D
2nd Military District’s order issued on May 14, 1992. Ban-
de, koje su se načelno formirale na razini općina.226
ja Luka Corps thus became I Krajina Corps, Bihać Corps
S obzirom na to da su nastali izravno od korpusa
and parts of Knin Corps became II Krajina Corps, Saraje-
JNA, korpusi VRS-a u načelu su zadržali njihov ustroj.
vo Corps became Sarajevo-Romanija Corps, Tuzla Corps
Uz naslijeđene postrojbe JNA dodane su mnogobroj-
became East Bosnia Corps and Bileća Corps became
ne lake brigade iz baštine TO-a. Prvi krajiški korpus
Herzegovina Corps. In November, 1992, Drina Corps was
R
bio je najjači sastav srpske oružane sile, sa zonom
formed. The corps, with the exception of II Krajina Corps,
djelovanja u sjevernoj i središnjoj Bosni i sjedištem u
retained under their command the already formed units.
These units were given names according to their locality
224 ICTY: Odluka ministra narodne odbrane Srpske Repub- of formation. Those units that were formed subsequently
like BiH od 16. 4. 1992.
were mostly light infantry brigades, formed, as a rule, at
225 Zakon o vojsci, Službeni glasnik srpskog naroda u BiH, br. the level of municipality.
7 od 1. 6. 1992.
The corps of the VRS were created directly from the
226 Manojlo MILOVANOVIĆ, Istine i zablude o ratu u Bosni i
JNA corps. For that reason, the corps of the VRS retained
Hercegovini (1992. - 1995. godine), Udruženje defendelo-
ga Republike Srpske, Banja Luka, 2005., 51-55. the organizational structures of the JNA corps. Many

115

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 Davor Marijan • Rat za opstojnost Hrvata, 1991. - 1995.
Banjoj Luci. Drugi krajiški korpus nalazio se u zapad-
noj i jugozapadnoj Bosni i imao je sjedište u Drvaru.
Zona djelovanja Istočnobosanskoga korpusa bila je u
sjeveroistočnoj Bosni, a Komanda u Ugljeviku i Bijeljini.
Sarajevsko-romanijski korpus imao je zonu u središnjoj
i istočnoj Bosni, a nakon osnivanja Drinskoga korpusa
samo u središnjoj Bosni. Hercegovački je korpus dje-
lovao u Hercegovini, s Komandom u Bileći. Posljednji
korpus VRS-a, Drinski, osnovan je 1. studenoga 1992.
od postrojbi Sarajevsko-romanijskoga i Hercegovačko-
H
ga korpusa. Zona djelovanja bila mu je istočna Bosna, a
Komanda u Vlasenici. Vazduhoplovstvo i protivvazduš-
na obrana bili su smješteni na području Banje Luke, a
komandant je bio general Živomir Ninković.227
Kao SVK, i VRS je imao personalnu potporu Vojske
Jugoslavije preko 30. kadrovskog centra, koji je osno-
M
van u studenome 1993. godine.228 U srpnju 1992. VRS je
imao 177.341, a u travnju 1993. godine 222.727 ljudi.229
D
C
227 ICTY: Naredba komandanta GŠ VSR BiH str. pov. br.
30/18-17 od 16. 6. 1992.; ICTY: Naredba str. pov. br.
30/18-17 komandanta GŠ VSR BiH od 16. 6. 1992.; ICTY:
Komanda Drinskog korpusa, Zone odgovornosti briga-
da, Naređenje str. pov. br. 2-259 od 30. 11. 1992.; M. MI-
LOVANOVIĆ, Istine i zablude, 53-55.
228 ICTY: Naredba str. pov. br. 3087-1 od 15. 11. 1993. načel-
nika Generalštaba VJ od 15. 11. 1993.; ICTY: Predsednik
Savezne Republike Jugoslavije, Naredba str. pov. br.
1/2-02-004/94-1 od 18. 2. 1994.
229 ICTY: GŠ VRS, april 1993., Analiza borbene gotovosti i
aktivnosti Vojske Republike Srpske u 1992. godini.
116
Domovinski rat 04-02-2020 Knjiga 1.indd 116
light brigades that originally belonged to the Territori-
al Defense were added to the VRS formations inherited
from the JNA. I Krajina Corps was the strongest forma-
tion of the Serb armed forces. Its area of operations was
in northern and central Bosnia and its HQ was located
in Banja Luka. II Krajina Corps was stationed in western
and southwest Bosnia with its HQ in Drvar. East Bosnia
Corps operated in northeast Bosnia with its HQ divid-
ed between Ugljevik and Bijeljina. Sarajevo-Romanija
Corps’s area of operations was in central and eastern Bos-
nia and after Drina Corps had been formed, its operative
zone was reduced to central Bosnia only. Herzegovina
Corps operated in Herzegovina and its HQ was located
in Bileća. Drina Corps was formed on November 1, 1992,
out of elements of Sarajevo-Romanija Corps and Herze-
govina Corps. Its area of operations was in eastern Bosnia
and HQ in Vlasenica. The Air Force and Air Defense were
stationed in the Banja Luka area. The commander of the
Air Force and Air Defense was General Živomir Ninković.
Just like the SVK, the VRS was also equipped, sup-
ported and to a large degree maintained by the JNA
through the 30th Personnel Center which was set up in
November, 1993. In July the VRS had 177,341 men under
arms. In April, 1993, that number was 222,727.
D
R
4.2.2020. 19:25:53
 The Croatian Nation’s Struggle for Survival, 1991-1995
ARMIJA REPUBLIKE BOSNE I
HERCEGOVINE
Muslimanska odnosno bošnjačka vojna sila pr-
vih se nekoliko mjeseci postojanja zvala Teritorijalna
obrana Bosne i Hercegovine, a potom Armija Repu-
blike Bosne i Hercegovine. Njezina je prethodnica
bila Patriotska liga, paravojna formacija SDA čije se
djelovanje prije proljeća 1992. teško prati, uglavnom
kroz kasnija sjećanja iz kojih je teško odvojiti mito-
H
loški dio od stvarnosti.230 Navodno je osnovana 1.
ožujka 1991. u Sarajevu, a prvu smotru imala je 16.
lipnja iste godine u okolici Sokolca.231 Početkom ve-
ljače 1992. Patriotska liga navodno je imala između
60 i 70 tisuća članova.232
M
Nakon što je rat eskalirao, Predsjedništvo Repu-
blike BiH je 8. travnja 1992. ukinulo Republički štab
Teritorijalne obrane, organiziralo Štab TO i imenovalo
zapovjednika (Musliman) s dva pomoćnika po nacio-
nalnom ključu (Srbin i Hrvat), kako bi formalno zado-
voljilo kriterij zastupljenosti sva tri konstitutivna na-
D
roda. Zapravo je TO proglašen oružanom silom dijela
BiH pod muslimanskim nadzorom. Službeno, kao dan
Armije RBiH obilježava se 15. travnja, uz obrazloženje
da je toga dana 1992. došlo do ujedinjenja postrojbi
TO-a i raznih bošnjačkih dobrovoljačkih formacija u je-
dinstvenu vojsku. TO BiH je u ARBiH preimenovana 23.
C
lipnja, a naziv je u uporabi od 4. srpnja 1992. godine.
Teritorijalna obrana u početnoj se fazi sastojala od Šta-
ba TO BiH, okružnih i općinskih štabova i postrojbi ra-
zličite veličine i imena. Naslijeđeni okružni štabovi TO-a
nastavili su djelovati u Sarajevu, Zenici, Tuzli, Goraždu,
D
Bihaću i Tešnju (štab Doboj). Komandant Štaba TO BiH
bio je pukovnik Hasan Efendić.233
230 Nihad HALIBEGOVIĆ, Činjenice o Patriotskoj ligi Bosne i
Hercegovine, autorsko izdanje, Sarajevo, 1994., 9.
231 Stručni leksikon osnovnih vojnih i ratnih političko-pravnih
pojmova, Uprava za politička pitanja Generalštaba AR-
BiH, Sarajevo, 1996., 166-167.
232 Sefer HALILOVIĆ, Lukava strategija, “Matica”, Sarajevo,
1997., 148.
233 ICTY: Predsjednik Predsjedništva BiH, Naredba PR br.
01-011 od 23. 6. 1992.; Hasan EFENDIĆ, Ko je branio
Bosnu, Udruženje građana plemićkog porijekla BiH,
Sarajevo, 1999.; Rasim DELIĆ, Armija Republike Bosne i
Hercegovine – nastanak, razvoj i odbrana zemlje, Vijeće
Kongresa bošnjačkih intelektualaca, Sarajevo, 2007.,
dio I, 180-187.
117
Domovinski rat 04-02-2020 Knjiga 1.indd 117
THE ARMY OF THE
REPUBLIC OF BOSNIA AND
HERZEGOVINA
During its first few months of existence, the armed
forces of the Bosniaks, that is, Muslims, were called the
Territorial Defense of Bosnia and Herzegovina. It was lat-
er named the Army of the Republic of Bosnia and Herze-
govina. Its predecessor was the Patriotic League, a para-
military formation of the SDA, whose activities before
the spring of 1992 are shrouded in mystery – historians
have only dubious eye-witness accounts to rely on and
separating myth from reality is often impossible. Appar-
ently, the League was formed in Sarajevo on March 1,
1991, and its first parade was held on June 16, 1991, near
the town of Sokolac. According to the most realistic es-
timates, the League, at the beginning of February, 1992,
had between 60,000 to 70,000 members.
When the war escalated, the Presidency of the Re-
public of Bosnia and Herzegovina, on April 8, 1992, dis-
banded the Republic TO HQ, formed a new TO HQ and
appointed its commander (a Muslim) and two of the
commander’s assistants (a Croat and a Serb). The com-
position of the newly formed HQ reflected the national
composition of BiH, but it is worth pointing out that
the appointments were made for exclusively cosmetic
purposes. The Territorial Defense was proclaimed the
armed force of the part of BiH under Muslim control.
Officially, ARBIH Day is observed on April 15, because
on that day in 1992, according to the official explana-
tion, the Territorial Defense and various Bosniak volun-
teer formations were amalgamated into a single armed
force. The Territorial Defense BiH was redesignated as
the ARBIH on June 23 and the name has been in official
use since July 4, 1992.
The Territorial Defense, in the initial phase, con-
sisted of the HQ of the Territorial Defense, district and
municipal HQs and units of varying sizes. The district
R
HQs inherited from the Territorial Defense continued
operating in Sarajevo, Tuzla, Zenica, Goražde, Bihać
and Tešanj (HQ Doboj). The commander of the HQ of
the Territorial Defense of Bosnia and Herzegovina was
Colonel Hasan Efendić.
The Army of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegov-
ina consisted of the General Staff of the Armed Forces,
district HQs and municipal defense departments, HQs,
units and institutions tasked with providing support and
4.2.2020. 19:25:53
 Davor Marijan • Rat za opstojnost Hrvata, 1991. - 1995.
Armija Republike Bosne i Hercegovine sastojala se
od štabova (Glavnoga štaba Oružanih snaga, okruž-
nih štabova i općinskih štabova obrane), komandi i
postrojbi te ustanova za potporu i osiguranje.234 Osim
Glavnoga štaba javila se i funkcija Štaba Vrhovne ko-
mande (ŠVK) i njegova načelnika. Rasim Delić drži da je
ŠVK pogrešno funkcionirao i da je neovlašteno preuzeo
dio nadležnosti Predsjedništva RBiH.235 Komandanti
GŠ-a bili su Sefer Halilović (ujedno i načelnik ŠVK-a) i
Rasim Delić.
H
U drugoj polovini srpnja 1992. počelo je osnivanje
operativnih skupina kao privremenih sastava ARBiH,
a u rujnu je počela transformacija ARBiH na korpusnu
strukturu. Osnovano je pet korpusa: 1. za Sarajevo i
okruženje, 2. za tuzlansko područje i sjeveroistočnu
Bosnu, 3. za središnju Bosnu, 4. za Hercegovinu i ju-
M
gozapadnu Bosnu i 5. za zapadnu Bosnu. Komanda-
ma korpusa podređeni su regionalni štabovi obrane
u zonama njihova djelovanja. U dijelu korpusa, ope-
rativne grupe dužeg trajanja postojale su do početka
1995., kada su preustrojene u divizije.236 U lipnju 1993.
od dijelova 1., 3. i 4. korpusa u sjevernoj Hercegovini
D
i dijelu središnje Bosne osnovan je 6. korpus sa sjedi-
štem u Konjicu. Ugašen je početkom 1994. godine.237
Posljednji, 7. korpus, osnovan je u travnju za područje
središnje Bosne (šire područje Travnika i Bugojna) od
dijela snaga 3. korpusa.238 Krajem 1992. formirano je
Ratno vazduhoplovstvo i protivvazdušna obrana, čime
C
je zaokružena organizacija Armije RBiH.239
Na taktičkoj razini, u ARBiH je prvu godinu rata
postojao niz postrojbi, od čete do brigade, neujedna-
čenog nazivlja i sastava. Postupnim prelaskom na bri-
gadni sastav nazivlje se usklađivalo s nazivom korpusa.
234 ICTY: Predsjednik Predsjedništva BiH, Odluka o organi-
zaciji OS RBiH br. 02-011-461/92 od 4. 7. 1992.
235 Rasim DELIĆ, Armija Republike Bosne i Hercegovine –
nastanak, razvoj i odbrana zemlje, Vijeće Kongresa bošn-
jačkih intelektualaca, Sarajevo, 2007., dio I, 210.
236 ICTY: Predsjednik Predsjedništva BiH, Odluka o formi-
ranju korpusa ARBiH br. 02-111-738/92 od 3. 9. 1992.; R.
DELIĆ, Armija RBiH, I, 204-205.
237 ICTY: GŠ OS RBiH, Odluka o formiranju 6. korpusa ARBiH
str. pov. br. 14/76-7 od 9. 6. 1993.; R. DELIĆ, Armija RBiH,
I, 379.
238 Hasib MUŠINBEGOVIĆ, Remzija ŠILJAK, Kemo BEĆIREVIĆ,
Operacija Vlašić, autorsko izdanje, Sarajevo, 1999., 24-29.
239 R. DELIĆ, Armija RBiH, I, 206.
118
Domovinski rat 04-02-2020 Knjiga 1.indd 118
security. There also existed the Supreme HQ (ŠVK) and its
function overlapped with that of the General Staff. Rasim
Delić holds the view that the ŠVK was given the wrong
function and that it illegally assumed certain authorities
which should have remained the sole preserve of the
Presidency of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina.
The commanders of the General Staff were Sefer Hali-
lović (also the chief of the ŠVK) and Rasim Delić.
The process of restructuring the Army of the Re-
public of Bosnia and Herzegovina into corps began in
the second half of July, 1992. Five corps were formed:
I Corps for Sarajevo and the city’s environs, II Corps
for the Tuzla area and northeast Bosnia, III Corps for
central Bosnia, IV Corps for southwestern Bosnia and
V Corps for western Bosnia. The regional defense HQs
were subordinated to the Corps HQs within their oper-
ational areas. Operations (battle) groups existed within
the corps structure. These groups, once formed, were
rarely disbanded and those still existing at the begin-
ning of 1995 were restructured into divisions. In June,
1993, VI Corps was formed out of elements of I, III and
IV Corps in northern Herzegovina and central Bosnia.
Its HQ was in Konjic. VI Corps was disbanded at the be-
ginning of 1994. VII Corps was formed last, in April, for
central Bosnia (wider Travnik and Bugojno area) from
elements of III Corps. At the end of 1992, the Air Force
and Air Defense was formed. With that, the creation of
the organizational structure of the Army of the Repub-
lic of Bosnia and Herzegovina was completed.
During the first years of its existence, at the tacti-
cal level, the Army of the Republic of Bosnia and Her-
zegovina comprised a whole plethora of company- to
brigade-strength units with mismatching designations
D
and complement. Gradually, in line with the restructur-
ing process, the designations were attuned to the nu-
merical designation of the corps in question. Most of the
brigades were numbered with three-digit numbers; the
first digit designating the corps (for example 216). Some
R
brigades retained their one-digit numerical designation
(7th Muslim) or two-digit numerical designation (17th Kra-
jina Brigade).
In terms of manpower, the Territorial Defense, lat-
er the Army of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina
steadily grew in size. At the end of June, 1992, there were
131,528 personnel in the Territorial Defense. At the end
of the year the Army of the Republic of Bosnia and Her-
zegovina had 205,097 men. At the end of 1994, 227,645
men served in the Army of the Republic of Bosnia and
4.2.2020. 19:25:54
 The Croatian Nation’s Struggle for Survival, 1991-1995
Većina brigada imala je troznamenkasti naziv, gdje je
prva znamenka označavala pripadnost korpusu (npr.
216.). Bilo je iznimaka i neke su brigade zadržale jed-
noznamenkasti (7. muslimanska) ili dvoznamenkasti
broj (17. krajiška brigada).
Stalan rast brojnoga stanja bila je konstanta TO-a,
odnosno ARBiH. Krajem lipnja 1992. TO je imao 131.528
pripadnika. Krajem godine Armija Republike BiH imala
je 205.097 ljudi, na kraju 1994. godine 227.645, a kra-
jem veljače 1995. godine 229.823 pripadnika.240
H
Mudžahedini
Uz muslimanske snage, u BiH od ljeta 1992. borili
su se i strani islamski dragovoljci - mudžahedini. Naj-
većim su dijelom stigli iz Afganistana i Pakistana pod
M
obrazloženjem da su djelatnici humanitarnih organiza-
cija. Oni su u BiH demonstrirali muslimanski koncept
svetog rata protiv nevjernika i bili jedno od najučinko-
vitijih sredstava borbe protiv nemuslimanskog stanov-
ništva u središnjoj Bosni. Odigrali su značajnu ulogu u
izazivanju rata s Hrvatima i zločinima nad njima, kao
D
paravojna formacija navodno neovisna od ARBiH, u što
je teško povjerovati. Izvori nedvojbeno potvrđuju da je
vrh muslimanske stranke SDA znao za mudžahedine te
da je podržavao njihovu nazočnost i djelovanje u BiH.
U kolovozu 1993. su organizirani u Odred El mudžahid
koji je bio u sastavu 3. korpusa ARBiH. Mnogo toga oko
C
njih još nije razriješeno, počevši od brojnog stanja koje
se procjenjuje od nekoliko stotina do nekoliko tisuća
osoba, te mnogo značajnijeg pitanja u kakvom su doi-
sta odnosu bili s vrhom SDA-a.241
D
240 ICTY: Uprava za org. mob. poslove Štaba Armije, Izv-
ještaj o popuni ARBiH str. pov. br. 4/48-1-1 od 12. 1.
1995.; ICTY: Uprava za org. mob. poslove Štaba Armije,
Izvještaj o popuni ARBiH str. pov. br. 4/48-10-1 od 24. 3.
1995.; R. DELIĆ, Armija RBiH, I, 214-215.
241 ICTY: ŠVK OS RBiH, Ovlaštenje, pov. br. 1/207-54 od 23.
7. 1993.; ICTY: ŠVK OS RBiH, str. pov. br. 14-75/86 od 13.
8. 1993.; Esad HEĆIMOVIĆ, Garibi: mudžahedini u BiH
1992-1999, Fondacija Sina, Zenica, 2006.
119
Domovinski rat 04-02-2020 Knjiga 1.indd 119
Herzegovina. At the end of February, 1995, the number
of soldiers serving in the Army of the Republic of Bosnia
and Herzegovina was 229,823.
Mujahideen
Foreign Muslim volunteers – Mujahideen – fought
for the Bosniak cause in the war in Bosnia and Herzegov-
ina. They first appeared in Bosnia and Herzegovina in the
summer of 1992. For the most part they were men from
Afghanistan and Pakistan and they arrived in Bosnia and
Herzegovina claiming to be humanitarian workers. The
Mujahideen in Bosnia and Herzegovina demonstrated
the Muslim concept of the holy war against infidels and
were the most efficient instrument of total war the Bos-
niaks used against the non-Muslim population in central
Bosnia. The Mujahideen played the pivotal role in pro-
voking the conflict with the Croats and were responsible,
in some cases directly, in others indirectly, for the war
crimes and crimes against humanity committed by the
Bosniak forces against the Croats. The Mujahideen were
a paramilitary formation and claimed to operate inde-
pendently of the Army of the Republic of Bosnia and Her-
zegovina’s chain of command. The Bosnian government
claimed the same thing but the available evidence does
not support the claim. The sources clearly show that the
leadership of the Muslim party (SDA) was aware of the
presence of the Mujahideen on the ground and support-
ed and maintained their combat role in the war in Bosnia
and Herzegovina. In August, 1993, the El Mudžahid De-
tachment was formed and placed under the command
of III Corps. It has to be pointed out that many aspects
of the Mujahideen’s involvement in the war in BiH are
shrouded in mystery, for example, the estimates of the
number of Mujahideen engaged in combat in BiH range
from a few hundred to a few thousand. More important-
ly, it is still not clear what the nature of the relationship
between the Mujahideen and the leadership SDA was.
R
4.2.2020. 19:25:54
 Davor Marijan • Rat za opstojnost Hrvata, 1991. - 1995.

ORGANIZACIJSKE PROMJENE THE ORGANIZATIONAL

VOJNIH SNAGA 1992. - 1995. CHANGES OF THE ARMED
FORCES 1992 – 1995
HRVATSKA
CROATIA
Hrvatske oružane snage
Croatian Armed Forces
Sarajevsko su primirje sukobljene strane iskoristile za
organizacijske promjene oružanih snaga. U siječnju 1992. All the belligerents took advantage of the Sarajevo
H
hrvatske su snage imale četiri djelatne brigade ZNG-a i 60
cease-fire agreement to restructure their armed forc-
pričuvnih brigada HV-a sa 155.772 pripadnika, 216 ten-
es. In January, 1992, Croatia had four active Croatian
kova, 127 drugih borbenih vozila i 1108 raznih topničkih
National Guard brigades and 60 Croatian Army reserve
oruđa. Do proljeća je HV rastao, tendencija je bila okrup-
brigades; in total 155,772 soldiers under arms, 216
njivanje parcijalnih sastava – bataljuna u nove brigade:
tanks, 127 other combat vehicles and 1,108 various
98. u Zagrebu, 159. u Zadru, 160. u Osijeku, 161. u Sisku,
M
artillery pieces. The Croatian Army had been experi-
162. u Petrinji, 163. u Dubrovniku, 164. u Starigradu, 165.
encing a steady growth by spring, 1992; the tendency
u Sunji i Brigadu vukovarskih veterana, odnosno 204. bri-
was toward amalgamating four battalions into one bri-
gadu u Zagrebu. Ustrojena je glavnina bojnoga postroja
gade: the 98th Brigade was formed in Zagreb, the 159th
HRM-a, uključujući pristožerne postrojbe pomorskih za-
in Zadar, the 160th in Osijek, the 161st in Sisak, the 162nd
povjedništava, mornaričko pješaštvo, lake baterije PZO-a
in Petrinja, the 163rd in Dubrovnik, the 164th in Stari-
i obalno topništvo. Unutar HRZ-a i PZO-a osnovane su
D
grad, the 165th in Sunja and 204th – composed of veter-
zrakoplovne baze na Plesu, u Puli i Zadru, mješovita zra-
ans of the Battle of Vukovar – in Zagreb. The bulk of the
koplovna eskadrila u Splitu, Brigada ZMIN, Zrakoplov-
fighting contingent of the Croatian Navy was formed,
no-tehnički centar i Zavod za zrakoplovnu medicinu.242
including HQ units, naval infantry, light anti-aircraft
U drugoj polovini siječnja Glavni stožer HV-a dao je
battery and coastal artillery. The Croatian Air Force and
smjernice za izradu strategijske operacije oslobađanja
Air Defense set up air bases at Pleso, in Pula and Zadar,
C
okupiranih područja RH u slučaju da to bude potrebno.
formed a mixed squadron in Split, an air surveillance
U odnosu na postojeću organizaciju operativnih sasta-
and navigation brigade, the Aeronautical Technical
va, promjena je bilo u zapadnoj Slavoniji, Lici i Dalma-
Center and the Institute of Aviation Medicine.
ciji. Operativna zona Bjelovar zadužena je da pripremi
In the second half of January the General Staff of
the Croatian Armed Forces issued guidelines relating
D
242 ICTY: Direktiva GSHV iz siječnja 1992. za izvođenje to the creation of a strategic operation for liberating
strategijske ofenzive Hrvatske vojske; SVA MORH, KMO: the occupied areas of the Republic of Croatia if such a
MORH, Zapovijedi kl. sp. 801-01/91-01/07, ur. br. 512- course of action became necessary. In relation to the
06-05-91-50 od 27. 12. 1991.; DT 801-02/92-01/01, ur. br.
512-06-02-92-22 od 8. 1. 1992.; kl. sp. 801-01/92-01/07, existing organization of the operative zones, changes
ur. br. 512-06-05-92-09 od 11. 2. 1992.; kl. DT. 801-02/92- were also made in western Slavonia, Lika and Dalma-
01/01, ur. br. 512-06-02-92-125 od 20. 2. 1992.; kl. str. tia. Operative Zone Bjelovar was tasked with prepar-
R
pov. 801-01/92-01/07, ur. br. 512-06-05-92-14 od 25. 2.
1992.; kl. str. pov. 801-02/92-01/07, ur. br. 512-06-05-92-
ing an operation in western Slavonia. The strength of
15 od 26. 2. 1992.; kl. 801-02/92-01/02, ur. br. 512-06- Operational Group Posavina was augmented for that
02-92-166 do 168 od 16. 3. 1992.; kl. str. pov. 801-01/92- purpose (commander of the OG was Brigadier Rozario
01/07, ur. br. 512-06-05-92-18 od 20. 3. 1992.:, kl. SP 801- Rozga). Operational Group Posavina retained its orga-
02/92-01/03, ur. br. 5120-07-92-03 od 13. 4. 1992.; kl. SP
801-02/92-01/03, ur. br. 5120-07-92-06 od 21. 4. 1992.; kl. nization and order of battle in the Novska area. The for-
sp. 801-01/92-01/03, ur. br. 512-01-92-967 od 5. 6. 1992.; mations in the Nova Gradiška area were organized into
SVA MORH, GSHV: Zapovjedništvo HRZ i PZO, Izvješće Operational Group Gradiška (commanders Brigadiers
kl. 119-01/92-01/01, ur. br. 5120-20/08-92-115 od 5. 9. Stjepan Slivar and Josip Mikšić) and the formations
1992.; SVA MORH, GSHV, Zap. OZ Zagreb, kl. 811-05/92-
01, ur. br. 1075-07/92-5529 od 8. 10. 1992. in the Pakrac area were organized into Operational

120

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 The Croatian Nation’s Struggle for Survival, 1991-1995
operaciju u zapadnoj Slavoniji, za što je ojačana Opera-
tivnom grupom Posavina (zapovjednik brigadir Rozario
Rozga), koja je zadržala organizaciju i sastav snaga na
novljanskom području. Snage na području Nove Gradiš-
ke organizirane su u Operativnu grupu Gradiška (zapo-
vjednici brigadiri Stjepan Slivar i Josip Mikšić), a snage na
području Pakraca u Operativnu grupu Pakrac (zapovjed-
nik brigadir Josip Tomšić i zastupnik zapovjednika briga-
dir Đuro Dečak). Operativna zona Rijeka zadužena je za
operaciju u Lici, za što je dobila OG Lika iz OZ-a Karlovac.
H
Zapovjedništvo HRM-a sa snagama OZ-a Split zaduženo
je za operacije u srednjoj i južnoj Dalmaciji. Operativ-
na podređenost Operativne zone Split Zapovjedništvu
HRM-a prestala je sredinom studenoga.243 U drugoj polo-
vini travnja 1992. u sastavu OZ-a Osijek osnovana je Ope-
rativna grupa Sava, čiji je zadatak bio obrana smjerova
M
koji s područja Bosanske Posavine vode u Hrvatsku. Za-
povjednik skupine bio je brigadir Josip Tomšić.244 U srp-
nju je počelo funkcionirati Zapovjedništvo slavonskoga
bojišta, koje je osnovano da zapovijeda snagama HV-a i
HVO-a u Slavoniji i Bosanskoj Posavini. Zapovjedništvo je
bilo u Đakovu, a zapovjednici su bili general Petar Stipe-
D
tić i brigadir Ivan Tonković. Zapovjedništvo Južnoga vo-
jišta bilo je slično zapovjedništvo, osnovano je u travnju
1992. da zapovijeda snagama HV-a na jugu Hrvatske i
postojalo je do studenoga iste godine. Bili su mu podre-
đeni Sektor Dubrovnik i glavnina HVO-a. Sjedište mu je
bilo u Pločama i Dubrovniku, a zapovjednik je bio gene-
C
ral Janko Bobetko.245
U ljeto 1992. u HV-u je počeo proces demobilizacije,
preustroja HV-a i organiziranja Domobranstva. Prvi val
demobilizacije pričuvnoga sastava HV-a počeo je na te-
melju naredbe predsjednika RH dr. Franje Tuđmana od
D
26. veljače, nakon čega je demobilizirano 21.336 vojnih
obveznika. Kriterij za demobilizaciju bio je sljedeći: oso-
be zaposlene u tvrtkama i ustanovama od posebne važ-
nosti za obranu države, a nužne su za njihov rad (isti je
kriterij vrijedio i za razinu općina); osobe koje se nalaze
243 SVA MORH, GSHV, Zapovijed kl. 8/92-01/07, ur. br. 5120-
05-92-02 od 19. 1. 1992.; ICTY: Direktiva GSHV iz siječnja
1992. za izvođenje strategijske ofenzive Hrvatske vojske;
SVA MORH, GSHV, Zapovijed kl. 8/92-01/20, ur. br. 5120-
02-92-5 od 2. 2. 1992.; SVA MORH, GSHV, Zapovijed kl.
8/92-01/07, ur. br. 5120-05-92-241 od 17. 11. 1992.
244 SVA MORH, ZOZO, Zapovijed kl. 8/92-01/13, ur. br. 1076-
33-92-22 (61) od 13. 4. 1992.
245 Predsjednik Republike Hrvatske, Naredba br. PA7-74/1-
92 od 30. 6. 1992.; J. BOBETKO, Sve moje bitke, 202.
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Domovinski rat 04-02-2020 Knjiga 1.indd 121
Group Pakrac (commander Brigadier Josip Tomšić and
the representative of the commander Brigadier Đuro
Dečak). Operative Zone Rijeka’s task was to prepare an
operation in Lika. Operational Group Lika from Oper-
ative Zone Karlovac was placed under the command
of Operative Zone Rijeka. The HQ of the Croatian Navy
and the forces of Operative Zone Split were tasked
with operating in central and southern Dalmatia. Op-
erative Zone Split, regarding operational matters, was
under the command of the HQ of the Croatian Navy
until mid-November. In the second half of April, 1992,
Operational Group Sava was formed as part of the
Operative Zone Osijek. The task of Operational Group
Sava was to defend the communication routes leading
from the Bosanska Posavina region into Croatia. The
commander of Operational Group Sava was Brigadier
Josip Tomšić. The Slavonia Theater of Operations HQ
started operating in July. It was formed for the purpose
of commanding the HV and HVO forces in Slavonia and
the Bosanska Posavina region. The HQ was in Đakovo
and the commanders were General Stipetić and Briga-
dier Ivan Tonković. The Southern Theater of Operations
HQ was set up along similar lines. It was formed in April,
1992, for the purpose of commanding the HV forces in
the south of Croatia. It existed until November, 1992.
Sector Dubrovnik and the bulk of the HVO forces were
under the command of the Southern Theater of Oper-
ations HQ. Its seat was in Ploče and Dubrovnik and its
commander was Janko Bobetko.
In the summer of 1992, the Croatian Army initiat-
ed three processes: demobilization, restructuring and
forming of the Home Guard. On February 26, President
Franjo Tuđman instructed the Croatian Army to initiate
the first phase of the demobilization of reserve soldiers.
21,336 enlisted men were demobilized as a result. The
criteria for demobilization were as follows: persons em-
ployed in those companies and institutions that were
of crucial importance for the country’s defense and
R
whose expertise was indispensable for viable function-
ing of said institutions (the same criterion applied at
the level of municipality); persons enrolled in educa-
tion courses and able to continue their studies; persons
gainfully employed in agriculture; persons employed
abroad and persons who had not done their compul-
sory military service. On June 18, President Tuđman
ordered that 50% of the HV’s complement be demo-
bilized – 65,000 soldiers. In the event, 59,426 soldiers
were demobilized. On October 19, President Tuđman
4.2.2020. 19:25:54
 Davor Marijan • Rat za opstojnost Hrvata, 1991. - 1995.
na školovanju i mogu ga nastaviti; osobe zaposlene u
poljodjelstvu i kojima je bio osiguran rad; osobe zapo-
slene u drugim državama i osobe koje nisu odslužile voj-
ni rok. Drugom naredbom, od 18. lipnja, predsjednik RH
odredio je demobilizaciju 50 % sastava HV-a, odnosno
65.000 vojnih obveznika, a demobilizirano ih je 59.426.
Trećom naredbom, od 19. listopada, trebalo je demobi-
lizirati 40.000 vojnih obveznika, a demobilizirano ih je
24.596. Do 1. prosinca mobilizirano je 16.657 domobra-
na, pa su u operativnoj vojsci bila mobilizirana 59.502
H
vojna obveznika.246 Demobilizacija je djelovala porazno
na HV – otišao je prevelik broj kvalitetnog ljudstva, a
ostajali su oni koji su životni poziv vidjeli u vojsci i oni
koji nisu imali izbora.
U lipnju 1992. ukinute su operativne grupe Sava i
Vukovar, a u srpnju, nakon što je UNPROFOR razdvojio
M
sukobljene snage, ukinute su druge operativne grupe:
Posavina, Gradiška, Pakrac, OG za Baniju i Sisak i Zapo-
vjedništvo Sektora Zadar. Operativna grupa Istočna Po-
savina ukinuta je u listopadu, a OG Lika u studenome.
Ukidanje postrojbi počelo je u srpnju i nastavilo se do
kraja godine. Ukinuti su gotovo svi samostalni batalju-
D
ni (51., 52., 53., 55., 56., 59., 65., 76., 77. i 83.), dio divi-
zijuna za potporu i dio brigada: 1. mehanizirana, 98.,
100., 107., 117., 118., 129., 134., 136., 139., 155., 158.,
159., 160., 161. (zadržan 57. samostalni bataljun), 162.,
164. i 165. brigada. Kao ročne brigade u kojima se izvo-
dila izobrazba novaka organizirane su motorizirane
C
brigade: 104. u Varaždinu, 111. u Rijeci, 113. u Šibeni-
ku, 123. u Požegi, 15. protuoklopna topničko-raketna
brigada u Križevcima i 16. topničko-raketna brigada u
Bjelovaru. U jesen je 204. brigada HV-a preimenovana
u 5. brigadu ZNG-a u Vinkovcima, a u Gospiću se po-
čela organizirati 6. brigada ZNG-a. Sredinom prosinca
1992. brigade ZNG-a preimenovane su u gardijske bri-
gade HV-a, a krajem mjeseca u Varaždinu je osnovana
7. gardijska brigada. Do kraja 1992. i Domobranstvo je
postalo bitna sastavnica HV-a. Osnovano je 16 domo-
branskih pukovnija: 1., 2., 3. i 4. u Zagrebu, 5. u Osijeku,
6. u Splitu, 7. u Zadru, 8. u Rijeci, 9. u Osijeku, 10. i 11. u
Vinkovcima, 12. u Sisku, 13. i 14. u Karlovcu, 15. u Šibe-
246 Zap. 3. OZ Zagreb, Izvod iz Zapovijedi za ukidanje i de-
mobilizaciju postrojbi kl. DT 801-01/92-13, ur. br. 5120-
04/92-10-6 od 1. 3. 1992.; SVA MORH, Uprava za vojnu
obvezu i mobilizaciju MORH, Mobilizacija postrojbi HV,
kl. sp. pov. 801-01/94-01/63, ur. br. 512-35-11/10-94-1 od
17. 2. 1994.
122
Domovinski rat 04-02-2020 Knjiga 1.indd 122
ordered another wave of demobilization. This time
40,000 enlisted men were to be demobilized. However,
only 24,596 enlisted men were actually demobilized.
By December 1, 16,657 Home Guard soldiers had been
mobilized. At that point, 59,502 conscripts served in
the army. The Croatian Army was crippled by these de-
mobilization drives – too many competent personnel
had left and the army remained saddled with too many
of those who either sought a career in the armed forces
or had no prospects worth the name in civilian life.
In June, 1992, Operational Groups Sava and Vuko-
var were disbanded. In July, after UNPROFOR had sep-
arated the warring parties the following Operational
Groups were also disbanded: Posavina, Gradiška, Pa-
krac, the Operational Group for Banija and Sisak and
the Sector Zadar HQ. Operational Group East Posavina
was disbanded in October and Operations Group Lika
in November. The disbandment of units commenced in
July and continued until the end of the year. Almost
all independent battalions were disbanded (51st, 52nd,
53rd, 55th, 56th, 59th, 65th, 76th, 77th and 83rd) and also
some support battalions and some brigades: 1st Mech-
anized, 98th, 100th, 107th, 117th, 118th, 129th, 134th, 136th,
139th, 155th, 158th, 159th, 160th, 161st (the 57th Indepen-
dent Battalion was not disbanded), 162nd, 164th and
165th. The following motorized brigades were formed
as conscript brigades: the 104th in Varaždin, 111th in Ri-
jeka, 113th in Šibenik, 123rd in Požega, 15th Anti-armor
Artillery Rocket Brigade in Križevci, and 16th Artillery
Rocket Brigade in Bjelovar. In the fall, the 204th Brigade
of the Croatian Army was redesignated as the 5th Bri-
gade of the Croatian Defense Council in Vinkovci. At
the same time the 6th Brigade of the Croatian Defense
D
Council was in the process of being formed in Gospić.
In mid-December, 1992, the ZNG Brigades were redes-
ignated as Guards Brigades of the Croatian Army. At the
end of the month the 7th Guards Brigade was formed in
Varaždin. By the end of 1992, the Home Guard had be-
R
come an important integral part of the Croatian Army.
Sixteen Home Guard regiments were formed: the 1st,
2nd, 3rd, 4th in Zagreb, the 5th in Osijek, the 6th in Split, the
7th in Zadar, the 8th in Rijeka, the 9th in Osijek, the 10th
and 11th in Vinkovci, the 12th in Sisak, the 13th and 14th in
Karlovac, the 15th in Šibenik and the 16th in Sinj. Some
Home Guard companies and battalions were disband-
ed, but more new ones were formed.
During 1992 a number of schemes for reorganizing
the Croatian Army were made but none of them was
4.2.2020. 19:25:54
 The Croatian Nation’s Struggle for Survival, 1991-1995
niku i 16. u Sinju. Osim njih ukinut je, ali i osnovan veći
broj domobranskih bojni i satnija.247
Tijekom 1992. napravljeno je nekoliko planova pre-
ustroja HV-a, no ni jedan nije prihvaćen, iako su u pro-
sincu Operativne zone Karlovac i Bjelovar preimenova-
ne u Operativne grupe Karlovac i Bjelovar i podređene
Zapovjedništvu OZ-a Zagreb. Unutar OZ-a Zagreb još
je u ožujku 1992. osnovano Zapovjedništvo obrane
Grada Zagreba, koje je naslijedilo nekadašnji Gradski
štab TO-a, odnosno Operativnu grupu Zagreb. Opera-
H
tivna zona Rijeka preimenovana je sredinom prosinca
u Zborno područje Gospić, a Zapovjedništvo je iz Rije-
ke preseljeno u Gospić.248
U tom je razdoblju počela unifikacija i preraspodjela
oružja i opreme u korist brigada ZNG-a, odnosno gardij-
skih brigada HV-a. Procjene da će mirovne snage UN-a
M
osigurati mir, a potom uspostavu pravnoga poretka Re-
publike Hrvatske na okupiranom području dovele su do
zanemarivanja strategije razvoja oružane sile. To je na
kraju 1992. dovelo do priznanja da nije napravljena kva-
D
247 SVA MORH, KMO: MORH, Zapovijed kl. sp. 801-01/92-
01/03, ur. br. 5120-07-92-17 od 26. 5. 1992.; SVA MORH,
GSHV, Zapovijed kl. 801-02/92-02/01, ur. br. 5120-07-92-
145 od 1. 6. 1992.; SVA MORH, ZOZS: Uprava za vojnu ob-
vezu i mobilizaciju, Zapovijed kl. SP 801-02/92-01/01, ur.
br. 512-06-02-92-292 od 27. 6. 1991.; SVA MORH, KMO:
MORH, Zapovijed kl. sp. 801-02-92-01/01, ur. br. 512-
C
06-02-92-339 od 22. 9. 1992.; SVA MORH, KMO: MORH,
Izmjena mobilizacijskog razvoja kl. sp. 801-01/92-02/12,
ur. br. 512-01-92-1596 od 28. 9. 1992.; SVA MORH, GSHV:
Uprava za ustroj, Izvod iz izmjena i dopuna mobilizaci-
jskog razvoja HV kl. sp. 801-01/92-02/22, ur. br. 5120-07-
02-92-5 (nedatirano); SVA MORH, GSHV, Zapovijed kl.
D
8/92-01/07, ur. br. 5120-05-92-226 od 28. 10. 1992.; SVA
MORH, KMO: MORH, Zapovijed ur. br. 512-01-92-2292 od
5. 11. 1992.; SVA MORH, KMO: MORH, Ukidanje i izmjene
mobilizacijskog razvoja HV kl. sp. 801-01/92-02/49, ur.
br. 512-01-92-2341 od 16. 11. 1992.; SVA MORH, KMO:
MORH, Izmjene i dopune mobilizacijskog razvoja HV kl.
SP 801-01/92-02, ur. br. 512-01-92-2649 od 15. 12. 1992.;
SVA MORH, KMO: MORH, Izmjene i dopune mobilizaci-
jskog razvoja HV kl. SP 801-01/92-02, ur. br. 512-01-92-
2688 od 16. 12. 1992.; SVA MORH, KMO: MORH, Dopune
mobilizacijskog razvoja HV kl. SP 801-01/92-02, ur. br.
512-01-92-2724 od 22. 12. 1992.
248 SVA MORH, KMO: MORH, Zapovijed kl. str. pov. 801-
02/92-01/07, ur. br. 512-06-05-92-16 od 9. 3. 1992.; SVA
MORH, GSHV, Zapovijed kl. 8/92-01/07, ur. br. 5120-05-
92-255 od 1. 12. 1992.; Zapovjedništvo OZ Gospić, Zapo-
vijed kl. 8/92-01/01, ur. br. 1079-03/1-92-01 od 12. 12.
1992.; Zap. OZ Zagreb, Zapovijed kl. 800-08/92-01, ur. br.
1075-07/92-7850 od 31. 12. 1992.
123
Domovinski rat 04-02-2020 Knjiga 1.indd 123
implemented. However, in December Operative Zones
Karlovac and Bjelovar were redesignated as Operation-
al Groups Karlovac and Bjelovar and placed under the
command of the HQ of Operative Zone Zagreb. Already
in March, 1992, the Zagreb Defense HQ was formed as
part of Operative Zone Zagreb. The Zagreb Defense HQ
was the successor of the former City HQ of the Territo-
rial Defense, that is, Operational Group Zagreb. Oper-
ative Zone Rijeka was redesignated as, in mid-Decem-
ber, Military District Gospić, and the HQ was relocated
from Rijeka to Gospić.
During this period the process of standardization
of the ZNG brigades in terms of numerical strength
and equipment began. The Croatian government be-
lieved that the UN peacekeeping force would do its
job and secure peace and later also the establishment
of the constitutional order of the Republic of Croatia
in the occupied areas of the country. That erroneous
assumption led the country’s leadership to disregard
the need to steadily develop the armed forces. At the
end of 1992 Bobetko submitted a report to President
Tuđman in which he stated that the demobilization
process was flawed and that no proper armed forces
had been formed. In November General Janko Bobet-
ko sacked General Tus from the position of the Chief of
the General Staff of the Croatian Army. With the new
chief the General Staff was gradually transformed into
what it was supposed to be all along – a strategic com-
mand. Emphasis was placed on educating and training
the army and its command cadres. The quality of com-
bat documentation increased dramatically.
In 1993 the process of organizational changes in
the Croatian Army continued, but at a more leisurely
pace in comparison to the previous year. In the sum-
mer of 1993, by order of the minister of defense, the
existing tactical and combat groups (TG and BG) were
disbanded and its personnel integrated into other for-
mations. At the beginning of October the operative
R
zones were redesignated as military districts. The areas
of responsibility and order of battle of the formations
in question remained, for the most part, the same.
One exception was western Slavonia. There, the 121st
Brigade of the Croatian Army from Nova Gradiška (Mil-
itary District Zagreb) and the 127th Brigade of the Cro-
atian Army from Virovitica (Military District Bjelovar)
were placed under the command of Military District
Osijek. This new operational structure of the Croatian
Army remained unchanged until the end of the war.
4.2.2020. 19:25:54
 Davor Marijan • Rat za opstojnost Hrvata, 1991. - 1995.
litetna demobilizacija niti je ustrojena vojska.249 U stude-
nome je general zbora Janko Bobetko zamijenio genera-
la Antona Tusa na dužnosti načelnika Glavnoga stožera
HV-a. Njegovim je dolaskom Glavni stožer počeo postaja-
ti ono što do tada nije bio – strategijsko zapovjedništvo.
Započet je intenzivan rad na izobrazbi i osposobljavanju
postrojbi i zapovjednoga kadra, a borbeni dokumenti
značajno su dobili na kvaliteti.
Hrvatska je vojska 1993. nastavila organizacijske pro-
mjene, ali u mnogo manjoj mjeri od prethodne godine. U
H
ljeto su po zapovijedi ministra obrane ukinute postojeće
taktičke i borbene skupine (TG i BG), a ljudstvo je integri-
rano u postojeće formacijske sastave.250 Početkom velja-
če operativne su zone preimenovane u istoimena zborna
područja. Područja nadležnosti i sastav podređenih sna-
ga najvećim su dijelom ostali isti. Iznimka je bila zapadna
M
Slavonija, u kojoj su 121. brigada HV-a iz Nove Gradiške
(ZP Zagreb) i 127. brigada HV-a iz Virovitice (ZP Bjelovar)
ušle u sastav ZP-a Osijek. Tom je promjenom operativna
fizionomija HV-a zadržana do kraja rata.251
Tijekom 1994. HV je prošao najveće organizacijske
promjene od 1992., a 1995. su promjene bile najmanje.
D
Domobranstvo je potpuno reorganizirano u 38 pukovni-
ja od kojih je 14 osposobljeno za napadna djelovanja.252
Velikih promjena bilo je i u profesionalnom sastavu
Oružanih snaga RH. Početkom 1994. u Zbornim područ-
jima Osijek i Split osnovane su samostalne gardijske boj-
ne: 80. u Novoj Gradiški, 81. u Virovitici, 82. u Osijeku, 83.
C
u Županji i 84. u Zadru.253 U ožujku je profesionalni sa-
stav dobio još jednu sastavnicu. Krajem ožujka počelo je
osnivanje 1. hrvatskoga gardijskog zbora, koji je bio spoj
249 J. BOBETKO, Sve moje bitke, 364-365.
250 SVA MORH, GSHV, Zapovijed kl. 8/93-02/04, ur. br. 512-
01-93-740 od 29. 3. 1993.
251 Raščlamba b/d na “Istočnoslavonskom bojištu” za 1993.
godinu, Zagreb, 2001., 28.
252 SVA MORH, Uprava za ustroj, popunu i mobilizaciju OS
RH, Izvod iz Odluke ministra obrane, kl. SP 801-01/94-
03/30, ur. br. 512-06-07/21-94-6 od 9. 6. 1994.; SVA
MORH, GSHV: Uprava za ustroj, popunu i mobilizaciju
OS RH GSHV, Izvod iz Odluke ministra obrane, kl. SP 801-
01/94-04/05, ur. br. 512-06-07/21-94-25 od 1. 8. 1994.;
SVA MORH, GSHV: Izvješće GSHV o stanju borbene
spremnosti HV-a u prosincu 1994. godine.
253 SVA MORH, KMO: Uprava za ustroj, popunu i mobilizaci-
ju OS RH, Ustroj br. 1104176 i Izmjene i dopune mob. raz-
voja kl. SP 801-01/94-03/17, ur. br. 512-06-07/24-94-24
od 8. 11. 1994.; SVA MORH, GSHV, kl. 023-01/95-02/05,
ur. br. 512-06-09-95-8 od 21. 6. 1995.
124
Domovinski rat 04-02-2020 Knjiga 1.indd 124
During 1994 the organizational structure of the
Croatian Army was altered more significantly than
during 1992. In 1995 the scale of alterations in the ar-
my’s structure was minimal in comparison to any previ-
ous year. The Home Guard was completely reorganized
into 38 regiments. 14 of those were trained for offen-
sive operations.
Major changes also took place within the profes-
sional contingent of the armed forces of the Republic
of Croatia. At the beginning of 1994 in Military Districts
Osijek and Split the following independent guards
battalions were formed: the 80th in Nova Gradiška, the
81st in Virovitica, the 82nd in Osijek, the 83rd in Županja
and the 84th in Zadar. Another branch was added to the
professional contingent of the armed forces in March.
At the end of the month the process of the forming
of the 1st Croatian Guards Corps was initiated. The 1st
Guards Corps combined ceremonial, security and com-
bat roles and existed outside the scope of the General
Staff of the Croatian Army. The 1st Guards Corps con-
sisted of the 1st Guards Corps in Zagreb, the 1st Guards
Honor Battalion in Zagreb, the 2nd Guards Assault Bat-
talion in Zagreb, the 3rd Guards Naval Honor Assault
Battalion in Pula and in the Brijuni, the 4th Guards Spe-
cial Purpose Battalion in Zagreb. The 1st Guards Corps
was more than sufficiently logistically supported. With
the forming of the 1st Guards Corps the following units
were disbanded: the Special Operations Unit of the
Ministry of Defense – “Zrinski” Battalion, Honor Guard
Squad of the Croatian Army, Special Operations Naval
Commando Company, 8th Light Brigade, 271st Naval In-
fantry Company, HQ of the Gakovo training center and
Special Operations units of the General Staff of the Cro-
D
atian Army. The last changes occurred in the spring of
1995; the 80th, 82nd and 83rd Guards Battalions were in-
corporated into the 3rd and 5th Guards Brigade, the 84th
Guards Battalion was incorporated into the 9th Guards
Brigade and the 81st Guards Battalion became a head-
R
quarters unit of the General Staff of the Croatian Army.
During 1994 both the reserve and active contin-
gents of the Croatian Army underwent an intensive
program of training and education. A number of exer-
cises were carried out; Krndija-94, Bandira 94 and Pose-
jdon 94, to name just a few. For the purpose of training
and educating active duty soldiers the Training Center
for Guards units was founded in Šepurine near Zadar.
In Pakoštani a recon-training camp was set up.
The most significant structural changes regarding
4.2.2020. 19:25:54
 The Croatian Nation’s Struggle for Survival, 1991-1995

počasne, osiguravajuće i borbene postrojbe, ali izvan

nadležnosti Glavnoga stožera HV-a. Zbor se sastojao od
1. hrvatskoga gardijskog zdruga u Zagrebu, 1. gardijske
počasne bojne u Zagrebu, 2. gardijske posadne bojne
u Zagrebu, 3. gardijske mornaričko-počasne posadne
bojne u Puli i na Brijunima, 4. gardijske bojne poseb-
ne namjene u Zagrebu i Opslužništva zbora. Njegovim
osnivanjem ukinuti su Specijalna postrojba Ministarstva
obrane Bojna Zrinski, Počasni odred HV-a, Specijalna
satnija za djelovanje na vodama, 8. lakojurišna brigada,
H
271. satnija mornaričkog pješaštva, Zapovjedništvo po-
ligona Gakovo i Specijalne postrojbe Glavnoga stožera
HV-a.254 Posljednje promjene bile su u proljeće 1995.,
kada su 80., 82. i 83. gardijska bojna uvedene u sastav 3.
i 5. gardijske brigade, 84. u sastav 9. gardijske brigade,
a 81. gardijska bojna postala je podstožerna postrojba
M
Glavnoga stožera HV-a.255
Godina 1994. razdoblje je intenzivne izobrazbe dje-
latnoga i pričuvnoga sastava HV-a. Izvedeno je nekoliko
metodsko-pokaznih vježbi, od kojih su najpoznatije Krn-
dija-94, Bandira-94 i Posejdon-94. Za izobrazbu djelatno-
ga sastava u Šepurinama kod Zadra u srpnju je osnova-
D
no Središte za obuku instruktora gardijskih postrojbi, a u
Pakoštanama kamp za obuku izvidnika.256
Najveće personalne promjene u HV-u bile su ti- Hrvatski vojnik, 1995.
jekom 1992. godine. U studenome je za načelnika
Glavnog stožera HV-a imenovan general zbora Janko Croatian soldier, 1995
Bobetko. Operativna zona Osijek promijenila je neko-
C
liko zapovjednika: generale Karla Gorinšeka i Josipa
Lucića, brigadire Vinka Vrbanca i Đuru Dečaka. Briga-
personnel occurred during 1992. In November Gener-
al Janko Bobetko was appointed Chief of the General
254 SVA MORH, GSHV: Predsjednik RH, Odluka br. PA7-61/1- Staff of the Croatian Armed Forces. A number of offi-
D
94 od 31. 3. 1994.; SVA MORH, GSHV: MORH, Izmjene i cers served in the capacity of commander of Opera-
dopune mobilizacijskog razvoja i ustroja OS RH kl. SP tive Zone Osijek: General Karlo Gorinšek, General Jo-
801-01/94-03, ur. br. 512-01-94-1259 od 29. 3. 1994.
sip Lucić, Brigadier Vinko Vrbanac and Brigadier Đuro
255 SVA MORH, GSHV, Zapovijed kl. 8/94-02/04, ur. br. 512- Dečak. Brigadier Miroslav Jerzečić was replaced by
06-05-94-02 od 6. 1. 1994.; SVA MORH, GSHV, Zapovijed
kl. 8/94-02/04, ur. br. 512-06-05-94-04 od 6. 1. 1994. Brigadier Josip Tomšić as commander of the Operative
R
256 SVA MORH, GSHV, Zapažanja kl. 8/94-02/04, ur. br. 512-
Zone Bjelovar. Brigadier Rudi Stipčić, General Božo Bu-
06-05/1-94-177 od 22. 5. 1994.; SVA MORH, GSHV, Ocje- dimir and General Petar Stipetić successively served
na stanja, borbene spremnosti i aktualne zadaće HV-a, as commander of Operative Zone Zagreb. Brigadier
kl. 8/94-02/04, ur. br. 512-06-01-94-12 od 3. 6. 1994.; Izidro Češnjaj was replaced by Brigadier Pavao Miljavac
SVA MORH, GSHV, Zapovijed kl. 8/94-02/08, ur. br. 512-
06-15-94-30 od 1. 7. 1994.; GSHV, Ubrzano osposoblja- as commander of Operative Zone Karlovac. Brigadier
vanje zapovjedništava i postrojbi HV-a, zapovijed kl. Izidor Češnjaj replaced Brigadier Antun Rački as com-
8/94-02/04, ur. br. 512-06-05/01-94-227 od 23. 7. 1994.; mander of Operative Zone Rijeka. In Operative Zone
SVA MORH, Izvješće GSHV o stanju borbene spremno- Split Brigadier Mate Viduka was replaced by Brigadier
sti HV-a u prosincu 1994.; Ante GOTOVINA, Napadajni
bojevi i operacije HV i HVO, Zborno područje Knin, Knin, Ante Gotovina. General Nojko Marinović was appoint-
1996., 15-16. ed Commander of Sector South of Operative Zone

125

Domovinski rat 04-02-2020 Knjiga 1.indd 125 4.2.2020. 19:25:54

 Davor Marijan • Rat za opstojnost Hrvata, 1991. - 1995.
dira Miroslava Jerzečića u OZ-u Bjelovar zamijenio je
brigadir Josip Tomšić. U OZ-u Zagreb zapovjednici su
bili brigadir Rudi Stipčić i generali Božo Budimir i Pe-
tar Stipetić. U OZ-u Karlovac brigadira Izidora Češnjaja
zamijenio je brigadir Pavao Miljavac. U OZ-u Rijeka bri-
gadira Antuna Račkog zamijenio je brigadir Izidor Češ-
njaj. U OZ-u Split brigadira Matu Viduku zamijenio je
brigadir Ante Gotovina. Zapovjednikom Južnoga sek-
tora OZ-a Split imenovan je general Nojko Marinović.
U listopadu 1993. zapovijedanje Zbornim područjem
H
Gospić od brigadira Izidora Češnjaja preuzeo je briga-
dir Veselko Gabričević.
Tijekom 1994. i 1995. dogodio niz personalnih pro-
mjena u HV-u, najveća sredinom srpnja 1995., kada je
stožerni general Janko Bobetko umirovljen, a načelni-
kom Glavnoga stožera HV-a imenovan general zbora
M
Zvonimir Červenko. U ZP-u Bjelovar brigadira Josipa
Tomšića u travnju 1994. na dužnosti zapovjednika za-
mijenio je brigadir Luka Džanko. U ZP-u Zagreb u rujnu
1994. general-bojnika Petra Stipetića na dužnosti zapo-
vjednika zamijenio je general-bojnik Ivan Basarac. Nje-
ga je krajem kolovoza 1995. zamijenio general-bojnik
D
Marijan Mareković. U ZP-u Karlovac sredinom kolovoza
1994. dužnost zapovjednika od generala Pavla Miljavca
preuzeo je general-bojnik Miljenko Crnjac. U ZP-u Gos-
pić krajem srpnja, odnosno početkom kolovoza 1994.
brigadir Mirko Norac preuzeo je dužnost zapovjednika
od brigadira Veselka Gabričevića. Na Južnom bojištu
C
sredinom rujna 1995. dužnost zapovjednika od gene-
ral-bojnika Nojka Marinovića preuzeo je general-bojnik
Živko Budimir.257
Očekivani dolazak UNPROFOR-a značajno je redefi-
nirao položaj HV-a i njegov način održavanja borbene
spremnosti na visokoj razini. Borbena spremnost hrvat-
skih snaga tijekom 1992. temeljila se na četiri brigade
ZNG-a, nekoliko pričuvnih brigada i većem broju taktič-
kih grupa. Ustrojavanje prvih taktičkih grupa počelo je
po zapovijedi načelnika Glavnoga stožera HV-a od 10.
travnja. Taktička je grupa organizacijsko rješenje koje je
tijekom 1992. i 1993. bilo razmjerno često u pričuvnom
257 GSHV, Zapovijed kl. SP 8/95-02/03, ur. br. 512-06-01-95-
20 od 14. 9. 1995.; Jure ŠIMIĆ i sur., Bjelovar u Domov-
inskom ratu – Svjedoci vremena, Bjelovarsko-bilogorska
županija – Grad Bjelovar – Prosvjeta, Bjelovar, 1997.,
183.; M. MALEŠ, “Kronologija zbivanja”, 201., 212-213.; 1.
gardijska brigada HV – Tigrovi, 427.; 3. gardijska brigada
HV – Kune, 305.; 9. gardijska brigada HV – Vukovi, 426.
126
Domovinski rat 04-02-2020 Knjiga 1.indd 126
Split. In October, 1993, Izidor Češnjaj was replaced by
Brigadier Veselko Gabričević as commander of Military
District Gospić.
A number of personnel shuffles also occurred in
1994 and 1995 in the Croatian Army. The most signifi-
cant change in that regard took place in mid-July, 1995,
when General Janko Bobetko was sent into retirement
and General Zvonimir Červenko was appointed Chief
of the General Staff of the Croatian Armed Forces. In
April, 1994, Brigadier Josip Tomšić was replaced as
commander of Operative Zone Bjelovar by Brigadier
Luka Đanko. In September, 1994, Major General Petar
Stipetić was replaced by Major General Ivan Basarac as
Commander of Operative Zone Zagreb. Ivan Basarac
was, in turn, replaced by Major General Marijan Maren-
ković at the end of August, 1994. General Pavao Mil-
javac was replaced by Major General Miljenko Crnjac
as commander of Military District Karlovac in mid-Au-
gust. At the end of July and beginning of August, 1994,
Brigadier Mirko Norac replaced Brigadier Veselko Ga-
bričević as commander of Military District Gospić. In
mid-September Major General Živko Budimir succeed-
ed Major General Nojko Marinović as commander of
the Southern Theater of Operations.
The expected arrival of UNPROFOR fundamental-
ly redefined the role of the Croatian Army. Also, the
Croatian Army altered its procedures and methods for
maintaining high levels of combat readiness. The level
of combat readiness of the Croatian forces during 1992
pivoted on four ZNG brigades, a number of reserve
brigades and a significant number of tactical groups.
The chief of the General Staff’s order issued on April 10
initiated the process of the forming of the first tactical
D
groups. The formation of tactical groups was an organi-
zational expedient often resorted to in 1992 and 1993
in relation to the reserve army. The role of the tactical
groups was similar to that of the ready-for-combat JNA
battalions. The numerical strength of a tactical group
R
was limited to 1,100 men, 10-12 transport and 80 other
motor vehicles. Because the situation on the ground
was, more often than not, more difficult than anticipat-
ed, the concept of tactical group proved to be a failure.
The creators of the tactical group concept did not take
into account the geographical-tactical specificities of
a given theater of operations or a given battlefield.
Furthermore, the inherenent flaws of the concept also
stemmed from the fact that the quality of replace-
ments was very low.
4.2.2020. 19:25:54
 The Croatian Nation’s Struggle for Survival, 1991-1995
sastavu Hrvatske vojske.258 Po svojoj namjeni taktičke su
grupe podsjećale na gotove bataljune JNA koji su držani
u stanju pune borbene spremnosti. Brojno stanje tak-
tičke grupe ograničeno je do najviše 1100 ljudi, 10-12
putničkih i 80 ostalih motornih vozila.259 S obzirom na
to da je stanje na ratištu bilo mnogo teže od predviđe-
nog, koncepcija taktičkih grupa pokazala se kao potpu-
no promašena, između ostalog jer su stvarane po istom
obrascu, čije su slabosti izbijale na vidjelo zbog zemljopi-
sno-taktičkih specifičnosti bojišta, kao i zbog nedovoljne
H
kvalitete ljudstva kojim su popunjavane.
Glavnina raspoloživih snaga HV-a bila je angažirana
na Južnom i Slavonskom bojištu, pa su se zapovjedništva
operativnih zona snalazila na razne načine.260
Borbena spremnost HV-a na crti dugoj 1290 kilo-
metara održavala se na taktičkoj dubini s dijelovima 24
M
brigade HV-a, 14 domobranskih pukovnija, devet sa-
mostalnih domobranskih bojni, 15 mješovitih topnič-
ko-raketnih divizijuna za potporu i protuoklopnu borbu,
devet topničko-raketnih divizijuna PZO-a, šest inženje-
rijsko-pontonirskih bojni, eskadrilom helikoptera HRZ-a
i PZO-a, do tri divizijuna brodova, plovilima dviju riječnih
D
ratnih flotila i drugim, manjim sastavima HV-a. Ukupno
je u ljeto 1993. bilo angažirano 76.467 ljudi, 250 tenkova,
711 raketno-topničkih oruđa za potporu, 431 za protu-
C
258 SVA MORH, GSHV, Zapovijed kl. 8/92-01/07, ur. br. 5120-
05-92-31 od 10. 4. 1992.; SVA MORH, GSHV, Zapovijed
kl. 8/92-01/07, ur. br. 5120-05-92-38 od 17. 4. 1992.; SVA
MORH, GSHV, Zapovijed kl. 8/92-01/07, ur. br. 5120-05-
92-40 od 17. 4. 1992.; SVA MORH, GSHV, Zapovijed kl.
D
8/92-01/07, ur. br. 5120-05-92-45 od 17. 4. 1992.; SVA
MORH, GSHV, Zapovijed kl. 8/92-01/07, ur. br. 5120-05-
92-77 od 21. 5. 1992.; SVA MORH, GSHV, Zapovijed kl.
8/92-01/07, ur. br. 5120-05-92-79 od 22. 5. 1992.; SVA
MORH, GSHV, Zapovijed kl. 8/92-01/07, ur. br. 5120-05-
92-96 od 13. 6. 1992.; SVA MORH, GSHV, Zapovijed kl.
8/92-01/07, ur. br. 5120-05-92-139 od 20. 7. 1992.; SVA
MORH, GSHV, Zapovijed kl. 8/92-01/07, ur. br. 5120-05-
92-150 od 27. 7. 1992.; SVA MORH, GSHV, Zapovijed kl.
8/92-01/07, ur. br. 5120-05-92-158 od 4. 8. 1992.
259 SVA MORH, GSHV, Formiranje TG i “B” brigada kl. 8/92-
01/07, ur. br. 5120-05-92-103 od 20. 6. 1992.
260 SVA MORH, ZOZ Osijek, Borbena zapovijed kl. 8/92-
01/01, ur. br. 1076-33-92-124 od 2. 12. 1992.; SVA MORH,
ZOZ Osijek, Borbena zapovijed kl. 8/92-01/01, ur. br.
1076-33-92-125 od 16. 12. 1992.; SVA MORH, ZOZ Osijek,
Borbena zapovijed kl. 8/92-01/01, ur. br. 1076-33-92-127
od 24. 12. 1992.
127
Domovinski rat 04-02-2020 Knjiga 1.indd 127
The bulk of the available forces of the Croatian
Army was deployed in the Southern and Slavonian
theaters of operations. The HQs of the operative zones
had to cope with that state of affairs as best they could.
The Croatian Army, on a 1,290 kilometer-long front
line, and in the context of tactical and operational
depth, deployed 24 army brigades, 14 Home Guard
regiments, 9 independent Home Guard regiments, 15
mixed artillery rocket battalions for support and an-
ti-tank combat, 9 anti-aircraft artillery rocket battalions,
6 Engineer Pontoon Battalions, helicopter squadron of
the Air Force and Air Defense, up to three naval squad-
rons, two river flotillas and other, smaller formations.
In total, 76,467 men, 250 tanks, 711 rocket artillery
pieces for support, 431 for anti-tank warfare and other
weaponry were deployed in the summer of 1993. The
Guards Brigades were deployed in Zadar’s hinterland
(the 3rd, 4th, 7th and elements of 1st, 2nd, 5th, and 6th Bri-
gades), in the area of responsibility of Military District
Karlovac (1st, elements of the 7th Brigade and the 8th
Light Brigade) and in parent Military Districts. Until the
beginning of April elements of the 1st and 4th Guards
Brigades operated in Sector South. Reserve forces, for
the most part, were deployed in the area of responsi-
bility of their parent command units. The 133rd Brigade
from Military District Gospić and the 145th Brigade
from Military District Zagreb were deployed in the area
of Military District Split. Most Croatian Army brigades
were deployed in the Southern Front. Formations be-
longing to Military District Zagreb were there (144th,
150th and 153rd Brigades) and also those belonging to
the northern portion of Military District Split (114th,
126th and 141st Brigades).
In the spring of 1994, when the Zagreb Agreement
had been put into effect, the Croatian Army demobi-
lized 28,112 conscripts. For that reason, the army had
to be restructured so as to maintain its high level of
combat readiness. In principle, the first defensive line
R
was defended by Home Guard units and reserve bri-
gades reinforced with elements of Guards and con-
script brigades. These forces were deployed according
to a system of observation posts, reconnaissance pa-
trols and ambushes for the purpose of securing tacti-
cal control of the surveillance, security and maneuver
zones. Tactical reserve consisted of platoon- to compa-
ny-strength units. Other operational units held in re-
serve were stationed up to ten kilometers beyond the
maneuver zone in bivouacs and barracks.
4.2.2020. 19:25:54
 Davor Marijan • Rat za opstojnost Hrvata, 1991. - 1995.
oklopnu borbu i dr.261 Gardijske su brigade težišno bile
angažirane u zaleđu Zadra (3., 4. i 7., te dijelovi 1., 2., 5.
i 6. brigade), zoni ZP-a Karlovac (1., dio 7. te 8. lakojuriš-
na brigada) i matičnim zbornim područjima. Do početka
travnja u Južnom sektoru bili su dijelovi 1. i 4. gardijske
brigade. Pričuvne su snage najvećim dijelom angažirane
na matičnom području. Na području ZP-a Split bile su
angažirane 133. brigada iz ZP-a Gospić i 145. brigada iz
ZP-a Zagreb. Najveći angažman bio je na Južnom bojištu,
na kojem su bile snage iz ZP-a Zagreb (144., 150. i 153.
H
brigada HV-a) i sjevernoga dijela ZP-a Split (114., 126. i
141. brigada HV-a).
U proljeće 1994., nakon stupanja na snagu Zagre-
bačkoga sporazuma, Hrvatska je vojska demobilizirala
28.112 vojnih obveznika.262 Zbog toga je bio nužan novi
raspored snaga radi održanja borbene spremnosti na
M
potrebnoj razini. Načelno se crta držala s domobranskim
postrojbama i pričuvnim brigadama te ojačanjima iz gar-
dijskih i ročnih brigada. Snage su angažirane po sustavu
borbenoga osiguranja s promatračkim punktovima, op-
hodnjama i zasjedama s ciljem dubinskoga osiguranja
područja na taktičkoj dubini i pričuvama jačine voda do
D
satnije u spremnosti za intervenciju. Na dubini većoj od
10 i 20 kilometara u pričuvi u taborskim prostorijama i
vojarnama bile su ostale operativne snage u spremnosti
za intervenciju.263
Jugoslavenska narodna armija
C
Po procjenama Hrvatske vojske, na okupiranom te-
ritoriju Hrvatske srpske su snage u siječnju 1992. imale
33 brigade, od čega 19 JNA i 14 TO, s 59.500 ljudi, 833
tenka, 522 oklopna borbena vozila i 901 topničkim oru-
đem. JNA i podređeni srpski sastavi bili su osjetno jači.
Ona je naspram HV-a u Hrvatskoj i istočnoj Hercegovini
imala najmanje 53 brigade, od kojih tri oklopne, sedam
261 Prosudba operativnog razvoja i potreba za pregrupiran-
je snaga i pojačavanja pojedinih pravaca, koreferat gen-
erala Franje Feldija za sastanak kod načelnika GSHV-a 23.
8. 1993.
262 SVA MORH, GSHV: Uprava za ustroj, popunu i mobilizaci-
ju OS RH, Izvod iz zapovijedi Ministra obrane, kl. SP 801-
03/94-02/11, ur. br. 512-06-07/40-94-7 od 14. 3. 1994.;
SVA MORH, GSHV, Ocjena stanja, borbene spremnosti i
aktualne zadaće HV-a, kl. 8/94-02/04, ur. br. 512-06-01-
94-12 od 3. 6. 1994.
263 SVA MORH, GSHV, Zapovijed kl. 8/94-02/04, ur. br. 512-
06-05-92-134 od 13. 4. 1994.
128
Domovinski rat 04-02-2020 Knjiga 1.indd 128
The Yugoslav People’s Army
According to the Croatian Army’s estimates, the
Serb forces in the occupied territory of the Republic
of Croatia had nineteen JNA brigades and fourteen
Territorial Defense brigades in January, 1992, with a
total of 59,500 men, 833 tanks, 522 armored fighting
vehicles and 901 artillery pieces. The Yugoslav People’s
Army and formations under its command were consid-
erably stronger. The Yugoslav People’s Army deployed,
against the Croatian Army in Croatia and eastern Her-
zegovina, at least 53 brigades, out of which three were
armored, seven were mechanized and two were mixed
artillery brigades for close support. This force num-
bered around 145,000 men, 1,100 tanks, 700 other ar-
mored vehicles and around 1,980 artillery pieces.
At the beginning of January, 1992, the JNA’s orga-
nizational structure consisted of four military districts,
the Navy and Air Force and Air Defense. At the opera-
tional level, within X Corps, the following formations
were disbanded: the 1st and 3rd Operational Groups.
Three new Operational Groups were formed instead:
the 6th Operational Group for Lika (Commander Slo-
bodan Đorđević) the 7th Operational Group for Banovi-
na (Commander General Mirko Ratković) and the 8th
Operational Group for Kordun (Commander General
Mile Mrkšić). In Lika and Kordun the 6th Lika Division
and TG-2 were disbanded. Elements of Užice Corps re-
mained in Herzegovina until March, 1992, when they
were withdrawn to Serbia. In the Air Force and Air De-
fense, V Corps operated until the end of April, and then,
for less than a month, the temporary command of 5th
Operational Group functioned within the Air Force and
D
Air Defense.
In March, 1992, the JNA developed the Kopaon-
ik plan. The plan was a modification of the Sutjeska-2
plan. One scenario in the plan was based on the possi-
bility that the Croatian Army, in its attempt to liberate
R
the occupied areas of the Republic of Croatia, would be
assisted by the armed forces of Germany, Austria, Italy,
Hungary, Bulgaria and Albania. The JNA planned, in the
case of a Croatian attack, to counterattack and advance
as far as the western boundaries of the Republic of Ser-
bian Krajina. The HQ of the 2nd Military District would
be in charge of the operation but would be designated
the HQ of the Western Theater of Operations with the
JNA forces belonging to the 2nd Military District and
Territorial Defense forces in their areas of operations.
4.2.2020. 19:25:54
 The Croatian Nation’s Struggle for Survival, 1991-1995
mehaniziranih, 15 motoriziranih i dvije mješovite briga-
de topništva za potporu. Brojno stanje iznosilo je oko
145.000 ljudi, 1100 tenkova, 700 drugih oklopnih vozila
i oko 1980 topničkih oruđa.264
U prvim danima siječnja 1992. JNA je prešla na orga-
nizaciju koju su činile četiri vojne oblasti, Ratna morna-
rica i RV i PVO. Na operativnoj razini unutar 10. korpusa
ugašene su 1. i 3. operativna grupa, a umjesto njih su
formirane tri nove: 6. OG za Liku (komandant general
Slobodan Đorđević), 7. OG za Banovinu (komandant ge-
H
neral Mirko Raković) i 8. OG za Kordun (komandant ge-
neral Mile Mrkšić). Na području Like i Korduna ukinute su
6. lička divizija i TG-2. Na području Hercegovine dijelovi
Užičkog korpusa su ostali do sredine ožujka 1992. kada
su vraćeni u Srbiju. U RV-u i PVO-u 5. korpus je funkcioni-
rao do potkraj travnja, a potom je nepunih mjesec dana
M
djelovala privremena Komanda 5. operativne grupe.265
U ožujku 1992. JNA je izradila ratni plan Kopaonik,
koji je bio modifikacija ratnog plana Sutjeska-2. U jed-
noj od opcija predviđalo se da će Hrvatskoj u pokušaju
oslobađanja okupiranih područja pomoći oružane snage
Njemačke, Italije, Austrije, Mađarske, Bugarske i Albanije.
D
Plan JNA bio je da u slučaju hrvatskoga napada u protu-
napadu izbije na granice RSK. Za operaciju je bila zaduže-
na Komanda 2. vojne oblasti pod imenom Komanda za-
padnog vojišta sa snagama JNA iz 2. vojne oblasti i TO-a
u njezinoj zoni djelovanja.266 Iz toga je plana u travnju
1992. izveden prvi ratni plan pobunjenih Srba. Po njemu
C
je Teritorijalna obrana RSK pripremana za borbu u okol-
nostima povlačenja JNA s okupiranih područja Hrvatske.
Predviđala se obrana s osloncem na snage Ujedinjenih
naroda i Vojske Jugoslavije.267
D
264 ICTY: Komanda 1. vojne oblasti, Pregled sastava sna-
ga str. pov. br. 1614-162 od 16. 11. 1991.; ICTY: Radna
karta rasporeda snaga 2. OG na dan 2. 12. 1991.; ICTY:
Materijal za referisanje komandanta 5. korpusa u GŠ OS
SFRJ 3. 12. 1991. godine; ICTY: Direktiva GSHV iz siječn-
ja 1992. za izvođenje strategijske ofenzive Hrvatske vo-
jske; HMDCDR: Komanda 10. korpusa, Pregled brojnog
stanja jedinica, Izveštaj str. pov. br. 3/15-36 od 17. 1.
1992.; ICTY: Komanda 2. vojne oblasti, Referat o stan-
ju borbene gotovosti komandi i jedinica 2. VO str. pov.
br. 09/63-26 od 23. 1. 1992.; D. MARIJAN, “The Sarajevo
ceasefire ”, 119-120.
265 D. MARIJAN, Slom Titove armije, 322-327.
266 HMDCDR: Komanda Zapadnog vojišta, Direktiva koman-
danta Zapadnog vojišta za protivofanzivu DT br. 3-3 od
17. 3. 1992.
267 M. SEKULIĆ, Knin je pao u Beogradu, 43-45.
129
Domovinski rat 04-02-2020 Knjiga 1.indd 129
The first plan of the rebel Serbs derived directly from
the Kopaonik plan in April, 1992. According to the rebel
Serbs’ plan, the Territorial Defense of the Republic of
Serbian Krajina would have to be ready to fight in a sit-
uation where the JNA was in the process of withdraw-
ing from the occupied areas of the Republic of Croatia.
The Territorial Defense was supposed to defend the
Republic of Serbian Krajina relying heavily on the UN
forces and the Yugoslav Army.
After the JNA had withdrawn from the front line
and handed the positions over to the rebel Serbs, it
maintained a high level of combat readiness by utiliz-
ing a system of forward detachments. These detach-
ments were formed around reinforced armored, mech-
anized or motorized battalions. There were nine such
detachments in the 2nd Military District and a few in
the 1st Military District. The JNA, just before it withdrew
from the front line and underwent a process of reorga-
nization, formed, with its equipment and its Territorial
Defense soldiers, eight brigades of the Special Police
(Special Militia) in the Republic of Serbian Krajina. Al-
together there were 16,000 men serving in the eight
brigades of the Special Police. With these brigades the
rebel Serbs held the separation line and maintained
their combat readiness. It has to be pointed out that
the existence of the eight brigades of the Special Po-
lice constituted a serious breach of the provisions of
the Vance Plan.
The Serbian Army of Krajina
While in the process of withdrawing from the Re-
public of Croatia’s territory, the JNA formed the armed
forces of the rebel Serbs. In early spring the JNA formed
the HQ of the Territorial Defense of the RSK and six zone
HQs with subordinated units. The Main HQ was located
in Knin and its commanders were General Milan Torbi-
ca and General Mile Novaković. The Zone HQ of the Ter-
R
ritorial Defense of Northern Dalmatia was in Knin, the
Zone HQ of the Territorial Defense of Lika was in Koren-
ica, the Zone HQ of the Territorial Defense of Kordun
was in Vojnić, the Zone HQ of the Territorial Defense of
Banija was in Glina, the Zone HQ of the Territorial De-
fense of Western Slavonia was in Okučani and the Zone
HQ of the Territorial Defense of Eastern Slavonia was
in Vukovar. The following Territorial Defense brigades
were formed: the 1st in Knin, the 3rd in Benkovac, the
4th in Obrovac, the 7th in Gračac, the 8th in Korenica, the
4.2.2020. 19:25:55
 Davor Marijan • Rat za opstojnost Hrvata, 1991. - 1995.
Nakon što je predala crtu pobunjenim Srbima, JNA
je visok stupanj borbene spremnosti održavala susta-
vom prednjih odreda, čije su osnove bili ojačani oklopni,
odnosno mehanizirani ili motorizirani bataljuni. U sasta-
vu 2. vojne oblasti bilo ih je devet, a nekoliko i u sastavu
1. vojne oblasti. Uoči povlačenja i transformacije JNA je
od svoje opreme i ljudstva TO-a osnovala u RSK 8 briga-
da Specijalne milicije, koje su imale oko 16.000 ljudi. S
tim su brigadama pobunjeni Srbi držali položaje uz crtu
razdvajanja i održavali borbenu spremnost, premda je
H
njihovo postojanje kršilo odredbe Vanceova plana.268
Srpska vojska Krajine
Pripremajući se za povlačenje s teritorija Republike
Hrvatske, JNA je istodobno formirala oružane snage po-
M
bunjenih Srba. U rano proljeće formirani su Glavni štab
TO RSK i šest zonskih štabova s podređenim postrojbama.
Glavni je štab bio u Kninu, a komandanti su bili generali
Milan Torbica i Mile Novaković. Zonski štab TO-a Sjeverna
Dalmacija bio je u Kninu, Zonski štab TO-a Lika u Korenici,
Zonski štab TO-a Kordun u Vojniću, Zonski štab TO-a Banija
D
u Glini, Zonski štab TO-a Zapadna Slavonija u Okučanima
i Zonski štab TO-a Istočna Slavonija u Vukovaru. Brigade
TO-a su osnovane: 1. u Kninu, 3. u Benkovcu, 4. u Obrovcu,
7. u Gračacu, 8. u Korenici, 11. u Vojniću, 13. u Slunju, 19. u
Vrginmostu, 24. u Glini, 26. u Kostajnici, 31. u Petrinji, 35. u
Dalju, 39. u Belom Manastiru, 40. u Vukovaru, 45. u Mirkov-
C
cima, 54. u Okučanima i 145. u Plaškom. Odredi TO-a bili
su: 51. u Pakracu, 59. u Daruvaru, 63. u Podravskoj Slatini,
73. u Vrhovinama, 93. u Bruvnu i 98. u Jasenovcu.
Osim vojske, JNA je u sastavu MUP-a ustrojila i Upra-
vu posebnih jedinica milicije s osam brigada milicije: 75.
u Kninu, 79. u Korenici, 80. u Vojniću, 83. u Petrinji, 85. u
Okučanima, 87. u Vukovaru, 90. u Belom Manastiru i 92.
brigada u Benkovcu.269
Premda se JNA obvezala napustiti teritorij Hrvatske
do 19. svibnja 1992., njezino povlačenje nije proteklo
prema planu. Pobunjeni Srbi spriječili su izvlačenje na-
oružanja i opreme glavnine Kninskoga korpusa, dijelova
268 ICTY: Završno izvješće Glavnog tajnika UN-a od 24. 11.
1992. sukladno s Rezolucijom Vijeća sigurnosti br. 743
(1992.); D. MARIJAN, Smrt oklopne brigade, 167.
269 HMDCDR: III uprava GŠ OS SFRJ, Naređenje DT br. 892-2
od 2. 3. 1992.; HMDCDR: III uprava GŠ OS SFRJ, Naređenje
str. pov. br. 1349-2 od 26. 3. 1992.; HMDCDR: III uprava GŠ
OS SFRJ, Naređenje str. pov. br. 1943-2 od 28. 4. 1992.
130
Domovinski rat 04-02-2020 Knjiga 1.indd 130
11th in Vojnić, the 13th in Slunj, the 19th in Vrginmost, the
24th in Glina, the 26th in Kostajnica, the 31st in Petrinja,
the 35th in Dalj, the 39th in Beli Manastir, the 40th in Vu-
kovar, the 45th in Mirkovci, the 54th in Okučani and the
145th in Plaško. The following detachments of the Terri-
torial Defense were formed: the 51st in Pakrac, the 59th
for Daruvar, the 63rd for Podravska Slatina, the 73rd in
Vrhovine, the 93rd in Bruvno and the 98th in Jasenovac.
The JNA also formed the Special Police Administra-
tion with eight brigades within the Ministry of Internal
Affairs for the rebel Serbs. The eight brigades were: the
75th in Knin, the 79th in Korenica, the 80th in Vojnić, the
83rd in Petrinja, the 85th in Okučani, the 87th in Vukovar,
the 90th in Beli Manastir and the 92nd in Benkovac.
The JNA promised the international communi-
ty that it would withdraw its soldiers and equipment
from the Republic of Croatia by May 19, 1992. It did not
happen that way. The rebel Serbs prevented the JNA
from withdrawing the weapons and equipment be-
longing to the bulk of Knin Corps, elements of Bihać
Corps and elements of headquarters units of the HQ of
the 2nd Military District. The weapons and equipment
thus acquired dramatically augmented the combat val-
ue of the Territorial Defense of the Republic of Serbian
Krajina. New formations were added to the organiza-
tional structure of the Territorial Defense. In November
and December the army was reorganized. The Special
Police Administration and police brigades (militia bri-
gades) were disbanded and the personnel incorporat-
ed into the Serbian Army of Krajina. The operational
structure of the Serbian Army of Krajina was based on
six Corps.
In November, 1992, the Territorial Defense was
D
redesignated as the Serbian Army of the Republic of
Serbian Krajina, or Serbian Army of Krajina. The most
significant changes were redesignating the operative
zones as corps and disbanding the Special Police Ad-
ministration whose equipment and personnel were
R
incorporated into the Serbian Army of Krajina. The re-
gional HQs of the Territorial Defense were incorporat-
ed into the commands and units according to orders
issued by the corps commanders. The HQ of the Terri-
torial Defense was redesignated as the General Staff of
the Serbian Army of Krajina.
In its reorganized form the SVK consisted of: the
General Staff of the Serbian Army of Krajina in Knin
with headquarters units and six corps. VII Northern
Dalmatia Corps was stationed in Knin; XI Slavonia-Ba-
4.2.2020. 19:25:55
 The Croatian Nation’s Struggle for Survival, 1991-1995
Bihaćkoga korpusa i dijela podstožernih postrojba Ko-
mande 2. vojne oblasti. S tim je oružjem i opremom zna-
čajno porasla vatrena moć Teritorijalne obrane RSK.270
Organizacija TO-a dopunjena je novim sastavima, a
u studenome i prosincu došlo je do nove organizacije
vojske. Uprava posebnih jedinica i brigade milicije su
ukinute i uvedene u sastav SVK-a, koji je prešao na ope-
rativnu organizaciju od šest korpusa.271
U studenome 1992. TO je preimenovan u Srpsku
vojsku Republike Srpske Krajine, odnosno Srpsku voj-
H
sku Krajine. Najvažnija promjena bilo je preimenovanje
operativnih zona u korpuse i ukidanje Uprave i poseb-
nih jedinica milicije, koje su s opremom i ljudstvom in-
tegrirane u SVK. Općinski štabovi TO-a ugrađeni su u
zapovjedništva i postrojbe po odlukama komandanata
korpusa. Glavni štab TO-a preimenovan je u Glavni štab
M
Srpske vojske Krajine.
Nakon preimenovanja i prestrojavanja Srpska voj-
ska Krajine se sastojala od Glavnog štaba Srpske vojske
u Kninu s prištabnim postrojbama i šest korpusa. Sjedi-
šta korpusa su bila: Sjevernodalmatinskog (7.) u Kninu,
Slavonsko-baranjskog (11.) u Borovu Selu, Ličkog (15.) u
D
Korenici, Zapadnoslavonskog (18.) u Okučanima, Kordu-
naškog (21.) na Petrovoj gori, Banijskog (39.) u Glini. U
Belom Manastiru je bila Baranjska divizija, a brigade: 1.
laka u Vrlici, 2. pješačka u Kistanju, 4. laka u Obrovcu, 9.
mtbr u Gračacu, 11. pješačka u Vojniću, 13. pješačka u
Slunju, 18. pješačka u Buniću, 19. pješačka u Vrginmostu,
C
24. pješačka u Glini, 26. pješačka u Kostajnici, 31. pješač-
ka u Petrinji, 33. pješačka u Dvoru na Uni, 35. slavonska
u Dalju, 37. pješačka u Dardi, 39. pješačka u Belom Ma-
nastiru, 40. pješačka u Vukovaru, 43. pješačka u Tenji, 45.
pješačka u Jankovcima, 50. pješačka u Vrhovinama, 51.
D
pješačka u Pakracu, 54. pješačka u Okučanima, 70. pje-
šačka u Plaškom, 75. mtbr u Drnišu, 92. mtbr u Benkov-
cu, 98. pješačka u Jasenovcu, 103. laka u Donjem Lapcu.
Odredi su bili: 59. za Daruvar, 63. za Podravsku Slatinu
i Sisak-Caprag u Capragu. U Korenici je bio 37. pješački
bataljun, u Kneževu Granični bataljun, a bataljuni za in-
tervencije u Željavi, Slunju, Okučanima i Borovu Selu.272
270 D. MARIJAN, Slom Titove armije, 397-398.
271 HMDCDR: GŠSV RSK, Preformiranje Teritorijalne odbrane
i posebnih jedinica milicije u Srpsku vojsku Republike
Srpska Krajina, DT br. 947-23/1 od 27. 11. 1992.
272 HMDCDR: GŠSV RSK, Preformiranje Teritorijalne odbrane
i posebnih jedinica milicije u Srpsku vojsku Republike
Srpska Krajina, DT br. 947-23/1 od 27. 11. 1992.
131
Domovinski rat 04-02-2020 Knjiga 1.indd 131
ranja Corps in Borovo Selo; XV Lika Corps in Korenica,
XVIII Western Slavonia Corps in Okučani; XXI Kordun
Corps in Petrova Gora; XXXIX Banija Corps in Glina. The
Baranja Division was stationed in Beli Manastir. The 1st
Light Brigade was stationed in Vrlika; the 2nd Infantry
Brigade in Kistanj; the 4th Light Brigade in Obrovac; the
9th Motorized Brigade in Gračac; the 11th Infantry Bri-
gade in Vojnić; the 13th Infantry Brigade in Slunj; the
18th Infantry Brigade in Bunić; the 19th Infantry Brigade
in Vrginmost; the 24th Infantry Brigade in Glina; the 26th
Infantry Brigade in Kostajnica; the 31st Infantry Brigade
in Petrinja; the 33rd Infantry Brigade in Dvor na Uni; the
35th Slavonia Brigade in Dalj; the 37th Infantry Brigade
in Darda; the 39th Infantry Brigade in Beli Manastir;
the 40th Infantry brigade in Vukovar; the 43rd Infantry
Brigade in Tenja; the 45th Infantry Brigade in Jankovci;
the 50th Infantry Brigade in Vrhovine; the 51st Infantry
Brigade in Pakrac; the 54th Infantry Brigade in Okučani;
the 70th Infantry Brigade in Plaško; the 75th Motorized
Brigade in Drniš; the 92nd Motorized Brigade in Benko-
vac; the 98th Infantry Brigade in Jasenovac; the 103rd
Light Brigade in Donji Lapac. The detachments were:
the 59th for Daruvar; the 63rd for Podravska Slatina; the
Sisak-Caprag Detachment in Caprag. The 37th Infantry
Battalion was stationed in Korenica; the Border Battal-
ion in Kneževo. The Intervention Battalions were sta-
tioned in Željava, Slunj, Okučani and Borovo Selo.
The air force initially consisted of one air brigade
and one air base. At the beginning of 1994 the Air
Force and Air Defense Division was formed.
In 1993 the Serbian Army of Krajina did not un-
dergo significant structural changes. At the Udbina Air
Base the 105th Air Brigade was formed and with that
the SVK acquired an air force. In the first half of 1993 an
attempt was made to form the 1st Shock Brigade. The
attempt failed because the plan was too ambitious and
because the corps and civilian structures vehemently
opposed it. In mid-November, 1993, by the Chief of the
R
General Staff of the Yugoslav Army’s order, the 40th Per-
sonnel Center was formed. The purpose of the center
was to provide trained cadres for the SVK.
In a strictly organizational sense, the Serbian Army
of Krajina was not significantly changed in 1994. In
May the Independent Motorized Brigade of the Gen-
eral Staff of the SVK was disbanded and the headquar-
ters and battalions were placed under the command of
the corps from which they had been taken. The most
significant organizational change – the formation of
4.2.2020. 19:25:55
 Davor Marijan • Rat za opstojnost Hrvata, 1991. - 1995.
Zrakoplovstvo se u početku sastojalo od zrakoplov-
ne brigade i baze, a početkom 1994. osnovana je Divizija
ratnoga zrakoplovstva i protuzračne obrane.273
Srpska vojska Krajine 1993. nije imala većih orga-
nizacijskih promjena. U zračnoj luci u Udbini osnova-
na je 105. vazduhoplovna brigada, čime je SVK dobio
i zrakoplovnu komponentu. Pokušaj osnivanja 1. ju-
rišne brigade u prvoj polovini godine propao je zbog
megalomanskih planova i snažnog otpora korpusa i
civilnih struktura. Sredinom studenoga 1993., po za-
H
povijedi načelnika Generalštaba Vojske Jugoslavije,
osnovan je 40. kadrovski centar, čija je svrha bila per-
sonalna potpora SVK-u.274
U organizacijskom je smislu 1994. bilo malo pro-
mjena u sastavu SVK-a. U svibnju je rasformirana Sa-
mostalna motorizirana brigada Glavnoga štaba SVK-a, a
M
komanda i bataljuni vraćeni su u sastav korpusa iz kojih
su uzeti.275 Najveća organizacijska promjena, osnivanje
Korpusa specijalnih jedinica, napravljena je u ljeto 1995.
uoči sloma RSK. Unatoč imenu, to je bila postrojba veli-
čine brigade. Osnovana je po uzoru na istoimeni sastav
u Vojsci Jugoslavije i sastojala se od Komande, 2. oklo-
D
pne brigade, 71. specijalne brigade, 2. gardijske brigade,
Brdskoga bataljuna, bataljuna VP-a i lakog artiljerijskog
divizijuna PZO-a. Komanda i glavnina korpusa bili su u
Slunju, a manji dijelovi u Kninu. Komandant korpusa bio
je general-major Milorad Stupar.276
Sredinom 1994. SVK je imao 300 tenkova, 295 raznih
C
oklopnih borbenih vozila, 360 topničkih oruđa kalibra
od 100 i više milimetara. Krajem listopada 1994. brojno
stanje SVK-a bilo je u granicama od 20 do 25 tisuća bora-
ca. U svibnju 1995. SVK je imao oko 14.900 ljudi po mir-
nodopskoj, odnosno 62.500 po ratnoj formaciji.277
Na najvišoj personalnoj razini bilo je nekoliko pro-
mjena. General Milan Čeleketić zamijenio je 22. veljače
273 HMDCDR: GŠ SVK, Organizacijsko-formacijske promene
SVK, Naređenje str. pov. br. 8-14 od 15. 2. 1994.
274 HMDCDR: GŠ SVRSK, Naređenje str. pov. br. 299-1 od 28.
2. 1993.; HMDCDR: 105. vbr, Izveštaj str. pov. br. 1-6793
od 19. 4. 1993.; HMDCDR: Komanda 7. korpusa, Naređen-
je str. pov. br. 30-3680 od 23. 5. 1993.; ICTY: Naredba str.
pov. br. 3087-1 načelnika GŠ VJ od 15. 11. 1993.
275 HMDCDR: GŠSV RSK, Naređenje str. pov. br. 8-26 od 28. 4.
1994.
276 KSJ, Naređenje pov. br. 2811 od 12. 7. 1995.; Davor MAR-
IJAN, Oluja, HMDCDR, Zagreb, 2007., 38.
277 D. MARIJAN, Oluja, 38.
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Domovinski rat 04-02-2020 Knjiga 1.indd 132
Special Units Corps – was made in the summer of 1995,
just before the collapse of the Republic of Serbian Kra-
jina. Despite its designation, Special Units Corps was
in reality a battalion-strength unit. It was modeled on
the Yugoslav People’s Army’s formation bearing the
same name and it consisted of HQ, the 2nd Armored Bri-
gade, the 71st Special Brigade, the 2nd Guards Brigade,
the Mountain Battalion, the VP Battalion, and the Light
Artillery Battalion of the Air Force. The HQ and the bulk
of the Corps were stationed in Slunj and the other ele-
ments in Knin. The commander of the Corps was Major
General Milorad Stupar.
In mid-1994, the SVK had 300 tanks, 295 assorted
armored vehicles, 360 artillery pieces of 100-mm and
larger calibers. At the end of October, 1994, the numer-
ical strength of the SVK was between 20,000 – 25,000
men. In May, 1995, the peacetime contingent of the
SVK numbered 14,900 men and the wartime contin-
gent 62,500 men.
There were a number of changes at the highest
levels of the army. General Milan Čeleketić replaced,
on February 22, 1994, General Mile Novaković as the
Commander of the General Staff of the Serbian Army
of Krajina. General Mile Čeleketić remained in the post
until mid-May, 1995, when he was replaced by Colonel
General Mile Mrkšić, the former commander of Special
Units Corps of the Yugoslav Army.
After the withdrawal of the JNA, the RSK was de-
fended by the Special Police brigades. The Special Po-
lice brigades were effectively the army of the Repub-
lic of Serbian Krajina and its members were soldiers
wearing police/militia uniforms. The SVK maintained
its combat readiness by frequently mobilizing reserve
D
soldiers. The overriding strategic emphasis of the SVK
was on defense, but nevertheless, offensive actions
were planned in mid-June, 1993. According to these
plans, the SVK would advance along the Vojnić – Karlo-
vac line with the aim of cutting the Zagreb – Karlovac
R
– Gospić communication line; along the Sunja – Sisak
line with the aim of destroying the industrial zone of
the city of Sisak; along the Jankovci – Županja line in
concert with the VRS Eastern Bosnia Corps with the
aim of gaining control of the Županja highway. In No-
vember the General Staff of the Yugoslav Army issued
a directive codenamed Drina for using the Yugoslav
Army, Army of the Republika Srpska and Serbian Army
of Krajina in a combined operation. The objective was
to create the necessary conditions for the establish-
4.2.2020. 19:25:55
 The Croatian Nation’s Struggle for Survival, 1991-1995

1994. generala Milu Novakovića na dužnosti koman-

danta Glavnoga štaba SVK-a. Čeleketić se održao do
sredine svibnja 1995., kada ga je zamijenio general-pot-
pukovnik Mile Mrkšić, bivši komandant Korpusa speci-
jalnih jedinica Vojske Jugoslavije.278
Nakon povlačenja JNA jamac sigurnosti RSK bile
su brigade Posebnih jedinica milicije koje su bile voj-
ska preobučena u odore milicije. Borbena spremnost
SVK-a održavala se na mirnodopskom postroju i če-
stim mobilizacijama pričuve. Zamisao uporabe snaga
H
i dalje je bila odsudna obrana, s tim da su se sredinom
lipnja 1993. planirali napadi na sljedećim smjerovi-
ma: Vojnić – Karlovac, radi presijecanja prometnice
Zagreb – Karlovac – Gospić; Sunja – Sisak, radi uni-
štenja industrijske zone u Sisku; Jankovci – Županja,
radi presijecanja autoceste kod Županje u suradnji s
M
Istočnobosanskim korpusom VRS-a.279 U studenome
je Generalštab Vojske Jugoslavije izradio zajedničku
direktivu za uporabu Vojske Jugoslavije, VRS-a i SVK-a
pod imenom Drina. Cilj je bio stvoriti uvjete za uspo-
stavljanje “jedinstvene države srpskog naroda, sprečiti
stvaranje velike Hrvatske i kompaktne islamske države
D
na prostorima bivše Jugoslavije”. U tom je planu SVK s
ojačanjima trebao zadržati teritorij koji je nadzirao, a u
nastavku borbi napraviti značajne pomake u Slavoniji,
Kordunu, Lici i sjevernoj Dalmaciji.280
C
Pripadnici Srpske vojske Krajine, četničke paravojne formacije i
dobrovoljci iz Srbije i BiH. (Vojska Krajine, časopis SVK, 11. srp-
nja 1995.)
D
Members of the Serbian Army of Krajina and Chetnik paramili-
tary troops and volunteers from Serbia and BiH. (Army of Kraji-
na – magazin, July 11, 1995)
R
ment of the “unitary state of the Serbian nation, pre-
vent the creation of a greater Croatia and prevent the
278 HMDCDR: Kabinet Predsjednika RSK, Ukaz o postavljen- creation of a territorially compact Muslim state in the
ju br. 03-3-55/94 od 22. 2. 1994.; D. MARIJAN, Oluja, 38.
territory of the former Yugoslavia”. According to that
279 VSA MORH: GŠ SVRSK, Direktiva za odbrambena i ofan- plan, the SVK would be reinforced and its role would
zivna dejstva DT br. 72-1 od 15. 6. 1993.
initially be to defend its territory and in the latter stag-
280 ICTY: Uprava za operativne poslove GŠ VJ, Direktiva za
es to conduct offensive operations in Slavonia, Kor-
upotrebu Vojske Jugoslavije, Vojske RS i Srpske vojske
Krajine DT br. 75-2 od 14. 11. 1993. dun, Lika and northern Dalmatia.

133

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 Davor Marijan • Rat za opstojnost Hrvata, 1991. - 1995.
BOSNA I HERCEGOVINA
Hrvatsko vijeće obrane
U travnju 1992. nakon višemjesečnog djelovanja
u općinskim štabovima Teritorijalne obrane i pričuv-
nom sastavu milicije hrvatski oružani sastavi u Bosni i
Hercegovini su prozvani Hrvatskim vijećem obrane na
čelu s Glavnim stožerom.281 Do jeseni 1992. općinski
su stožeri bili dominantna ustrojbena forma HVO-a,
H
ukinuti su nakon organiziranja brigada HVO-a.282 Spo-
na između Glavnog stožera HVO-a i općinskih stože-
ra, kasnije brigada, bile su operativne grupe i slična
operativna zapovjedništva. U travnju 1992. osnovana
je Operativna grupa za područje jugoistočne Herce-
M
govine. Za područje sjeverozapadne Hercegovine i ju-
gozapadne Bosne operativna grupa nije formirana, pa
su na tom području postojala posebna zapovjedništva
za Livno i Tomislavgrad. Za područje središnje Bosne s
dolinom Vrbasa 21. travnja 1992. formiran je Regional-
ni vojni stožer Travničke regionalne zajednice sa sjedi-
štem u Busovači. Potom je po zapovijedi generala Bo-
D
betka od 19. svibnja 1992. u Gornjem Vakufu/Uskoplju
osnovano Izdvojeno zapovjedno mjesto (IZM) Srednja
Bosna, koje je koordiniralo i zapovijedalo snagama na
području središnje Bosne, doline Vrbasa te u općina-
ma Prozor, Tomislavgrad i Posušje. Umjesto njega je
C
10. lipnja 1992. u Gornjem Vakufu osnovan Regional-
ni stožer Srednja Bosna koji je u prvoj polovini srpnja
preimenovan u Zapovjedništvo Oružanih snaga Sred-
nje Bosne sa sjedištem u Vitezu. Podređene su mu bile
četiri operativne zone, čija su sjedišta bila u Gornjem
Vakufu, Vitezu, Kiseljaku i Žepču.283
281 Predsjedništvo HZ HB donosi odluku o osnivanju HVO-a
zbog “…nemoći legalne vlasti Republike Bosne i Herce-
govine i posebno raspada njezinog obrambenog sus-
tava…” (Odluka broj 0-I-03/92 od 8. travnja 1992.).
282 Glavni stožer HVO, Zapovijed br. 01-92/92 od 10. 4.
1992.; Odjel obrane HZ HB, Ukidanje općinskih stožera,
zapovijed br. 03-294/92 od 26. 12. 1992.
283 HVO HZ HB, Odluka br. 40-09/92 od 21. 4. 1992.; ICTY:
IZM Ploče Zapovjedništva južnog vojišta, Zapovijed kl.
8/92-01/91, ur. br. 6030-02/92-1 od 19. 5. 1992.; ICTY:
Regionalni stožer Srednje Bosne, Zapovijed br. 23/92
od 10. 6. 1992.; ICTY: Regionalni stožer Srednje Bosne,
Zapovijed br. 27/92 od 10. 6. 1992.; ICTY: Zapovjedništ-
vo OS Srednja Bosna, Redovno borbeno izvješće br.
108/92 od 11. 7. 1992.
134
Domovinski rat 04-02-2020 Knjiga 1.indd 134
BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA
Croatian Defense Council
In April, 1992, after months of operating through
municipal HQs of the Territorial Defense and police re-
serve units, the Croatian armed formations in Bosnia and
Herzegovina were named the Croatian Defense Council
with the Main Staff as its commanding organ.5 Until the
fall of 1992 the municipal HQs were the dominant orga-
nizational form of the HVO. They were disbanded after
the reorganization of the HVO brigades. The operation-
al groups and similar operational commands linked the
Main Staff of the HVO with the municipal HQs (brigades).
In April, 1992, the operational group for southeast Her-
zegovina (OG Southeast Herzegovina) was formed. No
operational group was formed for northwest Herzegov-
ina and southwestern Bosnia. In these areas operated
special headquarters for Livno and Tomislavgrad. On
April 21, the regional military HQ of the Travnik region-
al community with its seat in Busovača was formed for
central Bosnia and the Vrbas Valley. Then, by General
Bobetko’s order issued on May 19, 1992, Forward Com-
mand Post (IZM) Central Bosnia was formed in Gornji
Vakuf/Uskoplje. The forces in central Bosnia, the Vrbas
Valley, and in the municipalities of Prozor, Tomislavgrad
and Posušje were under the command of Forward Com-
mand Post (IZM) Central Bosnia. On June 10, 1992, the
Regional HQ Central Bosnia was formed in Gornji Vakuf.
The newly formed HQ took over all the functions of the
now defunct Forward Command Post (IZM) Central Bos-
nia. In the first half of July the Regional HQ Central Bosnia
was redesignated as the HQ of the Armed Forces of Cen-
D
tral Bosnia. It was stationed in Vitez. The four operative
zones with their HQs in Gornji Vakuf, Vitez, Kiseljak and
Žepče were subordinated to the HQ of the Armed Forces
of Central Bosnia.
The forming of the operative zones of the Croatian
R
Defense Council commenced in September, 1992. The
process was initiated by the order of the commander
of the General Staff of the HVO. Four operational zones
were formed: Operative Zone Southeast Herzegovina,
5 The Presidency of the HZHB passes the Decision on the
forming of the HVO because “…the legal authority in
RBiH is impotent and the defensive system of RBiH is in
complete disarray…” (Decision No. 0-I-03/92 of April 8,
1992).
4.2.2020. 19:25:55
 The Croatian Nation’s Struggle for Survival, 1991-1995
Formiranje operativnih zona HVO-a počelo je u ruj-
nu 1992. po zapovijedi zapovjednika Glavnoga stožera
HVO-a. Ustrojene su četiri operativne zone: Jugoistoč-
na Hercegovina, Sjeverozapadna Hercegovina, Srednja
Bosna i Posavina.284
Operativna zona Jugoistočna Hercegovina imala
je zonu odgovornosti na području općina Čapljina,
Čitluk, Grude, Ljubuški, Mostar, Neum, Ravno, Stolac
i Široki Brijeg. Sjedište je bilo u Mostaru, a zapovjed-
nici su bili pukovnik Drago Poljak i brigadir Miljenko
H
Lasić. Sastojala se od Zapovjedništva operativne zone,
1. brigade Knez Domagoj u Čapljini, 2. i 3. brigade u
Mostaru, 4. brigade Stjepan Radić u Ljubuškom, mješo-
vitog topničkog divizijuna u Širokom Brijegu i oklopne
bojne u Mostaru.285
Operativna zona Sjeverozapadna Hercegovina
M
imala je zonu odgovornosti na području općina Bu-
gojno, Gornji Vakuf/Uskoplje, Jablanica, Konjic, Kupres,
Livno, Posušje, Rama i Tomislavgrad. Sjedište je bilo
u Tomislavgradu, a zapovjednik je bio brigadir Željko
Šiljeg. Sastojala se od brigada Petar Krešimir IV sa sje-
dištem u Livnu, Kralj Tomislav sa sjedištem u Tomisla-
D
vgradu, Ante Starčević sa sjedištem u Gornjem Vakufu,
Eugen Kvaternik sa sjedištem u Bugojnu, Rama sa sjedi-
štem u Prozoru i Herceg Stjepan sa sjedištem u Konjicu.
U zoni su djelovali ostaci HVO-a Jajce kao brigada Hr-
voje Vukčić Hrvatinić.286
Operativna zona Srednja Bosna imala je zonu od-
C
govornosti na području općina Busovača, Donji Vakuf,
Fojnica, Jajce, Kakanj, Kiseljak, Kreševo, Novi Travnik,
Travnik, Vareš, Vitez, Zenica i Žepče. Sjedište je bilo u
Travniku, odnosno Vitezu, a zapovjednik je bio brigadir
Tihomir Blaškić. Sastojala se od Zapovjedništva opera-
D
tivne zone, brigade Stjepan Tomašević u Novom Trav-
niku, brigade Ban Josip Jelačić u Kiseljaku, brigade Bo-
bovac u Varešu, Travničke brigade u Travniku, brigade
Nikola Šubić Zrinski u Busovači, brigade Kralj Tvrtko u
Sarajevu, 110. brigade Usora u Usori, 111. xp brigade u
284 ICTY: GS HVO, Formiranje operativnih zona, Zapovijed
str. pov. br. 01-2054/92 od 31. 8. 1992.
285 ICTY: GS HVO, Formiranje operativnih zona, Zapovijed
str. pov. br. 01-2054/92 od 31. 8. 1992.; Odjel obrane
HVO, Izmjene i dopune mobilizacijskog razvoja br. 02-
1-116/93 od 24. 2. 1993.
286 ICTY: GS HVO, Formiranje operativnih zona, Zapovijed
str. pov. br. 01-2054/92 od 31. 8. 1992.; GS HVO, Zapovi-
jed dj. br. 01-585/93 od 4. 4. 1993.
135
Domovinski rat 04-02-2020 Knjiga 1.indd 135
Operative Zone Northwest Herzegovina, Operative Zone
Central Bosnia and Operative Zone Posavina.
The area of responsibility of Operative Zone South-
east Herzegovina encompassed the municipalities of
Čapljina, Čitluk, Grude, Ljubuški, Mostar, Neum, Ravno,
Stolac and Široki Brijeg. The HQ of Operative Zone South-
east Herzegovina was in Mostar and its commanders
were Colonel Drago Poljak and Brigadier Miljenko Lasić.
Operative Zone Southeast Herzegovina consisted of its
HQ, the 1st Brigade “Knez Domagoj” in Čapljina, the 2nd
and 3rd Brigades in Mostar, the 4th Brigade “Stjepan Radić”
in Ljubuški, the Mixed Artillery Battalion in Široki Brijeg
and the Armored Battalion in Mostar.
The area of responsibility of Operative Zone North-
west Herzegovina encompassed the municipalities of
Bugojno, Gornji Vakuf, Jablanica, Konjic, Kupres, Livno,
Posušje, Rama and Tomislavgrad. It was headquartered in
Tomislavgrad. The commander of Operative Zone North-
west Herzegovina was Brigadier Željko Šiljeg. It consisted
of the Petar Krešimir IV Brigade stationed in Livno, the
Kralj Tomislav Brigade stationed in Tomislavgrad, the
Ante Starčević Brigade stationed in Gornji Vakuf, the Eu-
gen Kvaternik Brigade stationed in Bugojno, the Rama
Brigade stationed in Prozor and the Herceg Stjepan Bri-
gade stationed in Konjic. Also, the remnants of the HVO
Jajce operated in Operative Zone Northwest Herzegovi-
na as the Hrvoje Vukčić Hrvatinić Brigade.
The area of responsibility of Operative Zone Central
Bosnia encompassed the municipalities of Busovača,
Donji Vakuf, Fojnica, Jajce, Kakanj, Kiseljak, Kreševo,
Novi Travnik, Travnik, Vareš, Vitez, Zenica and Žepče.
Its HQ was nominally in Travnik, and in reality in Vitez.
The commander of Operative Zone Central Bosnia was
Brigadier Tihomir Blaškić. It consisted of HQ, the Stje-
pan Tomašević Brigade in Novi Travnik, the Ban Josip
Jelačić Brigade in Kiseljak, the Bobovac Brigade in Vareš,
the Travnik Brigade in Travnik, the Nikola Šubić Zrinski
Brigade in Busovača, the Kralj Tvrtko Brigade in Saraje-
R
vo, the 110th Usora Brigade in Usora, the 111xp Brigade
in Žepče, the Jure Francetić Brigade in Zenica and the
Mixed Artillery Battalion.
Operative Zone Bosanska Posavina was formed after
the HVO had suffered a defeat in Posavina and lost pos-
session of the city of Bosanski Brod. The operative zone’s
HQ was in the Orašje Municipality and its commander
was Brigadier Đuro Matuzović. After the fall of Bosanski
Brod the 101st, 102nd, 103rd, 104th, 105th and 106th Brigades
were withdrawn to Orašje and Domaljevac. On the other
4.2.2020. 19:25:55
 Davor Marijan • Rat za opstojnost Hrvata, 1991. - 1995.
Žepču, brigade Jure Francetić u Zenici i mješovitog top-
ničkog divizijuna.287
Operativna zona Bosanska Posavina osnovana je
nakon pretrpljenog poraza HVO-a u Posavini i gubitka
Bosanskog Broda. Sjedište je bilo u općini Orašje, a za-
povjednik je bio brigadir Đuro Matuzović. Nakon pada
Bosanskog Broda izvučene snage 101., 102., 103., 104.,
105. i 106. brigade grupirane su u Orašju i Domaljevcu.
S druge strane koridora bile su 107. brigada HVO-a Gra-
dačac i 108. brigada HVO-a Brčko.288
H
Hrvatsko vijeće obrane je imalo i manju profesio-
nalnu sastavnicu koja je bila izravno vezana za Glav-
ni stožer. Početkom rujna 1992. profesionalni sastav
HVO-a sastojao se od pukovnije Ante Bruno Bušić s pet
bojni u općinama Livno, Žepče, Posušje, Široki Brijeg
i Gornji Vakuf, bojne Ludvig Pavlović u Čapljini, Anti-
M
terorističke grupe (ATG) Baja Kraljević, bojne Vitezovi
u Vitezu i Nastavnoga centra jedinica za posebne na-
mjene u Ljubuškom. U Travniku je bila u formiranju
satnija Tvrtko II.289 Krajem 1992. u profesionalnom di-
jelu HVO-a bilo je 855 ljudi, od čega 85 časnika, 91 do-
časnik i 670 vojnika.290
D
Po uzoru na HV, i HVO je imao Vojnu policiju s
posebnim statusom, na čijem je čelu bila Uprava
Vojne policije. Osnovana je početkom travnja 1992.
u sklopu općinskih postrojbi HVO-a. Krajem travnja
postojala je u 25 općina.291 Postrojbe Vojne policije
bile su organizirane u bojne, satnije i vodove. Bojna
C
je bila najveća postrojba. Prva je bila djelatna s tri sat-
nije (Vitez, Ljubuški i Livno); 2. bojna u Livnu bila je
nadležna za Operativnu zonu Sjeverozapadna Herce-
govina, 3. bojna u Mostaru za Operativnu zonu Jugo-
istočna Hercegovina, 4. bojna u Vitezu za Operativnu
zonu Srednja Bosna, a 5. bojna trebala je biti osnova-
287 ICTY: GS HVO, Formiranje operativnih zona, Zapovijed
str. pov. br. 01-2054/92 od 31. 8. 1992.; Odjel obrane
HVO, Izmjene i dopune mobilizacijskog razvoja br. 02-
1-117/93 od 24. 2. 1993.
288 Odjel obrane HVO, Izmjene i dopune mobilizacijskog
razvoja br. 02-1-286/93 od 30. 3. 1993.
289 GS HVO, str. pov. br. 01-2138/92 od 11. 9. 1992.; GS HVO,
Izvješće o stanju u profesionalnom sastavu HVO dj. br.
04-4/92 od 31. 12. 1992.
290 GS HVO, Izvješće ur. br. 01-240 od 4. 2. 1993.
291 Uprava Vojne policije HVO, ur. br. 01-60/92 od 24. 6.
1992.; ICTY: Uprava Vojne policije HVO, Izvješće dj. br.
02-4/3-01-1941/92 od 26. 12. 1992.
136
Domovinski rat 04-02-2020 Knjiga 1.indd 136
side of the corridor were the 107th Gradačac Brigade of
the HVO and the 108th Brčko Brigade of the HVO.
The HVO also had a small professional contingent.
These troops were directly linked to the Main Staff. At
the beginning of September the professional contin-
gent of the HVO consisted of the Ante Bruno Bušić Reg-
iment with five battalions in the municipalities of Liv-
no, Žepče, Posušje, Široki Brijeg and Gornji Vakuf, the
Ludvig Pavlović Battalion in Čapljina, the Baja Kraljević
Antiterrorist Group, the Vitezovi Battalion in Vitez, and
the training center for special purpose units in Ljubuš-
ki. The Tvrtko II Company was in the process of forming
in Travnik. At the end of 1992, the professional contin-
gent of the HVO numbered 855 personnel – 85 officers,
91 non-commissioned officers and 670 soldiers.
The Military Police was also an integral part of the
HVO. However, imitating the structure of the Croatian
Army, the Military Police of the HVO enjoyed a special
status. The Military Police was formed at the begin-
ning of April, 1992, as part of the municipal formations
of the HVO and operated under the umbrella of the
Military Police Administration. By the end of April, its
units were present in 25 municipalities. The formations
of the Military Police were organized into battalions,
companies and platoons. The battalion was the largest
formation. The 1st Battalion was an active formation
comprising three companies: the Vitez Company, the
Ljubuški Company and the Livno Company; the 2nd
Battalion in Livno was responsible for Operative Zone
Northeast Herzegovina, the 3rd Battalion in Mostar was
responsible for Operative Zone Southeast Herzegov-
ina, the 4th Battalion in Vitez was responsible for Op-
erative Zone Central Bosnia and the 5th Battalion was
D
supposed to be formed in Orašje for Operative Zone
Bosanska Posavina.
In January, 1993, the HVO restructured its mili-
tary-territorial structure. The municipalities of Konjic
and Jablanica with the Herzeg Stjepan Brigade from
R
Operative Zone Northwest Herzegovina were joined to
Operative Zone Southeast Herzegovina. The operative
zones were redesignated as military districts on Octo-
ber 14, 1993: Operative Zone Southeast Herzegovina
was redesignated as Military District Mostar, Opera-
tive Zone Northwest Herzegovina was redesignated as
Military District Tomislavgrad, Operative Zone Central
Bosnia was redesignated as Military District Vitez and
Operative Zone Bosanska Posavina was redesignated
as Military District Orašje.
4.2.2020. 19:25:55
 The Croatian Nation’s Struggle for Survival, 1991-1995
na u Orašju za Operativnu zonu Bosanska Posavina.292
U siječnju 1993. HVO je promijenio vojno-terito-
rijalnu organizaciju. Općine Konjic i Jablanica s briga-
dom Herceg Stjepan iz OZ-a Sjeverozapadna Hercego-
vina ušle su u sastav OZ-a Jugoistočna Hercegovina.293
Operativne zone su 14. listopada 1993. preimenova-
ne u zborna područja: Jugoistočna Hercegovina u ZP
Mostar, Sjeverozapadna Hercegovina u ZP Tomislav-
grad, Srednja Bosna u ZP Vitez i Bosanska Posavina u
ZP Orašje.294
H
Na taktičkoj su razini gotovo sve općine 1993. do-
bile svoju brigadu, dijelom zbog jakih lokalnih interesa,
a dijelom i zbog totalne mobilizacije ljudskoga poten-
cijala u ratu s ARBiH. U OZ-u Jugoistočna Hercegovina
izdvajanjem iz 4. brigade osnovane su brigade Knez
Branimir u Čitluku i Vitez Rafael Boban u Grudama, a
M
Ljubuški je zadržao ime dotadašnje zajedničke brigade
Stjepan Radić. U Širokom Brijegu osnovana je brigada
Mario Hrkač Ćikota i mješoviti raketno-topnički puk.295
Od ostataka brigade Herceg Stjepan iz Konjica osnova-
na je samostalna bojna Mijat Tomić. Od Domobranstva
u Mostaru je osnovana Domobranska pukovnija, u Ča-
D
pljini Domobranska bojna, a u Širokom Brijegu, Ljubuš-
kom, Grudama, Čitluku, Stocu, Ravnom, Neumu, Konji-
cu i Jablanici domobranske satnije.296
U OZ-u Sjeverozapadna Hercegovina izdvaja-
njem vojnika iz Bojne Posušje iz brigade Kralj Tomi-
slav osnovana je 5. brigada HVO-a.297 U ljeto 1993.
C
292 Uprava Vojne policije HVO, Zapovijed br. 01-1319/92 od
27. 9. 1992.; Uprava VP HVO, Izvješće Vojne policije HVO
HZ HB dj. br. 02-4/3-01-1941/92 od 26. 12. 1992.
293 GS HVO, Brigada “Herceg-Stjepan”, Konjic Jablanica,
D
pretpočinjavanje dj. br. 01-05/93 od 7. 1. 1993.
294 Ured predsjednika HR HB, Zapovijed, br. UP 00223/93
od 14. 10. 1993.
295 GS HVO, Zapovijed ur. br. 02-2/1-01-1190/93 od 23. 6.
1993.; GS HVO, Zapovijed ur. br. 02-2/1-01-1192/93 od
23. 6. 1993.; Odjel obrane HVO, Izmjene i dopune mob.
razvoja br. 02-1-717/93 od 28. 6. 1993.; Odjel obrane
HVO, Izmjene i dopune mobilizacijskog razvoja br. 02-
1-718/93 od 28. 6. 1993.; Odjel obrane HVO, Izmjene i
dopune mobilizacijskog razvoja br. 02-1-719/93 od 28.
6. 1993.; Odjel obrane HVO, Izmjene i dopune mobili-
zacijskog razvoja br. 02-1-720/93 od 28. 6. 1993.; OZ JiH,
Zapovijed, str. pov. br. 01-2360/93 od 14. 4. 1993.; Odjel
obrane HVO, str. pov. br. 02-1-612/93 od 14. 6. 1993.
296 GS HVO, Analiza preustroja HVO-a kl. 818-01/94-02/10,
ur. br. 02-10-18-94-54 od 7. 7. 1994.
297 GS HVO, Zapovijed dj. br. 01-585/93 od 4. 4. 1993.
137
Domovinski rat 04-02-2020 Knjiga 1.indd 137
On the tactical level almost every municipality had
its brigade in 1993. This situation existed partly due to
local interests and partly due to the fact that the Bos-
nian Croats had to mobilize all available manpower to
stand a chance of successfully resisting the Army of
the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina. In Operative
Zone Southeast Herzegovina the Knez Branimir Bri-
gade in Čitluk and the Vitez Rafael Boban Brigade in
Grude were formed. The brigades consisted of person-
nel detached from the 4th Brigade. The brigade from
Ljubuški retained its original name, the Stjepan Radić
Brigade. In Široki Brijeg the Mario Hrkač Čikota Brigade
and the Mixed Rocket Artillery Regiment were formed.
The Independent Battalion Mijat Tomić was formed
around the remnants of the Herceg Stjepan Brigade
from Konjic. Out of the Home Guard contingent the fol-
lowing units were formed: the Home Guard Regiment
in Mostar, Home Guard Battalion in Čapljina and Home
Guard companies in Široki Brijeg, Ljubuški, Grude, Čit-
luk, Stolac, Ravno, Neum, Konjic and Jablanica.
In Operative Zone Northwest Herzegovina men were
detached from the Posušje Battalion of the Kralj Tomislav
Brigade to form the 5th Brigade of the HVO. In the sum-
mer of 1993, the Lašva Battalion was formed with sol-
diers from central Bosnia. The Lašva Battalion was sta-
tioned in Gornji Vakuf/Uskoplje. In Posušje, Gornji Vakuf
and Tomislavgrad Home Guard companies were formed.
In Livno, Tomislavgrad and Prozor Home Guard Battalion
were formed. In Bugojno a Home Guard regiment was in
the process of being formed. In Operative Zone Central
Bosnia the Kotromanić Brigade in Kakanj, the Frankopan
Brigade in Travnik, the Vitez Brigade in Vitez and the Zeni-
ca Brigade in Zenica were formed. Also, the logistics base
in Novi Travnik was set up. Out of the Home Guard con-
tingent Home Guard battalions were formed in Kiseljak,
Komušina, Travnik, Žepče and Home Guard companies in
Busovača, Fojnica, Kreševo, Novi Travnik, Vareš, Vitez and
Zenica. Operative Zone Bosanska Posavina was enlarged
R
in spring, 1993, by establishing a logistics base in Orašje
and by incorporating the 115th Brigade of the HVO from
Tuzla into its order of battle.
During 1993 the situation in the professional units
was fluid. By order of the Head of the War Defense De-
partment of February 16, a company was formed out of
the soldiers belonging to Jusuf Juka Prazina’s group who
had survived the retreat from Igman. That company exist-
ed until mid-year. Attempts were made to form one com-
pany-strength unit (Operative Zone Bosanska Posavina,
4.2.2020. 19:25:55
 Davor Marijan • Rat za opstojnost Hrvata, 1991. - 1995.
od vojnika iz središnje Bosne osnovana je Lašvan-
ska bojna, koja je smještena na području Gornjeg
Vakufa/Uskoplja.298 U Bugojnu je počelo osnivanje
domobranske pukovnije, u Livnu, Tomislavgradu i
Prozoru osnovane su domobranske bojne, a u Po-
sušju, Gornjem Vakufu i Tomislavgradu domobranske
satnije.299 U OZ-u Srednja Bosna osnovane su brigade
Kotromanić u Kaknju, Frankopan u Travniku, Viteška u
Vitezu i Zenička u Zenici, te Logistička baza u Novom
Travniku.300 Od Domobranstva su osnovane domo-
H
branske bojne u Kiseljaku, Komušini, Travniku i Žepču
te domobranske satnije u Busovači, Fojnici, Kreševu,
Novom Travniku, Varešu, Vitezu i Zenici.301 Operativna
zona OZ-a Bosanska Posavina proširena je u proljeće
1993. osnivanjem Logističke baze u Orašju i pridoda-
vanjem 115. brigade HVO-a iz Tuzle.302
M
Tijekom 1993. stanje u profesionalnim postrojba-
ma brzo se mijenjalo. Od ljudstva Jusufa Juke Prazine,
koje se izvuklo s Igmana po zapovijedi predstojnika
Odjela obrane od 16. veljače, formirana je satnija koja
je postojala do sredine godine.303 Bilo je pokušaja da se
pri pričuvnim brigadama osnuje postrojba jačine satni-
D
je (OZ Bosanska Posavina, Bugojno, Čapljina, Ljubuški)
i bojne (Livno).304 Sredinom rujna 1993. profesionalni
je sastav imao 1398 ljudi: 529 u Kažnjeničkoj bojni, 84
u ATG-u Baja Kraljević, 153 u bojni Ludvig Pavlović, 56
u Hrvatskoj legiji časti, 501 u pukovniji Bruno Bušić i 75
C
298 Odjel obrane HVO, Izmjene i dopune mobilizacijskog
razvoja br. 02-1-909/93 od 28. 7. 1993.
299 GS HVO, Analiza preustroja HVO-a kl. 818-01/94-02/10,
ur. br. 02-10-18-94-54 od 7. 7. 1994.
300 Odjel obrane HVO, Izmjene i dopune mobilizacijskog
razvoja br. 02-1-280/93 od 28. 3. 1993.
301 GS HVO, Analiza preustroja HVO-a, kl. 818-01/94-02/10,
ur. br. 02-10-18-94-54 od 7. 7. 1994.
302 Odjel obrane HVO, Izmjene i dopune mobilizacijskog
razvoja br. 02-1-286/93 od 30. 3. 1993.; Odjel obrane
HVO, Izmjene i dopune mobilizacijskog razvoja br. 02-
1-320/93 od 3. 4. 1993.
303 Odjel obrane HVO, Ustroj postrojbe, zapovijed br. 02-1-
57/93 od 16. 2. 1993.
304 GS HVO, Izmjena zapovijedi dj. br. 01-249/93 od 6. 2.
1993.; Odjel obrane HVO, Izmjene i dopune mobilizaci-
jskog razvoja br. 02-1-114/93 od 24. 2. 1993.; GS HVO,
Zapovijed ur. br. 01-560/93 od 31. 3. 1993.; Odjel obrane,
Izmjene i dopune mobilizacijskog razvoja br. 02-1-288/93
od 1. 4. 1993.; GS HVO, Zapovijed ur. br. 01-582/93 od 3.
4. 1993.; Odjel obrane HVO, Izmjene i dopune mobilizaci-
jskog razvoja br. 02-1-615/93 od 15. 6. 1993.
138
Domovinski rat 04-02-2020 Knjiga 1.indd 138
Bugojno, Čapljina, Ljubuški) and one battalion-strength
unit (Livno) in a number of reserve brigades. In mid-Sep-
tember, 1993, the professional contingent numbered
1,398 men; 529 men in the Penal Battalion, 84 men in the
Baja Kraljević Anti-terrorist Group, 153 men in the Ludvig
Pavlović Battalion, 56 men in the Croatian Legion of Hon-
or, 501 men in the Bruno Bušić Regiment and 75 men in
the Grdani anti-terrorist group. On December 23, Gener-
al Roso ordered the disbandment of all special purpose
units with the exception of the Ludvig Pavlović Battalion
and the Ante Bruno Bušić Regiment. These units were
supposed to form the core of two guards brigades.
In the second half of 1993, the Military Police under-
went significant changes. Three light battalions “as strict-
ly military units capable of operating in the entire area of
the HZ HB” were formed. The formation of the three light
battalions was to be a stepping stone towards forming
the Light Brigade of the Military Police modeled on the
equivalent formation in the Armed Forces of the Repub-
lic of Croatia. However, the Light Brigade of the Military
Police was never formed. With the forming of the three
light battalions the other battalions were given new nu-
merical designations: 5th Battalion in Mostar, 6th Battalion
in Tomislavgrad, 7th Battalion in Vitez and 8th Battalion in
Orašje. At the beginning of December, 1993, the Military
Police reverted, for the most part, to the organizational
structure in had before July 1, 1993.
Many personnel changes took place due to the
Army of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina’s offen-
sive and consequent loss of territory. In the summer of
1993, the function of the commander of the Main Staff
of the HVO was introduced into the chain of command.
With that, Chief of the Main Staff of the HVO was not the
D
highest post in the chain of command anymore – the
function, in order of importance, was below that of the
Commander and Deputy Commander of the Main Staff
of the HVO. The commanders of the Main Staff of the
HVO were General Slobodan Praljak and General Ante
R
Roso. Deputy Commander was General Milivoj Petkov-
ić (until the appointment of General Praljak he was the
chief of the Main Staff of the HVO) and the chief of the
Main Staff of the HVO was General Žarko Tole. In the fall
Croatian Army officers were transferred to the HVO and
given commissions as unit commanders and as mem-
bers of HQs of military districts and the Main Staff of the
HVO. With the arrival of these officers the Main Staff was
gradually restructured along the lines of the General
Staff of the Croatian Army. The aim was to ensure that
4.2.2020. 19:25:55
 The Croatian Nation’s Struggle for Survival, 1991-1995
u ATH-u Grdani.305 Kraj malih profesionalnih sastava
počeo je zapovijeđu generala Ante Rose od 23. pro-
sinca 1993., da se rasformiraju sve postrojbe posebne
namjene s iznimkom bojne Ludvig Pavlović i pukovnije
Ante Bruno Bušić.306 Za njih se planiralo da budu okosni-
ca dviju gardijskih brigada.
U drugoj polovini 1993. Vojna policija doživjela
je velike promjene. Osnovane su tri lakojurišne bojne
kao “čisto vojne postrojbe koje su u stanju operirati
po cijelom prostoru HZ HB”. Osnivanjem lakojurišnih
H
bojni nastojalo se formirati lakojurišnu brigadu Vojne
policije po uzoru na istu takvu u Oružanim snagama
RH, što nije realizirano. Formiranjem lakojurišnih boj-
ni ostale bojne dobile su nove numeracije: V. bojna u
Mostaru, VI. bojna u Tomislavgradu, VII. bojna u Vitezu
i VIII. bojna u Orašju.307 Početkom prosinca 1993. Vojna
M
je policija uglavnom vraćena u okvire koje je imala prije
1. srpnja 1993. godine.308
Učinjene su i brojne personalne promjene zbog
ofenzive Armije RBiH i gubitka teritorija. U ljeto 1993.
uvedena je funkcija zapovjednika Glavnoga stožera
HVO-a, kojom je načelnik GSHVO-a potisnut na dru-
D
go, odnosno treće mjesto jer je ustanovljena i funk-
cija zamjenika zapovjednika GSHVO-a. Zapovjednici
GS-a bili su generali Slobodan Praljak i Ante Roso.
Zamjenik zapovjednika bio je general Milivoj Pet-
ković (do dolaska generala Praljka bio je načelnik
GSHVO-a), a načelnik GS-a general Žarko Tole. U je-
C
sen je HVO pojačan časnicima koji su iz HV-a prešli
u HVO na dužnosti zapovjednika postrojbi i časnika
u zapovjedništvima zbornih područja i GSHVO-a. Nji-
hovim dolaskom GS je postupno ustrojen po uzoru
na Glavni stožer HV-a i pokušavao je biti ratovodno
D
tijelo kakvo se moglo i očekivati od takve institucije.
Zborno područje Tomislavgrad promijenilo je zapo-
vjednika: brigadira Željka Šiljega zamijenio je pukov-
nik Zvonimir Skender.
305 Sektor opskrbe, nabave i proizvodnje Odjela obrane
HVO, Pregled broja vojaka po postrojbama, br. 02-7/1-
4424/93 od 18. 9. 1993.
306 GS HVO, Rasformiranje postrojbi “Posebne namjene”, ur.
br. 02-271-01-4308/93 od 23. 12. 1993.
307 Uprava VP HVO, Zapovijed br. 02-4/3-01-1980/93 od 12.
8. 1993.; Uprava Vojne policije HVO-a, Prijedlog br. 02-
4/3-01-2758/93 od 11. 11. 1993.
308 Ministarstvo obrane HR HB, Zapovijed, dj. br. 02-1-9-
38/93 od 3. 12. 1993.
139
Domovinski rat 04-02-2020 Knjiga 1.indd 139
the Main Staff would live up to its name. Brigadier Željko
Šiljeg was replaced as commander of the Military District
Tomislavgrad by Colonel Zvonimir Skender.
In 1994 the HVO was restructured more thoroughly
than at any given point previously. Again the model for
the restructuring process was borrowed from the Croa-
tian Army. The bedrock of the process was the formation
of the military districts. Military District Mostar consisted
of the 2nd Guards Brigade in Mostar, the 50th Home Guard
Regiment in Čapljina, the 51st Home Guard Regiment in
Ljubuški, the 56th Home Guard Regiment in Konjic, the
81st and 82nd Home Guard Regiments in Mostar and the
83rd Home Guard Regiment in Široki Brijeg, the 40th Home
Guard Battalion in Grude, the 41st Home Guard Battalion
in Čitluk, the 72nd Signal Company, the 12th Anti-aircraft
Artillery Rocket Battery, the 3rd Military Police Battalion,
and Logistics Base Mostar.
Military District Tomislavgrad consisted of the 1st
Guards Brigade in Čapljina (Livno), the 1st Home Guard
Regiment in Posušje, the 55th Home Guard Regiment
in Tomislavgrad (Kupres), the 79th Home Guard Regi-
ment in Tomislavgrad, the 80th Home Guard Regiment
in Livno, the 42nd Home Guard Battalion in Rama, the
43rd Home Guard Battalion in Uskoplje, the 2nd Military
Police Battalion in Livno, the 71st Signal Company, the
14th Anti-Aircraft Artillery Rocket Battery and Logistics
Base Tomislavgrad.
Military District Vitez consisted of the 3rd Guards
Brigade in Vitez, the 90th Home Guard Regiment in Novi
Travnik, the 91st Home Guard Regiment in Nova Bila, the
92nd Home Guard Regiment in Vitez, the 93rd Home Guard
Regiment in Busovača, the 94th Home Guard Regiment
in Kiseljak, the 95th Home Guard Regiment in Kreševo,
the 96th Home Guard Regiment in Daštansko (Vareš) the
110th Home Guard Regiment in Žabljak (Usora), the 111th
Home Guard Regiment in Žepče, the 44th Home Guard
Battalion in Zenica (Busovača), the 45th Home Guard Bat-
talion in Žepče (Komušina), the 73rd Signal Company, the
R
4th Military Police Battalion, the 4th Light Anti-aircraft Ar-
tillery Rocket Battalion in Vitez, the Artillery Rocket Bat-
talion in Vitez and Logistics Base Vitez.
After restructuring, Military District Orašje consisted of
the 4th Guards Brigade in Orašje, the 108th Brigade in Gorn-
ji Zovik (Ravne-Brčko), the 106th and 201st Home Guard
Regiment in Orašje, the 202nd Home Guard Regiment in
Domaljevac, the Artillery Rocket Battalion in Orašje, one
armored battalion in Orašje, the Engineer Company, the
5th Military Police Company and Logistics Base Orašje.
4.2.2020. 19:25:55
 Davor Marijan • Rat za opstojnost Hrvata, 1991. - 1995.
Organizacijski je HVO 1994. prošao najveće pro-
mjene u svojem postojanju. Preustroj se radio po uzoru
na organizacijska rješenja HV-a, s težištem na ustroju
zbornih područja. Zborno područje Mostar sastojalo
se od 2. gardijske brigade u Mostaru, šest domobran-
skih pukovnija: 50. u Čapljini, 51. u Ljubuškom, 56. u
Konjicu, 81. i 82. u Mostaru i 83. u Širokom Brijegu, dvi-
je domobranske bojne: 40. u Grudama i 41. u Čitluku,
72. satnije veze, 12. topničko-raketne bitnice PZO-a, 3.
bojne VP-a, Logističke baze Mostar i dva opslužništva
H
vojarni u Čapljini i Heliodromu.309
Zborno područje Tomislavgrad sastojalo se od 1.
gardijske brigade u Čapljini, odnosno Livnu, četiri do-
mobranske pukovnije: 1. u Posušju, 55. u Tomislavgra-
du, odnosno Kupresu, 79. u Tomislavgradu i 80. u Livnu,
dvije domobranske bojne: 42. u Rami i 43. u Uskoplju,
M
2. bojne VP-a u Livnu, 71. satnije veze, 14. topničko-ra-
ketne bitnice PZO-a i Logističke baze Tomislavgrad.310
Zborno područje Vitez sastojalo se od 3. gardijske
brigade u Vitezu, devet domobranskih pukovnija: 90.
u Novom Travniku, 91. u Novoj Biloj, 92. u Vitezu, 93. u
Busovači, 94. u Kiseljaku, 95. u Kreševu, 96. u Daštan-
D
skom (Vareš), 110. u Žabljaku (Usora) i 111. u Žepču,
dvije domobranske bojne: 44. u Zenici (Busovača) i 45.
u Žepču (Komušina), 73. satnije veze, 4. bojne VP-a,
4. lakog artiljerijsko-raketnog divizijuna PZO u Vite-
zu, topničko-raketnog divizijuna u Vitezu i Logističke
baze Vitez.311
C
Nakon preustroja 1994., Zborno područje Orašje
sastojalo se od 4. gardijske brigade u Orašju, 108. bri-
gade u Gornjem Zoviku (Ravne - Brčko), tri domobran-
ske pukovnije, 106. i 201. u Orašju i 202. u Domaljevcu,
topničko-raketnog divizijuna u Orašju, oklopne bojne
u Orašju, Inženjerijske satnije, 5. satnije VP-a i Logistič-
ke baze Orašje.312
Tijekom 1994./1995. pristožerne postrojbe Glav-
noga stožera HVO-a bile su: 1. bojna VP-a u Mostaru,
10. topničko-raketni puk u Širokom Brijegu, 60. gar-
dijsko-desantna bojna Ludvig Pavlović u Čapljini, 11.
mješovita zrakoplovna eskadrila u Mostaru, Inženjerij-
sko-pontonirska bojna u Posušju, 15. topničko-raketni
309 GS HVO, Raščlamba mob. razvoja OS HVO kl. str. pov.
803-02/94-03/01, ur. br. 02-10-09-94-01 od 6. 1. 1995.
310 Isto.
311 Isto.
312 Isto.
140
Domovinski rat 04-02-2020 Knjiga 1.indd 140
During 1994/1995 the HQ units of the General Staff
of the HVO were: the 1st Military Police Battalion in Mo-
star, the 10th Artillery Rocket Regiment in Široki Brijeg,
the 60th Guards-Assault Battalion “Ludvig Pavlović” in
Čapljina, the 11th Mixed Air Squadron in Mostar, the Engi-
neer Pontoon Battalion in Posušje, the 15th Anti-Aircraft
Artillery Rocket Battalion in Grude, the 33rd Signal Com-
pany in Posušje, the 121st Air Surveillance and Navigation
Battalion in Ljubuški, the 88th Signals Intelligence Unit in
Mostar, the 22nd Sabotage Detachment and Central Lo-
gistics Base in Posušje.
During the course of 1994, three officers served as
Chief of the Main Staff of the HVO. General Ante Roso
was replaced by General Milivoj Petković and he was
in turn replaced by General Tihomir Blaškić. A string of
changes took place in the operational commands in
1994 and 1995. General Nedjeljko Obradović was ap-
pointed as commander of Military District Mostar. Brig-
adiers Ivan Purić and Josip Černi and Generals Filip Fili-
pović and Željko Glasnović were commanders of Military
District Tomislavgrad. Generals Filip Filipović and Drago
Dragičević served as commanders of Military District Vi-
tez. In 1995 there were hardly any organizational chang-
es – after the liberation of Jajce the 97th Home Guard
Regiment “Hrvoje Vukčić Hrvatinić” was formed in Mili-
tary District Vitez.
The Army of the Republic of Bosnia and
Herzegovina
The Army of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina
underwent a whole plethora of organizational changes
at the operational level in 1993. These changes occurred
D
as a direct result of the hostilities between the Army of
the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the HVO
and mostly in III Corps. At the beginning of March, 1993,
four Operational Groups were formed in III Corps: Oper-
ational Group Lašva for the municipalities of Busovača,
R
Kakanj and Vitez, Operational Group West for the mu-
nicipalities of Bugojno, Gornji Vakuf, Novi Travnik and
Travnik, Operational Group Bosnia for the municipalities
Zavidovići and Žepče and Operational Group Bosanska
Krajina with three maneuver brigades. In mid-March Op-
erational Group Visoko, later redesignated as Operation-
al Group East, was transferred from I Corps to III Corps.
With that the Vareš Municipality was included in the area
of responsibility of III Corps while the Olovo Municipality
was included in the area of responsibility of II Corps.
4.2.2020. 19:25:56
 The Croatian Nation’s Struggle for Survival, 1991-1995
divizijun PZO-a u Grudama, 33. satnija veze u Posušju,
121. bojna ZMIN-a u Ljubuškom, 88. središnjica ED-a u
Mostaru, 22. DO i Središnja logistička baza u Posušju.313
Tijekom 1994. promijenjena su i tri zapovjednika,
odnosno načelnika Glavnoga stožera HVO-a. Gene-
rala Antu Rosu zamijenio je general Milivoj Petković,
a njega general Tihomir Blaškić. U operativnim zapo-
vjedništvima bilo je niz promjena 1994. i 1995. godine.
Zpovjednikom Zbornog područja Mostar imenovan
je general Nedjeljko Obradović. Zbornim područjem
H
Tomislavgrad zapovijedali su brigadiri Ivan Purić i Jo-
sip Černi te generali Filip Filipović i Željko Glasnović. U
Zbornom području Vitez zapovijedali su generali Filip
Filipović i Drago Dragičević. Godine 1995. organiza-
cijske su promjene bile gotovo zanemarive – nakon
oslobađanja Jajca u sastavu ZP-a Vitez osnovana je 97.
M
domobranska pukovnija Hrvoje Vukčić Hrvatinić.314
Armija Republike Bosne i Hercegovine
Zbog rata s HVO-om ARBiH je na operativnoj razi-
ni 1993. imala niz organizacijskih promjena, najvećim
D
dijelom u 3. korpusu. Početkom ožujka 1993. u sasta-
vu 3. korpusa formirane su četiri operativne grupe:
Lašva za općine Busovača, Kakanj i Vitez, Zapad za
općine Bugojno, Gornji Vakuf/Uskoplje, Novi Travnik
i Travnik, Bosna za općine Zavidovići i Žepče te Bo-
sanska Krajina s tri manevarske brigade.315 Sredinom
C
ožujka iz 1. u sastav 3. korpusa uvedena je OG Visoko,
koja je poslije preimenovana u OG Istok. Time je opći-
na Vareš stavljena u zonu 3. korpusa, a općina Olovo
ušla je u zonu 2. korpusa.316
Nakon napada ARBiH na HVO u dolini Neretve,
D
općine Konjic i Jablanica su 24. travnja 1993. prešle
313 GS HVO, Izvješće o popuni postrojbi OS HR HB, kl. str.
pov. 803-02/94-03/01, ur. br. 02-10-09-94-24 od 5. 8.
1994.; Informacija o Oružanim snagama Federacije BiH,
svibanj 1996.
314 GS HVO, Izvješće o popuni postrojbi OS HR HB, kl. str.
pov. 803-02/94-03/01, ur. br. 02-10-09-94-24 od 5. 8.
1994.; GS HVO, Raščlamba mob. razvoja OS HVO kl. str.
pov. 803-02/94-03/01, ur. br. 02-10-09-94-01 od 6. 1.
1995.; Informacija o Oružanim snagama Federacije BiH,
svibanj 1996.
315 ICTY: Komanda 3. korpusa, Naređenje str. pov. br. 02/33-
628 od 8. 3. 1993.
316 ICTY: ŠVK OS RBiH, Naređenje str. pov. br. 02/403-1 od
17. 3. 1993.; M. ŠADINLIJA, Prvi korpus ARBiH, 29-30.
141
Domovinski rat 04-02-2020 Knjiga 1.indd 141
After the Army of the Republic of Bosnia and Her-
zegovina’s attack on the HVO in the Neretva Valley the
municipalities of Konjic and Jablanica were no longer in
the area of responsibility of IV Corps but were incorpo-
rated into the area of responsibility of Operational Group
Igman within the area of I Corps in April 24, 1993. This
reshuffling of the areas of responsibility was done for the
purpose of deflecting the responsibility for causing the
conflict with the HVO from IV Corps and directing its op-
erations to the wider Mostar area. In the first half of June,
VI Corps of the Army of the Republic of Bosnia and Her-
zegovina was formed out of elements of I, II and III Corps.
The area of responsibility of VI Corps encompassed the
municipalities of Fojnica, Gornji Vakuf, Hadžići, Jablanica,
Kalinovnik, Kiseljak, Konjic, Kreševo, Prozor, Trnovo and
Visoko. Some units, apart from the mentioned elements,
already operating in the municipalities were placed un-
der the command of VI Corps. The HQ of VI Corps was
in Konjic. The commander of VI Corps was Salko Gušić.
At the beginning of July the new Operational Group Ig-
man was formed out of elements of I and VI Corps for the
municipalities of Ilidža and Trnovo. At the beginning of
September Operational Group East was detached from
III Corps and incorporated into VI Corps. The area of re-
sponsibility of Operational Group East encompassed the
municipalities of Kiseljak and Vareš.
Rasim Delić replaced Sefer Halilović as Commander
of the Army of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina
on June 8, 1993. The change was made by the establish-
ment of the function of the commander of the General
Staff of the Armed Forces of the Republic of Bosnia and
Herzegovina. Delić was then appointed Commander of
the General Staff while Halilović stayed on as the Chief of
the General Staff.
There was another event that occurred in the Army
of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina that left its
mark on 1993. During the initial phase of the war, and
especially in Sarajevo, a large number of shady but en-
R
trepreneurial characters from the Bosnian underworld
established themselves firmly in the Territorial Defense,
and later spread their tentacles to the Army of the Re-
public of Bosnia and Herzegovina as well. Some of these
criminals were engaged in terrorizing and robbing the
non-Muslim population in Sarajevo with sometimes tac-
it, and sometimes open support from the political and
military leadership of the SDA party. Tolerating these ex-
cesses of the criminal element within the armed forces
came back to bite the men in charge of the SDA party.
4.2.2020. 19:25:56
 Davor Marijan • Rat za opstojnost Hrvata, 1991. - 1995.
iz sastava 4. korpusa u sastav OG-a Igman 1. korpusa
ARBiH.317 Tako se pokušalo 4. korpus osloboditi odgo-
vornosti za izazivanje sukoba i usmjeriti ga isključivo
na šire područje Mostara. U prvoj polovini lipnja od
dijelova 1., 3. i 4. korpusa formiran je 6. korpus AR-
BiH. Zona korpusa bile su općine Fojnica, Gornji Vakuf,
Hadžići, Jablanica, Kalinovik, Kiseljak, Konjic, Kreševo,
Prozor, Trnovo i Visoko s dijelom snaga u tim općina-
ma. Sjedište korpusa bilo je u Konjicu, a komandant je
bio Salko Gušić.318 Početkom srpnja za područje općina
H
Ilidža i Trnovo formirana je nova OG Igman od dijela 1. i
6. korpusa. Grupa je podređena Komandi 1. korpusa.319
Početkom rujna iz 3. u 6. korpus uvedena je OG Istok,
koja je uključivala područje općina Kiseljak i Vareš.320
Na vodeće mjesto ARBiH umjesto Sefera Halilovića
8. lipnja 1993. doveden je Rasim Delić. Smjena je izve-
M
dena manevrom ustanovljavanja dužnosti komandanta
Glavnoga štaba OS RBiH na koju je Delić imenovan. Ha-
lilović je ostao na dužnosti načelnika Glavnoga štaba.321
Još jedan događaj unutar Armije RBiH obilježio je
1993. godinu. U početnoj fazi rata, posebice u Sarajevu,
pojavio se niz poduzetnih osoba iz kriminalnoga miljea
D
koji se etablirao u Teritorijalnu obranu, a poslije u Armi-
ju RBiH. Dio njih pljačkao je i terorizirao nemusliman-
sko stanovništvo u Sarajevu, što je politički i vojni vrh
SDA i Armije RBiH tolerirao. Problem je nastao kada su
pljačku i teroriziranje proširili na Muslimane i nastojali
utjecati na kadroviranje unutar obrambenih struktura
C
u Sarajevu. Najpoznatije skupine bile su iz sastava 9. i
10. motorizirane brigade i postrojbe Delta, a predvodili
su ih Mušan Topalović Caco i Ramiz Delalić Ćelo. Te su
skupine početkom srpnja blokirale Sarajevo i ozbiljno
uzdrmale zonu obrane 1. korpusa ARBiH. “Problem” je
riješen 26. listopada 1993. u akciji nazvanoj Trebević-2.
U sukobu je ubijeno devet pripadnika ARBiH i MUP-a, a
Mušan Topalović je ubijen, navodno u pokušaju bijega.
Uhićeno je nekoliko stotina pripadnika 9. i 10. moto-
317 Komanda 4. korpusa, Naređenje dj. br. 02/1-3381-1/93
od 24. 4. 1993.
318 ICTY: GŠ OS RBiH, Odluka str. pov. br. 14/76-7 od 9. 6.
1993.
319 ICTY: ŠVK OS RBiH, Naređenje str. pov. br. 14/75-63 od 5.
7. 1993.
320 ICTY: ŠVK OS RBiH, Naređenje str. pov. br. 14/75-103 od
2. 9. 1993.
321 ICTY: Predsjednik Predsjedništva RBiH, Odluka PR br.
02-011-308/93 od 8. 6. 1993.
142
Domovinski rat 04-02-2020 Knjiga 1.indd 142
Not surprisingly, the loot the criminals acquired from
robbing non-Muslims only fuelled their appetite for
more spoils of war and they started targeting Muslims
too. Also, they were bent upon placing their men in
charge of all of the integral parts of the defensive struc-
ture of the city of Sarajevo. The most infamous criminal
groups within the armed forces of Bosnia and Herzegov-
ina were in the 9th Motorized Brigade, the 10th Motorized
Brigade and the Delta unit. The leaders of that criminal
element were Mušan “Caco” Topalović and Ramiz “Ćelo”
Delalić. These groups, at the beginning of the war, block-
aded Sarajevo and by doing so seriously jeopardized the
defensive zone of the ARBIH I Corps. “The problem” was
solved on October 26, 1993, in an operation codenamed
Trebević-2. Nine members of the Army of the Republic of
Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Ministry of Internal Af-
fairs were killed in the shoot-out. Mušan Topalović was
also killed. According to the official version of events, he
was killed while trying to escape. A few hundred mem-
bers of the 9th and 10th Motorized Brigades were arrested,
eighteen of which were tried and sentenced for armed
insurrection and murder. The Army of the Bosnia and
Herzegovina and the MUP used Operation Trebević-2 to
remove Sefer Halilović from the command structure be-
cause it was suspected that he had ties with Topalović
and Ramiz Delalić.
In 1994 the Army of the Republic of Bosnia and
Herzegovina went through a number of organizational
changes at the operational level. In January the 8th Op-
erational Group was formed in Srebrenica as part of II
Corps. In the same month VI Corps was disbanded. The
biggest and most important change was the forming of
VII Corps in April, 1994. The Corps was created by diving
D
III Corps into the Zenica contingent and the Travnik con-
tingent. The forces operating in the wider Travnik area
became VII Corps and III Corps remained in the wider
Zenica area. The HQ of VII Corps was in Travnik and
the commander was Mehmed Alagić. Out of elements
R
of I Corps outside Sarajevo three Operational Groups
were formed: Operational Group 1 Pazarić, Operation-
al Group 2 Visoko and Operational Group 3 Vareš. The
forces operating in the area of Goražde were detached
from I Corps at the beginning of the year. The idea was
to form VIII Corps around these units but the decision
was never realized. Operational Group East Bosnia con-
tinued its existence unchanged.
During the period from October, 1994, to March,
1995, the Army of the Republic of Bosnia and Herze-
4.2.2020. 19:25:56
 The Croatian Nation’s Struggle for Survival, 1991-1995
rizirane brigade, od kojih je 18 optuženo i osuđeno za
oružanu pobunu i ubojstva. Akcija je iskorištena da se
iz sustava odstrani i Sefer Halilović, navodno jer je bio u
vezi s Topalovićem i Ramizom Delalićem.322
Armija Republike BiH imala je 1994. nekoliko opera-
tivnih organizacijskih promjena. U siječnju je u sastavu
2. korpusa osnovana 8. operativna grupa u Srebrenici.323
Istoga je mjeseca ukinut 6. korpus. Najveća i najvažnija
organizacijska promjena bilo je osnivanje 7. korpusa u
travnju 1994. godine. Korpus je nastao podjelom 3. kor-
H
pusa na travnički i zenički dio. Snage na širem područ-
ju Travnika postale su 7. korpus, a 3. je ostao na širem
području Zenice. Sjedište 7. korpusa bilo je u Travniku,
a zapovjednik je bio Mehmed Alagić.324 Od snaga 1. kor-
pusa izvan Sarajeva u svibnju su osnovane tri operativ-
ne grupe: OG-1 Pazarić, OG-2 Visoko i OG-3 Vareš. Kor-
M
pus je početkom godine ostao bez snaga na području
Goražda, od kojih se planirao osnovati 8. korpus, no ta
odluka nije realizirana nego je i dalje zadržana Istočno-
bosanska operativna grupa.325
Od listopada 1994. do ožujka 1995. ARBiH je reo-
rganizirana u izrazito napadačku vojsku. U 1. korpusu
D
osnovane su tri divizije i četiri manevarske brigade, u
2. korpusu osnovano je pet divizija i šest manevarskih
brigada, u 3. korpusu dvije divizije i tri manevarske bri-
gade, a u 7. korpusu jedna divizija i dvije manevarske
brigade. Četvrti i 5. korpus zadržali su brigadni sustav.326
C
Vojska Republike Srpske
U VRS-u nije bilo značajnih organizacijskih promje-
na: sustav sa šest korpusa i RV-a i PVO-a i dalje je ostao
na snazi. Najvažnije zbivanje unutar VRS-a bila je pobu-
D
na u Banjoj Luci koja je počela 10., a završila 17. rujna
1993. godine. Nazvana je Septembar-93 i u njoj su bili
angažirani vojnici 1. krajiškog korpusa, najvećim dije-
lom iz 16. krajiške motorizirane i 1. oklopne brigade. Po-
čela je kao prosvjed zbog nebrige o vojnim stradalnici-
ma rata, a ubrzo je prerasla u pobunu i dobila političku
322 R. DELIĆ, Armija RBiH, I, 298-301.
323 ICTY: ŠVK OS RBiH, Naređenje str. pov. br. 14/75-156/93
od 1. 1. 1994.
324 H. MUŠINBEGOVIĆ, R. ŠILJAK, K. BEĆIREVIĆ, Operacija
Vlašić, 21, 24.
325 M. ŠADINLIJA, Prvi korpus ARBiH, 37, 40.
326 R. DELIĆ, Armija RBiH, II, 52-53.
143
Domovinski rat 04-02-2020 Knjiga 1.indd 143
govina was reorganized into a decidedly offensive force.
There divisions and four mobile brigades were formed
in I Corps, five divisions and six maneuver brigades were
formed in II Corps, two divisions and three mobile bri-
gades were formed in III Corps and one division and two
mobile brigades were formed in VII Corps. IV Corps and V
Corps retained their brigade structure.
The Army of the Republika Srpska
No significant changes occurred in the Army of
the Republika Srpska: the six-corps system and the Air
Force and Air Defense remained unaltered. The most
notable development within the Army of the Repub-
lika Srpska was a rebellion in Banja Luka that started
on September 10 and ended on September 17, 1993.
The rebellion was named September-93 and involved
soldiers belonging to I Corps, mostly from the 16th Kraji-
na Motorized Brigade and the 1st Armored Brigade. The
rebellion started as a protest against the government’s
desultory attitude towards the war invalids. The protest
soon escalated into a rebellion and acquired a political
aspect. The rebels occupied Banja Luka and blocked all
approaches to the city. The political leadership of the
Republika Srpska and the General Staff of the Army of
the Republika Srpska defused the tensions. The real
motives of the rebels remain shrouded in mystery.
The General Staff of the Army of the Republika Srpska
strongly suspected that the political leadership of the
Republika Srpska was behind the rebellion.
During the year the General Staff issued two direc-
tives for future actions of the Army of the Republika Srps-
ka. Directive No. 5 of June 25, 1993, tasked the Army of
the Republika Srpska with preventing the enemy from
breaching the blockade of Sarajevo, capturing military
industry installations, and gaining full control of the Sa-
rajevo – village of Kijevo – Trnovo –the Rogoj pass – Kali-
novik line and thus link Herzegovina with other parts of
R
the Republika Srpska. With Directive No. 6 of November
11, 1993, the Supreme Command ordered the Serbian
Army of Krajina to capture Sarajevo, define the bound-
ary on the Neretva River and reach the sea at Neum and
Prevlaka, define the border of the Republika Srpska on
the watershed of the River Una, extend the border of the
Republika Srpska in the northwestern part of Bosnia and
Herzegovina and establish firmer links with Serbia. The
aims set forth in Directive No. 6, unlike those given in Di-
rective No. 5, were, for the most part, unattainable.
4.2.2020. 19:25:56
 Davor Marijan • Rat za opstojnost Hrvata, 1991. - 1995.

značajku. Pobunjenici su zauzeli Banju Luku i blokirali

prilaze gradu. Na smirivanju su se angažirali politički
vrh RS-a i Glavni štab VRS-a. Pravi motivi pobune nisu
jasni, a iz Glavnoga štaba VRS-a sumnjali su da iza nje
stoji politički vrh RS-a.327
Tijekom godine Glavni je štab izdao dvije direktive
za daljnja djelovanja VRS-a. U Direktivi broj 5 od 25. lip-
nja 1993., VRS-u je dan zadatak da spriječi deblokadu
Sarajeva i zauzimanje pogona vojne industrije, a po-
tom da zauzme pravac Sarajevo – selo Kijevo – Trnovo
H
– prijevoj Rogoj – Kalinovik i tako spoji Hercegovinu s
Srpske snage (Vojska Krajine, časopis SVK, 11. srpnja 1995.).
ostalim dijelovima RS-a.328 U Direktivi broj 6 od 11. stu-
denoga 1993., Vrhovna komanda dala je VRS-u zadatak Serb Forces (Army of Krajina – magazin, July 11, 1995).
da zauzme Sarajevo, definira granicu RS-a na Neretvi i
izbije na more kod Neuma i Prevlake, definira granicu
RS-a na slivu rijeke Une, proširi granice RS-a u sjevero-
M
zapadnom dijelu BiH i čvršće se poveže sa Srbijom.329
Ciljevi iz te direktive, za razliku od prethodne, najvećim Unlike the other armed forces, the Army of the Re-
dijelom nisu bili ostvarivi. publika Srpska in 1994 was not reorganized in any major
U odnosu na ostale vojske, VRS 1994. gotovo nije way. The six-corps plus the Air Force system remained
imao formacijskih promjena. Zadržan je sustav sa šest in place. At the end of 1994, the 10th Sabotage Unit was
korpusa i Vazduhoplovstvom. Krajem 1994. osnovan je formed as a headquarters unit of the General Staff. The
D
10. DO kao prištabna postrojba Glavnoga štaba i prva 10th Sabotage Unit was the first professional unit of the
profesionalna postrojba VRS-a. U odnosu na ostale voj- Army of the Republika Srpska. Again unlike the other
ske, VRS je imao učestalu praksu osnivanja privremenih armed forces the Army of the Republika Srpska was in
sastava unutar pojedinih korpusa i iz više korpusa te the habit of forming temporary groups within individu-
angažman u zonama djelovanja drugih korpusa. Naj- al corps and also within the framework of a number of
poznatije od tih sastava bile su brigade koje su u imenu
C
corps. It often happened that groups under the nominal
imale naziv “srpske”.330 command of one corps operated in the area of respon-
sibility of another corps. The most known such groups
were those brigades that sported the prefix “Serbian”.
D
327 Milovan MILUTINOVIĆ, Vojska Republike Srpske između
politike i rata, Srpska Vila, Sremska Mitrovica, Institut
za političke studije, Beograd, Sremska Mitrovica, 1997.,
R
99-100; Nikica BARIĆ, “Akcija ‘Septembar 93’ – pobuna
Vojske Republike Srpske u Banjoj Luci”, Prilozi, br. 41, In-
stitut za istoriju, Sarajevo, 2012., 185-201.
328 ICTY: GŠ VRS, Direktiva za dalja dejstva br. 5, str. pov. br.
02/2-479 od 25. 6. 1993.
329 ICTY: Vrhovna komanda OS RS, Direktiva za dalja dejst-
va op. br. 6, str. pov. br. 02/2-934 od 11. 11. 1993.
330 ICTY: GŠ VRS, Borbeno naređenje str. pov. br. 02/2-139
od 27. 10. 1994.; ICTY: GŠ VRS, Naređenje str. pov. br.
18/19-1625 od 4. 12. 1994.; ICTY: IKM Komande 1. KK,
Status 1. Splbr str. pov. br. 24-1/95 od 14. 1. 1995.

144

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 1990. – 1992.:
OD SRPSKE POBUNE DO III
SARAJEVSKOGA PRIMIRJA
H
M
1990 – 1992
D
FROM THE SERB
REBELLION TO THE
C
SARAJEVO CEASE-FIRE
AGREEMENT
D
R

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 Davor Marijan • Rat za opstojnost Hrvata, 1991. - 1995.

H
M
D
C
D
R
THE AGGRESSORS ARE SERBIA AND THE YUGO COMMUNIST ARMY.
C ROATIAN INFORMAT ION CENTR E
Print : HR VATSKA TIS KAR A, d.o.o. ZAG REB

146

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 The Croatian Nation’s Struggle for Survival, 1991-1995
SRPSKA POBUNA I AGRESIJA
Razoružanje Teritorijalne obrane
i preustrojavanje Jugoslavenske
narodne armije za rat
Vodstvo JNA nije prihvatilo pobjedu HDZ-a u Hrvat-
skoj. Premda se SKJ raspao u siječnju 1990., JNA je i dalje
držala da ima obvezu braniti partijske vrijednosti i cilje-
ve socijalističkoga poretka.331 Dok je HDZ slavio izbor-
H
nu pobjedu i čekao da navodno reformirani komunisti
predaju vlast, JNA je sredinom svibnja 1990. razoruža-
la republičke teritorijalne obrane. U Srbiji i Crnoj Gori
razoružanje je bilo fiktivno, ali u ostalim republikama
nije. Samo je Slovenija uspjela zadržati dio naoružanja.
M
U Hrvatskoj je razoružanje proteklo bez većih proble-
ma jer se JNA za to temeljito pripremala dva mjeseca,
a zapovjedni kadrovi TO-a su im najvećim dijelom bili
istomišljenici. Naoružanje i streljivo Teritorijalne obrane
Hrvatske čuvalo se u 364 objekta, od kojih je 178 bilo u
vlasništvu i nadležnosti JNA, pa je razoružanje bilo go-
tovo formalnost. Hrvatska je preko noći ostala bez oruž-
D
ja za oko 204.000 ljudi.332
Na prosvjede iz Hrvatske i Slovenije JNA je tvrdila
da nije razoružala TO, nego da ga je bolje zaštitila od
krađe i da postoji mogućnost da se oružje vrati ako
republike osiguraju “dobre uslove zaštite”.333 Iako su
C
u dijelu općina u Hrvatskoj osigurani uvjeti kvalitetne
zaštite, oružje nije vraćeno.334 Predsjedništvo SFRJ je
29. svibnja 1990. očekivano podržalo JNA i kao neute-
meljene odbacilo “sve spekulacije o političkoj pozadini
ovih mera”.335 Da su spekulacije o političkoj pozadini
razoružanja bile osnovane svjedoči tadašnji predsjed-
D
331 Miroslav HADŽIĆ, Sudbina partijske vojske, Samizdat
B92, Beograd, 2001., 138.
332 AHS: Zapisnik 3. sjednice održane 24. 5. 1999. Istražnog
povjerenstva Hrvatskog državnog Sabora radi ut-
vrđivanja okolnosti i krivnje državnih i političkih tijela
Socijalističke Republike Hrvatske za oduzimanje oružja
od Teritorijalne obrane Hrvatske do 30. svibnja 1990.; D.
MARIJAN, Slom Titove armije, 151-152.
333 B. JOVIĆ, Poslednji dani SFRJ, 146-147.
334 SVA MORH, fond RSNO RH: MORH, Zahtjev za vraćanje
naoružanja i municije u skladišta TO DPZ, kl. 213-01/90-
01/01, ur. br. SP. 512-02-04-90-12 od 25. 10. 1990.
335 AHS: Predsjedništvo SFRJ, str. pov. br. 150/3-3/690 od
31. 5. 1990.
147
Domovinski rat 04-02-2020 Knjiga 1.indd 147
SERB REBELLION AND
AGGRESSION
Disarming of the Territorial Defense and
Gearing up the Yugoslav People’s Army
for War
The leadership of the JNA did not accept the HDZ’s
victory in the elections in Croatia. Even though the
League of Communists of Yugoslavia had fallen apart
in January, 1990, the JNA subscribed to the notion that
it was obligated to continue to defend the Communist
Party values and goals of the socialist order. As the HDZ
party celebrated its victory, waiting for the ostensibly
reformed Communists to hand over the reins of power,
the JNA, in mid-May, 1990, disarmed the republic Terri-
torial Defense forces. In Serbia and Montenegro the JNA
only went through the motions with regard to disarm-
ing the TO, but in the other republics it took its task very
seriously. Only the Slovenian TO managed, somehow, to
keep some of its weapons and equipment. In Croatia,
the process of disarmament went smoothly, partly be-
cause the JNA had been carefully preparing the move
for two months, partly because most officers of the Cro-
atian TO were pro-JNA and partly because 178 out of
364 facilities and installations where the weapons and
ammunition belonging to the Croatian TO were kept
were in direct ownership and under direct control of the
JNA. Overnight Croatia had lost enough weapons and
ammunition sufficient to arm 204,000 men.
Croatia and Slovenia protested. The JNA responded
by claiming that it had not really disarmed the TOs but
acted with the aim of protecting the weapons and am-
munition from theft and that the weapons and ammu-
nition would be returned if the republics “secure good
safety conditions”. Some municipalities in Croatia took
the JNA at its word and bent over backwards to set up
foolproof security conditions for the storage of weapons
R
and ammunition. The JNA refused to even consider re-
turning the weapons and ammunition. On May 29, 1990,
the Presidency of the SFRY, as expected, expressed sup-
port for the JNA and rejected “all speculations about the
political background of these measures’ as unsubstan-
tiated”. But, the speculations about the political back-
ground of the disarmament of the TO forces were not
unsubstantiated. The then President of the Presidency
of the SFRY Borisav Jović wrote the following note on
4.2.2020. 19:29:22
 Davor Marijan • Rat za opstojnost Hrvata, 1991. - 1995.
nik Predsjedništva SFRJ Borisav Jović u zabilješci od
17. svibnja 1990.: “Praktično smo ih razoružali. Formal-
no, ovo je uradio načelnik Generalštaba, ali faktički po
našem nalogu. Slovenci i Hrvati su oštro reagovali, ali
nemaju kud”, te da neće “dozvoliti da oružje Teritorijal-
ne odbrane zlouporabe u eventualnim sukobima ili za
nasilno otcepljenje”.336
Osim razoružanja TO-a, JNA je zahvaljujući ka-
drovskoj politici s kraja 1980-ih uspjela vezati za sebe
Republički štab TO SRH i većinu zonskih štabova. Po-
H
kušaj hrvatske vlasti da stavi pod nadzor Republički
štab Teritorijalne obrane nije urodio plodom. Tadašnji
komandant hrvatske TO general Zdravko Novoselić
čvrsto se držao JNA. Hrvatska je u prosincu 1990., s
iznimkom plaća, uskratila financiranje TO-a. Ali TO
nije zanemaren. U rujnu 1991. predsjednik F. Tuđman
M
je razriješio generala Novoselića, a TO je preveden u
pričuvni sastav HV-a.337
Drugi potez JNA poduzet zbog političkih pro-
mjena u zapadnim dijelovima SFRJ bio je djelomični
preustroj i novi razmještaj snaga u Hrvatskoj, BiH i
Srbiji radi pacifikacije Hrvatske. Na taktičkoj je razi-
D
ni to značilo dovođenje dijela postrojbi iz niže (B i R)
u najvišu, A klasifikaciju odnosno, pojednostavljeno
rečeno, povećanje brojnoga stanja postrojbi. Težište
promjena bilo je u 5. vojnoj oblasti, na širem područ-
ju Zagreba. Krajem lipnja 1990. ukinute su Komanda
obrane grada Zagreba i 6. proleterska pješačka divi-
C
zija u Karlovcu. Šire područje Zagreba s Kordunom i
Banovinom ušlo je u sastav novoustrojenoga 10. kor-
pusa sa sjedištem u Zagrebu. Korpus je osnovan od
dijela prištabnih postrojbi Komande 5. vojne oblasti
te Riječkoga i Varaždinskoga korpusa. Mirnodopski
ustroj JNA pojačan je ljudstvom i borbenom tehni-
kom u Bjelovaru, Dugom Selu, Jastrebarskom, Karlov-
cu, Virovitici i Zagrebu. U Sloveniji je između ostalog
pojačan u brigadi u Ilirskoj Bistrici, koja je bila nami-
jenjena za djelovanje u Hrvatskoj. U sjevernoj Dalma-
ciji, u sastavu Vojnopomorske oblasti, pojačan je u
Kninu i Benkovcu. U Srbiji su pojačanja bila u Beogra-
du, Pančevu, Požarevcu, Srijemskoj Mitrovici i Valje-
vu. U Bosni i Hercegovini pojačane su snage u Banja
336 B. JOVIĆ, Poslednji dani SFRJ, 146.
337 Martin ŠPEGELJ, Sjećanja vojnika, Znanje, Zagreb, 2001.,
125; Petar KRISTE, Sjene nad slobodom, Golden market-
ing, Zagreb, 2001., 81-82, 91; D. MARIJAN, Slom Titove
armije, 173-175.
148
Domovinski rat 04-02-2020 Knjiga 1.indd 148
May 17, 1990: “We have disarmed them. Formally, the
deed was done on the chief of the General Staff’s orders,
but in reality we gave the order. The Slovenes and Croats
protested vociferously but there’s bugger all they can do
about it.” He added that he would not “allow the repub-
lics to use the TO weapons and ammunition in conflicts
or for fighting for their independence”.
The JNA, besides disarming the TO managed to tie
to itself the republic HQ of the TO Croatia and most of
the zone HQs. This feat was accomplished, thanks, in
large measure, to the fact that most officers in the TO
Croatia were politically suitable individuals and more
often than not, especially at the tail end of the 1980s,
Serbs. The Croatian government attempted to subordi-
nate the Republic Staff of the Territorial Defense to its
authority but the attempt failed. The then commander
of the Croatian TO, Zdravko Novoselić, was staunchly
loyal to the JNA. The Croatian government refused to
continue to fund the Croatian TO. However, in Decem-
ber, 1990, the move did not extend to the salaries of
the TO’s personnel. The measure did not mean that the
Croatian government was washing its hands of the TO,
quite the contrary. In September, 1991, Tuđman relieved
Novoselić of duty and the TO was incorporated into the
reserve contingent of the Croatian Army.
Prompted by the political development in the west-
ern parts of the SFRY, the JNA made another move. It
partially restructured and redeployed its forces in Croa-
tia, Bosnia and Herzegovina and Serbia for the purpose
of pacifying Croatia. On the tactical level that meant im-
proving the classification of some units, raising it from
the lowest level (classification B and R) to the highest lev-
el (classification A). In layman’s terms, it meant increas-
D
ing the numerical strength of the units in question. Most
changes in that particular regard occurred in the area of
the 5th Military District, in the wider Zagreb area. At the
end of June the HQ of the Defense of Zagreb and the 6th
Proletarian Infantry Division in Karlovac were disbanded.
R
The wider Zagreb area, including Kordun and Banovina,
was incorporated into the newly formed X Corps with
its headquarters in Zagreb. X Corps was formed out of
elements of the headquarters units of the HQ of the 5th
Military District and Rijeka Corps and Varaždin Corps. The
peacetime contingent of the JNA was augmented with
additional personnel and equipment in Bjelovar, Dugo
Selo, Jastrebarsko, Karlovac, Virovitica and Zagreb. The
numerical strength of the brigade in Ilirska Bistrica, Slo-
venia, was also increased because the brigade was slated
4.2.2020. 19:29:22
 The Croatian Nation’s Struggle for Survival, 1991-1995
Luci i Mostaru. Sve su te snage kasnije angažirane u
agresiji na Hrvatsku.338
Prevođenje armijskih snaga u Hrvatskoj u tip A bio
je pokušaj da se premosti ovisnost o ljudstvu na područ-
jima gdje su Hrvati bili većina. Od toga pravila odudara
samo 221. mtbr iz Knina i Benkovca, koja je smještena
na područje s većinskim srpskim stanovništvom. No
vrijeme će brzo pokazati da njoj nije bila namijenjena
uloga pacifikacije nemirnog etničkog područja, nego
zaštitnika Kninske krajine. Pojačavanjem snaga i njiho-
H
vim novim razmještajem JNA je imala snage spremne da
interveniraju i spriječe hrvatske snage da uguše pobunu
Srba. Bivši savezni sekretar za narodnu obranu SFRJ ge-
neral armije Veljko Kadijević priznao je 1993. što se želje-
lo postići tim promjenama:
“Radi izvršenja postavljenog zadatka ojačati jedini-
M
ce JNA u Hrvatskoj i oko Hrvatske. Imati dvije vrste for-
macija. Veći broj oklopnomehanizovanih sastava jačine
čete do bataljona smjestiti što bliže mogućim mjesti-
ma sukoba, tako da mogu brzo intervenisati. Odgova-
rajući broj oklopnomehanizovanih jedinica brigadnog
sastava i jačih, postaviti na odgovarajućim punktovima
D
u Hrvatskoj i oko Hrvatske, tako da se mogu angažovati
za veće intervencije.”339
Većina je preustrojenih postrojbi do izbijanja otvo-
renog rata u ljeto 1991. korištena da spriječi rad hrvatske
policije i zaštiti SAO Krajinu. Jugoslavenska je narodna
armija pak tvrdila da sprečava međuetničke sukobe i
C
razdvaja sukobljene strane.
Srpska pobuna i hrvatske protumjere
Pobuna hrvatskih Srba u ljeto 1990. bila je uvod u
D
rat. Počela je u Kninu, gradu u sjevernoj Dalmaciji s ve-
ćinskim srpskim stanovništvom. U Drugom svjetskom
ratu Knin je bio najveće uporište četnika (pobornika
ideje „Velike Srbije“ sa zapadnom granicom duboko na
teritoriju Hrvatske, koji su tada surađivali s talijanskim
fašistima, a kasnije i s njemačkom vojskom) u Hrvatskoj
i nije čudno da je pobuna počela upravo ondje. Pobuna
je počela nakon hrvatske odluke da zbog najavljenog
srpskog referenduma o autonomiji povuče oružje pri-
338 D. MARIJAN, Slom Titove armije, 156-165; Bojan B. DIM-
ITRIJEVIĆ, Modernizacija i intervencija: jugoslovenske ok-
lopne jedinice 1945–2006, Institut za savremenu istoriju,
Beograd, 2010., 261-262.
339 V. KADIJEVIĆ, Moje viđenje raspada, 127.
149
Domovinski rat 04-02-2020 Knjiga 1.indd 149
to operate in Croatia. In northern Dalmatia, which was in
the area of the Military-Maritime District, the numerical
strength of the JNA contingents in Knin and Benkovac
was increased. In Serbia, JNA formations in Belgrade,
Pančevo, Požarevac, Srijemska Mitrovica and Valjevo
were reinforced. In Bosnia and Herzegovina JNA forma-
tions in Banja Luka and Mostar also received reinforce-
ments. All these forces were later deployed in Croatia
and participated in Serbia’s aggression against Croatia.
Increasing the numerical strength of the mentioned
formations in Croatia was an attempt to compensate
for the fact that these formations were stationed in pre-
dominately Croatian areas. One exception was the 221st
Motorized Brigade stationed in Knin and Benkovac,
towns where Serbs formed a majority. Time would soon
tell, however, that the JNA was not gearing up for the
role of pacifying volatile areas but for the role of protect-
ing the Kninska Krajina. By straightening the numerical
strength of the mentioned formations and by redeploy-
ing them the JNA was ready to intervene and prevent
the Croatian forces to nip the Serb rebellion in the bud.
The former Federal Secretary of National Defense of the
SFRY General Veljko Kadijević admitted in 1993 what
was meant to be accomplished by these changes:
“For the purpose of accomplishing our task: boost
the strength of the JNA formations in Croatia and
around Croatia; have two types of formations at our dis-
posal; deploy a large number of armored-mechanized
formations of company- to battalion-strength as close
as possible to contested areas so that they can intervene
in a timely fashion; deploy the appropriate number of
armor-mechanized formations of brigade-strength and
larger to strategic points in Croatia and around Croatia
so that they can be used in strength if required.”
Most of the restructured formations, until the out-
break of open war in the summer of 1991, were used for
protecting the SAO Krajina and preventing the Croatian
police from doing its job. Throughout the JNA main-
R
tained that its task was to prevent inter-ethnic conflict
and to separate the belligerent parties.
Serb Rebellion and Croatian
Countermeasures
The rebellion of the Croatian Serbs in the summer
of 1990 was a prelude to war. It erupted in Knin, a pre-
dominately Serb town in northern Dalmatia. During
WWII Knin was the largest Chetnik (followers of the
4.2.2020. 19:29:22
 Davor Marijan • Rat za opstojnost Hrvata, 1991. - 1995.
čuvnog sastava policije iz policijskih postaja u mjesti-
ma s većinskim srpskim pučanstvom. U okolici Knina
17. kolovoza naoružani civili srpske nacionalnosti za-
priječili su prometnice. Pokušaj Specijalne postrojbe
Ministarstva unutarnjih poslova RH da intervencijom
u Kninu uguši pobunu u začetku je spriječila JNA svo-
jim zrakoplovstvom. Postupak se opravdao tvrdnjom
da su hrvatski helikopteri letjeli mimo najave i odo-
brenog koridora. Pobuna se brzo proširila po sjevernoj
Dalmaciji i Lici, a potom u rujnu 1990. na području Ba-
H
novine, u mjestima s većinskim srpskim pučanstvom.
Zbog čestih barikada promet kroz ta područja postu-
pno je zamro.340
Krajem rujna 1990., zbog potrebe da se naoruža
rastući kontingent policije, MUP RH ponovno je nare-
dio da se dio naoružanja pričuvnoga sastava policije
M
povuče u sjedišta SUP-ova. Na području Banovine dio
je oružja povučen u Sisak, a u Petrinji je pokušaj one-
mogućen insceniranim zaprečivanjem ceste. Ubrzo su
slijedile provale i pljačka oružja u Petrinji, Glini i još ne-
kim policijskim postajama.341
Mirnodopski razmještaj JNA, posebice Kninskoga
D
korpusa u sjevernoj Dalmaciji, omogućio je pobunje-
nim Srbima da šire pobunu na druge dijelove RH. U
neravnopravnom odnosu snaga hrvatsko se vrhovniš-
tvo nije usudilo ući u izravan sukob s dobro naoruža-
nom federalnom vojskom. Do smirivanja stanja u dijelu
države nastojalo je doći posredno, najprije pregovori-
C
ma, koji nisu donijeli željeni uspjeh, a potom ograni-
čenom demonstracijom policijske sile. U sličnom, iako
boljem položaju, jer nije imala srpski problem, bila je i
Slovenija. To je bio razlog da obje republike 20. siječnja
1991. sklope tajni sporazum o pomoći.342
340 USMKSMP: Podaci i informacije MUP RH od 11. 2. 1991. u
svezi sa netočnim ili nepotpunim konstatacijama u ma-
terijalu SSNO pod naslovom “Informacija o neovlašćen-
om formiranju oružanih sastava u SFRJ” dostavljenom
poslanicima Skupštine SFRJ; N. BARIĆ, Srpska pobuna,
77-82; D. MARIJAN, Slom Titove armije, 227-229.
341 USMKSMP: SUP Sisak, Oružje i municija rezervnog
sastava milicije br. 511-10-01/2-SP-40/128/14/9-90
od 28. 9. 1990.; USMKSMP: SUP Sisak, br. 511-10-02-
SP-40/128-19/90 od 30. 9. 1990.; USMKSMP: MUP RH,
Operativno dežurstvo, br. 511-01-35-D-26900/90 od
30. 9. 1990.; USMKSMP: SUP Zadar, br. 511-17-01-str.
pov. 132/90 od 3. 10. 1990.; “Otuđeno oružje”, Narodna
armija, 11. 10. 1990., 15.
342 Slaven LETICA, Mario NOBILO, Rat protiv Hrvatske: KOS - Ta-
jni dokumenti, Globus, specijalno izdanje, 11. 2. 1991., 73.
150
Domovinski rat 04-02-2020 Knjiga 1.indd 150
Greater Serbia concept who collaborated with the
Italian Army and later with the Wehrmacht) strong-
hold in Croatia. If viewed from that perspective, when
Yugoslavia disintegrated the Serbs from Knin were
bound to rebel. The rebellion was sparked when the
Croatian government decided to take control of the
weapons of the reserve police force in the police sta-
tions in the predominantly Serb towns and villages
before the announced Serb referendum on autono-
my. On August 17, in the environs of Knin, armed Serb
civilians blocked the roads. The special police unit of
the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Republic of Cro-
atia was sent by helicopters to Knin with the task of
forestalling the rebellion from spreading. The helicop-
ters were intercepted by JNA jet fighters and forced
to turn back. The JNA justified the move by claiming
that the Croatian helicopters had taken off without
announcing the flight and that they had been flying
outside of the permitted fly-zone corridor. The rebel-
lion soon spread the length and breadth of northern
Dalmatia and Lika and in September, 1990, to the
towns and villages where Serb formed a majority in
the Banovina area. Armed Serbs were fond of placing
barricades on the roads there and gradually all traffic
died out in the region.
At the end of September, 1990, there existed a
growing need to arm the ever increasing police con-
tingent. For that reason the MUP of the Republic of
Croatia again ordered that the weapons belonging to
the reserve police force be moved to the SUP centers
(Secretariat of Internal Affairs). In the Banovina area
some weapons were transported to Sisak. In Petrin-
ja armed Serbs prevented the move by blocking the
D
roads. Shortly thereafter the Serbs started attacking
and pillaging police stations in Petrinja, Glina and in
other places.
The peacetime deployment of the JNA forces, es-
pecially Knin Corps in northern Dalmatia, enabled the
R
rebel Serbs to spread the rebellion to other parts of
the Republic of Croatia. Needless to say, the JNA forc-
es vastly outnumbered the nascent Croatian armed
forces and for that reason the Croatian government
was careful not to take any action that could lead to
a direct confrontation with the JNA. The Croatian gov-
ernment adopted an indirect approach to trying to de-
fuse the crisis, first by negotiations, which did not bear
fruit and then by a limited demonstration of force, us-
ing exclusively police units for the purpose. Slovenia
4.2.2020. 19:29:22
 The Croatian Nation’s Struggle for Survival, 1991-1995
Srpska pobuna u Hrvatskoj u ljeto 1990. bila je u
domeni izvanrednih prilika i na nju Hrvatska nije mo-
gla reagirati na predviđeni način jer je JNA razoruža-
la TO i spriječila intervenciju policije. Uz to je JNA u
svibnju 1990. jednostrano otkazala dugogodišnji plan
sukladnoga djelovanja s organima unutarnjega reda
socijalističke Hrvatske i Slovenije. Zbog novog stanja
u Republici prvi planovi za uspostavu ustavnoga po-
retka bili su policijskoga tipa, iako ih je izrađivalo Mini-
starstvo obrane. Ustalila se tvrdnja da je 1990. ministar
H
obrane Martin Špegelj izradio plan napada na vojarne
JNA da bi se došlo do oružja TO-a i JNA, ali da ga je Tu-
đman odbio. Dokazi o postojanju takva plana još nisu
predočeni javnosti.343
Hrvatska je težište obrane stavila na miliciju, odno-
sno policiju (MUP RH), jer na razoružani TO nije mogla
M
računati. Zbog nepovoljne nacionalne strukture u ljeto
1990. počelo je popunjavanje policije novim kadrom
hrvatske nacionalnosti. Ministarstvo unutarnjih poslo-
va RH je sa 6800 ljudi iz sredine 1990. do sredine siječnja
1991. naraslo na 18.752 djelatna i 22.865 pričuvnih pri-
padnika, ukupno 41.751 pripadnik.344
D
Pokušaj razoružavanja hrvatske policije
u siječnju 1991. godine
Ostavši bez oružja Teritorijalne obrane i suočena s
rastućom srpskom pobunom, Hrvatska je bila primo-
C
rana nabavljati oružje od onih koji su ga željeli proda-
ti. U Mađarskoj je nabavljen kontingent pješačkoga
naoružanja za policiju koja je ubrzano rasla. Kupovinu
oružja u inozemstvu JNA je pokušala iskoristiti da “le-
galno” sruši izabranu vlast u Hrvatskoj. Na temelju nje-
D
zine informacije o neovlaštenom ustrojavanju oružanih
paravojnih postrojba Predsjedništvo SFRJ naredilo je 9.
siječnja 1991. rasformiranje svih neregularnih sastava
“koji nisu u sastavu jedinstvenih Oružanih snaga SFRJ ili
organa unutrašnjih poslova i čija organizacija nije utvr-
đena u skladu sa saveznim propisima”. Zahtijevalo se da
se naoružanje i oprema u roku od 10 dana predaju naj-
343 Davor MARIJAN, “Oružane snage SFRJ u izvanrednim
prilikama”, Časopis za suvremenu povijest, 2/2002., 368-
369; M. ŠPEGELJ, Sjećanja vojnika, 126-131, 133-135,
141-142, 149-158.
344 HDA, UPRH, 138/91: MUP RH, br. 511-01-01-Sp. 12/1-
1991 od 17. 1. 1991., Zapisnik o izvršenoj inspekciji.
151
Domovinski rat 04-02-2020 Knjiga 1.indd 151
was in a similar position albeit with one crucial dif-
ference – it did not have a large Serb minority to deal
with within its borders. Still, both republics felt their
existence threatened by the JNA and on January 20,
1991, they signed a secret agreement on mutual help
and assistance.
The Serb rebellion in Croatia in the summer of 1990
constituted a state of emergency but the Croatian
government was in no position to deal with the prob-
lem effectively because the JNA had disarmed Croa-
tia’s TO and prevented the Croatian police from trying
to put an end to the rebellion. Also, in May, 1990, the
JNA repudiated the long existing plan for coordinat-
ing its actions with the police forces of socialist Croa-
tia and Slovenia. The first Croatian plans, therefore, for
establishing the constitutional order, revolved around
the police force, even though they were drafted by
the ministry of defense. There are claims to the effect
that Martin Špegelj, acting in the capacity of minister
of defense, created a plan of attack on the JNA bar-
racks with the objective of obtaining the weapons and
equipment stored in them but that Tuđman rejected
the plan. No evidence, supporting the theory, has yet
been unearthed.
The Croatian government had no choice but to
rely on the police force for the defense of the coun-
try because the JNA had disarmed the TO. At that par-
ticular point in time many police officers were Serbs.
For that reason the Croatian government started aug-
menting the police force with Croats in the summer of
1990. The MUP had 6,800 personnel in mid-1990. By
mid-January, 1991, the number had grown to 18 752
active personnel and 22,865 reserve personnel, 41,751
personnel in total.
Attempt to Disarm the Croatian Police
in January 1991
R
Having lost the TO’s weapons and equipment
and faced with the growing Serb rebellion the Cro-
atian government was forced to purchase weapons
from anyone who was willing to sell some. A consign-
ment of small arms was purchased in Hungary and
the weapons were distributed to the rapidly growing
police force. The JNA tried to use the fact that Croatia
was in the process of obtaining arms from abroad as
a pretext to attempt to “legally” bring down the Cro-
atian government. The Presidency of the SFRY, based
4.2.2020. 19:29:22
 Davor Marijan • Rat za opstojnost Hrvata, 1991. - 1995.
bližim postrojbama i ustanovama JNA.345 Reakcija hrvat-
skih vlasti na Informaciju JNA i Naredbu Predsjedništva
SFRJ bila je oštra i nepokolebljiva. Ono što je JNA držala
posve očitim, Hrvatska nije. Iz Vlade RH poručeno je da
“neregularnih vojnih ili paravojnih jedinica” u Hrvatskoj
nema, osim onih “koje djeluju u kninskom kraju, a po-
vremeno i još nekim općinama Like”.346 Hrvatski politički
vrh je čvrsto branio stajalište da nema ništa sporno u na-
oružavanju i povećanju hrvatske policije, te da je sve u
skladu s Ustavom i zakonima Republike Hrvatske.347
H
Premda je JNA negirala da se sprema oružjem rea-
lizirati naredbu, dio preustrojenih snaga bio je spreman
za intervenciju u Hrvatskoj. O planovima JNA za inter-
venciju za sada su dostupni tek fragmenti na temelju
kojih se može pretpostaviti da su vođeni pod imenom
Neretva-91.348 Komanda 1. vojne oblasti zapovjedila je
M
17. siječnja 1991. Komandi Banjalučkoga korpusa da
pripremi 329. oklopnu brigadu iz Banje Luke “za marš i
borbenu upotrebu” na području Gline, Petrinje i Slunja i
pridoda je 5. vojnoj oblasti.349
Na zahtjev hrvatskoga člana Predsjedništva SFRJ
Stjepana Mesića i njegovo uvjeravanje da će Hrvatska
D
prikupiti 20.000 automatskih pušaka i staviti ih u skla-
dišta koja će zajednički nadzirati MUP Hrvatske i JNA,
Predsjedništvo SFRJ produžilo je 19. siječnja rok za pre-
daju oružja za 48 sati, odnosno do ponoći 21. siječnja
1991. godine. U produženom roku Hrvatska je samo
djelomično provela Naredbu.350 Jugoslavenska narodna
C
armija stoga je podigla borbenu spremnost, te počela
prestrojavanje i dodatnu mobilizaciju snaga da silom
omogući vojnom pravosuđu da uhićuje i sudi po Hrvat-
skoj. Srpski vođa Slobodan Milošević je od JNA očekivao
345 ICTY: Predsjedništvo SFRJ, Naredba br. 3 od 9. 1. 1991.;
“Naredba Predsjedništva SFRJ”, Narodna armija, 26. 1.
1991., 8.
346 “Sve po zakonu”, intervju s Josipom Manolićem, Danas,
15. 1. 1991., 19.
347 AHS: Vlada Republike Hrvatske kl. 815-05/90-01/01, ur.
br. 5030101-91-1 od 24. 1. 1991.
348 ICTY: Operativni centar 5. korpusa, Stanje u jedinicama pov.
br. 13/1-26 od 21. 1. 1991.; ICTY: Operativni centar 5. korpu-
sa, Stanje u jedinicama pov. br. 13/1-37 od 26. 1. 1991.
349 ICTY: Komanda 5. korpusa, Izvođenje marša, Naređenje
str. pov. br. 37-2 od 18. 1. 1991.
350 Komanda Vojnopomorske oblasti, int. br. 213-5 od 24. 1.
1991., Informacija PU SSNO int. br. 77-1 od 23. 1. 1991.;
“Za doslednu primenu zakona”, Narodna armija, 24. 1.
1991., 4.
152
Domovinski rat 04-02-2020 Knjiga 1.indd 152
on the JNA’s claim to be in possession of evidence that
Croatia was illegally forming armed paramilitary for-
mations, ordered, on January 9, 1991, that all irregular
military formation that “do not belong to the Armed
Forces of the SFRY or internal affairs organs of the
SFRY and whose organization structure is not in ac-
cordance with the federal regulations” be disbanded
forthwith. The Presidency of the SFRY also demanded
that all weapons and equipment be handed over to
the nearest units and institutions of the JNA within
ten days. The Croatian government’s reaction to the
JNA claim and the consequent order of the SFRY pres-
idency was sharp and resolute. What the JNA claimed
was obvious the Croatian government did not per-
ceive as such at all. The Croatian government stated
that “there are no irregular or paramilitary formations”
in Croatia apart from “those that operate in the Knin
region and, on occasion, in some parts of Lika.” The
Croatian political leadership claimed that there was
nothing controversial in increasing the size and arm-
ing of the Croatian police force and that everything
was in accordance with the Constitution and laws of
the Republic of Croatia.
Even though the JNA denied that it was ready
to enforce the Presidency’s order, some restructured
JNA formations were ready to intervene in Croatia.
Only fragments of the JNA’s plans for intervening
in Croatia are available to scholars at this point in
time. However, these fragments tell us enough to
know that the plans were collectively codenamed
Neretva-91. On January 17, 1991, the HQ of the 1st Mil-
itary District ordered the HQ of Banja Luka Corps to
prepare the 329th Armored Brigade from Banja Luka
D
for “advance and combat” in the Glina, Petrinja and
Slunj areas and subordinate the brigade to the 5th
Military District”.
At the request of the Croatian member of the
Presidency of the SFRY, Stjepan Mesić and prompt-
R
ed by his promise that Croatia would gather 20,000
assault rifles and put them in warehouses controlled
jointly by the Croatian MUP and the JNA, the Presi-
dency of the SFRY extended, on January 19, the dead-
line for handing over the weapons for 48 hours, until
midnight January 21, 1991. Croatia only partially im-
plemented the Presidency’s order by the deadline’s
expiration. The JNA raised the combat readiness of
its formations, started to mobilize additional forces
and regrouped for the purpose of enabling military
4.2.2020. 19:29:23
 The Croatian Nation’s Struggle for Survival, 1991-1995
da “‘pokrije’ srpske krajeve u Hrvatskoj” te “da u slučaju
sukoba, zadrži tu teritoriju a ostalo neka se odcepi”.351
Hrvatsko vrhovništvo nije dvojilo da JNA priprema
intervenciju zbog njezina priopćenja 23. siječnja 1991.,
da će sama provesti Naredbu Predsjedništva SFRJ ako se
na teritoriju Republike Hrvatske odmah ne raspuste svi
mobilizirani sastavi.352 Hrvatska vlada odgovorila je tako
što je 25. siječnja po hitnom postupku podnijela Saboru
RH prijedlog usvajanja odluke da na teritoriju RH vrijede
samo oni savezni zakoni koji nisu u suprotnosti s Usta-
H
vom Republike Hrvatske.353
Paralelno s političkom akcijom za obranu Hrvatske
trajala je i konkretna akcija na terenu. Policija je u krat-
kom vremenu povećala brojno stanje, uglavnom člano-
vima HDZ-a, zapriječila dio vojarni i značajnih prometnih
pravaca.354 Jugoslavenska narodna armija osigurala je
M
vojne objekte, stanove i članove obitelji stalnoga sasta-
va JNA te se pripremala za djelovanje u uvjetima okru-
ženja. Na Televiziji Beograd 25. siječnja 1991. prikazan je
film koji je JNA napravila o naoružavanju Republike Hr-
vatske, u kojem je “glavnu ulogu” imao ministar obrane
RH Martin Špegelj. Film je trebao biti najava i opravdanje
D
vojne intervencije u Hrvatskoj.355
Iako je Kadijević 15. siječnja 1991. uvjeravao srbijan-
ski politički vrh da je spreman na sve, ipak se nije usu-
dio pokrenuti JNA jer je tijekom sjednice Predsjedništva
C
351 B. JOVIĆ, Poslednji dani SFRJ, 257-258.
352 Komanda Vojnopomorske oblasti, int. br. 213-5 od 24. 1.
1991., Informacija PU SSNO int. br. 77-1 od 23. 1. 1991.
Priopćenje je objavljeno u: Narodna armija, 26. 1. 1991., 9.
353 Zapisnik s 56. sjednice Vlade Republike Hrvatske održane
24. siječnja 1991.; AHS: Vlada Republike Hrvatske, Pri-
D
jedlog Ustavnog zakona o dopuni Ustavnog zakona o
provedbi Ustava Republike Hrvatske, kl. 5030115-91-
5223-6, ur. br. 012-02/90-01/02 od 25. 1. 1991.
354 HDA, UPRH: Kabinet komandanta Komande 5. VO pov.
br. 2/22-26 od 23. 1. 1991.; HMDCDR: Komanda 5. VO,
Informacija u vezi saopštenja SSNO pov. br. 25/295-5 od
24. 1. 1991.; HDA, UPRH: Kabinet saveznog sekretara za
narodnu obranu, Dopuna informacije br. 5-64-1/90 od 4.
2. 1991.; USMKSMP: Podaci i informacije MUP-a RH od
11. 2. 1991. u vezi s netočnim ili nepotpunim konstataci-
jama u materijalu SSNO pod naslovom “Informacija o
neovlašćenom formiranju oružanih sastava u SFRJ” do-
stavljenom poslanicima Skupštine SFRJ.
355 HMDCDR: Komanda 5. VO, Informacija u vezi saopštenja
SSNO pov. br. 25/295-5 od 24. 1. 1991.; HMDCDR: Ko-
manda 5. VO str. pov. br. 25/295-6 od 24. 1. 1991.; HM-
DCDR: Komanda 32. K, Preduzimanje dodatnih mera,
Upozorenje str. pov. br. 43-60 od 25. 1. 1991.; S. LETICA,
M. NOBILO, Rat protiv Hrvatske, 18.
153
Domovinski rat 04-02-2020 Knjiga 1.indd 153
authorities to make arrests and hold court-martials
in Croatia. The Serbian leader Slobodan Milošević
expected the JNA to “‘cover’ the predominantly Serb
areas of Croatia and to, “in case of conflict, hold the
areas and the rest of Croatia can go its own way.”
On January 23, 1991, the JNA issued a statement
that it was ready to intervene in Croatia if all mobi-
lized formations in the territory of the Republic of
Croatia were not immediately disbanded. The Cro-
atian leadership did not doubt that the JNA meant
business. The Croatian government reacted on Janu-
ary 25 by submitting an urgent recommendation to
the Croatian Parliament to adopt the decision that
only federal laws valid in the territory of the Republic
of Croatia were those that were not in contradiction
with the Constitution of the Republic of Croatia.
The Croatian government did not limit its activ-
ities for defending Croatia to political maneuvers
– there was action in the field too. The numerical
strength of the police force had grown significantly
in a relatively short span of time, augmented most-
ly by HDZ members. The police put some JNA bar-
racks and some main communications routes under
blockade. The JNA secured its facilities and installa-
tions, apartments and family members of its active
contingent and was preparing to operate in siege
conditions. On January 25, 1991, TV Belgrade aired
footage, courtesy of the JNA, showing the minister
of defense of the Republic of Croatia, Martin Špegelj,
concluding a purchase of a quantity of arms. The film
was supposed to provide the JNA with a pretext for a
military intervention in Croatia.
Even though Kadijević gave assurances to the
Serbian political leadership, on January 15, 1991, that
he was ready for everything, he did not dare send the
JNA into action because, during a meeting of the
Presidency of the SFRY held on January 25, it became
obvious that the outcome of the vote would be 4:4
R
and that, therefore, no legal basis would be provid-
ed for the JNA to intervene in Croatia. The Croatian
government was determined to remain steadfast in
its decision not to give in to the JNA but it was also
committed to trying to avoid open conflict. At the
meeting it was agreed that the reserve police force
in Croatia should be demobilized on January 26 by
1200 hours and that the JNA should decrease its
combat readiness to the peacetime level. It was also
agreed that the legal order be reestablished as soon
4.2.2020. 19:29:23
 Davor Marijan • Rat za opstojnost Hrvata, 1991. - 1995.
SFRJ 25. siječnja bilo očito da će ishod glasanja biti 4 : 4 i
da se neće dobiti zakonsku osnovu za pokretanje vojske.
U Hrvatskoj su bili odlučni da neće pokleknuti, ali i da
neće izazvati sukob. Na sjednici je dogovoreno da se 26.
siječnja u 12 sati demobilizira pričuvni sastav policije u
Hrvatskoj, a da JNA stupanj borbene spremnosti vrati na
mirnodopsku razinu.356 Dogovoreno je da se što hitnije
uspostavi pravni poredak ondje gdje je narušen, što se
u Hrvatskoj tumačilo kao odobrenje za rješavanje pro-
blema u Krajini. Uz to je dogovoreno i da vojno-pravo-
H
sudna tijela JNA surađuju s mjerodavnim institucijama
RH u provedbi istražnoga i pravosudnoga postupka.357
Dogovoru su prethodili odvojeni sastanci čelnika Srbije
s čelnicima Hrvatske i Slovenije 24. i 25. siječnja, koji su
također doprinijeli smirenju.358
Na temelju dogovora u Beogradu JNA se vratila u
M
stanje redovne borbene spremnosti, a MUP je deaktivi-
rao pričuvni sastav. Oko 42 % ljudstva ostalo je zaduženo
s osobnim oružjem, a 58 % oružje je vratilo u policijska
skladišta. Krajem siječnja 1991. JNA je uhitila nekoliko
hrvatskih građana, a protiv ministra obrane RH generala
Špegelja Vojni sud u Zagrebu podignuo je i optužnicu.359
D
Prihvaćanjem Naredbe i Zaključaka Predsjedništva
SFRJ, Hrvatska je dobila vrijeme da legalizira naoružano
ljudstvo i nastavi s internacionalizacijom krize. Jugosla-
venska narodna armija ubrzo se žalila da Hrvatska poku-
šava izbjeći obveze oko razoružanja na koje je pristala i da
ne surađuje s vojnim pravosuđem. Vojni je vrh 13. veljače
C
1991. ratoborno i “poslednji put” upozorio hrvatsko vrhov-
356 B. JOVIĆ, Poslednji dani SFRJ, 247; Franjo TUĐMAN, Zna
se HDZ u borbi za osamostaljenje Hrvatske, Izvršni odbor
HDZ-a, Zagreb, 1992., 104-108: Izlaganje na izvanred-
noj sjednici Hrvatskog sabora 26. 1. 1991.; HMDCDR:
Komanda 5. VO pov. br. 25/168-6 od 28. 1. 1991.; POA:
Naređenje, Komanda 32. korpusa str. pov. br. 140-9 od
26. 1. 1991.; ICTY: Stenografske beleške sa 93. sednice
Predsedništva SFRJ održane 25. 1. 1991.
357 HMDCDR: Komanda 5. VO pov. br. 25/168-6 od 28. 1. 1991.
358 HDA, UPRH: Saopštenje povodom razgovora delegacije
Srbije i delegacije Slovenije 24. 1. 1991.; HDA, UPRH: Sa-
opštenje povodom razgovora delegacije Srbije i deleg-
acije Hrvatske 25. 1. 1991.
359 ICTY: Komanda 5. korpusa, Naređenje str. pov. br. 37-
21 od 28. 1. 1991.; USMKSMP: Podaci i informacije MUP
RH od 11. 2. 1991. u svezi sa netočnim ili nepotpunim
konstatacijama u materijalu SSNO pod naslovom “Infor-
macija o neovlašćenom formiranju oružanih sastava u
SFRJ” dostavljenom poslanicima Skupštine SFRJ; “Istina
o naoružavanju terorističkih formacija HDZ u Hrvatskoj
(2)”, Narodna armija, 28. 2. 1991.
154
Domovinski rat 04-02-2020 Knjiga 1.indd 154
as possible in those areas where it had been disrupt-
ed. The Croatian government opted to interpret that
as a permission to proceed with attempting to solve
the problem in Krajina. The SFRY Presidency also de-
cided that military judicial organs of the JNA should
cooperate with appropriate organs of the Republic
of Croatia in regard to implementing investigation
procedures and criminal proceedings. The reaching
of all of these decisions was preceded by separate
meetings between the leaders of Serbia with the
leaders of Croatia and Slovenia on January 24-25.
These meetings played an instrumental part in de-
fusing the situation.
Honoring the decisions reached by the Pres-
idency of the SFRY in Belgrade the JNA decreased
its combat readiness to the peacetime level and the
MUP deactivated its reserve force. About 42% of the
MUP personnel kept their weapons and 58% of the
weaponry was returned to police warehouses. At the
end of January, 1991, the JNA arrested a number of
Croatian citizens and the Military Court in Zagreb
filed charges against the minister of defense of the
Republic of Croatia, General Špegelj.
By not rejecting the order given and decisions
made by the Presidency of the SFRY, Croatia secured
for itself an invaluable period of time to legalize its
armed formations and continue its efforts to inter-
nationalize the crisis. The JNA soon submitted com-
plaints that Croatia was trying to evade its obliga-
tions regarding disarmament and that it was not
cooperating with the military authorities. The mili-
tary leadership, on February 13, 1991, belligerently
and “for the last time” warned the Croatian leader-
D
ship to disband and disarm all illegally armed for-
mations in the territory of Croatia, to hand over the
weapons to the JNA and that all accused, including
Minister Špegelj, had to be handed over to the pros-
ecuting authorities of the JNA.
R
The events were unfolding contrary to the JNA’s
expectations. For that reason, Kadijević, on February
25, 1991, presented to Borisav Jović a plan accord-
ing to which the JNA would bring down the gov-
ernments in Croatia and Slovenia. “The basic idea is
that the army should strongly rely on the support of
those elements of society that favor Yugoslavia in all
parts of the country and that a combination of polit-
ical and military measures should be implemented
for the purpose of bringing the government down
4.2.2020. 19:29:23
 The Croatian Nation’s Struggle for Survival, 1991-1995
ništvo da mora raspustiti i razoružati sve ilegalno naoruža-
ne sastave na teritoriju Hrvatske, da se oružje mora predati
u skladišta JNA, a svi okrivljeni, uključujući ministra Špege-
lja, predati tijelima kaznenoga gonjenja u JNA.360
S obzirom na to da su se događaji odvijali mimo
očekivanja JNA, Kadijević je 25. veljače 1991. Borisavu
Joviću izložio prijedlog plana JNA za rušenje vlasti u Hr-
vatskoj i Sloveniji. “Osnovna zamisao vojske sastoji se u
tome da se čvrsto osloni na snage koje su za Jugoslaviju
u svim delovima zemlje i da se kombinovanim političkim
H
i vojnim merama sruši vlast prvo u Hrvatskoj, a potom u
Sloveniji.” U Hrvatskoj se planiralo “institucionalno i poli-
tički jačati Srpsku krajinu i podržavati njeno otcepljenje
od Hrvatske (ne javno nego faktički)”.361
Prvi sukobi
M
Realizacija scenarija počela je vrlo brzo u zapad-
noj Slavoniji, u Pakracu, gradiću u kojem su Srbi imali
relativnu većinu. Na sjednici održanoj 22. veljače 1991.
Skupština općine Pakrac odlučila je da općina pristupi
SAO Krajini, a da se Policijska postaja Pakrac preimenuje
D
u Općinski Sekretarijat unutarnjih poslova i podredi Se-
kretarijatu unutarnjih poslova Krajine. Provodeći odluku
u djelo, većina policajaca Srba razoružala je 1. ožujka
policajce Hrvate i četiri Srbina neistomišljenika. Hrvatski
odgovor na otvorenu pobunu u Pakracu bilo je slanje
Specijalne policije, koja je 2. ožujka stigla u grad i stavila
C
ga pod svoj nadzor. Pobunjenici su odstupili na obližnja
brda, a u Pakrac su upućene postrojbe JNA iz Bjelovara,
Virovitice i Zagreba. Pakrac je nekoliko dana bio u foku-
su zbivanja jer su srbijanski mediji izvještavali o pokolju
nad Srbima, premda je u pothvatu hrvatske policije bilo
D
ranjenih samo na njezinoj strani. Savezna su tijela vlasti
zahtijevala od Hrvatske da povuče Specijalnu policiju iz
Pakraca, a JNA je bila pripravna i na korištenje sile. Na-
kon pregovora Specijalna se policija povukla iz Pakraca,
uredovanje je preuzela temeljna policija, nakon čega se
18. ožujka povukla i JNA.362
360 “Naredba Predsedništva SFRJ sprovešće se do kraja”, Bor-
ba, 4. 2. 1991., 1; SVA MORH, VSZ: Informacija SSNO od
13. 2. 1991. o sprovođenju Naredbe i Zaključaka Preds-
jedništva SFRJ.
361 B. JOVIĆ, Poslednji dani SFRJ, 276-278.
362 Antun ERJAVEC, Pakrac i Lipik uoči rata 1991. godine, Pogla-
varstvo grada Pakraca, Pakrac, 2001., 15-25; N. BARIĆ, Srps-
ka pobuna, 114; D. MARIJAN, Slom Titove armije, 241-243.
155
Domovinski rat 04-02-2020 Knjiga 1.indd 155
first in Croatia, and then in Slovenia.” In Croatia the
plan was to “institutionally and politically strength-
en the Serbian Krajina and support its secession from
Croatia (not publically but factually)”.
First Engagements
The scenario started to unfold shortly after the
events described above in Pakrac, a town in which Serbs
formed a relative majority, in western Slavonia. At a
meeting held on February 22, 1991, the Assembly of the
Pakrac Municipality decided to join the municipality to
the SAO Krajina and to rename the Police Station Pakrac
to the Secretariat of Internal Affairs and subordinate it
to the Secretariat of Internal Affairs of the Krajina. Imple-
menting the decision, most of the Serb police officers
disarmed the Croatian police officers and four Serbs
who sided with their Croatian colleagues on March 1.
The Croatian government responded to this act of open
mutiny by sending the Special Police to Pakrac. The Spe-
cial Police arrived on March 2 and quickly put the town
under its control. The rebels withdrew to near-by hills
and JNA formations from Bjelovar, Virovitica and Zagreb
moved on Pakrac. The events in Pakrac were breaking
news for a number of days because the Serb media out-
lets claimed that the Croats had been massacring Serbs
in the town. The claims were complete nonsense. There
were casualties as a result of the Special Police actions,
but only its troops sustained wounds and injuries. The
federal organs demanded that the Special Police leave
Pakrac and the JNA was ready to use force. After negoti-
ations the Special Police withdrew from Pakrac, the uni-
formed police was tasked with keeping law and order
and the JNA also withdrew on March 18.
The manner in which the JNA acted in Pakrac was
the formula the JNA would adopt and use regularly for
the next few months. The JNA, time and again, prevent-
ed the Croatian police from keeping law and order. The
R
JNA propagandists brazenly claimed that the JNA was
creating buffer zones between the two belligerent par-
ties but in reality the JNA was protecting the rebel Serbs
and their territorial acquisitions.
The rebellion in Pakrac and a rally staged by the
Serbian opposition parties expressing disapproval of
Milošević’s rule on March 9, 1991, prompted the Su-
preme Command HQ of the Armed Forces of the SFRY
to demand, at a meeting of the Presidency of the SFRY
held on March 12-15, that martial law be declared in the
4.2.2020. 19:29:23
 Davor Marijan • Rat za opstojnost Hrvata, 1991. - 1995.
H
Hrvatska policija i kolona vozila JNA, Pakrac, 2. ožujka 1991. go-
dine (autor fotografija: Toni Hnojčik).
M
Način na koji je postupila JNA u Pakracu bio je “for-
mula” postupanja nekoliko sljedećih mjeseci i njezina
redovita zadaća. U svojem tisku i javnim istupima taj
D
su pristup, kojim su onemogućavali rad tijela sigurnosti
Republike Hrvatske, nazvali stvaranjem tampon-zona,
čija je stvarna svrha bila podržavanje pobunjenih Srba
te održavanje napetosti i postojećega stanja.363
Pobuna u Pakracu i demonstracije protiv Sloboda-
na Miloševića koje je srbijanska oporba održala u Be-
C
ogradu 9. ožujka 1991. bile su povod da Štab Vrhovne
komande OS SFRJ na sjednici Predsjedništva SFRJ odr-
žanoj od 12. do 15. ožujka zatraži uvođenje izvanredno-
ga stanja u zemlji i suspenziju svih normativnih akata
koji su u suprotnosti s Ustavom SFRJ i saveznim zako-
nima. Predsjedništvo SFRJ s omjerom glasova 4 : 4, od-
nosno 5 : 3 u drugom krugu glasanja nije prihvatilo taj
prijedlog. „Za“ su bile Crna Gora i Srbija s autonomnim
pokrajinama Vojvodinom i Kosovom, čiji je predstavnik
poslije glasao protiv.364 Nakon te sjednice, na kojoj veli-
kosrpska opcija nije uspjela naoko legalno ostvariti svo-
je planove u zemlji, JNA se priklonila opciji koja je zna-
čila, kako to priznaje osobno general Kadijević, “zaštitu
i odbranu srpskog naroda van Srbije i prikupljanje JNA
363 D. MARIJAN, Slom Titove armije, 244-245, 248-249.
364 HDA, UPRH: Stenografske beleške sa sednice Predsed-
ništva SFRJ u funkciji Vrhovne komande, održane 15. 3.
1991.; V. KADIJEVIĆ, Moje viđenje raspada, 113; B. JOVIĆ,
Poslednji dani SFRJ, 286-295.
156
Domovinski rat 04-02-2020 Knjiga 1.indd 156
Croatian police officers and a column of JNA vehicles. Pakrac,
March 2, 1991 (Photographs by Toni Hnojčik).
country and that all normative legal acts which are in
contradiction to the Constitution of the SFRY and fed-
eral laws be suspended. The Presidency voted on the
demand: in the first round of voting the demand was
rejected by a 4:4 vote. In the second round the rejection
was confirmed by a 5:3 vote. Montenegro and Serbia,
with the autonomous provinces Vojvodina and Kosovo,
were in favor of the demand in the first round of voting.
In the second round the Kosovo representative changed
his mind and voted against the demand. After the meet-
ing during which the proponents of the Greater Serbia
idea failed to drape a veneer of legality over their ag-
gressive designs, the JNA sided with the option which
meant, in the words of none other but General Kadije-
D
vić, “protecting and defending the Serb nation outside
Serbia and gathering the JNA formations within the bor-
ders of the future Yugoslavia.” At that time for sure, and
possibly even before the Presidency’s meeting, some
members of the JNA security service in Croatia started
arming the rebel Serbs.
R
It did not take long for another major incident to
take place. In March, 1991, the rebel Serb militia placed a
road block in the Plitvice Lakes National Park, on the Kar-
lovac – Knin road. The Lučko and Rakitje special forces
of the Croatian Police successfully intervened on March
31, removed the road block and arrested 29 rebels. In
the skirmish the Croatian police officer Josip Jović was
killed. Officially he is listed as the first Croatian soldier
killed in the Croatian War of Independence. Follow-
4.2.2020. 19:29:23
 The Croatian Nation’s Struggle for Survival, 1991-1995
u granice buduće Jugoslavije”.365 Najkasnije od tada u
Hrvatskoj je dio pripadnika službi sigurnosti JNA počeo
naoružavati pobunjene Srbe.366
Nije prošlo dugo do novog incidenta: u ožujku
1991. milicija pobunjenih Srba postavila je barikadu u
Nacionalnom parku Plitvička jezera, na prometnici Kar-
lovac – Knin. Specijalne postrojbe hrvatske policije Luč-
ko i Rakitje 31. ožujka uspješno su intervenirale, razbile
barikadu i uhitile 29 pobunjenika. U sukobu je poginuo
policajac Josip Jović, koji se drži prvim poginulim hr-
H
vatskim braniteljem u Domovinskom ratu. Na Plitvica-
ma je potom osnovana Policijska postaja u sastavu PU
Gospić.367 Odmah nakon policije stigle su oklopne po-
strojbe JNA iz 1. i 5. vojne oblasti, koje su postavile tam-
pon-zonu između sukobljenih strana.368 Bio je to uvod
u angažman JNA radi zaštite srpske Krajine, sve prema
M
načelu uporabe oružanih snaga u izvanrednim prilika-
ma. Početkom travnja Vojnopomorska oblast i 5. vojna
oblast zatvorile su prilaze Kninskoj krajini i dijelu Like
te stvorile tampon-zonu koja je sprečavala djelovanje
hrvatske policije.369 Jugoslavenska narodna armija po-
kušala je postaviti tampon-zonu i na prijevoju Ljubovo,
D
što je hrvatska policija 8. i 10. travnja spriječila bez bor-
be. Jugoslavenska narodna armija potom je zaposjela
područje između Bunića i Ljubova, čekajući povoljan
trenutak da prijevoj stavi pod nadzor. Početkom svibnja
u garnizon Gospić prebačen je s Plitvica dio mehani-
ziranog bataljuna 4. oklopne brigade, čime je ojačana
C
obrana gradskoga garnizona.370
Krajem travnja 1991. MUP RH odlučnije je nastupio
prema SAO Krajini, stvarajući policijski prsten oko Knina
D
365 V. KADIJEVIĆ, Moje viđenje raspada, 113-114.
366 ICTY: Odjeljenje bezbjednosti GŠ SVK, Zahtjev S.P. br.
321-99 od 16. 10. 1994.
367 Hrvatska policija u Domovinskom ratu, Ministarstvo un-
utarnjih poslova Republike Hrvatske (bez mjesta i go-
dine izdanja), 99-101.
368 Davor MARIJAN, “Djelovanje JNA i pobunjenih Srba u
Lici 1990.–1992. godine”, Senjski zbornik, br. 33, Senj,
2006., 225.
369 HMDCDR: Komanda 9. korpusa, Zapovest za odbranu
Op. br. 1, DT br. 1-4 od 5. 4. 1991.; B. JOVIĆ, Poslednji dani
SFRJ, 317.
370 Davor MARIJAN, “Gospić u Domovinskom ratu”, u:
Gospić: grad, ljudi, identitet, Institut društvenih znanosti
Ivo Pilar, Zagreb – Gospić, 2013., 236.
157
Domovinski rat 04-02-2020 Knjiga 1.indd 157
ing the incident a police station in Plitvice was set up.
The police station was subordinated to Police Admin-
istration Gospić. Immediately following the incident,
armored JNA units belonging to the 1st and 5th Military
Districts made an appearance and expeditiously set up a
buffer zone between the Croatian police officers and the
rebels. This was the opening act of the active involve-
ment of the JNA in protecting the Serbian Krajina, as per
the guidelines for using armored units in emergency sit-
uations. At the beginning of April the Military-Maritime
District and 5th Military District sealed off the approach-
es to the Kninska Krajina and parts of Lika and created
a buffer zone that prevented the Croatian police from
taking action. The JNA tried to create a buffer zone on
the Ljubovo pass but the Croatian police managed to
prevent that without a fight on April 8-10. The JNA then
occupied the area between Bunić and Ljubovo, waiting
for the right opportunity to place the pass under its con-
trol. At the beginning of May elements of the Mecha-
nized Battalion of the 4th Armored Brigade were moved
from Plitvice to Gospić, thus strengthening the Gospić
garrison of the JNA.
At the end of April, 1991, the MUP of the Repub-
lic of Croatia adopted a more determined approach to
dealing with the SAO Krajina and created a ring of po-
lice outposts around Knin by setting up police stations
in Drniš and Sinj. By the end of April the MUP set up
police stations and offices in Kijevo, Kruševo, Stankov-
ci, Oklaj and Polača. It was also planned to set up police
stations in Gradac near Ploče, Grude, Mokošica, Rijeka
Dubrovačka near Dubrovnik, Hrvatska Dubica, Divuša
near Dvor na Uni, Saborski Drežnik near Slunj, Plaško
near Ogulin, Lovinac near Gračac, Korenica and Ljubo-
vo near Gospić.
The setting up of the police stations in Kijevo, in the
direction of Sinj – Knin and in Kruševo in the direction
of Obrovac – Zadar, exacerbated the already highly vol-
atile situation in the area. The situation was especially
R
tense for a few days around the police station in Kijevo
because the HQ of Knin Corps of the JNA insisted that
the police station be disbanded. The rebel Serbs in the
area were incensed by the police station because they
absolutely refused to tolerate the presence of Croatian
police officers in the Knin Municipality. The Croatian
government remained steadfast and rejected all the
demands from Belgrade and Knin.
The security situation in Croatia deteriorated
steadily from May, 1991. On May 2 twelve Croatian po-
4.2.2020. 19:29:23
 Davor Marijan • Rat za opstojnost Hrvata, 1991. - 1995.
osnivanjem ispostava policijskih postaja Drniš i Sinj.371
Do kraja travnja otvorene su policijske postaje i ispo-
stave u Kijevu, Kruševu, Stankovcima, Oklaju i Polači.
Osnivanje se planiralo u Gradcu kod Ploča, Grudi, Mo-
košici i Rijeci dubrovačkoj kod Dubrovnika, u Hrvatskoj
Dubici, Divuši kod Dvora na Uni, Saborskom Drežniku
kod Slunja, Plaškom kod Ogulina, Lovincu kod Gračaca,
Korenici i na Ljubovu kod Gospića.372
Osnivanje policijskih postaja u Kijevu, na smjeru
Sinj – Knin, i Kruševu, na pravcu Obrovac – Zadar, poja-
H
čalo je ionako velike tenzije na tom području. Oko po-
licijske postaje u Kijevu nekoliko je dana vladala velika
napetost jer je Komanda Kninskoga korpusa JNA tražila
da se ona ukine, kao i pobunjeni Srbi, koji nisu prihvaća-
li da na području općine Knin djeluje hrvatska policija.
Hrvatsko se vrhovništvo postavilo odlučno i odbilo pri-
M
tiske iz Knina i Beograda.373
Od svibnja 1991. sigurnosno stanje u Hrvatskoj
iznimno se pogoršalo. U Borovu Selu kod Vukovara 2.
svibnja u zasjedi su ubijena dvanaestorica pripadnika
hrvatske policije. Tim je masakrom počela srpska pobu-
na u istočnoj Slavoniji. Proširila se i oko Vinkovaca i Osi-
D
jeka, gdje Mirkovci i Tenja pod zaštitom tampon-zona
JNA postaju jaka pobunjenička uporišta. Istoga dana,
u zaleđu Zadra, u selu Polača, srpski teroristi ubili su
još jednog hrvatskog policajca. Zbog demonstracija
protiv JNA u Splitu 6. svibnja, u kojima je poginuo je-
dan vojnik, Štab Vrhovne komande OS SFRJ podignuo
C
je borbenu spremnost JNA i mobilizirao dio postrojbi.
Početkom svibnja na krizna područja Hrvatske uvedena
su tri nova bataljuna, oklopni iz 51. mbr iz Prijedora u
Petrinju, mehanizirani 36. mbr iz Subotice u Vinkovce i
mehanizirani 453. mbr iz Srijemske Mitrovice u Vukovar.
Pokušaj dovođenja 10. mtbr JNA iz Mostara u Split nije
uspio jer su ga 7. svibnja 1991. spriječili hercegovački
Hrvati, pa je ona razmještena na području Kupresa. Ju-
371 Zapisnik s 2. sjednice Vrhovnog državnog vijeća Repub-
like Hrvatske, održane 25. 4. 1991.
372 Zapisnik s 3. sjednice Vrhovnog državnog vijeća Repub-
like Hrvatske, održane 30. 4. 1991.
373 HMDCDR: Komanda 5. VO, pov. br. 25/295-36 od 4. 5.
1991.; HDA, UPRH: MUP RH od 29. 4. 1991., Operativ-
no-indikativna informacija o značajnijim sigurnosnim
saznanjima, pojavama i događajima (181); HDA, UPRH:
MUP RH od 29. 4. 1991., Operativno-indikativna infor-
macija o značajnijim sigurnosnim saznanjima, pojava-
ma i događajima (182); Zapisnik s 3. sjednice Vrhovnog
državnog vijeća Republike Hrvatske, održane 30. 4. 1991.
158
Domovinski rat 04-02-2020 Knjiga 1.indd 158
lice officers were killed in an ambush in Borovo Selo
near Vukovar. The massacre marked the beginning of
the Serb rebellion in eastern Slavonia. The rebellion
spread swiftly to the Vinkovci and Osijek areas. In these
areas Mirkovci and Tenja, under the protection of the
JNA’s buffer zones, soon became major Serb strong-
holds. On May 2 in the village of Polača, in Zadar’s hin-
terland, Serb terrorists killed one Croatian police officer.
On May 6 an anti-JNA rally was staged in Split. One JNA
soldiers was killed in the protest. The Supreme Com-
mand HQ of the Armed Forces of the SFRY reacted by
raising the combat readiness of the JNA and mobilizing
a number of units. At the beginning of May the JNA
deployed three new battalions to crisis areas of Croa-
tia: an armored battalion of the 51st Motorized Brigade
from Prijedor was deployed in Petrinja, a mechanized
battalion of the 36th Motorized Brigade from Subotica
was deployed in Vinkovci and a mechanized battalion
for the 453rd Motorized Brigade from Srijemska Mitro-
vica was deployed in Vukovar. The JNA attempted to
move the 10th Motorized Brigade from Mostar to Split
but the plan was foiled on May 7, 1991, by Bosnian
Croats in Herzegovina. The 10th Motorized Brigade was
then deployed in the Kupres area. The JNA took control
of two bridges over the Danube, at Ilok and Bezdan.
The bridges were then protected by JNA infantry units
and the river flotilla. These moves enabled the JNA to
move fresh forces into Croatia.
In Belgrade, meanwhile, the federal organs held a
series of meetings at which representatives of the re-
publics were present. The talks centered on how to de-
fuse the crisis in the country. At the extended session
of the Presidency of the SFRY held between May 7-9,
D
1991, it was agreed that “movement of armed forma-
tions and armed citizens in crisis areas, except legal lo-
cal organs representing the ministry of the interior, and
between predominantly Serb areas and other parts of
Croatia, in both directions, all armed formations and
R
groups except JNA units and SSUP units” be prevent-
ed. This limitation on movement was planned to last a
month and the JNA was tasked with enforcing the de-
cision. The Rebel Serbs and Croatian police were treat-
ed the same, with the difference that units belonging
to the SUP Knin were not permitted to move “in the ter-
ritory of other municipalities of the so-called SAO Kra-
jina.” These measures were designed to maintain the
status quo and not to solve the crisis, which suited the
Serbian leadership perfectly well. The measures were
4.2.2020. 19:29:23
 The Croatian Nation’s Struggle for Survival, 1991-1995

goslavenska narodna armija zaposjela je i dva mosta

na Dunavu, kod Iloka i Bezdana, koja su osiguravale
kopnene snage i snage Riječne ratne flotile. Tim su po-
tezima stvorene pretpostavke za uvođenje novih snaga
JNA u Hrvatsku.374
U Beogradu se na nekoliko sjednica saveznih tijela,
na kojima su sudjelovali i predstavnici republika, pre-
govaralo o smirivanju stanja.375 Na proširenoj sjednici
Predsjedništva SFRJ održanoj od 7. do 9. svibnja 1991.
dogovoreno je da se odmah spriječi “kretanje oružanih
H
formacija i naoružanih građana u kriznim žarištima,
izuzev legalnih lokalnih organa unutrašnjih poslova, a
između područja sa pretežno srpskim stanovništvom i
ostalih delova Hrvatske, u oba pravca, svih naoružanih
formacija i grupa, izuzev jedinica JNA i SSUP”. Ograni-
čenje je planirano na mjesec dana, a za provedbu je
M
zadužena JNA.376 Pobunjeni Srbi i hrvatska policija tre-
tirani su na isti način, s tim da se snagama SUP-a Knin
nije smjelo dopustiti kretanje “na teritoriji ostalih opšti-
na tzv. SAO Krajine”.377 Mjere su trebale jamčiti održanje
postojećega stanja te tako nisu mogle donijeti nikakav Naslovnica Večernjeg lista, petak, 3. svibnja 1991.: „Obranit ćemo
Hrvatsku“ i „Teroristička ofenziva“; prve vijesti o napadu srpskih
pomak u razrješenju krize, što je odgovaralo srbijansko-
D
terorista na hrvatske policajce: u jednom danu (2. 5. 1991.) ubili
mu vodstvu. Prihvaćene zadaće i dalje su bile u skladu su 13 hrvatskh policajaca – 12 u Borovu Selu kraj Vukovara (Sla-
s postupanjem JNA, koja je praktično legalizirala snage vonija), jednog u Polači kraj Zadra (Dalmacija).
koje je prije dovela na krizna žarišta mimo suglasnosti
The front page of Večernji List, Friday, May 3 1991: ‘’We will re-
Predsjedništva SFRJ, odnosno bez suglasnosti ili znanja pel the attackers’’ and ‘’Terrorist Offensive’’; first news about
dijela njegovih članova. Ona je postupno demobilizira- attacks on Croatian police officers by Serb terrorists: in one day
la mobiliziranu pričuvu i spustila podignuti stupanj bor- (May 2) Serb terrorists kill 13 Croatian police officers – 12 in Bor-
C
ovo Selo near Vukovar (Slavonia) and one in the village of Polača
bene spremnosti.378 near Zadar (Dalmatia).
O spomenutoj sjednici Borisav Jović je 9. svibnja
1991. u svoj dnevnik zapisao: “Sednica je trajala dva
dana i dve noći 7. i 8. ovog meseca. Završili smo 8.
maja posle ponoći, u stvari 9. maja ujutro u 3 časa. also compatible with the behavior of the JNA. The JNA,
D
Ta je sednica bila izuzetno teška i dramatična. Pode- it has to be noted, essentially legalized the presence of
la je bila potpuna, nesloga velika, ali i presija da je its troops in the crisis areas without the consent of the
vojna opcija neminovna ako se ne postigne politički members of the SFRY Presidency. The JNA gradually
sporazum. (...) Imajući u vidu neviđeno političko nad- demobilized the reserves it had mobilized previously
mudrivanje i natezanje koje je trajalo dva dana i dve and decreased the level of its combat readiness.
Borisav Jović wrote the following in his diary on
R
May 9, 1991, about the mentioned session of the Presi-
374 D. MARIJAN, Slom Titove armije, 253-256.
dency, “The session lasted for two days and two nights,
375 ICTY: Zapisnik sa 118. sednice članova Predsedništva
SFRJ, održane 6. maja 1991. godine.
from the 7th to the 8th of this month. We wrapped things
up on May 8, some time after midnight. Well, actually,
376 Zapisnik sa 119. sednice članova Predsedništva SFRJ,
održane 7.-9. maja 1991. godine. it was on May 9 at three o’clock in the morning. The
session was hard, dramatic. Divisions along every fault
377 SVA MORH, Komanda 5. VO: I uprava GŠ OS SFRJ, Izvod
pov. br. 881-1 od 16. 5. 1991. line, discord and the realization that the military option
378 B. JOVIĆ, Poslednji dani SFRJ, 324; D. MARIJAN, Slom Ti-
is unavoidable if a political solution is not found (…)
tove armije, 420, 423. Keeping in mind that the session was marked with in-

159

Domovinski rat 04-02-2020 Knjiga 1.indd 159 4.2.2020. 19:29:24

 Davor Marijan • Rat za opstojnost Hrvata, 1991. - 1995.
H
Smotra postrojbi ZNG-a i Narodne zaštite, Zagreb, 28. svibnja
1991. (autor fotografija: Marko Perić).
M
noći, mora se imati u vidu da su ovi zaključci možda i
taktički kompromis Hrvatske, koja je bila do krajnjih
D
granica ‘priterana uza zid’. U svakom slučaju zaključci
predstavljaju ogroman napredak u pogledu ovlašće-
nja koja su data vojsci... (...) Slobodan (Milošević) sma-
tra da bi bilo dobro suziti front otpora time što bismo
pustili Slovence da izađu. Ako Republike nemaju na to
primedbi, treba omogućiti Slovencima da se legalno
C
odvoje. (...) Rekao sam da je sada aktuelno ostvariva-
nje odluka Predsedništva SFRJ od 7. i 8. maja, koje su
legalna podloga za aktivnosti JNA i svih drugih za re-
šavanje problema. (...) U suštini, odluka Predsedništva
SFRJ je vojna opcija (jer je dala ogromna ovlašćenja
vojsci) iako se tako ne zove”.379
Nakon što su propali svi pokušaji dijaloga s pobu-
njenim Srbima hrvatski je ministar unutarnjih poslova
Josip Boljkovac naredbom od 15. svibnja 1991. prenio
poslove javne sigurnosti s Policijskih postaja Titova
Korenica, Gračac i Donji Lapac na Policijsku upravu
Gospić, s Policijskih postaja Benkovac i Obrovac na Po-
licijsku upravu Zadar i s Policijske postaje Knin na Po-
licijsku upravu Šibenik. Od tada su policijske postaje
u Krajini bile nelegalne, a milicija je postala paravojna
formacija.380
379 B. JOVIĆ, Poslednji dani SFRJ, 320-323.
380 “SUP Krajine van zakona”, Borba, 17. 5. 1991., 8.
160
Domovinski rat 04-02-2020 Knjiga 1.indd 160
Review of ZNG (National Guard Corps) and National Defense
units, Zagreb, May 28, 1991 (Photographs by Marko Perić).
credible bickering and political maneuvering that last-
ed for two days and two nights it has to be acknowl-
edged that these conclusions may constitute a tactical
compromise for Croatia whose back was completely
against the wall. In any case, the conclusions repre-
sent a huge leap forward in terms of power given to
the army…(…) Slobodan Milošević thinks it would be a
good idea to let the Slovenes go, so as to narrow down
our front. If the republics do not express objections
then we should let Slovenia legally go (…) I said that
now the decisions of the Presidency of May 7-8 ought
to be implemented and that these decisions form the
legal foundation for the JNA’s activities and all the oth-
D
er activities for solving the problem (…) In essence, the
decision of the Presidency of the SFRY means the mil-
itary option (because the Presidency empowered the
army to act) even though nobody is saying it out loud”
(Jović 1996: 320-323).
After all attempts at dialogue with the rebel Serbs
R
had failed, the Croatian minister of internal affairs, Jo-
sip Boljkovac, by order of May 15, 1991, transferred the
public security affairs from the police stations in Tito-
va Korenica, Gračac and Donji Lapac to the PU (Police
Administration) Gospić and from the police stations
in Benkovac and Obrovac to the PU Zadar and from
the police station in Knin to the PU Šibenik. From that
point on the police stations in Krajina were illegal, and
the militia became a paramilitary formation.
4.2.2020. 19:29:24
 The Croatian Nation’s Struggle for Survival, 1991-1995
Od proglašenja hrvatske neovisnosti do
rata za vojarne
Od sredine svibnja do sredine lipnja 1991. sigurno-
sno stanje u Hrvatskoj bilo je razmjerno mirno, čak naj-
mirnije tijekom godine. U Zagrebu je 28. svibnja 1991.
Hrvatska predstavila javnosti Zbor narodne garde, što
je bio temelj buduće Hrvatske vojske.381 Sastanci čelnika
republika o preustroju Jugoslavije završili su bez uspje-
ha. Hrvatska je organizirala referendum, na kojem se
H
većina izjasnila za savez suverenih država, odnosno neo-
stajanje u Jugoslaviji, a pobunjeni Srbi svoj referendum
za ostanak u Jugoslaviji. U drugoj polovini lipnja, uoči
najavljenog proglašenja samostalnosti Republike Hr-
vatske, sigurnosno se stanje naglo pogoršalo. Na etnički
miješanim područjima bilježio se porast nasilja, pljački,
M
prijetnji, pucnjave i neovlaštenog nadzora prometa.382
U slavljeničkom ozračju Hrvatska je 25. lipnja 1991.
proglašena neovisnom državom. Idućega dana uslijedio
je napad pobunjenih Srba na policijsku postaju u Glini.383
U kontekstu sukoba u Sloveniji taj je napad bio pokušaj
vezivanja hrvatskih snaga na lokalnoj razini i odvlačenja
D
pozornosti od angažmana JNA u Sloveniji.
Kratkotrajni sukob u Sloveniji počeo je ujutro 27. lip-
nja 1991., kada je JNA pokrenuta da zaposjedne granicu
Slovenije s Austrijom i Italijom i uspostavi nadležnost fe-
deralne policije i carine na granici. Prema Sloveniji su po-
C
krenute i snage JNA iz Hrvatske: dijelovi Varaždinskoga i
Zagrebačkoga korpusa iz Varaždina i Jastrebarskog te 580.
mješovite artiljerijske brigade iz Karlovca.384 Nakon počet-
noga neuspjeha u Sloveniji, u Generalštabu Oružanih sna-
ga napravljen je plan za angažman dijela snaga iz Srbije i
Crne Gore, formalno prema Sloveniji, no to je uključivalo
D
pacifikaciju Hrvatske i zapadne Hercegovine.385 Dio toga
plana bio je dovođenje četiriju mehaniziranih brigada na
granicu Hrvatske i Srbije (Vojvodine) u noći 2./3. srpnja.
381 M. ŠPEGELJ, Sjećanja vojnika, 213-215.
382 USMKSMP: Bilten MUP RH, br. 198, lipanj 1991.
383 SVA MORH, GSHV: MUP RH od 26. 6. 1991., Operativ-
no-indikativne informacije o značajnijim sigurnosnim
saznanjima, pojavama i događajima (228); SVA MORH,
GSHV: Tok događaja i stanje 26./27. 6. 1991. godine.
384 D. MARIJAN, Slom Titove armije, 200-201.
385 B. MAMULA, Slučaj Jugoslavija, 213-214; Davor MARIJAN,
“Zamisao i propast napadne operacije Jugoslavenske
narodne armije na Hrvatsku u rujnu 1991. godine”, Časo-
pis za suvremenu povijest, 2/44, 2012., 256-257.
161
Domovinski rat 04-02-2020 Knjiga 1.indd 161
From the Declaration of Croatian
Independence to the War for the Barracks
From mid-May to mid-June, 1991, the security situa-
tion in Croatia was relatively calm. It could even be said
that this period was the calmest period of the entire year.
On May 28, 1991, in Zagreb, the Croatian National Guard
(Zbor narodne garde – ZNG) was presented to the gen-
eral public in a military parade. These troops formed the
core of the future Croatian Army. The meetings between
the leaders of the republics about restructuring Yugosla-
via ended in failure. Croatia organized a referendum in
which the vast majority of voters voted for a federation
of sovereign states, that is, leaving Yugoslavia. The rebel
Serbs staged their own referendum. Unsurprisingly, the
vast majority of voters in that referendum voted for stay-
ing in Yugoslavia. In the second half of June, prior to the
announced declaration of Croatia’s independence, the
security situation in the country took a dramatic turn for
the worse. The number of incidents involving violence,
robbery, threats, shootings, and unauthorized monitor-
ing of traffic increased greatly.
On June 25, 1991, Croatia declared its indepen-
dence. The declaration sparked spontaneous celebra-
tions on the streets of the capital. The very next day
rebel Serbs attacked the police station in Glina. In the
context of the war in Slovenia the attack was an attempt
to tie down Croatian forces at the local level and draw-
ing attention away from the events in Slovenia.
The Ten-Day War in Slovenia began on the morn-
ing of June 27, 1991, when the JNA moved into action
with the aim of taking control of the Slovenian border
with Austria and Italy and establishing the jurisdiction
of the federal police and customs along the border. JNA
forces in Croatia moved towards Slovenia: elements of
Varaždin Corps and Zagreb Corps from Varaždin and Jas-
trebarsko respectively and elements of the 580th Mixed
Artillery Brigade from Karlovac. The JNA soon run into
R
trouble in Slovenia and the General Staff of the Armed
Forces created plans for moving some forces from Ser-
bia and Montenegro into Slovenia but also for the pur-
pose of pacifying Croatia and western Herzegovina. One
part of the plan included deploying four mechanized
brigades to the Croatian-Serbian (Vojvodina) border
during the night of July 2-3. During the war in Slovenia
82 JNA and TO units were mobilized in Serbia, Montene-
gro and some parts of Bosnia and Herzegovina.
4.2.2020. 19:33:39
 Davor Marijan • Rat za opstojnost Hrvata, 1991. - 1995.
Tijekom sukoba u Sloveniji, u Srbiji, Crnoj Gori i dijelom u
BiH mobilizirane su 82 postrojbe JNA i TO-a.386
Na sastanku održanom 5. srpnja 1991. Slobodan
Milošević i Borisav Jović dobili su od generala Veljka Ka-
dijevića i Blagoja Adžića obećanje da će JNA zaposjesti
granice teritorija Hrvatske na kojem, kako su govorili,
žive Srbi, a to je crta Karlovac – Plitvice na zapadu, Bara-
nja, Osijek, Vinkovci – Sava na istoku i Neretva na jugu.387
Na temelju Kadijevićeva obećanja u Komandi 1. vojne
oblasti napisana je nakon ponoći 7./8. srpnja 1991. za-
H
povijed za angažiranje snaga u Hrvatskoj. Plan je bio da
mehanizirane snage 1. vojne oblasti “brzim i energičnim
pokretima oklopno-mehanizovanih snaga” izbiju na crtu
Virovitica – Pakrac – Kutina. Banjalučkom je korpusu za-
povjeđeno da 329. oklopnu i 16. motoriziranu brigadu
premjesti u Glinu i pridoda Komandi 5. vojne oblasti za
M
djelovanje na Banovini i u Lici. Konkretni zadaci ostalih
dijelova oblasti nisu poznati jer se radi o izvodu iz zapo-
vijedi u kojoj nedostaje 11 točaka. Spremnost za pokret
svih snaga bila je u 4 sata 9. srpnja.388 Zapovijed nije re-
alizirana, najvjerojatnije zbog stupanja na snagu Brijun-
skoga sporazuma 7. srpnja 1991. i jer bi i međunarodnoj
D
zajednici bilo očito da ga JNA krši. Jedini način koji je
JNA omogućivao da djeluje, bilo je namjerno izazivanje
sukoba i podržavanje pobunjenika navodnim razdvaja-
njem sukobljenih strana.
Sukob u Sloveniji završio je brzo i bez većih borbi,
nakon čega je Predsjedništvo SFRJ 18. srpnja većinom
C
glasova donijelo neustavnu odluku o povlačenju JNA iz
Slovenije. Za Hrvatsku je to značilo da se nove snage JNA
razmještaju u susjedstvu, na području BiH i Srbije. Vojni
je vrh izradio Direktivu koja je trebala osigurati povlače-
nje iz Slovenije. Pisana je dvosmisleno, kao što se JNA i
ponašala. Nema naznaka da je nesrpski dio Predsjedniš-
tva uopće znao za nju, što znači da je bila nezakonita,
kao i povlačenje koje je navodno trebala osigurati.389
386 Milisav SEKULIĆ, Jugoslaviju niko nije branio a Vrhov-
na komanda je izdala, NIDDA Verlag GmbH, Bad Vilbel,
1997., 242; D. MARIJAN, Slom Titove armije, 264-266.
387 B. JOVIĆ, Poslednji dani SFRJ, 349-350.
388 ICTY: Komanda 1. vojne oblasti, Izvod iz Zapovesti za an-
gažovanje snaga 1. VO u Slavoniji str. pov. br. 1438-32 od
8. 7. 1991.
389 SVA MORH, Komanda 5. VO: I Uprava GŠ OS SFRJ, Na-
ređenje br. 51-1 od 25. 7. 1991.; Milovan BUZADŽIĆ, Se-
cesija bivših jugoslovenskih republika u svetlosti odluka
Ustavnog suda Jugoslavije. Zbirka dokumenata s uvodnom
raspravom, Službeni list SFRJ, Beograd, 1994., 236-237.
162
Domovinski rat 04-02-2020 Knjiga 1.indd 162
Borisav Jović and Slobodan Milošević met General
Kadijević and Blagoje Adžić on July 5, 1991. Kadijević
and Adžić promised to Milošević and Jović that the JNA
would occupy the borders of the areas where Serbs
lived in Croatia, meaning the Karlovac – Plitvice line in
the west, Baranja, Osijek, Vinkovci – Sava River line in
the east and the Neretva River in the south. Based on
Kadijević’s promise the HQ of the 1st Military District
drafted the order, after midnight on July 7-8, 1991, for
employing JNA forces in Croatia. The plan was that the
motorized forces of the 1st Military District would, “by
swift and energetic moves of armor-mechanized forces”
reach the Virovitica – Pakrac – Kutina line. Banja Luka
Corps was ordered to move the 329th Armored Brigade
and the 16th Motorized Brigade to Glina and subordinate
the brigades to the HQ of the 5th Military District for ac-
tion in Banovina and Lika. The actual orders given to the
other units are not known because 11 articles are miss-
ing from the archived copy of the order. The JNA units
were supposed to be ready to move at 0400 hours on
July 9. The order was never realized, probably because
of the signing of the Brijuni Agreement which went into
effect on July 7, 1991. Had the JNA moved against Cro-
atia at that time, it would have been absolutely clear to
the international community that the JNA was in breach
of the agreement signed only two days previously. The
only way the JNA could act was through deliberately try-
ing to provoke a conflict and supporting the rebels un-
der the guise of trying to separate the warring parties.
The war in Slovenia ended quickly and without ma-
jor battles. The Presidency of the SFRY, on July 18, by a
majority vote, decided to pull the JNA out of Slovenia.
It is worth noting that the decision ran counter to the
D
Yugoslav Constitution. For Croatia the whole thing
meant that a bad situation had just gotten worse. Now
new JNA forces were stationed just across the country’s
borders in Serbia and Bosnia and Herzegovina. The JNA
leadership created a Directive by which the JNA’s with-
R
drawal from Slovenia could look legal. The text of the Di-
rective was deliberately ambiguous as was the behavior
of the JNA. There are no indications that the non-Serb
part of the Presidency was even aware of the Directive
which means that the Directive, as such, was beyond
the scope of legality, as was the JNA’s withdrawal from
Slovenia. The Directive envisaged two scenarios – Slove-
nia’s refusal to let the JNA go without interference and
Croatia’s refusal to allow the JNA’s forces from Slovenia
to transit through Croatia and maybe even attack the
4.2.2020. 19:33:39
 The Croatian Nation’s Struggle for Survival, 1991-1995
U Direktivi su bile predviđene obje opcije – odbijanje
Slovenaca da se naoružanje i oprema JNA povuku, kao
i odbijanje Hrvatske da odobri tranzit i mogućnost da
uporabi oružje. U tom je slučaju JNA planirala “energič-
no preći u napad iz Srema kroz Slavoniju ka Varaždinu i
Mariboru, iz Bosanske Krajine preko Banije i Korduna ka
Novom Mestu i Ljubljani, i snagama 37. K[orpusa] kroz
zapadnu Hercegovinu, sa zadatkom: razbiti paravojne
formacije Republike Hrvatske i Slovenije na pravcima
dejstva i naneti im odlučni poraz, a čvrstim držanjem
H
vitalnih objekata i kontrolom teritorije obezbediti reali-
zaciju Odluke Predsjedništva SFRJ”.390
Direktivom su određene snage koje se planiralo ko-
ristiti, kao i podređenost odnosno pridodavanje drugim
komandama. Za opciju sukoba sa Slovenijom bez uklju-
čivanja Hrvatske 5. vojnoj oblasti pridodan je Banjalučki
M
(5.) korpus te dvije mehanizirane brigade: 1. proleterska
gardijska iz Beograda i 453. iz Srijemske Mitrovice. U op-
ciji uključivanja Hrvatske u sukob, uz Banjalučki je kor-
pus na području Bosanske krajine 5. vojnoj oblasti pri-
dodana i 1. proleterska gardijska mehanizirana divizija
od crte Virovitica – Kutina.391
D
General Kadijević smijenio je tijekom sukoba u
Sloveniji generale slovenske nacionalnosti s dužnosti
komandanata 5. vojne oblasti i 5. korpusa RV-a i PVO-a
i zamijenio ih Srbima. Generala Konrada Kolšeka zami-
jenio je general Života Avramović, a generala Marjana
Rožiča pukovnik Ljubomir Bajić.392 Osim što je pokazao
C
očito nepovjerenje u nesrpski kadar, general Kadijević
demonstrirao je samovolju za koju nije imao ovlasti. U
oficirskom koru JNA u Sloveniji i Hrvatskoj tada je bilo 57
% Srba, 12 % Hrvata, 6 % Slovenaca, 5 % Crnogoraca, 4 %
Jugoslavena i 16 % pripadnika ostalih nacionalnosti.393
D
Za vrijeme sukoba u Sloveniji, 28. lipnja i 2. srpnja
mobiliziran je dio postrojbi ZNG-a.394 Od djelatnih briga-
da samo je 1. brigada ZNG-a bila popunjena ljudstvom
i opremom, a ostale su bile znatno slabije popunjene
390 USMKSMP: I uprava GŠ OS SFRJ, Direktiva za izvršenje
Odluke Predsjedništva SFRJ o prestanku stacioniranja
JNA na teritoriji R. Slovenije, DT br. 53-1 od 25. 7. 1991.
391 D. MARIJAN, “Zamisao i propast napadne operacije
JNA”, 258.
392 D. MARIJAN, Slom Titove armije, 206-207.
393 Isto, 206-207, 438.
394 SVA MORH, ZOZO: GSHV, Informacija o slabostima u
toku mobilizacije kl. 801-01/91-01/17, ur. br. 5120-34-91
od 10. 10. 1991.
163
Domovinski rat 04-02-2020 Knjiga 1.indd 163
withdrawing JNA units. In that case the JNA planned to
“mount an energetic attack from Sirmium through Sla-
vonia towards Varaždin and Maribor, from the Bosanska
Krajina through Banija and Kordun towards Novo Mesto
and Ljubljana and sent XXXVII Corps into attack through
western Herzegovina with the task of defeating the
paramilitary formations of the Republic of Croatia and
Slovenia along its axis of advance and protecting the vi-
tal installations and facilities and controlling territory for
the purpose of securing the realization of the Presiden-
cy’s Decisions”.
The Directive selected the units to be used and set
up the organizational and command structure for the
upcoming operations. For the Slovenia only scenario
V Banja Luka Corps and two mechanized brigades, the
1st Proletarian Guards Brigade from Belgrade and 453rd
Brigade from Srijemska Mitrovica were placed under
the command of the 5th Military District. For the Slo-
venia-plus-Croatia scenario the 1st Proletarian Guards
Mechanized Division, from the Virovitica – Kutina line,
was also placed, alongside the above mentioned forma-
tions, under the command of the 5th Military District.
General Kadijević, during the war in Slovenia,
sacked the Slovenian generals from their positions as
commanders of the 5th Military District and V Corps of
the Air Force and Air Defense and replaced them with
Serb officers – General Konrad Kolšek was replaced by
General Života Avramović and General Marjan Rožić was
replaced by Colonel Ljubomir Bajić. General Kadijević, it
has to be noted, did not have the authority to sack the
Slovenian generals. Not only did he act with extreme
prejudice, he also acted illegally. In Slovenia and Croatia,
at that time, the officer contingent of the JNA consisted
of 57% Serbs, 12 % Croats, 6 % Slovenes, 5 % Montene-
grins, 4 % Yugoslavs and 16 % other nationalities.
During the war in Slovenia, on June 28 and July 2
some units of the ZNG were mobilized. Of the active
service brigades only the 1st Brigade was up to strength.
R
The others were undermanned and underequipped.
The reserve brigades and independent battalions were
at full strength but only about half of the soldiers were
armed and only with small arms, on account of an acute
shortage of weapons. Only the 106th Brigade ZNG in
Osijek, 109th Brigade ZNG in Vinkovci and Županja and
56th Kutina Battalion and 57th Sisak Battalion could arm
more than half its soldiers.
The declaration of Croatia’s independence ener-
gized the rebel Serbs into stepping up their efforts.
4.2.2020. 19:33:39
 Davor Marijan • Rat za opstojnost Hrvata, 1991. - 1995.
ljudstvom, naoružanjem i opremom.395 Pričuvne briga-
de i samostalni bataljuni imali su ljude po formaciji, no
stupanj popune, i to gotovo samo streljačkim naoruža-
njem, bio je vrlo nizak. Više od 50 % popune streljačkim
oružjem imale su 106. brigada ZNG-a u Osijeku i 109.
brigada ZNG-a u Vinkovcima i Županji, te 56. bataljun
Kutina i 57. bataljun Sisak.396
Proglašenje neovisnosti Hrvatske bio je povod pobu-
njenim Srbima da pojačaju svoje djelovanje. Pobunjeni
Srbi otvorili su niz kriznih žarišta na gotovo svim područji-
H
ma gdje su bili u većem broju. Jugoslavenska narodna ar-
mija pratila ih je postavljanjem tampon-zona, a u drugoj
polovini kolovoza preuzela je primat u izazivanju sukoba
i grabežu hrvatskoga teritorija. To je posebice bilo izraže-
no u Baranji, Slavoniji, Banovini i sjevernoj Dalmaciji. Za
hrvatske snage otežavajuća je bila okolnost što su imale
M
zapovijedi da izbjegavaju sukobe s JNA.397 Hrvatske sna-
ge su nastojale da pobunu lokaliziraju bez sukoba s JNA,
no to se pokazalo nemogućom zadaćom. U prvoj polovi-
ci rujna 1991. stanje je postalo neizdrživo pa je hrvatsko
vrhovništvo bilo prinuđeno da 12. rujna 1991. zapovjedi
blokiranje vojnih objekata JNA.398
D
Reakcije na rat u Hrvatskoj
Napadi JNA u srpnju i kolovozu 1991. izazvali su oš-
tre reakcije u Hrvatskoj, ali i Makedoniji i BiH. Prestala je
popuna ročnicima iz Hrvatske i Slovenije, a Makedonija i
C
BiH počele su dvojiti o tome, što je utjecalo na smanjenje
borbene spremnosti JNA. Sustav redovne vojne obve-
ze u zapadnom dijelu Jugoslavije potpuno je narušen i
JNA se suočila s manjkom vojnika na redovnom služenju
vojnoga roka, koje je zakonski morala otpustiti nakon
395 SVA MORH, GSHV: Izvješće sa sastanka održanog s PK PO
1, 2, 3, 4. i 108. brigade dana 3. 7. 1991. po pitanjima ma-
terijalnog osiguranja jedinica Zbora NG.
396 SVA MORH, GSHV: Izvještaj Zapovjedništva ZNG od 11. 7.
1991. o popuni jedinica ZNG-a.
397 SVA MORH, ZZNG RH, Zapovijed kl. 8-01/91-01/01, ur. br.
512-03-91-1 od 7. 7. 1991.; SVA MORH, ZZNG RH, Zapovi-
jed kl. 8/91-01/01, ur. br. 512-03-91-2 od 11. 7. 1991.; SVA
MORH, ZZNG RH, Zapovijed kl. 119-01/91-01, ur. br. 512-
03-91 od 24. 7. 1991.; SVA MORH, ZZNG RH, Zapovijed kl.
8/91-01/03, ur. br. 512-91-03-1 od 5. 8. 1991.; SVA MORH,
ZZNG RH, Zapovijed kl. 801-01/91-01/08, ur. br. 5120-03-
91-1 od 30. 8. 1991.; SVA MORH, ZZNG RH, Naredba kl.
8/91-01/17, ur. br. 512-03-91-1 od 3. 9. 1991.
398 D. MARIJAN, Slom Titove armije, 275-279.
164
Domovinski rat 04-02-2020 Knjiga 1.indd 164
The rebel Serbs had created a number of crisis areas
in almost every locality where they formed a majority.
The JNA supported them every step of the way by set-
ting up buffer zones and in the second half of August
it became the principal player in fomenting strife and
grabbing Croatian territory. This was especially true in
Baranja, Slavonia, Banovina and northern Dalmatia. The
Croatian forces, on the other hand, labored under the re-
stricting orders from the Croatian government to avoid
conflict with the JNA. The Croatian forces tried hard to
deal with the rebellion without provoking the JNA but
that soon proved to be mission impossible. In the first
half of September, 1991, the situation could no longer
be contained and the Croatian government ordered, on
September 12, 1991, the Croatian Army to put the JNA
installations in Croatia under blockade.
Reactions to the War in Croatia
The JNA’s attacks in July and August, 1991, sparked
strong reactions in Croatia, Macedonia and Bosnia and
Herzegovina. Croatia and Slovenia no longer allowed
conscripts to serve their compulsory military service in
the JNA. Macedonia and Bosnia and Herzegovina were
leaning in that direction as well. The development had a
detrimental effect on the JNA’s ability to maintain a high
level of combat readiness. The system of the compulsory
military service in the western part of Yugoslavia was to-
tally disrupted and the JNA was faced with a lack of new
conscripts who were supposed to replace those at the
end of their one year of compulsory service currently in
the JNA. In certain areas there was a serious dearth of new
conscripts so that the JNA did not have enough soldiers
D
to maintain the buffer zones nor enough men for garrison
duty. At that time the real role of the JNA in Croatia was
revealed for all to see. The Croatian Parliament concluded,
at the end of its session on August 3, 1991, that “elements
of the JNA, with the assistance of terrorist groups, are ac-
R
tively participating in the Serbia-sponsored aggression
against Croatia” and demanded that the JNA withdrew
its forces into barracks immediately and, as part of the
dissociation process, vacate Croatia completely in a rea-
sonable time period. The JNA ignored the Croatian Par-
liament’s conclusions and continued to act aggressively.
The Croatian Army, however, was ready and willing to re-
act. On September 11, the President of the Presidency of
the SFRY Stjepan Mesić ordered the JNA units in Croatia
to withdraw into barracks within 48 hours. The leadership
4.2.2020. 19:33:39
 The Croatian Nation’s Struggle for Survival, 1991-1995

jednogodišnje službe. Otpušteni vojnici na pojedinim se AN APP£AL FOR PEACE IN CROATIA

(OY TI!Cll"'OI' DOCCMlll!R f l OOP.-l'l. LA1,:n£ATES I/AD SJGKCDTI-IIS APPL-\1.-

područjima nisu mogli zamijeniti u dovoljnom broju, pa =~r-~n:~~~-::~r '.:~.~~:.._':,.~.~ :.7~1~~,~~~~~~:J~~';

JNA više nije imala na raspolaganju potreban broj vojni- M V11lx-cn bQ<,,"""
~:!'~~;f;: .,~7...:~~~l~ t1~::-·i/;~•!b~~/'i~~1il:IC•tbe:..OODdWcrldW4'r,
no.i•• ,,..,. ,,.,,,._. ...,.,n" •"'~
c.-,..,.,..r-c• do>,,.....,..,. ll-. al w,o
ka za održavanje tampon-zona i posadnu službu u vojar-
~Nl!'lea. " 't.r.

~= ~~:~.:~.;.~
v.•c ar{ll'>0-1 "'th~ w~_,~,n a N<I l!•S!~m i""",..,.,,,~•·•o lo() s.op t'.i,r '{u,:-::.Elit,, • ATJ:l.v'I 1--anoor. M6tr\K";IOO.
'Wc , OO(lll1 "'" Mhurr.an ~uU n '"P " " " """' (~pro<'<k, i.lC fo~r.ll<:.~t 'l"IC1U::ISc4Yu.,:oatav?llltl.; an-brulltlll:f

nama. Njezina uloga u Hrvatskoj postala je sasvim jasna. ~~.:;;;.~~ ~-~(l!!"b,.~~ %!~~))~~~i;i~~=i<:-:Q

Sabor RH utvrdio je na zasjedanju 3. kolovoza 1991. da

u agresiji na Hrvatsku “organiziranu od Republike Srbije
sudjeluju na izravan i neizravan način i dijelovi JNA uz
pomoć terorističkih pobunjeničkih skupina” te je zatra-
ženo da se JNA bez odgađanja povuče u vojarne i u pri-
H
mjerenom roku u procesu razdruživanja povuče s terito-
rija Republike Hrvatske.399 Jugoslavenska narodna armija
oglušila se na zaključke Sabora i nastavila napade, zbog
čega je slijedila odgovarajuća reakcija hrvatskih snaga.
Naredbu predsjednika Predsjedništva SFRJ Stjepana Me-
sića od 11. rujna za povlačenje postrojbi JNA u vojarne u
M
roku od 48 sati vojni je vrh odbacio kao nezakonitu, što je
stvarno i bila jer nije bila usuglašena s ostalim članovima
Predsjedništva. U priopćenju povodom te naredbe JNA
je negirala da postrojbe pobunjenih hrvatskih Srba pod
imenom Teritorijalne obrane djeluju “pod komandom i THE AGGRESSORS ARE SERUIA A.\ IJ T Hl:i YLGO COMMUNIST AR MY
) f.
okvirima JNA”, no to je bila laž.400
~:·"'~~~.;.:..;·'~~~-~~'%.~,·
D
Svakako je najvažnija reakcija na djelovanje JNA Apel za mir u Hrvatskoj, 9. prosinca 1991., koji je potpisao 81 do-
stigla iz inozemstva. Europska je zajednica 27. kolovoza bitnik Nobelove nagrade.
1991. prozvala Srbiju i JNA zbog porasta nasilja u Hrvat-
81 Nobel Laureates had signed this Appeal, December 9, 1991
skoj. Odgovorni su upozoreni na to da EZ neće prihvatiti
politiku svršenog čina, odnosno promjenu granica si-
lom. Srbijanski su vođe prozvani zato što probleme koji
C
se javljaju u novom poretku pokušavaju rješavati vojno. of the JNA rejected the order as illegal, which it really was
Jugoslavenska narodna armija prozvana je jer je bilo because the Presidency had not voted on it. In a commu-
nedvojbeno da njezini dijelovi pružaju “aktivnu podršku niqué relating to the order the JNA denied that rebel Serb
srbijanskoj strani”.401 Reakcija je bila uvod u posljednji units under the designation Territorial Defense were op-
pokušaj da se jugoslavenska kriza riješi pregovorima, erating “under the control and within the framework of
D
zbog čega je početkom rujna u Haagu počela mirovna the JNA”. The claim was a blatant lie.
konferencija.402 The most important reaction to the JNA’s actions
came from abroad. On August 27, 1991, the European
Community publically blamed Serbia and JNA for the
escalating cycle of violence in Croatia. The European
R
Community warned the Serbs and JNA that it would not
countenance accepting the situation in the country as a
fait accompli and alterations of the internal boundaries
399 Zaključci Sabora Republike Hrvatske od 3. 8. 1991.,
Narodne novine, br. 39 od 3. 8. 1991. by way of force. Also, the EC criticized publically the Serbi-
an leadership for trying to solve the problems by military
400 “Neovlašćeno i samovoljno izdavanje naređenja”, Narod-
na armija, 14. 9. 1991., 6. action. The JNA was put on the spot on account of some
401 HDA, UPRH: MIP RH od 28. 8. 1991., Deklaracija o Jugo-
of its elements’“active support for the Serbs”. This reaction
slaviji: Prijevod izjave Ministarskog savjeta EZ nakon iz- from the EC was a prelude to a last-ditch attempt to solve
vanrednog sastanka u Bruxellesu 27. 8. 1991. the Yugoslav crisis by dialogue – a peace conference com-
402 M. LIBAL, Njemačka politika, 61-62. menced in The Hague at the beginning of September.

165

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 Davor Marijan • Rat za opstojnost Hrvata, 1991. - 1995.
H
M
D
C
HRVATI / SE NE / BOJE / NIKOGA // IZLOŽBA RATNE FOTOGRAFI-
JE I ZNAKOVLJA POSTROJBA ZP-a ZAGREB 1991. - 1995. / Autor:
Ivo Vrtarić, Zagreb, 1995., autor fotografije: Željko Gašparović,
izdavač: Ministarstvo obrane Republike Hrvatske, Glavni stožer
HV-a, Zborno područje Zagreb // Plakat za čije je oblikovanje kao
predložak korišten grafit ispisan na zidu u Pakracu.
CROATS DO NOT FEAR ANYONE/EXHIBITION OF WAR PHOTOG-
RAPHY AND INSIGNIA OF THE UNITS OF THE ZAGREB CORPS
DISTRICT 1991-1995 / Author: Ivo Vrtarić, Zagreb, 1995, Photo-
graph by: Željko Gašparović, published by: Ministry of Defence of
the Republic of Croatia, General HV Staff, Zagreb Corps District
// This piece of graffiti in Pakrac provided the idea for the design.
166
Domovinski rat 04-02-2020 Knjiga 1.indd 166
LIVE AND LET LIVE!, Autor: Ivo Vrtarić, Autor fotografije: Željko
Gašparović, Izdavač: War press OGP Novska, 1992. / Na plakatu
je hrvatski dragovoljac. Snimljen je u listopadu 1991. u Starom
Grabovcu na prvoj crti bojišnice. Zbog grafita s imenom svjetski
poznate grupe Guns N’ Roses na zidu kuće u pozadini fotografija
je objavljena u brojnim svjetskim listovima i knjigama o ratu pro-
tiv Hrvatske.
D
LIVE AND LET LIVE!, Author: Ivo Vrtarić, Photograph by: Željko
Gašparović, Published by: War press OGP Novska, 1992 / The
poster shows a Croatian volunteer. The photo was taken in Octo-
ber 1991 in Stari Grabovac on the front line. Owing to the graffiti
with the name of the world-famous heavy metal act Guns N’ Ros-
es on the wall of the house in the background the photograph
was published in many papers around the world and in books on
R
the Croatian War of Independence.
4.2.2020. 19:33:56
 The Croatian Nation’s Struggle for Survival, 1991-1995
RAT ZA VOJARNE
Uz oružje i opremu JNA, u vojarnama JNA bilo je
oružje hrvatske Teritorijalne obrane oduzeto u svibnju
1990. nakon izbornoga poraza komunista u Hrvatskoj.
Hrvatskoj je ostala vrlo mala, gotovo zanemariva koli-
čina toga oružja.
Hrvatski napadi na vojarne nisu iznenadili JNA,
koja se od ljeta 1990. pripremala za sukob s Hrvat-
skom. U listopadu 1990., nakon nemira na Banovini,
H
Kordunu i u Lici, naređene su prve opsežnije mjere za
obranu i osiguranje objekata u Hrvatskoj. Pojačane su
nakon saznanja da Hrvatska kupuje oružje u Mađar-
skoj. Od tada su zbog svakog pogoršanja sigurnosno-
ga stanja pisane nove zapovijedi za obranu objekata i
M
jačanje borbene spremnosti postrojba. Nakon kratko-
trajnog sukoba u Sloveniji 1991. obrana objekata bila
je najvažniji zadatak JNA u Hrvatskoj.403
Trenutak u kojem su hrvatske snage napale i blo-
kirale vojarne i druge vojne objekte JNA bio je do tada
najpovoljniji za Hrvatsku. Od sukoba u Sloveniji su-
stavna dezertiranja iz JNA nepovoljno su utjecala na
D
njezinu borbenu spremnost. Jugoslavenska narodna
armija u ljeto je počela uhodavati novi sustav služe-
nja vojnoga roka šaljući novake na izobrazbu u istoč-
ne republike, iz kojih je dobivala vojnike koji su prošli
taktičku izobrazbu. Time su postrojbe oslobođene izo-
C
brazbe i mogle su se koncentrirati isključivo na održa-
nje borbene spremnosti.404
Bez oružja i opreme JNA je počela ostajati od po-
četka kolovoza 1991., kada su, u obliku prepada, počeli
prvi napadi na manje objekte i skupine. Iz Tehničko-re-
montnoga zavoda Bregana skupina naoružanih civila
D
odvezla je 2. kolovoza remontirano oružje.405 Na otoku
Šolti 5. kolovoza skupina naoružanih civila zauzela je
vojarnu Velika straža i iz nje odnijela veću količinu stre-
ljiva za protuzračne topove 20 mm.406 U Slavonskom
Brodu 28. kolovoza i 1. rujna zaustavljena su dva vlaka,
s kojih je skinuta veća količina oružja i opreme JNA, uk-
ljučujući 54 topa 76 mm, 86 minobacača 120 mm, 46
403 D. MARIJAN, Slom Titove armije, 279-280.
404 Isto, 202, 210, 280.
405 HMDCDR: Komanda 5. VO, Redovni dnevni izveštaj str.
pov. br. 10/43-800 od 2. 8. 1991.
406 SVA MORH, ZOZS: Saopćenje Službe za informiranje Ko-
mande VPO; I. JELIĆ, 4. brigada ZNG, 50-51.
167
Domovinski rat 04-02-2020 Knjiga 1.indd 167
WAR FOR THE BARRACKS
In May, 1990, the weapons and equipment of the
Croatian Territorial Defense was stored in JNA barracks
in Croatia. When the Croatian Communists lost in the
elections in Croatia that month the JNA appropriated
most of the weapons of the Croatian TO.
The JNA was not taken by surprise when the Croa-
tian Army attacked its barracks in Croatia. After all, the
JNA had been preparing for a war with Croatia since the
summer. In October, 1990, after the incidents in Banovi-
na, Kordun and Lika the JNA began implementing the
first serious measures for protecting and securing its
installations and bases in Croatia. One of the factors
that prompted the JNA to act in this manner was the
fact that Croatia was buying quantities of weapons in
Hungary. From that point on whenever the security sit-
uation in the country took a turn for the worse the JNA
would issue new orders for improving the defenses of
the installations and bases and for increasing the level
of combat readiness of its troops in Croatia. After the
Ten-Day War in Slovenia in 1991 defending the instal-
lations and bases was the most important task of the
JNA in Croatia.
The Croatian Army chose its moment to put the
JNA barracks and other installations in the country un-
der blockade well. Ever since the end of the war in Slo-
venia the JNA had been experiencing a sustained wave
of desertions which affected its ability to maintain its
forces at a high level of combat readiness. The JNA had
adopted a new system of compulsory military service
whereby the recruits were sent to the eastern republics
for basic training. The JNA units stationed in the west-
ern parts of Yugoslavia, therefore, could focus their ef-
forts on maintaining a high level of combat readiness
without having to worry about whether this or that
group of conscripts would desert or not.
At the beginning of August the Croatian Army and
R
armed civilians started raiding barracks, installations
and small JNA detachments. The attacks on the bar-
racks and installations, at that time, were just small raids
launched for the purpose of stealing weapons, as were
the attacks on small groups of JNA soldiers. The strategy
worked and the JNA soon felt the pinch as it was losing
not an insignificant amounts of weapons and equip-
ment. A group of armed civilians broke into the Techni-
cal Overhauling Institute in Bregana and took off with
a large amount of weapons and equipment on August
4.2.2020. 19:33:56
 Davor Marijan • Rat za opstojnost Hrvata, 1991. - 1995.
H
M
protuzračnih topova 20/3 mm, 68 lakih raketnih lanse-
ra 128 mm i 60 lansera protuoklopnih vođenih raketa.
Istodobno su u Vinkovcima zaustavljene četiri željeznič-
ke kompozicije, s kojih je skinuto šest haubica 105 mm,
D
jedna haubica 155 mm, 17 gorskih topova 76 mm, osam
minobacača 120 mm, tri protuzračna topa 40 mm, šest
protuzračnih topova 20 mm, 10 ručnih bacača, oko
1000 automatskih pušaka, 28 različitih motornih vozila,
jedno neispravno borbeno vozilo, nekoliko inženjerij-
skih sredstava i slično.407 Naoružani civili napali su 30.
C
kolovoza strelište Vrapčanski potok u Zagrebu i odnijeli
42 puške i četiri pištolja s većom količinom streljiva.408
U Sisku je 3. rujna zauzeta vojarna u kojoj je bio ponto-
nirski bataljun.409 U Gospiću su hrvatske snage 7. rujna
zaustavile i zarobile postrojbu Vojne policije Riječkoga
korpusa i oduzele četiri oklopna vozila.410 Svi su ti napa-
di bili neorganizirani i nisu ih poticali iz Zapovjedništva
ZNG-a, za razliku od napada na vojarne i skladišta oružja
i opreme JNA, što je bio sljedeći korak hrvatskih snaga.
407 SVA MORH, ZZNG RH za istočnu Slavoniju i Baranju, Izv-
ješće pov. br. 525-19/1-91 od 2. 9. 1991.
408 HMDCDR: Komanda 10. korpusa, pov. br. 20/1938-8 od
31. 8. 1991.
409 SVA MORH, Zapovjedništvo ZNG za Baniju, Posavinu i
Moslavinu, Izvješće br. 10-89/91 od 4. 9. 1991.
410 SVA MORH, Komanda 35. partd: Komanda garnizo-
na Gospić, Izveštaj str. pov. br. 65-1 od 9. 9. 1991.; VSA
MORH: Vojna pošta br. 9595 Sveti Rok (Gospić), Izveštaj
pov. br. 684-1 od 12. 12. 1991.
168
Domovinski rat 04-02-2020 Knjiga 1.indd 168
JNA se povlači iz Slovenije, ljeto 1991. godine (autor fotografi-
je: Marko Perić).
JNA retreats from Slovenia, summer 1991 (Photograph by
Marko Perić).
2. On the island of Šolta, on August 5 a group of armed
civilians captured the Velika Straža barracks and carried
away a large amount of 22-mm flak ammunition. In Sla-
vonski Brod, on August 28 and September 1 two freight
trains transporting JNA equipment were stopped. The
raiders took off with 56 76-mm guns, 86 120m mortars,
46 20/3 flak guns, 68 128-mm light rocket launchers and
60 launchers for anti-armor guided missiles. At the same
time four trains were stopped in Vinkovci. Six 105-mm
howitzers, one 155-mm howitzer, 17 76-mm field guns,
eight 120-mm mortars, around 1,000 assault rifles, 28
various motor vehicles, one combat vehicle not in driv-
ing condition, a few pieces of engineering equipment
and other items were taken off these four trains. Armed
civilians attacked the Vrapčanski Potok firing range in
D
Zagreb and took away 42 rifles and four pistols and a
significant amount of ammunition on August 30. On
September 3 in Sisak the barracks housing the Pontoon
Battalion was captured. Croatian forces, on September
7 in Gospić, stopped and took prisoner a detachment
R
of Military Police of Rijeka Corps and appropriated four
armored vehicles. All these attacks were uncoordinated
and happened, more or less, on the spur of the moment.
They were not planned, initiated or instigated by the HQ
of the ZNG. The attacks on the barracks and warehous-
es where weapons and equipment were stored, on the
other hand, were a different matter. And on these tar-
gets the HQ of the ZNG set its sights in September.
Pretty soon a number of reserve units of the JNA
(R classification) and detachments securing smaller in-
4.2.2020. 19:33:58
 The Croatian Nation’s Struggle for Survival, 1991-1995
Do prvih predaja došlo je vrlo brzo, najprije kod pri-
čuvnih postrojba (R klasifikacije) i manjih vojnih objeka-
ta. Većina vojarni i drugih vojnih objekata u sjeveroza-
padnoj i središnjoj Hrvatskoj osvojena je u rujnu 1991.
godine. Poslije je zabilježeno tek nekoliko takvih sluča-
jeva. Najlakši plijen bili su slabo branjeni objekti i insti-
tucije JNA, čija je predaja imala veći psihološki učinak.
To su u prvom redu bili domovi JNA, strelišta, objekti
veze, tehničke radionice, manja skladišta i sl. Veći uspje-
si bili su zarobljavanja posada graničnih karaula. Osva-
H
janja trupnih skladišta, poput Prečeca kod Ivanić-Gra-
da, Malih Bara kod Ploča, Doljana kod Daruvara, Velike
Bune kod Velike Gorice, Jamadola kod Karlovca i napose
skladišta Velebit kod Delnica, bila su velik uspjeh. Kruna
hrvatskih uspjeha ipak su bile velike vojarne u kojima
je bilo oružje i oprema postrojba razine puka i brigade.
M
To su bile vojarne u Pločama (naoružanje TO-a triju op-
ćina), Šibeniku (dijelovi obalnoga topništva i brodov-
lja Vojnopomorskoga sektora), Gospiću (motorizirana
brigada i dio partizanske divizije), Delnicama (brdska
brigada), Virovitici (mješovita protuoklopna artiljerijska
brigada), Đakovu (mješovita protuoklopna artiljerijska
D
brigada), Slavonskoj Požegi (automobilski nastavni cen-
tar i partizanska divizija) i Našicama (manji dijelovi me-
hanizirane brigade). Najveći uspjeh hrvatskih snaga bilo
je zarobljavanje Varaždinskoga korpusa bez lakog arti-
ljerijskog puka protuzračne obrane, koji je bio u vojarni
Borongaj u Zagrebu. Prvi dijelovi korpusa zarobljeni su
C
17. rujna u Križevcima, glavnina korpusa zarobljena je
22. rujna u Varaždinu i Čakovcu, garnizon u Bjelovaru
predao se 29. rujna, a idućega dana predali su se ostaci
korpusa u Koprivnici.411 U Varaždinu i Čakovcu, prema
podacima JNA, zarobljena su, među ostalim, 74 tenka
D
T-55, tri plivajuća tenka PT-76, dva tenka nosača mosta,
pet tenkova za izvlačenje, 71 oklopni transporter, 18
top-haubica 152 mm, 18 haubica 155 mm, četiri VLR-a
128 mm Plamen, četiri SVLR-a 128 mm Oganj, sedam sa-
mohodnih haubica 122 mm, 12 samohodnih oruđa 90
mm, 12 protuoklopnih lansirnih oruđa, šest protuoklo-
pnih topova 76 mm, 37 lansirnih oruđa za protuoklo-
pne rakete, 17 oklopnih borbenih vozila BOV-1 i BOV-3,
411 Osnovne informacije o osvajanju vojnih objekata iz sas-
tava snaga 1. i 5. vojne oblasti JNA kod: Dražen NAJMAN,
Ivan POSILOVIĆ, Marija DUJIĆ, Blokade i osvajanja vojarni
i vojnih objekata JNA u Hrvatskoj 1991., Udruga dragov-
oljaca Narodne zaštite Domovinskog rata, Zagreb, 2004.
O osvajanju objekata s područja Vojnopomorske oblasti
kod: P. ŠIMAC, Svjedočanstva o Domovinskom ratu.
169
Domovinski rat 04-02-2020 Knjiga 1.indd 169
stallations surrendered. Most barracks and other JNA
facilities in northwest and central Croatia were cap-
tured in September, 1991. Only a few barracks and in-
stallations were captured after September. The softest
targets were poorly defended JNA installations and
facilities and the capture of these targets significantly
boosted the Croats’ morale. For the most part, these fa-
cilities and installations were JNA dorms and recreation
centers, firing ranges, communications facilities, work-
shops, smaller warehouses and similar. A more import-
ant success was the capture of border posts and the
JNA troops garrisoning them. Croatian forces captured
a number of large warehouses: the Prečec warehouse
near Ivanić-Grad, or Male Bare near Ploče, Doljani near
Daruvar, Velika Buna near Velika Gorica, Jamadol near
Karlovac and especially Velebit near Delnice. Having
possession of these warehouses, and more important-
ly, of everything stored in them, constituted important
successes for the Croatian forces. However, the biggest
prizes were the large barracks with amounts of weap-
ons and equipment sufficient to arm and equip a pla-
toon and sometimes a whole brigade. These barracks
were located in Ploče (weapons belonging to the TOs
of three municipalities), Šibenik (elements of coast artil-
lery and ships belonging to the Military-Maritime Sec-
tor), Gospić (motorized brigade and elements of a par-
tisan division), Delnice (mountain brigade), Virovitica
(mixed anti-armor artillery brigade), Đakovo (mixed an-
ti-armor artillery brigade), Slavonska Požega (automo-
bile training center and partisan division) and Našice
(smaller elements of a mechanized brigade). By far the
biggest success of the Croatian forces was the capture
of the whole of Varaždin Corps with the exception of
its flak platoon which was stationed in the Borongaj
barracks in Zagreb. The first elements of the Corps were
captured on September 17 in Križevci. The bulk of the
Corps was captured on September 22 in Varaždin and
Čakovec. The garrison in Bjelovar surrendered on Sep-
R
tember 29 and the following day the rest of the Corps
surrendered in Koprivnica. In Varaždin and Čakovec, ac-
cording to the JNA, the following equipment and weap-
onry, among other things, were captured: 74 T55 tanks,
three PT76 floating tanks, two tanks bridge layers, five
armored recovery vehicles, 71 APCs, 18 152-mm how-
itzers, 18 155-mm howitzers, four 128-mm VLRs, seven
122-mm self-propelled howitzers, 12 90-mm self-pro-
pelled artillery pieces, 12 anti-armor launchers, six 76-
mm anti-armor guns, 37 launchers for anti-armor rock-
4.2.2020. 19:33:58
 Davor Marijan • Rat za opstojnost Hrvata, 1991. - 1995.
H
M
Posljedice napada zrakoplova JNA na oslobođenu vojarnu, Đako-
vo, 19. rujna 1991. godine (autor fotografija: Marko Perić).
D
631 motorno vozilo, 7834 puške, 391 puškostrojnica,
76 strojnica, 25.000 ručnih bombi, 4.858.000 komada
streljiva za pješačko naoružanje i veća količina streljiva
različitog kalibra.412
Na hrvatske napade JNA je odgovorila ultimatumi-
C
ma, topničkim granatiranjem i napadima zrakoplovstva
po nekim od zauzetih vojarni i objekata. Skladište u Plo-
čama i aerodromi na Hvaru i u Varaždinu raketirani su
14. rujna 1991., a dva dana poslije napadnuto je i jedno
skladište u Solinu. Pokušaja uništenja tek osvojenih ili
predanih objekata bilo je i poslije, pri čemu se izdvaja
zračni napad na skladišta kod Delnica 7. studenoga.413
Dio objekata JNA je uspjela obraniti, a iz nekoliko se
uspjela probiti na okupirano područje. Iz Osijeka se uz
pomoć snaga iz okolice 17. rujna 1991. probila glavnina
412 Vojno tužilaštvo SSNO, Optužnica br. 341/91 od 30. 1.
1992. Optužnica je objavljena na web-stranici Slobodana
Praljka.
413 HMDCDR: Komanda garnizona Varaždin, Upozorenje int.
br. 46-324 od 14. 9. 1991.; SVA MORH, GS HV: Izvješće
Operativnog centra ZZNG RH od 15/16. rujna 1991.; SVA
MORH, ZOZS: Zapovjedništvo obrane srednje i sjeverne
Dalmacije, Izvješće kl. 8-01/91-01/03, ur. br. 512-91-10
od 16. 9. 1991.; SVA MORH, Zap. OZ Rijeka, Redovno
dnevno izvješće ur. br. 400/249-17/91 od 7. 11. 1991.
170
Domovinski rat 04-02-2020 Knjiga 1.indd 170
The aftermath of a JNA aerial attack on the barracks captured
by Croatian troops, Đakovo, September 19, 1991 (Photographs
by Marko Perić).
ets, 17 BOV-1 and BOV-3 armored vehicles, 631 motor
vehicles, 7,834 rifles, 391 submachine guns, 76 machine
guns, 25,000 hand grenades, 4,858,000 rounds of small
arms ammunition and a large quantity of ammunition
of various calibers.
The JNA responded to these attacks by issuing ul-
timatums, shelling and attacking from the air some of
the captured barracks and installations. The warehouse
in Ploče and airstrips on Hvar and in Varaždin were rock-
eted on September 14, 1991, and two days later the JNA
D
attacked one warehouse in Solin. The JNA attempted
to destroy just captured or surrendered facilities after
the above mentioned date. Maybe the fiercest such at-
tempt was the air strike on the warehouse in Delnice on
November 7.
The JNA managed to successfully defend some fa-
R
cilities and installations. The garrisons of a number of
encircled facilities and installations even managed to
break through the encirclement and reach Serb occu-
pied areas. On September 17, 1991, the bulk of the 12th
Proletarian Mechanized Brigade broke out from Osijek
with the help of Serb forces in the surrounding area.
In Vinkovci the garrison in the barracks systematically
shelled the city and thus forced the Croat forces there
to negotiate. The garrison was allowed to leave the bar-
4.2.2020. 19:34:00
 The Croatian Nation’s Struggle for Survival, 1991-1995
H
M
Hrvatska protuzračna obrana, naoružanjem netom zarobljen-
im iz vojarni JNA, srušila je zrakoplov JNA, selo Forkuševci, kod
Đakova, 19. rujna 1991.; ostaci zrakoplova JNA, sa zvijezdom pe-
tokrakom, jednim od simbola neprijateljskih snaga u agresiji na
Hrvatsku (autor fotografija: Marko Perić).
D
12. pmbr. U Vinkovcima je posada vojarne sustavnim
granatiranjem grada iznudila pregovore i sporazumno
C
napustila vojarnu 27. rujna. Iz vojarne Logorište kod
Karlovca posada se 6. studenoga s dijelom naoružanja i
opreme probila do Vojnića.414
Nije moguće ustanoviti točnu količinu oružja koju
su hrvatske snage zarobile u ratu za vojarne. Gotovo da
D
nema izvještaja u kojem su postrojbe izvijestile o koli-
čini oružja i opreme koju su zarobile. Postrojbe su zna-
čajnim dijelom skrivale podatke o naoružanju i opremi,
očito strahujući da u preraspodjeli ne ostanu bez dijela
za koji su držale da im pripada, ne vodeći računa o tome
da na pojedinim područjima imaju mnogo manje od
njih. Proračun na osnovi mirnodopske lokacije jedinica
JNA i njihova formacijskoga stanja na idealnoj je razi-
ni, a ne stvarnoj, jer su iz nekih skladišta pojedini oficiri
JNA uspjeli izvući dio naoružanja i opreme i predati ga
pobunjenim Srbima, kao što je to slučaj s naoružanjem
414 HMDCDR: [Vojna pošta br. 5512 Karlovac], Izvešće pov.
br. 1-3 od 14. 11. 1991.; D. MARIJAN, Slom Titove armije,
282-283.
171
Domovinski rat 04-02-2020 Knjiga 1.indd 171
Croatian troops shot down this JNA aircraft with anti-aircraft
guns acquired from the captured JNA barracks, the village of
Forkuševci, near Đakovo, September 19, 1991; parts of the
wreckage of the destroyed JNA plane. The JNA marked its air-
craft with a red star in a white circular field framed by a blue
circle. The red star symbol, widely used, among other insignia,
by the aggressor in its attack on Croatia, is clearly visible in the
photograph (Photograph by Marko Perić).
racks freely and the Serbs duly left on September 27. On
November 6 the JNA troops from the Logorište barracks
in Karlovac fought their way through Croatian lines to
Vojnić and even managed to take some weapons and
equipment with them.
It is not possible to ascertain with any degree of
accuracy the amount of weaponry and equipment
the Croatian forces captured during the war for the
barracks. The groups and units that captured the bar-
racks, installations and facilities were not in the habit
of writing after-action reports. That selfish attitude is
understandable because they did not want to have
their prizes taken away from them but, in the scheme
R
of things, caused a number of units in critical areas to
do without what they should have had. Any calculation
based on the peacetime location of the JNA units and
their organizational situation at the time is bound to
be erroneous because Serbs officers managed to pull
quantities of weapons and ammunition out of the bar-
racks and installations in question and hand them over
to the rebel Serbs. For example, that exact scenario took
place in Gospić, Daruvar and Požega. Also, many weap-
4.2.2020. 19:34:01
 Davor Marijan • Rat za opstojnost Hrvata, 1991. - 1995.
H
JNA je minirala skladište naoružanja i streljiva u Oštarijama kraj
M
Ogulina, 13. listopada 1991. (autori fotografija: Miro Brozović i
Kruno Dujmić).
iz Gospića, Daruvara i Požege. Uz to je značajan dio na-
D
oružanja i opreme bio bez vitalnih dijelova ili oštećen,
što znači da je u trenutku dolaska u hrvatski posjed bio
neupotrebljiv i protekli su dani, a ponekad i mjeseci,
da se osposobi za uporabu. Bez obzira na to, hrvatske
su snage u ratu za vojarne, uz nekoliko velikih skladišta
raznovrsnog intendantskog, sanitetskog, tehničkog i
C
ubojnog materijala, zarobile naoružanje i vojnu opre-
mu ekvivalenta ojačanog korpusa sa svim pripadaju-
ćim dijelovima. Zauzimanje dijela vojarni i učinkovita
blokada ostalih promijenili su odnos snaga i utjecali
na tijek rata. Zbog toga je rat za vojarne najvažniji do-
gađaj na hrvatskom ratištu. Osim zarobljenog oružja i
opreme JNA, hrvatske su snage došle u posjed i dijela
naoružanja i opreme TO-a oduzetih u svibnju 1990. go-
dine. S tim je oružjem, uglavnom, HV uspješno završio
rat. Oružjem i opremom Varaždinskoga korpusa JNA
naoružane su operativne zone Zagreb, Bjelovar i Osi-
jek te u manjoj mjeri Karlovac. Operativna zona Split
naoružana je slabije, napose njezin Sektor Dubrovnik.
Oružje iz vojarne u Đakovu dalo je značajan prilog u
protuoklopnoj obrani Slavonije 1991. godine.
172
Domovinski rat 04-02-2020 Knjiga 1.indd 172
The JNA placed explosives in the ammunition and weapons
storage depot in Oštarije near Ogulin, October 13, 1991 (Photo-
graphs by: Miro Brozović and Kruno Dujmić).
ons and pieces of equipment were unusable for vari-
ous reasons. Sometimes it took months of repair work
before the Croatian Army could use them. Regardless
of everything, however, it could be said that the Croa-
tian forces captured enough weapons and equipment,
with large quantities of medical supplies, explosives,
technical equipment, camping equipment and tools,
to equip one reinforced corps with all its supporting
units. By capturing some barracks and placing others
under blockade the Croatian forces determined the lat-
er course of the war. For that reason it can be argued
that the war for the barracks was the most important
D
period of the entire war in Croatia. The Croatian forces,
with significant amounts of weapons, equipment and
material belonging to the JNA also captured not an in-
significant amount of those weapons that the JNA had
appropriated from the Croatian Territorial Defense in
May, 1990. With the weapons captured during the war
R
for the barracks the Croatian army finished the Croatian
War of Independence. The weapons and equipment
captured from Varaždin Corps was used for arming and
equipping OZ Zagreb, OZ Bjelovar and OZ Osijek and,
in a smaller measure, OZ Karlovac. OZ Split was not as
well armed as the above mentioned OZs, especially its
Sector Dubrovnik. The weapons from the Đakovo bar-
racks was used with great effect in anti-tank warfare in
Slavonia in 1991.
4.2.2020. 19:34:02
 The Croatian Nation’s Struggle for Survival, 1991-1995

ZAMISAO I PROPAST FAILURE OF THE YUGOSLAV

NAPADNE OPERACIJE PEOPLE’S ARMY’S OFFENSIVE
JUGOSLAVENSKE NARODNE
The JNA had been anticipating the Croatian forces’
ARMIJE attacks on the barracks for a long time. When the Cro-
atian forces finally attacked and placed a number of
Blokade i napadi na vojarne, što je JNA dugo če-
JNA barracks, bases, installations and facilities under
kala, ubrzali su njezine agresivne planove. Željela je
blockade, the JNA reacted swiftly. The JNA, for obvi-
spriječiti da se hrvatske snage domognu oružja i vojne
ous reasons, was determined to prevent the Croatian
opreme. Jugoslavenska narodna armija planirala je u
forces from getting their hands on vast quantities of its
H
kratkom roku poraziti hrvatske snage i dobiti rat. Plan
weapons and equipment. The JNA planned to deliver a
operacije predviđao je da se već angažiranim postroj-
knockout blow to the Croatian forces in a blitzkrieg cam-
bama JNA doda još 15 do 18 oklopnih, mehaniziranih
paign and thus win the war. The plan was to augment
i pješačkih brigada Kopnene vojske. Po priznanju ge-
the already deployed JNA units with 15 to 18 armored,
nerala Kadijevića, ideja “manevra sadržala je sledeće
mechanized and infantry brigades. According to General
osnovne elemente:
M
Kadijević, the idea of “maneuver contained the following
– potpuno blokirati Hrvatsku iz vazduha i sa mora; basic elements:
– pravce napada glavnih snaga JNA što neposrednije
- put Croatia, from the air and from the sea, under
vezivati za oslobođenje srpskih krajeva u Hrvatskoj
complete blockade;
i garnizona JNA u dubini hrvatske teritorije. U tom
- link the axes of advance of the main JNA force, as
cilju ispresecati Hrvatsku na pravcima Gradiška –
directly as possible, with operations for liberating
Virovitica; Bihać – Karlovac – Zagreb; Knin – Zadar;
D
Serbian areas in Croatia and those for lifting the sieg-
Mostar – Split. Najjačom grupacijom oklopno-me-
es of the garrisons in Croatia deep in Croatia’s rear.
hanizovanih snaga osloboditi Istočnu Slavoniju,
Pursuing that objective advance in the following
a zatim brzo nastaviti dejstvo na zapad, spojiti se
directions: Gradiška – Virovitica; Bihać – Karlovac –
sa snagama u zapadnoj Slavoniji i produžiti ka Za-
Zagreb; Knin – Zadar; Mostar – Split. The strongest
grebu i Varaždinu, odnosno ka granici Slovenije.
armored-mechanized formation is to liberate east-
C
Istovremeno jakim snagama iz rejona Herceg Novi
ern Slovenia and then advance westwards without
– Trebinje, blokirati Dubrovnik sa kopna i izbiti u
delay, link up with the forces in western Slavonia and
dolinu Neretve i na taj način sadejstvovati snaga-
continue on towards Zagreb and Varaždin and the
ma koje nastupaju na pravcu Mostar – Split;
Slovenian border. At the same time a strong force
– nakon dostizanja određenih objekata, obezbjediti
from the Herceg Novi – Trebinje region is to put
i držati granicu Srpske Krajine u Hrvatskoj, izvući
D
Dubrovnik under siege from the landward side and
preostale jedinice JNA iz Slovenije i nakon toga po-
reach the Neretva Valley and in that way operate in
vući JNA iz Hrvatske;
coordination with the forces advancing in the direc-
– za mobilizaciju, pripremu mobilisanih ili domobili-
tion of Mostar – Split;
sanih jedinica kao i njihovo dovođenje na planira-
- after reaching certain points, secure and hold the
ne pravce upotrebe potrebno je 10-15 dana, zavi-
boundary of the Srpska Krajina in Croatia, pull out
R
sno od stepena borbene gotovosti jedinica i njene
the remaining units still in Slovenia and then pull the
udaljenosti od pravca upotrebe.”415
JNA forces out of Croatia;
Predviđenom operacijom Hrvatska je trebala biti
- it is going to take 10-15 days to mobilize units, pre-
ispresijecana te prisiljena na bezuvjetnu predaju i pri-
pare for action those already mobilized and those
hvaćanje svih srpskih teritorijalnih zahtjeva.
with recently mobilized contingents and deploy
Za opsežne planove ofenzive bila je nužna do-
them in planned locations – the number of days de-
mobilizacija aktiviranih i mobilizacija ratnih postrojbi.
pending on the level of combat readiness of a given
unit and its geographical distance from the deploy-
415 V. KADIJEVIĆ, Moje viđenje raspada, 135-136. ment area.”

173

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 Davor Marijan • Rat za opstojnost Hrvata, 1991. - 1995.
Prema podacima pukovnika Milisava Sekulića, od 10.
do 20. rujna 1991. mobilizirana je 91 ratna postrojba s
prosječnim odzivom od 69 %, uključujući mirnodopski
sastav. Mobilizirana je 1. proleterska gardijska mehani-
zirana divizija, četiri partizanske divizije, 22 brigade Ko-
pnene vojske, tri partizanske brigade, dvije mješovite
artiljerijske brigade, pet pukova potpore, 20 bataljuna
– divizijuna, dvije čete, 15 baza, tri brigade i 19 odreda
Teritorijalne obrane te veći broj manjih sastava.416 Od-
ziv na mobilizaciju bio je različit: u Vojvodini 93 %, a
H
u Srbiji znatno manji, oko 26 %.417 Izlaz iz takva stanja
JNA je tražila u dobrovoljcima koji su u pravima i ob-
vezama izjednačeni s djelatnim i pričuvnim sastavom
JNA.418 Prihvaćanjem dobrovoljaca, od kojih je znača-
jan dio pripadao četničkomu miljeu, JNA je dosegnula
moralno dno. Ideološke razlike i politička opredjeljenja
M
između njih izbrisao je zajednički cilj – velika Srbija.
Paralelno s mobilizacijom otpuštali su se isluženi
novaci naraštaja “rujan - ‘90”, što je još jedan od apsurda
djelovanja JNA u završnici jugoslavenske krize.419 Ipak,
uza sve slabosti s mobilizacijom, JNA je pod oružjem, u
usporedbi s Hrvatskom, imala neusporedivo jaču silu.
D
Uz žilavi otpor hrvatskih snaga i pokazane sistemske
slabosti JNA, napadna operacija je propala prije no
što je i počela. Na sastanku čelnika Srbije i Crne Gore
i članova Predsjedništva SFRJ iz tih republika (Slobo-
dan Milošević, Borisav Jović, Momir Bulatović, Branko
Kostić, Veljko Kadijević i Blagoje Adžić) održanom 20.
C
rujna 1991., general Adžić informirao je da mobilizacija
nije uspjela i da se mora “praviti redukovani plan”.420
Jugoslavenskoj narodnoj armiji i TO-u Srbije tre-
balo je desetak dana da se nakon propasti strategij-
ske ofenzive 20. - 21. rujna 1991. prestroje i pripreme
za nove napade. U prilog im je išla Rezolucija Vijeća
sigurnosti UN-a broj 713, kojom je 25. rujna uvedena
416 M. SEKULIĆ, Jugoslaviju niko nije branio, 243, 260.
417 Ivan VESELINOVIĆ, “Razbijanje Jugoslavije i uloga Jugo-
slavenske narodne armije”, u: Stvaranje i razaranje av-
nojevske Jugoslavije, Društvo za istinu o antifašističkoj
narodnooslobodilačkoj borbi u Jugoslaviji (1941–1945),
Beograd, 1996., 300.
418 ICTY: III uprava GŠ OS SFRJ, Uputstvo o prijemu dobro-
voljaca u JNA pov. br. 2391-1 od 13. 9. 1991.
419 USMKSMP: Operativni centar I uprave GŠ OS SFRJ,
Dnevni izveštaj SP br. 1-262 od 19. 9. 1991.; USMKSMP:
Operativni centar I uprave GŠ OS SFRJ, Dnevni izveštaj
SP br. 1-263 od 20. 9. 1991.
420 B. JOVIĆ, Poslednji dani SFRJ, 386.
174
Domovinski rat 04-02-2020 Knjiga 1.indd 174
The JNA intended to cut through Croatian territory
on multiple axes of advance and force the Croatian gov-
ernment to sign an unconditional surrender and accede
to all Serb territorial demands.
The JNA’s plan for defeating Croatia was ambitious
and relied, in great measure, on successful mobilization.
According to Colonel Milisav Sekulić, 91 units were mo-
bilized from September 10 to September 20, 1991, with
an average turnout of 69%, including the peacetime con-
tingent. The 1st Proletarian Guards Mechanized Division,
four partisan divisions, 22 brigades of the land forces,
three partisan brigades, two mixed artillery brigades,
five support regiments, 20 support battalions, two de-
tachments, 15 bases, three brigades and 19 TO squads
and a large number of smaller units were mobilized. In
some parts of the country most draftees answered the
recruitment call, in others most men did not. For exam-
ple, in Vojvodina 93% of those called for service showed
up at the appointed location but in Serbia only 26% of
those called did so. The situation soon became alarming
for the JNA. The JNA therefore, tried to solve the problem
by inviting volunteers for service, giving them the same
rights enjoyed by the active and reserve contingents of
the JNA. It has to be noted that most of the volunteers
were men of the extremist nationalistic – Chetnik – per-
suasion. By accepting these characters into its ranks the
JNA had effectively jettisoned all moral, ethical and civ-
ilized values a modern army is supposed to uphold and
protect. The volunteers were a motley collection of men
subscribing to different political options but they were
all united in their belief in the idea of Greater Serbia.
At roughly the same time when the JNA initiated
the mobilization process it started sending home the
D
soldiers belonging to the “September 90” generation of
conscripts, men who were now at the end of their one
year compulsory service period. This was just another
paradox in a string of absurdities that marked the behav-
ior of the JNA during the last acts of the Yugoslav crisis.
R
However, in spite of all the problems with mobilization,
the JNA was vastly superior to the Croatian armed forc-
es in terms of numbers, equipment, matériel, reserves
and logistics. On the other hand, when the JNA moved
into attack the determined Croatian resistance revealed
that the JNA suffered from a number of debilitating, and
inherent weaknesses. In that sense, the JNA offensive
failed even before it had begun. The leaders of Serbia,
Montenegro and members of the presidency from the
two republics (Slobodan Milošević, Borislav Jović, Mo-
4.2.2020. 19:34:02
 The Croatian Nation’s Struggle for Survival, 1991-1995
zabrana prodaje oružja Jugoslaviji.421 U Beogradu je 30.
rujna, na sastanku članova Štaba Vrhovne komande sa
zapovjednicima strategijskih i operativnih sastava, do-
govorena korekcija ratnoga plana. Odluka je bila “preći
u ofanzivno-defanzivna dejstva, sa ciljem: ostvariti blo-
kadu delova Hrvatske, naneti odlučan poraz ustaškim
snagama u Dalmaciji i istočnoj Hrvatskoj, a zatim va-
trenim udarima po vitalnim objektima Hrvatske prisiliti
vrhovništvo da omogući izvlačenje naših snaga na liniji
koja je omeđena ugroženim narodima”.422 Provedba re-
H
duciranoga plana počela je 30. rujna, a za manje od 10
dana odustalo se od većine ciljeva iz njega.423
Dok je JNA s pomagačima izvodila reduciranu na-
padnu operaciju, srbijansko je vrhovništvo zaključilo
da rat treba privesti kraju. Na sjednici dijela članova
Predsjedništva SFRJ i Slobodana Miloševića s vojnim
M
vrhom 5. listopada 1991., general Kadijević tražio je
opću mobilizaciju, premda je nekoliko dana prije tvr-
dio da je “za konačan uspeh” dostatno još šest brigada
s 30.000 ljudi. Milošević i Jović odbili su prijedlog, a Jo-
vić je tražio da se razradi koncept mirovne inicijative
kombiniran s koncepcijom sile “radi odvraćanja od rata
D
i prelaska na političko rešenje”. Idućega su dana Milo-
šević i Jović odlučili da ne idu “na ratnu opciju u meri
koja nije potrebna i da (ne) ginemo za ono što može-
mo da postignemo pregovorima”. Prihvatili su zahtjev
ministara EZ-a o prekidu vatre “sa ciljem da kasarne u
Hrvatskoj oslobodimo i deblokiramo bez žrtava, a da
C
vojsku orjentišemo na odbranu već oslobođene terito-
rije. Bez obzira što vojska misli”. Popodne istoga dana
Predsjedništvo SFRJ je “donelo takvu odluku i ovlastilo
vojsku da pregovara o njenoj realizaciji”.424 Predsjedniš-
tvo je najavilo prekid vatre od strane JNA, ali je tražilo
D
jamstvo EZ-a da će to napraviti i Hrvatska. Tražilo je i da
se do ponoći 8. listopada deblokiraju garnizoni JNA i
omogući izvlačenje ljudstva i opreme. U suprotnom je
prijetilo da će JNA “nastaviti započetu operaciju oslo-
bađanja garnizona u Republici Hrvatskoj”.425 Bio je to
421 ICTY: Rezolucija 713 Vijeća sigurnosti UN-a od 25. 9.
1991.
422 Jevrem COKIĆ, Početak kraja, Srpska knjiga, Ruma,
2008., 258-269.
423 D. MARIJAN, “Zamisao i propast napadne operacije
JNA”, 269-270.
424 B. JOVIĆ, Poslednji dani SFRJ, 391-392.
425 ICTY: Komanda 5. korpusa, Odluka Predsjedništva SFRJ
pov. br. 14-377/1 od 8. 10. 1991.
175
Domovinski rat 04-02-2020 Knjiga 1.indd 175
mir Bulatović, Branko Kostić, Veljko Kadijević and Adžić)
held a meeting on September 20, 1991. General Adžić, at
that meeting, informed the others that mobilization had
failed and that a new “less ambitious plan” would have to
be prepared.
After the failure of the strategic offensive of Septem-
ber 20-21, 1991, it took about ten days for the JNA and
the Serbian TO to regroup and prepare for new offensive
operations. The Serbs benefited greatly, at that time,
from UN Security Council Resolution 713, which, on Sep-
tember 25, put an arms embargo on Yugoslavia. On Sep-
tember 30 in Belgrade, the members of the General Staff
and commanders of the strategic and operative forma-
tions agreed to alter the war plan. They decided that the
JNA would simultaneously “engage in offensive and de-
fensive actions with the aim of: placing parts of Croatia
under blockade, inflicting a decisive defeat on the Cro-
atian Fascist forces in Dalmatia and eastern Croatia and
then shelling and rocketing vital locations in Croatia and
in that way force the Croatian government to allow our
troops to pull out along the line which is surrounded by
the threatened peoples”. The implementation of the new
plan started on September 30. In less than 10 days the
Serbs gave up on most of the objectives from the plan.
As the JNA with its helpers was trying to realize the
new plan, the Serbian leadership concluded that the war
should be ended. Some members of the Presidency met
Milošević and the JNA leadership on October 5, 1991.
General Kadijević requested general mobilization, even
though only a few days before he had claimed that, “for
the offensive to succeed” an additional six brigades with
30,000 men were needed. Milošević and Jović rejected
Kadijević’s request and Jović demanded that a concept
of a peace initiative combined with a concept of force
be developed for the “purpose of moving away from war
and focusing on a political solution”. The following day
Milošević and Jović decided to abstain from “the unnec-
essary degree of the war option because there’s no point
R
in dying in war for what we can achieve by negotiations”.
Milošević and Jović accepted the request made by the
EC ministers for a cease-fire “because we want to lift the
blockade of the barracks in Croatia without suffering
casualties and we also want to use the army for defend-
ing the liberated territories. Regardless of how the army
may feel about it”. In the afternoon on the same day the
Presidency of the SFRY “reached that decision and au-
thorized the army to negotiate its realization”. The Pres-
idency of the SFRY announced a cease-fire on the part of
4.2.2020. 19:34:02
 Davor Marijan • Rat za opstojnost Hrvata, 1991. - 1995.
H
M
uvod u duge pregovore o izvlačenju JNA iz Hrvatske.
Nakon djelomičnog realiziranja armijskih zadata-
ka stvoren je svojevrsni pat-položaj, koji je dugoročno
išao protiv srpskih interesa. Srbija se morala zadovolji-
D
ti ograničenim uspjehom, nadajući se da će mirovne
snage UN-a koje su dolazile na ratna područja osigura-
ti njezine teritorijalne stečevine. Kompromis je, uz asi-
stenciju međunarodne zajednice, riješen sporazumom
od 23. studenoga 1991. o premještanju preostalih sna-
C
ga 5. vojne oblasti JNA s područja Hrvatske i ostavljanju
oduzetog oružja TO-a hrvatskoj strani. Premještanje je
završilo do 30. prosinca 1991. godine. Na Visu i Lastovu
ostao je dio efektiva Ratne mornarice, čije je premje-
štanje JNA završila krajem svibnja 1992. godine.426
426 D. MARIJAN, Slom Titove armije, 317-321.
176
Domovinski rat 04-02-2020 Knjiga 1.indd 176
Tenk JNA zaustavljen kod Starog Grabovca u zapad-
noj Slavoniji, listopad 1991.; poraz JNA u Hrvatskoj
1991. (autor fotografije: Željko Gašparović).
JNA tank stopped at Stari Grabovac in Western
Slavonia, October, 1991; the defeat of the JNA in
Croatia in 1991 (Photograph by Željko Gašparović).
the JNA and requested guarantees from the EC that Cro-
atia would follow suit. The Presidency of the SFRY also
demanded that the blockades of the garrisons in Croa-
tia were to be lifted by midnight on October 8 and that
Croatia should not interfere with the withdrawal of the
men and equipment from the barracks. If Croatia refused
to cooperate, the Presidency warned, the JNA “would re-
sume its offensive with the aim of lifting the blockades
by force in the Republic of Croatia.”. This was the start of
long negotiations about pulling the JNA out of Croatia.
The JNA’s offensive had failed, but it had still man-
aged to achieve some of the objectives laid out in the
two plans, resulting in a stalemated military, and politi-
cal, situation that, in the long run, did not favor the Serbs.
Serbia now had to rely on the UN peacekeeping force
D
that was being deployed to the crisis areas to secure its
territorial conquests. A compromise, brokered by the in-
ternational community was reached on November 23,
1991. Both sides signed an agreement about withdraw-
ing the remaining troops belonging to the 5th Military
R
District from Croatia and handing over the weapons and
equipment taken previously from the Croatian TO to the
Croatian forces. The withdrawal of the remaining forces
from Croatia was completed by December 30, 1991. El-
ements of the JNA Navy remained on Vis and Lastovo.
These forces finally left Croatia at the end of May, 1992.
4.2.2020. 19:34:03
 The Croatian Nation’s Struggle for Survival, 1991-1995

ISTOČNO BOJIŠTE THE EASTERN THEATER OF

OPERATIONS
Istočno bojište, tj. istočna Slavonija, Baranja i za-
padni Srijem bili su zahtjevni za obranu zbog istočne The Eastern Theater of Operations comprised eastern
granice koja je ujedno bila i državna granica Hrvatske Slavonia, Baranja and western Sirmium. The region was
i Srbije. Granica se većim dijelom poklapa s riječnim difficult to defend because at its eastern extremity there
tokom Dunava od granice s Mađarskom do Iloka. Na is the Croatian –Serbian border. The border follows, for
tom dijelu granice postoje tri mostovna prijelaza: Ba- the most part, the course of the Danube River from the
tina u Baranji, Erdut istočno od Osijeka i kod Iloka. No border with Hungary and as far as the town of Ilok. Along
od Iloka u obliku teritorijalnog džepa počinje kopnena the Danube stretch of the border with Croatia there are
H
granica koja završava na rijeci Savi blizu županjskog three bridge border crossings: Batina border crossing in
sela Račinovci. Glavne prometnice su Zagreb – Lipovac Baranja, Erdut border crossing to the east of Osijek and
– Beograd na južnom i Podravska magistrala na sjever- border crossing at Ilok. But from Ilok the border bulges
nom dijelu regije. Zbog šumskog kompleksa Spačve away from the Danube and runs through the area as far
koji se lako mogao braniti veći je značaj imala Podrav- as the Sava River at the village of Račinovci near Župan-
M
ska magistrala i posebice smjer Šid – Vinkovci koji je ja. The main lines of communications are the Zagreb –
vodio na Đakovačku zaravan, a s nje na nekoliko smje- Lipovac – Belgrade highway in the southern part of the
rova na kojima je bio moguć prodor u dubinu Hrvatske. region and the Podravina highway in the northern part
Južna granica duž rijeke Save bila je ujedno i granica s of the region. From a strategic perspective the Podravina
Bosnom i Hercegovinom i od ljeta 1991. konstantno je
highway was more important than the Zagreb – Lipov-
postojala mogućnost da snage JNA pokušaju nasilan
ac – Belgrade highway. There were a number of reasons
prijelaz rijeke i napad s boka na hrvatske snage.
D
for that, two of the most important ones being the easily
Iz hrvatske obrambene perspektive i demograf-
defensible Spačva forest complex and the Šid – Vinkovci
ska struktura je bila nepovoljna. Premda ni u jednoj
stretch of the highway which led to the Đakovo plateau
od graničnih općina, posebice u gradovima, Srbi nisu
from where an invader could easily advance deep into
imali većinu, bilo ih je dovoljno da uz pomoć garnizo-
Croatian territory. The Croatian southern border – the
na JNA ugroze i otežaju organizaciju hrvatske obrane.
border with Bosnia and Herzegovina – ran along the
C
Žarišta srpske pobune bila su sela s većinskim srpskim
course of the Sava River. From the summer of 1991 the
stanovništvom. Oko Vukovara to su bili Negoslavci,
Croatian strategists were acutely aware that at any time
Bršadin, Pačetin, Trpinja, Bobota i Borovo Selo, oko
the JNA could attempt a crossing and attack the Croatian
Osijeka Tenja i Bijelo Brdo, a kod Vinkovaca Mirkovci.
forces in the area from the flank.
Ostala su sela uglavnom bila mirna, a neka su djelovala
The demographic structure of the region was un-
po potrebi vodstva pobunjenika. Posljednja značajka
D
favorable to Croatia. It has to be pointed out that Serbs
bio je nepovoljan mirnodopski raspored JNA u regiji i
did not make up a majority in any of the border munic-
bliskom susjedstvu. Snage JNA bile su dostatne da u
ipalities, especially in the urban centers. However, there
početnoj eskalaciji podrže srpsku pobunu, a u otvore-
were enough of them to, with the help of the JNA gar-
nom ratu napadnu jakim snagama iz Srbije i Bosne i
risons, make a lot of trouble for the Croatian defenders.
Hercegovine. Uz to je utjecaj srbijanskih struktura, po-
The hotbeds of the Serb rebellion were predominantly
R
sebice MUP-a Republike Srbije, na pobunjene Srbe bio
Serbian villages in the region. Around Vukovar these vil-
vrlo velik.427
lages were Negoslavci, Bršadin, Pačetin, Trpinja, Bobota
Uz policiju u policijskim upravama Osijek, Vinkov-
and Borovo Selo, around Osijek Tenja and Bijelo Brdo and
ci i Vukovar, hrvatske snage su bile organizirane u re-
near Vinkovci the village of Mirkovci. The other villages
gionalni ZNG koji je potkraj rujna postao Operativna
offered overt support to the JNA and rebel Serbs only
when directly instructed to do so by this or that rebel
427 ICTY: Reynaud THEUNENS, “Vojni aspekt uloge Jovice commander. Making things even worse for the defend-
Stanišića i Franka Simatovića u sukobima u Hrvatskoj
i Bosni i Hercegovini (1991–1995)”, Izveštaj za potrebe
ers was the fact that many JNA units were stationed in
predmeta br. IT-03-69, Haag, 30. 6. 2007. the region. The JNA forces there were strong enough

177

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 Davor Marijan • Rat za opstojnost Hrvata, 1991. - 1995.
H
M
D
Vukovar tijekom i neposredno nakon službenoga završetka proce-
sa mirne reintegracije – posljedice napada srpskih snaga i razaran-
ja 1991. godine (autor fotografija: Marko Perić).
C
zona Osijek. Uz jednu djelatnu brigadu ZNG-a do kraja
godine gotovo u svim općinama osnovane su pričuvne
brigade ZNG-a, tj. HV-a. Na drugoj strani bila je JNA iz
sastava 17. korpusa sa sjedištem u Tuzli i garnizonima
u Đakovu, Našicama, Osijeku, Slavonskom Brodu, Vin-
kovcima i Vukovaru. U susjednoj Vojvodini i Mačvi bio
je jak kontingent 12. novosadskog korpusa. Pobunjeni
su Srbi bili organizirani u samostalne skupine po uzoru
na prostornu strukturu Teritorijalne obrane. Veličina tih
skupina ovisila je o veličini naselja i broju stanovnika.428
Nakon što je izbio rat u Sloveniji na granicu Hrvat-
ske i Srbije, odnosno Vojvodine tijekom 2. i 3. srpnja
1991. stigle su četiri mehanizirane brigade JNA iz Vojvo-
dine, Srijema i Beograda. Već u svibnju JNA je nadzirala
mostove na Dunavu kod Batine i Iloka, a u srpnju kod
428 D. MARIJAN, Obrana i pad Vukovara, 37.
178
Domovinski rat 04-02-2020 Knjiga 1.indd 178
Vukovar during and in the immediate aftermath of the official
completion of the process of peaceful reintegration of the Cro-
atian Danube region – the damage the city sustained during the
Serb attack in 1991 is clearly visible (Photographs by Marko Perić).
to prop up the rebellion in its initial stage. The JNA for-
mations stationed just across the Serbia and Bosnia and
D
Herzegovinian borders were also strong. When Serbia
launched its open aggression against Croatia these for-
mations moved into the attack. It has to be pointed out
that Serbian political, security and military structures ex-
erted a high degree of influence on the rebel Serbs, espe-
cially the MUP of the Republic of Serbia.
R
The Croatian defense force in the region was orga-
nized into the regional ZNG. At the end of September
the regional ZNG became Operative Zone Osijek. There
were also the police forces in the PU Osijek, Vinkovci and
Vukovar. In addition to one professional brigade, by the
end of the year, in most municipalities reserve brigades
of the ZNG, later the Croatian Army, had been formed.
Ranged against these forces were the JNA forces from
XVII Corps headquartered at Tuzla and garrisons in Đa-
4.2.2020. 19:34:04
 The Croatian Nation’s Struggle for Survival, 1991-1995
H
Erduta. U kolovozu je okupirala Baranju i napala Vuko-
M
var. Vukovar, grad i općina uz Dunav, za obranu je bila
u nezavidnom položaju, uvjerljivo najtežem na istoku
Hrvatske. Graničila je sa Srbijom, a oko grada je imala
nekoliko sela s većinskim srpskim stanovništvom koje je
od svibnja 1991. bilo u stanju pobune. Intenzivne bor-
be za grad počele su 25. kolovoza. U teškim borbama
D
obrana grada je odbila napade na grad iako su JNA i po-
bunjeni Srbi zauzeli dio okolnih sela s hrvatskim stanov-
ništvom. Do kraja rujna Vukovar je opskrbljen oružjem
i opremom te pojačan manjim brojem dragovoljaca iz
raznih krajeva Hrvatske. Obrana grada tada je imala oko
C
1800 naoružanih ljudi. U drugoj polovici rujna propa-
la je napadajna operacija JNA, pa je u njezinom vrhu
donesena odluka da se grad zauzme kako bi se dobilo
kompaktno područje u istočnoj Hrvatskoj. Za osvajanje
grada formirane su dvije namjenske skupine, koje su
prema smjerovima napada dobile imena Taktička grupa
D
Sjever i Operativna grupa Jug. Zadatak TG-a Sjever bio
je zauzimanje Borova naselja, a OG-a Jug grada Vuko-
vara. Sredinom studenoga u napadu na Vukovar bilo
je angažirano oko 7800 ljudi iz sastava JNA, 2186 ljudi
iz TO-a Srbije, 112 tenkova, 68 oklopnih transportera i
borbenih vozila pješaštva te 145 oruđa za topničku pot-
poru. Vukovar je odsječen od Vinkovaca 1. listopada i
nakon teških i krvavih borbi zauzet 18., odnosno do 20.
studenoga. Pojedine skupine pripadnika hrvatskih oru-
žanih snaga uspjele su se probiti iz Vukovara i uz veliki
napor doći do Vinkovaca. Na poljoprivrednom dobru
Ovčara u blizini Vukovara u noći 20./21. studenoga ubi-
jeno je najmanje 200, od 266 ranjenika i medicinskog
osoblja odvedenoga iz vukovarske bolnice. Hrvatsko
stanovništvo i ranjenici iz bolnice koji nisu pobijeni na
179
Domovinski rat 04-02-2020 Knjiga 1.indd 179
Selo Bogdanovci kraj Vukovara (istočna Slavonija), posljedice na-
pada srpskih snaga i razaranja 1991. godine (autor fotografije:
Marko Perić).
The village of Bogdanovci near Vukovar (eastern Slavonia) – the
results of the attack of the Serb forces on the village in 1991
(Photograph by Marko Perić).
kovo, Našice, Osijek, Slavonski Brod, Vinkovci and Vuko-
var. In neighboring Vojvodina and Mačva the JNA had XII
Novi Sad Corps. The rebel Serbs were formed into inde-
pendent detachments on the TO model. The size of the
detachments depended on the size of a given village and
number of residents.
When the war in Slovenia broke out four mecha-
nized JNA brigades from Vojvodina, Sirmium and Bel-
grade arrived at the Serbian (Vojvodina)-Croatian border
on July 2 and July 3, 1991. Already in May, 1991, the JNA
took control of the bridges over the Danube in Batina
and Ilok. In July the JNA took control of the bridge at
Erdut as well. In August the JNA occupied Baranja and
attacked Vukovar. Vukovar, both the city and the munic-
ipality, were a nightmare to defend. The situation there
for the defenders was worse than in any other part of
eastern Croatia. The municipality of Vukovar bordered
with Serbia and included a number of predominantly
Serb villages. These villages, from May, 1991, were in a
state of rebellion. Intensive fighting for the city started
on August 25. The defenders managed to repulse the
JNA’s determined attacks on the city. However, the JNA
and rebel Serbs did capture a number of predominantly
R
Croatian surrounding villages. At that point in time 1,800
men defended the city. By the end of September the de-
fenders received a quantity of weapons and equipment.
Also, a small number of volunteers from various parts of
Croatia arrived in the city. In the second half of Septem-
ber the JNA strategic offensive against Croatia failed. The
JNA leadership of the JNA, therefore, decided to capture
the city of Vukovar so as to acquire a compact area in
eastern Croatia. Two groups were formed for the pur-
pose of taking the city and designated according to their
4.2.2020. 19:34:05
 Davor Marijan • Rat za opstojnost Hrvata, 1991. - 1995.
H
Prognani Hrvati iz Iloka, 18. listopada 1991. (autor fotografije:
Marko Perić)
M
A column of Croatian refugees from Ilok, October 18, 1991
(Photograph by) Marko Perić)
Ovčari od 19. do 23. studenoga u organizaciji JNA na-
D
pustili su razrušeni grad. Nekoliko dana prije Vukovara,
11. studenoga JNA je zauzela i selo Bogdanovce koje je
u okruženju bilo od 1. listopada.429
Za odsijecanje Vukovara od Vinkovaca i onemogu-
ćavanje pomoći zadužena je Gardijska mehanizirana
divizija JNA. Na popisu njenih zadaća bilo je zauzima-
C
nje Iloka i okolnih sela. Pritiscima, prijetnjama i zauzi-
manjem dijela sela malobrojne hrvatske snage i oko
15.000 civila dovedeni su u bezizlazan sporazum. U
Šidu u nazočnosti predstavnika Misije EZ-a 14. listopada
sastavljen je “sporazum” o predaji oružja između pred-
stavnika Iloka i komandanta Gardijske divizije. Iz Iloka
je protjerano oko 10.000 ljudi, koji su nakon prihvata u
Slavonskom Brodu i Đakovu postupno razmješteni po
unutrašnjosti Hrvatske.430
Tijekom završnih borbi za grad JNA je napravila
prodor na vinkovačkom dijelu bojišta preko rijeke Bo-
sut i zauzela nekoliko sela u općinama Vinkovci i Župa-
nja. Par dana kasnije sličan uspjeh JNA je imala južno od
Osijeka. Posljednje jače borbe na bojištu bile su sredi-
nom prosinca u bližoj okolici Osijeka.431
429 D. MARIJAN, Domovinski rat, 83-84, 89-95.
430 D. MARIJAN, Obrana i pad Vukovara, 169-172.
431 D. MARIJAN, Domovinski rat, 88-89, 96-99.
180
Domovinski rat 04-02-2020 Knjiga 1.indd 180
assigned directions of advance: Tactical Group North
and Operational Group South. TG North was tasked with
capturing Borovo Naselje and OG South was tasked with
capturing Vukovar. In mid-November 7,800 men from
the JNA, 2,186 men from Serbia TO, 112 tanks, 68 APCs
and armored vehicles and 145 artillery pieces were em-
ployed in the battle for Vukovar. On October 1 the JNA
cut off Vukovar from Vinkovci. Finally, after vicious and
bloody fighting, Vukovar fell on November 20. A number
of groups of Croatian soldiers managed to break through
Serb lines and reach safety in Vinkovci. It has to be point-
ed out that many Croatian soldiers lost their lives in the
attempt. On the Ovčara farm near Vukovar, on the night
of November 20-21 at least 200 people were murdered,
out of 266 wounded people and hospital staff taken from
the Vukovar hospital earlier that day. Those Croats who
were not killed in Ovčara were transported by the JNA
out of the ruined city between November 19 to 23. A few
days before the fall of Vukovar, on November 11 the JNA
captured the village of Bogdanovci which had been un-
der siege since October 1.
The Guards Mechanized Division of the JNA was
tasked with cutting off Vukovar from Vinkovci and pre-
venting the Croatian Army from sending help to the be-
leaguered defenders of Vukovar. The list of the Division’s
objectives included Ilok and a number of surrounding
villages. Ilok was defended by a small number of Croa-
tian soldiers. About 15,000 civilians lived in the town. By
various means – threats, military action, maltreatment
of civilians – the Guards Division forced the defenders
and civilians to accede to an agreement which was re-
ally tantamount to unconditional surrender. In Šid, in
the presence of representatives of the Mission of the
D
EC, on October 14 an “agreement” on handing over the
weapons was signed by the representative of Ilok and
the commander of the Guards Division. 10,000 civil-
ians were expelled from Ilok. The refugees were initially
transported to Slavonski Brod and Đakovo, and then,
R
in groups, they were gradually moved to the interior of
Croatia, where adequate accommodation was provided
for them.
During the final phase of the Battle of Vukovar the
JNA crossed the Bosut River, advanced in the Vinkovci
area and captured a number of villages in the municipal-
ities of Vinkovci and Županja. A few days later the JNA
achieved a similar success to the south of Osijek. The last
of heavy fighting in the area occurred in mid-December
near Osijek.
4.2.2020. 19:34:06
 The Croatian Nation’s Struggle for Survival, 1991-1995
ZAPADNOSLAVONSKO
BOJIŠTE
Zapadna Slavonija je područje između Mađar-
ske na sjeveru i Bosne i Hercegovine na jugu. Južna
granica je obilježila bojište jer je ispod nje područje
Bosanske Krajine s većinskim srpskim stanovništvom
na kojem je uz to bio i respektabilan potencijal JNA.
Najvažnije prometnice su uzdužne u zahvatu pravca
Zagreb – Novska – Nova Gradiška na južnom dijelu
H
područja i Podravska magistrala na sjevernom dijelu
regije. Najvažnija poprečna prometnica je Stara Gra-
diška – Okučani – Lipik – Daruvar – Grubišno Polje –
Virovitica. Demografska struktura bila je izrazito ne-
povoljna za obranu Hrvatske. U Pakracu su Srbi imali
M
relativnu većinu, a bili su brojni i u ostalim općinama
(Daruvar, Grubišno Polje) koje su se prostirale po za-
padnoslavonskom gorju na kojem su i vođene najjače
borbe. JNA je imala nekoliko uporišta, no uglavnom u
mjestima s većinskim hrvatskim stanovništvom. Opa-
snost od presijecanja regije na pravcu Bosanska Gra-
D
diška – Pakrac – Daruvar – Virovitica i odsijecanja Sla-
vonije od matice države bila je realna u ljeto 1991., što
bojištu daje značaj jednog od najvažnijih na ratištu.
Policija je bila organizirana u četiri policijske upra-
ve: Bjelovar, Kutina, Osijek i Slavonski Brod. Glavne
snage ZNG-a bile su iz Operativne zone Bjelovar, te
C
manjim dijelom iz operativnih zona Osijek i Zagreb. U
zoni su bile snage JNA 5. korpusa iz Banje Luke i 17.
korpusa iz Tuzle. Srpske pobunjeničke snage u zapad-
noj Slavoniji nastale su najvećim dijelom na postoje-
ćoj strukturi unutarnjih poslova i narodne obrane i
D
prozvane su Teritorijalna obrana Zapadne Slavonije.432
Brojna srpska zajednica u Okučanima i na područ-
ju planinskoga masiva Psunja, Papuka i Bilogore nije
mirno prihvatila proglašenje hrvatske neovisnosti.
Sigurnosno stanje u regiji naglo se pogoršalo, a po-
bunjene srpske skupine su u maniri najbližoj hajduči-
ji napadale prometnice i naselja. U Okučanima je 12.
kolovoza 1991. proglašena Srpska autonomna oblast
Zapadna Slavonija, nakon čega su pojačani napadi po-
bunjenih Srba na hrvatska naselja i odmetanje dijela
policajaca Srba u srpsku miliciju. Pobuna je eskalirala
sredinom kolovoza u Okučanima i Pakracu. Zahvalju-
jući intervenciji JNA iz Bjelovara i Banje Luke, Okučani
432 D. MARIJAN, Domovinski rat, 102-104.
181
Domovinski rat 04-02-2020 Knjiga 1.indd 181
WESTERN SLAVONIA
THEATER OF OPERATIONS
Western Slavonia is situated between Hungary in
the north and Bosnia and Herzegovina in the south. The
southern boundary was of immense strategic importance
during the war because beyond it the Bosanska Krajina
area lay in which Serbs made up a near-absolute majori-
ty and where strong JNA units were stationed. The most
important roads stretched from east to west – the Zagreb
– Novska – Nova Gradiška road in the southern part of the
region and the Podravina highway in the northern part
of the region. The most important road stretching from
north to south was the Stara Gradiška – Okučani – Lipik
– Daruvar – Grubišno Polje – Virovitica road. The demo-
graphic structure of the region did not favor the Croatian
defenders. In Pakrac Serbs made up a relative majority.
There were also numerous Serb minorities in other mu-
nicipalities (Daruvar, Grubišno Polje). These municipal-
ities stretched over the western Slavonian mountains
and fighting there was heavier than in other areas of the
theater. The JNA had a number of strongholds in the area
but most of them were in predominately Croatian towns
and villages. In the summer of 1991 the JNA was poised
to cut the region in half by advancing in the direction of
Bosanska Gradiška – Pakrac – Daruvar – Virovitica and
thus cutting off Slavonia from the rest of the country. That
factor made western Slavonia on of the crucial theaters of
operations in the entire theater of war.
The police force was organized into four police ad-
ministrations: Bjelovar, Kutina, Osijek and Slavonski Brod.
The bulk of the ZNG came from Operative Zone Bjelovar
and the remainder from OZ Osijek and OZ Zagreb. The
JNA V Corps from Banja Luka and XVII Corps from Tuzla
were stationed in the area. The rebel Serb forces in west-
ern Slavonia were created, for the most part, on the exist-
ing structure of the Internal Affairs and National Defense
and designated the TO Western Slavonia.
R
The sizeable Serb community in Okučani and in the
area of the Psunj, Papuk and Bilogora massif did not accept
the proclamation of Croatian independence. The security
situation in the region quickly deteriorated with armed
groups of Serb civilians roaming the countryside and at-
tacking roads and villages as brigands used to do in ages
past. On August 12, 1991, the Serbs proclaimed the Serbi-
an Autonomous Region of Western Slavonia in Okučani.
Immediately after the proclamation the attacks of rebel
Serbs on Croatian villages intensified. A large number
4.2.2020. 19:34:06
 Davor Marijan • Rat za opstojnost Hrvata, 1991. - 1995.
H
M
D
Hrvatski sanitet u akciji: dr. Miroslav Kinčl „Igla”, Prekopakra, stu-
deni 1991. (autor fotografija: Toni Hnojčik).
C
su pretvoreni u tampon-zonu i uporište za nastavak po-
bune i uvođenje postrojbi JNA u zapadnu Slavoniju. Do
sredine rujna 1991. u regiji je vođen pravi rat između
hrvatskih snaga i pobunjenih Srba i JNA. Nakon hrvat-
skih napada na objekte JNA, Banjalučki korpus je sredi-
nom rujna napravio pomake koji su bili najava napadne
operacije JNA. Do kraja rujna Banjalučki korpus JNA je
spojio snage iz Stare Gradiške i Okučana i napao Nov-
sku, Lipik, Pakrac i Novu Gradišku. Do sredine listopa-
da hrvatske snage su zaustavile napade JNA, a potkraj
mjeseca počele su s operacijama oslobađanja zauzetog
teritorija. Do kraja godine oslobođeno je nekoliko sela
na novljanskom dijelu bojišta i dva na novogradiškom
dijelu bojišta. Najveći uspjesi postignuti su u čišćenju
brdskog područja Bilogore od snaga pobunjenih Srba i
njihovom odbacivanju od Grubišnog Polja i Daruvara u
borbama od 31. listopada do 3. studenog. Krajem stu-
182
Domovinski rat 04-02-2020 Knjiga 1.indd 182
Novi Varoš, zapadna Slavonija, druga polovica rujna 1991.: tužna
kolona junaka koji su se vratili na područje pod kontrolom nepri-
jateljskih vojnika da bi izvukli tijelo poginuloga suborca i dostoj-
no ga pokopali; neki od njih su tijekom rata postali visoki časnici
HV-a: Ante Gotovina – tada zapovjednik izvidničke satnije, Damir
Tomljanović – Gavran … (autor fotografije: Mario Filipi).
Novi Varoš, Western Slavonia, second half of September, 1991:
Grief-stricken heroes who returned to enemy-controlled area
in order to recover the body of a killed comrade and give him a
proper burial. Later in the war some of the soldiers in the photo-
graph would become high-ranking officers in the Croatian Army
(from left to right): Ante Gotovina – then commander of a recon-
naissance company, Damir “Gavran” Tomljanović … (Photograph
by Mario Filipi).
Croatian Medical Corps in action; Doctor Miroslav “Needle” Kinčl;
Prekopakra, November, 1991 (Photographs by Toni Hnojčik).
of police officers of Serb ethnicity deserted the Croatian
police force and joined the Serbian militia. The rebellion
D
escalated further in Okučani and Pakrac in mid-August.
JNA forces from Bjelovar and Banja Luka intervened and
turned Okučani into a buffer zone, a launching pad for
spreading the rebellion and staging area for JNA forces
for their deployment in western Slavonia. Until mid-Sep-
tember, 1991, fighting raged between the JNA and rebel
R
Serbs on one side and Croatian forces on the other. Af-
ter Croatian forces attacked JNA installations Banja Luka
Corps moved into action in mid-September, heralding a
JNA offensive. By the end of September Banja Luka Corps
linked the forces in Okučani with those in Stara Gradiška
and attacked Novska, Lipik, Pakrac and Nova Gradiška.
By mid-October the Croatian forces stopped the JNA’s
advance and towards the end of the month mounted
operations with the aim of liberating portions of the oc-
4.2.2020. 19:34:06
 The Croatian Nation’s Struggle for Survival, 1991-1995

denoga počelo je čišćenje slavonskih planina Papuka i cupied territory. By the end of the year the Croatian forces
Bilogore, što je obavljeno sredinom prosinca. Lokalne had liberated a few villages in the Novska area and two
snage pobunjenih Srba su razbijene, a dijelovi Banja- villages in the Nova Gradiška area. Most successes were
lučkog korpusa na novljanskom pravcu odbačeni su achieved in the mopping-up operations in the mountain-
prema Okučanima. Tijek operacija okončan je primir- ous region of Bilogora. The Serb forces there were pushed
jem 3. siječnja 1992. godine.433 back from Grubišno Polje and Daruvar during the fighting
that lasted from October 31 until November 3. At the end
BOJIŠTE BANOVINE I SISKA of November Croatian forces began mopping up the Pap-
uk Mountain and Bilogora Mountain. These operations
Banovina je regija omeđena rijekama Kupom na ended successfully in mid-December. The local rebel Serb
H
sjeveru, Savom na istoku, Unom na jugu i Petrovom forces were destroyed and elements of Banja Luka Corps
gorom na zapadu. Regija je 1991. bila podijeljena na in the Novska area pushed back towards Okučani. These
području općina Dvor na Uni, Glina, Hrvatska Kostaj- operations ended with the signing of a ceasefire agree-
nica, Petrinja i dijelu općine Sisak. Ratne okolnosti su ment on January 3, 1992.
ovom bojištu pridružile i područje Topuskog koji je
BANOVINA AND SISAK
M
bio istočni dio kordunske općine Vrginmost. U regi-
ji su Srbi imali izrazitu većinu u Dvoru na Uni, Glini, THEATER OF OPERATIONS
Kostajnici, u Petrinji su imali neznatnu većinu, a u
Sisku su bili u izrazitoj manjini. Rijeka Una je granica Banovina is a region enclosed by the Kupa River on
s BiH i općinama Bosanski Novi i Bosanska Dubica u its western side, the Sava River on its eastern side, the Una
kojima su Srbi većinsko stanovništvo, te Bosanskom River on its southern side and Petrova Gora Mountain on
Krupom s većinskim muslimanskim stanovništvom.
D
its western side. In 1991 the region was divided among
Zbog visokog postotka srpskoga stanovništva i dijela
the following municipalities: Dvor na Uni, Glina, Hrvatska
susjedne BiH s dominantnim srpskim stanovništvom,
Kostajnica, Petrinja and Sisak (in part). The vagaries of war
regija je bila kao predodređena za pobunu.
joined the Topusko area to the Banovina and Sisak theater
Policija je bila iz Policijske uprave Sisak, a HV iz
of operations. The Topusko area was located in the east-
Operativne grupe za Sisak i Baniju. Glavnina hrvatskih
ern part of the municipality of Vrginmost. Serbs formed
C
snaga bila je u Sisku, uključujući 2. djelatnu brigadu
an absolute majority in Dvor na Uni, Kostajnica and Glina.
ZNG-a, a ostala jača uporišta bila su u hrvatskim na-
In Petrinja Serbs made up a relative majority while in Si-
seljima u dolini rijeke Une i uz rijeku Savu. Jugosla-
sak they were a minority group. The border with Bosnia
venska narodna armija je na Banovini imala snage iz
and Herzegovina in the region ran along the course of the
sastava 10. korpusa iz Zagreba s glavnim uporištem
Una River. Right across the border were the municipalities
u Petrinji. Nakon propasti napadne operacije JNA, za
D
of Bosanski Novi, Bosanska Dubica and Bosanska Krupa.
snage na Banovini i Kordunu 25. rujna je osnovana
The first two municipalities were predominately Serbian
Prva operativna grupa (OG-1), čija je Komanda bila
while Bosanska Krupa was predominately Muslim. With
na Petrovoj gori. Pobunjeni Srbi na Banovini imali su
a high percentage of Serbs making up the population in
dio policijske strukture koji se odmetnuo i prešao u
the region including both sides of the border rebellion
sastav Milicije SAO Krajine. Teritorijalna obrana pobu-
was bound to erupt there.
R
njenih Srba nastala je izravno iz prostorne strukture
The police force there came from Police Administra-
TO-a RH.434
tion Sisak and the Croatian Army forces stationed in the
Do kraja srpnja 1991. pobunjeni Srbi su uz pomoć
region belonged to OG for Sisak and Banija. The bulk of
JNA eliminirali hrvatska uporišta na području općine
the Croatian forces were in Sisak, including the 2nd Bri-
Dvor na Uni i zauzeli grad Glinu. Do druge polovice
gade of the ZNG. Strong Croatian forces were also sta-
rujna 1991. JNA i pobunjeni Srbi zauzeli su veći dio
tioned in Croatian villages in the Una Valley and along
the Sava River. The JNA in Banovina had forces from X
433 Isto, 104-121. Corps headquartered in Zagreb. Its main stronghold
434 Isto, 121-123. was in Petrinja. When the JNA strategic offensive against

183

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 Davor Marijan • Rat za opstojnost Hrvata, 1991. - 1995.
Banovine i Pounja, Hrvatska Kostajnica okupirana je
12./13. rujna, Topusko dan kasnije, a Petrinja 21. rujna.
Do kraja rujna JNA je izbila na rijeku Kupu s izuzet-
kom jednog dijela zapadno od Siska. Na tom je dijelu
pretrpjela neuspjeh u napadu 17. i 18. listopada kod
Novog Farkašića. Neuspješno je 2. studenoga završio
i napad na hrvatsko uporište Sunju, jugoistočno od
Siska. Potkraj listopada 1991. hrvatske snage su po-
stale agilnije na području južno od rijeke Kupe, no bez
većih uspjeha. Najozbiljniji pokušaj hrvatskih snaga
H
bila je operacija Vihor, pokušaj nasilnog prijelaza rije-
ke Kupe prema Glini od 11. do 13. prosinca, što je na-
kon početnog uspjeha i stvaranja plitkog mostobrana
na kraju neuspješno završilo, uz gubitke u ljudstvu i
borbenoj tehnici.435
M
ŠIRE PODRUČJE ZAGREBA
Kao upravno, gospodarsko i prometno sjedište,
ujedno i najveći grad u Hrvatskoj, Zagreb je imao izni-
mnu važnost u sustavu obrane. U gradu je bilo sjedi-
D
šte MUP-a RH i Policijske uprave Zagreb, kao i Zapo-
vjedništvo Zbora narodne garde, odnosno od druge
polovice rujna 1991. Glavnog stožera HV-a, iz kojeg su
vođene postrojbe ZNG-a i HV-a na terenu. Operativ-
no zapovijedanje hrvatskim snagama bilo je u sklopu
Operativne zone Zagreb. U Zagrebu je bilo jedno od
C
najvećih uporišta JNA i sjedište 5. vojne oblasti, 10.
korpusa i 5. korpusa RZ-a i PZO-a.436
Sredinom rujna 1991. u Zagrebu su hrvatske sna-
ge zauzele dio objekata JNA. U zauzimanju su angaži-
rane sve strukture obrane: policija, ZNG, TO, Narodna
zaštita i naoružani građani. JNA je ostala u nekoliko
vojarni, a u okolici u Dugom Selu, Velikoj Buni, Sa-
moboru i Jastrebarskom. Sve su vojarne bile bloki-
rane snagama iz sastava HV-a, policije, Teritorijalne
obrane, Narodne zaštite i naoružanim građanima.
Dio snaga angažiran je u Zagrebu i neposrednoj oko-
lici sa zadatkom da spriječi prodor oklopništva JNA
iz vojarni u gradu, kao i prema gradu. Zagreb i bliža
okolica uglavnom su bili pošteđeni većih napada JNA.
Ona je povremeno napadala zrakoplovstvom po voj-
nim, komunikacijskim i političkim ciljevima: 22. rujna
bombardirana je Velika Gorica; 4. listopada raketiran
435 Isto, 123-133.
436 Isto, 134.
184
Domovinski rat 04-02-2020 Knjiga 1.indd 184
Croatia failed the JNA formed, on September 25, OG-1
for Banovina and Kordun. The HQ of OG-1 was on Petro-
va Gora. The rebel Serbs in Banovina inherited parts of
the renegade police structures that joined the Serb mi-
litia of the SAO Krajina. The rebel Serbs TO was created
directly from the local structure of the TO Croatia.
By the end of July the rebel Serbs, with the help of the
JNA, had eliminated the Croatian strongholds in the Dvor
na Uni Municipality and captured the city of Glina. By the
second half of September, 1991, the JNA and rebel Serbs
had captured most of Banovina and the Pounje region.
Hrvatska Kostajnica fell on September 12/13, Topusko
one day later and Petrinja on September 21. By the end
of September the JNA reached the Kupa River with the
exception of one pocket of resistance near Sisak. There
the defenders beat back the JNA on October 17-18. On
November 2 the JNA attacked Sunja, a Croatian strong-
hold to the southeast of Sisak but the attack failed. At the
end of October, 1991, the Croatian forces became more
aggressive in the area to the south of the Kupa River, but
to no significant advantage. The most ambitious under-
taking of the Croatian forces was Operation Vihor (Whirl-
wind), an attempt to force a crossing of the Kupa River
and advance on Glina. The operation lasted from Decem-
ber 11 to December 13. Initially everything went well and
the Croatian forces established a small bridgehead on the
opposite bank. But then everything went awry. The Croa-
tian Forces suffered heavy casualties and lost a significant
amount of equipment and were forced to withdraw.
THE WIDER ZAGREB AREA
The strategic importance of Zagreb, the largest city in
D
Croatia and its capital, and also the country’s economic,
administrative and transportation center was immense.
Zagreb was the pivotal factor in the country’s defense
system. The city housed the main offices of the MUP and
Police Administration Zagreb as well as the HQ of the
Croatian National Guard, which was re-designated in the
R
second half of September, 1991, as the General Staff of
the Croatian Army. Operational command of the Croatian
forces was the preserve of OZ Zagreb. On the other hand,
Zagreb was also a JNA stronghold. The HQs of the 5th Mil-
itary District, X Corps and V Corps of the Air Force and Air
Defense were in the capital.
In mid-September, 1991, Croatian forces captured a
number of JNA facilities and installations in Zagreb. All
defensive structures participated in these operations: po-
4.2.2020. 19:34:06
 The Croatian Nation’s Struggle for Survival, 1991-1995
je RTV odašiljač na Sljemenu; 6. listopada raketiran je
RTV toranj na Sljemenu; 7. listopada raketirani su Ban-
ski dvori u pokušaju da se likvidira hrvatski politički
vrh. Dogovorenim izvlačenjem postrojbi JNA u stude-
nom i prosincu sigurnosno stanje u gradu se značaj-
no poboljšalo. Zagreb je 1991. bio mjesto u kojem se
odlučivalo o svim bitnim aspektima obrane Hrvatske i
odmjeravale snage s raspadajućom federacijom i JNA.
Zagreb je bio i glavni psihološki i logistički oslonac hr-
vatskim snagama. Krajem rujna obrana grada Zagre-
H
ba preuzela je obranu lijeve obale Kupe od napada
JNA i pobunjenih Srba s područja Banovine. Najviše
postrojbi HV-a angažirano na drugim dijelovima hr-
vatskog ratišta bilo je iz Zagreba.437
BOJIŠTE KARLOVCA I
M
KORDUNA
Kordun i Karlovac bili su 1991. spoj regije s većin-
skim srpskim stanovništvom i grada u kojem su većina
bili Hrvati. Većinsko hrvatsko stanovništvo na Kordunu
D
bilo je samo u općini Slunj. Rijeka Kupa bila je etnička
granica općine Karlovac, sjeverno su bila naselja s hr-
vatskim, a južno sa srpskim stanovništvom. Južni dio
općine bio je povezan s pobunjenim Kordunom i bio
je slaba točka obrane općine. Karlovac je važno pro-
metno čvorište i mjesto u kojem su se prometnice iz
C
smjera Knina i Rijeke spajale na autocestu za Zagreb.
Kod Karlovca je Hrvatska bila “najtanja” i postojala je
mogućnost da je se presiječe na dva dijela. U tom kraj-
nje pesimističnom scenariju cjelokupan promet morao
bi biti prebačen kroz Sloveniju, što je, iako nepovoljno,
D
bilo znatno prihvatljivije od presijecanja kod npr. Gos-
pića ili Zadra.
Policija je bila organizirana u Policijsku upravu Kar-
lovac, a HV u Operativnu zonu Karlovac. U Karlovcu je
JNA, uglavnom iz Riječkog korpusa, bila koncentrirana
u oko 20 objekata u gradu i bližoj okolici. Teritorijalna
obrana pobunjenih Srba osnovana je po postojećoj
prostornoj strukturi, a pred kraj godine osnovano je
nekoliko brigada TO-a.438
Značajka bojišta je relativno kasno izbijanje suko-
ba i s obzirom na značaj regije, skromne hrvatske sna-
ge. Pobunjeni Srbi su u ljeto 1991. odsjekli gradić Slunj
437 Isto, 134-139.
438 Isto, 139-140.
185
Domovinski rat 04-02-2020 Knjiga 1.indd 185
lice, ZNG, TO, National Defense and armed citizens. The
JNA retained possession of a number of barracks in the
city and its environs. Those around the city were in Dugo
Selo, Velika Buna, Samobor and Jastrebarsko. These, and
those in the city that were still in JNA hands, were placed
under blockade by forces belonging to the HV, police, TO
and National Defense. Armed citizens also participated
in the actions. Some Croatian troops were employed in
Zagreb and its outskirts with the task of preventing the
JNA armor from breaking out of the barracks and mov-
ing into the city. It has to be pointed out that the JNA ab-
stained from launching strong attacks on Zagreb and its
environs. On occasion the JNA Air Force attacked military,
communications and political targets: on September 22
Velika Gorica was bombed; on October 4 the radio-tele-
vision transmitter on Sljeme was rocketed; on October 6
the radio-television tower on Sljeme was rocketed; on Oc-
tober 7 the seat of the Croatian government, the Banski
Dvori, was rocketed in an attempt to assassinate the Croa-
tian political leadership. After a round of negotiations the
Croatian government allowed the JNA garrisons to leave
in safety. With the JNA troops gone, the security situation
in and around Zagreb in November and December im-
proved significantly. In 1991, all major decisions regarding
the country’s defense were reached in Zagreb. The capital
was the political stage where the Croatian government
pitted its agenda against that of the quickly deteriorating
federation and the JNA. Zagreb was the main psycholog-
ical and logistical buttress for the Croatian Armed Forces.
At the end of September, the Defense of Zagreb became
responsible for defending the left bank of the Kupa Riv-
er from JNA and rebel Serbs attacks from the direction of
Banovina. Most HV units deployed in other parts of the
Croatian theater of war were from Zagreb.
KARLOVAC AND KORDUN
THEATER OF OPERATIONS
R
In 1991 the Kordun region was predominantly Serb.
On the other hand, the administrative center of the re-
gion, the city of Karlovac, was, and still remains to this
day, a predominantly Croatian city. In the Kordun re-
gion, only in the municipality of Slunj did Croats make
up a majority. The Kupa River was the ethnic boundary
of the municipality of Karlovac. To the north were Croa-
tian villages and to the south Serbian villages. One part
of the municipality was linked to rebel-held Kordun. That
part of the municipality was a weak spot in the munic-
4.2.2020. 19:34:06
 Davor Marijan • Rat za opstojnost Hrvata, 1991. - 1995.
H
M
Karlovac, posljedice napada JNA i srpskih snaga, listopad 1991.
(autor fotografije: Dinko Neskusil).
D
Destruction wrought by the JNA and Serb forces, Karlovac, Oc-
tober, 1991 (Photograph by Dinko Neskusil).
C
od Karlovca i ustrojavali svoje snage. Osnivanjem OG-1
i dovođenjem snaga iz Srbije, JNA je od 4. do 8. listopa-
da bez uspjeha pokušala zauzeti Karlovac. Nakon ne-
uspjeha, JNA se ograničila na držanje crte i izvlačenje
okruženih snaga i opreme iz vojarni u Karlovcu i zale-
đu. U rujnu i početkom studenoga hrvatske su snage
zauzele dio vojarni. Iz vojarne Logorište u predgrađu
Karlovca 4. i 5. studenoga snage JNA su se probile s di-
jelom tehnike na Kordun. Nakon ovog proboja nije bilo
većih sukoba. Crta se stabilizirala, a hrvatske su snage
preuzele inicijativu u svoje ruke. U dubini Korduna, JNA
i pobunjeni Srbi su 16. studenoga zauzeli Slunj, a do
kraja mjeseca i preostala sela s hrvatskim stanovniš-
tvom. Oko 11.000 stanovnika povuklo se uglavnom u
Cazin u susjednoj BiH, odakle je organiziran prijevoz
za Hrvatsku. Zauzimanjem Slunja spojeno je područje
Like i Korduna pod kontrolom srpskih snaga.439
439 Isto, 140-145.
186
Domovinski rat 04-02-2020 Knjiga 1.indd 186
ipality’s defensive system. Karlovac was, and still is, an
important transportation hub. The roads from Knin and
Rijeka merged into the Zagreb highway at Karlovac. The
narrowest stretch of Croatian territory in this part of the
country is at Karlovac. There existed a real danger that
the JNA and rebel Serbs would cut Croatia in two halves
there. The Croatian strategists were acutely aware that if
the Serbs managed to pull that coup off, all traffic from
northern Croatia to southern Croatia and vice versa
would have to be re-routed through Slovenia. Still, such
a scenario, although highly undesirable, was more palat-
able than the same scenario at Gospić or Zadar.
The police force in the municipality was under the
auspices of the Police Administration Karlovac and the
HV forces there were organized into OZ Karlovac. The
JNA, mostly troops from Rijeka Corps, held about 20 in-
stallations and facilities in Karlovac and the surrounding
area. The rebel Serbs TO was formed on the basis of the
existing local structure. Towards the end of the year a few
TO brigades were formed.
Conflict in this area erupted later than in other areas
of the country. It is important to emphasize that despite
the high strategic importance of the area, the Croatian
forces deployed there were not numerically strong. In
the summer of 1991 the rebel Serbs cut off Slunj from
Karlovac and were in the process of forming their forc-
es. The JNA formed OG-1 and brought in reinforcements
from Serbia for the purpose of capturing Karlovac. The
onslaught on the city started on October 4 and lasted
until October 8. The attack was a failure. After this set-
back the JNA limited its activities to holding the line and
pulling out its surrounded forces from the barracks in the
city and the surrounding area. In September and at the
D
beginning of November, Croatian forces captured some
of the barracks. The JNA garrison from the Logorište
barracks on the outskirts of Karlovac managed to break
out, with some equipment, on November 4-5 and reach
Kordun. After this break-out there were no more large
R
engagements. The front line stabilized and the Croatian
forces gained the initiative. Deep in the Kordun area the
JNA and rebel Serbs captured Slunj on November 16.
By the end of the month the JNA and rebel Serbs had
captured all the Croatian villages in the area. 11,000 Cro-
atian civilians fled, most of them to Cazin in Bosnia and
Herzegovina, whence they were transported to the gov-
ernment-controlled territory of Croatia. By capturing
Slunj the Serbs linked up their territory in Kordun with
that in Lika.
4.2.2020. 19:34:06
 The Croatian Nation’s Struggle for Survival, 1991-1995
ISTRA, HRVATSKO
PRIMORJE, KVARNER I
GORSKI KOTAR
Istra, Hrvatsko primorje, Kvarner i Gorski kotar
područja su u kojima 1991. nije bilo značajnijih su-
koba iz jednostavnog razloga što je srpsko stanov-
ništvo bilo u izrazitoj manjini i relativno udaljeno od
glavnih žarišta krize. Općina Vrbovsko bila je sigurno-
H
sno najosjetljivija. Premda mala po broju stanovnika,
u njoj su bile dvije srpske enklave: sjeverozapadna,
uz općinu Delnice sa Srpskim Moravicama kao najve-
ćim naseljem, i jugoistočna, s Gomirjem prema Ogu-
linu. Brojna je skupina Srba bila i na području Ogu-
lina, zapadno i jugozapadno od grada, s najvećim
M
naseljem Jasenkom. Druga je cjelina bila jugoistoč-
no, oko Plaškog. Širenjem rata i presijecanjem naj-
važnijih prometnih pravaca kontinentalne s primor-
skom Hrvatskom, ova su područja postala prometna
žila kucavica Hrvatske. Riječ je o području Policijskih
uprava Pula i Rijeka i dijelu Policijske uprave Karlovac
D
(Ogulin i Vrbovsko). U vojno-teritorijalnom pogledu
radilo se o operativnim zonama Rijeka i Karlovac. JNA
je u Rijeci imala sjedište 13. korpusa, a ostale snage
bile su u Delnicama. U Istri su glavne snage 5. vojno-
pomorskog sektora bile u Puli i Pazinu, te na dijelu
otoka. Djelatnost JNA svela se na povremene zračne
C
napade i korištenje aerodroma kod Pule za napade u
zaleđu Istre i dubini Hrvatske. Druga konstantna dje-
latnost JNA bila je pomorska blokada akvatorija. Uz
kraće prekide trajala je od 17. rujna do 11. studeno-
ga, kada je počelo iseljavanje JNA u Crnu Goru. Iselja-
D
vanje je okončano 15. prosinca.440
LIČKO BOJIŠTE
Lika je u strategijskom smislu bila iznimno značaj-
na regija. Ključna točka hrvatske obrane - grad Gospić -
ujedno je bio i zadnja brana prema gradiću i luci Karlo-
bagu, mitskoj točki velikosrpskih planova. Odsijecanje
na tom pravcu nije se moglo sanirati zbog blizine mora
na kojem je dominirala Jugoslavenska ratna mornari-
ca. U demografskom smislu je zapadna Lika bila s hr-
vatskom (Gospić i Otočac), a istočna i južna sa srpskom
440 Isto, 145-148.
187
Domovinski rat 04-02-2020 Knjiga 1.indd 187
ISTRIA, CROATIAN LITTORAL,
KVARNER AND GORSKI KOTAR
In 1991 there were no battles or engagements to
speak of in Istria, the Croatian Littoral, Kvarner and Gor-
ski Kotar. The reason for this is simple and rather prosaic
– the Serbs made up an insignificant percentage of the
population in these areas. Also, these areas were relative-
ly far geographically from the hotbeds of the Serb rebel-
lion. The municipality of Vrbovsko was, from a security
standpoint, the most sensitive area. There were two Serb
enclaves in the municipality: one in northwest, bordering
with the municipality of Delnice with Srpske Moravice as
its largest town and the other in southeast, with Gomir-
je towards Ogulin. A large number of Serbs lived in the
Ogulin area, to the west and southwest of the city. The
largest settlement there was Jasenak. Another area where
many Serbs lived was around Plaško. As the conflict in
Croatia spread and when the Serbs cut most of the com-
munications lines connecting the northern part of Croa-
tia with the southern part of Croatia, this area became the
vital communications artery of the country. The following
police administrations had jurisdiction in the region: Pula,
Rijeka and Karlovac (Ogulin, Vrbovsko). In the military-ter-
ritorial context the region was in the area of responsibility
of OZ Rijeka and OZ Karlovac. The HQ of XIII Corps of the
JNA was in Rijeka. The other JNA units in the area were
stationed in Delnice. In Istria the bulk of the forces of the
5th Military-Maritime Sector were stationed in Pula and
Pazin. Some units were stationed on some of the islands.
The JNA’s activities there were limited to occasional air-
strikes and using the air base in Pula for attacks in Istria’s
hinterland and other areas of Croatia. Another JNA activ-
ity worthy of note was its naval blockade of the aquato-
rium. The blockade, with short interruptions, lasted from
September 17 until November 11, when the JNA started
withdrawing its forces to Montenegro. The withdrawal
was completed on December 15.
R
LIKA THEATER OF
OPERATIONS
From a strategic standpoint Lika was an important
region. The key location for the Croatian defense was
the city of Gospić. The city was also the last line of de-
fense towards the town and port of Karlobag, the pivotal
location in the plan for the creation of a Greater Serbi-
4.2.2020. 19:34:06
 Davor Marijan • Rat za opstojnost Hrvata, 1991. - 1995.
većinom (Korenica, D. Lapac i Gračac) i uz to oslonjena
na istovjetna demografska područja BiH.
U Gospiću je bilo sjedište Policijske uprave Gos-
pić, a HV je bio u ingerenciji Operativne zone Karlo-
vac, odnosno njezine Operativne grupe Lika. Glavne
snage JNA u Lici bile su iz sastava Riječkog korpusa
u Gospiću i Otočcu. Njima je od studenoga 1991. za-
povijedala Treća operativna grupa (OG-3). Pobunjeni
Srbi su organizirani na temelju prostorne strukture
Teritorijalne obrane RH i pod zapovijedanjem 2. ope-
H
rativne zone TO-a.441
Nakon sukoba na Plitvicama, JNA je u travnju
1991. zatvorila pravce koji vode u dubinu Like prema
područjima s većinskim srpskim stanovništvom. Od
kraja travnja predstavnici JNA su preko vodstva Srp-
ske demokratske stranke Srbima u Lici dijelili oružje
M
iz vojnih skladišta, uključujući i ona iz Gospića. Do
početka srpnja podijeljeno je oko 15.000 komada ra-
znog pješačkog oružja, minobacača, protuavionskih
topova 20 mm i veća količina streljiva. Najkritičnije
područje Like bila je općina Gospić. Položaj hrvatskih
snaga pogoršao se nakon što su početkom kolovoza
D
1991. one bile prinuđene napustiti prijevoj Ljubovo
na kojem su zatvarale put prema Gospiću. Uz pomoć
JNA pobunjeni Srbi su 30. kolovoza napali Gospić. S
manjim prekidima borbe za grad su trajale mjesec
dana. Tijekom tih borbi hrvatske snage su zauzele
uporišta JNA u gradu i okolici, te deblokirale selo Bilaj
C
jugoistočno od grada. Srpske snage spriječile su pru-
žanje pomoći okruženim hrvatskim selima Sveti Rok i
Lovinac sjeverozapadno od Gračaca. Obrana tih sela
izdržala je do 26. rujna. Sredinom studenoga vođene
su jače borbe južno od Gospića, no bez ikakvih poma-
ka. Time su prestala zahtjevnija djelovanja hrvatskih
snaga, koje su s velikim naporom držale crtu dugu
oko 70 kilometara. Razdoblje do Sarajevskoga primir-
ja obilježilo je granatiranje Gospića i okolice, pri čemu
je grad pretrpio ogromnu materijalnu štetu, u Hrvat-
skoj najveću nakon Vukovara.442
Na području Otočca početkom kolovoza 1991. sta-
nje je bilo vrlo teško: oko 30 posto općine bilo je pod
nadzorom pobunjenih Srba, učestale su bile pljačke i
presretanja putnika na prometnicama u okolici grada.
Sredinom rujna Otočac je bio u teškom stanju, goto-
441 Isto, 148-149.
442 Isto, 149-151.
188
Domovinski rat 04-02-2020 Knjiga 1.indd 188
an state. Losing Gospić, the Croatian strategists knew,
would be a blow the Croatian Army could not recover
from because of the city’s proximity to the sea, where
the Serb-dominated JNA navy held sway at that point in
time. Demographically, western Lika was predominant-
ly Croatian (Gospić, Otočac) while eastern and southern
Lika were predominantly Serbian (Korenica, Donji Lapac
and Gračac) and bordered with predominantly Serbian
areas in Bosnia and Hezegovina.
The main office of Police Administration Gospić was
in Gospić, and the HV forces were under the command
of OZ Karlovac, which was subordinated to OG Lika. The
main JNA forces in the area were from Rijeka Corps and
stationed in Gospić and Otočac. They were under the op-
erational command of OG-3 from November, 1991. The
rebel Serbs were organized according to the local struc-
ture of the TO Croatia and under the command of 2nd OZ
of the TO.
After the incident in Plitvice, the JNA, in April, 1991,
sealed off communications routes leading to the center
of Lika towards the predominantly Serbian areas. From
the end of April JNA representatives, through leaders of
the Serbian Democratic Party, distributed weapons from
JNA depots, including the one in Gospić, to the rebel
Serbs in Lika. By the beginning of July the rebel Serbs
received 15,000 various small arms, mortars, 20-mm flak
guns and vast amounts of ammunition. The municipali-
ty of Gospić, from a strategic perspective, was the most
important area in Lika. The situation there for the Croa-
tian forces was critical. It got even worse after the HV was
forced to retreat from the Ljubovo pass at the beginning
of August, 1991. The positions in the pass had prevented
the JNA to move on Gospić. Now those critical positions
D
were no longer in Croatian hands. On August 30, the reb-
el Serbs, assisted by the JNA, attacked Gospić. The bat-
tle for the city, with brief interludes, lasted for a month.
During the fighting the Croatian forces captured the JNA
strongholds in the city and the surrounding area and
R
lifted the blockade of the village of Bilaj located south-
east of the city. The Serb forces prevented the HV from
sending help to the encircled Croatian villages of Sveti
Rok and Lovinac located to the northwest of Gračac. The
villages fell on September 26. In mid-November heavy
fighting developed to the south of Gospić but neither
side could gain the upper hand. The Croatian forces, at
that point, went on the defensive and focused all their
efforts on holding the seventy-kilometer-long defensive
line. The Serbs regularly shelled Gospić and its environs,
4.2.2020. 19:34:06
 The Croatian Nation’s Struggle for Survival, 1991-1995
vo okružen snagama pobunjenih Srba, a u gradu je
bila relativno jaka posada JNA. U borbama od 14. do
18. rujna hrvatske su snage zauzele nekoliko uporišta
JNA i odbile napade JNA i pobunjenih Srba na grad.
Do kraja godine hrvatske snage su u nekoliko pothva-
ta odbacile pobunjene Srbe iz sjeverozapadnog dijela
općine i osigurale prometnice na tom dijelu bojišta.
Pokušaj pružanja pomoći okruženim hrvatskim sna-
gama u selu Saborsko, sjeveroistočno od Otočca, nije
uspio. Obrana sela održala se do 12. studenoga, a pre-
H
živjelo stanovništvo i branitelji danima su se probijali
kroz šume prema Slunju i Ogulinu.443
SJEVERNO I
SREDNJODALMATINSKO
M
BOJIŠTE
U sjevernoj Dalmaciji je u kolovozu 1990. počela
srpska pobuna. Kao bojište sjevernu i srednju Dal-
maciju karakterizirala je nepovoljna demografska
struktura i velik potencijal JNA. Srbi su imali većinu u
D
Benkovcu, Kninu i Obrovcu, a Hrvati u Sinju, Drnišu i
primorskim općinama. Vitalna prometnica Split – Dr-
niš – Karlovac rano je presječena za korištenje, pa je
sav promet prebačen na Jadransku magistralu koja
je postala objekt strategijskog značenja, posebice na
dijelu između Zadra i Šibenika gdje bi njeno presije-
C
canje značilo i presijecanje Hrvatske.
Policija je bila organizirana po policijskim upra-
vama Split, Šibenik i Zadar. Zbor narodne garde, od-
nosno HV bio je u sastavu Operativne zone koja je
obuhvaćala područje sjeverne, srednje i južne Dal-
D
macije. Jugoslavenska narodna armija je u regiji ima-
la Kninski korpus i glavninu snage Vojnopomorske
oblasti. Srpske snage su bile organizirane u miliciju
SAO Krajine, a u srpnju je počelo osnivanje postrojbi
TO-a.444
Početkom travnja 1991. JNA je sjevernu Dalma-
ciju s istočnom Likom pretvorila u tampon-zonu i
onemogućila uspostavu pravnog poretka Republike
Hrvatske. Nakon burnog proljeća, do početka srpnja
u regiji je vladao mir. Od tada se stanje konstantno
pogoršavalo, promet je bio otežan i često blokiran,
443 Isto, 151-155.
444 Isto, 155-156.
189
Domovinski rat 04-02-2020 Knjiga 1.indd 189
inflicting significant material damage, second only to the
destruction the JNA had visited on Vukovar. The artillery
attacks on Gospić stopped with the signing of the Sara-
jevo Agreement.
In the Otočac area, at the beginning of August, 1991,
the situation was dire: about 30% of the municipality
was under the control of the rebel Serbs. Rebel Serbs
frequently engaged in looting and highway robbery in
villages and on roads around the city. By mid-September
Otočac was almost in a complete encirclement. The situ-
ation was desperate – rebel Serbs around the city and the
relatively strong JNA garrison in the city. The defenders
did not despair though. In the fighting that lasted from
September 14-18 the Croatian forces captured a number
of JNA positions and repulsed all attacks mounted by
the JNA and rebel Serbs on the city. By the end of the
year the Croatian forces, in a number of actions, pushed
back the rebel Serbs from the northwestern part of the
municipality and secured the roads in the area. The Cro-
ats sent a relief force to break the siege of the village of
Saborsko, to the north of Otočac. The attempt failed and
the Croatian troops in Saborsko remained encircled by
Serb forces. The village fell on November 12. The surviv-
ing civilians and defenders fled towards Slunj and Ogulin
through the surrounding forests. The trek was perilous
and it took them days to finally reach safety.
NORTH DALMATIAN AND
CENTRAL DALMATIAN
THEATER OF OPERATIONS
In August, 1990, the Serb rebellion erupted in north-
ern Dalmatia. The demographic structure in northern
and central Dalmatia and a strong presence of the JNA
determined the initial events of the war in that theater
of operations and, to a significant extent, its later course
in general. Serbs made up a majority in Benkovac, Knin
and Obrovac and Croats were predominant in Sinj, Drniš
R
and the Croatian Littoral municipalities. The Serbs imme-
diately blocked the vital Split – Drniš – Karlovac road. The
Croats had no choice but to re-route all traffic to the Adri-
atic Highway, thus imparting a strategic importance to
the highway, especially along its Zadar – Šibenik stretch.
If the Serbs had gained control of that stretch of the
highway, they would have effectively cut Croatia in half.
The police force was formed into Police Administra-
tion Split, Police Administration Šibenik and Police Ad-
4.2.2020. 19:34:07
 Davor Marijan • Rat za opstojnost Hrvata, 1991. - 1995.
učestali su bili incidenti između sela s hrvatskim i
srpskim stanovništvom te upadi srpske milicije u
ustanove na rubnim područjima SAO Krajine. Kada
su krajem kolovoza izbile borbe, hrvatske snage su
natjerane na defenzivu i povlačenje. One su blokirale
objekte JNA u primorskim gradovima i Sinju, ali ne
i u Kninu i Benkovcu, gdje su bile smještene glavne
snage JNA u regiji. Dio vojarni se predao, a obranom
Šibenika od 16. do 22. rujna i Zadra od 4. do 7. listo-
pada spriječeno je odsijecanje Dalmacije od matice
H
Hrvatske. Prema dogovoru, JNA se povukla u listopa-
du sa zadarskog područja, da bi potom 18. stude-
noga bez povoda napala i zauzela selo Škabrnju pri
čemu je počinjen jedan od većih zločina u Hrvatskoj.
Na prijelazu iz 1991. u 1992. JNA je u operaciji Udar-
91, sjeveroistočno od Zadra, zauzela nekoliko naselja
M
na Novigradskom moru.445
Na središnjem dijelu bojišta JNA i pobunjeni Srbi
zauzeli su 20. rujna 1991. grad Drniš, s tim da su po-
raženi južno od grada prilikom nastupanja prema Ši-
beniku. Poraz je natjerao JNA na oprez i odustajanje
od pritiska prema jugu, čime su hrvatske snage dale
D
doprinos uspješnoj obrani Šibenika. Hrvatska obrana
organizirana je potom osloncem na planinu Moseć
na kojoj je uoči Sarajevskog primirja odbijen posljed-
nji jači srpski napad na tom području.446
Na području općine Sinj, JNA je s pobunjenim
Srbima 26. i 27. kolovoza 1991. zauzela dva hrvatska
C
uporišta između Sinja i Kijeva. U nastavku napada 18.
rujna zauzeli su i branu na Peručkom jezeru i izbili
na prilaze Sinju gdje su ih hrvatske snage zaustavile.
Do kraja godine nije bilo većih pomaka na tom dijelu
bojišta.447
U gradu Splitu glavna zadaća hrvatskih snaga
bila je blokada i zauzimanje uporišta JNA. Dio tih vo-
jarni zauzet je od 15. do 20. rujna 1991., a preostala
uporišta JNA držana su u blokadi do okončanja iselje-
nja 4. siječnja 1992. godine. U tom se vremenu zbio
niz incidenata oko vojarni, a 15. studenoga je odbijen
napad JRM-a iz splitskog kanala.448
445 Isto, 159-165.
446 Isto, 157-159.
447 Isto, 166-167.
448 Isto, 168.
190
Domovinski rat 04-02-2020 Knjiga 1.indd 190
ministration Zadar. The ZNG, later the Croatian Army, was
under the command of the operative zone whose area of
responsibility encompassed northern, central and south-
ern Dalmatia. In the region the JNA had Knin Corps and
the bulk of the Military-Maritime District forces. The reb-
el Serb forces were organized into the militia of the SAO
Krajina. In July the rebel Serbs started forming TO units.
At the beginning of April, 1991, the JNA formed
northern Dalmatia and eastern Lika into a buffer zone
and prevented the Croatian government from establish-
ing the legal order of the Republic of Croatia in the area.
After the tumultuous events in spring, a period of rela-
tive calm followed. It lasted until the beginning of July.
From that point on, the situation grew steadily worse;
traffic was often interrupted, roads were often blocked,
incidents between Serbian and Croatian villages were
frequent as were the SAO Krajina militia’s forays into the
border areas of the SAO Krajina. When fighting erupted
at the end of August, the Croatian forces were forced
to retreat. The Croatian forces then put the JNA instal-
lations, barracks and facilities in coastal towns and Sinj
under blockade. However, the Croatian forces were not
strong enough to put the JNA barracks and facilities in
Knin and Benkovac under blockade. In these two cities
the main JNA forces in the region were stationed. The
garrisons in some of the barracks under blockade surren-
dered. The Croatian forces successfully defended Šibenik
from the JNA’s attacks mounted during the period from
September 16 to September 22. The Serb forces then
turned their attention to Zadar and mounted a series of
attacks from October 4 to October 7. The defenders man-
aged to repulse all of these attacks. By winning the bat-
tles for Šibenik and Zadar, the Croatian forces prevent-
D
ed the Serbs from cutting off Dalmatia from the rest of
the country. Following a round of negotiations, the JNA
withdrew from the Zadar area. Then, on November 18,
without provocation or any strategic or tactical rationale,
the JNA attacked and captured the village of Škabrnja.
R
After the fall of the village, the JNA committed one of the
worst crimes against humanity of the entire war. At the
end of 1991 and beginning of 1992, the JNA mounted
Operation Udar-91 (Strike-91) in the area to the north-
west of Zadar and captured a number of settlements in
the Novigrad Bay.
In the central area of the theater, the JNA and rebel
Serbs captured the city of Drniš on September 20, 1991.
However, the JNA and Serbs suffered a defeat south of
Drniš when they tried to advance on Šibenik. This defeat
4.2.2020. 19:34:07
 The Croatian Nation’s Struggle for Survival, 1991-1995

JUŽNO BOJIŠTE 1991. smartened the JNA and forced it to give up the idea of
advancing southwards. Šibenik was, at least for the time
GODINE being, safe. The Croatian defense was then organized so
as to pivot its positions on Mount Moseć. Just before the
Kao bojište, hrvatski jug je karakterizirala izduže-
signing of the Sarajevo Agreement the Serbs launched a
nost i granica s Bosnom i Hercegovinom i Crnom Go-
determined attack on these positions but the defenders
rom. Na tom je dijelu Hrvatska bila najtanja, i s obzirom
repulsed the onslaught. This was the last serious attack
na demografsku strukturu dijelova susjednih republika,
launched by Serb forces in the area.
najteža za obranu. O operativnoj dubini se moglo go-
In the municipality of Sinj the JNA and rebel Serbs,
voriti tek na dijelu bojišta u općinama Metković i Ploče.
on August 26-27, captured two Croatian strongholds
Uoči srpskog napada hrvatske snage na Južnom
H
between Sinj and Kijevo. Following up the success, the
bojištu bile su najslabije i najmalobrojnije na hrvatskom
Serbs captured Peruća Dam and reached the outskirts of
ratištu. U Dubrovniku je bilo sjedište Policijske uprave
Sinj on September 18. There they were stopped by Croa-
Dubrovnik, koja je imala oko 230 policajaca, od čega 60
tian forces. By the end of the year, there were no signifi-
u Specijalnoj jedinici. Pri općinama su postojala zapo-
cant changes in the front line in this area.
vjedništva s manjim snagama, a ZNG je bio organiziran
The main task of the Croatian forces in Split was
M
u 116. brigadu čiji ustroj nije tekao po planu. Sredinom
putting the JNA barracks and installations in the city
rujna 1991. u Dubrovniku je osnovan Odred naoružanih
and the surrounding area under blockade and then
brodova. Neposredno prije napada JNA dubrovačko je
capturing them. Some of these barracks were captured
područje branila mješovita skupina od 670 gardista i
between September 15-20, 1991, and the blockades of
policajaca raspoređena na bojištu dugom 75 kilometa-
others were maintained until the JNA finally vacated the
ra od Slanog do Vodovađe (zaselak Bani) blizu granice
area on January 4, 1992. During that time a string of in-
D
Hrvatske i Crne Gore. Zapovjednik obrane bio je potpu-
cidents occurred around the barracks. On November 15,
kovnik Nojko Marinović. U kasnijim intervalima obra-
Croatian forces beat back the JNA Navy’s attack from the
na grada pojačavana je manjim skupinama, uglavnom
Split channel.
vodovima iz sastava OZ-a Split: 4. brigade ZNG-a, 114.
brigade HV-a i HOS-a.449
Na zapadnom dijelu bojišta, uz policijske snage THE SOUTHERN THEATER
C
u Metkoviću, početkom lipnja 1991. osnovana je četa OF OPERATIONS IN 1991
koja je bila u sastavu 116. brigade ZNG-a. U srpnju je na
Pelješcu osnovana četa ZNG-a, a na Korčuli dvije čete The south of Croatia was very difficult to defend.
koje su sredinom rujna prerasle u Korčulanski bataljun. The border with Bosnia and Herzegovina and Montene-
U Pločama je 21. rujna osnovana Ratna luka, koja je na- gro is long and the distance, in that part of the country,
D
jesen prerasla u Zapovjedništvo HRM-a za južni Jadran. from the Croatian coast to the border with Bosnia and
Kada je postalo očito da zapovijed o formiranju Herzegovina never exceeds 20 kilometers. Achieving
116. brigade u Dubrovniku neće biti realizirana jer ju operational depth is possible only in the municipalities
nije bilo moguće popuniti, novom zapovijedi 116. bri- of Metković and Ploče. The demographic structure of
gada formirana je u studenom sa sjedištem u Metko- the areas of Bosnia and Herzegovina and Montenegro
viću, od samostalnih bataljuna iz Metkovića, Opuzena bordering Croatia also made life very difficult for the
R
defenders.
449 SVA MORH, GSHV: MORH, Zapovijed kl. str. pov. 801- On the eve of the Serbian attack the Croatian forces
01/91-01/07, ur. br. 512-06-05-91-40 od 13. 11. 1991.; in the Southern Theater of Operations were weaker, in
Raščlamba borbenih djelovanja OS RH u Domovinskom terms of manpower and equipment, than in other ar-
ratu na Južnom bojištu tijekom 1991., Zagreb, 1999.,
19-20; ICTY: Izjava svjedoka Nojka Marinovića dana is- eas of the country. The Police Administration Dubrovnik
tražiteljima MKSJ dana 2. - 4., 6. i 7. kolovoza, te 20. ru- had about 230 policemen under arms, 60 of which were
jna 2000.; ICTY: PU dubrovačko-neretvanska, Procjena members of the Special Forces Unit. There were HQs
policijskih snaga br. 511-03-04/02-2754/00-1 od 8. 9. commanding smaller units in the municipalities. The
2000.; I. JELIĆ, 4. brigada ZNG, 35-36; 4. gardijska brigada
HV – Pauci, 114-117. ZNG troops were organized into the 116th Brigade. The

191

Domovinski rat 04-02-2020 Knjiga 1.indd 191 4.2.2020. 19:34:07

 Davor Marijan • Rat za opstojnost Hrvata, 1991. - 1995.
i Ploča. Također, 26. rujna 1991. u Metkoviću je osno-
vano Zapovjedništvo ZNG-a za južnu Dalmaciju, koje
je postojalo do 15. listopada, kada je u sastavu OZ-a
Split osnovano Zapovjedništvo Sektora Dubrovnik. Za-
povjednici hrvatskih snaga na bojištu bili su: pukovnik
Ante Marinov, potom Mate Šarlija Daidža i na kraju pu-
kovnik Luka Džanko.450
Glavne snage JNA na bojištu bile su iz sastava Voj-
nopomorske oblasti OS SFRJ, odnosno iz sastava 9. voj-
nopomorskog sektora, čije je sjedište bilo u Boki, a dio
H
plovnih snaga i skladišta u Pločama.451 Za agresiju na
Hrvatsku, u rujnu 1991. osnovana je Druga operativna
grupa (OG-2). Komanda OG-2 formirana je od ljudstva
iz Inspekcije Oružanih snaga, postrojba 1. vojne obla-
sti lociranih na širem području Sarajeva i određenog
broja starješina iz Generalštaba OS SFRJ. Komandanti
M
su bili generali Jevrem Cokić, Mile Ružinovski i Pavle
Strugar. Brojno stanje snaga koje je JNA angažirala u
sastavu OG-2 višestruko je prelazilo brojnost hrvatskih
oružanih sastava. Prema podacima s radnog zemljovi-
da, OG-2 je u drugoj polovini listopada imala 25.684
pripadnika, od toga 18.879 na dubrovačkom područ-
D
ju i 6598 u dolini Neretve i zapadnom dijelu istočne
Hercegovine. Slično se brojno stanje održavalo do kra-
ja 1991., s tim da je u drugoj polovini studenoga VPS
Boka u blokadi Dubrovnika oslabljen u korist jačanja
Titogradskoga korpusa na širem području Stona i smje-
ru od Stoca prema dolini Neretve.452
C
U drugoj polovici prosinca 1991. u istočnu Herce-
govinu su iz Crne Gore dovedeni dijelovi 13. (Riječkog)
korpusa: Komanda korpusa, prištabne postrojbe, puko-
vi potpore i 13. motorizirana brigada. Sjedište korpusa
450 SVA MORH, GSHV kl. 804-01/91-03/59, ur. br. 5120-01-91-
1 od 15. 10. 1991.; Angažiranje snaga 6. OZ 3. 12. 1991.;
Raščlamba borbenih djelovanja OS RH u Domovinskom
ratu na Južnom bojištu tijekom 1991., 15-18; I. JELIĆ, 4.
brigada ZNG, 35.
451 D. MARIJAN, “‘Jedinstvo’ – posljednji ustroj JNA”, 11-47;
Davor MARIJAN, “Djelovanje Jugoslavenske narodne
armije u Hercegovini 1990.–1992.”, u: Hum i Hercegovina
kroz povijest, Hrvatski institut za povijest, Zagreb, 2011.,
II, 630-631.
452 ICTY: Komanda 2. OG, Izvod iz Direktive za napad op. br.
2, str. pov. br. 32-1 od 29. 9. 1991.; ICTY: Komanda 2. OG
str. pov. br. 189-1 od 8. 10. 1991.; ICTY: Personalna upra-
va SSNO pov. br. 01/5-58 od 11. 10. 1991.; ICTY: Radne
karte 2. OG sa stanjem 24. - 26. 10. 1991. i 2. 12. 1991.; J.
COKIĆ, Početak kraja, 233-234, 293-294.
192
Domovinski rat 04-02-2020 Knjiga 1.indd 192
process of forming the brigade did not go according to
plan. In mid-September, 1991, the Armed Boats Squad-
ron was formed in Dubrovnik. Just prior to the JNA’s at-
tack, the Dubrovnik area was defended by a group con-
sisting of 670 ZNG soldiers and policemen deployed on
a seventy-five-kilometer line stretching from Slano to
Vodovađe (the hamlet of Bani) near the Croatian-Mon-
tenegrin border. The commander of that force was Lieu-
tenant Colonel Nojko Marinović. The defense of the city
was gradually reinforced with smaller units, mostly pla-
toons from Operative Zone Split: from the 4th Brigade
of the Croatian National Guard, the 114th Brigade of the
Croatian Army and from the HOS.
In the western part of the theater, at the beginning
of June, 1991, a company was formed and placed un-
der the command of the 116th Brigade of the ZNG, aug-
menting the forces belonging to the police in Metković.
Another company of the ZNG was formed in Pelješac in
July and two companies in Korčula. In mid-September
the latter two companies grew into the Korčula Battal-
ion. On September 21, the Naval Base was established
in Ploče. In the fall of 1991, the Naval Base became the
HQ of the Croatian Navy for the south Adriatic.
When it became obvious that the 116th Brigade
could not be formed because there were not enough
men to bring it up to strength, it was decided to form
the Brigade in Metković. The 116th Brigade was duly
formed there out of independent battalions from Met-
ković, Opuzen and Ploče. The HQ of the Brigade was in
Metković. Also, on September 26, 1991, the HQ of the
Croatian National Guard for southern Dalmatia was
formed in Metković. It functioned until October 15
when the HQ of Sector Dubrovnik was formed within
D
Operative Zone Split. The commanders of the Croatian
forces there were, in order of appointment: Colonel
Ante Marinov, Mate “Daidža” Šarlija and Colonel Luka
Džanko.
The main JNA forces in the theater belonged to the
R
Military-Maritime District of the Armed Forces of the
SFRY, more specifically, to the 9th Military-Maritime Sec-
tor, whose HQ was located in Boka. Some vessels were
stationed in Ploče. A number of warehouses belonging
to the JNA were also located in Ploče. In September,
1991, the 2nd Operational Group (OG-2) was formed for
the upcoming attack on Croatia. The HQ of OG-2 was
formed and consisted of personnel from the Internal Af-
fairs Department, units belonging to the 1st Military Dis-
trict stationed in the wider Sarajevo area and a number
4.2.2020. 19:34:07
 The Croatian Nation’s Struggle for Survival, 1991-1995
smješteno je u Bileću, po kojoj je korpus i dobio ime.
Komandant je bio general Branko Stanković.453
Krajem srpnja 1991., prema direktivi Generalšta-
ba OS SFRJ, napravljen je plan napadne operacije JNA
u Dalmaciji i južnoj Hrvatskoj. Trebala ga je realizirati
operativna grupa sastavljena od Kninskoga korpusa,
dijelova Sarajevskoga korpusa, Užičkoga korpusa, Tito-
gradskoga korpusa, Vojnopomorskoga sektora Boka i
dijela jedinica TO-a Crne Gore i istočne Hercegovine. Iz
istočne Hercegovine isplaniran je napad na šire pod-
H
ručje Dubrovnika i osvajanje južne Dalmacije. U drugoj
etapi operacije planiralo se zauzeti Split i ovladati Dal-
macijom. Cjelokupna operacija trebala je trajati 20 - 25
dana. U rujnu je plan operacije promijenjen. Operativ-
na je grupa zadatak trebala realizirati bez sudjelovanja
Kninskoga korpusa, odnosno bez djelovanja u Dalma-
M
ciji. U prvoj fazi napada dio glavnih snaga trebao je
odsjeći južnu Hrvatsku na smjeru Čapljina – Metković
– Ploče i iz smjera Trebinja blokirati Dubrovnik.454
U ratu za vojarne hrvatske su snage 14. rujna 1991.
preuzele skladište JNA Male bare kod Ploča u kojem
je bilo oružje Teritorijalne obrane okolnih općina, a
D
17. rujna je JNA sporazumno napustila mjesnu luku i
objekte garnizona.455 Istog dana Jugoslavenska ratna
mornarica je blokirala sve luke na istočnom Jadranu,
tako i na južnom priobalju Hrvatske.456 Dovođenje sna-
ga JNA iz Srbije i Crne Gore u Hercegovinu počelo je
19. rujna razmještajem dijelova Užičkoga korpusa na
C
području Nevesinja, Kružnja, Mostara i Dubravske vi-
soravni. Korpus je imao velike probleme s mobilizaci-
jom ustrojbenih dijelova. Dio postrojba nije se uspio
mobilizirati, a ljudstvo 208. map-a odbilo je 25. rujna
poslušnost te je dva dana poslije razoružano i vraćeno
D
u Valjevo. Dijelovi Titogradskoga korpusa razmješteni
su na području Stoca, Ljubinja, Trebinja i Igala, a 179.
brdska brigada iz Nikšića na području Mostara. Za zrač-
453 ICTY: Komanda 13. korpusa, Redovni dnevni izveštaj pov.
br. 172-1 od 16. 12. 1991.; ICTY: Komanda 13. korpusa, Re-
dovni dnevni izveštaj pov. br. 172-3 od 18. 12. 1991.
454 ICTY: Komanda OG, DT br. 8-1 od 21. 9. 1991.; J. COKIĆ,
Početak kraja, 217-220.
455 Jakša RAGUŽ, Hrvatsko Poneretvlje u Domovinskom ratu,
Ogranak Matice hrvatske Metković – Hrvatski institut za
povijest, Metković – Zagreb, 2004., 148-151, 169-170.
456 “Mrtvo slovo primirja”, Narodna armija, 21. 9. 1991., 6;
Trpimir MACAN, Posljednja opsada Dubrovnika, Matica
hrvatska, Dubrovnik, 2001., 25-26.
193
Domovinski rat 04-02-2020 Knjiga 1.indd 193
of senior officers from the General Staff of the Armed
Forces of the SFRY. The commanders were Jevrem
Cokić, Mile Ružinovski and Pavle Strugar. The numerical
strength of OG-2 vastly exceeded that of the Croatian
forces. According to the date from the military map, the
OG-2 had, in the second half of October 25,648 men –
18,879 of that number deployed in the Dubrovnik area
and 6,598 in the Neretva Valley and in the western part
of eastern Herzegovina. The numbers remained more
or less the same until the end of 1991 – in the second
half of November some of the units belonging to the
VPS Boka, which was participating in the siege of Du-
brovnik, were transferred to Titograd Corps deployed in
the wider Stone area and on a line from Stolac to the
Neretva Valley.
During the second half of December, 1991, the
following units of XIII Rijeka Corps were deployed in
eastern Herzegovina: Corps HQ, HQ units, support reg-
iments and the 13th Motorized Brigade. Out of these
units Bileća Corps was formed and it was headquar-
tered in Bileća. The commander of the Corps was Gen-
eral Branko Stanković.
At the end of July, 1991, according to the Gener-
al Staff of the Armed Forces of the SFRY’s directive, a
plan for a JNA offensive in Dalmatia and southern Cro-
atia was made. An Operational Group consisting of
Knin Corps, elements of Sarajevo Corps, elements of
Užice Corps, elements of Titograd Corps, a number of
units belonging to Military-Maritime Sector Boka and
elements of the Territorial Defense of Montenegro and
eastern Herzegovina was to carry out the attack. In the
first phase of the offensive an attack would be mounted
from eastern Herzegovina against the wider Dubrovnik
area with the aim of taking control of southern Dalma-
tia. The objective of the second phase of the offensive
was the capture of Split and the entire area of Dalma-
tia. The operation was to last 20-25 days. In September
the plan was altered. Knin Corps was removed from the
R
order of battle and no operations would be conduct-
ed in Dalmatia. The objective of the first phase of the
offensive was to cut off southern Croatia from the rest
of the country on the Čapljina – Metković – Ploče line
and put Dubrovnik under blockade from the direction
of Trebinje.
On September 14, 1991, Croatian forces captured
the JNA warehouses in Male Bare near Ploče. Equip-
ment and weaponry belonging to the Territorial De-
fense of the municipality in the area were stored there.
4.2.2020. 19:34:07
 Davor Marijan • Rat za opstojnost Hrvata, 1991. - 1995.
nu potporu zaduženi su dijelovi 97. avijacijske brigade
i 107. mješovitog avijacijskog puka iz Mostara te 172.
lovačko-bombarderskog puka iz Titograda.457
Komanda OG-2 planirala je izbiti na morsku oba-
lu, presjeći Jadransku magistralu, blokirati Dubrovnik,
aerodrom i snage na Prevlaci. Dio snaga određen je za
napad na pravcu Ljubinje – Ravno – Slano, presijeca-
nje prometnice kod Slanog radi izoliranja Dubrovnika i
sprečavanja pomoći iz smjera Ploča.458
Nakon povremenog otvaranja vatre te sustavne
H
medijske pripreme i optuživanja malobrojnih hrvat-
skih snaga za provokacije, JNA je 1. listopada 1991. iz
Hercegovine i Crne Gore napala šire područje Dubrov-
nika.459 Napad na grad počeo je topničkom vatrom s
područja Ivanice, a potom se uključilo i zrakoplovstvo,
koje je raketiralo repetitor s TV odašiljačem na Srđu.460
M
Nakon blokiranja Dubrovnika do kraja listopada
1991. JNA je na razne načine pokušavala ući u grad, što
joj je bio glavni zadatak na Južnom bojištu. Nije uspio
ni pokušaj stvaranja kolaboracionističke „Dubrovačke
republike“ što je, budući da ondje nije bilo Srba pa se
nije moglo izgovarati njihovom ugroženošću – bio na-
D
čin da se Dubrovnik izdvoji iz Hrvatske i priključi Jugo-
slaviji, odnosno Srbiji. Naravno, to nije bilo u skladu s
opredjeljenjem Hrvata u Dubrovniku. Krajem listopada
JNA je otvoreno pozivala stanovništvo Dubrovnika da
napusti grad.461
C
457 ICTY: Komanda OG, DT br. 8-1 od 21. 9. 1991.; Dušan
Lončar, “Vreme pogrešnih odluka”, Vojska, 9. 9. 1993., 14;
V. KADIJEVIĆ, Moje viđenje raspada, 139; J. COKIĆ, Početak
kraja, 244-250; D. MARIJAN, Slom Titove armije, 312-313.
458 ICTY: Komanda 2. OG, Izvod iz Direktive za napad op. br.
2, str. pov. br. 32-1 od 29. 9. 1991.
459 SVA MORH, ZJD, Dnevni izvještaj str. pov. br. 10/91 od 1.
10. 1991.; T. MACAN, Posljednja opsada Dubrovnika, 31.
460 ICTY: Zapovest za napad Komande 472. mtbr JNA od
29. 9. 1991.; SVA MORH, ZSD: Zap. za Južnu Dalmaciju,
Dnevni izvještaj str. pov. br. 10/91 od 1. 10. 1991.; SVA
MORH, GSHV: PU Dubrovnik, Operativni izvještaj br.
811-03-02-SP-143/91 od 1. 10. 1991.; ICTY: Komanda
472. mtbr, Redovni borbeni izveštaji str. pov. br. 20-
10 od 1. 10. 1991. i str. pov. br. 20-12 od 3. 10. 1991.;
USMKSMP: I uprava GŠ OS SFRJ, Dnevni izveštaji SP br.
1-275 od 2. 10. 1991.; SP br. 1-276 od 3. 10. 1991.; SP
br. 1-278 od 5. 10. 1991. i SP br. 1-286 od 13. 10. 1991.;
Raščlamba borbenih djelovanja OS RH u Domovinskom
ratu na Južnom bojištu tijekom 1991., 60.
461 HDA, UPRH: Sigurnosno-informativna služba MORH,
Saznanja br. 512-1380/92 od 4. 3. 1992.; D. MARIJAN,
Slom Titove armije, 313.
194
Domovinski rat 04-02-2020 Knjiga 1.indd 194
On September 17 the JNA, as agreed with the Croatian
government, vacated the local harbor and its installa-
tions and facilities. On the same day the JNA put all the
ports in the eastern Adriatic under blockade, includ-
ing the southern portion of the Croatian coast, around
Dubrovnik. The JNA started bringing troops from Ser-
bia and Montenegro to Herzegovina on September 19
by deploying elements of Užice Corps in the areas of
Nevesinje, Kružanj, Mostar and the Dubrava plateau.
The Corps experienced substantial problems with
mobilizing its units. Some units were not mobilized at
all and the 208th Mixed Artillery Regiment refused to
obey orders on October 25th. Two days later the 208th
Mixed Artillery Regiment was disarmed and returned
to Valjevo. Elements of Titograd Corps were deployed
in the areas of Stolac, Ljubinje, Trebinje and Igalo. The
179th Mountain Division from Nikšić was deployed in
the Mostar area. Elements of the 97th Aviation Brigade
and the 107th Mixed Aviation Regiment from Mostar
and the 172nd Fighter-Bomber Regiment from Titograd
were tasked with providing aerial support for the at-
tacking troops.
The OG-2 was to reach the sea, cut the D8 state
road, put Dubrovnik, Dubrovnik airport and the Croa-
tian forces in Prevlaka under siege. Some forces from
the OG-2 would attack along the Ljubinje – Ravno – Sla-
no line, cut off the road at Slano and thus isolate Du-
brovnik and prevent Croatian forces from mounting a
rescue attack from the direction of Ploče.
The JNA, during its preparations for the offensive,
provoked a number of skirmishes with Croatian troops
and accused the Croatian forces of aggression. At the
same time, the Serbian media launched a propaganda
D
campaign against Croatia. Finally, on October 1, 1991,
the JNA started its offensive. From eastern Herzegovina
and Montenegro the JNA attacked the wider Dubrovnik
area. The attack on the city itself began with artillery
bombardment from the Ivanica area. The Air Force at-
R
tacked the city as well, rocketing the TV transmitter on
Srđ Hill.
Having put Dubrovnik under siege at the end of Oc-
tober, 1991, the JNA tried to fight its way into the city,
which was the main objective of the offensive. These at-
tacks failed. The JNA propagandists could not play the
Serb card and claim that the Serbs in Dubrovnik were
being mistreated simply because there were no Serbs
in Dubrovnik. This particular gambit served the Serbs
well in other areas of Croatia and in Bosnia and Herze-
4.2.2020. 19:34:07
 The Croatian Nation’s Struggle for Survival, 1991-1995
H
M
Nakon polumjesečnoga zatišja, JNA je 8. studeno-
ga 1991. ponovno napala Dubrovnik. Napad je trajao
do 13. studenoga, a težište je bilo na Srđu, koji je bra-
nio mješoviti vod 4. brigade ZNG-a i obrane Dubrov-
D
nika. Uz velike gubitke obrana se povukla sa Srđa, koji
je dva dana bio prazan, pa su ga hrvatske snage 15.
studenoga ponovno zaposjele. Obrana je potom orga-
nizirana na crti Mokošica – Sustjepan – Nuncijata – Srđ
– padine Srđa – prilazi gradu. Do kraja mjeseca JNA
C
je postupno, demonstracijom sile i napadima, ušla u
Mokošicu i Komolac (20. studenoga). Napad na Sustje-
pan hrvatske su snage odbile u noći 21./22. studeno-
ga. Grad je u tim trenucima branilo oko 600 ljudi s vrlo
malo sredstava potpore, a JNA je u okolici grada imala
bataljun 5. pmtbr, 3. lpbr, bataljun Vojne policije i ba-
D
taljun TO-a Trebinje.462
Uz spomenuti napad u studenom, najjači napad
na Dubrovnik JNA je izvela 6. prosinca 1991. godine.
Grad su napali po jedan bataljun 5. proleterske i 472.
motorizirane brigade. Težište je ponovno bilo na Srđu,
koji je napao dio 3. bataljuna 472. mtbr. Srđ je branio
mješoviti vod IX. bojne HOS-a i obrane grada. Napad
je bio jak i obrana ga je odbila s krajnjim naporom. Ju-
goslavenska narodna armija imala je pet poginulih i 14
462 ICTY: Komanda 9. VPS, Borbeno naređenje str. pov. br.
27-64/80-266 od 20. 11. 1991.; Raščlamba borbenih
djelovanja OS RH u Domovinskom ratu na Južnom bo-
jištu tijekom 1991., 62-63; 4. gardijska brigada HV – Pauci,
113-117.
195
Domovinski rat 04-02-2020 Knjiga 1.indd 195
Hrvatski dragovoljci, tvrđava Imperijal na Srđu iznad Dubrovnika,
listopad 1991. (autor fotografije: Zoran Filipović).
Croatian Volunteers, The Imperijal fort on Srđ Hill overlooking
Dubrovnik, October, 1991 (Photograph by Zoran Filipović).
govina but could not be utilized in Dubrovnik. If Serbia
wanted Dubrovnik, it had to rely solely on the JNA to
conquer the city. It has to be pointed out that the Serbs
proclaimed that a sizable number of Dubrovnik’s resi-
dents harbored pro-Yugoslav sentiments and were in
favor of embracing the idea of establishing a pro-Serb
neo-Ragusan republic, effectively a Quisling entity. This
plan also failed ignominiously because no resident of
Dubrovnik had any desire to live under Serbian rule. At
the end of October the JNA called on the citizens of Du-
brovnik, over loudspeakers, to leave the city.
The JNA attacked the city again on November 8,
1991. The attack lasted until November 13. The main
JNA effort was against Srđ Hill, which was defended
by a mixed platoon composed of troops belonging
to the 4th Brigade of the ZNG and the Defense of Du-
brovnik. The defenders suffered serious losses and were
forced to withdraw from their positions. However, the
attackers did not take control of the positions. For two
days the contested area lay empty. On November 15,
R
Croatian forces again occupied the positions they had
withdrawn from. The Croats then set up defensive po-
sitions on the Mokošica – Sustjepan – Nuncijata – Srđ
Hill – slopes of Srđ Hill – approaches to the city line. JNA
troops made a number of shows of force and launched
a number of attacks on Mokošica and Komolac. The
strategy proved successful and the JNA troops entered
the two villages on November 20. The JNA attacked
Sustjepan but the defenders beat the attackers back
during the night from November 21 to November 22.
4.2.2020. 19:34:07
 Davor Marijan • Rat za opstojnost Hrvata, 1991. - 1995.
H
M
Posljedice napada srpsko-crnogorskih snaga, Dubrovnik, jesen 1991. (autor fotografija: Zlatko Kalle).
Results of attacks by Serb and Montenegrin forces on Dubrovnik, autumn 1991 (Photographs by Zlatko Kalle).
D
ranjenih vojnika. U napadu na grad toga dana poginulo
je 19, a ranjeno oko 60 osoba, uglavnom civila.463 Bila je
to nesumnjivo jedna od najvećih grešaka JNA u agresiji
na Hrvatsku – izazvala je svjetsko javno mišljenje i po-
kazala da JNA ratuje za teritorij, a ne za proklamiranu
deblokadu vojarni JNA, kojih, uostalom, u Dubrovniku
C
nije ni bilo.
U zamisli odsijecanja Dubrovnika od matice zemlje,
Užički je korpus glavnim snagama 3. partizanske divizi-
je napao na smjeru Ravno – Cicrina – Čepikuće – Doli,
a pomoćnima na smjeru Zavala – Orahov Do – Slano.
Glavne snage na području Čepikuća prvoga dana napa-
da, 1. listopada 1991., zaustavila je A četa 116. brigade
iz Metkovića i nanijela im veće gubitke.464 Neuspjeh JNA
platilo je Ravno, kompleks sela s hrvatskim stanovniš-
463 ICTY: komanda 9. VPS, Redovni borbeni izveštaj str. pov.
br. 27-64/80-374 od 6. 12. 1991.; ICTY: Komanda 2. OG,
Redovni borbeni izveštaj str. pov. br. 1044-1 od 6. 12.
1991.; SVA MORH, fond Zapovjedništva obrane grada
Dubrovnika, Izvješće o b/d neprijatelja dana 05/06. 12.
1991. godine br. 236/1-91 od 8. 12. 1991.; Dubrovnik u
Domovinskom ratu 1991.–1995., Dubrovački muzeji –
Muzej suvremene povijesti, Dubrovnik, 2013., 20-22.
464 USMKSMP: I uprava GŠ OS SFRJ, Dnevni izveštaj SP br.
1-275 od 2. 10. 1991.; Raščlamba borbenih djelovanja
OS RH u Domovinskom ratu na Južnom bojištu tijekom
1991., 48-49; J. COKIĆ, Početak kraja, 272-273.
196
Domovinski rat 04-02-2020 Knjiga 1.indd 196
At that point only 600 men defended the city, with no
artillery support to speak of. Against this meager force
the JNA ranged a force consisting of a battalion of the
5th Proletarian Motorized Brigade, the 3rd Light Infantry
Brigade of the Military Police Battalion and a battalion
belonging to the Territorial Defense of Trebinje.
On December 6, 1991, the JNA launched another
determined attack, using one battalion of the 5th Prole-
tarian Brigade and one battalion of the 472nd Motorized
Brigade. The main effort was again against Srđ, where
elements of the 3rd Battalion of the 472nd Motorized Bri-
D
gade attacked. This time Srđ was defended by a mixed
platoon composed of troops belonging to the IX Bat-
talion of the HOS and the Defense of Dubrovnik. The
defenders offered stiff resistance and managed to de-
feat the attack, killing five JNA soldiers and wounding
fourteen. The JNA also unleashed artillery fire on the
R
city that day. Nineteen persons were killed and sixty
wounded, mostly civilians, in the shelling. The shelling
of Dubrovnik was arguably one of the biggest blun-
ders the JNA made during its aggression against Cro-
atia – world public opinion turned against Serbia and
the JNA. The JNA was exposed as an army of occupa-
tion, and one not averse to committing war crimes and
crimes against humanity.
The bulk of the 3rd Partisan Division of Užice Corps,
4.2.2020. 19:34:08
 The Croatian Nation’s Struggle for Survival, 1991-1995

DUBROVNIK/WAR/CROATIA/1991. / Autor: Tomislav Gusić, autor fotografije:

Pavo Urban, Dubrovnik, 1991. godine. Plakat s fotografijom kamene prašine
DUBROVNIK na Stradunu nakon eksplozije projektila 6. prosinca 1991., dana kada je ops-
jednuti Dubrovnik pretrpio jedan od najžešćih napada. Bila je to jedna od
posljednjih fotografija Pave Urbana koji je tog dana poginuo nedaleko od
Orlandova stupa od krhotina granate (Pavo Urban – Posljednje slike, tekst An-
tun Maračić, Zagreb, 1997.). Uz Pavu Urbana, u Domovinskom ratu poginuli
su hrvatski novinari i snimatelji: Gordan Lederer, Žarko Kaić, Živko Krstičević,
Tihomir Tunuković, Boris Erdelja, Luka Skračić...

DUBROVNIK/WAR/CROATIA/1991 / Author: Tomislav Gusić, Photograph by:

Pavo Urban, Dubrovnik, 1991. The photograph shows stone dust on Stradun,
the central street of Dubrovnik’s Old Town, after the explosion of a shell on
H
December 6, 1991. On that day Dubrovnik suffered one of the heaviest at-
tacks. This was one of the last photographs taken by Pavo Urban, who died
on that day near Orlando’s Column from a shrapnel wound (Pavo Urban – The
Last Pictures, text by Antun Maračić, Zagreb, 1997). Pavo Urban was not the
only journalist killed during the Croatian War of Independence. The list of
Croatian newsman and cameramen also includes: Gordan Lederer, Žarko Kaić,
Živko Krstičević, Tihomir Tunuković, Boris Erdelja, Luka Skračić...
M
D
tvom u istočnoj Hercegovini, koje je spaljeno, a stanov- in an effort to cut off Dubrovnik from the rest of the
ništvo protjerano i dijelom pobijeno.465 country, launched the main attack along the Ravno –
Težište napada Užički je korpus potom prebacio Cicrina – Čepikuće – Doli line. The remainder of the 3rd
C
na smjer Zavala – Orahov Do – Slano. Slano je brani- Partisan Division launched a supporting attack on the
la policija i skupina lokalnih mještana. Hrvatske su Zavala – Orahov Do – Slano line. On the first day of the
snage pružile snažan otpor 2. i 3. listopada 1991., no battle, October 1, 1991, the attackers ran into serious
nisu uspjele zaustaviti 10. partizansku brigadu JNA, trouble at Čepikiće. There, A Company of the 116th Bri-
koja je s oklopnim ojačanjem i usprkos značajnim gade from Metković inflicted heavy casualties on the at-
D
gubicima 4. listopada prodrla u Slano i odsjekla Du- tackers and beat them back. The JNA retaliated for this
brovnik od Hrvatske.466 defeat by launching a raid on a cluster of undefended,
predominantly Croatian villages in eastern Herzegovi-
na. The houses of the Croats were burned, some Croats
465 USMKSMP: I uprava GŠ OS SFRJ, Dnevni izveštaj SP br.
1-275 od 2. 10. 1991.; Ivo LUČIĆ, Selo moje Ravno: po-
murdered and the rest expelled.
Užice Corps then shifted the focus of the attack on
R
vijest stradanja Hrvata u Popovu, Hrvatska hercegov-
ačka zajednica „Herceg Stjepan“, Zagreb, 1992., 61-75; the Zavala – Orahov Do – Slano line. Slano was defend-
Raščlamba borbenih djelovanja OS RH u Domovinskom ed by policemen and armed group of its citizens. The
ratu na Južnom bojištu tijekom 1991., 48-49; J. COKIĆ,
Početak kraja, 272-273. defenders put up a determined resistance on October
2 and 3 but could not stop the onslaught of the 10th
466 ICTY: Komanda 2. OG, Odluka za daljnja dejstva str.
pov. br. 131-1 od 6. 10. 1991.; USMKSMP: I uprava GŠ Partisan Brigade of the JNA. The 10th Partisan Brigade
OS SFRJ, Dnevni izveštaji SP br. 1-276 od 3. 10. 1991.; SP was supported by armor. Despite suffering serious ca-
br. 1-278 od 5. 10. 1991.; SP br. 1-285 od 12. 10. 1991. i sualties, the Brigade managed to enter Slano on Oc-
SP br. 1-286 od 13. 10. 1991.; Raščlamba borbenih djelo- tober 4. The JNA had cut off Dubrovnik from the rest
vanja OS RH u Domovinskom ratu na Južnom bojištu
tijekom 1991., 50; J. COKIĆ, Početak kraja, 275. of Croatia.

197

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 Davor Marijan • Rat za opstojnost Hrvata, 1991. - 1995.
Zapadna Hercegovina
U odnosu na napadne planove s kraja rujna 1991.,
dolina Neretve bila je do kraja godine relativno mir-
na. General Kadijević tvrdi da je glavni razlog za to
bio slab odziv pričuve, zbog čega je napadna zadaća
Užičkoga korpusa promijenjena u osiguranje Zračne
luke Mostar i “stvaranje operativne osnovice za po-
tencijalna dejstva ka Splitu u sadejstvu sa snagama
kninske grupacije i ratne mornarice”.467 Mirnodopske
H
snage u Mostaru – 10. mtbr i 171. vazduhoplovna baza
– osiguravale su vojne objekte u gradu, za što su im
pridodana dva bataljuna 179. brdske brigade iz Nik-
šića. Glavnina brigade bila je pričuva Operativne gru-
pe na širem području Zračne luke Mostar.468 Stvarna
zadaća Užičkoga korpusa bila je da bez borbe zapo-
M
sjedne Mostar i zastrašuje nesrpsko stanovništvo, što
je trebao biti najučinkovitiji način za postizanje cilja. U
sklopu stalnih izvidničkih zadataka i praćenja stanja u
zapadnoj Hercegovini JNA je požurila izvući materijal-
no-tehnička sredstva iz skladišta s područja Mostara i
Čapljine u Vardište i Nikšić.469
D
Izlazak JNA izvan vojarni pogoršao je sigurnosno
stanje u cijeloj Hercegovini, posebice na širem po-
dručju Mostara. Dovođenjem pričuve JNA je postupno
postavila nadzor oko grada, osobito na prometnicama
od Čapljine, Čitluka i Širokog Brijega. Izvan njezina
C
nadzora bio je samo stari put preko Žovnice u sjever-
nom dijelu Mostara. Učestali incidenti bili su zloslutna
najava skorog rata.470 Od njih je svakako najznačajniji
onaj 18. rujna 1991., kada je skupina naoružanih Hrva-
ta napala vojnu kolonu JNA u Vinjanima kod Posušja.
U sukobu je poginuo podoficir JNA, a jedan je vojnik
ranjen. Na hrvatskoj je strani poginuo Ludvig Pavlović,
jedini preživjeli pripadnik skupine hrvatskih gerilaca
koja je 1972. ubačena u Jugoslaviju.471
467 V. KADIJEVIĆ, Moje viđenje raspada, 135, 139-140.
468 ICTY: Komanda OG, DT br. 8-1 od 21. 9. 1991.
469 ICTY: Komanda 2. OG, Odluka za daljnja dejstva str. pov.
br. 131-1 od 6. 10. 1991.; ICTY: Komanda 2. OG, Odluka
za dalja dejstva str. pov. br. 333-1 od 16. 10. 1991.; ICTY:
Komanda 2. OG, Odluka za dalja dejstva str. pov. br. 399-
1 od 21. 10. 1991.; ICTY: Komanda 2. OG, Naređenje str.
pov. br. 840-1 od 19. 11. 1991.
470 D. MARIJAN, “Djelovanje JNA u Hercegovini”, 641-642.
471 I. LUČIĆ, Uzroci rata, 329.
198
Domovinski rat 04-02-2020 Knjiga 1.indd 198
Western Herzegovina
From the end of September, the situation in the
Neretva Valley, in comparison to other areas under
JNA attack, was relatively calm. General Kadijević
claims that the JNA could not launch a strong attack
there because many reserve soldiers in Serbia had
dodged the mobilization. For that reason, according
to Kadijević, the original plan was jettisoned and Užice
Corps was given a new objective: to secure the airport
in Mostar and “create an operational basis for potential
attacks towards Split in coordination with the forces of
the Knin contingent and the navy”. The forces belong-
ing to the peacetime contingent of the JNA in Mostar
– the 10th Motorized Brigade and the 171st Air Base –
secured the military installations and facilities in the
city. They were assisted in that task by two battalions
belonging to the 179th Mountain Division from Nikšić.
The bulk of the Brigade was the reserve of the Opera-
tional Group in the wider area of Mostar Airport. The
real task of Užice Corps was to occupy Mostar without
a fight and intimidate the non-Serbs residents of the
city. JNA forces were constantly engaged in reconnais-
sance operations and the JNA leadership closely mon-
itored the situation in western Herzegovina. These
operations were mounted to facilitate a speedy ex-
traction of the matériel, weapons and equipment from
the warehouses in the Mostar and Čapljina area. The
matériel, weapons and equipment were then shipped
to Vardište and Nikšić.
The active presence of the JNA in Herzegovina ex-
acerbated the already tenuous security situation there,
especially in the wider Mostar area. By deploying its
D
reserves around the city, the JNA gradually encircled
the city and controlled the roads leading from Mostar
to Čapljina, Čitluk and Široki Brijeg. The old Žovnica
road in the northern part of Mostar was the only road
not controlled by the JNA. Incidents and skirmishes
R
occurred frequently and portended a full-scale war.
The most significant skirmish during this period oc-
curred on September 18, 1991, when a group of armed
Croats attacked a JNA column in Vinjani near Posušje.
One JNA NCO was killed and one JNA soldier wound-
ed in the attack. The Croats lost Ludvig Pavlović, the
sole survivor from a Croatian guerilla group infiltrated
Yugoslavia from the West with the aim of inciting a re-
bellion against the Communist regime in 1972.
4.2.2020. 19:34:08
 The Croatian Nation’s Struggle for Survival, 1991-1995
POMORSKO BOJIŠTE
Na Jadranskom moru JNA je imala potpunu pre-
vlast. Njena je mornarica imala uporišta duž cijele obale
i na dijelu otoka što je bila dobra osnova za zadržavanje
prijeratnih pozicija. Unatoč tome, sredinom rujna 1991.
od njenih je zarobljenih dijelova nastala Hrvatska ratna
mornarica koja je na dijelu bojišta (boj u Bračkom i Kor-
čulanskom kanalu, 15. i 16. studenoga 1991.) prekinula
dominaciju Jugoslavenske ratne mornarice, ograničivši
H
njeno djelovanje na akvatorij Dubrovnika te otoka Visa i
Lastova. JNA je na obali i priobalju imala snage Vojnopo-
morske oblasti koje su se sastojale od prištabnih postroj-
bi, Kninskog korpusa, Flote i vojnopomorskih sektora u
Puli, Šibeniku i Kumboru u Crnoj Gori.472
M
U napadnoj operaciji JNA zadatak njezine Flote bio
je nastaviti uspostavljenu blokadu i obranu vojnopo-
morskih uporišta Vis i Lastovo te snagama angažiranim
u blokadama luka, a po potrebi i drugim, pomoći ko-
pnenim i pomorskim snagama JNA u deblokadi garni-
zona u Zadru, Šibeniku, Splitu i Pločama. Pomorsku blo-
kadu jadranskih luka Ratna mornarica JNA uvela je u tri
D
navrata: od 17. do 23. rujna, od 3. do 11. listopada i od
8. studenoga do 3. prosinca 1991. godine. Flota je zadr-
žala pomorske baze na Visu i Lastovu do kraja svibnja
1992., kada se definitivno povukla iz Hrvatske.473
C
ZRAKOPLOVSTVO U RATU
1991. GODINE
Zračnog rata u klasičnom shvaćanju u Hrvatskoj
D
1991. nije bilo. Premda zastarjelo, Jugoslavensko ratno
zrakoplovstvo držalo je u svojim rukama sve zračne re-
surse i nije bilo nikakve mogućnosti da mu konkurira
zrakoplovstvo koje se počelo osnivati na temelju sport-
skog i poljoprivrednog potencijala. Nakon sukoba u
Sloveniji glavne zračne snage JNA koncentrirane su na
aerodromima Bihać, Zalužani i Pula. U srpnju 1991. po-
čeli su prvi zračni napadi na hrvatske snage u istočnoj
Hrvatskoj. Kao grana JNA, zrakoplovstvo je bilo najveći
gubitnik. Imalo je apsolutnu prevlast u zraku i nije ju
uspjelo iskoristiti. Praksa je pokazala da je skladno dje-
472 Isto, 174-175.
473 Isto, 175-176.
199
Domovinski rat 04-02-2020 Knjiga 1.indd 199
MARITIME THEATER OF
OPERATIONS
The JNA was in full control of the eastern portion
of the Adriatic Sea. Its navy had bases along the en-
tire length of the coast and on a number of islands.
Its position seemed unassailable. In spite of this the
Croats managed to capture some JNA vessels. Around
these vessels the Croats formed their own war navy
in mid-September, 1991. This nascent force broke the
JNA Navy’s hegemony in an encounter in the Brač and
Korčula channels on November 15-16. After the battle,
the JNA limited its activities to the Dubrovnik aquato-
rium and islands of Vis and Lastovo. The forces of the
Military-Maritime District were stationed on the coast
and islands and consisted of headquarters units, Knin
Corps, the fleet and military-maritime sectors in Pula,
Šibenik and Kumbor in Montenegro.
In the JNA’s strategic offensive against Croatia the
task of the JNA Navy was to maintain the blockade of
the coastline and defend its bases in Vis and Lastovo and
use the forces engaged in accomplishing their tasks, and
others if needed to help the land and other naval forces
to lift the blockades of the JNA garrisons in Zadar, Split,
Šibenik and Ploče. The JNA Navy put Croatian ports un-
der blockade three times: from September 17 to Septem-
ber 23; from October 3 to October 11 and from Novem-
ber 8 to December 3, 1991. The fleet held on to its bases
on Vis and Lastovo until the end of May, 1992, when it de-
finitively withdrew all of its forces from Croatian territory.
AIR FORCE IN WAR IN 1991
There was no air-war, in the conventional sense of
the term, in Croatia in 1991. The JNA Air Force consist-
ed of obsolete aircraft but Croatia had nothing to chal-
lenge the JNA’s absolute air superiority. The Croatian
R
Air Force at that time consisted of a few crop dusters
and light sport aircraft. After the conflict in Slovenia the
main JNA Air Forces were concentrated in the following
air bases: Bihać, Zalužani and Pula. In July, 1991, the JNA
Air Force launched its first attacks on Croatian forces in
eastern Croatia. The JNA Air Force put up a dismal per-
formance during the war. In the early stages of the war,
in 1991, it had absolute air superiority but could not use
it to any significant advantage for the land forces. Soon
4.2.2020. 19:34:08
 Davor Marijan • Rat za opstojnost Hrvata, 1991. - 1995.
lovanje s kopnenim snagama bilo ispod mirnodopskih
očekivanja. Do sredine rujna zrakoplovstvo je korišteno
za demonstriranje sile, što je značilo let na vrlo malim
visinama. Ovakva vrsta letova postala je kontraproduk-
tivna razvijanjem hrvatske protuzračne obrane koja je
bila učinkovita do 3000 m. Samo je iz jedne eskadrile
jurišnih lovaca s Batajnice pri ovoj taktici oštećeno 27
zrakoplova. Tijekom 1991. RV i PVO je izgubio 21 bor-
beni zrakoplov, a jedan su helikopter Mi-8 zarobile hr-
vatske snage.
H
Hrvatsko se ratno zrakoplovstvo počelo stvarati u
srpnju 1991. kada je osnovana Zrakoplovna grupa pri
Zapovjedništvu ZNG-a RH. Njeni su pripadnici davali
stručnu pomoć postrojbama ZNG-a u stvaranju su-
stava zračnog motrenja i dojavljivanja. Nakon što je
u rujnu osvojen aerodrom Lučko počelo je stvaranje
M
prvih zrakoplovnih postrojbi i zračnih baza. Aktivnost
hrvatskih zračnih snaga bila je 1991. simbolična iz jed-
nostavnog razloga što je takav bio zrakoplovni poten-
cijal. Uz to je prevlast JNA u zraku bila takva da je svaki
let u zahvatu crte bojišta bio avantura opasna po život.
Opasnost za hrvatske zrakoplovce bila je još veća od
D
protuzračne obrane JNA, posebice njenih raketnih pu-
kova. U istočnoj je Slavoniji 2. prosinca 1991. kod sela
Otoka oboren AN-2 s četiri člana posade, raketom su-
stava KUB-M. Iako im hrvatsko zrakoplovstvo nije mo-
glo biti adekvatan protivnik, JNA je nastojala da njego-
vo nastajanje sreže u samom začetku. Zabranjivala je
C
korištenje aerodroma, optuživala sportsko i poljopri-
vredno zrakoplovstvo za izviđanje, a od sredine rujna
1991. je izvela i nekoliko napada na mjesta baziranja
zrakoplova: 15. rujna na aerodrom Varaždin, 6. listopa-
da aerodrom Lučko, 3. i 7. studenoga Varaždin, 7. stu-
denoga aerodrom Pribislavac, a 21. prosinca 1991. na
aerodrom Vrsar.474
474 D. MARIJAN, Domovinski rat, 176-177.
200
Domovinski rat 04-02-2020 Knjiga 1.indd 200
after the war began in Croatia, the JNA Air Force proved
incapable of providing effective close air support to the
ground troops. Until mid-September the JNA used the
Air Force as a show of force. For the pilots that meant
flying at low altitudes. The practice soon proved ex-
tremely perilous because Croatia had acquired a quan-
tity of antiaircraft weapons. Flying at altitudes lower
than 3,000m invited disaster. 27 fighter bombers from
one squadron stationed in Batajnica sustained damage
by anti-aircraft fire while flying at low altitudes. During
1991 the JNA Air Force and Air Defense lost 21 aircraft
to Croatian anti-aircraft fire. Croatian forces also cap-
tured one Mi-8 helicopter.
Croatia started creating its Air Force in July, 1991,
when the Air Force Group at the HQ of the ZNG was
formed. Its members provided expert assistance to ZNG
units by creating an air surveillance and navigation sys-
tem. After Croatian forces captured the Lučko Air Base,
the process of creating first Air Force units and estab-
lishing air bases started. The activities of the Croatian Air
Force in 1991 were symbolic for the simple reason that
the nascent Air Force did not have potential for anything
more. Also, the JNA enjoyed absolute air superiority so
that every sortie into a combat area was, for all intents
and purposes, a suicidal act. It has to be said that the Cro-
atian flyers were in even more danger from the JNA Air
Defense, especially its rocket regiments, than its fighter
aircraft. In eastern Slavonia, on December 2, 1991, at the
village of Otok, a Croatian AN-2 with four members of the
crew was shot down by a KUB-M missile. The JNA did its
utmost to nip the creation of the Croatian Air Force in the
bud. The JNA imposed a no-fly zone, accused the Croa-
tian Army of sending crop dusters and light sport aircraft
D
on reconnaissance missions and, starting in September,
1991, launched a few airstrikes on a number of airfields
in Croatia: Varaždin airport on September 15, Lučko air-
port on October 6, Varaždin airport on November 3 and
November 7, Pribislavac airport on November 7 and Vr-
R
sar airport on December 21, 1991.
4.2.2020. 19:34:08
 The Croatian Nation’s Struggle for Survival, 1991-1995

H
Hrvatska „ratna eskadrila“, maskiranje poljoprivrednih zrakoplo- The Croatian “Air Force”. Troops camouflaging crop dusters,
M
va, „Gajgerova pustara“, Đakovo, jesen 1991. godine. Hrvatska Đakovo, autumn, 1991. At that time Croatia did not possess an
tada nije imala ratno zrakoplovstvo, pa su poljoprivredni zrako- air force. Agricultural aircraft were used for transport and for
plovi korišteni za potrebe logistike, ali i borbenog djelovanja po bombing the enemy. The bombs were improvised explosive de-
neprijateljskim ciljevima improviziranim bombama, tzv. „bojleri- vices, fashioned out of boilers and water heaters (Photograph
ma“ (autor fotografija: Marko Perić). by Marko Perić).
D
C
D
Umijeće improvizacije – sve za obranu, Hrvatska, rujan 1991.

The Art of Improvisation - all for defense, Croatia, September 1991.

R

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 Davor Marijan • Rat za opstojnost Hrvata, 1991. - 1995.

ZNAČENJE 1991. GODINE SIGNIFICANCE OF EVENTS OF

U rujnu i listopadu 1991. na crti ratišta dugoj oko
1300 kilometara riješena je sudbina Republike Hrvat-
ske. Opstala je premda je 3. siječnja 1992. dočekala s
četvrtinom okupiranog teritorija. Srbija se morala za-
dovoljiti sa samoproglašenom RSK i JNA u svojim ru-
kama, što se tada činilo dosta dobrim uspjehom. Bio je
to privremeni kraj procesa koji je počeo u svibnju 1990.
prije nego što je HDZ kao izborni pobjednik preuzeo
H
vlast u Hrvatskoj.
Zbivanja u Hrvatskoj 1990. - 1991. najvećim je di-
jelom odredila JNA svojim navodno jugoslavenskim, a
stvarno prosrpskim ponašanjem. Do sredine rujna 1991.
ona je djelovala na postavkama izvedenim iz doktrinar-
M
nih naputaka OS SFRJ u izvanrednim stanjima. Razlika,
ili odmak od njih je što je JNA djelovala protiv legalnih
vlasti RH i što je omogućila nastanak i razvoj srpske po-
bune te srpsku okupaciju dijela teritorija RH.475
Od srpske pobune u kolovozu 1990. do svibnja
1991. Hrvatska je nastojala mirno i pregovorima riješiti
problem. Krajem lipnja 1991., odmah nakon proglaše-
D
nja hrvatske neovisnosti, pobunjeni su Srbi počeli šire-
nje pobune i rat za teritorij. Jugoslavenska narodna ar-
mija im je u početku pomagala širenjem „tampon zona“
koje su bile učinkovito sredstvo za onemogućivanje
djelovanja hrvatske policije i ZNG-a te ispisivanje gra-
C
nice neke od srpskih autonomnih oblasti. U kolovozu
je JNA preuzela primat u grabežu hrvatskog teritorija
(Baranja, zapadna i istočna Slavonija) pa je hrvatsko vr-
hovništvo bilo prinuđeno odgovoriti, blokirati i napasti
objekte JNA gdje god su to njene snage bile u stanju
učiniti. Jugoslavenska narodna armija je reagirala dugo
pripremanom napadnom operacijom koja je propala
uslijed jakog otpora hrvatskih snaga, neuspješne mo-
bilizacije pričuve u Srbiji i nesposobnosti najvišeg ko-
mandnog kadra. Zbog toga je JNA morala promijeniti
planove koji su se ubrzo pokazali prezahtjevnim pa je
u prvoj polovici listopada 1991. srbijanski politički vrh
donio odluku o prekidu napada i izvlačenju blokiranog
ljudstva i opreme JNA iz dubine Hrvatske. U studenom
su potakli međunarodnu zajednicu da pokrene meha-
nizam dovođenja mirovnih snaga UN-a koje su trebale
zaštititi njihova teritorijalna osvajanja.
475 D. MARIJAN, “Oružane snage SFRJ u izvanrednim pri-
likama”, 354-374.
1991
In September and October, 1991, the front line in
Croatia stretched for about 1,300 kilometers. The Croa-
tian forces, vastly outgunned and outnumbered, resisted
fiercely along the whole length of the line. That resistance
ensured Croatia’s survival, despite the fact that by Janu-
ary 3 about one fourth of the territory of the Republic
of Croatia had been occupied by the enemy. The rebel
Serbs and the JNA’s objective was the total destruction
of the Croatian forces and in that respect the offensives
launched in 1991 against Croatia were a complete failure.
The Serbs had to content themselves with a tenuous hold
on one fourth of Croatian territory which they strove to
solidify by proclaiming the Republic of Serbian Krajina.
Also, the JNA had effectively become the Serbian army
and that gave confidence to the rebel Serbs and their pa-
trons in Belgrade that the initial objectives could still be
attained in the future. The process of turning the JNA into
a Serbian army had begun in May 1990, even before the
election victory of the HDZ party in Croatia.
The events in Croatia in 1990 and 1991 deter-
mined, more than anything else, the JNA’s future as a
force geared towards protecting Serbia’s interests. Until
mid-September 1991 the JNA operated, ostensibly, ac-
cording to the doctrinal guidelines of the Armed Forces
of the SFRY regarding states of emergency. However, the
JNA in reality, and completely contrary to the mentioned
guidelines, acted against the legally elected government
of the Republic of Croatia, in effect facilitating the Serb
rebellion in Croatia. The JNA, moreover, occupied a siz-
D
able portion of Croatian territory.
The Serb rebellion in Croatia started in August, 1990.
Until May, 1991, Croatia tried to solve the problem by ne-
gotiations. At the end of June, 1991, immediately after
Croatia had declared independence, the rebellion esca-
lated. The rebel Serbs started a war of aggression the aim
R
of which was to acquire as much Croatian territory as pos-
sible. The JNA initially helped the rebel Serbs by creating
buffer zones between them and the Croatian police and
the Croatian National Guard. By creating these buffer zones
the JNA successfully protected the rebel Serbs’ conquests.
In August the JNA launched open aggression against Cro-
atia. The objective was to destroy the Croatian forces and
occupy large swaths of Croatian territory. Baranja, eastern
Slavonia and western Slavonia fell under the onslaught

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 The Croatian Nation’s Struggle for Survival, 1991-1995
U drugoj polovici rujna 1991. nastala je kontinui-
rana crta na hrvatskom ratištu sa sedam jasnih kopne-
nih bojišta te pomorskim i zračnim bojištem. Svako je
bojište imalo svoje posebnosti i značaj, a među po-
sebnostima bila je i različitost ustrojenosti snaga, od
kojih su neke nastajale dijelom i na stihiji, a ne samo
na projekcijama Glavnog stožera HV-a. U srpnju 1991.
Hrvatska je imala četiri djelatne i 18 pričuvnih brigada
u različitom stupnju popunjenosti i borbene spremno-
sti te nekoliko samostalnih bataljuna. U siječnju 1992.
H
Hrvatska je vojska već bila respektabilna sila s više od
150.000 ljudi pod oružjem u više od 70 brigada i samo-
stalnih bataljuna.
Na istočnom bojištu JNA je planirala angažira-
ti glavne snage i s njima prodor u dubinu Hrvatske.
Sigurnosno stanje je bilo teško tijekom cijele 1991.
M
godine, a konstantno se pogoršavalo od proglaše-
nja hrvatske neovisnosti. Već u srpnju 1991. vođene
su teške borbe sa srpskim pobunjenicima, pa se po-
stupno stvarao animozitet prema središtu države
zbog procjena da oklijevaju u političkim odlukama i
da nedostatno pomažu obrani regije. Tu se radilo o
D
iskonstruiranom sukobu između središta i periferije u
kojem je središte držalo, s punim pravom, da djelo-
vanje mora prilagoditi stanju u cijeloj Hrvatskoj i da
ne može brzati s političkim i vojnim odlukama. Po-
sljedica takvog, vrijeme će pokazati, uravnoteženog
pristupa bila je okupacija Baranje od strane JNA, ali i
C
dobivanje na vremenu i odgađanje strategijske ofen-
zive JNA koja je pokrenuta u drugoj polovici rujna.
Na istočnom je bojištu Srbija imala najveće snage u
agresiji na Hrvatsku: 12. korpus i Gardijsku mehanizi-
ranu diviziju JNA s ojačanjima TO-a Srbije i Vojvodine.
D
Suprotstavila im se OZ Osijek u najvećoj obrambenoj
operaciji koja je vođena na nekom od hrvatskih bo-
jišta tijekom rata. Zahvaljujući propasti mobilizacije
u Srbiji, nedoraslom oficirskom kadru i posebice ži-
lavom otporu slabo naoružanih i borbeno uglavnom
neiskusnih hrvatskih sastava, napadna operacija JNA
je neslavno propala, a težište djelovanja preneseno je
na zauzimanje Vukovara. Nakon tromjesečnih borbi
grad je zauzet, unatoč nastojanjima hrvatskih sna-
ga da mu pomognu i da ga odterete. Obrana grada
je postala simbol svekolike hrvatske obrane. Istovre-
meno je, u skladu sa svojim mogućnostima i raspo-
loživim resursima, Zapovjedništvo OZ-a Osijek vodilo
obrambenu operaciju u istočnoj Hrvatskoj i s povre-
menim i neizbježnim taktičkim neuspjesima uspješno
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Domovinski rat 04-02-2020 Knjiga 1.indd 203
of the JNA and various Serb paramilitary units under its
command. The Croatian government was forced to react –
Croatian forces blocked and attacked the JNA’s bases and
facilities in Croatia wherever they were strong enough to
do so. The JNA had been preparing for just such a contin-
gency for a long time. It launched an offensive operation
the main objective of which was to break the back of the
Croatian forces and render the country defenseless. The of-
fensive failed miserably due to a tenacious Croatian resis-
tance, failed mobilization of JNA reserve soldiers in Serbia
and gross incompetence of the leadership of the JNA. The
JNA had no option but to modify its objectives. During the
first half of October, 1991, the Serbian political leadership
decided to give up the ghost in Croatia. Orders went out to
halt the offensive and pull the men and equipment out of
the bases under Croatian blockade in Croatia. In Novem-
ber, the Serbian leadership induced the international com-
munity to initiate a process of sending a UN peacekeeping
force to Croatia. The gambit was based on the assumption
that the presence of a UN peacekeeping force would effec-
tively protect the Serbs’ territorial conquests.
By the second half of September, 1991, a continuous
front line had been established. This theater of war encom-
passed seven clearly defined theaters of operations plus
the maritime theater and air operations. Each theater of
operations had its unique features and importance. Also, in
each theater there operated independent units and those
created in an ad hoc manner. In July, 1991, Croatia had four
active-duty and eighteen reserve brigades (at varying lev-
els of nominal vs. actual strength and combat readiness)
and several independent battalions. In January, 1992, the
Croatian Army was a respectable fighting force with more
than 150,000 men under arms serving in more than 70 bri-
gades and independent battalions.
The JNA planned to deploy its main force in the east-
ern theater of operations, defeat the Croatian forces there
and advance westwards, deep into Croatian territory. The
security situation in eastern Croatia was shaky through-
R
out 1991 and deteriorated steadily after the declaration
of Croatian independence. Already in July, 1991, Croatian
forces were engaged in combat against rebel Serbs in the
eastern part of the country. Many Croats in eastern Croa-
tia were of the opinion that the Croatian government’s
attitude towards the rapidly escalating situation in the
region was lackluster. It certainly seemed to the Croats in
eastern Croatia that the government’s responses to Serb
aggression in the region were indecisive and thus inade-
quate to bring the situation under control. However, the
4.2.2020. 19:34:10
 Davor Marijan • Rat za opstojnost Hrvata, 1991. - 1995.
je okončalo u prvim danima siječnja 1992. godine.
Iako neusporedivo nadmoćni u borbenoj tehnici, JNA
i pridružene snage TO-a Srbije te pobunjenih Srba i
paravojnih srbijanskih formacija nisu uspjele napravi-
ti uspjeh operativnog značaja. Njihov posljednji zna-
čajniji uspjeh postignut je sredinom prosinca 1991.
južno od Osijeka. Premda su JNA i TO Srbije u neočeki-
vano dugoj kampanji zauzele zapadni Srijem s Vuko-
varom, zaustavljene su na prilazima Osijeku i Vinkov-
cima i spriječene da prodru u dubinu Hrvatske. Iako
H
je imala prilično velike snage angažirane na bojištu,
OZ Osijek je za ojačanje crte od Glavnog stožera HV-a
tražila pet brigada i vraćanje svojih snaga pridodanih
OZ-u Bjelovar za čišćenje Bilogore i Papuka.476 Nave-
deni zahtjev je pokazatelj koliko su neke poslijeratne
ocjene o stanju na tom bojištu bile zlonamjerne i ten-
M
denciozne i da nije moglo biti ni govora o slobodnim
brigadama koje su se mogle odvojiti za druga bojišta
i mogućem rješenju rata na prijelazu iz 1991. u 1992.
godinu.477
U zapadnoj Slavoniji bojište je bilo kompliciranije
zbog opasnosti da JNA i dijelovi TO-a Bosne i Herce-
D
govine s pobunjenim Srbima presijeku, ako ne Hrvat-
sku, onda barem podravski prometni pravac. U tom je
području srpska manjina masovno podržala agresora.
Bojište je bilo aktivno od sredine kolovoza, a srpske
su snage u jednom trenutku držale Lipik i dio Pakraca
pod nadzorom što je bio njihov najveći uspjeh. Jedna
C
od teškoća u organizaciji hrvatske obrane bila je inge-
rencija tri operativne zone (Bjelovar, Osijek i Zagreb)
na bojištu. Zbog toga je, kao ni na jednom drugom
bojištu, rješenje pronađeno u osnivanju operativnih
grupa i sektora čija su zapovjedništva zapovijedala
snagama na pojedinom operativnom pravcu ili po-
dručju djelovanja. Krajem listopada hrvatske su snage
počele oslobodilačke operacije Orkan-91 i Otkos-10 što
je bila jedinstvena pojava na hrvatskom ratištu. Borbe
su okončane oslobađanjem Bilogore, Papuka i dijela
općina na zapadnoslavonskim planinama. Na ovom
su bojištu hrvatske snage napravile veliki učinak, na
temelju kojeg su kasnije, godinama, pojedini generali
HV-a pokušavali dokazati da je primirje u Sarajevu bila
strategijska greška, a ne ono što jest – nužnost i nasto-
476 SVA MORH, GSHV: Zap. OZ Osijek, str. pov. br. 525-
123-272 od 18. 12. 1991. Komentar i odluka načelnika
GSHV-a napisani su na izvješću.
477 D. MARIJAN, Smrt oklopne brigade, 219-220.
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Domovinski rat 04-02-2020 Knjiga 1.indd 204
Croatian government was aware that its actions had to be
calibrated according to the overall situation in Croatia and
that rash political and military decisions regarding any one
region could prove disastrous for the country as a whole.
The discontent of some Croats in eastern Slavonia was fu-
elled by political elements in Croatia that were opposed to
the legally elected government of the country. To be sure,
one result of the government’s balanced approach was the
loss of Baranja to the JNA. On the other hand, the approach
bought much needed time for the Croatian armed forces
and delayed the JNA’s strategic offensive; the onslaught
was finally launched in the second half of September. The
bulk of Serbia’s forces were deployed in the eastern theater
of operations; XII Corps and the Guards Motorized Division
with reinforcements from the Territorial Defense Force of
Serbia and Vojvodina. This Serbian force was opposed by
Operative Zone Osijek. The ensuing battle would prove
to be the largest defensive operation the Croatian armed
forces fought during the entire war. The JNA’s offensive
failed. A number of factors conspired against the JNA in the
battle: its senior officers were not nearly experienced and
competent enough to lead combined-arms offensive op-
erations, failed mobilization in Serbia and, most important-
ly, tenacious and heroic resistance of vastly outnumbered,
outgunned and inexperienced Croatian units. The JNA
leadership, realizing that their troops could not destroy the
Croatian forces ranged against them and that advancing
deep into Croatian territory was nothing more than a pipe
dream, decided to focus the JNA’s efforts on capturing the
city of Vukovar. The JNA besieged the city and after three
months of vicious fighting the JNA captured Vukovar. The
heroism of the defenders of Vukovar and the plight of its
citizens became a potent symbol of Croatian defiance of
D
Serbian aspirations to occupy significant portions of Croa-
tian territory and create a greater Serbian state. The forces
of Operative Zone Osijek were constantly on the defensive
in the eastern theater of operations. They suffered a num-
ber of setbacks and local defeats but in the end prevailed
R
over the vastly superior, in men, firepower and equipment,
enemy. The JNA’s last success occurred in mid-December,
1991, south of the city of Osijek. The JNA and the Territorial
Defense units, in a surprisingly long campaign, did man-
age to occupy Western Sirmium and Vukovar. However,
the Croatian forces halted the JNA’s offensive at Osijek and
Vinkovci. The fighting petered out during the first days of
January, 1992. The nascent Croatian army had won a signal
strategic victory. The JNA and the Territorial Defense units
and Serb paramilitary units of various hues had failed to
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 The Croatian Nation’s Struggle for Survival, 1991-1995
janje hrvatskog vrhovništva da se rat dobije s minimu-
mom žrtava.
Na bojištu Banovine i Siska te Pokuplja srpske su
snage do kraja rujna 1991. i u prvim danima listopada
napravile svoj maksimum, najvećim su dijelom izbile
na desnu obalu rijeke Kupe, a kod Jamničke Kiselice je
i prešle. Cijela Banovina je okupirana s izuzetkom ma-
log džepa oko sela Nebojan u općini Petrinja. Inicijati-
va koju su hrvatske snage preuzele pobjedom nad JNA
kod Novog Farkašića sredinom listopada, u prosincu je
H
kulminirala neuspješnom operacijom Vihor, potvrdiv-
ši veliku i nepremostivu razliku između želja Glavnog
stožera HV-a i mogućnosti Hrvatske vojske u procesu
nastajanja. Stoga ne čudi što tendenciozni tumači rata
prešućuju operaciju jer se ne uklapa u stajališta o mo-
gućem brzom okončanju rata u hrvatsku korist.
M
Na karlovačko-kordunskom bojištu hrvatske su
snage upornom obranom iskoristile slabosti JNA i spri-
ječile prijelaz preko rijeka Kupe, Korane i Mrežnice. U
vrijeme intenzivnih napada u prvim danima listopada
1991., hrvatske snage, premda nadomak Zagreba, bile
su među najmanje brojnim i najslabije naoružanim na
D
ratištu, a uz to nisu imale ni zapovjedništvo operativne
razine. U prosincu su hrvatske snage bile agilnije, no
bez sposobnosti pomaka koji su nešto značili u općem
stanju na ratištu.
Na ličkom su bojištu hrvatske snage već na pri-
jelazu iz kolovoza u rujan 1991. napravile strategijski
C
uspjeh obranom Gospića. U kasnijim pokušajima hr-
vatske snage nisu napravile veći uspjeh u odbacivanju
srpskih snaga od grada. Oko Otočca su hrvatske snage
bile poduzimljivije i uspješnije što je do primirja rezul-
tiralo aktivnim bojištem i odbacivanjem srpskih snaga
D
na pojedinim pravcima oko grada. Obrana Otočca je
značajna i zbog dovođenja snaga iz dubine, koje su
se, posebice 111. brigada HV-a iz Rijeke, pokazale izni-
mno dobrima.
Sjeverno i srednjodalmatinsko bojište je regija u
kojoj je Kninski korpus JNA već u travnju 1991. napra-
vio operativni razvoj. To je JNA i pobunjenim Srbima,
uz povoljnu demografsku strukturu (Benkovac, Knin i
Obrovac) omogućilo da do kraja rujna 1991. postignu
niz uspjeha taktičkog značaja, ali i strategijski neuspjeh
u borbama za Šibenik i Šibenski most gdje su nekoliko
dana držali Hrvatsku presječenu na dva dijela. Pobjeda
hrvatskih snaga u „rujanskom ratu“ u Šibeniku bila je i
temelj hrvatskog uspjeha i održanja priobalja u sjever-
noj i srednjoj Dalmaciji.
205
Domovinski rat 04-02-2020 Knjiga 1.indd 205
achieve anything of lasting or substantial operational im-
portance. It has to be pointed out that HQ, Operative Zone
Osijek, requested from the General Staff of the Croatian
Army that five more brigades be deployed in the eastern
theater of operations, and also those units that had been
transferred from Operative Zone Osijek to Operative Zone
Bjelovar for operations on Bilogora and Papuk. The request
decisively debunks the claims made by some people af-
ter the war that a number of formations under the com-
mand of Operative Zone Osijek could have been safely
transferred to other theaters. This is an important point
to stress because, according to the mentioned claims, the
Croatian Army would have won the war during the winter
of 1991/1992 had only the Croatian forces in the other the-
aters of operations been reinforced by troops belonging
to Operative Zone Osijek. The truth of the matter is that
Operative Zone Osijek had no troops to spare and that its
forces defeated the main effort of the JNA to destroy the
Republic of Croatia.
The situation in the Western Slavonia Theater of
Operations was potentially equally devastating for the
Republic of Croatia as a successful JNA offensive in the
eastern theater of operations would have been. The JNA,
assisted by elements of the Territorial Defense of Bosnia
and Herzegovina, in western Slavonia was poised to cut
off Slavonia from the rest of the country. Failing that, the
secondary objective of the JNA was to gain full control
of the Podravina communication routes. The Serbian mi-
nority in western Slavonia wholeheartedly supported
the invaders. The theater of operations was active from
mid-August. At one point the Serbs controlled Lipik and
parts of Pakrac. That was the height of their successes in
the theater. From an organizational standpoint defending
western Slavonia presented a number of problems. Most
of those difficulties stemmed from the fact that the areas
of responsibility of three Operative Zones (Bjelovar, Osijek
and Zagreb) met in the Western Slavonia Theater of Op-
erations. The problem was solved by forming operational
R
groups and sectors whose subordinate HQs commanded
the forces advancing in a given operational direction or
operating in a given area. At the end of October the Croa-
tian forces launched two offensive operations – Orkan-91
and Otkos-10. The objective was to liberate parts of the
occupied territory. The two operations were the first of-
fensive operations of the Croatian Army in the war. The
operations were successful and Bilogora, Papuk and parts
of some districts in the mountains in western Slavonia
were liberated. The Croatian forces achieved a lot in this
4.2.2020. 19:34:10
 Davor Marijan • Rat za opstojnost Hrvata, 1991. - 1995.
Na južnom je bojištu Hrvatska bila najtanja i bez
spomena vrijedne srpske manjine koju je trebalo, po
terminologiji JNA, „štititi“. Na tom je bojištu JNA, TO
Crne Gore i BiH iz istočne Hercegovine kao nigdje po-
kazala suštinu rata protiv Hrvatske – osvajačkog rata,
rata za teritorij na kojem je nesrpsko stanovništvo
bilo suvišno.
Na Jadranu je JRM imala apsolutnu prevlast u
brodovlju pa se iznenađujućim doimaju hrvatski
uspjesi u studenom 1991. kada je protivničko bro-
H
dovlje protjerano iz bračkog i korčulanskog kanala. I
u zraku je JNA imala apsolutnu premoć, no bez utje-
caja na tijek rata. Osim povremenih napada u stilu
zračnih terorista, zrakoplovstvo JNA nije se moglo ni-
čim značajnijim pohvaliti. Hrvatske zračne snage su
nastale na entuzijazmu i zrakoplovima prikladnim za
M
zaprašivanje poljoprivrednih usjeva i od njih se ništa
više nije moglo očekivati osim onog što su i značile –
psihološku ulogu.
Na kraju, stupanje na snagu Sarajevskog primirja
3. siječnja 1992. u 18 sati, Hrvatska je dočekala u polo-
žaju koji nije bio ugodan, no bio je daleko od bezizla-
D
znog. U istočnoj Hrvatskoj JNA je otela dio teritorija
koji nije ometao strategijski položaj, a u zapadnoj Sla-
voniji dio posavskog prometnog pravca. No Podravska
magistrala neometano je funkcionirala. U središnjoj
Hrvatskoj JNA je nadzirala prometnicu Split – Sinj –
Knin – Karlovac i dio Jadranske magistrale pa je pro-
C
met preusmjeren na obilazak preko Gorskog kotara i
Like i odvijao se bez teškoća, u što se ne računa osjet-
no duže trajanje puta. Južni dio Hrvatske bio je odsje-
čen kod Slanog s okruženim Dubrovnikom.
Hrvatska je iznijela rat s vojnom silom stvorenom
u ratnom hodu. Godinama kasnije se tvrdilo da je
već 1991. Hrvatska imala vojsku sposobnu dobiti rat,
kao da stvaranje oružane sile završava pozivanjem na
oružje skupine ljudi i davanjem naziva brigade. Proces
stvaranja vojske je kudikamo teži i složeniji. Najbolji
pokazatelj stanja u kojem se nalazila Hrvatska vojska
je osvrt glavnog inspektora HV-a generala Martina
Špegelja napisan 24. prosinca 1991. godine. Naglasio
je ogroman raskorak između htijenja i mogućnosti
provedbe.478 Bila je to vojska u povoju s nizom nedo-
stataka koji su uklonjeni do kraja 1994. godine.
478 Davor MARIJAN, “The Sarajevo ceasefire – realism or
strategic error by the Croatian Leadership”, Review of
Croatian History, VII/2011., 117.
206
Domovinski rat 04-02-2020 Knjiga 1.indd 206
theater of operations. Their successes in western Slavo-
nia led some Croatian generals to conclude after the war
that the signing of the Sarajevo cease-fire agreement was
a strategic blunder. The argument completely disregards
the fact that the Croatian leadership signed the Sarajevo
Agreement in an effort to win the war with as little military
and civilian casualties as possible.
By the beginning of October, 1991, in the Banovi-
na and Sisak Theater of Operations the Serb forces had
achieved all of their objectives and in some places even
exceeded them. They reached the right bank of the Kupa
River and crossed the Kupa River at Jamnička Kiselica. The
JNA occupied the whole of Banovina, with the exception
of one small pocket of resistance around the village of
Nebojan in the Petrinja Municipality. The Croatian forces,
in mid-October, won an engagement against the JNA at
Novi Farkašić. That success prompted the Croatian forc-
es to launch Operation Vihor. In December the operation
met with complete failure, proving that there was a huge
discrepancy between the wishes of the General Staff
of the Croatian Army and the real capabilities of the, at
that point, still nascent Croatian Army. It is not surprising
therefore, that those subscribing to the theory that the
Croatian Army could have won the war in 1991/1992 con-
veniently opt to gloss over Operation Vihor in their argu-
ments and analyses.
In the Karlovac-Kordun Theater of Operations the Cro-
atian forces offered stiff resistance, skillfully took advan-
tage of the JNA’s weaknesses in the theater and prevent-
ed the JNA from crossing the Kupa, Korana and Mrežnica
Rivers. During the first days of October, 1991, the JNA
launched a number of determined attacks in the direc-
tion of Zagreb. The Croatian forces there, as everywhere
D
else during that phase of the war, were vastly outgunned
and outnumbered. It is important to mention that on its
western side the area of the Karlovac-Kordun Theater of
Operations included Zagreb’s outlying suburbs and that
the Croatian forces in the theater were inferior to the forces
R
in any other theater of operations in terms on manpow-
er and equipment. Also, the Croatian forces there did not
have operational level command structures. In December,
1991, the Croatian forces in the theater made a number of
offensive moves and achieved a number of local successes.
However, these successes meant nothing in terms of the
overall situation in the theater of war.
In the Lika Theater of Operations the Croatian forces
achieved an important strategic success by successfully de-
fending Gospić in September, 1991. However, subsequent
4.2.2020. 19:34:11
 The Croatian Nation’s Struggle for Survival, 1991-1995
H
M
D
Improvizirana oklopna vozila HV-a 1991. (autor fotografija:
Toni Hnojčik).
Improvised armored vehicles of the Croatian Armed Forces in
1991 in Western Slavonia (Photographs by Toni Hnojčik).
C
Hrvatska vojska nastala je u uvjetima koje je ka-
rakterizirao posvemašnji nedostatak svega osim lju-
D
di spremnih da ratuju za Hrvatsku. JNA se pretvorila
u srpsku vojnu silu i okupacijsku vojsku razmještenu
diljem Hrvatske, baš poput strategijske mreže predvi-
đene njenom doktrinom „bitke u prostoru“.479 Uz niz
žarišta srpske pobune, Hrvatska se doimala kao da
nema šanse za obranu. Uz to je na vrijeme izbjegnuto
uključivanje Hrvatske u sukob Slovenije i JNA. Tadašnji
ministar obrane i zapovjednik ZNG-a RH general Mar-
tin Špegelj selektivnim odabirom činjenica brani tezu
479 Davor MARIJAN, “Borovo Selo i ‘bitka u prostoru’”,
Spomenica Filipa Potrebice, Filozofski fakultet Sveučilišta
u Zagrebu: Odsjek za povijest, Hrvatski institut za po-
vijest: Podružnica za povijest Slavonije, Srijema i Baran-
je, Zagreb, 2004., 469-484.
207
Domovinski rat 04-02-2020 Knjiga 1.indd 207
Croatian attempts to dislodge the JNA from its positions
around the city met with failure. In the area around Otočac
the Croatian forces were more aggressive and managed to
break the JNA’s encirclement around the city in a number
of places. The defense of Otočac is also significant because
the Croatian forces there were reinforced by units from the
rear. These units, especially the 111th Brigade of the Croa-
tian Army from Rijeka, proved exceptionally effective.
The North Dalmatia-Central Dalmatia Theater of Op-
erations was where the units of Knin Corps of the JNA
were operationally deployed in April, 1991. That, and the
favorable demographic structure of the area (Benkovac,
Knin and Obrovac), enabled the JNA and rebel Serbs to
achieve, by the end of September, 1991, a number of tacti-
cal victories. However, at the same time the JNA and rebel
Serbs suffered a major strategic reverse in the fighting for
Šibenik and Šibenik Bridge. For a few days in September
the situation was critical for the Croatian troops because
the positions the JNA held during those few days meant
that the southern part of Croatia was effectively cut off
from the rest of the country. The Croatian forces managed
to chase the JNA units away from these positions and with
that they won the battle for Šibenik. The victory laid the
foundations for the subsequent Croatian successes, both
offensive and defensive, in the coastal area in northern
and central Dalmatia.
The distance from the Croatian northern border to the
coast in the southern part of the country is small. On aver-
age, the distance is 15 kilometers. The Southern Theater of
Operations stretched along this area. The JNA initially jus-
tified its presence there by claiming that the Serb minority
in the area needed to be protected. It is worth noting that
the Serb minority in the area was virtually non-existent.
The operations and activities of the JNA, enthusiastically
assisted by the Territorial Defense of Montenegro and the
Territorial Defense units of Bosnia and Herzegovina from
eastern Herzegovina, in the theater revealed, to a larger ex-
tent than the JNA displayed in any other theater, the true
R
nature of its war against Croatia – it was a war of aggres-
sion, conquest and ethnic cleansing.
In the Adriatic the Yugoslav Navy enjoyed overwhelm-
ing superiority in both the number and quality of naval
ships. In November, 1991 the Croatian forces managed to
rout the enemy ships from the Brač and Korčula channels.
This success, given the Yugoslav Navy’s superiority, was
considered, and still is, nothing short of miraculous. The
JNA had absolute control of the air but could not translate
that advantage into tangible results in the theater. The JNA
4.2.2020. 19:34:11
 Davor Marijan • Rat za opstojnost Hrvata, 1991. - 1995.
H
Improvizirana oklopna vozila HV-a 1991. (Muzej Domovinskog
rata, Karlovac – Turanj).
Improvised armored vehicles of the Croatian Armed Forces in
1991 (Museum of the Homeland War, Karlovac – Turanj).
M
da se Hrvatska trebala uključiti i napasti vojarne JNA.
Aktualno stanje na ratištu pokazuje da je Tuđman s
pravom odbio Špegeljev zahtjev, jer je ocijenio da Hr-
D
vatska još nije spremna na rat širih razmjera, te da bi to
bio potez koji bi štetio Hrvatskoj na međunarodnom
planu.480 U bitkama koje su slijedile Hrvatska je vojska
stvarana s mnogo improvizacije uz velik doprinos sta-
novništva i lokalnih tijela vlasti. Velik problem bio je u
zapovjednom kadru jer su oni koji su prelazili iz JNA
C
često izbjegavali dužnost zapovjednika brigada i sa-
mostalnih bataljuna. Hrvatska je vojska na kraju 1991.
imala taktičku razinu, operativnu vrlo rijetko – može
se reći samo u zapadnoj Slavoniji, a strategijska razina
(GS HV) gotovo da nije funkcionirala. Ako treba izdvo-
jiti neku značajku HV-a tijekom 1991., to je onda kon-
stantan nedostatak streljiva jer je u rujnu 1991. Vijeće
sigurnosti UN-a uvelo embargo na izvoz oružja u SFRJ,
što je pogodilo samo Hrvatsku. Krajem 1991. HV nije
imao streljivo ni za kraću obranu, a kamoli za zahtjev-
nu napadnu operaciju.481
Hrvatska je izdržala nalet JNA i srpskih TO-ova,
obranila institucije države i sačuvala zdravu osnovu za
nastavak rata. Proces je tekao daleko od idealnih uvje-
ta, uz niz slabosti, s mnogo samovolje i lokalizama.
Nije bila rijetkost da su bojišta napuštale postrojbe ra-
480 D. MARIJAN, Smrt oklopne brigade, 216-218.
481 D. MARIJAN, “The Sarajevo ceasefire”, 103-122.
208
Domovinski rat 04-02-2020 Knjiga 1.indd 208
Air Force limited its activities to sporadic bombing and
rocketing of civilian targets. The Croatian Air Force in the
theater was created out of sheer enthusiasm and consisted
of a few obsolete crop dusters. Nothing of either tactical
or strategic importance was expected of the Croatian fly-
ers. However, their exploits, insignificant as they were in
strategic terms, did wonders for the morale of the Croatian
troops and civilians in the theater.
The Sarajevo cease-fire came into effect on January
3, 1992, at 1800 hours. At that particular point in time the
strategic situation for Croatia was not ideal, but neither
was it hopeless. In eastern Croatia the JNA held a portion of
Croatian territory of negligible strategic significance. The
territory the JNA had occupied in western Slavonia was,
on the other hand, important from a strategic standpoint
because it gave the JNA control of a portion of the Podravi-
na communications route. However, despite this the Po-
dravina Highway was open for traffic. In central Croatia the
JNA controlled the Split – Sinj – Knin – Karlovac highway
and a part of the Adriatic Highway. For that reason, peo-
ple traveling from the coast to the interior of the country
were forced to travel through Lika and Gorski Kotar, a sig-
nificantly longer route. The important thing, however, was
that the route was safe and connected the coastal areas of
the country with the interior, which was of vital strategic
importance. The southernmost area of Croatia, on the oth-
er hand, was cut off at the town of Slano. There, the city of
Dubrovnik was under siege.
The Croatian Army was created during the war and
the process of turning it into a viable fighting force ca-
pable of complex offensive maneuvers was relatively
long. After the war some commentators claimed that the
Croatian Army was capable of winning the war already
D
in 1991. What the commentators failed to appreciate was
the fact that it was not enough to gather a large num-
ber of soldiers together and divide them into brigades
with colorful names to create a viable army, especially
one capable of soundly defeating the JNA. It takes time
R
to train an army. Combat experience is gained through
trial and sometimes costly error, the effectiveness of the
command structure has to develop over a period of time,
starting with small operations where every new success
lays the foundation for the next, more complex step in
the process. The best indicator of the state of the Croatian
army in the early stages of the conflict is Marin Špegelj’s
statement written on December 24, 1991 – he wrote that
there was a huge gap between the wishes of the Croatian
army’s leadership and the real capabilities of the army.
4.2.2020. 19:34:12
 The Croatian Nation’s Struggle for Survival, 1991-1995
H
M
D
THF ~GGRFSSORS ARI SFRHL\ ,\NIJ Tll~ YUGO CO'vlMI '<IST \R\IY,
C
zličitih veličina jer su bile neučvršćene, nehomogene,
D
slabo naoružane i s lošim sustavom zapovijedanja. U
svim tim slučajevima protivnik je bio jači i s neuspo-
redivo većom vatrenom moći. To su redovni slučajevi
susretanja s ratom koji su uobičajeno stresni i nisu ni-
kakva hrvatska novina. Većina ljudi se teško nosila s
ratom, trebalo je vremena da se priviknu na življenje
s neizvjesnošću i stalnu mogućnost pogibije. Tek je u
studenom 1991. HV bio u stanju dovesti pričuvnu bri-
gadu s jednog na drugo bojište. Uglavnom su lokalni
sastavi bili bolji od dovedenih, no bilo je slučajeva da
su dovedene snage bile bolje organizirane i s manje
problema karakterističnih za vojske u nastajanju.
S druge je strane JNA kao dominantna snaga
srbijanskog ratnog stroja u cjelini pokazala niz sla-
bosti koje su je na koncu koštale strategijskog cilja
209
Domovinski rat 04-02-2020 Knjiga 1.indd 209
The Croatian Army suffered from many flaws. By the end
of the 1994 however, all these flaws had been corrected.
It is safe to say that the Croatian Army, as a highly effec-
tive military force capable of conducting most complex
operations, was born in 1994.
The Croatian Army suffered from a chronic lack of
weapons and equipment. The only thing that was not in
short supply were men ready and willing to fight for Cro-
atia. The JNA had effectively become a Serbian army and
army of occupation deployed the length and breadth of
Croatia, in accordance with its “deep operation” doctrine
borrowed from the Soviet Union. It seemed to many peo-
ple, in the early days of the Yugoslav crisis, that Croatia was
doomed – the JNA was a fighting force lavishly equipped
with modern weaponry and the Serb rebellion in Croatia
was gathering momentum. Croatia remained on the side-
lines during the Ten-Day War in Slovenia. The then Minis-
ter of Defense and Commander of the Croatian National
Guard of the Republic of Croatia General Martin Špegelj
claims that Croatia should have attacked the bases of the
JNA in Croatia while the JNA was busy fighting in Slovenia.
Špegelj, at the time, tried to convince Tuđman to order the
ZNG to attack the JNA bases in Croatia. Tuđman’s strategic
acumen was far greater than that of his minister of defense
– he flatly refused to embroil Croatia in a war with the JNA.
He rightly judged that the nascent Croatian armed forces
were too ill-equipped to take on the JNA and he also real-
ized that attacking the JNA bases in Croatia at that point
would hurt Croatia diplomatically.
The Croatian Army was formed in the crucible of war
and in many instances improvisation was the order of the
day. An important part in the process was played by the
population and local authorities. One of the biggest prob-
lems in the initial phase of the war was a lack of trained
and experienced officers – those officers who left the JNA
to join the Croatian army were less than keen to command
brigades and independent battalions. At the end of 1991
the Croatian Army was capable of operating at the tactical
R
level and at times – in western Slavonia – at the operational
level. At that point in time functioning at the strategic lev-
el was beyond the capabilities of the Croatian Army. It has
to be pointed out that the Croatian army suffered from a
chronic and debilitating shortage of ammunition through-
out 1991. The situation was additionally exacerbated in
September, 1991, when the UN Security Council imposed
an arms embargo on the SFRY. The embargo did not affect
the JNA but it hurt the Croatian Army badly. At the end of
1991, the Croatian Army did not have enough ammunition
4.2.2020. 19:34:28
 Davor Marijan • Rat za opstojnost Hrvata, 1991. - 1995.
H
M
D
DUBROVNIK, ONCE A FORTRESS OF TREASURE
AND BEAUTY, NOW A FORTRESS OF
DESTRUCTION, FEAR AND DEATH-IN 1991.
C
THE AGGRESSORS ARE SERBIA AND THE YUGO COMMUNIST ARMY.
('IW,Hl.~ '111-f(•.. ~\.,TI(•~ <' • ,TU,
,,._,,, u:n , TiK.tni ..M~-\ < OO uc.,u.:u
– vojne pobjede. Nije pobijedila, a to je u postojećoj
konstelaciji snaga bio poraz. Njena postignuća su bila
u granicama taktičkih i u par slučajeva operativnih
uspjeha koje uglavnom nije uspjela održati (sjeverna
Dalmacija i zapadna Slavonija). Njeno je djelovanje
izazvalo niz demografskih promjena, protjerivanje
stanovništva i niz zločina čija je svrha bila uklanjanje
nesrpskog stanovništva.
210
Domovinski rat 04-02-2020 Knjiga 1.indd 210
to hold its defensive positions, let alone mount an ambi-
tious offensive operation.
Croatia successfully halted the onslaught of the JNA
and the Serbian Territorial Defense force and defended
the country’s institutions. Its armed forces, flawed as they
were in the initial stages of their existence, proved to be
more than a match for the JNA and Serb paramilitaries.
Gradually, based on the experience gained during the first
phase of the war, the Croatian Armed Forces would be-
come superior in terms of morale and competence to their
Serb adversaries. To be sure, the process was marred by a
whole plethora of weaknesses and setbacks. At times there
was too much arbitrariness and sometimes local interests
trumped those of the country as a whole. On a number of
occasions units of varying sizes simply vacated the battle-
field because they were not homogenous, not adequately
armed and equipped and suffered from poor leadership. In
all these cases, it has to be pointed out, the enemy vastly
outnumbered the Croatian units and enjoyed overwhelm-
ing superiority in equipment and firepower. Fleeing in the
face of a superior enemy is a common occurrence in war.
Every combat situation is an extremely stressful experi-
ence. It took time for most Croatian soldiers, thrown into
the war directly from their civilian existence, to become
adjusted to the realities of war. Only in November, 1991,
was the Croatian Army able to transfer a reserve brigade
from one theater of operations to another. In most cases
local units performed better than those brought as rein-
forcements from other theaters. However, in some cases
reinforcing units were better organized than local ones
and suffered from fewer problems typically found in a na-
scent armed force.
The JNA, on the other hand, as the dominant force
D
of the Serbian war machine, displayed many weaknesses
that ultimately snatched defeat from the jaws of victory.
The JNA failed to achieve its primary objective – total de-
struction of the Croatian armed forces and in that sense
suffered a humiliating defeat. The height of the JNA’s suc-
R
cess were a number of tactical victories and a few opera-
tional victories. However, the JNA was not able to hold the
territory gained by these victories – cases in point: north-
ern Dalmatia and western Slavonia. The activities of the
JNA on Croatian soil caused many demographic changes,
expulsion of non-Serbs from the areas controlled by the
JNA and/or Serb militaries. Many war crimes and crimes
against humanity committed by the JNA and/or Serb
paramilitaries were planned and executed for the purpose
of ethnic cleansing.
4.2.2020. 19:34:42
 1992. - 1994.:
OD SARAJEVSKOG PRIMIRJA IV
DO ZAGREBAČKOG
SPORAZUMA
H
M
1992 – 1994
D
FROM THE SARAJEVO
CEASE-FIRE AGREEMENT
C
TO THE ZAGREB
AGREEMENT
D
R

Domovinski rat 04-02-2020 Knjiga 1.indd 211 4.2.2020. 19:34:42

 Davor Marijan • Rat za opstojnost Hrvata, 1991. - 1995.

H
M
D
C
D
R
10,000

- 10,000-20,000

- 20000 30000

~i6~'n7r~~,•=,;~~-• Assessment Notes

Serb;anActi v;1y
Croatia n Activity
=
r"\r\ 30,000&abo,e

Additio nal Notes 0

Okupirano područje Hrvatske - UNPA područja 1992. - 1995. godine.

The occupied parts of Croatia - UNPA zones 1992 - 1995.

212

Domovinski rat 04-02-2020 Knjiga 1.indd 212 4.2.2020. 19:34:44

 The Croatian Nation’s Struggle for Survival, 1991-1995
HRVATSKA 1992. GODINE
Oslobodilački pothvati hrvatskih snaga
U Sarajevu su predstavnici Republike Hrvatske i
Jugoslavenske narodne armije 2. siječnja 1992. potpi-
sali sporazum o bezuvjetnom prekidu vatre, a idućega
su dana prestale borbe. Sarajevsko je primirje za JNA i
pobunjene Srbe bilo taktički, a za Hrvatsku strategijski
predah. U prvim mjesecima 1992. Sarajevsko se primirje
H
sustavno kršilo, za što su sukobljene strane okrivljivale
jedna drugu. Interes za očuvanje primirja bio je veći u
JNA jer je očekivala da UNPROFOR preuzme crtu raz-
dvajanja prema hrvatskim snagama. Ona se trudila do-
kazati da je učinila sve što je mogla i da je dolazak UN-a
najbolja opcija za pobunjene Srbe u Hrvatskoj. Održa-
M
vanje primirja JNA je držala kao važno i kršenje s njezine
strane nastojali su spriječiti po svaku cijenu. Težak uda-
rac tim nastojanjima bio je napad zrakoplovstva JNA
na dva nenaoružana helikoptera misije EZ-a 7. siječnja
1992. kod Novog Marofa. Jedan je helikopter srušen, a
drugi oštećen i prinuđen na slijetanje. U srušenom heli-
D
kopteru poginulo je pet članova misije.482
U JNA se stalno naglašavalo da hrvatskoj strani ne
odgovara brzi dolazak mirovnih snaga. Intenzivnim po-
litičkim radom sastav JNA trebao se uvjeriti da je ope-
racija UN-a jedina prava i realna opcija, a da sve drugo
vodi u neizvjestan rat.483 Ipak, to nije bila prepreka za
C
zasjede i diverzantska djelovanja pobunjenih Srba i
JNA, posebice u Dalmaciji. U prvoj polovini siječnja HV
se žalio da JNA i pobunjeni Srbi sustavno krše primirje
na širem području Zadra, od stalnog otvaranja vatre do
preleta zrakoplova s aerodroma Zemunik, a vrhunac je
D
bio 14. siječnja, kada je naoružana skupina upala u Pri-
dragu, Murvicu i Donji Zemunik te opljačkala i spalila
nekoliko kuća.484 Sličnih je incidenata bilo i na ostatku
ratišta. Na ličkom bojištu, primjerice, u siječnju je u krše-
nju primirja bilo smrtno stradalih i ranjenih vojnika HV-
a.485 U početnoj fazi razdvajanja snaga i razmještaja UN-
PROFOR-a, JNA je 17. svibnja topništvom izvela jedan
482 D. MARIJAN, Slom Titove armije, 323, 331-333.
483 Isto, 333-334.
484 SVA MORH, GSHV, Vojno-sigurnosna situacija u općini Za-
dar kl. 81/92-02/08, ur. br. 5120-05/4-92-1 od 21. 1. 1992.
485 SVA MORH, GSHV: OZ Rijeka, Izvješće o događaju kl. 804-
04/92-01/08, ur. br. 1079-16-92-01 od 22. 1. 1992.; IKM
111. brHV Brinje, Izvješće kl. 81-92-01-04, ur. br. 2133-10-
92-524 od 1. 2. 1992.
213
Domovinski rat 04-02-2020 Knjiga 1.indd 213
CROATIA IN 1992
Offensive Operations of the Croatian
Armed Forces
On January 2, 1992, the representatives of the Re-
public of Croatia and the JNA signed the Implementing
Accord for an unconditional cease-fire. The following
day the fighting stopped. For the JNA and rebel Serbs
the Sarajevo cease-fire was a tactical respite. For Croatia,
on the other hand, the Sarajevo cease-fire was of stra-
tegic importance. During the first months of 1992 the
ceasefire was frequently broken with the belligerents
accusing each other of not honoring the agreement.
The JNA had more interest in preserving the cease-fire
than Croatia. The leaders of Serbia and the JNA expect-
ed that UNPROFOR would control the separation line
and vehemently claimed that the JNA had done all that
it could and that the arrival of a UN peacekeeping force
was the best option for the rebel Serbs. For that reason,
preserving the cease-fire was of immense importance
for the JNA. Breaches of the cease-fire by overeager JNA
soldiers or Serb paramilitaries had to be prevented at all
costs. These efforts ignominiously failed on January 7,
1992, when JNA jets attacked two unarmed helicopters
belonging to the EC Monitoring Mission over Novi Ma-
rof. One helicopter was shot down and the other dam-
aged and forced to land. Five members of the ECMM
were killed in the downed helicopter.
The JNA believed that a swift arrival of a peacekeep-
ing force was not in Croatia’s interest. The leadership of
Serbia and JNA put a lot of effort into convincing the rank
and file of the JNA that the arrival of a UN peacekeeping
force was the only realistic option and that every other
scenario meant an all-out war with uncertain chances of a
favorable outcome. The rank and file and the rebel Serbs,
judging by their frequent attacks and ambushes, espe-
cially in Dalmatia, were not exactly convinced. During
R
the first half of January the Croatian Army complained
that the JNA and rebel Serbs had been constantly break-
ing the cease-fire in the wider Zadar area. Specifically,
the Croatian Army complained that the JNA and rebel
Serbs had frequently opened fire on Croatian positions
and that JNA aircraft had on a number of occasions tak-
en off from the Zemunik air base and flew over Croatian
territory. On January 14 an armed group of Serbs raided
Pridraga, Murvica and Donji Zemunik and pillaged and
burned a number of houses. Similar incidents took place
4.2.2020. 19:34:44
 Davor Marijan • Rat za opstojnost Hrvata, 1991. - 1995.
od najjačih udara po Osijeku.486 Prije razmještaja mirov-
nih postrojba UN-a, hrvatske su snage izvele nekoliko
oslobodilačkih pothvata taktičkog značaja s različitim
uspjehom u istočnoj Slavoniji i Dalmaciji. Zapovjedna
razina HV-a od tih se pothvata ogradila.487
Velebit
U veljači 1992. hrvatske snage su se žalile da srpske
snage sustavno napadaju njihove ophodnje na promet-
H
nici Sveti Rok – Obrovac na području Malog Alana i Tu-
lovih greda, gdje u vrijeme potpisivanja primirja nije bilo
srpskih snaga. Stoga je Samostalni bataljun Starigrad 4.
ožujka izbacio srpske snage s Velebita i u smjeru Obrov-
ca i u smjeru Svetog Roka. Prijavljeno je uništenje srpskih
posada na Maloj Bobiji i Plani, desno od prometnice Sveti
M
Rok – Obrovac u visini Malog Alana. Dan kasnije odbijen
je srpski pokušaj vraćanja dijela izgubljenog područja.488
Nos Kalik
Nos Kalik je selo sa srpskim stanovništvom blizu Skra-
D
dina i kod ušća Čikole u Krku. Selo je bilo značajno jer je
njegovo držanje omogućavalo napredovanje prema Milje-
vačkom platou, a branio ga je vod pobunjenih Srba. U noći
1./2. ožujka 1992. selo su napali diverzantski vod i jedna
satnija 113. brigade HV-a, a tijekom 2. ožujka su ga zauzeli.
Hrvatske su snage imale dva poginula i dva ranjena vojni-
C
ka, a srpske tri poginula, dva ranjena i 21 zarobljenog.489
Komanda Kninskoga korpusa odgovorila je ujutro 3.
ožujka 1992. protunapadom koji je izvela mješovita oklo-
pno-pješačka borbena skupina TG-1 i 9. bataljun Vojne
policije jačine ojačane čete s devet oklopnih vozila i pot-
porom voda minobacača 120 mm. Skupina je napala na
smjeru Širitovci – Drinovci – Nos Kalik, bez ikakva uspje-
ha, te se u neredu povukla. Nakon neuspjeha u borbi,
Komanda 9. korpusa pokušala je pregovorima isposlovati
povlačenje hrvatskih snaga, u čemu također nije uspjela.
486 SVA MORH, GSHV: Državna komisija za UNPROFOR Vlade
RH, kl. 800-01/92-01/05, ur. br. 5030107-92-30 od 18. 5. 1992.
487 SVA MORH, GSHV, kl. 81/92-02/16, ur. br. 5120-01-92-10
od 24. 7. 1992.
488 SVA MORH, ZSZ: Izjava Zapovjedništva HV Starigrad –
Paklenica od 6. 3. 1992.
489 SVA MORH, ZHRZ: Vojna pošta br. 6030, Vanredno izv-
ješće kl. 81/92-02/131, ur. br. 6030-03/92-1 od 3. 3. 1992.;
Raščlamba bojnih djelovanja OS RH u Domovinskom
ratu za 1992. na području OZ Split, Knin, 1999., 57-58.
214
Domovinski rat 04-02-2020 Knjiga 1.indd 214
in every other theater of operations. For example, in the
Lika area a number of Croatian Army soldiers were killed
and wounded when the Serb side violated the cease-fire
during the month of January. During the initial phase
of the deployment of UNPROFOR the JNA, on May 17,
launched one of the most massive artillery attacks to
date on the city of Osijek. Before the UN peacekeeping
force completed its deployment, the Croatian Army had
mounted a few actions with the aim of liberating parts of
the occupied territory in eastern Slavonia and Dalmatia.
Some of these actions were successful, the others were
not. The leadership of the Croatian Army claimed that no
orders for these actions had been issued and that the op-
erations were mounted on local initiative.
Velebit
In February, 1992, the Croatian Army complained
that Serb forces had been systematically attacking their
patrols on the Sveti Rok – Obrovac road in the area of
Mali Alan and Tulove Grede. At the time of the signing of
the cease-fire there were no Serb forces in that area. The
Croatian Army reacted. On March 4 the Independent Bat-
talion Starigrad chased the Serb forces away from Velebit
and away from the communications routes leading to
Obrovac and Sveti Rok. The Serb garrisons in Mala Bobija
and Plana, located to the right of the Sveti Rok – Obrovac
highway at the altitude of Mali Alan, were destroyed. The
following day the Croatian forces beat back the Serbs’ at-
tempt to regain the lost ground.
Nos Kalik
D
Nos Kalik is a predominantly Serb village near Skra-
din at the confluence of the Čikola and the Krka Rivers.
The village was important because it provided an avenue
of advance towards the Miljevci plateau. It was held by
a platoon of rebel Serbs. During the night of March 1-2,
R
1992, the village was attacked by a commando platoon
and a company of the 113th Brigade of the Croatian Army.
The Croats captured the village on March 2. The attacking
force suffered four casualties – two soldiers were killed
and two wounded. The Serbs lost three soldiers killed,
two wounded and 21 taken prisoner.
The HQ of Knin Corps reacted on the morning of
March 3, 1992. A combat group of company-strength com-
posed of elements of the TG-1 and the 9th Battalion of the
Military Police reinforced with nine armored vehicles coun-
4.2.2020. 19:34:44
 The Croatian Nation’s Struggle for Survival, 1991-1995
Hrvatske su snage ostale u Nos Kaliku, čiju je obranu sre-
dinom ožujka od 113. preuzela 142. brigada HV-a.490
Baranja
Početkom travnja 1992. na Istočnom se bojištu zbio
neuspješni upad dijela snaga OZ-a Osijek na okupirani
teritorij Hrvatske. Napad je izvela 107. brigada HV-a u za-
padnom dijelu Baranje, u Torjanskom trokutu. Po zapo-
vijedi generala Gorinšeka, brigada je planirala ovladati
H
područjem Torjanskoga trokuta i presjeći srpske snage
na smjeru Vrbak – Karaula – Novi Bezdan. Zadatak 136.
brigade HV-a bio je osigurati desni bok 107. brigade.491
Brigada je otprije nadzirala manji dio na lijevoj obali
Drave, koji se teško održavao zbog izloženosti položaja
i rasta podzemnih voda, koje su plavile utvrđene objek-
M
te. Nasuprot hrvatskim snagama položaje su držale
snage TO-a Kula iz Vojvodine. Napad je počeo ujutro 3.
travnja i prekinut je prijepodne na intervenciju UNPRO-
FOR-a. Hrvatske su snage napravile manje pomake na
nasipu, na kojem je uništeno nekoliko srpskih bunkera.
Topnička vatra JNA po položajima 107. brigade bila je
D
toliko jaka i učinkovita da se postrojba po odobrenju za-
povjednika OZ-a Osijek prijepodne 4. travnja izvukla na
desnu obalu Drave. U napadu i povlačenju 107. brigada
pretrpjela je velike gubitke: 14 poginulih, 77 ranjenih, a
uništena su dva oklopna transportera i dva vozila. Srp-
ski su gubici također bili veliki: 14 poginulih, 17 ranjenih
C
i tri nestala vojnika. Nekoliko dana kasnije smijenjen je
zapovjednik OZ-a Osijek general-bojnik K. Gorinšek.492
490 HMDCDR: Komanda 9. K, Dopuna redovnog borbenog
izveštaja SP br. 4-1039 od 3. 3. 1992.; HMDCDR: Komanda
D
TG-1, Izveštaj o dejstvu str. pov. br. 50-93 od 4. 3. 1992.;
HMDCDR: Komanda 9. K, Redovni operativni izveštaj SP
br. 4-1106 od 5. 3. 1992.; HMDCDR: Komanda 9. K, Redovni
operativni izveštaj SP br. 4-1151 od 7. 3. 1992.; Slavko
LISICA, Komandant bez potrebe, Zavod distrofičara, Banja
Luka, 2000., 313; Raščlamba bojnih djelovanja OS RH u
Domovinskom ratu za 1992. na području OZ Split, 58.
491 ZOZ Osijek, Dopuna borbene zapovijedi kl. 8/92-01/01,
ur. br. 1076-01-92-9 od 30. 3. 1992.; Zapovjedništvo 107.
br HV, Borbena zapovijed op. br. 11, kl. 8/92-01/01, ur. br.
2129-01-92-9 od 2. 4. 1992.
492 ICTY: I uprava GŠ OS SFRJ, Dnevni izveštaj SP br. 1-95 od
4. 4. 1992.; ICTY: I uprava GŠ OS SFRJ, Dnevni izveštaj SP
br. 1-96 od 5. 4. 1992.; SVA MORH, KMO: Zapovjedništ-
vo 107. brHV, Izvješće kl. 81/92-01/02, ur. br. 2129-01-
92-2 od 8. 4. 1992.; SVA MORH, KMO: Glavna inspekcija
obrane, Izvješće kl. 822-01/92-01/04, ur. br. 512-20-92-79
od 10. 4. 1992.
215
Domovinski rat 04-02-2020 Knjiga 1.indd 215
terattacked. A platoon of 120-mm mortars provided fire
support for the counterattack. The combat group attacked
along the Širitovci – Drinovci – Nos Kalik line but without
success. The Croats routed the attackers. After this setback
the HQ of IX Corps tried to dislodge the Croatian force from
the village by negotiation. That effort failed too. The Croa-
tian forces remained in Nos Kalik and were relieved in mid-
March by the 142nd Brigade of the Croatian Army.
Baranja
At the beginning of April, 1992, in the eastern theater
of operations, formations belonging to Operative zone
Osijek attacked. The attack was made by the 107th Bri-
gade of the Croatian Army in the Torjanci triangle in the
western part of Baranja. According to General Gorinšek’s
orders, the brigade was to gain control of the Torjanci
triangle area and cut off the Serbian forces along the Vr-
bak – Karaula – Novi Bezdan line. The 136th Brigade of the
Croatian Army was tasked to secure the right flank of the
107th Brigade. The 107th Brigade had been holding a small
portion of territory on the left bank of the Drava. The posi-
tion of the Brigade there was precarious because it was ex-
posed to enemy attacks and a rise of groundwater levels.
The ground there and defensive fortifications were often
flooded by groundwater. Ranged against the 107th and
136th Brigade was the Kula unit of the Territorial Defense
of Vojvodina. The attack commenced on the morning of
April 3. It was discontinued in the afternoon when UNPRO-
FOR intervened. The Croatian force made some headway
on the levee, destroying a number of Serb bunkers before
the JNA launched a massive artillery barrage on the 107th
Brigade. The fire was so intense that the brigade request-
ed permission to withdraw. The commander of Operative
Zone Osijek approved and the brigade withdrew to the
right bank of the river. The 107th Brigade of the Croatian
Army suffered serious casualties in the abortive attack:
14 killed and 77 wounded. The Serbs destroyed two APCs
R
and two other vehicles. The Serbs’ casualties were also
high: 14 killed, 17 wounded and three soldiers missing in
action. A few days later the commander of Operative Zone
Osijek, Major General Gorinšek, was replaced.
Zadar (Podgradina and Križ)
The signing of the Sarajevo Agreement helped in no
way, shape or form the defenders of the beleaguered city
of Dubrovnik. In an attempt to improve the tactical posi-
4.2.2020. 19:34:44
 Davor Marijan • Rat za opstojnost Hrvata, 1991. - 1995.
Zadar (Podgradina i Križ)
Nakon Sarajevskoga primirja Zadar je uz Dubrovnik
bio najugroženiji hrvatski grad na obali Jadrana. Nastoje-
ći popraviti taktički položaj u zaleđu grada, 112. brigada
HV-a krenula je sa snagama jačine satnije (uključujući dva
voda HOS-a), vodom tenkova i uz potporu topništva na-
kon ponoći 27./28. travnja 1992. u oslobađanje sela Pod-
gradine. Glavni cilj napada bio je dominantni vis Gradina.
Tijekom napada hrvatske su snage ovladale zaselcima
H
Nekići i Crnci i zaustavljene su u podnožju Gradine. Ujutro
je uslijedio srpski protuudar i povlačenje hrvatskih snaga
na početne položaje, koje su pritom imale jednog pogi-
nulog i sedam ranjenih vojnika.493
Nakon 20 dana mirovanja hrvatske su snage u pot-
hvatu Jaguar napale utvrđeno brdo Križ iznad Bibinja. S
M
Križa je JNA nadzirala prometni prilaz Zadru iz smjera Ši-
benika i dio samoga grada. Uporište je branila nepotpuna
četa vojnika ojačana minobacačima i oruđima za protu-
oklopnu i protuzračnu borbu. Oslobađanje brda počelo
je 17. svibnja 1992. napadom na kolonu koja je smjerom
Babindub – Dumoštak pokušala izvršiti smjenu srpskih
D
snaga. Tijekom dana je kolona razbijena, a brdo potpuno
okruženo. Sljedeća dva dana srpske su snage iz smjera Ba-
binduba pokušale deblokirati okruženu posadu, no bez
uspjeha. Nakon što je 22. svibnja s pokolebanom posa-
dom dogovoreno napuštanje uporišta s osobnim oruž-
C
jem i prolaz u Babindub, ujutro 23. svibnja hrvatske snage
zaposjele su Križ i organizirale njegovu obranu.494
Miljevački plato
Najveći uspjeh hrvatskih snaga u ovom je razdoblju
bila akcija na Miljevačkom platou. Od 17. do 20. lipnja
1992. na Miljevački plato, na kojem se nalazilo sedam
sela, ubačene su dvije manje izvidničke skupine 113. i
142. brigade HV-a. U noći 20./21. lipnja ubačeno je još
nekoliko borbenih skupina tih brigada. Sukob je počeo
ujutro 21. lipnja, a hrvatske su skupine u noći 21./22.
493 SVA MORH, ZSZ: Zapovjedništvo 112. brHV, Izvješće
kl. 81/92-02/193, ur. br. 2134-03-92-75 od 29. 4. 1992.;
Raščlamba bojnih djelovanja OS RH u Domovinskom
ratu za 1992. na području OZ Split, 59.
494 SVA MORH, ZSZ: Zapovjedništvo 159. brigade, Izvještaj
kl. 8/92-01/376, ur. br. 3065-01-92-1 od 24. 5. 1992.; SVA
MORH, ZSZ: PU Zadar, Izvješće br. 511-17-01-SP/181/92
od 23. 5. 1992.; Jadranko KALEB, Zadar u Domovinskom
ratu 1992.–1993., Zadar, 2004., 59-67.
216
Domovinski rat 04-02-2020 Knjiga 1.indd 216
tion in Dubrovnik’s hinterland a company-size task force
composed of elements of the 112th Brigade of the Croatian
Army (including two HOS platoons) and supported by an
armored platoon and artillery cover launched, after mid-
night on April 28, 1992, an attack on the village of Podgra-
dina. The main objectives of the attack were to liberate the
village and, more important, to win control of the Gradina
heights, a dominant geographical feature. The task force
managed to take control of the hamlets of Nekići and Crn-
ci. The defenders managed to arrest the momentum of
the attack at the foot of Gradina. In the morning the Serbs
counterattacked and beat back the task force. The Croats’
casualties were one soldier killed and seven wounded.
For the next twenty days there was a lull in the
fighting. Then, the Croatian forces launched Operation
Jaguar, attacking the fortified Serb positions on Križ Hill
above Bibinje. From Križ Hill the JNA controlled the Šibe-
nik – Zadar communications route and parts of the city
of Zadar. The stronghold on Križ Hill was defended by an
incomplete infantry company reinforced with mortars
and anti-armor and anti-aircraft weapons. The Croatian
attack started with an assault on a column of Serb troops
marching along the Babindub – Dumoštak line. The
troops were on their way to relive the defenders of Križ
Hill. During the day the Croats scattered the column and
completely encircled the hill. During the following two
days Serb forces tried to break the encirclement attack-
ing from the direction of Babindub but their efforts were
unsuccessful. The determination of the defenders of Križ
Hill started to waver and on May 22 the Croats agreed
to let the garrison pull out safely to Babindub. The Serbs
were allowed to take small arms with them. On the morn-
ing of May 23, the Croats occupied Križ Hill and formed a
D
strong defensive perimeter around the position.
The Miljevci Plateau
The biggest success of the Croatian Army during
R
this period occurred in the Miljevci plateau. In the peri-
od from June 17 to June 20, 1992, two smaller Croatian
recon groups belonging to the 113th and 142nd Brigades
of the Croatian Army, sneaked onto the Miljevci plateau,
an area consisting of seven villages. A few more combat
groups consisting of soldiers belonging to the mentioned
brigades reached the Miljevci plateau during the night of
June 20-21. The battle started on June 21, in the morning.
During the night of July 21 to 22 the Croatian troops gained
control of the Miljevci plateau. Reinforcements of the 142nd
4.2.2020. 19:34:44
 The Croatian Nation’s Struggle for Survival, 1991-1995
lipnja ovladale platoom i uvele pričuvu iz 142. brigade.
Srpske snage pokušale su 23. lipnja vratiti Miljevački
plato, no napad je pretrpio neuspjeh.495
Razoružanje Srba u Gorskom kotaru
Razoružanje pobunjenih Srba bila je jedna od ob-
veza UNPROFOR-a i ona nije realizirana. Tijekom 1992.
jedna je skupina Srba položila oružje, i to izvan područ-
ja mandata UNPROFOR-a. Radilo se o naoružanim Srbi-
H
ma iz Gorskoga kotara. Oni su naoružani u srpnju 1991.
i nisu se borbeno aktivirali jer su bili okruženi hrvatskim
snagama koje su ih držale u blokadi. Njihov je zadatak
bio čekati izbijanje postrojbi JNA u blizinu njihovih
naselja. Jugoslavenska narodna armija to nije uspjela,
a nakon što je zaživjelo primirje, Srbi Gorskoga kotara
M
nisu imali izbora i dogovorili su predaju oružja. U nazoč-
nosti predstavnika Visokoga komesarijata za izbjeglice
UN-a dogovor je potpisan 6. srpnja 1992. u Vrbovskom.
Srbi iz mjesnih zajednica Jasenak, Drežnica, Gomirje
i Srpske Moravice obvezali su se da će predati policiji
oružje koje su dobili od JNA i u roku od 15 dana zatrpati
D
fortifikacijske objekte. U spomenutim mjesnim zajedni-
cama dogovoreno je osnivanje postrojbi pričuvne po-
licije jačine voda (30 ljudi) i policijske ispostave MUP-a
RH u Jasenku sastava u skladu s nacionalnim sastavom
stanovništva u četiri mjesne zajednice. Predaja oružja
medijski je iskorištena kao primjer srpskoga razuma. U
C
biti se radilo o pragmatičnom potezu – Srbi nisu ima-
li izbora i napravili su još jednu prijevaru jer su predali
samo 20 % oružja. Očito su držali da treba čekati novu
priliku za pobunu.496
D
495 Raščlamba borbenih djelovanja OSRH u Domovinskom
ratu na zadarsko-šibensko-sinjskom bojištu tijekom
1992. godine, Zagreb, 1999., 54, 62-64.
496 HDA, HUPMEZ: Dogovor ovlaštenih predstavnika
Mjesnih zajednica Drežnica, Gomirje, Jasenak i Srpske
Moravice i Policijske uprave Karlovac od 6. 7. 1992.; HM-
DCDR: Štab odbrane Gorskog kotara, Što sa Srbima Gor-
skog kotara, I deo, br. 3-1 od 18. 5. 1994.; F. GREGURIĆ,
Vlada demokratskog jedinstva, 642-643.
217
Domovinski rat 04-02-2020 Knjiga 1.indd 217
Brigade were brought in to solidify the positions. The Serbs
counterattacked on June 23 but were beaten back.
The Disarmament of the Serbs in Gorski
Kotar
UNPROFOR was tasked with disarming the rebel
Serbs. That obligation, however, remained unfulfilled.
During 1992 the rebel Serbs from Gorski Kotar surren-
dered their weapons. It is important to point out that this
happened outside the area encompassed by the man-
date of UNPROFOR. The rebel Serbs from Gorski Kotar
were armed in July, 1991. From the beginning, the rebel
Serbs in Gorski Kotar were encircled by Croatian forces
and made no attempt to break out of the encirclement.
The Croatian forces surrounding them also made no at-
tempt to attack the rebel Serbs in the encirclement, con-
tenting themselves with keeping the area under a tight
blockade. The rebel Serbs were under orders from the
JNA to sit tight and wait for the JNA to reach the area.
The JNA failed to achieve that objective and when the
cease-fire was signed the position of the rebel Serbs in
Gorski Kotar became untenable. Negotiations with the
Croatian government ensued and the rebel Serbs of Gor-
ski Kotar agreed to surrender their weapons. A formal
agreement regarding disarmament was signed on July
6, 1992, in Vrbovski in the presence of a representative
of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner
for Refugees. The rebel Serbs from the local communities
of Jasenak, Drežnica, Gomirje and Srpske Moravice, un-
der the terms of the agreement, were obligated to hand
over the weapons they had received from the JNA to the
Croatian police and render useless all fortifications and
defensive installations within 15 days. It was agreed that
police reserve platoon-strength (30 men) units would
be formed in the mentioned local communities. Also, it
was agreed that a police station of the Ministry of Inter-
nal Affairs of the Republic of Croatia would be formed in
R
Jasenak and that the national composition of its person-
nel would reflect that of the four local communities. The
media in Croatia gave a lot of coverage to the disarma-
ment process and praised the rebel Serbs’ commitment
to peace. In reality, the rebel Serbs of Gorski Kotar had
no choice but to surrender and made a mockery of the
media’s praise by surrendering only 20% of the weapons
the JNA had supplied them with. They obviously decided
to bide their time until another opportunity to take up
arms against the Croatian government presented itself.
4.2.2020. 19:34:44
 Davor Marijan • Rat za opstojnost Hrvata, 1991. - 1995.
RAT U BOSNI I HERCEGOVINI
1992. GODINE
Ratnu 1992. u Bosni i Hercegovini obilježilo je na-
stojanje bosanskohercegovačkih Srba da uz što manji
napor uzmu što veći dio teritorija države. Za razliku od
Muslimana i Hrvata, Srbi su vrlo rano znali što žele i te
želje su već u ranoj fazi rata stavili na papir. Njihova je
Narodna skupština u Banjoj Luci 12. svibnja prihvatila
odluku o strategijskim ciljevima Srba u BiH, koji su oči-
H
to prije dogovoreni u srpskom političkom vrhu, vjero-
jatno u Beogradu. Odluka je bila kratka i u samo šest
točaka sažela je što Srbi žele: 1) državno razgraničenje
od druga dva naroda, 2) koridor između Semberije i
Krajine, 3) uspostavljanje koridora u dolini Drine, “od-
M
nosno eliminisanje Drine kao granice između srpskih
država”, 4) uspostavljanje granice na Uni i Neretvi, 5)
podjelu Sarajeva na srpski i muslimanski dio i 6) izlaz
Republike Srpske na more.497
Provedbu srpskih ratnih ciljeva JNA je počela s di-
jelovima srpskoga TO-a već u ožujku 1992., dva mjese-
D
ca prije no što su oni usvojeni. No iz zapisnika prilikom
usvajanja očito je da su ratni ciljevi definirani ranije.
Skloni smo zaključiti da su oni bili jasni već krajem
1991., u vrijeme kada su Slobodan Milošević i Borisav
Jović zahtijevali od tadašnjega saveznog sekretara za
narodnu obranu SFRJ Veljka Kadijevića da počne pri-
C
preme za pretvaranje JNA u BiH u vojsku bosanskoher-
cegovačkih Srba. Realizacija se može posredno gledati
po dva korpusna plana, Drini za Tuzlanski, a Krajini za
Banjalučki korpus.498 Čini se da su ti planovi bili dio ope-
racijskoga plana Vojske Republike Srpske Bosna-92.499
To je značilo postupni razmještaj snaga prema područ-
jima na koja su Srbi pokazivali aspiracije.
Hrvati su također imali jasan cilj – entitet i obrana
prostora gdje žive Hrvati, a poučeni iskustvom rata u
Hrvatskoj koji se odrazio i na njih u BiH, uglavnom nisu
imali iluzija da ne slijedi rat i nastojali su ga dočekati
497 Odluka Narodne skupštine Republike srpskog naroda u
BiH od 12. 5. 1992. o strateškim ciljevima srpskog naro-
da u BiH, Službeni glasnik Republike Srpske, br. 22, 26. 11.
1993.
498 Boško Radović, “Marš prema ‘Drini’”, Slobodna Bosna, 26.
3. 1992., 5; Zapovest Komande 30. partd od 4. 3. 1992.
za izvođenje borbenih dejstava.
499 GŠ VSR BiH, Naređenje str. pov. br. 02/5-118 od 23. 8.
1992.
218
Domovinski rat 04-02-2020 Knjiga 1.indd 218
THE WAR IN BOSNIA AND
HERZEGOVINA IN 1992
Throughout 1992 the Bosnian Serbs strove to occu-
py as much of the country’s territory as possible with as
little effort as possible. In the early stages of the war, un-
like the Muslims and Bosnian Croats, the Bosnian Serbs
knew exactly what they wanted and they put their goals
on paper. The Assembly of the Serbian People of Bosnia
and Herzegovina adopted the decision on strategic goals
of the Serbs in Bosnia and Herzegovina in Banja Luka on
May 12. The strategic goals, as presented in the decision,
had been agreed with the Serbian leadership sometimes
before the meeting in Banja Luka. In all probability, the
text of the decision had been drafted in Belgrade. The
text of the decision was concise, consisting of only 6 ar-
ticles:1) Partitioning of Bosnia and Herzegovina along
national lines, 2) Establishing a corridor connecting Sem-
berija and Krajina, 3) Establishing a corridor in the Drina
Valley, “that is, eliminating the Drina River as the bound-
ary between the Serbian states”, 4) Establishing boundar-
ies on the Una and Neretva Rivers, 5) Partition of Sarajevo
into separate Muslim and Serb area, 6) Securing access to
the sea for the Republika Srpska.
The JNA and elements of the Serb units of the Terri-
torial Defense of Bosnia and Herzegovina started work-
ing towards accomplishing the strategic objectives of
the Bosnian Serbs already in March, 1992, two months
before the decision on strategic goals of the Serbs in
Bosnia and Herzegovina was officially adopted in Banja
Luka. The minutes of the meeting in Banja Luka held on
May 12 clearly reveal that the strategic objectives had
D
been formulated before – in all probability towards the
end of 1991 when Slobodan Milošević and Borisav Jović
had demanded from the then Federal Secretary of Na-
tional Defense of the SFRY Veljko Kadijević to start pre-
paring the ground for turning the JNA in Bosnia in Her-
zegovina into an Army of the Republic of Bosnian Serbs.
R
Two plans for the realization of the objectives described
above existed, the Drina plan for Tuzla Corps and the Kra-
jina plan for Banja Luka Corps. It appears that these plans
formed parts of the Bosnia-92 military operation plan of
the Army of the Republika Srpska. The plan called for a
gradual deployment of forces into the area coveted by
the Serbs.
The Bosnian Croats also had a clear goal – to gain
political and cultural autonomy and to defend their ar-
4.2.2020. 19:34:44
 The Croatian Nation’s Struggle for Survival, 1991-1995
koliko-toliko spremni. Najmanje pripravni za rat bili su
Muslimani. Trudili su se biti neutralni u ratu Srba i Hr-
vata, premda u tom srazu nije moglo biti neutralnih.
Kada su počeli prvi sukobi u BiH u kojima su stradali i
oni, njihov čelnik Alija Izetbegović i dalje je tvrdoglavo
nastojao izvući nekakav dogovor s krnjim vrhom SFRJ
i JNA. Pregovarajući s njima, nije vodio računa o hrvat-
skom interesu. Na Hrvate nije računao osim kada su tre-
bali Muslimanima, poput referenduma na kojem su dali
prilog da se preglasaju Srbi. Bošnjački politički vrh očito
H
je pretpostavljao da se savezništvo mora nečim platiti,
a to je bilo nešto na što nije želio pristati sve dok mu u
srpnju 1995. voda nije doslovno došla do grla.
S obzirom na to da su ranije počeli pripreme za
obranu, Hrvati su 1992. brže od Muslimana napravili
vojnu organizaciju. Uz potporu iz Hrvatske, ona je na-
M
stala iz TO-a općina u kojima su imali političku domi-
naciju, a 8. travnja proglašena je Hrvatskim vijećem
obrane. Do jeseni se HVO sastojao od Glavnoga stože-
ra i općinskih stožera. U rujnu je počelo organiziranje
operativnih zona: Jugoistočna Hercegovina u Mostaru,
Sjeverozapadna Hercegovina u Tomislavgradu, Srednja
D
Bosna u Travniku, odnosno Vitezu, i Bosanska Posavina
u Bosanskom Brodu, odnosno Orašju. Prelazak na bri-
gadnu organizaciju počeo je u ljeto i dovršen je u kasnu
jesen 1992. godine.
Muslimanima je trebalo nekoliko mjeseci da se
jasnije odrede prema ratu i sudionicima. Tek su u lip-
C
nju prihvaćene smjernice o ciljevima rata i organizaciji
vojske, koje su bile više deklarativnog nego stvarnog
značaja. Osnovna intencija bila je zadržati privid repu-
bličkoga kontinuiteta. Stoga je vojna sila u početnoj
fazi zadržala ime Teritorijalna obrana, a u ljeto 23. lipnja
D
1992. preimenovana je u Armiju Bosne i Hercegovine.
U početnoj je fazi zadržana organizacija okružnih šta-
bova i prostornih sastava u područjima koja su ostala
lojalna ostacima Predsjedništva BiH i Stranci demokrat-
ske akcije.
Izetbegović je mnogo očekivao od međunarodne
zajednice, mnogo više no što je ona bila spremna pruži-
ti. Umjesto željene vojne intervencije, UN je u kolovozu
pokrenuo dostavu humanitarne pomoći Sarajevu i dru-
gim dijelovima BiH. Sredinom rujna Vijeće sigurnosti
UN-a obvezalo je UNPROFOR da podrži humanitarne
agencije u pružanju pomoći. U listopadu je u Kiseljaku
organizirano Zapovjedništvo UNPROFOR-a za BiH, na
čijem je čelu bio francuski general Philippe Morillon. U
sjeverozapadnoj Bosni (Velika Kladuša) angažirana je
219
Domovinski rat 04-02-2020 Knjiga 1.indd 219
eas. The war in Croatia affected the Bosnian Croats and
they were aware that war was coming to Bosnia and
Herzegovina too. It was imperative for the Bosnian Cro-
ats to prepare, as much as they could in the short time
available, for the inevitable war. The Muslims were com-
pletely unprepared for war. They tried to stay neutral in
the conflict between the Croats and the Serbs but that
soon proved impossible. When hostilities commenced
in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Muslim’s initial neutral-
ity did not spare them the predatory attentions of the
JNA and Bosnian Serbs. Despite that, the Muslim leader
Alija Izetbegović stubbornly tried to reach some kind of
accommodation with the rump leadership of the SFRY
and the JNA. He negotiated with the Serb leaders and
the JNA completely disregarding the interests of the Bos-
nian Croats. He ignored the Bosnian Croats, except when
he needed them. For example, he desperately needed
Bosnian Croats’ votes in the referendum in order to out-
vote the Serbs. He got the votes but continued working
against the interests of the Bosnian Croats regardless.
The Bosniak political leadership shied away from allying
with the Bosnian Croats for fear of having to grant them
concessions. That changed in July, 1995, when the Bos-
niaks, under merciless onslaught of the Bosnian Serbs,
were on the verge of collapse.
The Bosnian Croats started preparing for war before
the Muslims did. In 1992 the Bosnian Croats had a mili-
tary defense force. The armed force of the Bosnian Croats
was created with the Republic of Croatia’s support out
of the Territorial Defense units from the municipalities
where the Croats were politically stronger than the other
two constituent nations of Bosnia and Herzegovina. This
armed force was named the Croatian Defense Council
(HVO) on April 8. Until the fall of 1992 the HVO consist-
ed of the General Staff and municipal headquarters. In
September operative zones were formed: Operative
Zone Southeast Herzegovina in Mostar, Operative Zone
Northwest Herzegovina in Tomislavgrad, Operative Zone
R
Central Bosnia in Travnik (its HQ was later located in Vi-
tez) and Operative Zone Bosanska Posavina in Bosanski
Brod (its HQ was later moved to Orašje). By late fall, 1992,
every municipality had its own brigade. That process had
started in the summer of the same year.
It took a few months for the Muslims to get their
heads around the realities of the situation and determine
their attitude towards the war and the participants in it.
Only in June did they adopt a set of guidelines regard-
ing their war aims and organization of their military. The
4.2.2020. 19:34:45
 Davor Marijan • Rat za opstojnost Hrvata, 1991. - 1995.

guidelines, in practical terms, meant little. Their primary

purpose was to create an illusion of the republic’s conti-
nuity. For that reason, the Bosniak’s military initially re-
tained the name Territorial Defense. On June 23 it was fi-
nally redesignated as the Army of the Republic of Bosnia
and Herzegovina. During the first phase of the war the
army’s organization still revolved around district head-
quarters and static units in the areas that remained loyal
to the rump Presidency of Bosnia and Herzegovina and
the SDA party.
H
Alija Izetbegović naively expected a lot more from
the international community than what the interna-
tional community was prepared to give. For example,
Alija Izetbegović expected the UN to intervene militarily
in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Instead, in August, the UN
started sending humanitarian aid to Sarajevo and other
M
parts of Bosnia and Herzegovina. In mid-September the
UN Security Council tasked UNPROFOR with support-
ing the efforts of the humanitarian agencies operating
in the country. In October UNPROFOR’s Bosnia High
Command HQ was formed in Kiseljak. The French Gen-
eral Philippe Morillon was the commander of UNPRO-
D
FOR in Bosnia. The French battalion was deployed in
northwest Bosnia (Velika Kladuša), the British battalion
was deployed in central Bosnia (Vitez and Gornji Vakuf/
Uskoplje) and the Spanish battalion was deployed in
Herzegovina (Mostar and Jablanica). The Canadian bat-
talion was supposed to be deployed in northern Bosnia
C
(Banja Luka) but the Serbs objected and the plan was
scrapped. The Logistics Battalion was from Belgium and
Busovača, nakon napada zrakoplova JNA, 26. travnja 1992. (au-
tor fotografija: Ilija Milić).
the Netherlands. One part of the Logistics Battalion was
stationed in Vitez and the other near Pančevo in Federa-
Damage inflicted by a JNA air raid, Busovača, April 26, 1992 tive Republic of Yugoslavia.
D
(Photographs by Ilija Milić).

Francuska bojna, u središnjoj Bosni (Vitez i Gornji Va-

kuf/Uskoplje) Britanska bojna i u Hercegovini (Mostar i
R
Jablanica) Španjolska bojna. Kanadskoj bojni u sjever-
noj Bosni (Banja Luka) Srbi su uskratili gostoprimstvo.
Logistički bataljun bio je iz Belgije i Nizozemske i dije-
lom je smješten kraj Viteza i Pančeva u SRJ.500

500 ICTY: Završno izvješće Glavnog tajnika UN-a od 24.

11. 1992. sukladno s Rezolucijom Vijeća sigurnosti br.
743 (1992.).

220

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 The Croatian Nation’s Struggle for Survival, 1991-1995
JNA I VRS NA ZADATKU
DRŽAVNOG RAZGRANIČENJA
SRPSKOG ENTITETA
Stupanjem na snagu Sarajevskoga primirja 3. si-
ječnja 1992. za JNA je počelo kratko zatišje u kojem je
dovršavala prije započete planove za otvaranje sukoba
u BiH. Razmještaj snaga za rat počela je u ljeto 1991.
izvlačenjem dijela snaga iz Slovenije: oklopnoga ba-
H
taljuna iz Vrhnike u Banju Luku, 14. pmtbr iz Ljubljane
u Zenicu, 30. partizanske divizije iz Vrhnike u Mrkonjić
Grad, glavnine 350. raketnog puka PVO-a iz Vrhnike u
Mostar, a 82. avijacijske brigade iz Cerklja na aerodrom
Zalužani kod Banje Luke.501 Taj je postroj do kraja 1991.
pojačan izvlačenjem JNA iz Hrvatske. U studenome
M
su dijelovi 4. oklopne brigade iz Jastrebarskog pre-
mješteni u Tuzlu i početkom 1992. preustrojeni u 336.
mtbr. Brigada je iz Tuzle u travnju 1992. premještena u
Šekoviće.502 Iz Dugog Sela i Zagreba glavnina 140. mbr
izvučena je u Sarajevo te ugašena, a ljudstvo i naoru-
žanje predani su 49. mtbr iz Sarajeva.503 U studenome
D
i prosincu iz Rijeke je u Crnu Goru izvučen ostatak 13.
korpusa, koji je potom doveden u istočnu Hercegovinu
i do ožujka 1992. popunjen i osposobljen za borbu. Do
10. travnja Generalštab OS SFRJ planirao je izvlačenje
iz Zenice, Čapljine i Travnika, gdje nije vidio mogućnost
opstanka JNA. U suradnji sa SDS-om JNA je planirala do
C
sredine travnja 1992. ustrojiti srpske dobrovoljačke sa-
stave i povezati ih s komandama JNA u zonama njihova
djelovanja. Sastavni dio priprema za rat bilo je izvlače-
nje ratnih materijalnih pričuva, posebno vrednijih i su-
vremenijih oruđa i oružja iz područja s većinskim mu-
D
501 VSA MORH: I uprava GŠOS SFRJ, Naređenje br. 51-1 od
25. 7. 1991.; SVA MORH, Komanda 5. VO, pov. br. 12/152-
74 od 1. 8. 1991.; SVA MORH, VSZ: Komanda 5. VO, str.
pov. br. 09/1945-56 od 8. 8. 1991.; HMDCDR: Komanda
5. VO, Redovni dnevni izveštaj str. pov. br. 10/43-772 od
31. 7. 1991.; “Ponovo krila nad Zalužanima”, Narodna
armija, 14. 8. 1991., 4; B. B. DIMITRIJEVIĆ, Jugoslovensko
ratno vazduhoplovstvo, 295-296.
502 VSA MORH: Komanda 5. VO, Naređenje str. pov. br. 9/79-
45 od 16. 12. 1991.; VSA MORH: Komanda 2. VO, pov. br.
15/15-28 od 16. 3. 1992.; Radovan TAČIĆ, Stakleni ten-
kovi: moć i nemoć Četvrte oklopne brigade, Štamparija
“Sloboda”, Vršac, 1994., 176.
503 VSA MORH: Komanda 5. VO, Naređenje str. pov. br. 9/79-
45 od 16. 12. 1991.; HMDCDR: Komanda 2. VO, Pov. br.
15/15-28 od 16. 3. 1992.
221
Domovinski rat 04-02-2020 Knjiga 1.indd 221
JNA AND VRS’S EFFORTS TO
ESTABLISH AND SECURE THE
BOUNDARIES OF THE SERB
AUTONOMOUS AREA
The Sarajevo Cease-fire Agreement, concluded on
January 3, 1992, gave the JNA a much needed inter-
mission. The JNA used the lull in the fighting against
Croatia to put into motion the already existing plans for
attacking Bosnia and Herzegovina. The deployment of
JNA forces that would be used in the war in Bosnia and
Herzegovina commenced in the summer of 1991, when
a number of units were pulled out of Slovenia. The Ar-
mored Battalion moved from Vrhnika to Banja Luka, the
14th Proletarian Motorized Brigade moved from Ljubljana
to Zenica, the 30th Partisan Division moved from Vrhnika
to Mrkonjić Grad, the bulk of the 350th Rocket Regiment
of the Air Defense moved from Vrhnika to Mostar and the
82nd Aviation Brigade moved from Cerklje to the Zalužani
airport near Banja Luka. The JNA force in Bosnia and
Herzegovina was augmented by formations pulled out
of Croatia by the end of 1991. In November, elements of
the 4th Armored Brigade were moved from Jastrebarsko
to Tuzla. At the beginning of 1992, the 336th Motorized
Brigade was formed out of the mentioned elements of
the 4th Armored Brigade. In April the 336th Motorized
Brigade was moved from Tuzla to Šekovići. Most of the
troops belonging to the 140th Motorized Brigade arrived
from Zagreb and Dugo Selo in Sarajevo. The 140th Mo-
torized Brigade was disbanded and its men and equip-
ment were incorporated into the 49th Motorized Brigade
from Sarajevo. In November and December the remain-
der of XIII Corps was moved from Rijeka to Montenegro.
Thence, XIII Corps was sent to eastern Herzegovina. By
March, 1992, XIII Corps had been brought up to strength
and was ready to be deployed in combat. The General
Staff of the Armed Forces of the SFRY planned to pull the
R
JNA units out of Zenica, Čapljina and Travnik, because
the position of those units was deemed untenable. The
JNA also planned, in collaboration with the SDS, to form
volunteer units and link them with JNA headquarters in
their areas of operations by mid-April. The JNA wanted to
pull all the weaponry and equipment, especially modern
weapons and equipment, out of the predominantly Mus-
lim and Croat areas. The leadership of the JNA believed
that the JNA forces gathered in Bosnia and Herzegovina
would be sufficient to create another Serbian state to the
4.2.2020. 19:34:45
 Davor Marijan • Rat za opstojnost Hrvata, 1991. - 1995.
slimanskim i hrvatskim stanovništvom.504 S postojećim
snagama u BiH JNA je imala solidnu osnovu da pokuša
stvoriti drugu srpsku državu zapadno od Drine. Prvi je
korak učinila JNA iz 2. i 4. vojne oblasti, a u drugoj po-
lovini svibnja 1992., uz manji prekid, to je nastavila od
nje nastala Vojska Srpske Republike BiH odnosno Voj-
ska Republike Srpske.
Golema srpska ofenzivna operacija odvijala se
na većem dijelu BiH uz niz specifičnosti. Na područji-
ma gdje su Hrvati bili u dovoljnoj većini Srbi su imali
H
manje uspjeha, s tim da su negdje, kao u Bosanskoj
Posavini i Jajcu, uspjehe postizali u višemjesečnim
napornim kampanjama. Na područjima poput Ku-
presa uspjeh je postignut u žestokoj borbi u relativno
kratkom vremenu. Na dijelovima bojišta poput Livna,
Bugojna ili Žepča uspjeh je izostao bez obzira na ulo-
M
žen napor. Najviše uspjeha Srbi su imali na područjima
gdje su Hrvati bili najmanje brojni, a HVO slab ili nije
postojao. Najveće uspjehe Srbi su postigli u Bosanskoj
krajini, istočnoj Hercegovini i Semberiji, a to znači re-
lativno brzo, premda je u pojedinim slučajevima bilo
jakog oružanog otpora.
D
Način na koji su Srbi stvarali državu bio je sličan u
mnogim područjima. Često su to bile lokalne akcije na
razini općina u kojima su sudjelovale postrojbe JNA,
TO-a, SDS-a ili paravojne formacije dovedene iz Srbi-
je. Te su akcije često bile slične: okruživanje nesrpskih
područja prije borbe, nerazmjerno jak odgovor na neki
C
gotovo beznačajan događaj, davanje ultimatuma za
predaju oružja, granatiranje, napad i razaranje naselja,
prisilno odvođenje stanovništva u logore, protjerivanje
i pljačka njihove imovine. U nekoliko su slučajeva po-
vod za intervenciju JNA, a to je redovito značilo zapo-
sjedanje i okupaciju, davale srpske paravojne postroj-
be. One su po iskustvima iz Hrvatske 1991. bile možda
najučinkovitiji izazivač sukoba.505
504 ICTY: I uprava GŠ OS SFRJ, Zabeleška, str. pov. br. 585-2
od 3. 4. 1992. Prijepis u: Stjepan ŠIBER, Prevare, zablude,
istina: ratni dnevnik 1992., Rabic, Sarajevo, 2000., 236-238.
505 ICTY: Ewan BROWN, Vojna situacija u Bosanskoj krajini –
1992.: Analiza situacije, Haag, 27. 11. 2002., 61; ICTY: Rey-
naud THEUNENS, “Vojni aspekt uloge Jovice Stanišića i
Franka Simatovića u Hrvatskoj i Bosni i Hercegovini
(1991–1995)”, Haag, 30. 6. 2007.
222
Domovinski rat 04-02-2020 Knjiga 1.indd 222
west of Drina. The opening moves of that gambit were
made by troops of the 2nd and 4th Military Districts. The
process continued with short interruptions, in the sec-
ond half of May, 1992, and the army of the Serbian Re-
public of Bosnia and Herzegovina, that is the army of the
Republika Srpska.
The scale of the JNA’s offensive against Bosnia and
Herzegovina was massive. Operations were conducted
in almost all areas of the country. In the predominant-
ly Croat areas the Serbs were not as successful as else-
where. Some successes were achieved though, but more
often than not, at a high price. In the Bosanska Posavina
region and Jajce the Serbs gained victories only after bit-
ter campaigning lasting a few months. In areas such as
Kupres, successes were achieved relatively quickly, but
the fighting was intense and brutal. In some areas, like
Livno, Bugojno and Žepče, the Serbs, despite expending
a lot of effort, were completely unsuccessful. The Serbs
only achieved complete victories in areas where the
Croats constituted a small minority and HVO units were
weak, or nonexistent. The Serbs’ most notable successes
occurred in Bosanska Krajina, eastern Herzegovina and
Semberija early in the war, even though the Serbs, on
some occasions, encountered stiff resistance.
The dynamic by which the Serbs set out to create a
Greater Serbian state was similar in many areas. Every-
thing often revolved around local, low-scale actions on
the level of municipality, using units belonging to the
JNA, the Territorial Defense, the SDS party and paramil-
itary units imported from Serbia. The tactical signature
of these actions in most cases followed a similar pattern;
encircling non-Serbs areas prior to attack, using insignif-
icant or invented incidents as a pretext for a dispropor-
D
tionately strong response, issuing ultimatums for surren-
der, artillery bombardment and deliberate destruction
of villages, rounding up the inhabitants and transporting
them to concentration camps, expelling the non-Serb
population and confiscating their property. In a number
R
of cases the activities of Serb paramilitary formations
provided pretexts for the JNA to act. In these cases the
JNA would occupy the area in question. The Serb para-
military formations in Bosnia were, in most cases, the
prime instigator of conflict in Bosnia and Herzegovina.
In that respect, they did not differ from the Serb paramil-
itary formations in Croatia during 1991.
4.2.2020. 19:34:45
 The Croatian Nation’s Struggle for Survival, 1991-1995
ISTOČNA BOSNA
Srpska operacija “čišćenja” teritorija od nesrpskog
stanovništva počela je u istočnoj Bosni, težišno u dolini
rijeke Drine, gdje su gradovi odnosno općine Bijeljina u
Semberiji, potom Zvornik, Vlasenica, Bratunac, Srebreni-
ca, Rogatica, Višegrad, Goražde, Čajniče, Rudo i Foča. Dio
je bio na Drini, a dio u relativnoj blizini rijeke. Srbi su izra-
zitu većinu imali u gradiću Rudo, u općini Bijeljina (u kojoj
su Muslimani držali grad i veliko selo Janju), a neznatnu
H
većinu u Čajniču.
Na tom je području JNA imala skromne mirnodopske
snage. U Bijeljini su bili 38. partizanska divizija i 670. pon-
tonirski bataljun iz sastava Tuzlanskoga korpusa. Sarajev-
ski korpus u Han Pijesku imao je 216. brdsku brigadu, čiji
M
je jedan bataljun bio u Vlasenici. Osvajanje Podrinja, što je
bio treći od strategijskih ciljeva Srba u BiH, JNA je počela
premještanjem glavnine 336. mtbr iz Tuzle prema Podri-
nju. Najprije je jedan oklopni bataljun 28. veljače poslan na
osiguranje mostova i hidroelektrane kod Zvornika. Glavni-
na brigade izvučena je 5. travnja s aerodroma kod Tuzle u
Šekoviće, a 21. travnja izvučen je ostatak postrojbe. Sredi-
D
nom travnja angažiran je dio Užičkoga korpusa na području
Višegrada i Goražda. U travnju je Komanda 1. vojne oblasti
osnovala Operativnu grupu Drina, koja je djelovala s obje
strane rijeke u općinama Zvornik, Loznica i Ljubovija. U sa-
stavu OG-a Drina bili su, među ostalima, 336. mtbr i oklopni
C
bataljun 453. mbr iz Srijemske Mitrovice.506
Rat u istočnoj Bosni započela je paravojna skupina
Željka Ražnatovića Arkana, koja je 1. travnja zauzela Bi-
jeljinu. Ista je skupina uz potporu TO-a i JNA predvodila
napad na Zvornik, koji je zauzet 10. travnja, premda su
muslimanske snage na pojedinim mjestima dugo pru-
D
žale otpor. Višegrad su Srbi napali 7. travnja, no tek su
uvođenje dijelova Užičkoga korpusa JNA 14. i 15. travnja
i blokada grada omogućili njegovo osvajanje. Uz pomoć
JNA Srbi su 21. travnja bez borbe zauzeli Vlasenicu. Ro-
gaticu je JNA zaposjela sredinom travnja. U Bratuncu su
nadzor nad općinom Srbi i JNA (dio 336. mtbr) preuzeli
506 ICTY: Komanda 2. vojne oblasti, Referat o stanju bor-
bene gotovosti komandi i jedinica 2. VO str. pov. br.
09/63-26 od 23. 1. 1992.; ICTY: Komanda 1. vojne oblas-
ti, Dnevni operativni izveštaj str. pov. br. 60-497 od 23. 4.
1992.; ICTY: Opštinski štab oružanih snaga RBiH Vlasen-
ica, Izvještaj br. 01/35/92 od 19. 7. 1992.; ICTY: Koman-
da Užičkog korpusa, Studija-analiza: efikasnost sistema
RiK-a u JNA u ratu 1990. - 1992. godine, DT br. 89-1 od
13. 4. 1993.; R. TAČIĆ, Stakleni tenkovi, 176-177, 256-266.
223
Domovinski rat 04-02-2020 Knjiga 1.indd 223
EASTERN BOSNIA
The Serbs started their “ethnic cleansing” operation
in eastern Bosnia. The epicenter of this initial effort was in
the Drina Valley, in the municipalities of Bijeljina, Zvornik,
Vlasenica, Bratunac, Srebrenica, Rogatica, Višegrad, Go-
ražde, Čajniče, Rudo and Foča. Some of these municipal-
ities were located relatively close to the river Drina and
some were centered on the river itself. The municipalities
of Rudo and Bijeljina were predominantly Serb. In the
Bijeljina Municipality the Muslims controlled the city of
Bijeljina and the sizeable village of Janja. In the Čajnić
Municipality the Serbs made up a small majority.
In this area the presence of the JNA was limited to a
number of units belonging to the peacetime contingent.
In the Bijeljina Municipality were the 38th Partisan Divi-
sion and the 670th Pontoon Battalion belonging to Tuzla
Corps. The 216th Mountain Brigade, belonging to Saraje-
vo Corps, was stationed in Han Pijesak. One battalion of
the 216th Mountain Brigade was stationed in Vlasenica.
Having captured the Podrinje region, which was, in order
of importance, the third strategic objective of the Serbs
in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the JNA began to move the
bulk of the 336th Motorized Brigade from Tuzla towards
the Podrinje region. On February 28 one armored bat-
talion was sent to secure the bridges and hydroelectric
power plant at Zvornik. The main body of the 336th Mo-
torized Brigade was moved, on April 5, from Tuzla Airport
to Šekovići. On April 21 the rest of the Brigade was also
moved there. In mid-April elements of the Užice Corps
were used in and around Višegrad and Goražde. In April
the HQ of the 1st Military District formed Operational
Group Drina. Operational Group Drina operated on both
sides of the river in the municipalities of Zvornik, Lozni-
ca and Ljubovija. The 336th Motorized Brigade and the
Armored Battalion of the 453rd Motorized Brigade from
Srijemska Mitrovica were, among other units, under the
command of Operational Group Drina.
R
The war in eastern Bosnia started when the para-
military formation led by Željko Ražnatović Arkan cap-
tured Bijeljina on April 1. That same paramilitary group,
supported by JNA and Territorial Defense units, led the
attack on Zvornik. The city of Zvornik fell on April 10, but
it took longer for the Serbs to defeat isolated pockets of
Muslim resistance around the city. The Serbs attacked
Višegrad on April 7. The initial attack failed so the Serbs
put the city under siege and brought elements of Užice
Corps as reinforcements. Višegrad finally fell on April 14-
4.2.2020. 19:34:45
 Davor Marijan • Rat za opstojnost Hrvata, 1991. - 1995.
17. travnja. Ozbiljan otpor Muslimani su pružili u Foči, koja
je napadnuta 7. i zauzeta 18. travnja.507
Srbi su neuspjeh pretrpjeli u napadima na Srebre-
nicu i Goražde i na području Žepe u općini Rogatica.
Muslimansko je stanovništvo sabijeno u sjeveroistočni
dio općine, na područje Žepe. Područje je blokirano već
u ožujku 1992., a obrana je postavljena na dva pravca s
kojih se moglo ući. Početkom lipnja VRS je napao iz prav-
ca Han Pijeska i pretrpio velik neuspjeh.508 Muslimanska
Teritorijalna obrana Goražda odbacila je na prijelazu iz
H
svibnja u lipanj srpske snage prema Ustikolini.509 Mu-
slimani su 24. srpnja 1992. uspjeli deblokirati Goražde,
odnosno napraviti koridor od Grepka preko Jabuke do
Goražda.510 Muslimani su se uspjeli održati i organizirati
otpor u Cerskoj (Vlasenica), Kamenici (Zvornik) i dijelu
općine Bratunac te su ugrožavali za Srbe važan most u
M
Novoj Kasabi.511
Sredinom kolovoza muslimanske snage iz Rogatice
zauzele su srpsko uporište Hranjen i presjekle prometni-
cu Pale – Prača – Hrenovica – Hranjen – Jabuka – Površ-
nica – Goražde. U drugoj polovini kolovoza 1992. Armija
Republike BiH oslobodila je u operaciji Krug cjelokupno
D
područje Goražda na lijevoj obali Drine.512
Srpske su snage najlošije stajale u Podrinju jer je te-
žište ofenzive bilo u ostalim dijelovima BiH. Drugi je pro-
blem bio to što su u Podrinju Srbi zauzeli općinska sre-
C
507 ICTY: Opštinski štab oružanih snaga RBiH Vlasenica, Izv-
ještaj br. 01/35/92 od 19. 7. 1992.; ICTY: Komanda Užičkog
korpusa, Studija-analiza: efikasnost sistema RiK-a u JNA u
ratu 1990.-1992. godine, DT br. 89-1 od 13. 4. 1993.; Nusret
E. AGIĆ, Živi štitovi. Hronika desetog genocida nad Bošnjaci-
ma i počeci otpora naroda općine Rogatica, “Hod”, Sarajevo,
1995., 25-26, 68-69; R. DELIĆ, Armija RBiH, I, 234-236; Edi-
na BEĆIREVIĆ, Genocid u istočnoj Bosni 1992.–1993., 55-62,
izvod iz monografije Na Drini genocid, istraživanje organi-
ziranog zločina u istočnoj Bosni, Buybook, Sarajevo, 2009.
508 ICTY: Komanda SRK, Instrukcija za dalja dejstva str. pov.
br. 10-74-44 od 7. 6. 1992.; ICTY: Predsjedništvo Srpske
Republike BiH, Odluka br. 01-779/92 od 9. 8. 1992.; Fuad
Dorić, “Smrtonosna klopka za četnike”, Prva linija, Saraje-
vo, br. 2, 1. 2. 1993., 10-11.
509 Medina Delalić, “Žive vatrene bombe”, Prva linija, br. 1, 8.
12. 1992., 22-23.
510 A. KLIKO, F. ĆUSKIĆ, 17. Viteška Krajiška brdska brigada
ARBiH, 51-52.
511 ICTY: Opštinski štab oružanih snaga RBiH Vlasenica, Izv-
ještaj br. 01/35/92 od 19. 7. 1992.
512 ICTY: GŠ VSR BiH, Informacija o stanju morala u VSR str.
pov. br. 16/10-110 od 9. 9. 1992.; N. E. AGIĆ, Živi štitovi,
83-85; R. DELIĆ, Armija RBiH, I, 246.
224
Domovinski rat 04-02-2020 Knjiga 1.indd 224
15. The Serbs, on April 21, with the JNA’s assistance, cap-
tured Vlasenica without a fight. The JNA occupied Rogat-
ica in mid-April. The Serbs and JNA (elements of the 336th
Motorized Brigade) took control of the Bratunac Munici-
pality on April 17. The Muslims offered spirited resistance
in Foča. The Serbs attacked the city on April 7 and cap-
tured it on April 18.
The Serbs’ attacks on Srebrenica, Goražde and
around Žepa in the Rogatica Municipality were not suc-
cessful. The Muslim population in the Žepa Municipality
was forced to flee to the northeastern part of the munic-
ipality. The Serbs put the area under blockade already in
March, 1992. The Muslims set up a defensive perimeter
with two entry points. At the beginning of June, the VRS
attacked from the direction of Han Pijesak, but the de-
fenders soundly defeated the Serbs. At the end of May
and beginning of June the Muslim Territorial Defense of
Goražde pushed back the Serb attacking force towards
Ustikolina. On July 24 the Muslims breached the encir-
clement around Goražde by creating a corridor from
Grepak, via Jabuka to Goražde. The Muslims managed to
beat back Serbs attacks on Cerska (Vlasenica Municipali-
ty), Kamenica (Zvornik Municipality) and in some areas in
the Bratunac Municipality. Muslim forces also threatened
the strategically important bridge in Nova Kasaba.
In mid-August Muslim forces operating from Rogati-
ca captured Hranjen, a Serb stronghold, and thus cut the
Pale – Prača – Hrenovica – Hranjen – Jabuka – Površnica
– Goražde communications route. In the second half of
August, 1992, the Army of the Republic of Bosnia and
Herzegovina liberated, during Operation Krug (Circle)
the area of the Goražde Municipality on the left bank of
the Drina River.
D
The Serb forces were the weakest in the Podrinje
region because the main offensive efforts were focused
on other areas of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Another prob-
lem the Serbs faced in the Podrinje region was the fact
that the Serbs there controlled only administrative cen-
R
ters of the municipalities. The rugged and inaccessible
areas outside the urban centers remained under Muslim
control. A significant portion of the Muslim population
in the municipalities, for example the Foča Municipality,
therefore, did not flee. This Muslim presence there made
life uneasy for the inhabitants of the Serb villages in the
area. The JNA had no units stationed in some areas of the
municipalities in the Podrinje region. The role of the VRS
there was defensive – the troops were tasked with activi-
ties suited more to a police force than an army. Warfare in
4.2.2020. 19:34:45
 The Croatian Nation’s Struggle for Survival, 1991-1995
dišta, a značajan je dio teško prohodnih područja ostao
bez njihova nadzora. Stoga je u dijelu općina poput Foče
dio muslimanskoga stanovništva ostao u općini i ugro-
žavao sela sa srpskim stanovništvom. U dijelu tih općina
nisu bile ukupne snage JNA, pa je VRS bio milicijskoga
karaktera, a dobar dio tih sukoba imao je elemente se-
oskih ratova. Zbog širokog prostora i nepovoljnog od-
nosa snaga VRS je često bio u defenzivi i čuvao stečene
položaje. Vojska Republike Srpske pokrenula je 25. rujna
1992. napadnu operaciju iz Gackog, Kalinovika, Foče i
H
Crne Gore protiv muslimanskih skupina na Vučevu, Tjen-
tištu i Zelengori i nakon trodnevne borbe natjerala ih je
sa stanovništvom na dugotrajno i mukotrpno izvlačenje
prema Grepku i Trnovu.513
Iako inferiorne u naoružanju i opremi, musliman-
ske su snage bile sve poduzetnije, ugrozile su Višegrad
M
i prometnice prema Sarajevu, zbog čega je VRS u istoč-
noj Bosni temeljito reorganiziran osnivanjem Drinskoga
korpusa od dijelova Istočnobosanskoga, Sarajevsko-ro-
manijskoga i Hercegovačkoga korpusa.514 Zadatak kor-
pusa bio je razbiti ARBiH, a muslimansko stanovništvo
natjerati da napusti područje Cerske, Žepe, Srebrenice i
D
Goražda, osposobiti za promet prometnicu Milići – Ko-
njević Polje – Zvornik te otvoriti koridor prema istočnoj
Hercegovini. Pomoćnim snagama odsudno je branio
branu kod Višegrada, Zvornik i koridor Sokolac – Šeko-
vići – Caparde – Zvornik.515
S druge strane, muslimanske su snage u Goraždu
C
1. studenoga združene u Istočnobosansku operativnu
grupu Armije RBiH. Skupina je od 19. do 25. prosinca
1992. pokušala osloboditi područje oko Ustikoline, u
čemu nije uspjela.516
D
TUZLANSKA REGIJA
U Tuzli je bilo središte i dio snaga Tuzlanskoga kor-
pusa JNA. Nakon što su srpske snage zauzele Doboj,
Tuzla je odsječena od dijela BiH pod nadzorom Musli-
513 ICTY: GŠ VRS, Naređenje str. pov. br. 02/5-176 od 29. 10.
1992.; Taib-Tato ČELIK, Diverzanti, TKD Šahinpašić, Sara-
jevo, 2004., 35-38.
514 ICTY: GŠ VRS, Poduzimanje mjera za odbranu gradova u
dolini Drine, Naređenje str. pov. br. 02/5-176 od 29. 10.
1992.; M. MILOVANOVIĆ, Istine i zablude, 55.
515 ICTY: Komanda Drinskog korpusa, Odluka za dalja dejst-
va str. pov. br. 2-126 od 24. 11. 1992.
516 R. DELIĆ, Armija RBiH, I, 246.
225
Domovinski rat 04-02-2020 Knjiga 1.indd 225
these areas assumed the character of tribal conflicts prac-
ticed by peoples existing below the military horizon. The
terrain favored the Muslim forces in the area which also
outnumbered the VRS forced deployed there. For that
reason the VRS was on the defensive, its main objective
to hold the conquered areas. On September 25, 1992, the
VRS launched an offensive operation from Gacko, Kalino-
vik, Foča and Montenegro against the Muslim forces in
Vučevo, Tjentište and Zelengora. After three days of fight-
ing the Serbs forced the Muslim forces and the Muslim
population to flee towards Grebak and Trnovo.
The Muslim forces were inferior to the Serbs in terms
of weapons and equipment but were, nevertheless, be-
coming ever more aggressive. The Muslims threatened
Višegrad and roads leading to Sarajevo. As a result, the
VRS in eastern Bosnia was thoroughly restructured; Drina
Corps was formed out of elements of East Bosnia Corps,
Sarajevo-Romanija Corps and Herzegovina Corps. The
task of the newly formed corps was to inflict a decisive
defeat on the Army of the Republic of Bosnia and Her-
zegovina, force the Muslim population to flee from the
municipalities of Cerska, Žepa, Srebrenica and Goražde,
open for traffic the Milići – Konjević Polje – Zvornik high-
way and close the corridor towards eastern Herzegovi-
na. Auxiliary forces belonging to the corps defended the
dam near Višegrad, Zvornik and the Sokolac – Šekovići
– Caparde – Zvornik corridor.
The Muslim forces in Goražde were formed, on No-
vember 1, into Operational Group East Bosnia of the
Army of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Op-
erational Group East Bosnia tried to liberate, during the
period from December 19-25, the area around Ustikolina
without success.
TUZLA REGION
The HQ and a number of formations of Tuzla Corps
of the JNA were stationed in Tuzla. After the Serbs had
R
captured Doboj Tuzla was cut off from the Muslim-con-
trolled areas of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Tuzla was also
under threat from the near-by Serb strongholds on Maje-
vica and Ozren. In addition, a strong pro-Serbian faction
was active in the city. The faction toyed with the idea of
securing a regional autonomy within a rump Yugoslavia.
In April the HQ of Tuzla Corps was moved to Ugljevik.
Only the 92th Motorized Brigade of the JNA remained in
the city. Hostilities in this region started on April 27 in Ži-
vinice. The battle for Kalesija lasted from May 2 to May
4.2.2020. 19:34:45
 Davor Marijan • Rat za opstojnost Hrvata, 1991. - 1995.
mana. Bila je ugrožena i s obližnjih srpskih uporišta na
Majevici i Ozrenu. Uz to je u gradu bila jaka prosrpska
opcija koja je kalkulirala s regionalnom autonomijom
u okviru krnje Jugoslavije. U travnju je Komanda Tu-
zlanskoga korpusa premještena u Ugljevik, a u gradu
je ostala 92. mtbr JNA. Borbe u regiji počele su 27. trav-
nja u Živinicama, a JNA i Srbi zauzeli su u borbama od
2. do 11. svibnja Kalesiju. U Tuzli je općinsko rukovod-
stvo dogovorilo s JNA odlazak 92. brigade. Prilikom
evakuacije brigade muslimanske su snage 15. svibnja
H
napale kolonu na Brčanskoj Malti i nanijele joj velike
gubitke. Jugoslavenska narodna armija iselila se 17.
svibnja, nakon čega je TO došao do svojega naoruža-
nja i organizirao crtu prema Srbima na Majevici, prema
Kalesiji i Ozrenu.517
M
OPSADA SARAJEVA
Ubojstvo srpskoga svata i podizanje barikada u
Sarajevu 2. ožujka 1992. bili su najava skoroga rata.
Grad je bio sjedište JNA u BiH, ali i političko središte,
pa je njegov položaj imao iznimnu važnost za Mu-
D
slimane i Srbe. U gradu je bilo osam vojarni, iz kojih
se vatrom mogao nadzirati veći dio grada. Sukob je
počeo 5. travnja 1992. napadom srpske milicije na
školu MUP-a na Vracama. Otpor JNA i Srbima pruži-
le su razne naoružane skupine čije je djelovanje na-
C
stojao koordinirati Gradski štab TO-a. Jugoslavenska
narodna armija i Srbi uspjeli su 22. travnja zauzeti dio
Dobrinje. Nakon kraćega primirja 29. travnja borbe
su ponovno eskalirale. Pokušaj izvlačenja Komande
2. vojne oblasti 2. i 3. svibnja i zarobljavanje pred-
sjednika Predsjedništva BiH Alije Izetbegovića nakon
povratka iz Portugala 2. svibnja bio je kraj navodne
neutralnosti JNA u Sarajevu. S Izetbegovićem u ruka-
ma, Komanda 2. vojne oblasti pokušala je prekinuti
napade TO-a BiH na vojne objekte u Sarajevu. Izetbe-
gović je u pratnji JNA i uz posredovanje UNPROFOR-a
doveden u Komandu 2. vojne oblasti, koja je poslije-
podne 3. svibnja krenula u premještanje prema Grba-
vici. Kod “Skenderije” je Izebegović pušten, a vojna je
kolona nakon toga napadnuta u Dobrovoljačkoj ulici,
517 Izjava majora Ranka Belojice dana 1. 6. 1993.; Vahid
KARAVELIĆ, Agresija na Bosnu i Hercegovinu. Sjeverois-
točna Bosna 1991.–1992., Institut za istraživanje zločina
protiv čovječnosti i međunarodnog prava, Sarajevo,
2004., 238; R. DELIĆ, Armija RBiH, I, 239-241.
226
Domovinski rat 04-02-2020 Knjiga 1.indd 226
11. The Serbs and the JNA defeated the Muslim force and
captured the city. In Tuzla the municipal leaders negoti-
ated with the JNA. The JNA agreed to withdraw the 92nd
Brigade from the city. Muslim forces attacked the with-
drawing column on May 15 at Brčanska Malta, inflicting
heavy casualties on the 92nd Brigade. By May 17 the JNA
had completely vacated Tuzla. The Territorial Defense
thus acquired considerable amount of weapons and set
up defensive positions guarding against Serb attacks
from Majevica, Kalesija and Ozren.
THE SIEGE OF SARAJEVO
Two incidents heralded the beginning of the war; a
Muslim killed a Serb at a wedding and Serbs put up bar-
ricades in Sarajevo on March 2, 1992. Sarajevo, as the
capital of Bosnia and Herzegovina, was the seat of the
Supreme HQ of the JNA forces in the country and admin-
istrative center. The city’s importance, for both the Serbs
and the Muslims, was immense. There were eight barracks
scattered throughout the city. From the barracks, the JNA
could keep almost the whole city under fire. The conflict
started on April 5, 1992, when the Serb Militia attacked
the School of the MUP in Vraca. Various armed groups re-
sisted the Serbs. The city headquarters of the Territorial
Defense tried to coordinate the actions of these groups.
The JNA and Serb paramilitaries managed to capture
most of Dobrinja on April 22. After a brief cease-fire, hostil-
ities recommenced on April 29. The JNA attempted to pull
out the HQ of the 2nd Military District on May 2-3. On May
2, when President of the BiH Presidency Alija Izetbegović
returned from Portugal, the JNA took him prisoner. These
actions marked the end of the JNA’s ostensible neutrality.
D
The HQ of the 2nd Military District, with Izetbegović in its
hands, tried to blackmail the Territorial Defense of Bosnia
and Herzegovina into stopping their attacks on JNA facil-
ities and installations in Sarajevo. The JNA started pulling
out, still holding Izetbegović, towards Grbavica on May 3.
R
At Skenderija, after negotiations involving UNPROFOR,
Izetbegović was released. The Muslims then attacked the
column in Dobrovoljačka Street and inflicted heavy casu-
alties on the retreating troops.
The JNA took positions on the hills around the city
and Sarajevo Corps was redesignated as Sarajevo Ro-
manija Corps of the VRS. The siege of Sarajevo had be-
gun. The Territorial Defense units in the encircled city
were commanded by the regional HQ of the Territorial
Defense. In September, 1992, the regional HQ of the Ter-
4.2.2020. 19:34:45
 The Croatian Nation’s Struggle for Survival, 1991-1995
pri čemu su joj naneseni veliki gubici.518
Izvlačenjem snaga JNA na brda u okolici grada
i preimenovanjem Sarajevskoga korpusa u Sarajev-
sko-romanijski korpus VRS-a počela je duga opsada
grada. U okruženom Sarajevu TO-om je zapovijedao
Regionalni štab TO-a, koji je u rujnu 1992. prerastao u
Komandu 1. korpusa Armije RBiH.519
U borbama 15. i 16. svibnja muslimanske su snage
zauzele Pofaliće i spriječile Srbe da se iz smjera Vogošće
i Rajlovca spoje sa snagama na Lukavici i Grbavici. Po-
H
četkom lipnja Glavni štab Srpske vojske naredio je da se
grad presiječe na pravcu Nedžarići – Stup – Rajlovac.520
Ni taj pokušaj nije uspio, muslimanske su snage 7. i 8.
lipnja deblokirale Dobrinju. Pokušaji ARBiH od 31. srpnja
do 31. kolovoza 1992. da deblokira Sarajevo nisu uspjeli.
Armija Republike BiH u tom je pokušaju 31. srpnja na-
M
pala i zauzela Trnovo, prvo i jedino naselje statusa gra-
da koje je uzeto od Srba do borbi za Kupres dvije i pol
godine poslije. Vojska Republike Srpske odgovorila je
protunapadom iz smjera Vogošće i Rajlovca od 18. do
23. rujna, no bez uspjeha. Potom je težište njezina djelo-
vanja prebačeno na odsijecanje Sarajeva od aerodroma
D
u Otesu, Stupu i Azićima. Naselja su napadnuta 2. pro-
sinca i do 6. prosinca muslimanske su snage potisnute iz
Otesa, Azića i dijela Stupa. Uz velike gubitke, srpski je na-
pad zaustavljen na dijelu Stupa do Stupske Petlje, čime
je spriječeno odsijecanje prigradskih naselja Hrasnice,
Sokolović Kolonije i Butmira. U završnici napada snage
C
1. korpusa Armije RBiH počele su protunapad na plato
Žuč i sasvim ga zauzele 15. prosinca, čime su otklonile
opasnost iz smjera Vogošće i Rajlovca. Potom su 18. pro-
sinca 1992. dijelovi 1., 3. i 4. korpusa ARBiH počeli ope-
raciju deblokade Sarajeva Sloboda ‘92, odnosno Koverta.
D
Operacija je vođena s Igmana i nakon dva dana borbi
neuspješno je završila zbog nerealnih ciljeva i izostanka
angažmana većine dogovorenih snaga.521
518 Komanda 2. VO, Borbeni i operativni izveštaj str. pov. br.
10/36-2400 od 21. 4. 1992.; Komanda 2. VO, Borbeni i op-
erativni izveštaj str. pov. br. 10/36-2524 od 29. 4. 1992.;
ICTY: Komanda 4. K, Događaji u Bosni i Hercegovini,
odnos i odraz ukupnog stanja na JNA, str. pov. br. 75-1
od 7. 5. 1992.; R. DELIĆ, Armija RBiH, I, 218, 257-261.
519 H. EFENDIĆ, Ko je branio Bosnu, 167.
520 ICTY: GŠ VSR BiH, Direktiva za dalja dejstva str. pov. br.
02/5-22 od 6. 6. 1992.; R. DELIĆ, Armija RBiH, I, 262-263.
521 Mirsad ĆATIĆ ČUPERAK, Sjene nad Igmanom: Ratni
dnevnik, 1992.–1996., autorsko izdanje, Sarajevo, 2000.,
170-173; R. DELIĆ, Armija RBiH, I, 262-268; A. KLIKO, F.
ĆUSKIĆ, 17. Viteška Krajiška brdska brigada ARBiH, 54-55.
227
Domovinski rat 04-02-2020 Knjiga 1.indd 227
ritorial Defense became the Main HQ of I Corps of the
Army of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina.
Muslim forces, after heavy fighting on May 15-16,
captured Pofalići and prevented the Serbs to link up their
forces in Vogošća and Rajlovac with those on Lukavica and
Grbavica. At the beginning of June, the General Staff of
the Army of the Republika Srpska ordered an attack the
objective of which was to cut through the city’s defens-
es along the Nedžarići – Stup – Rajlovac line. The attempt
failed. The Muslims, during a two day battle – June 7 and
8 – broke the encirclement around Dobrinja. The Army of
the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina made a several
attempts to lift the siege of Sarajevo – the first undertaken
on August 31, 1992 – but without success. In the attempt
launched on August 31 the Army of the Republic of Bosnia
and Herzegovina managed to capture Trnovo, the only city
the Muslims wrested from Serb control until the battles for
Kupres two and a half years later. The VRS responded by
launching a counterattack from the direction of Vogošće
and Rajlovac. This battle lasted from September 18 to
September 23 and ended in a Serb defeat. After the failed
counterattack the VRS shifted the focus of its offensive op-
erations to cutting off Sarajevo from the airports in Otes,
Stup and Azići. The attack commenced on December 2. By
December 6 the Muslim forces there had been chased out
from Otes, Azići and parts of Stup. The defenders of Stup,
at the cost of tremendous casualties, managed to halt
the Serbs’ onslaught at the Stup interchange. Thus, the
Muslims saved the suburban neighborhoods of Hrasnice,
Sokolović and Butimir from being cut off from the rest of
the city. The ARBIH I Corps then launched a counterattack
on the Žuč plateau and captured it on December 15. This
success made further Serb attacks from the direction of
Vogošće and Rajlovac impossible. Then, on December 18.
1992, elements of I, III and IV Corps launched Operation
Sloboda-92 (Freedom-92). The aim was to lift the siege of
Sarajevo. The operation was commanded from Igman. Af-
ter two days of fighting the Muslims made no significant
R
headway and gave up the ghost. The operation failed be-
cause the objectives were unrealistic and most forces that
were supposed to participate in the operation were, for
various reasons, not engaged in combat.
At the end of May, 1992, the Croatian Defense Coun-
cil was formed in Sarajevo. The military value of the Cro-
atian Defense Council in the Sarajevo region was minor
because both the Serb and Muslim forces there were
vastly superior to the Croats in both men and matériel.
The leadership of the Croats was well aware of the supe-
4.2.2020. 19:34:45
 Davor Marijan • Rat za opstojnost Hrvata, 1991. - 1995.
U Sarajevu je krajem svibnja 1992. osnovano Hr-
vatsko vijeće obrane. U općem odnosu bošnjačkih i
srpskih snaga u sarajevskoj regiji njegova vojnička
važnost bila je minorna. To je bilo jasno osnivačima,
koji su nastojali da zajednica Hrvata u Sarajevu što
bezbolnije prođe kroz rat. Njezin je položaj pokazatelj
odnosa većine (Bošnjaci) prema izrazitoj manjini (Hr-
vati) koja nastoji sačuvati svoj politički i vojnički izričaj.
Hrvatsko vijeće obrane Sarajevo držalo je crtu prema
VRS-u u Stupu, Otesu, Doglodima, Azićima i Barama.
H
Uz to je osiguravalo 96 velikih gospodarskih objekata.
Zona HVO-a bila je teško branjiva, nalazila se gotovo u
okruženju srpskih snaga i mogla se održati uglavnom
suzdržavanjem od sukoba i tolerantnim odnosom pre-
ma srpskom stanovništvu, kao u Doglodima. Nekoliko
mjeseci to je doista i funkcioniralo.522
M
Ubrzo po osnutku HVO-a lokalni bošnjački gos-
podari rata (Ramiz Delalić Ćelo, Jusuf Juka Prazina i
Ismet Bajramović Ćelo) počeli su na njemu vježbati
snagu, pri čemu su imali punu potporu vojnoga vrha
TO-a BiH, odnosno TO-a okruga Sarajevo. Na ruku im
je išla podjela unutar HVO-a nakon imenovanja Veli-
D
mira Marića predsjednikom HVO-a Sarajeva. Pritisci
su počeli u srpnju 1992., najprije političkim uvjerava-
njem, informativnim blokadama i dezinformacijama, a
potom i demonstracijom sile prema čelnicima sarajev-
skoga HVO-a, a poslije i prema hrvatskom stanovniš-
tvu. Najveći su incidenti bili pljačka tvornice čokolade
C
Zora 24. srpnja, a potom nekoliko upada Armije RBiH
u hrvatska naselja tijekom kolovoza. U upadu 11. ko-
lovoza ARBiH je zaposjela zonu HVO-a u Stupu, Otesu,
Barama, Azićima i Doglodima, razoružala dio vojnika,
uhitila zapovjednika HVO-a i zadržala ga u pritvoru 24
sata. Tijekom upada 22. kolovoza ARBiH je izvela be-
značajan napad prema Ilidži, na što je VRS odgovorio
granatiranjem Stupa, Otesa, Azića i Bara, pri čemu je
poginulo osam civila i pričinjena velika materijalna
šteta na civilnim objektima.523
522 HVO Sarajevo, Izvješće br. 140/1-92 od 25. 7. 1992.; HVO
Sarajevo, Izvješće br. 342/92 od 25. 8. 1992.; Prosvjed
HVO Sarajevo od 13. 9. 1992.; Izvješće o radu općinskog
stožera HVO Novo Sarajevo od 1. 10. 1992.
523 HVO Sarajevo, Izvješće br. 140/1-92 od 25. 7. 1992.; In-
formacija Dopredsjednika HVO Sarajevo Branka Hutter-
era od 13. 8. 1992. o događajima na Stupu; HVO Saraje-
vo, Izvješće br. 342/92 od 25. 8. 1992.; Dopredsjednik HZ
HB Dario Kordić od 11. 9. 1992. za Brunu Stojića.
228
Domovinski rat 04-02-2020 Knjiga 1.indd 228
riority of the both the Serb and Muslim forces and their
aim was to protect the Croats living in Sarajevo to the
fullest extent possible. It has to be pointed out that the
Muslim/Bosniak majority was determined to marginalize
the Croat minority. The Croats, on the other hand, tried to
preserve their political and military relevance. The Croa-
tian Defense Council in Sarajevo held defensive positions
facing the VRS troops positioned in Stup, Otes, Doglodi,
Azići and Bare. In addition, the Croatian Defense Council
secured 96 large industrial installations and facilities. The
area of responsibility of the Croatian Defense Council
was almost completely surrounded by Serb forces. The
Croatian Defense Council was in no shape to resist a de-
termined Serb attack on its positions. Therefore, the HVO
tried not to provoke the Serb forces and protected the
Serb population in its area of responsibility, as well as in
Doglodi. This strategy of non-confrontation was actually
successful for a few months.
As soon as the Croatian Defense Council was formed,
the local Muslim warlords (Ramiz “Ćelo” Delalić, Jusuf Juka
Prazina and Ismet “Ćelo” Bajramović) started provoking
incidents, the aim of which was to humiliate the newly
formed HVO. It has to be pointed out that the mentioned
warlords acted with full approval and support from the
military leadership of the Territorial Defense of Bosnia
and Herzegovina in general and the Territorial Defense of
the Sarajevo District in particular. The internal squabbles
within the HVO, especially after the appointment of Veli-
mir Marić as President of the HVO Sarajevo played right
into the hands of the HVO’s Muslim enemies. The Muslims
initially asserted their dominance over the HVO by polit-
ical pressures, information blockade and disinformation.
Pretty soon these, for want of a better word, soft methods
D
gave way to unbridled aggression towards the leaders of
the HVO Sarajevo and the Croatian population in the city.
The larges incidents were the pillage of the Zora choco-
late factory on July 24 and numerous incursions into the
Croatian neighborhoods during August. On August 11,
R
during one such incursion, the Army of the Republic of
Bosnia and Herzegovina occupied the Croatian held ar-
eas in Stup, Otes, Bare, Azići and Doglodi, disarmed many
HVO soldiers and arrested the commander of the HVO,
holding him prisoner for 24 hours. During the incursion
on August 22, the Army of the Republic of Bosnia and
Herzegovina attacked the Serb positions towards Ilidža.
The attack had only one purpose; to provoke the Serbs to
respond against Croatian positions. The ploy worked and
the VRS launched an artillery attack on Stup, Otes, Azić
4.2.2020. 19:34:45
 The Croatian Nation’s Struggle for Survival, 1991-1995
Armija Republike BiH iznenada je 12. rujna krenula
u razoružanje srpskoga stanovništva u Doglodima, što
je preraslo u uhićenja hrvatskoga stanovništva i vojni-
ka HVO-a te pljačku civilnih i gospodarskih objekata.
Pothvat ARBiH prekinuo je VRS napadom i zauzima-
njem naselja, pri čemu je bilo rušenja objekata i ubi-
janja hrvatskoga stanovništva, kojem su Srbi zamjerili
ulazak bošnjačkih snaga. Bošnjačke snage nisu pružile
nikakav otpor, a hrvatske su se povukle prema Stupu i
crta razdvajanja postavljena je u Barama.524
H
Posljedice napada Armije RBiH iz smjera Otesa bile
su teške za HVO i hrvatsko stanovništvo. “Kuće i sta-
novi su toliko uništeni da se teško može govoriti o sa-
naciji u dogledno vrijeme.” Rukovodstvo HVO-a s pod-
ručja Stupa uglavnom je napustilo Sarajevo, a vodstva
u drugim dijelovima grada navodno su bila u rasulu.
M
Zbog toga su istaknuti Hrvati iz svih oblasti života 16.
rujna dogovorili osnivanje jedinstvenoga HVO-a Sara-
jeva sa Slavkom Zelićem na čelu i političkom platfor-
mom HVO-a, odnosno Hrvatske zajednice Herceg-Bo-
sne. Zelić je u studenome imenovan zapovjednikom
brigade HVO-a Kralj Tvrtko, koja je krajem 1992. imala
D
oko 1500 ljudi.525
BOSANSKA KRAJINA
Najveću ulogu u stvaranju etničke srpske zajed-
C
nice imao je Banjalučki korpus JNA, poslije 1. krajiški
korpus VRS-a. Korpus je do lipnja glavne efektive imao
u zapadnoj Slavoniji, nakon čega je izvučen i najvećim
dijelom angažiran u Bosanskoj Posavini. Izvlačenje
dijela snaga radi priprema za osvajanje dijelova BiH
koje je srpski politički vrh svojatao počelo je u ožujku.
D
U Bosanskoj krajini te su akcije počele krajem travnja.
Uz JNA angažirane su razne srpske formacije: stranački,
SDS-ovi naoružani sastavi, paravojne formacije, policija
i dijelovi TO-a.
Zauzimanje vitalnih objekata u Sanskom Mostu od
strane Srba 20. travnja 1992. bila je najava etničkoga
čišćenja Bosanske krajine od nesrpskog stanovništva.
Krajem svibnja počelo je “čišćenje” te općine. Bosansku
Krupu Srbi su napali u noći 20./21. travnja i zauzeli veći
524 Saopćenje članova Gradskog stožera HVO (nedatirano,
a odnosi se na događanja od 12. rujna 1992.); Izvješće
HVO Sarajevo od 14. 9. 1992.
525 Izvješće zapovjednika brigade Kralj Tvrtko o radu HVO
Sarajeva od 17. 12. 1992.
229
Domovinski rat 04-02-2020 Knjiga 1.indd 229
and Bare. The shelling killed eight civilians and destroyed
many residential buildings and houses.
On September 12 the Army of the Republic of Bos-
nia and Herzegovina launched a sudden incursion into
Doglodi. The aim, ostensibly, was to disarm the Serb
population there. But, before long the Muslim forces
started arresting Croatian civilians and HVO soldiers at
random and pillaging houses, residential buildings and
industrial facilities. This raid was discontinued when the
VRS attacked and captured Doglodi. The Serbs destroyed
a number of houses and buildings and killed a number
of Croatian civilians. The leadership of the VRS viewed
the crime as just punishment for the Croats allowing
the Army of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina to
launch attacks on Serbian positions from Doglodi. The
Muslim forces in Doglodi did not offer even token resis-
tance to the VRS. The HVO troops withdrew towards Stup
and established a defensive line in Bare.
The HVO and the Croat civilians suffered badly as a
result of the ARBIH’s attack from the direction of Otes.
“The houses and buildings were damaged beyond re-
pair.” Most of the leaders of the HVO troops in Stup left
Sarajevo and the leaders of the HVO troops deployed in
other areas were, according to some sources, completely
disheartened. As a result, prominent Croats, on Septem-
ber 16, decided to form the unified HVO of Sarajevo with
Slavko Zelić at its helm and adopted the political platform
of the HVO/ HZ-HB. In November Zelić was appointed
Commander of the Kralj Tvrtko Brigade of the HVO. At the
end of 1992 the Brigade consisted of about 1,500 men.
THE BOSANSKA KRAJINA
REGION
Banja Luka Corps of the JNA, later redesignated as I
Krajina Corps of the VRS played the most important role
in the creation of the Republika Srpska. Until the end
of June the bulk of the Corps was stationed in western
R
Slavonia. At the end of June these forces were pulled
out of western Slavonia and most of them were sent to
the Bosanska Posavina region. The process of pulling
out had began in March as part of the preparations for
the conquest of those parts of Bosnia and Herzegovina
that the Serbian political leadership coveted. In Bosnian
Krajina the process was on the way by the end of April.
The JNA used many different armed groups as auxilia-
ries: armed groups belonging to the SDS party, various
4.2.2020. 19:34:46
 Davor Marijan • Rat za opstojnost Hrvata, 1991. - 1995.
dio grada na desnoj obali Une. Općinu Bosanski Novi,
u kojoj su imali relativnu većinu, Srbi su “riješili” krajem
travnja. Najveći srpski cilj u Bosanskoj krajini bio je Pri-
jedor, općina u kojoj su Muslimani imali tijesnu većinu.
U Prijedoru je 30. travnja SDS preuzeo vlast. U prvim
danima svibnja u Prijedor su s područja Pakraca dove-
deni dijelovi 343. mtbr, koji su 30. svibnja “očistili” grad
uz gubitke od 14 poginulih i 25 ranjenih pripadnika.
Najveći otpor Muslimani su pružili na području Kozar-
ca, koji je slomljen 24. svibnja.526
H
“Čišćenje” općine Ključ obavljeno je od 27. svibnja
do 1. lipnja.527 Počelo je nakon sukoba 27. svibnja na
području Velagića, koji se brzo proširio na područje sje-
verno od Ključa. Što je slijedilo, kazuje prikaz iz 1993.
godine: “Uistinu Srpska vojska, milicija i srpski narod
brzim udarom uništili su i razbili genocidne ustaše, a
M
zatim očistili ostatke ustaša na području opštine Ključ.
Ovim je srpski narod sa svojom vojskom i milicijom za-
uvijek raščistio sa vjekovnim neprijateljem.”528
Do početka lipnja 1992. srpske snage potpuno
su ovladale Bosanskom krajinom. Prvi krajiški korpus
oslobođen je brige za zaleđe i usmjeren u Bosansku
D
Posavinu i na osvajanje Jajca. Drugi krajiški korpus srp-
ske vojske u BiH angažirao je dio snaga za preostali dio
zapadne Bosne – šire područje Bihaća.
BIHAĆKI DŽEP
C
Premda je JNA na kraju 1991. pretvorila Bihać u
korpusno središte, u proljeće 1992. bilo je očito da
ga nije u stanju staviti pod svoj nadzor. Srbi su imali
problema u transformaciji Bihaćkoga korpusa, pa su
pregovori o povlačenju bili realna opcija. Nakon što je
minirala i učinila neupotrebljivim aerodrom u Bihaću,
JNA se zaključno s datumom 19. svibnja 1992. povu-
kla iz grada u Bosanski Petrovac, a dio zapovjednoga
kadra u Niš. Muslimani su u međuvremenu organizi-
rali TO, a u ljeto je formirana Unsko-sanska operativna
526 Komanda 2. VO, Borbeni i operativni izveštaj str. pov.
br. 10/36-2382 od 20. 4. 1992.; Komanda 2. VO, Borbe-
ni i operativni izveštaj str. pov. br. 10/36-2525 od 30. 4.
1992.; Radmilo Zeljaja, “Nikada više ne smijemo zaluta-
ti”, Bilten TG 4, PRES centar 43. motorizovane brigade,
april-maj 1993., 6; R. DELIĆ, Armija RBiH, I, 243.
527 Komanda 30. lpd pov. br. 2/1-9 od 22. 5. 1993.
528 ICTY: Pomoćnik komandanta za civilne poslove VP
7286, Izvještaj pov. br. 01-326-22/93 od 16. 2. 1993.
230
Domovinski rat 04-02-2020 Knjiga 1.indd 230
paramilitary formations, police units and elements of
the Territorial Defense.
On April 20, 1992, the Serbs took control of the key
installations and facilities in Sanski Most. The action her-
alded the Serbs’ campaign of ethnic cleansing in Bosans-
ka Krajina. At the end of May the ethnic cleansing of
the municipality began in earnest. The Serbs attacked
Bosanska Krupa during the night of April 20-21 and cap-
tured most of the city on the right bank of the Una Riv-
er and proceeded to ethnically cleanse the conquered
area. The Bosanski Novi Municipality, in which the Serbs
formed a relative majority, had already been ethnical-
ly cleansed at the end of April. The largest prize for the
Serbs in Bosanska Krajina was the Prijedor Municipality.
The Muslims formed a small majority in the municipality.
The SDS seized power in the city of Prijedor on April 30.
During the first days of May the JNA transferred the bulk
of the 343rd Motorized Brigade from Pakrac to Prijedor. By
May 30, the Serbs had captured Prijedor, losing 14 dead
and 25 wounded soldiers. The Muslims offered the fierc-
est resistance around Kozarac. However, the Serbs over-
ran the Muslims’ positions on May 24.
The ethnic cleansing of the Ključ Municipality was
conducted from May 27 to June 1. It started after a skir-
mish in Velagići on May 27. The fighting soon spread
to the area north of Ključ. A report penned in 1993 de-
scribes what followed: “The Serbian army, Serbian mili-
tia and Serbian nation, in a rapid operation, inflicted a
decisive defeat on the genocidal Croatian fascists and
then mopped up isolated pockets of Croatian fascist re-
sistance in the area of Ključ. With this magnificent victory
won by the Serbian army and Serbian militia, the Serbian
nation stands victorious over its age-old foe.”
D
By the beginning of June, 1992, the Serb had con-
quered Bosanska Krajina. I Krajina Corps was sent to the
Bosanska Posavina region. The main objective there was
the capture of Jajce. Elements of II Krajina Corps in Bos-
nia and Herzegovina were deployed in the other area of
central Bosnia – wider Bihać area.
R
BIHAĆ POCKET
At the end of 1991, the JNA set up the HQ of the Bihać
Corps in Bihać. However, by the spring of 1992 it became
obvious to the leadership of the JNA that controlling the
city and its immediate environs was beyond the capabil-
ity of the JNA. The Serbs had certain problems regarding
transforming Bihać Corps from its JNA identity into that
4.2.2020. 19:34:46
 The Croatian Nation’s Struggle for Survival, 1991-1995
H
ARBiH, 5. korpus, kolovoz 1995. (fotografiju darovao: Ljubo Kačić).
V Corps of the ARBiH, August, 1995 (Photograph donated by
M
Ljubo Kačić).
grupa, koja je u listopadu 1992. prerasla u 5. korpus
D
Armije RBiH.529
Povlačenjem JNA Srbi su organizirali crtu na smje-
ru Bosanski Novi – Bosanska Otoka – Bosanska Krupa
– Radić – Grabež – Otoka. Desetoga lipnja sa smjera
Martin Broda, Drvara, Bosanskog Petrovca i Vrtoča
C
napali su Orašac, Klisu, Ćukove i Kulen Vakuf, naselja
jugoistočno od Drvara u dolini Une i zauzeli ih do 13.
lipnja. Time su počele stalne borbe u bihaćkoj regiji.
Armija Republike BiH pokušala je od 15. do 21. rujna
u operaciji Plamen-92 osvojiti Lohovska Brda i vojarnu
Grabež, no uspjeh je izostao, a pretrpljeni su veliki gu-
D
bici. Početkom listopada Armija Republike BiH osvojila
je dominantni objekt Ćorkovaču na granici Hrvatske
i BiH, istočno od Bužima. U prvoj polovini studenoga
1992. ARBiH je ponovila napad na Grabež, osvojila dio
područja i blokirala vojarnu te je držala u blokadi do
sredine prosinca iste godine.530
529 VSA MORH: Komanda 10. K, Redovni borbeni izveštaj
str. pov. br. 12/1-15 od 14. 5. 1992.; R. DREKOVIĆ, U
obruču, 71-81, 154-157.
530 R. DREKOVIĆ, U obruču, 83, 91-92, 197-205, 207-212.
231
Domovinski rat 04-02-2020 Knjiga 1.indd 231
of VRS and their only viable option was to withdraw the
corps. All the JNA units in Bihać vacated the city on May
19, 1992. Before leaving, however, the JNA rendered the
airstrip in Bihać unusable. The bulk of the forces from Bi-
hać went to Bosanski Petrovac, and some officers to Niš.
In the meantime, the Muslims formed their Territorial De-
fense and in the summer of 1992 the Una-Sana Opera-
tional Group was formed. In October 1992 the Una-Sana
Operational Group became V Corps of the Army of the
Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina.
With the JNA gone from Bihać the Serbs formed
a defensive line starting at Bosanski Novi, stretching
through Bosanska Otoka, Bosanska Krupa, Radić, Grabež
and terminating at Otoka. On June 10 the Serbs attacked
Orašac, Klisa, Ćukovi and Kulen Vakuf, villages to the
southeast of Drvar in the Una Valley, from the direction
of Martin Brod, Drvar, Bosanski Petrovac and Vrtoče. By
June 13 the Serbs had captured all the mentioned villag-
es. The attack on these villages marked the beginning
of constant fighting in the Bihać region. On September
15 the Army of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina
launched Operation Plamen-92 (Flame-92). The aim was
to capture Lohovska Brda and the Grabež barracks. The
operation lasted until September 21 and it was a failure.
The Army of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina suf-
fered serious casualties for no gains whatsoever. At the
beginning of October the Army of the Republic of Bos-
nia and Herzegovina managed to capture the Ćorkovača
installation, a dominant feature on the border between
Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina, located to the east
of Bužim. In the first half of November the Army of the
Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina attacked the Grabež
barracks again. This time the Muslims were more suc-
cessful even though a complete victory still eluded them
– they managed to capture parts of the surrounding
area and put the barracks under blockade. The barracks
stayed under blockade until December of the same year.
R
4.2.2020. 19:34:46
 Davor Marijan • Rat za opstojnost Hrvata, 1991. - 1995.
JUŽNO BOJIŠTE 1992.
GODINE
Djelovanje Hrvatske vojske na jugu Hrvatske,
u području nadležnosti Zbornoga područja Split i
Hrvatske ratne mornarice, nerazdvojivo je od rata u
pograničnim područjima Bosne i Hercegovine. Od
svibnja 1991. područje BiH s većinskim hrvatskim
stanovništvom, od Livna do Čapljine i Stoca, nakon
poznatih blokada pokreta JNA prema Hrvatskoj ču-
H
valo je ranjivi bok Republike Hrvatske. Jugoslavenska
narodna armija imala je na području od Neretve do
Boke kotorske glavninu Bilećkoga korpusa, koji je u
prosincu 1991. premješten sa širega područja Rijeke,
lokalne postrojbe JNA u Trebinju, Mostaru i Čapljini
M
te dijelove Podgoričkoga korpusa. Po hrvatskim oba-
vještajnim podacima, JNA je s Kninskim korpusom
namjeravala zauzeti Livno i Tomislavgrad i spojiti se
sa snagama JNA u dolini Neretve.531
Hrvatska je vojska u proljeće 1992. na jugu Hr-
vatske imala tri lokalne pričuvne brigade i nekoliko
D
manjih borbenih sastava kopnene vojske i mornari-
ce, a od djelatnih snaga dijelove 4. brigade ZNG-a. U
zaleđu, na području Herceg-Bosne, bio je niz manjih,
slabo uvezanih oružanih sastava lokalnih Hrvata. Do
12. travnja 1992. u južnom dijelu Hrvatske vladala je
zapovjedna konfuzija, koja je završila kada je zapovi-
C
jedanje hrvatskim snagama na Južnom bojištu preu-
zeo general zbora Janko Bobetko na temelju zapovi-
jedi predsjednika Tuđmana od 10. travnja.532 Bobetko
je svoju nadležnost, uz očitu suglasnost vrha Her-
ceg-Bosne, proširio i na postrojbe HVO-a od Livna do
Stoca, po dubini do Bugojna, koje je pojačao dijelom
snaga ZNG-a i HV-a.
Intenzivne borbe na Južnom bojištu počele su na
Kupreškoj visoravni u prvim danima travnja i trajale
su do kasne jeseni 1992., tj. do oslobađanja Konavala
i napadne operacije HVO-a Bura na lijevoj obali Nere-
tve i u Podveležju.
531 J. BOBETKO, Sve moje bitke, 200.
532 Predsjednik Republike Hrvatske, Naredba br. PA7-28/1-
92 od 10. 4. 1992. Faksimil u: J. BOBETKO, Sve moje bitke,
202; SVA MORH, GSHV: Zapovjedništvo Južnog vojišta
od 12. 4. 1992. za GSHV.
232
Domovinski rat 04-02-2020 Knjiga 1.indd 232
SOUTHERN THEATER OF
OPERATIONS IN 1992
The activities of the Croatian Army in the south of
Croatia, in the area of responsibility of the Military Dis-
trict Split and the Croatian Navy, were indissolubly tied
to the military operations conducted in the areas of
Bosnia and Herzegovina located close to the Croatian
border in that region. The JNA started moving its forces
from Mostar to Sinj in Croatia. However, these move-
ments were often blocked by Croatian civilians. From
May, 1991, the predominantly Croatian area of Bosnia
and Herzegovina, from Livno to Čapljina and Stolac,
protected the exposed southern part of the Republic
of Croatia from the JNA and Serb paramilitary forma-
tions operating under the auspices of the JNA. The JNA
deployed the bulk of Bileća Corps, local JNA units from
Trebinje, Mostar and Čapljina and elements of Podgori-
ca Corps in the area stretching from the Neretva River
to the Bay of Kotor. It is worth mentioning that Bileća
Corps had been transferred to Bosnia and Herzegovina
from the wider Rijeka area in December, 1991. Accord-
ing to Croatian intelligence reports, the JNA plan was
for Knin Corps to capture Livno and Tomislavgrad and
link up with the JNA forces in the Neretva Valley.
In the spring of 1992, the Croatian Army had three
local reserve brigades, a few smaller army and navy
formations and elements of the 4th Brigade of the Cro-
atian National Guard in the south of Croatia. In the hin-
terland, in the territory of Herzeg-Bosnia, there were
many small armed groups of local Croats. The activi-
ties of these groups were poorly coordinated. Until
D
April 12, 1992, the command structure of the Croatian
forces in the Southern Theater of Operations was in
complete disarray. The situation changed when Gen-
eral Janko Bobetko was appointed, by order of Presi-
dent Franjo Tuđman issued on April 10, Commander
of all the Croatian forces in the theater. The HVO units
R
deployed in the area from Livno to Stolac in the rear as
far as Bugojno, were placed, with the consent of the
leadership of Herzeg-Bosnia, under Bobetko’s com-
mand. The general then strengthened these units with
troops belonging to the Croatian National Guard and
the Croatian Army.
Fighting in the Southern Theater of Operations in-
tensified with the engagements on the Kupres plateau
during the first days of April and did not abate until late
4.2.2020. 19:34:46
 The Croatian Nation’s Struggle for Survival, 1991-1995
Kupres i Šuica
Kupreška je visoravan područje strategijske važnosti
kao osnova za prodor iz Dalmacije u središnju Bosnu i
obrnuto. Kupres je nacionalno miješano područje na ko-
jem je prema popisu stanovništva iz 1991. živjelo 4864
Srba, 3813 Hrvata, 802 Muslimana i zanemariv broj osta-
lih. Zbog stacioniranja JNA na visoravni u svibnju 1991.
kupreški su Hrvati u rujnu počeli pripreme za obranu od
agresije. Prve postrojbe osnovane su od dragovoljaca i na
H
teritorijalnom načelu, a početkom studenoga prerasle su
u Kuprešku bojnu, organiziranu na teritorijalnom načelu.
Srbi su držali Štab TO-a i postrojbe organizirane po pro-
stornom načelu. U jesen 1991. JNA se povukla s visoravni,
za koju je zadužena 30. partizanska divizija, čija je Koman-
da bila smještena u Mrkonjić Gradu. Divizija se sastojala
M
od 1., 13. i 19. partizanske brigade, čija je mobilizacija
počela sredinom ožujka 1992. godine. Krajem ožujka Ko-
manda Banjalučkoga korpusa JNA intenzivirala je osni-
vanje srpskih sastava na području Kupresa i pripreme za
zaposjedanje visoravni. U Kupresu je mobiliziran bataljun
19. partizanske brigade, a za osvajanje visoravni zaduže-
D
na je 13. partizanska brigada s ojačanim bataljunom 11.
mtbr Kninskoga korpusa JNA iz Drvara, koji je razmješten
na području Mrđanovci – Novo Selo – Šemenovci. Na isto
je područje doveden i dragovoljački bataljun Banjalučko-
ga korpusa. Uoči sukoba JNA i Srbi imali su u TO-u oko
1700 ljudi. Hrvatske su snage imale oko 250 ljudi u Kupre-
C
su, a u Tomislavgradu je bilo oko 1500 ljudi pod oružjem,
od kojih se dio mogao angažirati na visoravni.533
Komanda 30. partizanske divizije napisala je 2.
travnja zapovijed za napad, a idućega dana hrvatske
su ih snage preduhitrile iznenadnim napadom. Uz po-
D
moć snaga HVO-a iz Posušja, HVO Tomislavgrad 3. trav-
nja iz Šuice je napao Donji Malovan. Sela su 4. travnja
stavljena pod nadzor, kao i Kupreška vrata. Bataljun 19.
partizanske brigade JNA u gradu bio je okružen i pred
predajom. Snage na području Blagaja JNA je pojačala
topništvom izvučenim iz zapadne Slavonije, a 6. trav-
nja dovedena je i TG-1 iz sastava Kninskoga korpusa.
Na Kupres je iz Gline poslana i četa tenkova 51. mbr.
Snage su narasle na gotovo 6000 ljudi s oklopnim ba-
taljunom i divizijunom topništva. Hrvatske su snage
pojačane skupinom bojne Zrinski i vodom 4. brigade
ZNG-a. Tijekom 6. travnja srpske su snage razbile obra-
nu na smjeru Blagaj – Zlosela i 7. travnja ušle u Kupres.
533 D. MARIJAN, Smrt oklopne brigade, 83-95.
233
Domovinski rat 04-02-2020 Knjiga 1.indd 233
fall, 1992, when the Croatian forces liberated Konavle
and launched offensive operations on the left bank of
the Neretva and on the Podveležje plateau.
Kupres and Šuica
The Kupres plateau was of immense strategic im-
portance because it offered a gateway from Dalmatia
into central Bosnia and vice versa. According to the
1991 census, 4,864 Serbs, 3,813 Croats, 802 Muslims
and an insignificant number of members of other na-
tionalities lived in the Kupres area. The JNA stationed
its troops on the plateau in May, 1991. In September,
the Croats started organizing defensive measures
against Serb aggression. The first units were formed
from volunteers locally. At the beginning of Novem-
ber these units were formed in the Kupres Battalion.
This battalion was a territorially based static unit.
The Serbs, on the other hand, formed their Territorial
Defense units and the Territorial Defense HQ also as
territorially based static units. In the fall of 1991 the
30th Partisan Division, with its HQ in Mrkonjić Grad, re-
lieved the JNA units on the plateau. The 30th Partisan
Division consisted of the 1st, 13th and 19th Brigades. The
mobilization of these brigades started in March, 1992.
The 19th Partisan Brigade was mobilized in mid-March
1992 and was then also deployed on the plateau. At
the end of March the HQ of Banja Luka Corps of the
JNA intensified its efforts to form Serb units in the Ku-
pres area and its preparations to gain full control of
the plateau. In Kupres, a battalion was mobilized and
attached to the 19th Partisan Brigade. The 13th Partisan
Brigade, reinforced with the 11th Motorized Brigade of
Knin Corps of the JNA from Drvar, was given the task of
capturing the whole of plateau. The 13th Partisan Bri-
gade and the 11th Motorized Brigade were deployed
in the Mrđanovci – Novo Selo – Šemenovci area. The
volunteer battalion of Banja Luka Corps was also de-
ployed on the plateau. On the eve of the war in Bosnia
R
and Herzegovina the JNA and Serbs had around 1,700
men in the Territorial Defense. The Croats had about
250 men in Kupres and 1,500 men in Tomislavgrad,
but only a part of that contingent could be deployed
against the Serbs on the plateau.
The HQ of the 30th Partisan Division issued orders
for attack on April 2. However, the Croats beat the
Serbs to the punch and attacked the very next day.
The HVO forces from Tomislavgrad, reinforced with
4.2.2020. 19:34:46
 Davor Marijan • Rat za opstojnost Hrvata, 1991. - 1995.
Istoga su dana sve snage JNA na visoravni stavljene
pod Komandu 9. korpusa, koja je osnovala 11. opera-
tivnu grupu za zapovijedanje snagama na području
Kupres – Livno – Bugojno.534
Ujutro 10. travnja OG-11 napala je u zahvatu pro-
metnice Kupres – Gornji i Donji Malovan. Hrvatske su
snage imale crtu obrane na potezu od benzinske po-
staje u blizini Gornjeg Malovana do hotela Adria Ski i
od prometnice prema Riliću. Protuoklopna skupina
Brigade vukovarskih veterana stradala je u vozilima
H
kod Donjeg Malovana. Pod jakom vatrom JNA satnija
TO-a Posušje povukla se 11. travnja s položaja kod ho-
tela Adria Ski prema Šuici. Tijekom dana OG-11 ušla je
u Donji Malovan. Prolaz dalje branile su razne skupine
HVO-a i HV-a (skupina 1. brigade ZNG-a, skupina Zrin-
ski, bojna 126. brigade HV-a), koje su odbile napad JNA
M
na Šuicu.535 Stanje u hrvatskim redovima bilo je teško,
zapovjednik obrane Tomislavgrada Željko Glasnović
ranjen je u borbama za Kupres, a bojna 126. brigade
HV-a se povukla. Kako bi konsolidirao stanje i ustrojio
skupine HVO-a u veću postrojbu, general Bobetko ime-
novao je pukovnika Žarka Tolu zapovjednikom obrane
D
Tomislavgrada, a brigadira Miljenka Crnjca koordina-
torom obrane na smjeru Tomislavgrad – Prozor – Ko-
njic.536 Premda je u organizaciji obrane bilo iznimnih
problema zbog upletanja politike, hrvatske su snage
od druge polovine travnja 1992. do siječnja 1993. izve-
le nekoliko diverzantskih napada i nasilnih izviđanja po
C
položajima JNA i srpskoga TO-a po Donjem Malovanu,
Zanaglini, Riliću i Mušiću.537 Od OG-11 JNA početkom
lipnja formirana je 7. brigada VRS-a Kupres – Šipovo.538
534 D. MARIJAN, Smrt oklopne brigade, 96-112.
535 HMDCDR: Komanda 9. korpusa, Redovni borbeni iz-
veštaj str. pov. br. 4-1961 od 11. 4. 1992.; SVA MORH,
GSHV: ZOZ Split, Podaci o stanju u Herceg-Bosni kl.
8/12-01-01, ur. br. 1080-01-20-92-280 od 12. 4. 1992.;
Slavko LISICA, Komandant po potrebi, MIGP “Vojvodina”,
Bezdan, Sombor, 1995., 102.
536 IZM ZJV Grude od 20. 4. 1992., Postavljenje časnika u
zapovjedništvo obrane Tomislavgrada; Zapovijed IZM
ZJV Grude od 21. 4. 1992.; Izvješće brigadira Miljenka
Crnjca generalu Bobetku o stanju na području Duvno
– Kupres – Livno; IZM ZJV Grude, Zbirno izvješće o bo-
jnim djelovanjima na području zapadne Hercegovine
str. pov. br. 01-354/92 od 11. 5. 1992.
537 IZM ZJV Grude, Zbirno izvješće o bojnim djelovanji-
ma na području zapadne Hercegovine str. pov. br. 01-
354/92 od 11. 5. 1992.
538 Komanda 2. KK, Organizacijsko naređenje str. pov. 32-1
od 2. 6. 1992.
234
Domovinski rat 04-02-2020 Knjiga 1.indd 234
HVO troops from Posušje, attacked Donji Malovan
from the direction of Šuica. The Croatian force took
control of the villages in the area on April 4. On that
day the Croats captured the Kupres pass as well. The
Battalion of the 19th Partisan Brigade of the JNA in the
city of Kupres was surrounded and its position was
hopeless. The JNA reinforced its troops deployed in
Blagaj with artillery transported from western Slavo-
nia. On April 6 the JNA also deployed the TG-1 from
Knin Corps in the area. In addition to all these forces,
the JNA sent a tank company of the 51st Motorized
Brigade from Glina to Kupres. The Serb forces in the
area soon numbered 6,000 men, supported by an ar-
mored battalion and an artillery battalion. The Croa-
tian forces were reinforced by a detachment from the
Zrinski Battalion and a platoon from the 4th Brigade of
the Croatian National Guard. On April 6 the Serbs over-
ran the Croatian defenses on the Blagaj – Zlosela line
and entered Kupres on April 7. On the same day all the
JNA formations on the plateau were placed under the
command of IX Corps. The HQ of IX Corps formed the
11th Operational Group. The forces in the Kupres – Liv-
no – Bugojno area were placed under the command of
the 11th Operational Group.
On the morning of April 10 the 11th Operational
Group attacked along the Kupres – Gornji Malovan and
Donji Malovan highway. The Croatian forces held a de-
fensive line stretching from the gas station near Gornji
Malovan to the Adria Ski hotel and another extending
from the highway to Rilić. The Anti-Armor group of
the Vukovar Veterans Brigade suffered serious losses
at Donji Malovan. The Serbs unleashed a torrent of
fire on the Company of the Posušje Territorial Defense
D
force manning the positions at the Adria Ski hotel. The
company was forced to withdraw towards Šuica on
April 11. Later on that day the 11th Operational Group
entered Donji Malovan. At Šuica the Croatian forces
(a detachment of the 1st Brigade of the ZNG, Group
R
Zrinski, one battalion of the 126th Brigade of the Cro-
atian Army) offered spirited resistance and beat back
the JNA onslaught. The situation was critical for the
Croatian defenders. The commander of the defense of
Tomislavgrad, Željko Glasnović was wounded during
the fighting for Kupres, and the battalion of the 126th
Brigade of the Croatian Army retreated. General Bob-
etko decided to consolidate the situation by placing
the disparate HVO units under a single command. He
appointed Colonel Žarko Tole as Commander of the
4.2.2020. 19:34:46
 The Croatian Nation’s Struggle for Survival, 1991-1995
Hrvatski gubici u borbama za Kupres bili su veliki.
U tjedan dana borbe poginulo je oko 160 ljudi, od toga
29 pripadnika Kupreške bojne i 19 civila.539 Gubici JNA
i srpskoga TO-a na Kupreškoj visoravni do kojih sam
uspio doći su različiti. Prema podacima JNA iz travnja
1992., poginulo je 45, a nestalo 111 osoba. Po kasnijim
podacima VRS-a, poginulo je 85 i nestale 154 osobe.540
Livno
H
Kao i u drugim dijelovima Herceg-Bosne, obrana
Livna počela je s naoružanim seoskim stražama, koje su
u proljeće 1992. združene u satnije, pa bojne u sklopu
HVO-a Livno. U prvim danima travnja u Livno je stigla 5.
bojna 4. brigade ZNG-a, koja je angažirana na smjeru pre-
ma Glamoču. Iz Dalmacije je stigla i skupina HOS-a, koja
M
je angažirana na istom pravcu. Oko 11. travnja stigla je
skupina Livnjaka u organizaciji Livanjske zajednice iz Za-
greba i s dijelom oružja 145. brigade HV-a. Neposredno
prije napada u Livno je stigla i skupina pripadnika Speci-
jalnih postrojbi Glavnoga stožera HV-a, čiji je zapovjed-
nik general Ante Roso preuzeo zapovijedanje obranom
D
Livna, a krajem mjeseca zamijenio ga je Ante Gotovina.541
Kada su počele borbe na Kupresu, Kninski je kor-
pus mobilizirao lokalne snage srpskoga TO-a u Glamo-
ču i Bosanskom Grahovu, od kojih je dio ušao u sastav
11. mtbr, te ih doveo na crtu prema Livnu. Nakon osva-
janja Kupresa TG-1 JNA nije napravila očekivani pomak
C
u napadu na Šuicu, pa je odlučeno da se iz smjera Gla-
moča napadne Livno, za što su u Glamoč prebačene
TG-1 i tenkovska četa 51. mbr.542
D
539 “Kako smo branili Kupres”, Stožer, Kupres, 1994., 27; HM-
DCDR: Telegram Komande 11. OG od 13. 4. 1992.
540 “Zločini koji se ponavljaju”, Narodna armija, 23. 4. 1992.,
14; “Uz godišnjicu oslobođenja Kupresa”, Međaš, list 7.
br VRS, Kupres, april 1993., 3.
541 J. BOBETKO, Sve moje bitke, 211, 215; 2. gardijska brigada
HV – Gromovi, 204; 4. gardijska brigada HV – Pauci, 198-
200; 145. brigada Hrvatske vojske, Repro-Color d.o.o., Za-
greb, 2011., 81-84.
542 HMDCDR: Komanda 9. korpusa, Raspored snaga str. pov.
br. 42-51/1 od 4. 4. 1992.; HMDCDR: Komanda 9. korpu-
sa, Naređenje str. pov. br. 24-59 od 5. 4. 1992.; HMDCDR:
Komanda 9. korpusa, Naređenje str. pov. br. 24-60 od
5. 4. 1992.; HMDCDR: Komanda 9. korpusa, Naređenje
str. pov. br. 24-61 od 5. 4. 1992.; HMDCDR: Komanda 9.
korpusa, Dopuna redovnog borbenog izveštaja str. pov.
br. 4-1909 od 9. 4. 1992.; Komanda 9. korpusa, Redovni
borbeni izveštaj str. pov. br. 4-2040 od 12. 4. 1992.
235
Domovinski rat 04-02-2020 Knjiga 1.indd 235
defense of Tomislavgrad and tasked Brigadier Miljen-
ko Crnjac with coordinating defensive actions on the
Tomislavgrad – Prozor – Konjic line. The efforts to orga-
nize the defense of the area were plagued by political
considerations. Despite this difficulty, from the second
half of April until January, 1993, the Croatian forces
mounted a number of successful commando raids
against JNA and Serbian Territorial Defense positions
in Donji Malovan, Zanaglina, Rilić and Mušić. At the
beginning of June the Serbs formed the 7th Brigade of
the VRS Kupres – Šipovo from 11th Operational Group
of the JNA.
The Croatian losses in the battles for Kupres
were high. In one week of fighting about 160 men
were killed in combat. 29 of those were members of
the Kupres Battalion. Also, 19 Croatian civilians were
killed. Sources differ as to the number of casualties
suffered by the JNA and the Serb Territorial Defense
in the fighting for Kupres. According to a report issued
by the JNA in April, 1992, the Serbs lost 45 men killed
and 111 missing in action. According to later reports
issued by the VRS, the Serbs lost 85 men killed and 154
men missing in action.
Livno
As in other parts of Herzeg-Bosnia, the defense on
Livno initially consisted of armed groups of men keep-
ing watch in the villages in the area. These groups were
unified into companies in the spring of 1992 and later
on the companies were unified into battalions operat-
ing under the umbrella of the HVO Livno. At the be-
ginning of April the 5th Battalion of the 4th Brigade of
the ZNG arrived in Livno. The battalion was deployed in
the direction of Glamoč, along with a HOS detachment.
Around April 11 a group of Livno natives organized by
Livno community from Zagreb arrived in the city. The
145th Brigade of the Croatian Army supplied the Livno
R
group with weapons and equipment. Just prior to the
Serb attack on Livno, a group of Special Forces Units
of the General Staff of the Croatian Army also arrived
in Livno. The commander of the group, Ante Roso, as-
sumed the command of the defense of Livno. At the
end of the month Ante Roso was replaced, in that ca-
pacity, by Ante Gotovina.
When the fighting for Kupres started, Knin Corps
mobilized local forces of the Serbian Territorial de-
fense in Glamoč and Bosansko Grahovo. Some of these
4.2.2020. 19:34:46
 Davor Marijan • Rat za opstojnost Hrvata, 1991. - 1995.
Prva taktička grupa Kninskoga korpusa JNA napala je
13. travnja 1992. Livno glavnim snagama na smjeru Gla-
moč – prijevoj Korićina – Priluka, a pomoćnima na smjeru
Glamočko polje – Strmica. Na smjeru Glamoč – Korićina
napad su odbile manje snage 4. brigade ZNG-a i HOS-a
uz jednu satniju HVO-a. Na pravcu Vidimlije – Strmica od-
bijen je napad pripadnika Specijalnih postrojbi Glavnoga
stožera HV-a, dragovoljaca iz Hrvatske i lokalnih snaga. Iz
stroja je izbačeno nekoliko vojnika i uništen tenk M-84.543
Nakon poraza Kninski se korpus nekoliko dana pri-
H
premao za novi pokušaj iz smjera Bosanskog Grahova.
U Crnom Lugu osnovan je IKM korpusa, a komandant je
bio načelnik štaba pukovnik Savo Kovačević.544 Za napad
pod imenom Proljeće angažirani su TG-1 i dijelovi 11. mtbr
JNA. Hrvatske su snage u tom razdoblju pojačane taktič-
kom skupinom 2. brigade ZNG-a jačine 220 ljudi, koja je
M
17. travnja stigla u Livno.545
Napad je izveden 23. travnja glavnim snagama na
smjeru Čaprazlije – Rujani – Livno, a pomoćnima na smje-
ru Čelebić – Livno. Tijekom borbi je obrana Donjih Rujana
pojačana skupinom 2. brigade ZNG-a koja je povučena s
položaja na planini Cincar. Na pravcu Vrbica – Čelebić na-
D
pad su zaustavili pripadnici Specijalnih postrojbi Glavno-
ga stožera HV-a i vod minobacača iz Sesveta (iz 83. samo-
stalnog bataljuna HV-a). Poginula su četiri, teže je ranjeno
16, a lakše šest vojnika JNA i TO-a. Uništeni su tenk M-84
i oklopni transporter, a zarobljena dva tenka. Hrvatske su
snage imale 13 poginulih i 14 ranjenih. Nakon poraza je
C
TG-1 JNA, ojačana još jednim bataljunom 11. mtbr, prešla
u obranu, čime je Kninski korpus JNA odustao od zamisli
da brzim prodorom zauzme Livno.546 U lipnju je od domi-
cilnih srpskih snaga osnovana 9. lpbr VRS-a.
543 HMDCDR: Komanda 9. korpusa, Redovni borbeni iz-
veštaj str. pov. br. 4-1998 od 13. 4. 1992.; 4. gardijska
brigada HV – Pauci, 198-200.
544 HMDCDR: Komanda 9. korpusa, Redovni borbeni iz-
veštaj str. pov. br. 7-1 od 21. 4. 1992.; HMDCDR: Komanda
9. korpusa, Redovni borbeni izveštaj str. pov. br. 9-1 od
22. 4. 1992.; HMDCDR: Komanda 9. korpusa, Zahtev str.
pov. br. 10-1 od 22. 4. 1992.
545 HMDCDR: Komanda 9. korpusa, Dopuna zapovesti str. pov.
br. 14-1 od 25. 4. 1992.; 2. gardijska brigada HV – Gromovi, 204.
546 Općinski stožer HVO Livno, Redovno izvješće br. 01/03-70
od 23. 4. 1992.; ICTY: I uprava GŠ OS SFRJ, Dnevni izveštaj
SP br. 1-115 od 24. 4. 1992.; HMDCDR: Komanda 9. kor-
pusa, Dopuna zapovesti str. pov. br. 14-1 od 25. 4. 1992.;
IZM ZJV Grude, Zbirno izvješće o bojnim djelovanjima na
području zapadne Hercegovine str. pov. br. 01-354/92 od
11. 5. 1992.; 2. gardijska brigada HV – Gromovi, 208-210.
236
Domovinski rat 04-02-2020 Knjiga 1.indd 236
troops were attached to the 11th Motorized Brigade
and brought to the Livno front line. When the TG-1 of
the JNA occupied Livno the Serbs expected that the at-
tack on Šuica would be equally successful. When that
attack failed the Serbs decided to attack Livno from
the direction of Glamoč. For that purpose the TG-1 and
a tank company of the 51st Motorized Brigade were
moved to Glamoč.
The main force of the 1st Tactical Group of Knin
Corps of the JNA attacked Livno on April 13, 1992,
advancing along the Glamoč – Korićina pass – Priluka
line. The remainder of the 1st Tactical Group advanced
on supporting axes of advance in the direction of the
Glamoč field and Strmica. The advance on the Glamoč
– Korićina axis was halted by a force comprising ele-
ments of the 4th Brigade of the ZNG, some HOS units
and one company of the HVO. The attack on the Vid-
imlije – Strmica axis of advance was beaten back by
troops belonging to the Special Forces Units of the
General Staff of the Croatian Army, volunteers from
Croatia and local forces. The Serbs lost a few soldiers
killed and one M-84 tank destroyed.
After this setback Knin Corps started making prepa-
rations for a new attack from the direction of Bosansko
Grahovo. The preparations lasted for a few days. In Crni
Lug the Corps’s Forward Command Post was formed.
The commander was Colonel Savo Kovačević. The TG-1
and elements of the 11th Motorized Brigade comprised
the attacking force. The operation was codenamed
Proljeće (Spring). At that time the Croatian forces were
reinforced with the Tactical Group of the 2nd Brigade of
the ZNG. The tactical group, numbering 220 men, ar-
rived in Livno on April 17.
D
The attack began on April 23rd. The main axis of ad-
vance was along the Čaprazlije – Rujani – Livno line.
The secondary axis of advance was along the Čelebić
– Livno line. During the fighting the defenders of Donji
Rujani were reinforced with a group from the 2nd Bri-
R
gade of the ZNG. The group had been withdrawn from
its positions on Mount Cincar. The attack on the Vrbica
– Čelebić axis of advance was defeated by the mem-
bers of the Special Forces Units of the General Staff of
the Croatian Army, supported by a mortar platoon from
Sesvete (belonging to the 83rd Independent battalion
of the Croatian Army). The Serbs lost four men killed.
Sixteen Serb soldiers suffered serious wounds and six
were lightly wounded. The defenders destroyed one
M-84 tank and an APC and captured two tanks. The
4.2.2020. 19:34:46
 The Croatian Nation’s Struggle for Survival, 1991-1995
Hrvatsko vijeće obrane u Livnu je osnovalo brigadu
Petar Krešimir IV, koja je držala 78 kilometara dugu crtu.
Nakon generala Rose, obranom Livna do kraja kolovoza
zapovijedao je brigadir Gotovina, u čije je vrijeme obrana
organizirana u šest sektora. U zoni obrane do kraja kolo-
voza bilo je skupina HV-a (iz 2. i 4. brigade ZNG-a) koje
su izvele nekoliko uspješnih prepada po crti i u zaleđu
srpske obrane, uglavnom na glamočkom području. Stra-
hujući od mogućnosti da JNA ipak probije crte obrane
Livna i Tomislavgrada te ugrozi Dalmaciju, zapovjednik
H
Južnoga bojišta general Bobetko angažirao je 126. bri-
gadu HV-a na dominantnim kotama između Livanjskoga
polja i Peručkog jezera, a taktičku skupinu 115. brigade
HV-a na pravcima Aržano – Podgradina – Livno i Aržano –
Bukova Gora – Tomislavgrad. Admiral Letica poslao je 158.
brigadu HV-a bez dvije bojne na obranu smjera Podgradi-
M
na – Rašeljke – Aržano. U pripravnosti za intervenciju na
području Sinj – Trilj držana je TG-4 iz 144. brigade HV-a.547
Mostar i Čapljina
U dolini Neretve JNA je imala jako uporište u Mosta-
D
ru i slabije u Čapljini. Na istočnoj strani Neretve imala je
jaku potporu u srpskim selima čapljinske općine. Sredi-
nom ožujka Bilećki odnosno 13. korpus JNA preuzeo je
ulogu i položaje Užičkoga korpusa, koji je povučen u Sr-
biju. Pod njegovom komandom bile su 10., 13. i 472. mo-
torizirana brigada, 179. brdska brigada, snage u garnizo-
C
nu Čapljina i nekoliko manjih postrojba u dolini Neretve
i istočnoj Hercegovini. U siječnju 1992. JNA je počela iz-
vlačenje ratnih materijalnih pričuva i suvremenije opre-
me na područja koja su držana sigurnijima (Rajlovac kod
Sarajeva). Odlučeno je i da se napusti garnizon Čapljina
D
i obrana organizira na istočnoj obali Neretve. Iznimka je
bio Mostar, koji JNA nije namjeravala dijeliti.548
547 SVA MORH, ZJB: IZM Ploče, Raspored snaga kl. 035-
01/92-01/15, ur. br. 6030-03/92-01 od 14. 4. 1992.; SVA
MORH, ZJB: IZM Ploče, Zapovijed kl. 8/92-01/44, ur. br.
6030-03/92-1 od 25. 4. 1992.; SVA MORH, ZJB: ZHRM,
158. brHV bojeva zapovijed kl. str. pov. 8/92-01/27, ur. br.
6030-11/92-1 od 29. 4. 1992.; SVA MORH, ZJB: Zapovjed-
ništvo 115. brHV, Sedmodnevno izvješće kl. 8/12-01-01,
ur. br. 2137-01-02-92-1 od 30. 4. 1992.; ICTY: IZM Ploče,
Zapovijed za dalje djelovanje str. pov. 8/92-01/61, ur. br.
6030-01/92-1 od 2. 5. 1992.; IZM ZJV Grude, Zbirno izv-
ješće o bojnim djelovanjima na području zapadne Her-
cegovine str. pov. br. 01-354/92 od 11. 5. 1992.; 4. gardijs-
ka brigada HV – Pauci, 196-201.
548 D. MARIJAN, “Djelovanje JNA u Hercegovini”, 645-646.
237
Domovinski rat 04-02-2020 Knjiga 1.indd 237
Croats lost 13 men killed and 14 wounded. After this
defeat the TG-1, reinforced by another battalion of the
11th Motorized Brigade, set up defensive positions.
Knin Corps’s plan to capture Livno had failed. In June
the 9th Light Infantry Brigade of the VRS was formed
out of local Serb forces.
The HVO formed the Petar Krešimir IV Brigade in
Livno. The Brigade held a 78-kilometer-long defensive
line. Brigadier Ante Gotovina served as Commander of
the defense of Livno until August. Under his leadership,
the defense of Livno was organized into six sectors. A
number of groups (from the 2nd and 4th Brigades of the
ZNG) were deployed in the defensive zone until Au-
gust. These groups conducted a number of successful
commando raids against the Serb defensive line and in
the rear of the enemy’s positions, mostly in the Glam-
oč area. For the moment the Serbs were on the defen-
sive but the danger of another attack on Livno and
Tomislavgrad could not be discounted. The command-
er of the Southern Theater of Operations was aware
that if the Serbs took Livno and Tomislavgrad they
could threaten Dalmatia. For that reason General Bob-
etko deployed the 126th Brigade of the Croatian Army
on the dominant hills between the Livno field and Pe-
ruća Lake and the Tactical Group of the 115th Brigade of
the Croatian Army on the Aržano – Podgradina – Liv-
no line and the Aržano – Bukova Gora – Tomislavgrad
line. Admiral Letica sent the 158th Brigade of the Cro-
atian Army, apart from two of its battalions to bolster
the defensive positions on the Podgradina – Rašeljke
– Aržano line. The TG-4 of the 144th Brigade of the Cro-
atian Army was kept in combat readiness, prepared to
reinforce the Croatian forces in the Sinj – Trilj area at a
moment’s notice.
Mostar and Čapljina
The JNA was strong in the Neretva Valley, especial-
R
ly in Mostar. The JNA forces in Čapljina were somewhat
weaker than those deployed in Mostar. On the eastern
bank of the Neretva the JNA could count on active sup-
port from the Serbian villages of the Čapljina Munici-
pality. In mid-March Bileća Corps/XIII Corps of the JNA
took over the positions held by Užice Corps, which was
withdrawn to Serbia. Under XIII Corps’s command were
the 10th, 13th and 472nd Motorized Brigade, the 179th
Mountain Brigade, the Čapljina garrison and a few
smaller units in the Neretva Valley and eastern Herze-
4.2.2020. 19:34:46
 Davor Marijan • Rat za opstojnost Hrvata, 1991. - 1995.
Hrvatske su snage organizirane po strukturi TO-a
pri općinskim stožerima (Mostar, Čapljina, Čitluk, Široki
Brijeg, Ljubuški i Grude), a u travnju 1992. je osnovana
Operativna grupa HVO-a za jugoistočnu Hercegovinu,
čiji je zapovjednik bio general Slobodan Praljak. U Mo-
staru je postupno osnovano devet bojni HVO-a. Po-
četkom lipnja u Mostaru su u HVO-u pod oružjem bile
3443 osobe. U svim općinama manje snage bile su u
sastavu HOS-a. Na bojištu se pojavilo i nekoliko manjih
dragovoljačkih skupina iz Hrvatske. Dio Muslimana
H
angažirao se u sastavu postrojbi HVO-a. U Mostaru su
osnovali Samostalni mostarski bataljun, koji se, ovisno
o komunikaciji, zvao HVO ili TO. Po odluci Kriznoga šta-
ba općine Mostar od 29. travnja 1992., koji se sastojao
od devet članova, među njima i četiri Muslimana, zašti-
ta i obrana Mostara povjerena je HVO-u.549
M
Sukob u Mostaru počeo je 3. travnja 1992. nakon
eksplozije kamiona cisterne kod vojarne Sjeverni logor.
U sljedećih nekoliko dana plamen rata zahvatio je šire
područje doline Neretve. Desetoga travnja Bilećki je
korpus napao u Mostaru i krenuo u prodor prema Ne-
retvi iz Berkovića, Kokorine i Pijesaka. Pritisak JNA bio je
D
prevelik, pa je HVO Čapljina 11. travnja povukao svoje
snage iz područja Domanovića na desnu obalu Nere-
tve. Za sprečavanje prodora JNA preko Neretve prema
Čitluku od 13. travnja angažiran je 4. bataljun 4. brigade
ZNG-a na području Slipčići – Tepčići – Dobro Selo.550
Tijekom travanjskih borbi riješena je sudbina sna-
C
ga JNA u okruženoj vojarni u Čapljini. Vojarna je od 17.
travnja bila pod jakim pritiskom hrvatskih snaga (HOS
Ljubuški, pukovnija Kralj Tomislav) i topništva 156. bri-
gade HV-a. U hrvatskom okruženju bilo je oko 200 pri-
padnika JNA i članova njihovih obitelji. Vojarna se odr-
žala do 24. travnja, kada se dio posade predao, a oko
170 ljudi izvučeno je iz okruženja akcijom borbene gru-
pe 63. padobranske brigade JNA u devet transportnih
helikoptera Mi-8. Akciju je podržavalo zrakoplovstvo,
koje je pritom izgubilo dva zrakoplova tipa Jastreb. U
osvajanju koje je vodio general Praljak sudjelovali su
pripadnici pukovnije Kralj Tomislav, 57. samostalnog
bataljuna HV-a, 156. brigade HV-a i HVO-a Čapljina.
549 Općinski stožer Mostar, Brojno stanje postrojbi dj. br.
01-286/328 od 6. 6. 1992.; Krizni štab Skupštine općine
Mostar, Odluka br. 427/92 od 29. 4. 1992., Mostarsko
jutro, 13. 9. 1992., 5.
550 J. BOBETKO, Sve moje bitke, 201; D. MARIJAN, “Djelovan-
je JNA u Hercegovini”, 648.
238
Domovinski rat 04-02-2020 Knjiga 1.indd 238
govina. In January, 1992, the JNA started pulling out
its matériel and modern equipment to safer areas (Ra-
jlovac near Sarajevo). The JNA garrison in Čapljina also
decided to vacate the city and set up a defensive line
on the eastern bank of the Neretva River. One excep-
tion to that was Mostar, a city straddling the Neretva
River. The JNA wanted to control the entire city.
The Croatian forces were organized along the Ter-
ritorial Defense structure with municipal HQs (Mostar,
Čapljina, Čitluk, Široki Brijeg, Ljubuški and Grude). In
April, 1992, HVO Operational Group for Southeast Her-
zegovina was formed. Slobodan Praljak was appoint-
ed its commander. Nine HVO battalions were formed
in Mostar, but not all of them were formed at the same
time. At the beginning of June the HVO had 3,443 men
under arms in Mostar. Smaller formations, in all munic-
ipalities, were under the command of the HOS. A few
other small units composed of volunteers from Croatia
were also present. A number of Muslim soldiers served
in HVO units. The Muslims formed the Independent
Mostar Battalion in Mostar. Sometimes the Battalion
was referred to as belonging to the HVO, and some-
times as belonging to the Territorial Defense, depend-
ing on whether the battalion communicated with Mo-
star or Sarajevo respectively. The Mostar Municipality
Crisis Staff, consisting of nine members, four of them
Muslims, decided, on April 29, 1992, to give the task of
defending the city to the HVO.
The conflict in Mostar started on April 3, 1992, af-
ter a tank truck exploded near the Sjeverni Logor bar-
racks. In the next few days the fighting spread out to
the wider areas of the Neretva Valley. On April 10 Bileća
Corps attacked the HVO in Mostar and advanced to-
D
wards the Neretva River from Berković, Kokorina and
Pijesci. The JNA attacks were determined and the HVO
Čapljina withdrew its forces from the Domanovići area
to the right bank of the Neretva River. The 4th Battal-
ion of the 4th Brigade of the ZNG was deployed in the
R
Slipčići – Tepčići – Dobro Selo area on April 13. The
Battalion’s task was to prevent the JNA from crossing
the river and advance towards Čitluk.
The JNA troops in the barracks in Čapljina were,
from April 17, under constant fire from a strong Cro-
atian force which comprised the HOS Ljubuški, Kralj
Tomislav Regiment and artillery belonging to the 156th
Brigade of the Croatian Army. About 200 JNA soldiers
and members of their families were in the barracks,
completely encircled by the Croatian force. The JNA
4.2.2020. 19:34:46
 The Croatian Nation’s Struggle for Survival, 1991-1995
Osvajanjem vojarne, od Mostara do Čapljine granica je
bila rijeka Neretva.551
Tijekom borbi u svibnju JNA je imala uspjeha samo
na području Mostara gdje je 12. svibnja uspjela zauzeti
Bijelo polje i popodne 13. svibnja bez gubitaka izići na
lijevu obalu Neretve.552
Travanjska ofenziva 4. vojne
oblasti JNA
H
U proljeće 1992. na jugu Hrvatske u sastavu Sektora
Dubrovnik postojale su tri pričuvne brigade HV-a: 115.
iz Imotskog, 116. iz Metkovića i 163. iz Dubrovnika, te
mornarički odredi Dubrovnik i Pelješac. Te su postrojbe
bile slabo naoružane, a dijelom i bez borbenoga isku-
stva. Osim njih, na tom je području bila i glavnina 4.
M
brigade ZNG-a.553
Bojište je počelo “oživljavati” 21. ožujka 1992. na-
padom JNA na Gornje Hrasno. Satnija 116. brigade s
vodom 4. brigade ZNG-a napala je i pomaknula 22. i
23. ožujka crtu obrane u Gornjem Hrasnu na dominan-
tne kote na istočnom dijelu visoravni. Pomicanjem crte
D
otklonjena je opasnost od prodora srpskih snaga iz
Popova polja u Gornje Hrasno. Jugoslavenska narod-
na armija i Srbi pokušali su 25. ožujka vratiti izgubljene
položaje, no nisu uspjeli. Početkom travnja u obrani su
bile hrvatske snage iz 4. brigade ZNG-a, 116. brigade
HV-a i jednoga bataljuna 115. brigade HV-a.554
C
551 SVA MORH, ZJB: IZM Ploče, Izvješće kl. 81/92-01/18, ur.
br. 6030-03/92-01 od 17. 4. 1992.; SVA MORH, ZJB: Izv-
ješće Zapovjedništva 156. brHV od 17. 4. 1992. o bor-
benim djelovanjima; SVA MORH, ZJB: Zap. 156. brHV,
D
Izvješće br. 173/32-92 od 18. 4. 1992.; SVA MORH, ZJV,
Vanredno izvješće kl. 81/92-02/97, ur. br. 6030-03/92-
38 od 23. 4. 1992.; SVA MORH, GSHV: Služba za zaštitu
ustavnog poretka, Sigurnosno stanje na širem prostoru
doline Neretve ur. br. I/4-75/129 od 24. 4. 1992.; Opera-
tivna grupa “Jugoistočna Hercegovina”, Obavještajno iz-
vješće br. 10/92 od 24. 4. 1992.; D. MARIJAN, “Djelovanje
JNA u Hercegovini”, 648-649.
552 Komanda 10. mtbr, Redovni borbeni izveštaj str. pov. br.
73-316 od 14. 5. 1992.
553 4. gardijska brigada HV – Pauci, 150-155.
554 SVA MORH, ZJB: ZSD, Raspored postrojbi u zoni od Sek-
tora Dubrovnik ur. br. 598/92 od 5. 4. 1992.; Izvješće Mi-
lana Babića od 29. 3. 1998. o 1. bojni 115. br HV od rujna
1991. do 15. 4. 1992.; Jakša RAGUŽ, Hrvatsko Poneretvlje
u Domovinskom ratu, Ogranak Matice hrvatske Met-
ković – Hrvatski institut za povijest, Metković – Zagreb,
2004., 317-323.
239
Domovinski rat 04-02-2020 Knjiga 1.indd 239
launched a rescue operation, using the Combat Group
of the 63rd Parachute Brigade transported in nine
transport Mi-8 helicopters. The operation was sup-
ported by the air force. The outcome was only partially
successful for the Serbs; on April 24 a part of the gar-
rison surrendered and the remainder, about 170 men,
were rescued. The Croats also shot down two Jastreb
jet light attack aircraft. The attack on the barracks was
commanded by General Praljak. Troops belonging to
the Kralj Tomislav Regiment, 57th Independent Battal-
ion of the HV, 156th Brigade of the HV and HVO Čaplji-
na participated in the attack. With the barracks in Cro-
atian hands the Neretva River from Mostar to Čapljina
marked the boundary between the belligerent sides.
In May the JNA achieved successes only in the
Mostar area. On May 12, the JNA recaptured Bije-
lo Polje and in the afternoon on May 13 reached,
without suffering any casualties, the left bank of the
Neretva River.
April Offensive Launched by the 4th
Military District of the JNA
In spring, 1992, the following Croatian units were
deployed in Sector Dubrovnik, in the south of Croa-
tia: 115th Reserve Brigade of the Croatian Army from
Imotski, the 166th Reserve Brigade of the Croatian
Army from Metković, the 163rd Reserve Brigade of the
Croatian Army, the Dubrovnik navy squad, the Pel-
ješac navy squad and the bulk of the 4th Brigade of the
Croatian National Guard. All these units, apart from
the 4th Brigade of the ZNG, were poorly equipped and
a significant number of soldiers serving in them had
no prior combat experience.
On March 21, 1992 the JNA launched an attack on
Gornje Hrasno. A company of the 116th Brigade with a
platoon of the 4th Brigade of the ZNG counterattacked
and during the fighting on March 22-23 took control
of the dominant heights in the area of Hrasno on the
R
eastern side of the plateau. The defensive line was
thus moved forward and the success nullified the dan-
ger of a Serb advance from the Popovo field into Gorn-
je Hrasno. The JNA and the Serb tried to recapture the
lost positions on March 25 but failed. At the beginning
of April the Croatian force defending the area consist-
ed of the 116th Brigade of the Croatian Army and one
Battalion of the 115th Brigade of the Croatian Army and
elements of the 4th Brigade of the ZNG.
4.2.2020. 19:34:46
 Davor Marijan • Rat za opstojnost Hrvata, 1991. - 1995.
U drugoj polovini ožujka 1992. Glavni stožer HV-a
započeo je provedbu plana Neretva, operaciju osloba-
đanja južne Dalmacije. Operaciju je trebalo realizirati
Zapovjedništvo HRM-a sa snagama OZ-a Split, odno-
sno Sektorom Dubrovnik i pojačanjima iz Splita i Ma-
karske. Te su snage početkom travnja pojačane Prvom
taktičkom grupom, koja se sastojala od dvije bojne i
dijela potpore 1. brigade ZNG-a. Skupina je dovedena
u naselje Klek kod Neuma, a u noći 6./7. travnja počela
je zaposjedanje položaja na smjeru obrane od mosta
H
Bistrina do masiva Rujnice, koji je do tada držala 4.
brigada ZNG-a. Preostali dio 1. brigade ZNG-a postu-
pno je dovođen u južnu Dalmaciju, a sredinom svibnja
brigada je bila kompletna, osim dijela oklopništva koji
je ostao u zapadnoj Slavoniji. Taj je dio izvučen počet-
kom lipnja 1992. godine.555
M
Provedbu operacije čija je svrha bila deblokada
Dubrovnika i izbacivanje srpskih snaga s teritorija Hr-
vatske uz istodobnu obranu doline Neretve general
Tus je zapovjedio 4. travnja. Za operaciju je bilo za-
duženo Zapovjedništvo HRM-a s IZM-om u Pločama,
kojem je osim dijelova 1. brigade ZNG-a pridodana i
D
glavnina 114. brigade HV-a iz Splita te manje snage
HRM-a i HRZ-a.556
U vrijeme prikupljanja 1. brigade ZNG-a, JNA je
napravila posljednji veliki pokušaj da izbije u dolinu
Neretve u Hercegovini i onemogući planiranu oslobo-
dilačku akciju Hrvatske vojske na pravcu od Metkovića
C
do obale mora. Komanda 4. vojne oblasti zapovjedila
je 10. travnja 1992. da se hrvatske snage izbace s pod-
ručja općine Stolac i da se izbije na lijevu obalu Nere-
tve te uspostavi crta fronte Mostar – Čapljina – Hutovo
– zapadna granica Popova polja. Za taj su zadatak an-
gažirane snage Bilećkoga i Podgoričkoga korpusa.557
Podgorički je korpus 10. travnja krenuo u napad
prema Stolovima nakon što je bez otpora Muslimana
555 ICTY: Direktiva GSHV za izvođenje strategijske ofenzive
HV iz siječnja 1992.; SVA MORH, GSHV, Zapovijed kl.
8/92-01/07, ur. br. 5120-05-92-16 od 23. 3. 1992.; SVA
MORH, GSHV: Zap. sektora Dubrovnik, Zapovijed za
obranu ur. br. 892/92 od 29. 3. 1992.; SVA MORH, GSHV:
IZM HRM Ploče, Redovno izvješće, kl. 81/92-02/97, ur.
br. 6030-03/92-1 od 7. 4. 1992.; 1. gardijska brigada HV –
Tigrovi, 213-214, 219-220, 226-228.
556 SVA MORH, GSHV, Zapovijed kl. 8/92-01/07, ur. br. 5120-
05-92-22 od 4. 4. 1992.
557 ICTY: IKM Komande 4. vojne oblasti, Direktiva za napad
str. pov. br. 1029-1 od 10. 4. 1992.
240
Domovinski rat 04-02-2020 Knjiga 1.indd 240
In the second half of March, 1992, the General
Staff of the Croatian Army began implementing the
Neretva plan. The objective was to liberate southern
Dalmatia. The Command of the Croatian Navy, with
formations belonging to OZ Split, that is Sector Du-
brovnik, with reinforcements from Split and Makarska,
was supposed to conduct the operation. These forces
were augmented, at the beginning of April, with the 1st
Tactical Group which consisted of two battalions and
some support units of the 1st Brigade of the ZNG. The
group arrived at the Klek settlement near Neum and
during the night of April 6-7 started taking positions
on a defensive line stretching from the Bistrina Bridge
to the Rujnica massif, relieving the 4th Brigade of the
ZNG. The remainder of the 1st Brigade of the ZNG grad-
ually arrived in southern Dalmatia. This transfer was
completed at the end of May, with the exception of
some armored elements which remained in western
Slavonia. These elements were pulled out of western
Slavonia at the beginning of June, 1992.
The aims of the operation were to lift the Serbi-
an siege of Dubrovnik, to chase the Serb forces from
the Republic of Croatia’s territory and to defend the
Neretva Valley. General Tus ordered the commence-
ment of the offensive of April 4. The Command of
the Croatian Navy with Forward Command Post in
Ploče, reinforced with elements of the 1st Brigade of
the ZNG, the bulk of the 114th Brigade of the Croatian
Army from Split and smaller units belonging to the
Croatian Navy and the Croatian Air Force, was to carry
out the operation.
While the 1st Brigade of the ZNG was in the process
of transferring to southern Croatia, the JNA launched
D
its last large-scale attempt to reach the Neretva Valley
in Herzegovina and thus foil the planned Croatian of-
fensive before it even got under way. Orders went out
from the Main HQ of the 4th Military District on April 10,
1992, instructing Bileća Corps and Podgorica Corps to
defeat the Croatian forces in the Stolac Municipality,
R
reach the left bank of the Neretva River and establish a
front line along the Mostar – Čapljina – Hutovo – west-
ern boundary of the Popovo field line.
On April 10 Podgorica Corps, having met no op-
position from the Muslim forces, entered Stolac and
continued its advance towards Stolovi. The Croatian
forces, on April 13, 1992, withdrew to the Crnoglav
– Trnovski Brijeg – Kozarica line. In the evening an
attempt was made to reinforce the Croatian forces
4.2.2020. 19:34:47
 The Croatian Nation’s Struggle for Survival, 1991-1995

prošao Stolac. Hrvatske su snage 13. travnja 1992. od-

stupile na crtu Crnoglav – Trnovski brijeg – Kozarica i
navečer ih se nastojalo pojačati svježim snagama 114.
i 116. brigade HV-a. Istodobno je JNA s četom tenkova
izbila na Stolove i ugrozila obranu pravca Gornje Hra-
sno – Donje Hrasno. Prostor su branile snage TG-2 u
sastavu: cijela 116. brigada HV-a, po jedna bojna 113.
i 114. brigade HV-a, te jedna stolačka bojna. U počet-
ku je sudjelovala i jedna satnija iz 4. gardijske brigade
HV-a. Borbe za Stolove završile su 16. travnja, nakon tri
H
neuspješna napada srpskih snaga koje su na bojištu
ostavile i dva oštećena tenka.
Obranom Stolova hrvatske su snage stabilizirale
dio neumskoga bojišta i otklonile opasnost od napada
iz smjera Stoca i Ljubinja. Obrana tog smjera potom
je povjerena 116. brigadi, a dovedena pojačanja pri-
M
dodana su da spriječe prodor preko prijevoja Stolovi
– Cerovica prema Metkoviću i Neretvi.558
Hrvatske su se snage intenzivno utvrđivale s teži-
štem na obrani Stolova, a 19. i 20. travnja postrojbe su
D
Hrvatski vojnik, Južno bojište, 1992. (autor fotografije: Željko
Gapšarović).

Croatian soldier, the Southern Theater, 1992, (Photograph by

C
558 SVA MORH, ZJB: IZM HRM Ploče, Redovno izvješće kl.
81/92-02/97, ur. br. 6030-03/92-6 od 10. 4. 1992.; SVA
MORH, ZJB: IZM HRM Ploče, Redovno izvješće kl. 81/92-
02/97, ur. br. 6030-03/92-7 od 11. 4. 1992.; SVA MORH,
ZJB: ZSD, Izvanredno izvješće kl. 81/92-01/01, ur. br.
3105-01-15-92-30 od 13. 4. 1992.; SVA MORH, ZJB: ZSD,
Izvanredno izvješće kl. 81/92-01/01, ur. br. 3105-01-
D
15-92-31 od 13. 4. 1992.; SVA MORH, ZJB: ZSD, Zapovi-
jed za obranu op. br. 4 ur. br. 490-4 od 13. 4. 1992.; SVA
MORH, ZJB: ZJV, Redovno izvješće kl. SP. 81/92-02/97, ur.
br. 6030-03/92-17 od 14. 4. 1992.; SVA MORH, ZJB: IZM
HRM, Vanredno izvješće kl. SP 81/92-02/97, ur. br. 6030-
03/92-19 od 15. 4. 1992.; SVA MORH, ZJB: ZSD, Izvanred-
no izvješće kl. 81/92-02/01, ur. br. 3105-01-15-92-41 od
16. 4. 1992.; SVA MORH, ZJB: ZSD, Izvanredno izvješće kl.
81/92-02/01, ur. br. 3105-01-15-92-43 od 16. 4. 1992.; SVA
MORH, ZJB: ZSD, Zapovijed za obranu Op. br. 5, kl. 8/92-
01/57, ur. br. 3105-01-01-92-1 od 16. 4. 1992.; SVA MORH,
ZJB: ZJV, Redovno izvješće kl. 81/92-02/97, ur. br. 6030-
03/92-21 od 16. 4. 1992.; SVA MORH, ZJB: ZJV, Redovno
izvješće kl. SP. 81/92-02/97, ur. br. 6030-03/92-23 od 17.
4. 1992.; SVA MORH, ZJB: Obavještajno izvješće Zapov-
jedništva 116. brigade HV od 17. 4. 1992.; SVA MORH,
ZJB: Zapovjedništvo 113. brHV, Stanje u postrojbama na
južnom frontu kl. 8/92-01/277, ur. br. 2135-01-92-1 od 3.
5. 1992.; J. RAGUŽ, Hrvatsko Poneretvlje, 333-336.
Željko Gašparović).
with elements of the 114th and 116th Brigades of the
Croatian Army. At the same time a JNA tank company
reached Stolovi and threatened the Croatian defensive
positions on the Gornje Hrasno – Donje Hrasno line.
The force defending the area belonged to the TG-2 and
consisted of the entire 116th Brigade, one battalion be-
longing to the 113th Brigade of the Croatian Army, one
battalion of the 114th Brigade of the Croatian Army and
one battalion from Stolac. In the initial stages of the
R
battle one company of the 4th Guards Brigade took part
in the fighting. The battle ended on April 16, after three
unsuccessful Serb attacks. The Serbs left two damaged
tanks on the battlefield. 
By successfully defending Stolovi the Croatian
forces stabilized a part of the Neum front and nullified
the danger of Serb attacks from the direction of Stolac
and Ljubinje. The 116th Brigade was then tasked with
defending the line and reinforcements were brought

241

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 Davor Marijan • Rat za opstojnost Hrvata, 1991. - 1995.
prestrojene i dobile su konkretne zadatke obrane.559
Nakon kraćega prestrojavanja snaga, JNA je od 21.
travnja ponovno krenula u napad od stolačkoga pod-
ručja do mora. Nakon manjih uspjeha ofenziva je 26. i
27. travnja prestala, a JNA je na Južnom bojištu prešla
u obranu. Ona je ušla u fazu tijekom koje je bila dužna
nestati iz BiH, odnosno u završni čin transformacije u
Vojsku Srpske Republike BiH. Bilećki je korpus 25. svib-
nja preimenovan u Hercegovački korpus.560
H
Prodor HV-a u istočnu Hercegovinu i
deblokada Dubrovnika
Prelaskom JNA u obranu došlo je vrijeme da Hrvat-
ska vojska krene u napad i oslobodi dubrovačko zaleđe.
Prvoga svibnja HV je na području Metkovića i Neuma
M
imao 1. brigadu ZNG-a kao TG-1, 4. brigadu ZNG-a, TG-2
sastavljenu od dijelova 4., 113., 114. i 116. brigade te
156. brigadu HV-a. U njihovu bojnom stroju bilo je 5407
ljudi, a za potporu su osim 14 oruđa kalibra od 122 do
155 mm imali i jednu ojačanu oklopno-mehaniziranu
satniju s 12 tenkova i četiri borbena vozila pješaštva.561
D
Već 6. svibnja 1. brigada ZNG-a zauzela je Gornji i
Donji Drijen i Višnjicu, a potom i važnu uzvisinu Šumet,
koja je olakšavala napredovanje prema Čepikućama. S
iznimkom dijela oklopništva, 1. brigada ZNG-a komple-
tirana je sredinom svibnja i bila je spremna za napad
C
559 SVA MORH, ZJB: ZJB, Redovno izvješće kl. SP. 81/92-02/97,
ur. br. 6030-03/92-24 od 18. 4. 1992.; SVA MORH, ZJB: ZJB,
Redovno izvješće kl. SP. 81/92-02/97, ur. br. 6030-03/92-25
od 18. 4. 1992.; SVA MORH, ZJB: ZSD, Operativno izvješće
kl. 81/92-02/01, ur. br. 3105-01-15-92-44 od 18. 4. 1992.;
SVA MORH, ZJB: IZM Ploče, Zapovijed za konsolidiranje
obrane kl. 8/92-01/35, ur. br. 6030-03/92-1 od 19. 4. 1992.;
SVA MORH, ZJB: ZSD, Zapovijed za obranu Op. br. 6, kl.
8/92-01/57, ur. br. 3105-01-01-92-2 od 19. 4. 1992.; 1. gar-
dijska brigada HV – Tigrovi, 222-223.
560 SVA MORH, ZJB, Redovno izvješće kl. SP. 81/92-02/97, ur.
br. 6030-03/92-32 od 21. 4. 1992.; SVA MORH, ZJB, Re-
dovno izvješće kl. SP. 81/92-02/97, ur. br. 6030-03/92-45
od 26. 4. 1992.; SVA MORH, ZJB, Redovno izvješće kl. SP.
81/92-02/97, ur. br. 6030-03/92-50 od 27. 4. 1992.; SVA
MORH, ZJB, Redovno izvješće kl. SP. 81/92-02/97, ur. br.
6030-03/92-51 od 28. 4. 1992.; SVA MORH, ZJB: IZM Ploče
kl. 81/92-02/39, ur. br. 6030-01/92-1 od 12. 5. 1992.; Ko-
manda Hercegovačkog korpusa, Naređenje za dalja de-
jstva, str. pov. br. 229-90 od 25. 5. 1992.; J. BOBETKO, Sve
moje bitke, 276-277.
561 SVA MORH, ZJV, Sedmodnevno izvješće kl. 81/92-02/97,
ur. br. 6030-03/92-59 od 1. 5. 1992.
242
Domovinski rat 04-02-2020 Knjiga 1.indd 242
in for the purpose of preventing Serb attacks across
the Stolovi – Cerovica mountain pass in the direction
of Metković and the Neretva River.
The Croatian forces fortified the defensive line cen-
tered on Stolac. On April 19 and 20 the Croatian units
regrouped and were given precise defensive tasks.
The JNA regrouped its forces and launched an-
other attack on April 21, advancing in the Stolac
area as far as the sea. During the offensive the JNA
achieved a few minor successes but nothing of any
significant importance that would justify reinforcing
it. The JNA stopped the offensive on April 26-27 and
went on the defensive in the Southern Theater of
Operations. The JNA entered the phase during which
it had to officially disappear from Bosnia and Herze-
govina, that is, transform its contingent in the coun-
try into the Army of the Serbian Republic of Bosnia
and Herzegovina. On May 25, Bileća Corps was redes-
ignated as Herzegovina Corps.
HV’s Advance into Easter Herzegovina
and Lifting the Siege of Dubrovnik
With the JNA on the defensive, the Croatian Army
had an opportunity to launch a large-scale offensive
operation and liberate the hinterland of Dubrovnik.
On May 1 the Croatian Army, in the Metković and
Neum area, had the 1st Brigade of the ZNG as TG-1, the
4th Brigade of the ZNG, TG-2 composed of elements
of the 4th, 113th, 114th and 116th Brigades and the
156th Brigade of the Croatian Army, altogether 5,407
men. Artillery and armor support consisted of 14 122
-mm and 155-mm artillery pieces, one reinforced ar-
D
mored-mechanized company with 12 tanks and four
armored vehicles.
Already on May 6 the 1st Brigade of the ZNG cap-
tured Gornji Drijen, Donji Drijen and Višnjica and after
that the all-important positions on Šumet Hill. Con-
R
trolling this hill facilitated, in large measure, the ad-
vance toward Čepikuće. In mid-May the 1st Brigade of
the ZNG was in its full complement, apart from some
armored elements, and ready to attack in the direc-
tion of Dubrovnik. The Croatian Army undertook a
whole series of smaller attacks, capturing one hill at
a time. This offensive was launched immediately prior
to the date by which the Federal Republic of Yugo-
slavia was due to withdraw the JNA from Croatia. The
Croatian leadership correctly assumed that the JNA
4.2.2020. 19:34:47
 The Croatian Nation’s Struggle for Survival, 1991-1995
prema Dubrovniku.562 Slijedio je ciklus napadnih opera-
cija hrvatskih snaga, koji je počeo malim koracima, na-
padima i osvajanjem jednog po jednog brda.563 Ofen-
zivno je nastupanje poduzeto neposredno prije no što
je SRJ bila dužna povući JNA iz Hrvatske. Operacija je
usklađena s tim jer se s pravom sumnjalo da će se JNA
preimenovati u vojsku bosanskohercegovačkih Srba i
dalje držati Dubrovnik u opsadi, odnosno izravnoj vizu-
alnoj ugrozi.
Operacijski ciklus oslobađanja južne Dalmacije te-
H
meljio se na 1. i 4. brigadi ZNG-a. Prva je brigada priku-
pljena gotovo u cijelosti, a krajem travnja pridodana joj
je bitnica samohodnih haubica 122 mm iz OZ Bjelovar.
Uz ustrojbenu oklopnu bojnu 1. brigada je u tom trenut-
ku bila postrojba s najvećom vatrenom moći u HV-u.564
Brigada je 28. svibnja pojačana i Satnijom mornaričko-
M
ga pješaštva iz Pule, koja je korištena za držanje dijela
zauzetih položaja.565 Četvrta je brigada bila osjetno sla-
bije opremljena, dijelom pridodana drugim postrojba-
ma, no u svemu drugom bila je ravna 1. brigadi.566
Operacija je počela 18. svibnja 1992.: 1. brigada
ZNG-a poslana je u napad od Bistrine, a 4. brigada iz Po-
D
pova polja.567 Dijelovi 1. brigade ZNG-a ušli su 23. svibnja
u Slano, no na okolnim su uzvisinama bile srpske snage
koje su nadzirale mjesto. Ključ nadzora bila je kota Lisnik,
za koju se nekoliko dana vodila teška borba. Brigada je
25. svibnja zauzela položaje Banja, Somina greda, Vri-
jesno, Gradina, Poda, Golić, kao i Slano.568 Konačno je
C
562 1. gardijska brigada HV – Tigrovi, 228-229.
563 SVA MORH, ZJB: IZM Ploče ZJV, kl. 81/92-02/39, ur. br.
6030-01/92-1 od 12. 5. 1992.
D
564 SVA MORH, GSHV: Zap. OZ Bjelovar, Zahtjev za mobili-
zaciju kl. 035-01/92-19, ur. br. 1077-05/92-37 od 21. 4.
1992.; SVA MORH, ZJB: ZSD, Vanredno dnevno operativ-
no izvješće kl. 81/92-02/94, ur. br. 3105-01-15-92-58 od
25. 4. 1992.; SVA MORH, ZJB: ZSD, Prijedlog za uporabu
topništva kl. 8/92-01/01, ur. br. 3105-01-10/92-01 od 28.
4. 1992.; 1. gardijska brigada HV – Tigrovi, 227-228.
565 SVA MORH, ZJB: IZM Ploče ZJV, Zapovijed kl. 8/92-
01/103, ur. br. 1080-01-01-92-1 od 25. 5. 1992.; Zapov-
jedništvo 1. brZNG, Zapovijed za posjedanje položaja ur.
br. 1111-207/92 od 27. 5. 1992.
566 SVA MORH, ZJB: Zapovjednik 4. brZNG, Izvanredno izv-
ješće kl. 8/92-01/76, ur. br. 5124-01-01-92-2 od 11. 5. 1992.
567 Izvješće II bojne I. brZNG od 31. 5. 1992.; 1. gardijska
brigada HV – Tigrovi, 231-236.
568 SVA MORH, ZOZS: ZJB, Dopuna izvješća kl. 81/92-02/97,
ur. br. 6030-03/92-114-1 od 26. 5. 1992.
243
Domovinski rat 04-02-2020 Knjiga 1.indd 243
would redesignate its forces as an Army of the Re-
public of Bosnian Serbs and thus continue besieging
Dubrovnik. It has to be pointed out that the troops
besieging Dubrovnik had a clear view of the city and
everything taking place in it – everything and every-
body in the city was a potential target. Therefore, it
was important to take advantage of the fact that the
JNA was on the defensive.
The 1st and 4th Brigades of the ZNG led the offen-
sive. The 1st Brigade was almost in its full complement,
and at the end of April it was reinforced by a battery
of 122-mm self-propelled howitzers from Operative
Zone Bjelovar. At that moment, alongside the Ar-
mored Battalion, the 1st Brigade of the ZNG was the
strongest, in terms of firepower, formation of the Cro-
atian Army. On May 28, the 1st Brigade of the ZNG was
reinforced with a company of naval infantry from Pula.
The Company was tasked with holding the liberated
areas. The 4th Brigade was not as well equipped as the
1st Brigade. Some elements of the 4th Brigade were at-
tached to other units. However, in terms of the fight-
ing ability of its soldiers, morale and motivation it was
the equal of the 1st Brigade.
The operation commenced on May 18, 1992: the
1st Brigade moved into attack from Bistrina, and the 4th
Brigade from the Popovo field. Elements of the 1st Bri-
gade entered Slano on May 23. However, Serb troops
held the hills around Slano. The key position on the
high ground around Slano was Lisnik Hill. Heavy fight-
ing developed for that position and it lasted for a few
days. On May 25 the 1st Brigade captured the Serb po-
sitions in Banja, Somina Greda, Vrijesno, Gradina, Poda,
Golić and Slano. On May 26 a group consisting of the
4th Battalion and a recon platoon captured Lisnik Hill,
having previously captured Resova Glava and Oštri
Gradac. During the fighting for Lisnik Hill the Croats
suffered heavy casualties: eight men killed and twenty
wounded. On May 30 an armored platoon of the 1st
R
Brigade of the ZNG consisting of three tanks, support-
ing the 163rd Brigade’s attack on Golubov Kamen, en-
tered Dubrovnik from the west and reached Kupare.
Operation Jackal and Battles for Mostar
The JNA tried to slow down, and possibly halt,
the Croatian Army’s advance towards Slano by issuing
threats and indiscriminately shelling targets in the wid-
er Čapljina area. At the end of May, the Main HQ of the
4.2.2020. 19:34:47
 Davor Marijan • Rat za opstojnost Hrvata, 1991. - 1995.
skupina 4. bojne i izvidničkoga voda 26. svibnja zauzela
Lisnik i prethodno Resovu glavu i Oštri gradac. Kampanja
osvajanja Lisnika plaćena je velikom cijenom, s 8 poginu-
lih i 20 ranjenih gardista.569 Potom je 30. svibnja oklopni
vod 1. brigade ZNG-a s tri tenka podržao napad 163. bri-
gade na Golubov kamen, sa zapadne strane ušao u Du-
brovnik i stigao u Kupare kao pojačanje 163. brigade.570
Operacija Čagalj i borbe za Mostar
H
Napredovanje HV-a prema Slanom JNA je osim pri-
jetnjama pokušala usporiti, ako ne zaustaviti, pojača-
nim granatiranjem širega područja Čapljine.571 Krajem
svibnja u Zapovjedništvu Južnoga vojišta donesena je
odluka za izvođenje operacije na području između Hu-
tova blata i rijeke Neretve. Cilj operacije nazvane Čagalj
M
(u javnosti poznate i kao Lipanjske zore) bio je prijeći
Neretvu, zauzeti Klepce, Tasovčiće, Prebilovce, Hotanj
i Domanoviće, ispresijecati srpske snage, izići na šire
područje Grabovača – Greda – selo Megdan, spriječiti
izvlačenje srpskih snaga prema Stocu, zaposjesti domi-
nantne točke na crti Ševaš Njive – Hadžiosmanovina –
D
selo Čučukovine – selo Megdan – Gnjezdac – Crna brda
– Noktac i na njima organizirati obranu. Hrvatske snage
za operaciju prikupljene su u dvije borbene skupine:
BG-1 na području Čapljine i BG-2 na području Metko-
vića.572 Uoči operacije, hrvatske snage (TG-2) su se 23.
svibnja 1992. uklinile u smjeru Stoca i zauzele Drenovac
C
te olakšale provedbu operacije Čagalj.573
Operacija Čagalj počela je u noći 6./7. lipnja, kada su
heterogene skupine HV-a i HVO-a prebačene na lijevu
569 SVA MORH, ZJB: Zapovjedništvo 1. brZNG, Izvješće ur. br.
1111-206/92 od 26. 5. 1992.; 1. gardijska brigada HV – Ti-
grovi, 237-243; SVA MORH, ZOZS: ZJB, Redovno izvješće
kl. 81/92-02/97, ur. br. 6030-03/92-124 od 30. 5. 1992.
570 SVA MORH, ZOZS: ZJB, Redovno izvješće kl. 81/92-02/97,
ur. br. 6030-03/92-126 od 31. 5. 1992.
571 SVA MORH, ZOZS: ZJB, Redovno izvješće kl. 81/92-02/97,
ur. br. 6030-03/92-104 od 22. 5. 1992.; SVA MORH, ZOZS:
ZJB, Redovno izvješće kl. 81/92-02/97, ur. br. 6030-03/92-
109 od 24. 5. 1992.
572 IZM Ploče ZJV, Zapovijed za napadnu operaciju kl. 8/92-
01/119, ur. br. 1080-01-01-92-1 od 28. 5. 1992. Faksimil u:
J. BOBETKO, Sve moje bitke, 252-262; MORH, GSHV: Ratni
put 156. brigade HV.
573 SVA MORH, ZJB: Zapovjedništvo TG-2, Izvješće 23/24 do
17,00, str. pov. br. 2071-92 od 24. 5. 1992.; SVA MORH,
ZOZS: ZJB, Redovno izvješće, klasa: 81/92-02/97; ur. br.
6030-03/92-109 od 24. 5. 1992.
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Domovinski rat 04-02-2020 Knjiga 1.indd 244
Southern Theater of Operations decided to launch an
operation in the area between Hutovo Blato and the
Neretva River. The operation was codenamed Čagalj
(Jackal, also known as June Dawns). The Croatian forces
were to cross the Neretva River, capture Klepci, Tasovčići,
Prebilevci, Hotanj and Domanovići, break the cohesion
of the Serbian positions, reach the wider Grabovača –
Greda – Megdan village area, prevent the Serbs from
withdrawing towards Stolac, capture the dominant po-
sitions on the Ševaš Njive – Hadžiosmanovina – Čuču-
kovine village – Megdan village – Gnjezdac – Crna Brda
– Noktac line and set up defensive positions there. Two
combat groups were organized for the purpose: Com-
bat Group 1 in the area of Čapljina and Combat Group
2 in the area of Metković. Before the Croatian forces
commenced the operation, the TG-2 stood poised to
continue advancing in the direction of Stolac and cap-
tured Drenovac and thus improved the chances for the
operation’s success.
Operation Jackal commenced during the night of
June 6-7, when combined groups of the Croatian Army
troops and HVO troops crossed to the left bank of the
Neretva River near Ševaš Njive and Počitelj. During the
day the attackers captured Klepci, Klepašnica, Ševaš
Njive, Počitelj and Prebilovci. During the night of June
7-8 the Serbs withdrew their forces from Tasovčići. Cro-
atian troops entered the village in the morning. Around
noon the Croats were in control of Hotanj Hill. Later in
the day the Croats captured Domanovići. By June 10,
Čapljina had been secured, the Serb strongholds along
the Neretva had been neutralized and the attacking
forces had linked up with the Croatian forces operating
in the wider Mostar area. The operation continued with
D
the aim of liberating Stolac and taking control of the
Čapljina – Mostar road.
The operation for the liberation of Mostar was
planned in Široki Brijeg under the direction of Gen-
eral Slobodan Praljak. Immediately prior to the com-
R
mencement of the operation, the order of battle of the
HVO was as follows: the 4th Battalion in the Balinovac
area, the 1st Battalion in Đubrani, the 2nd Battalion in
the Rudnik area, the 3rd Battalion in Vrdi, the 5th Bat-
talion in Ilići, the Penal Battalion in Široki Brijeg, the
Poskok Battalion in Galac, the Independent Mostar
Battalion in Mostar’s city center, the Orlac Company in
Mostar city center, a police platoon in Drežnica, artil-
lery in the area of Trtla and Sretnice and mortars in the
area of Troskot and Garevina.
4.2.2020. 19:34:47
 The Croatian Nation’s Struggle for Survival, 1991-1995
obalu Neretve prema Ševaš Njivama i Počitelju. Tijekom
dana zauzeti su Klepci, Klepašnica i Ševaš Njive te Poči-
telj i Prebilovci.574 U noći 7./8. lipnja srpske su snage izvu-
čene iz Tasovčića, u koji su hrvatske snage ušle ujutro, u
podne su ovladale brdom Hotanj, a potom i Domanovi-
ćima.575 Do 10. lipnja osigurana je Čapljina, eliminirana
su srpska uporišta uz Neretvu te je izvršen spoj s hrvat-
skim snagama koje su bile na širem području Mostara.576
Slijedio je nastavak operacije radi oslobađanja Stoca i
ovladavanja prometnicom od Čapljine do Mostara.577
H
Oslobodilačka operacija u Mostaru isplanirana je
u Širokom Brijegu pod vodstvom generala Slobodana
Praljka. Uoči operacije HVO je bio u sljedećem rasporedu:
4. bojna na području Balinovca, 1. bojna u Đubranima, 2.
bojna na području Rudnika, 3. bojna u Vrdima, 5. bojna u
Ilićima, Kažnjenička bojna u Širokom Brijegu, Poskok boj-
M
na u Galcu, Samostalni mostarski bataljun u središnjem
dijelu Mostara, satnija Orlac na istoimenom području,
vod MUP-a u Drežnici, topništvo na području Trtle i Sret-
nica, a minobacači na području Troskota i Garevine.578
Operacija je počela ujutro 11. lipnja 1992. topnič-
kom vatrom po Orlovcu, Kobilovači, Vardi i Humu, kao i
D
po vojarni Sjeverni logor, Fortici, Svetigori i Šehovini.579
U popodnevnim satima HVO je ovladao crtom Jasenica
(dom) – gimnazija Rodoč – glavna prometnica – most
“Hasana Brkića” u Čekrku i desnom obalom do isključ-
no Raštana. Do jutra 12. lipnja srpske su se snage s
crte Hum – Varda – Jasenica – Slipčići povukle na lijevu
C
obalu Neretve, s tim da su pri povlačenju digle u zrak
most u predjelu Bišće polje, nakon čega je u Mostaru u
funkciji ostao samo Stari most jer su sve ostale mostove
srušile srpske snage.
Kažnjenička bojna je, uz potporu topništva TRD-a ši-
D
rokobrijeških „Slavuja“ i u suradnji s ostalim postrojbama
HVO-a Mostar i Široki Brijeg - na lijevom boku s 4. bojnom
„Tihomir Mišić“ i 5. ilićkom bojnom, a na desnom boku
s Poskok bojnom, 6. bojnom Kruševo, 2. bojnom Široki
574 OG Jugoistočna Hercegovina, Dnevno izvješće br.
170/92 od 7. 6. 1992.
575 MORH, GSHV: Ratni put 156. brigade HV; Raščlamba b/d
na Južnom bojištu 1992.
576 J. BOBETKO, Sve moje bitke, 252-262, 274.
577 4. gardijska brigada HV – Pauci, 193-195.
578 Organizacija oslobađanja općine Mostar (nepotpisan i
nedatiran prikaz izrađen 1993. godine).
579 Isto.
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Domovinski rat 04-02-2020 Knjiga 1.indd 245
The operation began on the morning of June 11,
1992, with artillery attacks on Orlovac, Kobilovača, Varda,
Hum, the Sjeverni Logor barracks, Fortica, Svetigora and
Šehovina. By the afternoon the HVO was in possession
of the Jasenica (community hall) – the Rodoč grammar
school – main road – Hasan Brkić bridge in Čekrk line
and also in possession of the right bank as far as Raštani.
By the morning of June 12, the Serbian forces had with-
drawn from the Hum – Varda – Jasenica – Slipčići line to
the left bank of the Neretva River. The Serbs, while with-
drawing blew up the bridge in Bišće Polje. The Serbs had
already blown up all the bridges across the Neretva in
the Mostar area apart from the Old Bridge.
The Penal Battalion, with strong artillery support
provided by the artillery rocket battalion “Slavuji” from
Široki Brijeg and in coordination with other HVO units
from Mostar and Široki Brijeg – 4th Battalion Tihomir
Mišić and 5th Ilić Battalion on the left flank and the
Poskok Battalion, 6th Kruševo Battalion, 2nd Široki Brijeg
Battalion and 9th Rodoč-Jasenica Battalion on the right
flank and the 3rd Battalion Široki Brijeg as support, cap-
tured Orlovac, cut the Kruševo – Miljkovići – Varda – Mo-
star road, captured the Heliodrom JNA barracks, military
installation SOKO (aircraft factory), Aviation Bridge and
Aluminum factory. Elements of the 4th Battalion of the
4th Brigade ZNG gave their contribution to this success
by attacking along the Baćevići – Buna – Neretva line.6
During June 12, 1992, the HVO shifted the focus of
its operation to mopping up the remaining points of
Serb resistance in the city and in the southern indus-
trial zone and to preparing to cross to the left bank of
the Neretva River. During the night of June 13-14, 1992,
HVO troops began crossing the Neretva River. The plan
was to cross the Neretva in boats in three places, and a
portion of the force was to cross the river over the Old
Bridge. By the morning, one company of the Indepen-
dent Mostar Battalion had successfully made the cross-
ing. By noon at a location called “Bunur” a group of sol-
R
diers belonging to the 4th Battalion had also crossed the
river and secured the crossing for the remainder of the
force over the Old Bridge and also gained possession of
a stretch of the left bank of the Neretva as far as the Luč-
ki Bridge. This bridgehead made it possible for the HVO
to send more troops across the river and these troops
liberated a part of the city of Mostar. On June 15 the 4th
6 Statement by General Stanko Sopta.
4.2.2020. 19:34:47
 Davor Marijan • Rat za opstojnost Hrvata, 1991. - 1995.
Brijeg i 9. bojnom Rodoč-Jasenica te snagama u potpori:
3. bojnom Široki Brijeg, zauzela Orlovac, presjekla cestu
Kruševo – Miljkovići – Varda – Mostar, zauzela vojarnu JNA
Heliodrom, vojnu industriju (tvornicu zrakoplova) SOKO,
Avijatičarski most i Aluminijski kombinat. Uspjehu su pri-
donijeli dijelovi 4. bojne 4. brigade ZNG-a koja je napada-
la smjerom Baćevići - Buna - Neretva.580
Tijekom 12. lipnja 1992. HVO je težište djelovanja
stavio na čišćenje gradskoga dijela i južne industrijske
zone Mostara te pripreme za prijelaz na lijevu obalu
H
Neretve. U noći s 13. na 14. lipnja 1992. HVO je počeo
prijelaz Neretve. Plan je bio prijeći Neretvu čamcima na
tri mjesta, a dijelom snaga preko Starog mosta. Ujutro
je preko rijeke prešla jedna četa samostalnog mostar-
skog bataljuna. Do podne je na „Bunuru“ Neretvu prešla
i skupina vojnika 4. bojne koja je osigurala ostalim sna-
M
gama prelazak preko Staroga mosta i zaposjela lijevu
obalu Neretve do Lučkoga mosta. Preko stvorenog mo-
stobrana na lijevu obalu prešle su nove snage HVO-a
i oslobodile dio grada. U borbama 15. lipnja 4. bojna
„Tihomir Mišić“ je oslobodila srpska uporišta Sjeverni
logor i Zalik, te potom uspostavila crtu obrane na smje-
D
ru Neretva - Podvožnjak - vrh Zalika - Strelište. Ujutro
16. lipnja 5. i 4. bojna zauzele su Južni logor i područje
Opina, a 2. bojna je zauzela Raštane, te potom i brdo
Fortica iznad Mostara. Na južnom dijelu bojišta, ujutro
14. lipnja s pravca Baćevića hrvatske snage su čamcima
prešle Neretvu i na Buni i oslobodile je tijekom dana.
C
Preko rijeke je prešao dio 4. bojne 4. brigade ZNG-a, Sa-
mostalna satnija Buna, jedan vod VP-a HVO-a, dio „Ka-
žnjeničke bojne“ i skupina HOS-a. Dio 7. bojne HVO-a
prešao je rijeku Neretvu 14. lipnja, a dio 15. lipnja. Do
večeri 15. lipnja oslobođeno je područje Blagaja i Gnoj-
nica, a 16. lipnja je organizirana i utvrđena crta obrane
Busak - Vranjevići - Ravnice.581
Nakon prestrojavanja postojećih i uvođenja svježih
snaga na dijelu Velike Fortice 17. lipnja HVO napreduje i
čisti južne dijelove grada preko Gnojnica prema aerodro-
mu i iz smjera Bune spaja se sa snagama južnoga dijela
grada. Cilj je ovladati područjem Podveležja, što su uči-
nile snage iz južnoga dijela grada i predjela Fortice.582 U
Podveležju je vod HVO-a napao položaje na Svetoj gori,
580 Isto; Izjava generala Stanka Sopte.
581 Organizacija oslobađanja općine Mostar (nepotpisan i
nedatiran prikaz izrađen 1993. godine); Izjava brigadira
Ivana Primorca; Izjava brigadira Radmila Jaska.
582 Isto.
246
Domovinski rat 04-02-2020 Knjiga 1.indd 246
Battalion Tihomir Mišić captured the Serb strongholds
Sjeverni Logor and Zalik and established defenses on
the Neretva - Podvožnjak – vrh Zalika - Strelište line.
On the morning of June 16, the 5th and 4th Battalions
captured Južni Logor and the Opine area, and the 2nd
Battalion captured the village of Raštane and then also
Fortica Hill above Mostar. In the southern part of the
battlefield, on the morning of June 14, Croatian forces
crossed the Neretva at Buna in boats from the direction
of Baćevići. These forces liberated Buna during the day.
Elements of the 4th Battalion of the 4th Brigade of the
ZNG, Independent Company Buna, one Military Police
Battalion of the HVO, elements of the Penal Battalion,
and a detachment of the HOS also crossed the river. El-
ements of the 7th Battalion of the HVO crossed the river
on June 14, and the remainder of the battalion crossed
the river on the following day, June 15. By the evening
of June 15 the HVO had liberated the Blagaj and Gno-
jnice areas. On June 16, defensive positions were set up
on the Busak-Vranjevići- Ravnice line.7
The HVO forces engaged in the operation re-
grouped and were reinforced with fresh units. On
June 17 the HVO advanced in the area of Velika For-
tica and mopped up the southern parts of the city in
the area of Gnojnice towards the airport. The forces
advancing from the direction of Buna linked up with
the forces in the southern part of the city. The aim was
to take control of the Podveležje plateau. Troops from
the southern part of the city and troops from some
parts of Fortica achieved that objective. An HVO pla-
toon attacked the Serb positions in Sveta Gora. The
Serbs were routed, escaping in the direction of the
Podveležje plateau – Busak and in the direction the
D
Podveležje plateau – Relay.
The HVO then focused its efforts on liberating Bi-
jelo Polje. The bridge in Drežnica and the hydroelectric
power plant Grabovica were secured prior to the attack.
During the night of June 18-19 the Engineering Group
R
set up a scaffold along the destroyed bridge in Bijela
and the 3rd Battalion crossed to the other bank of the
river. The Recon-Commando Group had already crossed
the river and secured a bridgehead on the other side.
The following morning, after artillery preparation ele-
ments of the 3rd Battalion attacked in the direction of
Bresnica – Otolež and in the direction of Markanovina
7 Statement by Brigadier Ivan Primorac.
4.2.2020. 19:34:47
 The Croatian Nation’s Struggle for Survival, 1991-1995
što je izazvalo rasulo i bezglavo povlačenje srpskih snaga
pravcima Podveležje – Busak i Podveležje – Relej.583
Težište djelovanja HVO je potom prebacio na osloba-
đanje Bijelog polja. Prije početka oslobađanja osigurani
su most u Drežnici i HE Grabovica. U noći 18./19. lipnja
inženjerijska je skupina napravila skelu na srušenom mo-
stu u Bijeloj, preko koje je nakon ponoći prešla 3. bojna
uz zaštitu izvidničko-diverzantske skupine koja je branila
mostobran. Ujutro su nakon topničke pripreme dijelovi 3.
bojne napali glavnim smjerom Bresnica – Otolež i pomoć-
H
nim pravcem Markanovina – Salakovac. Prijepodne je 1.
bojna čamcima prešla jezero i napala na smjeru Vojno
– Potoci. Istodobno je 4. bojna napala smjerom Sjeverni
logor – Vrapčići i potisnula srpske snage prema Potocima,
gdje su uništene kod samostana časnih sestara. U Zapo-
vjedništvu TG-a Mostar odlučili su iskoristiti uspjeh i na-
M
stavili su napad smjerom Podgorani – Zelenika – Humi da
bi presjekli prometnicu Potoci – Rujište i spriječili povla-
čenje srpskih snaga prema Nevesinju. Do večeri 19. lipnja
HVO je ovladao crtom Vrapčići – Potoci – Željuša – Humi –
Zelenika. Idućega dana, 20. lipnja, u Potocima su se spojili
dijelovi 1. i 3. bojne, nakon čega je 1. bojna preuzela crtu
obrane i njezino utvrđivanje.584
D
Kratki predah u napadima HVO-a srpske snage iskori-
stile su za sređivanje stanja na području Velikog Banjdola i
Kružnja, a HVO se pripremao za ovladavanje Podveleškim
platoom. Tijekom 22. lipnja 4. bojna HVO-a uspostavila je
crtu razdvajanja Banjdol – kota 683, a sjeverno na područ-
C
ju Poljice. Hrvatsko vijeće obrane povuklo se 23. lipnja na
crtu razdvajanja Polja – Dražnjača. Na tom su se dijelu vo-
dile borbe i 24. lipnja, kao i za Poljice, s težištem na releju
Velež, koji je dominirao nad okolinom. Relej je 25. lipnja
zauzela Kažnjenička bojna uz potporu Poskok bojne, te
2., 3. i 4. bojne HVO-a Mostar. Srpske su snage 26. lipnja
D
izvele protuudar i razbile crtu HVO-a na području Polja –
Dražnjača. Poslijepodne su u boj uvedene svježe snage 3.
bojne HVO-a, uz pomoć kojih je zaustavljeno povlačenje
hrvatskih snaga i uspostavljena crta obrane u Patkovići-
ma, gdje je ostala do 8. srpnja. Toga je dana Nevesinjska
brigada VRS-a krenula u napad i nakon dvodnevnih bor-
bi zauzela Podveležje te odbacila HVO na crtu Suhi Dol
– Vučja glava – Stolac – Velika kosa – Guberača – Drvenik
– Komić – Ravnice – Stjepangrad – Orlovača.585
583 Isto.
584 Isto.
585 ICTY: Komanda Hercegovačkog korpusa, Borbeni izvještaj
str. pov. br. 147-288 od 8. 7. 1992.; Organizacija oslobađan-
ja općine Mostar; Izjava generala Miljenka Lasića.
247
Domovinski rat 04-02-2020 Knjiga 1.indd 247
– Salakovac. The former direction was the main axis of
advance and the latter direction the supporting axis of
advance. During the morning the 1st Battalion crossed
the Neretva River in boats and attacked in the direction
of Vojno – Potoci. At the same time the 4th Battalion at-
tacked in the direction of the Sjeverni Logor barracks –
Vrapčići and pushed back the Serb troops towards Poto-
ci. In Potoci, by the Convent, the retreating Serbs troops
were decisively defeated. The HQ of the TG Mostar de-
cided to take advantage of the success. The attack con-
tinued in the direction Podgorani – Zelenika – Humi
with the aim of cutting the Potoci – Rujište road and pre-
venting Serb troops from retreating towards Nevesinje.
By the evening on June 19 the HVO was in full control
of the Vrapčići – Potoci – Željuša – Humi – Zelenika line.
The following day elements of the 1st and 3rd Battalions
linked up in Potoci. After that the 1st Battalion started
fortifying the defensive life.
At this point the HVO paused for breath. The Serbs
took advantage of that intermission by solidifying their
positions in the area of Veliki Banjdol and Kružanj. The
HVO was busy with preparations for capturing the Pod-
veležje plateau. During June 22 the 4th Battalion of the
HVO established two separation lines; one along the
Banjdol – Hill 683 line and the other in the Poljice area.
The HVO withdrew, on June 23 to the Polja – Dražnjača
separation line. In that area there was fighting on June 24
and also fighting developed for the village of Poljice. The
main effort of the attackers was focused on the Velež ra-
dio television tower. The location was important because
it conferred to the occupier control of the surrounding
area. The tower was captured on June 25 by the Penal
Battalion supported by the Poskok Battalion, and 2nd, 3rd
and 4th Battalions of the HVO Mostar. Only when the HVO
brought in the 2nd Battalion was the tower captured, on
June 25. On June 26 the Serbs mounted a counterattack
and defeated the HVO troops on the Polja – Dražnjača
line. In the afternoon the 3rd Battalion joined the fray and
R
the retreat of the defeated Croatian forces was halted. A
new defensive line was set up in Patkovići. On July 8 the
Nevesinje Brigade of the VRS attacked and after two days
of fighting the HVO had no choice but to withdraw from
Podveležje to the Suhi Dol – Vučja Glava – Stolac – Velika
Kosa – Guberača – Drvenik – Komić – Ravnice – Stjepan-
grad – Orlovača line.8
8 Statement by Miljenko Lasić.
4.2.2020. 19:34:47
 Davor Marijan • Rat za opstojnost Hrvata, 1991. - 1995.
Tijekom ljeta i do kraja godine osnovane su četiri bri-
gade HVO-a: 1. brigada za općine Čapljina, Neum, Stolac
i Ravno, 2. za Mostar, 3. za općine Mostar i Široki Brijeg i
4. za općine Ljubuški, Grude i Čitluk. Operativna grupa
Jugoistočna Hercegovina je 31. kolovoza 1992. preime-
novana u Operativnu zonu Jugoistočna Hercegovina sa
sjedištem u Mostaru. Zapovjednici su bili pukovnik Dra-
go Poljak i brigadir Miljenko Lasić. Nakon oslobodilačkih
operacija osnovane su i dvije brigade Armije RBiH: 1. mo-
starska i 42. brdska Bregava, a u studenome je osnovan 4.
H
korpus Armije RBiH. Sjedište korpusa bilo je u Mostaru, a
zapovjednik je bio Arif Pašalić.586
Osiguranje zaleđa Dubrovnika i
operacija Tigar
M
Operacijom Čagalj, a potom i oslobađanjem Mo-
stara (Neretva), osigurano je stabilno zaleđe hrvatskim
snagama u Dubrovniku i olakšano napredovanje pre-
ma državnim granicama Republike Hrvatske.587 Bio je
to uvod u operaciju Tigar,588 čiji je cilj bio potisnuti sna-
ge Hercegovačkoga korpusa VRS-a na južni rub Popova
D
polja s planinskih visova od uzvisine Gradac do Timuna
te ga odbaciti iz okolice Dubrovnika dovoljno daleko
da se napravi osnovica za oslobađanje Konavala.589
Operacija Tigar završila je 13. srpnja 1992. godine.
Osvojene su dominantne kote iznad Dubrovnika i de-
blokiran je grad, razbijene su snage VRS-a u istočnoj
C
Hercegovini i odbačene 15 kilometara sjeverno od
Dubrovnika, prema Trebinju. Otvorena je i prometnica
Ploče – Dubrovnik, koja je olakšala opskrbu Dubrovni-
ka i logističku potporu HV-a u daljnjim operacijama. No
kako nije osvojena Vlaštica, koja je bila oslonac za pro-
dor prema Konavlima, operacija je postigla mnogo ma-
586 GS HVO, Zapovijed str. pov. br. 01-593/92 od 6. 7. 1992.;
Odjel obrane HZ HB, Zapovijed str. pov. br. 03-79/92 od
15. 9. 1992.; Odjel obrane HZ HB, Zapovijed str. pov. br.
03-100/92 od 22. 9. 1992.; OZ JiH, Informacija ur. br. 01-
585/92 od 9. 10. 1992.; Zapovjedništvo 4. korpusa AR-
BiH, Naređenje pov. dj. br. 1065-1 od 24. 11. 1992.
587 1. gardijska brigada HV – Tigrovi, 245-246.
588 4. gardijska brigada HV – Pauci, 204-206.
589 IZM Ploče ZJV, Zapovijed za napad kl. 8/92-01/159, ur.
br. 1080-02-10-92-1 od 27. 6. 1992. Faksimil kod: J. BOB-
ETKO, Sve moje bitke, 302-317; SVA MORH, ZJB: ZJV, Re-
dovno izvješće kl. 81/92-02/97, ur. br. 6030-03/92-197
od 3. 7. 1992.; 1. gardijska brigada HV – Tigrovi, 247-252;
4. gardijska brigada HV – Pauci, 208-216.
248
Domovinski rat 04-02-2020 Knjiga 1.indd 248
Four brigades of the HVO were formed during the
summer and by the end of the year: the 1st Brigade for
the municipalities of Čapljina, Neum, Stolac and Ravno,
the 2nd Brigade for Mostar, the 3rd Brigade for the munic-
ipalities of Mostar and Široki Brijeg and the 4th Brigade
for the municipalities of Ljubuški, Grude and Čitluk. Op-
erational Group Southeast Herzegovina was redesignat-
ed as Operative Zone Southeast Herzegovina on August
31, 1992. Its HQ was in Mostar. The commanders were
Colonel Drago Poljak and brigadier Miljenko Lasić. After
these offensive operations two brigades of the Army of
the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina were formed
as well: the 1st Mostar Brigade and the 42nd Mountain
Brigade “Bregava”. In November, IV Corps of the Army
of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina was formed.
The HQ of the corps was in Mostar and the commander
was Arif Pašalić.
Securing Dubrovnik’s Hinterland and
Operation Tiger
With the successes achieved in Operation Jackal
and the liberation of Mostar (Operation Neretva) the
rear of the Croatian forces in Dubrovnik was secured.
With no danger looming from that direction, the Cro-
atian forces in the Dubrovnik area were able to ad-
vance towards the borders of the Republic of Croatia.
The stage was thus set for Operation Tiger. The aim of
the operation was to push back the VRS Herzegovina
Corps, from its positions on mountain tops from Gra-
dac Hill to Timun, to the southern edge of the Popovo
field and as far as necessary from the environs of Du-
brovnik so as to make a future operation for the liber-
D
ation of Konavle possible.
Operation Tiger ended on July 13, 1992. The Croa-
tian forces captured the dominating hills around Du-
brovnik, broke the Serb siege of the city, defeated the
VRS forces in eastern Herzegovina and pushed them
R
back 15 kilometers to the north of Dubrovnik, towards
Trebinje. The Ploče – Dubrovnik road was open for traf-
fic and that made it significantly easier to bring supplies
to the city and logistically support the Croatian Army.
However, the Croatian Army failed to capture Vlaštica,
a key position for a planned advance towards Konav-
le. Operation Tiger was a marginal victory for the Cro-
atian Army. One of the results of Operation Tiger was
that the Croatian Army advanced deep into Bosnia and
Herzegovina’s territory. The Croatian Army really had no
4.2.2020. 19:34:47
 The Croatian Nation’s Struggle for Survival, 1991-1995
nji rezultat od očekivanog.590 Hrvatska je vojska u ope-
raciji Tigar zašla duboko na teritorij BiH jer je samo tako
bilo moguće postići veću operativnu dubinu kojom se
Dubrovnik osiguravao od srpskoga ugrožavanja.591
Operacija Oslobođena zemlja
Potreba za operacijom kao što je Oslobođena ze-
mlja pokazala se već u završnom dijelu operacije Tigar,
nakon što su neke pričuvne postrojbe HV-a počele
H
gubiti važne uporišne točke na crti obrane u istočnoj
Hercegovini. Srpske su snage koristile prednost po-
znavanja terena i počele su prelaziti u inicijativu. Da to
onemogući, general Bobetko odlučio se na, kako se či-
nilo, manje zahtjevnu operaciju čiji je cilj bio staviti pod
nadzor prometnicu Zavala – Osojnik i izbiti na obronke
M
jugozapadnoga ruba Popova polja te na njima posta-
viti novu crtu obrane. Tako se planiralo dijelom dobiti
Popovo polje kao prirodni međuprostor između crte
razdvajanja, što je bilo mnogo lakše braniti. Operacija
je planirana u tri dana.592
Operacija Oslobođena zemlja realizirana je samo
D
manjim dijelom. Pokazalo se da je prisutnost brigada
ZNG-a nužna i da bez nje nema pomaka. Pričuvne su
se postrojbe pokazale slabijima no što su bile jer su go-
tovo sve taktičke grupe dovedene iz dubine Hrvatske
bile nehomogene postrojbe nespremne za zahtjevne
zadatke i djelovanje na vrlo teškom terenu.
C
Protuudar Hercegovačkoga korpusa u
kolovozu 1992. godine
Početkom kolovoza, u sklopu direktive za daljnje
D
djelovanje, Glavni štab VRS-a naredio je Hercegovačko-
590 J. BOBETKO, Sve moje bitke, 337-338; 1. gardijska brigada
HV – Tigrovi, 252.
591 SVA MORH, ZJB: IZM Dubrovnik ZJV, Zapovijed za obranu
kl. 8/92-01/81, ur. br. 1080-01-01-92-08 od 17. 7. 1992.
592 SVA MORH, ZJB: IZM Dubrovnik ZJV, Zapovijed za na-
pad kl. 8-92-01/159, ur. br. 1080-02-10-92-20 od 21. 7.
1992.; SVA MORH, ZJB: IZM Dubrovnik ZJV, Dopuna
Zapovijedi za napad kl. 8-92-01/159, ur. br. 1080-02-
10-92-21 od 21. 7. 1992.; 4. gardijska brigada HV – Pauci,
218-219.; 1. gardijska brigada HV – Tigrovi, 259-260; SVA
MORH, ZJB: IZM Dubrovnik ZJV, Zapovijed za napadna
djelovanja kl. 8-92-01/265, ur. br. 1080-01-01-92-1 od 4.
9. 1992.; SVA MORH, ZJB: IZM Dubrovnik ZJV, Zapovijed
za stabiliziranje obrane kl. 8-92-01/274, ur. br. 1080-01-
01-92-1 od 11. 9. 1992.
249
Domovinski rat 04-02-2020 Knjiga 1.indd 249
choice but to use Bosnia and Herzegovina’s territory for
achieving operational depth and, in turn, keep the Serb
forces well away from Dubrovnik.
Operation Liberated Land
During the concluding phase of Operation Tiger,
some reserve units of the Croatian Army started to buck-
le under the Serbs’ determined attacks in eastern Herze-
govina. A number of key defensive positions were lost
to the enemy, and the Serb forces, taking advantage of
fighting on familiar ground, seized the initiative. General
Bobetko realized that the Croatian Army would have to
mount another offensive operation. His main concern
was to arrest the growing momentum of the Serb forces.
The aims of the new operation were limited in compari-
son to those of Operation Tiger. The area around the Za-
vala – Ostojnik road would be cleared of enemy troops,
and the attacking troops would reach the slopes on the
south-western edge of the Popovo field and establish a
new defensive line there. The idea was to gain the Popo-
vo field as a natural buffer zone along the separation line
and thus make the new defensive line that much more
defensible. The operation, codenamed Liberated Land,
was to last three days.
The operation was a partial success. It became clear
that ambitious offensive operations could not be deci-
sively successful without the participation of ZNG Bri-
gades. The reserve formations underperformed. The
main reason for their less than optimal performance was
the fact that all the tactical groups brought from other
areas of Croatia were not homogenous formations and
as such were not ready to accomplish demanding tasks
and operate with speed and determination in a rugged
and inhospitable terrain.
Herzegovina Corps’s Counterattack in
August 1992
R
At the beginning of August, as part of the direc-
tive for further actions, the General Staff of the Army
of the Republika Srpska ordered Herzegovina Corps
to defend the approaches to Herzegovina from Župa
Dubrovačka at all costs and send its main force into
attack with the aim of reaching the left bank of the
Neretva River on the stretch of the river’s flow between
Konjic and Čapljina and “if possible, reach the admin-
istrative border with Croatia”. It took about 10 days for
4.2.2020. 19:34:47
 Davor Marijan • Rat za opstojnost Hrvata, 1991. - 1995.
mu korpusu da odsudno brani pravce koji vode iz Župe
dubrovačke u Hercegovinu i glavnim snagama izbije na
lijevu obalu Neretve na dijelu od Konjica do Čapljine i
“po mogućnosti na administrativnu granicu s Hrvat-
skom”.593 Nakon desetak dana priprema Hercegovački je
korpus krenuo u provedbu naredbe. U kolovozu je po-
čeo pritisak prema snagama HV-a i HVO-a na području
Dubrovnika, Stoca i Mostara. Glavni je udar VRS napra-
vio 15. kolovoza napadom na Osojnik kod Dubrovnika
i Stolac, no bez uspjeha.594 Napadi VRS-a od 21. do 26.
H
kolovoza na mostarskom dijelu bojišta, od Bijelog polja
do Blagaja, također nisu uspjeli.595
Oslobađanje Konavala i zaleđa
Dubrovnika
M
Od sredine rujna hrvatske su snage intenzivno utvr-
đivale položaje za skoru zimu i pripremale se za osloba-
đanje Konavala. Kraj borbi na Južnom bojištu počeo se
nazirati nakon što je 24. rujna na brodu britanske ratne
mornarice Avenger potpisan sporazum kojim je reguli-
rano povlačenje Vojske Jugoslavije s područja Konavala
D
i demilitarizacija poluotoka Oštre. Na temelju toga spo-
razuma postrojbe Vojske Jugoslavije povukle su se 20.
listopada s Prevlake, koju su preuzeli promatrači UN-a.596
Očekujući povlačenje postrojbi Vojske Jugoslavije,
hrvatske su se snage pripremale za Konavle, završnu
operaciju na Južnom bojištu. Prva brigada ZNG-a odre-
C
đena je za oslobađanje Cavtata i šire okolice. Brigada
je nakon jednodnevnog odgađanja u noći 20./21., po
iznimno nepovoljnim vremenskim uvjetima i visokim
valovima, izvela pomorski desant kod Cavtata. Zajedno
s lijevim susjedom u napadu, 163. brigadom HV-a, te
snagama policije koje su već bile ubačene na područ-
je napada, oslobodila je okupirano područje i izbila na
granicu s BiH.597
593 ICTY: GŠ VSR BiH, Direktiva za dalja dejstva Op. br. 3 str.
pov. br. 02/5-92 od 3. 8. 1992.
594 D. MARIJAN, 144. brigada, 47-48.
595 J. RAGUŽ, “Prva hercegovačka brigada HVO ‘Knez Doma-
goj’”, 193-196.
596 SVA MORH, GSHV: Dnevno izvješće kl. 81/92-02, ur. br.
5120-05/13-92-286 od 21. 10. 1992.; Branko Vojičić, “Do
Dubrovnika i natrag”, feljton “Rat za Prevlaku”, Monitor,
Podgorica, 1. 11. 1992., 46; J. BOBETKO, Sve moje bitke,
139-140.
597 1. gardijska brigada HV – Tigrovi, 264-269, 271.
250
Domovinski rat 04-02-2020 Knjiga 1.indd 250
Herzegovina Corps to get ready for the operation. In
August Herzegovina Corps attacked the Croatian Army
and HVO forces in and around Dubrovnik, Stolac and
Mostar. The main push came on August 15 when the
VRS attacked Osojnik near Dubrovnik and Stolac. The
attack was unsuccessful. The VRS’s attacks from August
21 to August 26 in the Mostar area, from Bijelo Polje to
Blagaj, were also unsuccessful.
Liberation of Konavle and Dubrovnik’s
Hinterland
From mid-September the Croatian forces were busy
fortifying their positions and preparing offensive actions
for the liberation of Konavle. On September 24, aboard
the HMS Avenger Croatia and SR Yugoslavia signed an
agreement regulating the withdrawal of the Yugoslav
Army from the Konavle area and the demilitarization of
the Oštra Peninsula. The units of the Yugoslav Army duly
withdrew from Prevlaka on October 20 and UN observ-
ers moved in.
The Croatian Army expected that the Yugoslav Army
would withdraw from Prevlaka. For that reason, it was
necessary to prepare Operation Konavle. The 1st Brigade
of the ZNG would liberate Cavtat and the wider Cavtat
area. The plan was that the Brigade would launch an
amphibious attack at Cavtat during the night of Octo-
ber 20-21. Due to unfavorable weather conditions, the
attack was postponed for 24 hours. The following night
the sea was still choppy but the attack went ahead any-
way. The 163rd Brigade of the Croatian Army and the po-
lice forces that had already infiltrated the area of attack
secured the left flank of the 1st Brigade. The attack was
D
successful and the Croatian forces liberated the occu-
pied territory and reached the Bosnian border.
The last exploit of the 4th Brigade in the Southern
Theater of Operations was Operation Vlaštica. Vlaštica is
the highest peak above Dubrovnik and it had been one
R
of the objectives of Operation Tiger. The Croatian forces
had failed to capture it during that operation. The Serb
troops controlling the peak had a clear view of the city
and its environs from their vantage point. The operation
commenced on October 22 without the benefit of the
element of surprise because of the 1st Brigade’s amphib-
ious attack on Cavtat. The fighting for the peak lasted
three days. On October 25 the 4th Brigade took Vlaštica
Hill and Bobovište and thus successfully completed Op-
eration Vlaštica.
4.2.2020. 19:34:47
 The Croatian Nation’s Struggle for Survival, 1991-1995

Posljednji pothvat 4. brigade ZNG-a na Južnom bo-

jištu bila je operacija Vlaštica. Nazvana je po istoimenoj
koti, najvišem vrhu iznad Dubrovnika koji, premda se to
planiralo, nije zauzet u operaciji Tigar. S Vlaštice su srp-
ske snage vizualno nadzirale grad i okolicu.598 Operacija
je počela 22. listopada bez efekta iznenađenja zbog iskr-
cavanja 1. brigade ZNG-a u Cavtatu. Uspješno je završe-
na 25. listopada zaposjedanjem Vlaštice i Bobovišta.599

Operacija Bura
H
Posljednja operacija na Južnom bojištu koju je ge-
neral Bobetko planirao i zapovjedio prije no što je u
studenome 1992. preuzeo dužnost načelnika Glavnoga
stožera HV-a bila je napadna operacija HVO-a u Podve-
ležju. Cilj operacije bio je energičnim udarom oslabiti
M
ili spriječiti očekivani napad VRS-a, u čemu se na kra-
ju uspjelo, odnosno poboljšati položaj HVO-a, odbaciti
srpske snage u istočnu Hercegovinu i otkloniti opasnost
od vatre njihova topništva po Mostaru, Čapljini i Stocu,
kao i omogućiti djelovanje vlastitog topništva po Ne-
vesinju. Za operaciju je određeno oko 1600 pripadnika
D
HVO-a, uz potporu 25 topničkih oruđa i satniju tenko-
va.600 Nakon nekoliko dana odgađanja, operacija je po-
čela 8. studenoga napadom nekoliko borbenih skupina
Kažnjeničke bojne, koje su u početku napale objekt Ko-
biljaču i izbile na cestu Rabina-Nevesinje, a na desnom
boku bojna Ludvig Pavlović djeluje na kotu 690 iznad
C
Zapovjednik Južnog bojišta, general Janko Bobetko, i hrvatski
vojnici u oslobođenom Cavtatu, listopad 1992. (autor fotografi-
Rotimlje, gdje u žestokim borbama pogiba zapovjednik
ja: Zlatko Kalle).
bojne Božan Šimović.601 Operaciju je VRS obilježavao
kao Mitrovdansku bitku i u njoj je Nevesinjska brigada The commander of the Southern Front, General Janko Bobetko
izgubila 41 borca.602 S manjim uspjesima operacija je za- and Croatian soldiers in liberated Cavtat, October, 1992. (Photo-
graphs by Zlatko Kalle).
vršena, što je ujedno bio kraj većih borbi Hrvata i Srba
D
na Južnom bojištu do 1995. godine.
***
Borbe na Južnom bojištu tijekom 1992. iznimno Operation Bura
su važne za Hrvatsku, ali i za Hrvate i Bošnjake u BiH. S
obzirom na to da na jugu nije bilo UNPROFOR-a, i Hr- The last operation in the Southern Theater of
Operations planned and commanded by General Bo-
R
betko before he was appointed Chief of the General
598 4. gardijska brigada HV – Pauci, 224-229.
Staff of the Croatian Army in November, 1992, was an
599 Isto, 230-235.
HVO offensive on the Podveležje plateau. The aim of
600 ZJV, Zapovijed za napadnu operaciju, kl. 8/92-01/40, ur. the operation was to weaken or prevent the expect-
br. 3105-01-01-92-10 od 20. 10. 1992.
ed attack of the VRS, push back the Serb forces into
601 Izjava Jure Begića od 30. 3. 2012. o djelovanju Pukovnije eastern Herzegovina and out of artillery range of Mo-
Ante Bruno Bušić na Gnjilom brdu na Podveležju. Izjava
generala Stanka Sopte. star, Čapljina and Stolac and advance within artillery
602 O. Žerajić, “Na braniku srpskih ognjišta”, Srpska vojska, 15.
range of Nevesinje. 1,600 men were to participate in
7. 1993., 12. the operation, supported by 25 artillery pieces and a

251

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 Davor Marijan • Rat za opstojnost Hrvata, 1991. - 1995.
H
M
Naselja spaljena u srpsko-crnogorskoj agresiji na Dubrovnik i jug
Hrvatske u jesen 1991., Konavle (autor fotografije: Zlatko Kalle).
D
Villages torched to the ground by Serb-Montenegrin forces
during their attacks on Dubrovnik and southern Croatia in au-
tumn 1991, Konavle (Photograph by Zlatko Kalle).
C
vatska vojska i JNA mogle su neometano djelovati, što
su i činile. Hrvatska je vojska pomogla HVO-u da izdrži
prvi udar JNA na nekim pravcima (posebno kod Livna),
a u dolini Neretve značajno je doprinijela obrani. U oslo-
bodilačkom pohodu prema Prevlaci, koji su predvodile
dvije brigade ZNG-a, pokazalo se da je VRS mnogo lakše
prepuštao osvojena područja od svojih u istočnoj Her-
cegovini. Bojište je bilo teško i zahtjevno, a zahtjevan
boj na kršu bio je velik šok za dio pripadnika 1. brigade
ZNG-a, o čemu posredno govori podatak o 194 raskida
ugovora do 12. svibnja 1992. godine.603 Najveći učinak
na bojištu imale su 1. i 4. brigada ZNG-a što je i razumlji-
vo s obzirom na to da su bile profesionalne postrojbe.
No ne smije se podcijeniti ni doprinos pričuvnih briga-
da i taktičkih skupina koje su konstantno držale crtu i
bile na pomoćnim pravcima napada.
603 SVA MORH, KMO: Zapovjednik JV od 12. 5. 1992. za
Predsjednika i ministra obrane RH.
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Domovinski rat 04-02-2020 Knjiga 1.indd 252
tank company.9 After a number of postponements the
operation finally started on November 8 when a num-
ber of combat groups went on the attack. A number of
detachments of the Penal Battalion attacked Kobiljača
and reached the Rabina – Nevesinje road and the Lud-
vig Pavlović Battalion, on the right flank, attacked Hill
690 above Rotmilja. The commander of the Ludvig Pav-
lović Battalion, Božan Šimović, was killed in that attack.
The Nevesinje Brigade of the VRS lost 41 men. In Ser-
bian historiography the battle is called the Mitrovdan
Battle. The operation was a minor victory for the HVO
and was the last larger battle between the Serbs and
Croats in the Southern Theater of Operations until 1995.
The battles in the Southern Theater of Operations
in 1992 were immensely important for the Republic of
Croatia and also for the Bosnian Croats and Muslims in
Bosnia and Herzegovina. UNPROFOR was not present in
the theater and that gave the Croatian Army and the
JNA a free rein. The Croatian Army helped the HVO to
absorb the first attacks by the JNA on a number of axes
of JNA advance (especially near Livno). In the Neretva
Valley, the Croatian Army significantly helped the HVO.
During the Croatian Army’s advance towards Prevlaka it
became clear that the VRS did not fight as fiercely for the
areas it had conquered as it did for its areas in eastern
Herzegovina. The terrain in the theater was rugged and
extremely demanding for the soldiers fighting there. It
is worthy of mention that by May 12, 1992, 194 mem-
bers of the 1st Brigade of the ZNG had decided not to
renew their contracts of service. The 1st Brigade and the
4th Brigade were professional formations and as such
were the Croatian Army’s trump cards in the theater. It
has to be noted, however, that the contribution of the
D
reserve brigades and tactical groups was also import-
ant because these formations held the defensive lines
and attacked on supporting axes of advance.
R
9 Statement by General Stanko Sopta.
4.2.2020. 19:34:49
 The Croatian Nation’s Struggle for Survival, 1991-1995
SJEVERNA HERCEGOVINA
U sjevernoj Hercegovini, u općinama Prozor, Konjic
i Jablanica, Hrvati su imali većinu samo u Prozoru. Oni
su u prosincu 1991. osnovali obrambene sastave, koji
su u travnju 1992. u Prozoru i Konjicu postali HVO, a
u Jablanici je organiziranje osjetno kasnilo. Najprije su
osnovani općinski stožeri, u sklopu kojih su se osnivale
satnije i bojne. Do početka rujna HVO je bio pod za-
povijedanjem Glavnoga stožera oružanih snaga HVO-a
H
za srednju Bosnu. U rujnu su osnovane brigade HVO-a
Rama za općinu Prozor, odnosno Ramu, i Herceg Stje-
pan za Konjic i Jablanicu. Obje su brigade ušle u sastav
Operativne zone Sjeverozapadna Hercegovina sa sjedi-
štem u Tomislavgradu. Skupina HOS-a u Konjicu sredi-
M
nom kolovoza pridružila se Armiji RBiH.604
Muslimani su bili organizirani po prostornoj struk-
turi općinskih štabova TO-a. Njihovi su sastavi bili
slabije naoružani. U lipnju 1992. je osnovana TG-1 za
područje općina Hadžići, Pazarić, Konjic i Jablanica.605
Postojala je do studenoga 1992., kada je ukinuta, a
zona je podijeljena između 1. i 4. korpusa Armije RBiH.
D
Općine Jablanica, Konjic i Prozor ušle su u sastav 4. kor-
pusa Armije RBiH sa sjedištem u Mostaru. Na području
Konjica Armija Republike BiH osnovala je brigade Suad
Alić u Konjicu, Neretvicu u Parsovićima i Neretvu u Ja-
blanici. U istočnom dijelu općine Prozor osnovan je Sa-
C
mostalni bataljun Prozor.606
Krajem svibnja 1992. u sjevernoj Hercegovini po-
javio se Mate Šarlija Daidža (rođenjem Nijaz Batlak,
musliman) sa skupinom zvanom 1. bosanskoherce-
govački korpus – zbor Kralj Tomislav. Alija Izetbegović
zadužio ga je za područje sjeverne Hercegovine i bo-
D
sanskih općina na prilazima Sarajevu. Nakon sukoba s
604 ICTY: Ratni dnevnik GS OS HZ Srednja Bosna; Izvješće
općinskog stožera HVO Konjic od 20. 8. 1992.; ICTY:
Glavni stožer HVO, Zapovijed str. pov. 01-2054/92 od
31. 8. 1992.; Ratni put 56. domobranske pukovnije Her-
ceg-Stjepan HVO Konjic (nedatiran i nepotpisan prikaz,
vjerojatno iz 1994.); Davor MARIJAN, “Sukob HVO-a
i ARBiH u Prozoru u listopadu 1992.”, Časopis za suvre-
menu povijest, 2/38, 2006., 383.
605 ICTY: GŠ OS RBiH, Imenovanje br. 02/349-343 od 11. 7.
1992.; M. ĆATIĆ ČUPERAK, Sjene nad Igmanom, 105-106;
M. ŠADINLIJA, Teritorijalna odbrana BiH, 241, 244-245.
606 Zapovjedništvo 4. korpusa ARBiH, Naređenje pov. dj. br.
1065-1 od 24. 11. 1992.; Komanda 4. korpusa, Izvještaj
sa kontrole stanja u brigadama izvršene 28. 11. 1992.
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Domovinski rat 04-02-2020 Knjiga 1.indd 253
NORTHERN HERZEGOVINA
There were three municipalities in northern Herze-
govina; the Prozor Municipality, the Konjic Municipality
and the Jablanica Municipality. Only the Prozor Munici-
pality was predominantly Croatian. The Croats of north-
ern Herzegovina formed their defensive units in Decem-
ber, 1991. In April, 1992, these units became the HVO
in Konjic and Prozor. The organizational process in Jab-
lanica lagged behind that in Prozor and Konjic. Initially
municipal HQs were formed and then, within the scope
of those HQs, companies and battalions were formed as
well. Until the beginning of September the HVO was un-
der the command of the Main HVO HQ for Central Bosnia.
In September an HVO brigade for the Rama Municipality
(the town of Prozor was the administrative center of the
municipality was formed. The Herzeg Stjepan Brigade
was formed for Konjic and Jablanica. Both Brigades were
placed under the command of Operative Zone North-
west Herzegovina. The HQ of Operative Zone Northwest
Herzegovina was in Tomislavgrad. The HOS group from
Konjic joined the Army of the Republic of Bosnia and
Herzegovina in mid-August.
The Muslims were organized according to the ter-
ritorial structure of the municipal HQs of the Territorial
Defense. The Muslim’s formations were not as well armed
as those of the Croats. In June, 1992, the TG-1 was formed
for the municipalities of Hadžići, Pazarić, Konjic and Jab-
lanica. The TG-1 was disbanded in November, 1992. The
zone was divided between I and IV Corps of the Army of
the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina. The municipal-
ities of Jablanica, Konjic and Prozor were within the area
of responsibility of IV Corps of the Army of the Repub-
lic of Bosnia and Herzegovina with its HQ in Mostar. In
the Konjic area the Army of the Republic of Bosnia and
Herzegovina formed the Suad Alić Brigade in Konjic, the
Neretvica Brigade in Parsovići and the Neretva Brigade in
Jablanica. The Independent Battalion Prozor was formed
R
in the eastern part of the Prozor Municipality.
Mate “Daidža” Šarlija (born Nijaz Batlak, a Muslim)
started making a name for himself at the end of May,
1992, in northern Herzegovina. He was the leader of a
group pompously and optimistically called I Bosnia and
Herzegovina Corps – “King Tomislav” Group. Alija Izetbe-
gović tasked Mate Šarlija Daidža with operating in north-
ern Herzegovina and municipalities around Sarajevo.
Mate Šarlija Daidža quarreled with the commander of
4.2.2020. 19:34:49
 Davor Marijan • Rat za opstojnost Hrvata, 1991. - 1995.
komandantom TG-1 Zejnilom Delalićem, Daidža se u
ljeto povukao, iako su neke skupine koje je vodio osta-
le na tom području.607
U sjevernoj Hercegovini JNA je imala manja upo-
rišta i objekte: Tvornicu streljiva Igman u Konjicu, vo-
jarnu, skladište i objekt veze Ljuta (Komandno mjesto
Vrhovne komande OS SFRJ), skladište goriva i maziva u
Čelebićima, radiorelejna čvorišta veze Zlatar i Borašni-
ca i radioprijemni centar Kiser kod Boraca. U Kalinoviku
su bila dva puka Bilećkoga korpusa: 13. mješoviti arti-
H
ljerijski i 13. mješoviti protuoklopni artiljerijski. Upori-
šta Srba bila su sela Bijela i Borci južno od Konjica i Bra-
dina sjeverno od grada, a bili su organizirani u odred
TO Borci, koji je po osnutku Hercegovačkoga korpusa
ušao u njegov sastav.608
Skladište u Čelebićima preuzeto je bez borbe 18.
M
travnja 1992. godine. Hrvatsko vijeće obrane uz ma-
nju je pomoć snaga TO-a 5. svibnja zauzelo vojarnu,
skladište i središte veze Ljuta. U skladištu je bilo nao-
ružanje i oprema Teritorijalne obrane Jablanice, Konji-
ca i Prozora. U napadu zrakoplovstva JNA dijelom je
uništeno oružje TO-a Konjic, a preostali je dio izvučen i
D
podijeljen. Objekt Zlatar HVO i TO zauzeli su 7. svibnja,
nakon povlačenja JNA. Zajedno su HVO i TO u borba-
ma od 5. do 7. svibnja odbili srpski napad na planinu
Ljubinu jugozapadno od Konjica. Srbi su 11. svibnja
ušli u Gakiće, koje je branio TO. Napade iz Gornje Bije-
le prema Turiji HVO je odbio. Sela s većinskim srpskim
C
stanovništvom oko Konjica, Bjelovčine, Ceriće i Donje
Selo TO i HVO zauzeli su 21. svibnja. Na južnom dijelu
konjičkoga bojišta ustalila se crta koja se nije mijenjala
godinu dana. HVO i TO dijelom su izmiješanim snaga-
ma držali crtu obrane oko Konjica i uz Neretvu prema
njezinu izvoru. Srbi su bili koncentrirani na platou Bor-
ci, s glavnim uporištem na Kiseru. U sjeveroistočnom i
istočnom dijelu općine Konjic združene snage HVO-a i
TO-a zauzele su 25. svibnja Bradinu i prijevoj Ivan sed-
607 M. ĆATIĆ ČUPERAK, Sjene nad Igmanom, 101-102,
139, 157.
608 ICTY: Pregled mirnodopskih vojnih pošta III uprave GŠ
OS SFRJ iz 1992.; ICTY: Komanda Hercegovačkog kor-
pusa, Naređenje za dalja dejstva str. pov. br. 229-90 od
25. 5. 1992.; Predsjednik HVO Konjic, Priopćenje za jav-
nost br. 03-24/92 od 11. 7. 1992.; Općinski stožer HVO
Konjic, Izvješće br. 02-1/92 od 30. 7. 1992.; Kronologija
događanja na teritoriji općine Konjic 1992. i 1993. go-
dine (nedatirano i nepotpisano, na web-stranici Slo-
bodana Praljka).
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Domovinski rat 04-02-2020 Knjiga 1.indd 254
the TG-1 Zejnilo Delalić and then withdrew most of his
troops in the summer of 1992. However, some units he
was the commander of continued to operate in the area.
The JNA had a number of minor strongholds and
some facilities in northern Herzegovina: the Igman am-
munition factory in Konjic; a barracks and the Ljuta com-
munications bunker (Command post of the Supreme
Command of the Armed Forces of the SFRY) and a gas
depot in Čelebići; radio-relay station of the Zlatar and
Borašnica communications bunkers; the Kiser radio-relay
station at Borci. Two platoons from Bileća Corps were in
Kalinovik: the 13th Mixed Artillery Platoon and the 13th
Mixed Anti-tank Artillery Platoon. The villages of Bijela
and Borci, to the south of Konjic and the village of Bra-
dina to the north of the city were Serb strongholds. Men
from the villages served in the Territorial Defense Squad
Borci. When Herzegovina Corps was formed the Squad
was placed under the Corps’ command.
The HVO captured the warehouse in Čelebići with-
out a fight on April 18, 1992. On May 5 the HVO, with the
little help of the Territorial Defense, captured the bar-
racks, warehouse and the Ljuta communications bunker.
The weapons and equipment belonging to the Territo-
rial Defense of Prozor, Konjic and Jablanica were stored
in the warehouse. JNA planes attacked the warehouse
and destroyed almost all the weapons and equipment
belonged to the Territorial Defense Konjic. The weapons
and equipment belonging to the Territorial Defense of
Jablanica and Prozor were distributed to HVO and Mus-
lim units. The HVO and Territorial Defense captured the
Zlatar installation on May 7 after the JNA units guarding
the facility had withdrawn. Operating in concert, the
HVO and the Territorial Defense, during the two days of
D
fighting – from May 5 to May 7 – beat back a Serb attack
on Mount Ljubina to the southwest of Konjic. The Serbs
entered Gakići on May 11. The village was defended by
the Territorial Defense. The HVO defeated Serbs attacks
launched towards Turija from the direction of Gornja Bi-
R
jela. The HVO and the Territorial Defense captured the
predominantly Serb villages around Konjic, Bjelovčina,
Cerići and Donje Selo on May 21. The front stabilized to
the south of Konjic and did not change for a year. The
HVO and the Territorial Defense held the defensive line
around Konjic and along the Neretva River. Some forma-
tions were mixed, consisting of both Territorial Defense
troops and HVO troops. The Serbs concentrated most
of their forces on the Borci plateau. Their defensive line
there pivoted around their stronghold on Kiser. A com-
4.2.2020. 19:34:49
 The Croatian Nation’s Struggle for Survival, 1991-1995
lo. Posljednji zajednički pothvat HVO-a i TO-a bilo je
zauzimanje vojarne u Pazariću. Vojarna je bez borbe
zauzeta 30. svibnja, a posadi je dopušten odlazak na-
kon što je predala teško oružje.609 Da zatvori smjer od
Ivan sedla i Konjica prema Kalinoviku i Trnovu, Herce-
govački je korpus početkom lipnja formirao Taktičku
grupu Kalinovik.610 Nakon zauzimanja Trnova TG Ka-
linovik blokirala je prilaze iz smjera Konjica i smjera
Dejčići – Trebečaj, a na smjeru Trnovo – Dobro Polje
nastojala je zauzeti dominantne objekte.611
H
U ljeto 1992. počele su tenzije između HVO-a i AR-
BiH. U travnju je osnovano zajedničko zapovjedništvo
HVO-a i TO-a. Relativno dobra suradnja funkcionirala je
samo dva mjeseca, do sredine lipnja, kada su Hrvati u
općini Konjic majorizirani, pa su se povukli iz općinskih
tijela. Po hrvatskim podacima, tada su počeli pritisci i
M
provokacije od strane Muslimana. Preostali Srbi bili su
izloženi gorim pritiscima i počeli su od HVO-a tražiti
zaštitu od Muslimana. Zbog jednog takvog slučaja 20.
rujna zbio se sukob na punktu HVO-a u Ostrošcu. Ar-
mija Republike BiH napala je punkt čija je svrha bila za-
štita Srba u jednom zaselku Ostrošca. U sukobu je bilo
D
mrtvih i ranjenih na obje strane.612
Široj javnosti poznata kronologija sukoba između
HVO-a i Armije RBiH počinje sukobom u Rami, odno-
sno Prozoru. Hrvati su bili većinsko stanovništvo u
Rami, a u Prozoru su u većini bili Muslimani. Većina
sela bila je naseljena Hrvatima, s tim da su musliman-
C
ska bila grupirana u istočnom i jugoistočnom dijelu
općine, prema općinama Jablanica i Konjic. U općini je
na vlasti bio HDZ, u skladu s rezultatima višestranačkih
izbora. Unatoč nacionalnoj nesnošljivosti i povreme-
nim incidentima, u Rami je nekoliko mjeseci vladao
D
relativan mir. Od kolovoza 1992. međunacionalni in-
cidenti u Rami postali su češći. Unatoč konstantnim
609 Načelnik za sazn. poslove sektora HVO S/Z Hercegovi-
na, Saznajno izvješće str. pov. br. 59/92 od 12. 5. 1992.;
Kronologija događanja na teritoriji općine Konjic 1992.
i 1993. godine; M. ĆATIĆ ČUPERAK, Sjene nad Igmanom,
93, 97-100.
610 ICTY: GŠ VSR BiH, Direktiva za dalja dejstva str. pov. br.
02/5-22 od 6. 6. 1992.
611 ICTY: Naređenje za dalja dejstva komandanta TG Kalino-
vik od 13. 6. 1992.
612 Načelnik za saznajne poslove sektora S/Z Hercegovina,
Saznajno izvješće op. br. 106/92 od 21. 9. 1992.; Kro-
nologija događanja na teritoriji općine Konjic 1992. i
1993. godine.
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bined HVO and Territorial Defense force captured, on
May 25 Bradina and the Ivan Sedlo pass in northeast-
ern and eastern part of the Konjic Municipality. The last
combined effort of the HVO and the Territorial Defense
was the capture of the barracks in Pazarić. The barracks
was captured without a fight on May 30. The garrison
was allowed to leave in safety after handing over to the
HVO and the Territorial Defense all heavy weaponry. Her-
zegovina Corps, at the beginning of June, formed the
Tactical Group Kalinovik for the purpose of defending
against possible attacks on Kalinovik and Trnovo from
the direction of Ivan Sedlo and from the direction of Kon-
jic. Having captured Trnovo, the Tactical Group Kalinovik
blocked the approaches to the village from the direction
of Konjic and from the direction of Dejčići – Trebečaj. The
Group attempted to occupy the dominant locations on
the Trnovo – Dobro Polje line.
In summer, 1992, cracks in the alliance between the
HVO and the Army of the Republic of Bosnia and Her-
zegovina started to appear. In April 1992 the combined
command of the HVO and the Territorial Defense was
formed. The HVO and the Territorial Defense cooperated
in a viable manner for only two months, until mid-June.
At that time the Croats in the Konjic Municipality were
marginalized. In response, the Croats withdrew their rep-
resentatives from the municipal authorities. According to
Croatian accounts, the Muslims started to brutalize the
Croat population and especially the Serb population un-
der their control. As a result, the Serb civilians turned to
the HVO for help. One incident which occurred on Sep-
tember 20 is illustrative: the Serbs from a hamlet in the
Ostrožac area, in fear of Muslim raids, asked the HVO to
protect them. The HVO duly set up a checkpoint on the
road leading to the hamlet, only to be attacked by the
Army of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina. The en-
suing shoot-out was fierce, with many killed and wound-
ed on both sides.
Most of those uninitiated in the subject subscribe to
R
the opinion that the conflict between the HVO and the
Army of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina start-
ed with a battle in Rama/Prozor. Rama was a predomi-
nantly Croatian city while in Prozor the Muslims formed
a majority. Most villages in the area were predominately
Croatian. The predominately Muslim villages in the area
were grouped in the eastern and southeastern parts of
the municipality, in the direction of the municipalities
Jablanica and Konjic. In the Rama Municipality, the HDZ,
having won the elections, was in power. Ethnic hatred in
4.2.2020. 19:34:49
 Davor Marijan • Rat za opstojnost Hrvata, 1991. - 1995.
nastojanjima hrvatskih vojnih i političkih struktura,
sukob nije izbjegnut i bio je dio širega sukoba između
Armije RBiH i HVO-a koji je počeo 18. listopada u sre-
dišnjoj Bosni.
U Prozoru se sigurnosno stanje pogoršalo, ali nije
bilo sukoba. Armija Republike BiH povukla se s crte
prema Vojsci Republike Srpske na Kupresu u dijelove
grada naseljene Muslimanima i držala ih je u punoj
borbenoj spremnosti. Koncentriranjem ARBiH u Pro-
zoru teret obrane općine prema VRS-u sasvim je pao
H
na HVO brigadu Rama. Stanje se pogoršalo 21. listo-
pada 1992., nakon što je manja skupina bojne Vitezovi
uspjela proći iz Mostara i vratiti se u središnju Bosnu.
Radi smirenja tenzija i na poticaj HVO-a 23. listopada
održani su pregovori. Prekinuti su nakon što su pripad-
nici ARBiH napali postrojbe HVO-a i ubili vojnika Fra-
M
nju Zadru u predjelu Crnog vrha. Njegovo je ubojstvo
bilo okidač za sukob koji je počeo istoga dana i završio
poslijepodne 25. listopada. Brigada Rama je uz pomoć
manjih snaga iz sastava brigade Kralj Tomislav i 2. boj-
ne Vojne policije stavila Prozor pod svoj nadzor. Jedan
muslimanski izvor navodi na zaključak da većih borbi
D
i nije bilo, da je HVO topnički granatirao Prozor, a da je
nakon toga 24. listopada počelo izvlačenje civila i voj-
ske iz grada prema Jablanici. Prema podacima brigade
Rama, HVO je imao pet poginulih i 18 ranjenih, a ARBiH
11 poginulih. Prema poslijeratnim podacima, na strani
Muslimana poginula su četiri vojnika i četiri civila, od
C
kojih je jedan bio srpske nacionalnosti. Hrvati su u op-
ćini Prozor držali vlast osvojenu na izborima i uz to bili
vojnički dominantni, pa su samim time imali mnogo
manje povoda za sukob od Muslimana. Za sada nema
nikakvih naznaka da je političko i vojno vodstvo bo-
sanskohercegovačkih Hrvata (Predsjedništvo ili Glavni
stožer HVO-a) potaknulo oružano razračunavanje u
Prozoru. Civilno je vrhovništvo Prozor držalo područ-
jem čije mjesto nije sporno u razgraničenju i teritorijal-
noj jedinici Hrvata u Bosni i Hercegovini koja se očeki-
vala u budućem ustrojstvu republike.613 Okolnost da je
Prozor u neposrednom susjedstvu Jablanice i Konjica,
u kojima je Armija Republike BiH bila brojnija i jača,
stvorila je očito kod Muslimana u Prozoru osjećaj da
je njihov politički i vojnički položaj bolji nego što je
stvarno bio. To ih je odvelo do oštrog kursa koji nisu
mogli podržati ni vojnički ni politički. Konkretno, to je
613 D. MARIJAN, “Sukob HVO-a i ARBiH u Prozoru”.
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the Rama Municipality was a fact of life and tensions ran
high. Despite that, for a few months the Rama Munici-
pality was relatively peaceful. Starting in August, 1992,
however, the situation could no longer be contained. The
Croatian political and military structures tried their best
to defuse the tensions but without success. The violence
in Rama was part of the wider conflict between the Army
of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the HVO,
which started on October 18 in central Bosnia.
The security situation in Prozor worsened but there
were no violent incidents. The Army of the Republic of
Bosnia and Herzegovina withdrew their forces facing the
VRS from Kupres into the Muslim areas of the city of Pro-
zor and kept them in a constant state of combat readi-
ness. With the forces from the Kupres front concentrat-
ed in Prozor only the HVO Rama Brigade defended the
line against the VRS. The situation got worse on October
21, 1992, when a smaller group of soldiers belonging to
the Vitezovi Battalion left Mostar and returned to central
Bosnia. The situation threatened to spiral out of control
and the HVO instigated negotiations with the Army of
the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina. The negotia-
tions took place on October 23, but they did not amount
to anything because the Army of the Republic of Bosnia
and Herzegovina attacked the HVO. That first skirmish
occurred in the area of Crni Vrh. The only casualty was
Franjo Zadro, an HVO soldier. He was shot dead. The inci-
dent sparked a full-fledged battle which only ended on
the afternoon of October 25. The Rama Brigade with the
help of troops belonging to the Kralj Tomislav Brigade
and the 2nd Battalion of the Military Police took control
of Prozor. According to one Muslim source, there was not
any fighting worth the name in Prozor because the HVO
D
shelled the city from a safe distance, forcing the Army of
the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina to start evac-
uating civilians and withdrawing from the city towards
Jablanica on October 24. The Rama Brigade’s report after
the battle stated that the HVO had suffered 23 casual-
R
ties – 5 killed and 18 wounded. According to the same
report, the Army of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegov-
ina lost 11 men killed. According to research conducted
after the war, four soldiers of the Army of the Republic of
Bosnia and Herzegovina and four civilians were killed –
three Muslims and one Serb. The Croats were, as per the
results of the elections, politically dominant in the Pro-
zor Municipality. They were also militarily superior to the
Muslims there and had no reason to provoke a conflict
with the Muslims. The Muslims, on the other hand, were
4.2.2020. 19:34:49
 The Croatian Nation’s Struggle for Survival, 1991-1995
H
HVO, prvi tenk u Rami, Prozor, 18. lipnja 1993. (fotografiju
M
darovao IPD brigade Rama).
The first tank in Rama, Prozor, June 18, 1993 .
D
značilo političko zaoštravanje i nepomirljivo stajalište
prema političkoj opciji Herceg-Bosne, a vojnički na-
stojanje da se što manje sudjeluje u obrani općine na
crti prema Kupresu i srpskim snagama. Takvo je staja-
lište nesumnjivo imalo punu političku i vojnu potporu
C
iz Sarajeva, jer je Prozor zbog prijevoja Makljen imao
strategijsku važnost. Hrvatsko vijeće obrane bilo je
svjesno toga, što se vidi iz obavještajne procjene u ko-
joj se kaže da prema “svim raspoloživim podacima cilj
muslimanskih snaga na ovom prostoru je da ovladaju
prometnicama i hidrocentralama” te da bi nadzorom
D
“prometnica muslimanske snage … u svojim rukama
držale i sudbinu Hrvata u središnjoj Bosni”.614
614 VOS GS HVO, Obavještajno izvješće br. 89/92 str. pov. nr.
07-49/92 od 26. 10. 1992.
257
Domovinski rat 04-02-2020 Knjiga 1.indd 257
not so happy with the situation. There exists no evidence
supporting the theory that the political and military
leadership of the Bosnian Croats (the Presidency and/
or the HVO Main Staff) planned to attack the Muslims in
Prozor. The political leadership of the Bosnian Croats did
not see anything contentious in the fact that the Prozor
Municipality was predominantly Croatian and expected
that any future territorial settlement between the three
constituent nations of Bosnia and Herzegovina would
place the Prozor Municipality firmly within the Croatian
orbit. However, the Army of the Republic of Bosnia and
Herzegovina was stronger than the HVO in the neighbor-
ing municipalities of Jablanica and Konjic. Many Muslims
were thus tempted into believing that the Army of the
Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina could somehow
give them political control of the Prozor Municipality.
That mistaken belief in the superiority of the Army of
the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina over the HVO
hardened the Muslims’ stance towards any political set-
tlement that would include the existence of Herzeg-Bos-
nia. But the Muslims miscalculated badly. In reality, they
were not strong enough, militarily and politically, to take
on the HVO. The first military move in support of the
new political shift was the withdrawal of the bulk of the
Muslim forces deployed against the Serbs on the Kupres
front. It is perfectly clear that the political and military
leadership of the Bosnian Muslims was determined to
start a war with the Croats. The Makljen pass, in the Pro-
zor Municipality, became the most important strategic
location in the new political and military equation be-
tween the Croats and the Muslims practically overnight.
The HVO was aware that the Muslims would try to take
control of the pass. According to one HVO intelligence
report from that time, “the goal of the Muslim forces in
this area, judging by all available information, is to take
control of all the roads and hydroelectric power plants”
and if the Muslims are successful in achieving that objec-
tive then “the Croats in central Bosnia will be at the mercy
R
of the Army of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina”.
4.2.2020. 19:34:49
 Davor Marijan • Rat za opstojnost Hrvata, 1991. - 1995.
SREDIŠNJA BOSNA
Središnja Bosna je regija u kojoj su Srbi imali malo ma-
nje interese nego u ostalim dijelovima BiH. Jugoslavenska
narodna armija imala je u Travniku, Vitezu, Kiseljaku i Zenici
jača uporišta koja je željela izvući na sigurnije područje. U
fazi kada je ratovala JNA srpski je interes bio proširenje po-
dručja s većinskim srpskim stanovništvom na susjedna et-
nički miješana područja koja su bila važna zbog zemljopi-
snoga položaja i objekata vojne industrije. Prioritetni ciljevi
H
u ožujku su bili u dolini Vrbasa (Bugojno i Donji Vakuf), Jaj-
ce i do početka travnja Travnik. Za ovladavanje Kupresom,
Bugojnom, Donjim Vakufom, prijevojem Komar, Travnikom
i Jajcem angažirana je 30. partizanska divizija, kojoj su po-
dređeni lokalni srpski sastavi TO-a u općinama Kupres, Do-
nji Vakuf, Jajce, Skender Vakuf, Kotor Varoš, Šipovo, Ključ,
M
Mrkonjić Grad i dijelovi u općinama Travnik i Novi Travnik.
Do kraja ožujka divizija je dijelom mobilizirana i pojačana
122. lakom pješačkom brigadom, koja je iz zapadne Slavo-
nije dovedena na područje Vlašić – Skender Vakuf. Borbe za
Kupres promijenile su zonu 30. partizanske divizije, koja se
orijentirala na dolinu Vrbasa, Ključ i Jajce, a 122. lpbr izišla
D
je iz njezina sastava i zadužena je za Vlašić.615
Preimenovanjem JNA u Srpsku vojsku u Bosni i Herce-
govini prioritet je postalo Jajce, što je bio zadatak 1. krajiš-
kog korpusa, odnosno njegove 30. krajiške divizije. Idući
prioritet bilo je osiguranje Doboja i snaga koje su otvara-
le koridor između Bosanske krajine i Semberije. Na tom
C
dijelu bojišta zadatak 1. krajiškog korpusa bio je odbaciti
muslimanske i hrvatske snage južno od Doboja, presjeći
prometnice od Tuzle i Zenice prema Doboju i Gradačcu i
izbiti na crtu Teslić – Tešanj – Gračanica – Srebrenik. Tako
se željelo potpuno ovladati planinama Ozren i Trebavac i
zapadnim padinama Majevice.616
Hrvatski je interes bio održati se u dolinama Vrbasa i
Lašve i ondje gdje je moguće organizirati izvršnu vlast. Bio
je to prirodni nastavak djelovanja iz 1991. i početka 1992.,
kada su Hrvati onemogućili izvlačenje topničkoga oružja iz
tvornice u Novom Travniku. Organiziranje za obranu poče-
615 Zemljovid Komande 30. partd po planu Krajina-92.;
Zapovest Komandanta 30. partd od 4. 3. 1992. za iz-
vođenje borbenih dejstava (Krajina-92); Komanda 30.
partd, Redovni borbeni izveštaj str. pov. br. 174-52 od
21. 3. 1992.; ICTY: I uprava GŠ OS SFRJ, Izvod iz zadataka
str. pov. br. 585-2 od 3. 4. 1992.; Lična karta 30. krajiške
divizije (nedatirana i nepotpisana, nastala najkasnije
početkom 1994. godine).
616 ICTY: GŠ VSR BiH, Direktiva za dalja dejstva op. br. 3, str.
pov. br. 02/5-92 od 3. 8. 1992.
258
Domovinski rat 04-02-2020 Knjiga 1.indd 258
CENTRAL BOSNIA
The Serbs were not interested in central Bosnia as
much as they were in other parts of Bosnia and Herze-
govina. Substantial JNA forces were stationed in Travnik,
Vitez, Kiseljak and Zenica. The JNA wanted to withdraw
those troops to safer areas of the country. During the
phase of the war when the JNA was active, the Serbs’ ob-
jective was to conquer the areas with ethnically mixed
populations bordering the predominantly Serbs areas.
In March the priority objectives were in the Vrbas Valley
(Bugojno and Donji Vakuf), Jajce and, until the beginning
of April, Travnik. The 30th Partisan Division was given the
task of conquering Kupres, Donji Vakuf, Jajce, Skender
Vakuf, Kotor Varoš, Šipovo, Ključ, Mrkonjić Grad and some
parts of the municipalities of Travnik and Novi Travnik.
The local Serb Territorial Defense Units were placed un-
der the command of the 30th Partisan Division. By the
end of March the Division was partly mobilized and re-
inforced with the 122nd Light Infantry Brigade which had
been brought to the Vlašić – Skender Vakuf area from
western Slavonia. During the fighting for Kupres the 30th
Partisan Brigade operated in the Vrbas Valley and the
areas of Ključ and Jajce. The 122nd Light Infantry Brigade
was detached from the 30th Partisan Brigade and operat-
ed in the area of Vlašić.
When the JNA was redesignated as the Serbian
Army in Bosnia and Heregovina, the main objective be-
came Jajce. The task of taking Jajce was given to the
30th Krajina Division of I Krajina Corps. Another objec-
tive was to secure Doboj and the forces which were
opening a corridor between Bosanska Krajina and
Semberija. In this area the task of I Krajina Corps was to
D
push back the Croatian and Muslim forces southwards
from Doboj, cut the roads leading from Tuzla and Zen-
ica towards Doboj and Gradačac and reach the Teslić
– Tešanj – Gračanica – Srebrenik line. The idea was to
gain full control of Mount Ozren, Mount Trebavac and
R
western slopes of Mount Majevica.
The Croats wanted to keep their presence in the
Vrbas Valley and the Lašva Valley and set up executive
power in places where it was possible. These aims were
a logical continuation of the activities from 1991 and
the beginning of 1992, when the Croats prevented the
Serbs from taking away the artillery pieces from the fac-
tory in Novi Travnik. The Croats started taking defensive
measures in the fall of 1991. The existence of Croatian
armed groups prevented the JNA and the Territorial
4.2.2020. 19:34:49
 The Croatian Nation’s Struggle for Survival, 1991-1995
lo je u jesen 1991. i postojanje hrvatskih naoružanih sasta-
va onemogućilo je da JNA i srpski TO bez borbe zaposjed-
nu regiju. Združivanje snaga HVO-a po općinama počelo je
u travnju 1992. u Busovači,617 kada je osnovan Regionalni
vojni stožer Travničke regionalne zajednice. Dvojnost u
zapovijedanju nastala je kada je po zapovijedi generala
Bobetka od 19. svibnja u Gornjem Vakufu/Uskoplju osno-
van IZM Srednja Bosna, koji je koordinirao i zapovijedao
snagama na području središnje Bosne, doline Vrbasa te
u općinama Prozor, Tomislavgrad i Posušje. Izdvojeno za-
H
povjedno mjesto preimenovano je 10. lipnja u Regionalni
stožer Srednja Bosna, a područje djelovanja podijeljeno je
na četiri operativne zone, čija su sjedišta bila u Gornjem
Vakufu, Vitezu, Kiseljaku i Žepču. U prvoj polovini srpnja
Regionalni stožer Srednja Bosna preimenovan je u Zapo-
vjedništvo oružanih snaga Srednja Bosna sa sjedištem u Vi-
M
tezu. Zapovjednici su bili Paško Ljubičić, Filip Filipović, Žar-
ko Tole, Bruno Zorica Zulu i Tihomir Blaškić. U listopadu je
osnovana Operativna zona Srednja Bosna za područje op-
ćina Busovača, Donji Vakuf, Fojnica, Jajce, Dobretići (Sken-
der Vakuf), Kakanj, Kiseljak, Kreševo, Novi Travnik, Sarajevo,
Travnik, Vareš, Vitez, Zenica i Žepče. Sjedište je bilo u Vitezu,
D
a zapovjednik je bio pukovnik Tihomir Blaškić. Operativna
je zona podijeljena na tri operativne grupe: I. za općine
Jajce, Novi Travnik, Travnik, Vitez i Zenica, II. za općine Bu-
sovača, Fojnica, Kakanj, Kiseljak, Kreševo, Sarajevo i Vareš,
III. za općine Maglaj, Teslić, Tešanj, Zavidovići i Žepče. Od
listopada do prosinca 1992. osnovane su brigade HVO-a:
C
Nikola Šubić Zrinski u Busovači, Ban Josip Jelačić u Kiseljaku,
Travnička u Travniku, Stjepan Tomašević u Novom Travniku,
110. u Usori, Bobovac u Varešu, Jure Francetić u Zenici i 111.
xp u Žepču. U regiji je postojalo nekoliko skupina HOS-a,
koje su najvećim dijelom ušle u sastav HVO-a.618
D
617 Prema izjavama zapovjednika HVO-a na tom području,
združivanje snaga HVO-a po općinama, odnosno osni-
vanje Regionalnog vojnog stožera Travničke regionalne
zajednice, čiji je prvi zapovjednik bio Paško Ljubičić, do-
godilo se ranije, 27. veljače 1992., u Busovači.
618 HVO, Odluka br. 40-09/92 od 21. 4. 1992.; ICTY: IZM Ploče
Zap. Južnog vojišta, Zapovijed, kl. 8/92-01/91, ur. br. 6030-
02/92-1 od 19. 5. 1992.; Regionalni stožer Srednja Bosna,
Zapovijed br. 23/92 od 10. 6. 1992.; Regionalni stožer Sred-
nja Bosna, Zapovijed “R” br. 27/92 od 10. 6. 1992.; Zapov-
jedništvo OS Srednja Bosna, Redovno borbeno izvješće br.
108/92 od 11. 7. 1992.; ICTY: GS HVO, Zapovijed str. pov. br.
01-2054/92 od 31. 8. 1992.; ICTY: IZM Vitez ZOZSB, Zapo-
vijed br. 875/92 od 7. 10. 1992.; ICTY: IZM Vitez ZOZSB,
Zapovijed br. 1224/92 od 25. 11. 1992.; IZM Vitez ZOZSB,
Upozorenje br. 1561/92 od 5. 12. 1992.; Viteška ratna kroni-
ka, HKD Napredak, Vitez, 2001., 16-17.
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Domovinski rat 04-02-2020 Knjiga 1.indd 259
Defense from taking control of the region without a
fight. The forming of a higher HVO command began in
April, 1992, in Busovača10, when the regional military
headquarters of the Travnik regional community was
formed. Duality in terms of chain of command occurred
when Forward Command Post Central Bosnia was
formed in Gornji Vakuf/Uskoplje on General Bobetko’s
order of May 19. Forward Command Post Central Bos-
nia coordinated the actions and commanded the forces
deployed in central Bosnia, the Vrbas Valley and in the
municipalities of Prozor, Tomislavgrad and Posušje. On
June 10, the Forward Command Post was redesignated
as the Regional HQ Central Bosnia, and its area of oper-
ations was divided into four Operative Zones. The HQs
of the four Operative Zones respectively were in Gornji
Vakuf, Vitez, Kiseljak and Žepče. In the first half of July
the Regional HQ Central Bosnia was redesignated as
the Command of the Armed Forces in Central Bosnia
with its Main HQ in Vitez. The commanders were Paško
Ljubičić, Filip Filipović, Žarko Tole, Bruno “Zulu” Zorica
and Tihomir Blaškić. In October Operative Zone Central
Bosnia was formed for the municipalities of Busovača,
Donji Vakuf, Fojnica, Jajce, Dobretići (Skender Vakuf ),
Kakanj, Kiseljak, Kreševo, Novi Travnik, Sarajevo, Travnik,
Vreš, Vitez, Zenica and Žepče. The HQ was in Vitez and
the commander was Colonel Tihomir Blaškić. Operative
Zone Central Bosnia was divided into three Operation-
al Groups: Operational Group I for the municipalities of
Jajce, Novi Travnik, Travnik, Vitez and Zenica; Operation-
al Group II for the municipalities of Busovača, Fojnica,
Kakanj, Kiseljak, Kreševo, Sarajevo and Vareš; Opera-
tional Group III for the municipalities of Maglaj, Teslić,
Tešanj, Zavidovići and Žepče. From October to Decem-
ber, 1992, the following HVO brigades were formed: the
Nikola Šubić Zrinski Brigade in Busovača, the Ban Josip
Jelačić Brigade in Kiseljak, the Travnik Brigade in Travnik,
the Stjepan Tomašević Brigade in Novi Travnik, the 110th
Brigade in Usora, the Jure Francetić Brigade I Zenica and
R
the 111th Brigade in Žepče. A number of HOS groups
operated in the area and most of them became part of
the HVO.
10 According to statements issued by HVO commanders
in charge of the area in question, the formation of a
higher HVO command, that is, the formation of the
Regional Military Headquarters of the Travnik regional
community, whose first commander was Paško Ljubičić,
took place earlier, on February 27, 1992, in Busovača.
4.2.2020. 19:34:49
 Davor Marijan • Rat za opstojnost Hrvata, 1991. - 1995.
Muslimani su u središnjoj Bosni kasnili u svim ele-
mentima organizacije, pa se dogodilo da su Srbima bez
borbe prepustili Donji Vakuf i Doboj. Na „trusnim“ su po-
dručjima iskoristili bolju početnu organiziranost Hrvata i
u njihovu zaleđu postupno izgrađivali svoju vojnu organi-
zaciju, koja je početkom 1993. usmjerena u rat s HVO-om.
U regiji su postojala dva okružna štaba TO-a, u Doboju i
Zenici. Štab u Doboju preuzeli su Srbi, a postrojbe TO-a
u Tešnju nakon toga su stavljene pod Okružni štab TO-a
u Tuzli. Okružni štab Zenica, odnosno Štab regije Zenica,
H
zapovijedao je ostalim snagama Armije RBiH u središnjoj
Bosni. U studenome je osnovan 3. korpus ARBiH, u čiju su
zonu djelovanja ušle gotovo sve snage HVO-a u središnjoj
Bosni osim Usore i Vareša. Sjedište korpusa bilo je u Zenici,
a komandant je bio Enver Hadžihasanović. Do kraja 1992.
osnovano je 15 brigada: 7. muslimanska brdska u Zenici,
M
17. krajiška brdska u Travniku, 301. motorizirana u Zenici,
303. brdska u Zenici, 305. brdska Jajce (prognanici), 306.
brdska u Travniku, 308. brdska u Novom Travniku, 309.
brdska u Kaknju, 312. motorizirana u Travniku, 314. brd-
ska u Zenici, 317. brdska u Gornjem Vakufu, 318. brdska u
Zavidovićima, 319. brdska u Žepču, 325. brdska u Vitezu i
D
333. brdska u Busovači. Dio Muslimana organizirao je mu-
slimanske snage, po vjerskoj crti i na očiti poticaj Stranke
demokratske akcije. Uz njih su se u ljeto 1992. pojavili i
prvi vjerski ratnici iz inozemstva – mudžahedini. Iz tih je
sastava najesen nastala 7. muslimanska brdska brigada.619
C
Bugojno i Gornji Vakuf/Uskoplje
Bugojno, Donji i Gornji Vakuf tri su grada u dolini Vr-
basa. Srbi su bili zainteresirani za Bugojno i Donji Vakuf,
ne samo zbog tvornice streljiva u Bugojnu, nego i zbog
zemljopisnoga položaja i pogodnosti za življenje. U Bu-
gojnu je na izborima pobijedio HDZ, a u oba Vakufa ve-
ćinski su Muslimani, po hrvatskom uvjerenju, bili izrazito
prosrpski nastrojeni. Od ljeta 1991. Hrvati su organizi-
rali obranu općine i njihova je vojna struktura u travnju
1992. prerasla u HVO. Krajem svibnja počelo je organizi-
ranje brigade Eugen Kvaternik, što je formalizirano u rujnu
1992. nakon zapovijedi Odjela obrane HVO-a. Bugojno
619 ICTY: Štab odbrane okruga Zenica, Službena zabilješka
br. 03/773-4-3 od 21. 7. 1992.; Glavni stožer HVO, Infor-
macija o stanju na teritoriju Središnje Bosne, str. pov. br.
07-763/92 od 22. 7. 1992.; ICTY: ŠVK OS RBiH, Formiranje
jedinica 3. korpusa, naređenje str. pov. br. 02/1010-390
od 9. 11. 1992.; ICTY: Komanda 3. korpusa ARBiH, Podatci
o mob. razvoju pov. br. 02/3-67 od 11. 7. 1997.
260
Domovinski rat 04-02-2020 Knjiga 1.indd 260
The Muslims’ defensive measures lagged behind
those of the Croats. As a direct result of that the Serbs
captured Donji Vakuf and Doboj without a fight. It is
interesting to note that in many areas of the coun-
try the Muslims relied on the HVO to protect them
from the Serbs and while the Croats bore the brunt
of the fighting against the Serbs the Muslims slowly
organized their military formations in the rear areas.
The Muslim military organization, thus organized,
was then turned against the HVO at the beginning
of 1993. There were two district HQs of the Territori-
al Defense in the region: one in Doboj and the other
one in Zenica. The HQ in Doboj was taken over by the
Serbs and the Territorial Defense units in Tešanj were
then placed under the command of the District HQ
of the Territorial Defense in Tuzla. The District HQ Ze-
nica commanded the other units of the Army of the
Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina in central Bosnia.
In November III Corps of the Army of the Republic of
Bosnia and Herzegovina was formed. Almost all forc-
es of the HVO in central Bosnia, except those around
Usora and Vareš, were deployed in III Corps’s area of
responsibility. III Corps’s HQ was located in Zenica and
the commander was Enver Hadžihasanović. By the end
of 1992, 15 brigades had been formed: the 7th Muslim
Mountain Brigade in Zenica; the 17th Krajina Mountain
Brigade in Travnik; the 301st Motorized Brigade in Ze-
nica; the 303rd Mountain Brigade in Zenica; the 305th
Mountain Jajce Brigade (refugees); the 314th Mountain
Brigade in Zenica; the 317th Mountain Brigade in Gorn-
ji Vakuf; the 318th Mountain Brigade in Zavidovići; the
319th Mountain Brigade in Žepče; the 325th Mountain
Brigade in Vitez and 333rd Mountain Brigade in Buso-
D
vača. Some Muslim units were composed deliberately
of practicing Muslims and the practice was support-
ed by the SDS party. Mujahideen made their first ap-
pearance in Bosnia and Herzegovina in the summer of
1992. In the fall of 1992 these units were formed into
R
the 7th Muslim Mountain Brigade.
Bugojno and Gornji Vakuf/Uskoplje
The cities of Bugojno, Donji Vakuf and Gornji Vakuf
are located in the Vrbas Valley. The Serbs coveted Bu-
gojno and Donji Vakuf because of the ammunitions
factory in Donji Vakuf, geographical position of the
cities and fertile land in the cities’ environs. The HDZ
party won the elections in Bugojno. Gornji Vakuf and
4.2.2020. 19:34:49
 The Croatian Nation’s Struggle for Survival, 1991-1995
je do 6. rujna bilo u sastavu snaga HVO-a središnje Bo-
sne, a potom je ušlo u Operativnu zonu Sjeverozapadna
Hercegovina. U Gornjem Vakufu tekao je sličan proces, iz
općinskoga stožera nastala je brigada Dr. Ante Starčević.
Ranije, u proljeće i ljeto, u Gornjem Vakufu osnovana je
bojna Zvonko Krajina, koja je bila u sastavu profesionalne
pukovnije Ante Bruno Bušić.620
Početkom svibnja 1992. Hrvati i Muslimani formirali
su zajedničku Komandu obrane grada Bugojna, koja je
funkcionirala oko mjesec dana, nakon čega se raspala
H
zbog različitih gledišta na daljnju organizaciju borbe. Or-
ganizacija TO-a počela je tek sredinom travnja, premda su
navodno već prije postojale skupine Patriotske lige. Prve
postrojbe TO-a formirane su u Bugojnu krajem travnja, a
u Gornjem Vakufu desetak dana prije. Organizacijski su
Bugojno i Gornji Vakuf bili podređeni Okružnomu štabu
M
TO-a Zenice, a potom 3. korpusu ARBiH. U Bugojnu je na-
jesen osnovana 307. mtbr, a u Gornjem Vakufu 317. brd-
ska brigada. Krajem godine 3. korpus ARBiH doveo je iz
Travnika u dolinu Vrbasa 305. brdsku brigadu.621
Početkom ožujka 1992. godine 30. partizanska di-
vizija Banjalučkoga korpusa JNA počela je pripreme za
D
ovladavanje dolinom Vrbasa. Divizija je za taj zadatak mo-
bilizirala 19. partizansku brigadu, čiji je prioritet bio nad-
zor prijevoja Komar i blokada Donjeg Vakufa i Bugojna.
Pokušaj JNA da na samom kraju ožujka bez borbe uđe u
Bugojno onemogućio je predsjednik Skupštine općine –
član HDZ-a. To je potom potvrđeno na izvanrednoj skup-
C
štini općine sazvanoj na zahtjev HDZ-a. Zauzimanjem
Kupresa JNA je ugrozila Bugojno sa zapada. Nakon što
su Srbi u prvoj polovini svibnja bez borbe zaposjeli Donji
Vakuf, Bugojno je bilo ugroženo i sa sjeveroistoka.622 Hr-
D
620 Općinski stožer HVO Bugojno, Izvješće br. 01-109-613/92
od 2. 10. 1992.; Vatre nad Vrbasom: prilozi za bugojansku
ratnu kroniku 1990.–1993., Hrvatsko kulturno društvo
“Napredak”, Bugojno, 1993., 42-53, 89; Ratni put bojne
“Zvonko Krajina” Uskoplje, travanj 2012.
621 ICTY: Komanda 3. korpusa ARBiH, Podaci o mob. razvoju
pov. br. 02/3-67 od 11. 7. 1997.; Abdulah JELEČ, Besim
ŽDRALOVIĆ, “Kako je pripremana odbrana Bugojna”, Kor-
ak, br. 27, 2012., 97-99, 101; M. ŠADINLIJA, Teritorijalna
odbrana BiH, 245-247.
622 Zapovest Komande 30. partd od 4. 3. 1992. za izvođen-
je borbenih dejstava; SVA MORH, ZOZS: Zapovjedništvo
grada Bugojna (nedatirana, rukom pisana informacija o
stanju u dolini Vrbasa 31. 3. 1992.); Zapovest Komande
30. partd od 2. 4. 1992. za izvođenje borbenih dejstava;
Vatre nad Vrbasom, 37; ICTY: Izvještaj Stanice javne bez-
bjednosti Donji Vakuf iz januara 1993. o radu za period 1.
4. 1992. do 25. 12. 1992.
261
Domovinski rat 04-02-2020 Knjiga 1.indd 261
Donji Vakuf were predominantly Muslim. Many Croats
from the area were of the opinion, and justifiably so,
that the Muslims from Gornji Vakuf and Donji Vakuf
were pro-Serbian in their political outlook. In the sum-
mer of 1991 the Croats started taking measures for the
defense of the municipality. The military structure the
Croats created grew into the HVO in April, 1992. At the
end of May, 1992, the process of forming the Eugen
Kvaternik Brigade was started. The Eugen Kvaternik
Brigade was formally formed in September, 1992. Bu-
gojno was, until September 6 in the area of operations
of the HVO forces in central Bosnia and then came
within the scope of Operative Zone North West Her-
zegovina. A similar process took place in Gornji Vakuf;
out of the municipal HQ there the Dr. Ante Starčević
Brigade was formed. Before that, in spring and sum-
mer, the Zvonko Krajina Battalion had been formed in
Gornji Vakuf. The battalion was part of the Ante Bruno
Bušić Regiment, a formation composed exclusively of
professional soldiers.
At the beginning of May the Muslims and Croats
formed the Joint Command of the Defense of Bugojno
which functioned for about a month. It dissolved on
account of differing views regarding how to proceed
with the war. The process of organizing the Territori-
al Defense began only in mid-April. Some accounts
suggest that groups belonging to the Patriotic League
existed even before that time. The first units of the Ter-
ritorial Defense were formed in Bugojno at the end of
April. In Gornji Vakuf the first Territorial Defense units
were formed some ten days before those in Bugojno.
Organizationally, Bugojno and Gornji Vakuf were sub-
ordinated to the District HQ of the Zenica Territorial
Defense and later to III Corps of the Army of the Re-
public of Bosnia and Herzegovina. In the fall the 307th
Motorized Brigade was formed in Bugojno and the
317th Mountain Brigade in Gornji Vakuf. At the end of
the year, III Corps of the Army of the Republic of Bos-
R
nia and Herzegovina moved the 305th Brigade from
Travnik and deployed it in the Vrbas Valley.
At the beginning of March, 1992, the 30th Par-
tisan Division of Banja Luka Corps of the JNA began
its preparations for offensive operations in the Vrbas
Valley. For that task the Division mobilized the 19th
Partisan Brigade. Gaining control of the Komar pass
and putting Donji Vakuf and Bugojno under block-
ade was top priority. The JNA tried to enter Bugojno
without a fight at the end of March. The attempt was
4.2.2020. 19:34:49
 Davor Marijan • Rat za opstojnost Hrvata, 1991. - 1995.
vatsko vijeće obrane organiziralo je obranu na lijevoj
i desnoj obali Vrbasa, od Guvana do Koša. Da pomo-
gne, general J. Bobetko poslao je 19. svibnja u Bugoj-
no bojnu Frankopan da organizira obranu na smjeru
prema Donjem Vakufu i stavio je na raspolaganje
brigadiru Žarku Toli, poslanom nekoliko dana prije.623
Tole je s pratnjom 27. svibnja 1992. pod nejasnim
okolnostima zarobljen u Bugojnu i odveden u srpsko
zarobljeništvo. Zarobljen je nakon što je počeo sređi-
vati stanje u Bugojnu, gdje je namjeravao formirati
H
jedinstveno zapovjedništvo.624
Sredinom svibnja 1992. počele su prve borbe sa
srpskim snagama iz Kupresa i Donjeg Vakufa. One
su početkom lipnja dobile zapovijed da uznemiruju
obranu Bugojna i olakšaju 1. krajiškom korpusu pro-
boj koridora u Bosanskoj Posavini. Do sredine lipnja
M
HVO je odbio srpske napade i utvrdio crtu obrane Bu-
gojna prema Donjem Vakufu. Srbi iz Čipuljića povu-
kli su se u Kupres, što je olakšalo obranu Bugojna. U
drugoj polovini lipnja razdvojena su zapovjedništva
HVO-a i TO-a. Hrvatsko vijeće obrane predalo je TO-u
crtu prema Donjem Vakufu, a samo se orijentiralo na
D
smjer prema Kupresu. S tog su smjera dijelovi 2. kra-
jiškog korpusa bez uspjeha nastojali zauzeti Bugojno.
Do kraja godine HVO, a nakon uključivanja u borbu
i ARBiH, odbili su nekoliko jakih napada VRS-a. Pose-
bice su jaki bili napadi krajem svibnja i sredinom lip-
nja iz smjera Donjeg Vakufa. Početkom srpnja VRS je
C
napao iz smjera Kupresa, a krajem mjeseca iz smjera
Donjeg Vakufa. Najjači je udar VRS izveo u kolovozu,
duž cijele crte obrane. Napad je počeo 12. kolovoza i
uz manje prekide trajao do kraja mjeseca. Vojska Re-
publike Srpske povremeno je angažirala i zrakoplov-
stvo, pa su žrtve i materijalni gubici bili veliki, no crta
obrane nije se mijenjala.625
Srpski pritisak na Gornji Vakuf bio je osjetno ma-
nji. Vojska Republike Srpske iz Kupresa nije pokazivala
velik interes za taj dio doline Vrbasa. Crtu obrane na
623 IZM ZJV Ploče, Zapovijed kl. 8/92-01/90, ur. br. 6030-
02/92-1 od 19. 5. 1992.; Vatre nad Vrbasom, 68-69.
624 Izjava Antonia Šušnje dana 17. 7. 1992. u Regionalnom
stožeru Srednja Bosna.
625 ICTY: GŠ VSR BiH, Direktiva za dalja dejstva str. pov. br.
02/5-22 od 6. 6. 1992.; ICTY: GŠ VSR BiH, Direktiva za dal-
ja dejstva op. br. 3, str. pov. br. 02/5-92 od 3. 8. 1992.;
ICTY: Glavni štab VRS, Naredna dejstva VRS, Direktiva,
op. br. 4, str. pov. br. 02/5-210 od 19. 11. 1992.; Vatre nad
Vrbasom, 68-95.
262
Domovinski rat 04-02-2020 Knjiga 1.indd 262
foiled by the president of the Municipal Assembly –
a member of the HDZ party. The president’s stance
was confirmed by an extraordinary session of the As-
sembly of the municipality convened at the request
of the HDZ party. With the capture of Kupres the JNA
stood poised to attack Bugojno from the west. When
the Serbs captured Donji Vakuf without a fight during
the first half of May they were in a position to attack
Bugojno from northeast as well. The HVO established
defensive positions on both banks of the Vrbas River,
from Guvan to Koš. In order to help the HVO, General
Bobetko, on May 19, sent the Frankopan Battalion to
Bugojno to set up defensive positions in the direction
of Donji Vakuf. General Bobetko placed the Frankopan
Battalion under Brigadier Žarko Tole’s command. Žar-
ko Tole had been sent to the area just a few days previ-
ously. Tole’s intention was to form a unified command
in Bugojno but was captured by the Serbs in Bugojno
on May 27, 1992. The circumstances surrounding that
incident are still unclear.
In mid-May, 1992, the Serbs began attacking from
the direction of Kupres and Donji Vakuf, meeting op-
position from HVO and ARBIH forces. The Serbs forces
were ordered, at the beginning of June, to harass the
defenders of Bugojno and support I Krajina Corps’ at-
tempt to create a corridor in the Bosanska Posavina
region. The HVO defeated all the Serbs’ attacks and
by mid-June had fortified the defensive line guarding
against attacks from the direction of Donji Vakuf. The
Serbs from Čipuljići withdrew to Kupres. That move
made the job of the defenders of Bugojno that much
easier. In the second half of June the HVO Command
and the Muslim Territorial Defense Command were
D
separated. The Territorial Defense units took up the
defensive positions in the direction of Donji Vakuf and
the HVO manned the defensive positions protecting
against attacks from the direction of Kupres. Elements
of II Krajina Corps attacked Bugojno from the direction
R
of Kupres, but without success. During the period from
June to the end of the year the Serbs launched a num-
ber of determined attacks, but the HVO at first alone
and later in tandem with the Army of the Republic of
Bosnia and Herzegovina, repulsed each Serb attempt.
The attacks launched at the end May and in mid-June
from the direction of Donji Vakuf were especially fero-
cious. The biggest attack the VRS launched during the
mentioned period came in August. The VRS attacked
along the whole length of the line. The attack com-
4.2.2020. 19:34:49
 The Croatian Nation’s Struggle for Survival, 1991-1995
planini Raduši prema Donjem i Gornjem Vukovskom
u travnju je organizirao općinski stožer HVO-a. Teri-
torijalna obrana kasnije se uključila u držanje dijela
crte.626 Najveći problem u općini bio je loš međusobni
odnos HVO-a i TO-a. Iako su Muslimani imali relativnu
većinu, HVO se prije organizirao i bio je bolje naoru-
žan. Odnosi su stalno bili na rubu incidenta i sukob je
izbio 20. lipnja. Teritorijalna obrana počela se ukapati
prema naseljima s hrvatskim stanovništvom, povukla
se s crte na Raduši i na više mjesta u općini postavila
H
je punktove na kojima su Hrvati zaustavljani i maltre-
tirani. Zauzela je i punkt u Karamustafiću i s njega po-
tjerala Vojnu policiju HVO-a. Snage pukovnije Bruno
Bušić i postrojbe Garavi vratile su punkt i potisnule TO
prema Gornjem Vakufu. Sukob je završio 21. lipnja, a
u njemu su poginula dva pripadnika HVO-a i pet TO-a.
M
Nakon sukoba je TO ponovno preuzeo svoj dio crte
prema VRS-u na Raduši. Međunacionalna napetost
sustavno je rasla, a u listopadu 1992., tijekom sukoba
u središnjoj Bosni, obje su strane u početku bile do-
voljno razumne da izbjegnu sukob. Nakon što je izbio
sukob u Prozoru, HVO i ARBiH imali su 24. listopada
D
manji okršaj, a ARBiH je bez uspjeha pokušala prodor
od Gornjeg Vakufa prema Prozoru.627
Do kraja godine stanje se i dalje pogoršavalo. Po
tvrdnjama HVO-a, na vodeća mjesta u politici i AR-
BiH imenovane su osobe neprijateljski raspoložene
prema Hrvatima. U prosincu je iz Travnika počelo do-
C
vođenje dijelova tek osnovane 305. brdske brigade
ARBiH u sela koja su graničila s Ramom. Sredinom
prosinca u Zapovjedništvu brigade HVO-a Dr. Ante
Starčević nisu dvojili da se Muslimani spremaju za su-
kob, pa su “posvetili dužnu pažnju razradi plana ‘B’”, tj.
D
opciji sukoba s ARBiH.628
626 Načelnik za saz. posl. sektora S/Z Hercegovina, str. pov.
br. 148/92 od 13. 6. 1992.
627 Općinski stožer HVO Gornji Vakuf, Izvješće str. pov. br.
1-5/4-2/92 od 22. 6. 1992.; “Iz Zapovjedništva HVO”, Sko-
paljski vjesnik, br. 1, srpanj 1992., 2; Izvješće Općinskog
stožera HVO G. Vakuf od 7. 7. 1992. o proteklim zbivan-
jima; Općinski stožer HVO G. Vakuf br. 1-5/1-770/92 od
21. 10. 1992.; Zapovjedništvo brigade “Ante Starčević”,
Izvješće br. 1-5/1-783/92 od 30. 10. 1992.; Ratni put bo-
jne “Zvonko Krajina” Uskoplje, travanj 2012.
628 Zapovjedništvo brigade HVO “Dr. Ante Starčević” G.
Vakuf, Političko-sigurnosna situacija br. 1-5/1-1159/92
od 17. 12. 1992.
263
Domovinski rat 04-02-2020 Knjiga 1.indd 263
menced on August 12 and lasted, with brief lulls, until
the end of the month. The VRS attack was supported
by the air force. The defenders suffered serious casual-
ties and the Serbs inflicted a lot of collateral damage
but did not manage to break the defensive line.
The Serbs’ attacks against Gornji Vakuf were not
as determined as those against Bugojno. The VRS
formations in Kupres did not seem that much inter-
ested in that part of the Vrbas Valley. The municipal
HQ of the HVO organized a defensive line on Mount
Raduša in April. Territorial Defense units were later de-
ployed along the defensive line as well. The relation-
ship between the HVO and the Territorial Defense in
the municipality was contentious and that created a
whole myriad of problems. Even though the Muslims
formed a relative majority the Croats organized them-
selves before the Muslims and were better equipped.
The relationship between the HVO and the Territori-
al Defense was like a powder keg waiting to explode.
And explode it did on June 20. The Territorial Defense
entrenched their positions facing the predominately
Croatian towns and villages, withdrew from the de-
fensive line on Raduša and set up road blocks and
checkpoints in many places. The soldiers manning
the road blocks and checkpoints regularly stopped,
mistreated and sometimes brutalized Croats. The
Territorial Defense also dislodged the HVO’s military
policemen from the checkpoint in Karamustafić. The
Croats reacted. Troops belonging to the Bruno Bušić
Regiment and the Garavi unit attacked the Muslim
troops holding the checkpoint and pushed them back
towards Gornji Vakuf. The incident ended on June 21.
Two HVO soldiers and five Territorial Defense soldiers
were killed in the fighting. After the incident the Terri-
torial Defense returned to their previously abandoned
positions on the defensive line on Raduša. Ethnic ten-
sions continued to grow. However, in October, 1992,
while the battles in central Bosnia raged on, both sides
R
had enough common sense not to allow the volatile
situation to spiral out of control. But, the ethnic ten-
sions underlying the relationship between the HVO
and the Muslims could not be contained indefinitely.
A minor skirmish occurred on October 24 between
the HVO and the Army of the Republic of Bosnia and
Herzegovina, after the conflict in Prozor had erupted.
The Army of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina
launched an attack from Gornji Vakuf towards Prozor.
The attempt failed.
4.2.2020. 19:34:49
 Davor Marijan • Rat za opstojnost Hrvata, 1991. - 1995.
Jajce – operacija Vrbas-92
Jajce je grad u zapadnom dijelu središnje Bosne,
na ušću rijeke Plive u Vrbas. Za Srbe je imao iznimnu
važnost, posebno zbog hidrocentrala na Vrbasu, koje
su bile nužne za opskrbu Bosanske krajine električnom
energijom. Za napad na grad angažirana je glavnina 30.
partizanske divizije JNA, koja je tijekom borbi preime-
novana u 30. krajišku diviziju VRS-a. Tijekom operacije
divizija je bila ojačana dijelovima 2. krajiškog korpusa i
H
1. mješovitom protuoklopnom artiljerijskom brigadom.
Krajem listopada imala je 4704 pripadnika, a od sred-
stava potpore 19 haubica 105-155 mm, 10 topova 100
mm, 20 topova 76 mm, 21 minobacač 120 mm i oklo-
pno-mehaniziranu četu. Divizija je većinom djelovala u
taktičkim i borbenim grupama. Komandanti divizije bili
M
su pukovnici Stanislav Galić i Jovo Blažanović. Operacija
se vodila pod imenom Vrbas-92.629
Jajce je u proljeće 1991. imalo 45.007 stanovni-
ka. Najviše je bilo Muslimana (17.380), potom Hrvata
(15.811) i Srba (8663).630 U obrani Jajca sudjelovali su i
Hrvati Pougarja iz općine Skender Vakuf i iz Liskovice
D
(općina Mrkonjić Grad), što je s obzirom na oko 6500
stanovnika povećalo borbeno sposobno stanovništvo.
Jajce je branilo oko 3000 ljudi na crti bojišta dugoj više
od 100 kilometara. U ljeto je HVO bio organiziran u devet
bojni, od kojih je sedam bilo iz Jajca. Ostale dvije bile su
C
Pougarska i Kotorvaroška, koja je u srpnju stigla na po-
dručje Pougarja, a sastojala se od Muslimana i Hrvata iz
te općine koju su Srbi zauzeli. Od teškog oružja obrana
Jajca imala je pet minobacača 120 mm i jedan top 130
mm, koji su dobili 7. kolovoza. Zapovjednik HVO-a bio
je Stjepan Blažević. Od sredine kolovoza 1992. u obrani
Jajca sudjelovali su i ostali općinski stožeri HVO-a iz sre-
dišnje Bosne s manjim skupinama vojnika, kao i skupina
HOS-a iz Novog Travnika. Teritorijalna obrana odnosno
Armija Republike BiH bila je organizirana u Općinski
štab TO-a, na čijem čelu je bio Muhidin Kadrić. U obra-
ni Jajca sudjelovale su i dvije postrojbe ARBiH koje su
osnovane u Hrvatskoj: 1. krajiški bataljun (poslije 1. kra-
jiška brigada) od sredine srpnja, a od sredine listopada
629 Zemljovid Odluke komandanta 30. krd za napad (Vr-
bas-92) (nedatiran, izrađen prije 25. 10. 1992.); Komanda
30. lpd pov. br. 2/1-9 od 22. 5. 1993.
630 Stanovništvo Bosne i Hercegovine: narodnosni sastav
po naseljima, Državni zavod za statistiku Republike Hr-
vatske, Zagreb, 1995., 134-135.
264
Domovinski rat 04-02-2020 Knjiga 1.indd 264
The situation continued to deteriorate steadily.
According to the claims of the HVO, the Muslims ap-
pointed persons whose outlook was decidedly an-
ti-Croatian to top spots in the civilian administration
and in the Army of the Republic of Bosnia and Herze-
govina. The Army of the Republic of Bosnia and Herze-
govina started bringing elements of the newly formed
305th Mountain Brigade into the villages around Rama
in December. In mid-December the HQ of the HVO Dr.
Ante Starčević Brigade was acutely aware the Muslims
were actively preparing to attack the HVO. The officers
reacted by creating plans for that contingency.
Jajce – Operation Vrbas-92
Jajce is a city in the western part of central Bosnia,
situated at the mouth of the Pliva River, where the Pli-
va flows into the Vrbas. It was of crucial importance for
the Serbs to take the city because of the hydroelectric
power plant on the Vrbas River which fed Bosanska
Krajina with electricity. The bulk of the 30th Partisan
Division of the JNA attacked Jajce. During the fight-
ing the Division was redesignated as the 30th Krajina
Division of the VRS. As the operation to capture Jajce
progressed, the Division was reinforced with elements
of II Krajina Corps and elements of the 1st Mixed An-
ti-tank Artillery Brigade. At the end of October the 30th
Krajina Division had 4,704 men and it was supported
by 19 105-155-mm howitzers, 10 100-mm artillery
pieces, 20 76-mm artillery pieces, 21 120-mm mortars
and an armored-mechanized company. The Division
operated mostly with tactical and combat groups. The
commanders of the Division were Colonel Stanislav
D
Galić and Colonel Jovo Blažanović. The operation was
codenamed Vrbas-92.
In the spring of 1991, Jajce had a population of
45,007 people – 17,380 Muslims, 15,811 Croats and
8,663 Serbs. Croats from the Pougarje region in the
R
Skender Vakuf Municipality and Croats from Liskovice
in the Mrkonjić Grad Municipality participated in the
defense of Jajce. The number of the newcomers was
about 6,500 and the able-bodied men among them
significantly augmented the number of men defend-
ing Jajce. The defensive line around Jajce was about
100 kilometers long and it was manned by about
3,000 men. In the summer, the HVO Jajce comprised
nine battalions, seven of which were actually from Ja-
jce. The other two battalions were from the Pougarje
4.2.2020. 19:34:50
 The Croatian Nation’s Struggle for Survival, 1991-1995
i 7. krajiška brigada. Hrvatsko vijeće obrane u prvim je
mjesecima borbe držalo 80 % crte obrane, a TO ostatak.
Početkom rujna HVO je svoju zonu podijelio na sedam
sektora nadležnosti. Temeljni problem obrane Jajca
bila je neorganiziranost i nesuradnja HVO-a i ARBiH te
međusobno nepovjerenje. U drugoj polovini listopada
Jajce nije dobilo poslanu pomoć zbog međusobnih su-
koba HVO-a i ARBiH u Travniku i Prozoru.631
Nakon zauzimanja Donjeg Vakufa i Vlašića Srbi su
bili spremni za napad na Jajce, koje je preko Karaule
H
i Turbeta imalo nesigurnu vezu s Travnikom. Borbe za
Jajce počele su krajem svibnja 1992. godine. Snage
30. krajiške divizije VRS-a u prvim su danima lipnja bez
većega napora zauzele sela s muslimanskim stanovniš-
tvom južno i zapadno od Jajca i izbile do ulaza u Jajce.
Protuudar je slijedio 13. lipnja. Gubici Srba bili su veliki,
M
a zarobljeno je 13 policajaca, tenk T-34 i oklopni tran-
sporter. Uz pomoć pukovnika Filipa Filipovića iz Travni-
ka obrana je sredinom lipnja bolje organizirana. Krajem
srpnja i početkom kolovoza 1992. VRS je ponovno kre-
nuo u jak napad. Napali su i Pougarje, gdje su ih dvije
bojne uz pomoć snaga iz Jajca zaustavile, a nakon toga
D
do kraja kolovoza nije bilo ozbiljnijih srpskih napada.632
Na prilazima Jajcu HVO je u protunapadu 3. kolo-
voza zauzeo brdo Navis, s kojega je nadzirao promet-
nicu Mrkonjić Grad – Jajce – Šipovo – Kupres i držao je
do 25. kolovoza. Od 12. kolovoza u potpori napada Srbi
su angažirali i zrakoplovstvo i rakete „zemlja-zemlja“;
C
ukupno je ispaljeno devet raketa. Vojska Republike
Srpske uspjela je 25. kolovoza zauzeti prvi sektor obra-
ne grada, Čanino polje, pa se crta obrane organizirala
na potezu Grabež – Fratarski gaj – Ćorina jama – Gola
planina. U završni napad 30. krajiška divizija krenula je
D
glavnim snagama na smjeru Gola planina – Jajce, a po-
moćnima na smjeru Ćusine – Jajce. Na glavnom smjeru
angažirane su TG-1 (glavnina 1. mješovite protuoklo-
631 Izvješće Općinskog stožera HVO Jajce od 16. 7. 1992.;
Izvješće Zapovjedništva OS Srednja Bosna od 17. 8.
1992.; Zapovjedništvo Stožera OS Srednja Bosna, Iz-
vješće br. 458/92 od 31. 8. 1992.; Općinski stožer HVO
Jajce, br. 009/92 od 2. 9. 1992.; “Vrijeme kada je umi-
ralo Jajce”, Stožer, bilten 55. domobranske pukovni-
je, Tomislavgrad, studeni 1994., 6, 10-11; A. KLIKO, F.
ĆUSKIĆ, 17. Viteška Krajiška brdska brigada ARBiH, 28-32,
63-64.
632 Općinski stožer HVO Jajce, br. 01-536/92 od 5. 8. 1992.;
Izvješće Sigurnosno-informativne službe Općinskog
stožera HVO Jajce od 2. 10. 1992.; “Vrijeme kada je umi-
ralo Jajce”, Stožer, 11.
265
Domovinski rat 04-02-2020 Knjiga 1.indd 265
region and Kotor Varoš. The latter arrived in the Pou-
garje region in July and consisted of Muslims and Cro-
ats. The Kotor Varoš Municipality had been captured
by the Serbs. The defenders of Jajce could count on ar-
tillery support consisting of five 120-mm mortars and
one 130-mm artillery piece. The latter was transported
to Jajce on August 7. The commander of the HVO Ja-
jce was Stjepan Blažević. From mid-August, 1992, the
other municipal HQs from central Bosnia with small
groups of soldiers participated in the defense of Jajce,
as well as a HOS group from Novi Travnik. The Territo-
rial Defense, later the Army of the Republic of Bosnia
and Herzegovina was organized around the Munici-
pal HQ of the Territorial Defense. The commander of
the Municipal HQ was Muhidin Kadrić. Two units of
the Army of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina,
formed in Croatia, participated in the defense of Ja-
jce: the I Krajina Battalion (later named the 1st Kraji-
na Brigade) from mid-July and the 7th Krajina Brigade
from mid-October. During the first few months of the
battle, the HVO held 80% of the line and the Territo-
rial Defense the remaining 20%. At the beginning of
September the HVO divided its zone into seven sec-
tors of responsibility. The activities of the HVO and
Army of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina were
poorly coordinated and sometimes one army would
simply refuse to cooperate with the other. These is-
sues stemmed directly from a mutual mistrust. In the
second half of October no reinforcements, weapons
and equipment arrived in Jajce even though they had
been sent from a number of places. This help did not
arrive due to clashes between the HVO and the ARBIH
in Travnik and Prozor.
Having captured Donji Vakuf and Vlašić, the Serbs
stood poised to attack Jajce. Through Karaule and
Turbe Jajce was tenuously connected to Travnik. The
battle for Jajce started at the end of May, 1992. During
the first days of June the 30th Krajina Division of the
R
VRS easily captured the predominately Muslim vil-
lages to the south and west of Jajce and reached the
outskirts of the city. The defenders counterattacked
on June 13. The Serbs suffered serious casualties, and
13 Serb police officers were taken prisoner. The Serbs
also lost a T-34 tank and an APC. With the help of Filip
Filipović from Travnik the organization of the defense
of Jajce was improved in mid-June. At the end of July
and beginning of August, 1992, the VRS launched an-
other determined attack on Jajce. The Pougarje region
4.2.2020. 19:34:50
 Davor Marijan • Rat za opstojnost Hrvata, 1991. - 1995.
pne artiljerijske brigade s dijelovima 1. krajiške i 11.
lake pješačke brigade), TG-2 (17. lpbr s dijelom topniš-
tva i PZO 2. krajiškog korpusa) i BG-1 (dijelovi 6. lpbr).
Na pomoćnom smjeru bila je 1. krajiška brigada. Napad
je počeo ujutro 25. listopada probojem crte ARBiH kod
Vrbice, što je bio uvod u slom obrane. Vojska Republi-
ke Srpske ušla je 29. listopada 1992. u Jajce, a snage
HVO-a i ARBiH sa stanovništvom (civilima Hrvatima i
Muslimanima) povukle su se prema Travniku. U bor-
bama za Jajce iz HVO-a je poginulo 89 osoba, 12 ih je
H
nestalo, a 480 ranjeno. Iz Kotorvaroške bojne poginu-
lo je 10 vojnika, kao i iz HVO-a središnje Bosne. Gubici
ARBiH koja je branila Jajce bili su veći, i to nakon pada
grada, jer je oveća skupina pokušala ostati na području
općine Kotor Varoš, gdje je većina ljudi smrtno strada-
la.633 Od bojno sposobnog ljudstva iz Jajca osnovane
M
su brigada HVO-a Hrvoje Vukčić Hrvatinić u Tomislav-
gradu i 305. brdska brigada ARBiH u Travniku.
Dolina Lašve i Zenica
U dolini Lašve JNA je manjim snagama držala neko-
D
liko objekata. U Travniku je bila vojarna s Tehničkim re-
montnim zavodom i dopunskim pukom s malo ljudi. U
Slimeni je bilo skladište oružja TO-a, koje je osiguravala
posada JNA. U Novom Travniku bila je tvornica topnič-
koga naoružanja Bratstvo, u kojoj je bio veći broj novih
haubica i samohodnih lansera raketa. U susjednom Vi-
C
tezu bila je tvornica eksploziva i raketnog goriva. Osim
tvornice oružja, za JNA i Srbe najvažniji je objekt bila
planina Vlašić. S nje se nadzirao dio Lašvanske doline
i zaprečivali su se pravci prema Skender Vakufu i Kotor
Varoša. Za osvajanje i nadzor planine zadužena je 30.
partizanska divizija. Njezina 19. partizanska brigada
držala je prijevoj Komar, a 122. lpbr zadužena je za dr-
žanje Vlašića i Kruševa Brda. Jugoslavenska narodna
armija imala je premalo ljudi da se održi u okruženju
koje je u travnju 1992. postalo potpuno neprijateljsko.
Vojarnu i skladište Slimena blokirali su HVO i TO. U dru-
goj polovini mjeseca propao je pokušaj JNA da iz tvor-
nice Bratstvo izvuče kompletirano oružje. Vojarna JNA
Draga pored Busovače i skladište u Stojkovićima kod
633 Zemljovid Odluke komandanta 30. krd za napad (Vr-
bas-92) (nedatiran, izrađen prije 25. 10. 1992.); Izvješće
Stožera HVO Jajce od 4. 11. 1992.; “Vrijeme kada je umi-
ralo Jajce”, Stožer, 11; A. KLIKO, F. ĆUSKIĆ, 17. Viteška Kra-
jiška brdska brigada ARBiH, 31.
266
Domovinski rat 04-02-2020 Knjiga 1.indd 266
was also under attack but two battalions reinforced by
troops from Jajce repulsed the onslaught. The Serbs
did not launch another determined attack until the
end of August.
Counterattacking on August 3, the HVO captured
Navis Hill. From that position the HVO controlled the
Mrkonjić Grad – Jajce – Šipovo – Kupres road. The HVO
managed to hold on to Navis Hill until August 25. From
August 12 the Serb attacks were supported by the air
force and ground to ground missiles; altogether nine
such missiles were fired. The VRS captured, on August
25, the first sector of the defense of the city, Čanino
Polje. The defenders established a new defensive line. It
stretched from Grabež, through Fratarski Gaj and Ćori-
na Jama to Gola Planina. The 30th Krajina Division com-
menced its final attack. The main direction of advance
was along the Gola Planina – Jajce line and the troops
supporting the attack advanced along the Ćusine – Ja-
jce line. The force attacking along the main direction of
advance consisted of the TG-1 (the bulk of the 1st Mixed
Anti-tank Artillery Brigade with elements of the 1st Kra-
jina Brigade and the 11th Light Infantry Brigade), TG-2
(17th Light Infantry Brigade with elements of II Krajina
Corps’ artillery and the Air Defense) and BG 1 (elements
of the 6th Light Infantry Brigade). The 1st Krajina Bri-
gade supported the attack. The attack commenced on
the morning of October 25. The Serbs quickly overran
the Army of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina
troops defending the line at Vrbica. This Serb success
proved fatal for the defenders. Gradually, the defensive
line crumbled and the VRS entered Jajce on October
29, 1992. The defenders, both the HVO units and those
belonging to the Army of the Republic of Bosnia and
D
Herzegovina withdrew towards Travnik. The non-Serb
residents of Jajce went with them. During the battle for
Jajce the HVO lost 89 men killed, 12 missing and 480
wounded. 10 soldiers from the Kotor Varoš Battalion
were killed in action. The HVO units from central Bos-
R
nia also lost ten men killed. The Army of the Republic of
Bosnia and Herzegovina suffered a significantly higher
number of casualties than the HVO. Most of those were
incurred after the fall of the city – a large group of sol-
diers decided to remain in the Kotor Varoš area and the
Serbs killed most of them. Two brigades were formed
out of able-bodied men from Jajce: the Hrvoje Vukčić
Hrvatinić HVO Brigade in Tomislavgrad and the 305th
Mountain Brigade of the Army of the Republic of Bosnia
and Herzegovina in Travnik.
4.2.2020. 19:34:50
 The Croatian Nation’s Struggle for Survival, 1991-1995
H
Ostaci vojarne JNA Slimena (općina Travnik), nakon što su je
pripadnici JNA uništili prije povlačenja, 3. svibnja 1992. (autor
fotografije: Srećko Stipović).
M
This is what remained of the JNA barracks in Slimena (Travnik
Municipality) after the retreating JNA garrison blew it up, May
3, 1992 (Photograph by Srećko Stipović)
D
Novog Travnika zauzeti su 26. travnja. Potom je u noći
2./3. svibnja posada JNA u skladištu Slimena digla dio
skladišta u zrak i povukla se prema Vilenici. Nakon pre-
govora JNA je 6. svibnja napustila Travnik i izvukla se
C
na Vlašić, koji je nakon osnivanja Srpske vojske držala
22. lpbr, a poslije Operativna grupa Vlašić VRS-a. HVO
je 14. svibnja napao srpske položaje na platou Vlašića
i privremeno ovladao strateški izuzetno važnom Gali-
com, kotom (1460 m nadmorske visine) s koje se kon-
trolirala cijela Lašvanska dolina i šire. Znajući da je to
D
izuzetna zadaća, HVO je prije toga pozvao musliman-
ske vojne čelnike da im se u toj operaciji pridruže, što
je iz Travnika odbijeno. Nakon što su u cjelodnevnim
borbama Srbi potisnuti prema unutrašnjosti Vlašića,
JNA i srpske snage noću su se preustrojile i, uz pojača-
nja iz Banje Luke, u ranu zoru idućega dana krenule u
protunapad. Slabije, neiskusne i nedovoljno opremlje-
ne snage HVO-a primorane su na povlačenje, a u dije-
lu Galica zarobljeno je i potom ubijeno 14 pripadnika
travničkog HVO-a.634
U Travniku su HVO i TO preuzeli napuštene objekte
634 ICTY: Komanda 5. korpusa, Redovni borbeni izveštaj, str.
pov. br. 44-1/138 od 15. 5. 1992.; „Datumi koji se pamte“,
Vlašići vidici, 19. 11. 1993., 12; Viteška ratna kronika, 19.
267
Domovinski rat 04-02-2020 Knjiga 1.indd 267
Lašva Valley and Zenica
The JNA held a number of installations with meager
forces in the Lašva Valley. A barracks with the Technical
Overhauling Institute was in Travnik. A training regiment
consisting of a small number of men protected the bar-
racks. In Slimena there was an armory belonging to the
Territorial Defense, protected by the JNA garrison there.
In Novi Travnik there was the Bratstvo artillery factory.
A large number of brand new howitzers and self-pro-
pelled rocket launchers were stored there. In neighbor-
ing Vitez there was an explosives and rocket fuel factory.
The artillery factory was of utmost strategic importance
for the JNA. Also highly important, from a strategic per-
spective, was Mount Vlašić. From the mountain a mili-
tary force could easily control a part of the Lašva Valley
and communications routes towards Skender Vakuf and
Kotor Varoš. The 30th Partisan Division was saddled with
the task of capturing and holding the mountain. The
19th Partisan Brigade of the 30th Partisan Division held
the Komar pass and the 122nd Light Infantry Brigade
were ordered to hold Mount Vlašić and Kruševo Brdo.
The JNA did not have enough troops to defend its as-
sets in what, in April, 1992, became enemy territory. The
HVO and the Territorial Defense put the barracks and the
warehouse in Slimena under blockade. In the second
half of April the JNA attempted to move the howitzers
and self-propelled rocket launchers to a safer place from
the Bratstvo factory, but the attempt was not successful.
The JNA Draga barracks near Busovača and the depot in
Stojkovići near Novi Travnik fell on April 26. On the night
of May 2-3 the JNA blew up part of the warehouse in
Slimena and withdrew towards Vilenica. On May 6, af-
ter negotiating a safe passage, the JNA troops vacated
Travnik and withdrew to Mount Vlašić. Mount Vlašić was
held, after the forming of the VRS, by the 22nd Light In-
fantry Brigade and later by Operational Group Vlašić of
the VRS. On May 14 the HVO attacked the Serb positions
R
on the Vlašić plateau and captured Galica, an extremely
important strategic location, situated at 1,460 meters
above sea level, from where the occupants could control
the entire Lašva Valley and surrounding areas. It is worth
mentioning that the HVO, realizing that capturing Gal-
ica would be extremely difficult, asked the Muslims to
take part in the attack but the Muslims refused. The HVO
went ahead and attacked Galica. After one whole day
of fighting the HVO pushed the Serbs back. During the
night the Serb troops regrouped and received reinforce-
4.2.2020. 19:34:50
 Davor Marijan • Rat za opstojnost Hrvata, 1991. - 1995.
i podijelili oružje. Vojarnu u Kaoniku kod Busovače HVO
je osvojio 9./10. svibnja. Zenicu je JNA, po dogovoru,
napustila 18. svibnja, a TO je na prepad uspio oteti dio
naoružanja i opreme.635
Srpski udar na regiju počeo je 20. travnja napadom
na Turbe, koje je TO obranio uz pomoć iz Busovače. Zbog
zauzimanja vojnih objekta u Busovači i Novom Travniku
zrakoplovstvo JNA raketiralo je 26. travnja Busovaču i Vi-
tez pri čemu je ubijeno nekoliko civila i pričinjena veća
materijalna šteta. Više uspjeha JNA je imala na Vlašiću 1.
H
svibnja. Njezina 122. brigada zauzela je televizijski toranj
i zarobila više od 30 pripadnika policije BiH. U lipnju je
TO bez borbe izgubio selo Goleš kod Komara.
U rujnu je ARBiH iz Travnika pružila izvjesnu po-
moć obrani Jajca na pravcima Šešička planina – Gostilj
i Studenjača – Meokrnje. Nakon srpske okupacije Jajca
M
ugrožena je bila i obrana Travnika. Komanda 30. krajiške
divizije VRS-a planirala je napad i izbijanje na crtu Ko-
mar – Turbe – Vlašić. Oko obrane Travnika angažiralo se
zajedničko zapovjedništvo ARBiH i HVO-a, koje su vo-
dili general Slobodan Praljak i Jasmin Jaganjac, a bili su
angažirani još Ante Prkačin i Arif Pašalić. Osnovano je
D
i zajedničko zapovjedništvo HVO-a i ARBiH za Travnik,
rađeni su planovi za vraćanje Jajca, no na kraju se ništa
od planiranog nije realiziralo. Vojska Republike Srpske
napala je početkom studenoga i 14. studenoga zauzela
Karaulu, koju je branila ARBiH. Obrana Travnika organi-
zirana je na padinama Vlašića i na prilazima Turbetu.636
C
Izbijanjem otvorenog rata počeli su sukobi između
HVO-a i muslimanskog TO-a. Većina tih sukoba bila je
u Lašvanskoj dolini. Zbog napada pripadnika TO-a na
punkt HVO-a kod Busovače HVO je 10. svibnja poništio
635 Zapovest Komande 30. partd od 4. 3. 1992. za izvođen-
je borbenih dejstava; Zapovest Komande 30. partd od
2. 4. 1992. za izvođenje borbenih dejstava; Komanda 2.
VO, Borbeni i operativni izveštaj str. pov. br. 10/36-2501
od 26. 4. 1992.; H. EFENDIĆ, Ko je branio Bosnu, 198-199;
Milorad DRAGOJEVIĆ, Razvoj našeg naoružanja: VTI kao
sudbina, Zadužbina Andrejević, Beograd, 2003., 206-
207; Zijad ČABER, “Pripreme za otpor 1991. i odbrana od
agresije u 1992. na području općine Travnik”, Korak, br.
27/2012., 88-89.
636 Komanda 2. VO, Borbeni i operativni izveštaj str. pov. br.
10/36-2548 od 1. 5 1992.; Komanda 30. krajiške divizije,
Naređenje str. pov. br. 174-65 od 30. 10. 1992.; Glavni
stožer HVO, Imenovanje privremenih članova Zapovjed-
ništva dj. br. 01-2505-4/92 od 10. 11. 1992.; Zajedničko
zapovjedništvo Armije BiH i HVO-a, Zapovijed Op. br. 1,
pov. br. 01/4-92 od 10. 11. 1992.; Viteška ratna kronika,
18-19; Z. ČABER, “Pripreme za otpor”, 87-93.
268
Domovinski rat 04-02-2020 Knjiga 1.indd 268
ments from Banja Luka. In early dawn the Serbs mount-
ed a counterattack. The HVO troops, outnumbered and
outclassed, could not withstand the onslaught and re-
treated. Galica was again in Serb hands. The Serbs took
14 HVO soldiers prisoner and later summarily shot them.
All 14 Croat soldiers belonged to the Travnik HVO.
In Travnik the HVO and the Territorial Defense cap-
tured the abandoned JNA installations and divided
the weapons between them. The HVO captured the
barracks in Kaonik near Busovača on May 9-10. The
JNA, as per agreement, vacated Zenica on May 18.
Territorial Defense troops mounted a sudden raid and
managed to capture some weapons and equipment
from the Serbs.
The Serbs’ offensive began on April 20 with an at-
tack on the village of Turbe, defended by the Territorial
Defense. When the Serbs attacked Turbe, troops from
Busovača arrived at the village and with their help the
defenders defeated the attack. On April 26 the JNA Air
Force attacked Busovača and Vitez from the air in retal-
iation for the loss of the JNA installations and facilities
in Busovača and Novi Travnik. The JNA aircraft killed
a number of civilians and inflicted significant material
damage. The JNA was more successful on Mount Vlašić
on May 1. The 122nd Brigade captured the television
tower and took more than 30 police officers prison-
er. In June the JNA captured the village of Goleš near
Komar without a fight. In September the Territorial De-
fense helped the defenders of Jajce to hold the Mount
Šešićka – Gostilj and Studenjača – Meokrnje line. With
Jajce in Serb hands the position of Travnik became pre-
carious. The HQ of the 30th Krajina Division planned an
attack on Travnik with the aim of reaching the Komar –
D
Turbe – Vlašić line. A joint HVO-Army of the Republic of
Bosnia and Herzegovina HQ was set up for the defense
of Travnik. Slobodan Praljak and Jasmin Jaganjac were
in charge. Ante Prkačin and Arif Pašalić were engaged
in the same capacity. Also, a joint HVO-ARBIH HQ for
R
Travnik was formed. Plans were made for an operation
to retake Jajce, but the plans amounted to nothing. At
the beginning of November, the VRS attacked Karau-
la and captured it on November 14. The town was
defended by the Army of the Republic of Bosnia and
Herzegovina. The defense of Travnik pivoted on the
positions on the slopes of Mount Vlašić and approach-
es to Turbe.
Clashes between the HVO and the Muslim TO be-
gan when open war erupted in Bosnia and Herzegovi-
4.2.2020. 19:34:50
 The Croatian Nation’s Struggle for Survival, 1991-1995
H
Zrakoplovi srpskih snaga (bivše JNA) raketirali su Novi Travnik,
rujan 1992. (autor fotografije: Srećko Stipović).
Aircraft of the Serb forces (former JNA) rocketed Novi Travnik,
M
September, 1992 (Photograph by Srećko Stipović).
sporazum o podjeli naoružanja iz vojarne u Kaoniku,
D
preuzeo policijsku stanicu i držao općinu u blokadi do
22. svibnja.637 Novi sukob u općini Busovača zbio se 13.
lipnja u Grablju, u kojem su pripadnici TO-a oduzimali
oružje od Srba koji su izrazili lojalnost HVO-u i preda-
li oružje dobiveno od JNA. Tom su prilikom Muslimani
napali ophodnju Vojne policije HVO-a koja je izišla na
C
teren radi uviđaja i uhićenja organizatora oduzimanja
oružja.638 U Novom Travniku 19. lipnja izbio je sukob
između TO-a s jedne i snaga HVO-a i HOS-a s druge
strane. U sukobu su poginule tri, a ranjeno je 15 osoba.
Prema dostupnim izvorima i kasnijim interpretacijama
D
radilo se o lokalnom incidentu koji je ARBiH planski pre-
uveličala pripisujući HVO-u svoje namjere zaposjedanja
općinskih institucija.639
U drugoj polovini listopada 1992. HVO i ARBiH u
Lašvanskoj regiji bili su doslovno na rubu rata. Tenzije su
sustavno rasle i oružani je sukob bio na pomolu. Nave-
637 Općinski stožer HVO Busovača, Zapovijed br. 62/92 od
10. 5. 1992.; Općinski stožer HVO Busovača, Zapovijed br.
01-4/92 od 22. 5. 1992.
638 Tjedno izvješće Vojne policije Regionalnog stožera HVO
Srednja Bosna za period od 8. do 15. 6. 1992.
639 Davor MARIJAN, Rat Hrvata i Muslimana u Bosni i Herce-
govini od 1992. do 1994., Hrvatski institut za povijest, Za-
greb, 2018., 196.
269
Domovinski rat 04-02-2020 Knjiga 1.indd 269
na. Most of these skirmishes occurred in the Lašva Val-
ley. Reacting to the Territorial Defense’s attack on the
HVO checkpoint at Busovača the HVO, on May 10, nulli-
fied the agreement about distribution of weapons from
the Kaonik barracks, captured the police station and
put the municipality under blockade. The HVO lifted
the blockade on May 22. Another skirmish took place
in the Busovača Municipality on June 13 in Grablje. Ter-
ritorial Defense soldiers were disarming the Serbs who
had declared themselves loyal to the HVO. An HVO mil-
itary police patrol showed up to protect the loyal Serbs
and arrest the instigators of the incident. The Muslims
would have none of it and attacked the MPs. On June
19 a firefight developed between the HVO and the HOS
on one side and the Territorial Defense on the other.
Three men were killed and 15 wounded in the incident.
According to the available sources the Army of the Re-
public of Bosnia and Herzegovina blew these incidents
out of all proportion and accused the HVO of trying to
usurp power in the municipalities. Ironically, the Army
of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina was falsely
accusing the HVO of what it had been guilty all along.
During the second half of October, 1992, the HVO
and the Army of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina
were at loggerheads in the Lašva Valley. Tensions steadi-
ly grew and war between the HVO and the Army of the
Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina became inevitable.
On the evening of October 11 in Rostovci near Novi
Travnik, the Army of the Republic of Bosnia and Herze-
govina attacked a vehicle with HVO officers from Opera-
tive Zone central Bosnia. Then, on October 13, the Army
of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina attacked an
HVO vehicle, wounding the commander of the HVO Ja-
jce. On October 18 in Novi Travnik the Army of the Re-
public of Bosnia and Herzegovina tried to take control
of the gas station and a few facilities. The HVO opposed
the move and a firefight developed. The following day
the Army of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina at-
R
tacked the HQ, the repeater and shooting range in Novi
Travnik. The fighting lasted for a few days and both sides
suffered serious casualties. Collateral damage was also
serious. According to the available sources, the HVO
lost 10 men killed, 30 wounded and 5 missing in action.
The fighting stopped on October 25 when UNPROFOR
intervened, and after a few meetings between repre-
sentatives of the HVO and the Army of the Republic of
Bosnia and Herzegovina. In neighboring Vitez the Army
of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina took a group
4.2.2020. 19:34:50
 Davor Marijan • Rat za opstojnost Hrvata, 1991. - 1995.
čer 11. listopada u Rastovcima kod Novog Travnika AR-
BiH je napala vozilo HVO-a u kojem su bili časnici OZ-a
Srednja Bosna. Potom je u Karauli 13. listopada napad-
nuto vozilo HVO-a i ranjen zapovjednik HVO-a Jajce.640
U Novom Travniku zbio se 18. listopada incident između
HVO-a i ARBiH jer je ARBiH pokušala zauzeti benzinsku
postaju i nekoliko objekata, čemu se HVO protivio. Idu-
ćega dana ARBiH je napala Stožer, Repetitor i Strelište.
Nekoliko su se dana vodile jake borbe u kojima se ko-
ristilo sve raspoloživo naoružanje, pa su žrtve i materi-
H
jalne štete bile velike. Po nepotpunim podacima, HVO
je imao 10 poginulih, 30 ranjenih i pet nestalih osoba.
Uz posredovanje UNPROFOR-a i nekoliko sastanaka
predstavnika HVO-a i ARBiH sukob se postupno smirio
i do 25. listopada je završen. U susjednom Vitezu ARBiH
je zarobila skupinu vojnika HVO-a koji su se vraćali iz
M
Hercegovine i blokirala prometnicu prema Novom Trav-
niku. Nakon što pregovorima nisu uspjeli ukloniti bari-
kade u Ahmićima, HVO je to 20. listopada učinio silom.
U Travniku su 20. listopada 1992. pripadnici ARBiH na
punktu na istočnom ulazu u grad ubili zapovjednika
brigade HVO-a Travnik Ivicu Stojaka, pucajući u njegov
D
automobil, a teško ranili njegova dva suputnika. Za su-
kob je HVO optuživao Refika Lendu, komandanta ARBiH
iz Novog Travnika, a iz ARBiH su tvrdili da je povod za
sukob blokada vlasti i favoriziranje HVO-a. Zbog sukoba
u cijeloj regiji nekoliko su dana bile blokirane prometni-
ce, što je u konačnici utjecalo i na pad Jajca.641
C
Usora – Žepče – Maglaj
Između Doboja i Zenice veća hrvatska zajednica
bila je u općinama Žepče, Teslić, Tešanj i Maglaj. Na tom
području Hrvati su organizirani u HVO, iz kojega je na
području općine Tešanj 18. lipnja 1992. nastala 110. bri-
gada Usora. Borbe su počele nakon što su Srbi i JNA 3.
svibnja 1992. bez borbe zauzeli Doboj i napali Tešanj.
640 IZM Vitez Zap. OZ Srednja Bosna od 15. 10. 1992. za
Zapovjednika I. OG.
641 Zapovjedništvo OZ Srednja Bosna od 19. 10. 1992. za
Stožer HVO Grude; Izvješće IZM Vitez Zap. OZ SB od 20.
10. 1992. u 12,07; Izvješće IZM Vitez Zap. OZ SB od 20.
10. 1992. u 15 sati; Izvješće IZM Vitez Zap. OZ SB od 26.
10. 1992. u 22,35; Izvješće Općinskog stožera HVO Vitez
o sukobu HVO i TO u Vitezu 19.-23. 10. 1992.; Komisija
HVO za praćenje stanja na području općine Novi Travnik,
Izvješće br. 1215/92 od 6. 11. 1992.; Izvješće načelnika
Stožera HVO Novi Travnik od 7. 11. 1992.
270
Domovinski rat 04-02-2020 Knjiga 1.indd 270
of HVO soldiers who were returning from Herzegovina
prisoner and blocked the Novi Travnik road. The HVO
instigated talks with the Army of the Republic of Bos-
nia and Herzegovina, trying to convince the Muslims to
remove the road blocks in Ahmići. The Army of the Re-
public of Bosnia and Herzegovina refused and the HVO
decided to use force. On October 20 the HVO succeeded
in removing the road blocks. In Travnik, on October 20,
1992, Army of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina
soldiers, at the checkpoint on the eastern side of the
city, fired at the vehicle occupied by the commander
of the HVO Travnik Brigade Ivica Stojak, wounding two
men traveling with him. The HVO held Refik Lendo, the
commander of Army of the Republic of Bosnia and Her-
zegovina troops in Novi Travnik, responsible for the at-
tack. The Army of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegov-
ina claimed that the attack had been provoked by the
HVO’s political moves. As a direct result of the conflict,
the roads in the region were blocked and that, in turn,
helped the Serbs to capture Jajce.
Usora – Žepče – Maglaj
Between Doboj and Zenica larger Croatian com-
munities were in the municipalities of Žepče, Teslić,
Tešanj and Maglaj. In that area the Croats were orga-
nized into the HVO. On June 18, 1992, the 110th Uso-
ra Brigade was formed in the area. The fighting there
started when the JNA and Serbs took Doboj without
a fight and attacked Tešanj on May 3, 1995. The HVO
put up a stiff resistance for a few days around Makl-
jenovac. From the end of May fighting around Usora
and Tešanj was continuous. The Serbs attacked from
D
Doboj and Teslić, focusing their efforts on Miljanovci,
Lončar, Piljužić, Kološević, Bobar and Omanjska. Serb
forces belonging to Operational Group Doboj tried to
pin down the Croatian and Muslim forces in Tešanj and
prevent them from engaging the Serbs forces trying
R
to conquer the Bosanska Posavina region. The Serbs
sporadically shelled Usora and launched small-scale
attacks. Such attacks were mounted on May 31, June
2 and June 22 and July 6. The HVO Usora and the 109th
Brigade of the Territorial Defense attacked Doboj with
the aim of relieving the Serb pressure on the HVO and
Croatian Army forces in Bosanski Brod and Odžak. On
July 11, the 109th Brigade of the Territorial Defense and
the 110th Brigade of the HVO mounted a sudden attack
on the Serbs positions at Plana and Putnikovo Hill near
4.2.2020. 19:34:50
 The Croatian Nation’s Struggle for Survival, 1991-1995
Hrvatsko vijeće obrane na par ih je dana zaustavilo u
borbama kod Makljenovca. Od kraja svibnja borbe oko
Usore odnosno Tešnja bile su svakodnevne. Srbi su na-
padali iz Doboja i Teslića, težišno na područje Miljano-
vaca, Lončara, Piljužića, Kološevića, Bobara i Omanjske.
Srpske snage u sastavu OG-a Doboj nastojale su vezati
hrvatske i muslimanske snage u Tešnju da bi na miru
zaposjele Bosansku Posavinu. Povremeno su intenziv-
no granatirali Usoru i izvodili napade manjega opse-
ga, kao 31. svibnja, 2. i 22. lipnja te 6. srpnja. Hrvatsko
H
vijeće obrane Usora i 109. brigada TO-a odgovorili su
napadom na Doboj u nastojanju da olakšaju položaj
snagama HVO-a i HV-a na području Bosanskog Broda
i Odžaka. U iznenadnom napadu južno od Doboja, u
Plani i kod Putnikova brda snage 109. brigade TO-a i
110. brigade HVO-a 11. srpnja 1992. nanijele su velike
M
gubitke srpskim snagama, koje su imale 31 poginulog
i 80 ranjenih ljudi. Operativna grupa Doboj natjerana je
da organizira namjensku borbenu skupinu za vraćanje
izgubljenih položaja. Pokušaj vraćanja 14. srpnja nije
bio uspješan. Nakon toga je 110. brigada HVO-a uz če-
ste borbe uglavnom nadzirala kompleks sela Žabljak,
D
Omanjska, Sivša, Alibegovci i Ularice.642
U donekle sličnu položaju kao u Usori, Hrvati su
bili i u Žepču, gradiću smještenom na obalama rijeke
Bosne, oko 35 kilometara sjeveroistočno od Zenice,
30 kilometara južno od Doboja i stotinjak kilometara
sjeverozapadno od Sarajeva. U Žepču je 1992. osnovan
C
Stožer HVO-a, koji je prihvatilo i hrvatsko stanovništvo
iz okolnih općina: Zavidovići, Maglaj i Teslić. Krizni štab
općine Maglaj, u kojoj su Muslimani imali relativnu
većinu, prepustio je 2. lipnja 1992. HVO-u Žepča obra-
nu općine. U Žepču je od lipnja do početka listopada
D
1992. bilo sjedište IV. operativne zone HVO-a za pod-
ručje općina Žepče, Zavidovići, Tešanj i Teslić, a potom
3. operativne grupe za Žepče, Usoru i Komušinu, koja
je bila podređena OZ-u Srednja Bosna. Zapovjednik tih
642 ICTY: Zapovest Komande 1. KK od 9. 6. 1992. za odbra-
nu, obezbeđenje teritorije i ofanzivna dejstva, Op. br.
04/92; Glavni stožer obrane, Borbena zapovijed kl. 8/92-
01, ur. br. HVO-01/92-57 od 5. 7. 1992.; Uprava SIS HR
H-B, Službena zabilješka br. 02-11-1-/94 od 11. 3. 1994.;
HVO Usora, Zahtjev, br. 1/92-314 od 20. 11. 1992.; HVO
Usora, Preporuka br. 01-137/94 od 27. 4. 1994.; Prosud-
ba Službe sigurnosti ZP Vitez od 18. 1. 1996. o 110. dp
Usora; “100 dana rata”, TRN – Tešanjske ratne novine, br.
1, 10. 8. 1992.; ICTY: Ratni dnevnik 1. KK, zabilješka za 14.
7. 1992.; Novica SIMIĆ, Operacija “Koridor-92”, Boračka
organizacija RS, Banja Luka, 2011., 234-236, 240-242.
271
Domovinski rat 04-02-2020 Knjiga 1.indd 271
Doboj and inflicted serious casualties on the Serbs.
The Serbs lost 31 killed and 80 wounded soldiers. Op-
erational Group Doboj was forced to form a combat
group for retaking the lost positions. On July 14 the
combat group attacked but without success. After
that the 110th Brigade of the HVO was engaged in con-
stant fighting and controlling the villages of Žabljak,
Omanjska, Sivša, Alibegovci and Ularice.
The Croats in Žepče were in a somewhat similar
position as those in Usora. Žepče is a town situated
on the banks of the River Bosna, some 35 kilometers
to the east of Zenica, 30 kilometers to the south of
Doboj and about 100 kilometers to the northwest of
Sarajevo. In 1992, the HQ of the HVO was formed in
Žepče. The Croats from the neighboring municipali-
ties – Zavidovići, Maglaj and Teslić – accepted the au-
thority of the HQ in Žepče. The Crisis Committee of the
Maglaj Municipality, in which the Muslims made up a
majority, agreed that the HVO Žepče be responsible
for defending the municipality on June 2, 1992. The
HQ, from the beginning of October, of the 4th Opera-
tive Zone of the HVO for the municipalities of Žepče,
Zavidovići, Tešanj and Teslić was in Žepče and later the
HQ of the 3rd Operational Group for Žepče, Usora and
Komušin. The 3rd Operational Group Žepče was sub-
ordinated to Operative Zone Central Bosnia. The com-
mander of these forces was Ivo Lozančić. In June the
Andrija Tadić Battalion (initially named Ban Kulin) was
formed in Žepče as part of the Ante Bruno Bušić Reg-
iment. By the end of the year the 111th Brigade of the
HVO was also formed in Žepče.11
11 The author bases his claim regarding the formation of
the 111xp Brigade on the order of the HQ, OZ Central
Bosnia, of November 18, 1992. However, according to
the commander of the 111xp Brigade, on April 17, 1992,
the Decision on development through mobilization of
the armed forces of the HVO in the entire area of Bosnia
and Herzegovina was passed and the Decision also
determined the numerical designation and structure of
R
the units in question. In accordance with the Decision, the
numerical designations of all HVO units stationed to the
south of the Sava River carried the numerical designations
from the number 101 (101st Brigade Bosanski Brod) to
the number 112 (112th Brigade Tuzla). In the Žepče area
a brigade carrying the numerical designation 111, with
the letters xp added to the designation, was formed.
According to the aforementioned commander, the
official designation of the HVO Brigade in the Žepče area,
from that period onwards, was the 111xp HVO Brigade.
The commander’s statements as given here should be
corroborated with a written source, that is, the text of the
mentioned Decision.
4.2.2020. 19:34:50
 Davor Marijan • Rat za opstojnost Hrvata, 1991. - 1995.
operativnih sastava bio je Ivo Lozančić. U Žepču je u
lipnju osnovana bojna Andrija Tadić (prvo nazvana boj-
na Ban Kulin) u sastavu pukovnije Ante Bruno Bušić, a do
kraja godine i 111. xp brigada HVO-a.643
Nakon sređivanja stanja nastalog transformacijom
JNA u Vojsku Republike Srpske, Srbi iz Teslića počeli su
napade prema Žepču. Prva je na udaru bila Komušina,
dio općine Teslić s većinskim hrvatskim stanovništvom.
Napad je počeo 25. svibnja 1992. i s uspjehom je od-
bijen. Radi deblokade Tešnja i Usore HVO je uspio 4.
H
lipnja zauzeti važnu kotu Crni vrh na prometnici Novi
Šeher – Teslić. Srbi su 7. lipnja napali Studence, što je
obranu regije povećalo za dodatnih desetak kilometa-
ra. U borbama koje su slijedile HVO se solidno držao do
početka kolovoza. U tom razdoblju HVO Žepče brani
Maglaj, aktivno sudjeluje u borbama oko Komušine i
M
pomaže 110. brigadi HVO-a Usora. Potkraj srpnja HVO
je zauzeo kotu Ivanove njive i potisnuo VRS prema Mla-
dikovinama.644 Nekoliko dana poslije uslijedio je srpski
odgovor. Komanda 1. krajiškog korpusa prestrojila je
snage i od snaga na širem području Teslića i Ozrena (1.
i 2. ozrenska brigada, Teslićka brigada, Trebavska bri-
D
gada i snage Komande obrane grada Doboja) osnovala
5. taktičku grupu. Planirano je presijecanje prometnica
od Zenice i Tuzle prema Doboju i Gradačcu, a potom
izbijanje 1. krajiškog korpusa na crtu Teslić – Tešanj –
Gračanica – Srebrenik te stavljanje pod nadzor Ozre-
na, Trebavca i zapadne padine Majevice. Cilj VRS-a na
C
žepačkom dijelu bojišta bilo je osvajanje Crnog vrha
te preko Osova i Poljica spajanje sa snagama na Ozre-
nu, čime bi se Tešanj i Usora potpuno okružili. Srpski
je pritisak počeo 4. kolovoza i nakratko je prestao 11.
643 HVO Žepče, Zavidovići, Maglaj i Teslić, br. 1/1-28 od 1.
6. 1992.; ICTY: Regionalni stožer HVO Srednja Bosna,
Zapovijed br. 27/92 od 10. 6. 1992.; ICTY: IZM Zapovjed-
ništva OZ Srednja Bosna, Zapovijed br. 875/92 od 7. 10.
1992.; IZM Zapovjedništva OZ Srednja Bosna, Zapovi-
jed br. 997-2/92 od 4. 11. 1992.; IZM Zapovjedništva OZ
Srednja Bosna, Zapovijed br. 1244/92 od 18. 11. 1992.;
“Obranili smo ono što je hrvatsko”, Drmaj, br. 1-2, srpanj
1994., 18-19; Anto MARINČIĆ, Općina Žepče ili ključ za
funkcioniranje Federacije Bosne i Hercegovine, Ceres, Za-
greb, 2000., 30, 58, 218.
644 Zapovjednik HVO Ivo Lozančić za Daria Kordića i Ig-
nacia Koštromana (nedatirano, pisano nakon 4. 6.
1992.); HVO Teslić Komušina, Izvješće br. 238/92 od 19.
8. 1992.; IPD bojne “Andrija Tadić” – Tko je bojna “An-
drija Tadić” (nedatirani tekst koji je nastao vjerojatno
u siječnju 1993.); “Obranili smo ono što je hrvatsko”,
Drmaj, br. 1-2, srpanj 1994., 19.
272
Domovinski rat 04-02-2020 Knjiga 1.indd 272
After a period of consolidation and after the trans-
formation of the JNA into the VRS the Serbs started
attacking Žepče from Teslić. The Serbs attacked
Komušina, a predominately Croatian part of the Teslić
Municipality, on May 25, 1992. The defenders beat the
Serbs back. On June 4 the HVO succeeded in captur-
ing Crni Vrh Hill along the Novi Šeher – Teslić road.
The position was crucial for the Croats’ plan to lift the
blockade of Tešanj and Usora. On June 7 the Serbs at-
tacked Studenci, thus extending the defensive line for
10 kilometers. In the fighting that followed the HVO
resisted fiercely until the beginning of August. During
that period the HVO Žepče defended Maglaj, active-
ly participated in the fighting around Komušina and
helped the 110th Brigade at Usora. Towards the end of
July the HVO captured Ivanove Njive Hill and pushed
the VRS in the direction of Mladikovine. A few days
later the Serbs reacted. The HQ of I Krajina Corps re-
grouped its forces and formed the 5th Tactical Group
from troops deployed in the wider Teslić and Ozren
area (the 1st and 2nd Ozren Brigade, the Teslić Brigade,
the Trebavska Brigade and the forces under the com-
mand of the Defense of Doboj). The plan was to cut
the roads from Zenica and Tuzla towards Doboj and
Gradačac and then I Krajina Corps would reach the
Teslić – Tešanj – Gračanica – Srebrenik line and gain
control over Ozren, Trebavac and western slope of
Majevica. The VRS’ objective in the Žepče part of the
front was to capture Crni Vrh and link up, via Osovo
and Poljice, with the forces in Ozren, thus encircling
Tešanj and Usore. The Serbs started attacking on Au-
gust 4. The momentum of the attack slackened a bit
on August 11 when Serb forces captured of Komušina
D
and reached the Studenci – Slatina – Komušina – Crna
Rijeka – Kamenica – Rajševo line and gained control
of the Teslić – Blatnica road. By August 24 the VRS had
captured the Gavranić height and from there fired on
the defensive positions around Dubrava. The HVO
R
forces in Žepće, Maglaj and Novi Šeher defended the
Borovnjak – Paline – Tutljak – Dubrave – Krš – Lipova
Glava – Martinski Hill – Vukove Njive, Gornja Papratni-
ca – Kršić line. Heavy fighting developed in October
around Crni Vrh. In mid-November the HVO Komušina
and the Andrija Tadić Battalion halted a determined
Serb attack on Hatkine Njive.
In the second half of September the Serbs shift-
ed the focus of the attack on the Maglaj part of the
front. The VRS launched a strong attack on Septem-
4.2.2020. 19:34:50
 The Croatian Nation’s Struggle for Survival, 1991-1995
kolovoza, zauzimanjem Komušine i izbijanjem na crtu
Studenci – Slatina – Komušina – Crna Rijeka – Kameni-
ca – Rajševo i zauzimanjem prometnice Teslić – Blatni-
ca. Do 24. kolovoza VRS je zauzeo dominantnu točku
Gavranić i s nje bočnom vatrom ugrožavao crtu obra-
ne Dubrava. Postrojbe HVO-a Žepča, Maglaja i Novog
Šehera branile su crtu Borovnjak – Paline – Tutljak –
Dubrave – Krš – Lipova glava – Martinski vis – Vukove
njive, Gornja Papratnica – Kršić. U listopadu su se jake
borbe vodile oko Crnog vrha. Sredinom studenoga
H
HVO Komušina i bojna Andrija Tadić zaustavili su jak
srpski napad na Hatkine njive.645
U drugoj polovini rujna težište napada VRS-a pre-
bačeno je na maglajski dio bojišta. Jači napad VRS je
izveo 25. rujna, no bez uspjeha. Napad na Maglaj, koji
su branile lokalne snage HVO-a i ARBiH, VRS je ponovio
M
12. i 13. listopada. Grad se održao u prvom redu zbog
angažmana snaga HVO-a. Glavni štab VRS-a zamjerio je
u studenome 1992. Prvom krajiškom korpusu što nije
osvojio Maglaj.646 Kraj 1992. poklopio se s prestankom
jačih srpskih napada na obranu Žepča i Usore.
D
Kakanj i Vareš
U istočnom dijelu središnje Bosne veća hrvatska
zajednica bila je u općinama Kakanj i Vareš. Kakanj je
grad uz prometnicu Zenica – Sarajevo, a Vareš rudar-
ski gradić na važnoj prometnici koja od Sarajeva preko
C
Breze vodi za Banoviće i Tuzlu. U Varešu su Hrvati bili
većinsko stanovništvo, a u Kaknju su činili gotovo tre-
ćinu. U Varešu je od 1. srpnja 1992. izvršna vlast bila
u rukama HVO-a. Uz manji oružani sukob u ljeto 1992.
predstavnici lokalnoga HVO-a uspjeli su postići dogo-
D
vor da srpska sela Planinica i Slavin predaju oružje uz
645 ICTY: GŠ VSR BiH, Direktiva za dalja dejstva op. br. 3, str.
pov. br. 02/5-92 od 3. 8. 1992.; IV operativna zona HVO,
Zapovijed br. 02/1-41/92 od 14. 8. 1992.; Zapovjedništ-
vo OS Srednja Bosna, Izvješće o stanju u 4. OZ (Žepče)
str. pov. br. 431/92 od 24. 8. 1992.; 3. OG Žepče, Zapo-
vijed br. 02/2-1-182/92 od 14. 11. 1992.; Izvještaj bojne
“Andrija Tadić” od 15., 17. i 19. 11. 1992.
646 Stožer HVO Žepče, Zapovijed br. 02/1-100/92 od 23.
9. 1992.; Izvještaj bojne “Andrija Tadić” od 26. 9. 1992.;
3. operativna grupa HVO Žepče, Zapovijed br. 02/1-
139/92 od 10. 10. 1992.; Izvještaj bojne “Andrija Tadić”
za vrijeme od 12. do 14. 10. 1992.; ICTY: Glavni štab VRS,
Naredna dejstva VRS, Direktiva, op. br. 4, str. pov. br.
02/5-210 od 19. 11. 1992.; Pohvala Zapovjednika bojne
“Vladimir Miličević” od 26. 11. 1992.
273
Domovinski rat 04-02-2020 Knjiga 1.indd 273
ber 25 but without success. The VRS attacked Maglaj,
defended by the HVO and the Army of the Republic
of Bosnia and Herzegovina, again on October 12-13.
The Serbs again failed to capture the city, mainly due
to the Andrija Tadić Battalion’s determined perfor-
mance. The General Staff of the Army of the Republika
Srpska criticized, in November, 1992, I Krajina Corps
for failing to capture Maglaj. With the end of 1992
came the end of serious Serb efforts to capture Žepče
and Usora.
Kakanj and Vareš
In the eastern part of Central Bosnia large Croat
populations were in the municipalities of Kakanj and
Vareš. Kakanj is a city abutting the Zenica – Sarajevo
road and Vareš is a mining town straddling the strate-
gically important road connecting Sarajevo, via Breza,
with Banovići and Tuzla. In Vareš Croats made up a ma-
jority and in Kakanj they made up about a third of the
population. In Vareš, from July 1, 1992, the executive
power was in the hands of the HVO. Minor skirmishes
with the Serbs took place in the summer of 1992 but
representatives of the local HVO force managed to
reach an agreement with the Serbs whereby the Ser-
bian villages of Planinica and Slavin would hand over
their weapons to the HVO and the HVO would pro-
tect their lives and property. The southeastern part of
the municipality was under control of the VRS, with
strongholds in the villages of Brgule, Žižci, Žalja and
Okruglica. In Kakanj, the municipal HQ of the HVO
deployed a small number of its troops in the part of
the municipality stretching towards Zavidovići, Vareš,
Visoko and Breza. There were no hostilities with the
Serb forces deployed in the area but the relationship
between the HVO and the Muslim Territorial Defense
steadily deteriorated due to disagreements regarding
the HVO’s organization of its executive power in the
R
municipality and the HVO’s attitude towards the local
Serbs. Also, Muslim extremists replaced Muslim mod-
erates in the TO. By the end of the year the Bobovac
Brigade was formed out of troops belonging to the
HVO Kakanj and HVO Vareš. The HQ of the Bobovac
Brigade was located in Vareš. The Army of the Repub-
lic of Bosnia and Herzegovina formed municipal HQs
and the 309th Mountain Brigade in Kakanj.
4.2.2020. 19:34:50
 Davor Marijan • Rat za opstojnost Hrvata, 1991. - 1995.
zajamčenu sigurnost života i imovine. Jugoistočni dio
općine bio je pod nadzorom VRS-a, s uporištima u se-
lima Brgule, Žižci, Žalja i Okruglica.647 U Kaknju je op-
ćinski stožer HVO-a manji dio snaga angažirao na dijelu
općine prema Zavidovićima, Varešu, Visokom i Brezi. Su-
koba sa srpskim snagama nije bilo, a odnos s musliman-
skim TO-om se sustavno pogoršavao zbog prijepora
oko organiziranja izvršne vlasti HVO-a u općini, odnosa
prema lokalnim Srbima i kadrovskih promjena u TO-u.648
Do kraja godine od HVO-a Kaknja i Vareša formirana je
H
brigada Bobovac sa sjedištem u Varešu. Armija Repu-
blike BiH je uz općinske štabove formirala 309. brdsku
brigadu u Kaknju.
Fojnica – Kiseljak – Kreševo
M
Fojnica, Kiseljak i Kreševo tri su susjedne općine
u središnjoj Bosni, u dolinama manjih rijeka Lepenice,
Kreševke i Fojnice. Lepenička dolina, u čijem je središtu
Kiseljak, zemljopisno je smještena na izuzetno povolj-
noj lokaciji s prilazima iz više regija i gradova, uključu-
jući i glavni grad BiH Sarajevo. Hrvati su bili većinsko
D
stanovništvo u Kreševu i Kiseljaku, a Muslimani u Fojni-
ci, no općenito su u dolini Lepenice Hrvati bili brojniji.
U obližnjem Sarajevu bila je velika koncentracija JNA,
a na ovom je području samo u Kiseljaku bila vojarna s
mješovitim artiljerijskim pukom, koji je uoči napada na
Sarajevo premješten na Pale. Hrvatsko vijeće obrane
C
ranije je organizirano i preuzelo je dominantnu ulogu
u Kiseljaku i Kreševu. U Kiseljaku je bilo sjedište 2. ope-
rativne grupe OZ-a Srednja Bosna (kasnije Zborno pod-
ručje Vitez). U drugoj polovici prosinca 1992. osnovana
je brigada Ban Josip Jelačić. U strukturi TO-a ove su opći-
ne ušle u sastav TG-1 sa sjedištem u Visokom.
Crta obrane HVO-a prema Srbima organizirana je u
zahvatu prometnice Kiseljak – Sarajevo, na kojoj je bio
poznati punkt Kobiljača. Prema podacima HVO-a, oni
nisu bili protiv organiziranja muslimanskog TO-a, s tim
da su tražili da budu upoznati s njegovim djelovanjima
i uz najavu su dopuštali prolaz kroz Kiseljak prema Viso-
kom i kroz Kreševo prema Tarčinu. Dvije vojne organi-
zacije s različitim političkim ciljevima na istom prosto-
647 ICTY: HVO Vareš br. 01-sl. od 10. 7. 1992.; Izvješće Načel-
nika VOS-a HVO I. op. zone o Varešu (primljeno 27. 10.
1992.); Istina o Varešu Ante Pejčinovića od 18. 3. 1994.
648 Općinski stožer HVO Kakanj, Izvješće br. 11-1687/92 od 25.
7. 1992.; SIS Općinskog stožera HVO Kakanj od 13. 8. 1992.
274
Domovinski rat 04-02-2020 Knjiga 1.indd 274
Fojnica – Kiseljak – Kreševo
Fojnica, Kiseljak and Kreševo are three neighboring
municipalities in central Bosnia, situated in the valleys
of three small rivers – the Lepenica River, Kreševka Riv-
er and Fojnica River. The geographical location of the
Lepenica Valley, with the town of Kiseljak in its center
could best be described as fortuitous because major
roads connecting a whole myriad of Bosnian-Herze-
govinian cities and regions, including Sarajevo, pass
through it. Croats formed a majority in Kreševo and
Kiseljak and Muslims in Fojnica. Generally speaking,
more Croats lived in the Lepenica Valley than Muslims.
The JNA had a strong presence in neighboring Saraje-
vo. In the valley itself the JNA had only a barracks in
Kiseljak housing the Mixed Artillery Regiment. Just pri-
or to the JNA’s attack on Sarajevo the Mixed Artillery
Regiment was moved to Pale. The HVO had been orga-
nized before the Serbs attacked Sarajevo and played
the dominant role in Kiseljak and Kreševo. The HQ of
the 2nd Operational Group of the OZCB (later ZP Vitez)
was in Kiseljak. During the second half of 1992 the Ban
Josip Jelačić Brigade was formed. The three municipal-
ities were incorporated, as regards the TO structure,
into the TG-1. The HQ of the TG-1 was in Visoki.
The HVO’s defensive line opposite the Serbs was
organized along the Kiseljak – Sarajevo road. Situated
on that road was the village of Kobiljača, which gained
notoriety as a major smuggling hub situated as it was
right on the line of separation between the Serbs and
Croats. According to the HVO, the Croats were not op-
posed to the Muslim Territorial Defense. The HVO in-
sisted, though, that the Territorial Defense should duly
D
inform the HVO of its activities. The HVO was prepared
to grant passage to Territorial Defense troops through
Kiseljak towards Visoki and through Kreševo towards
Tarčin on the condition that the Territorial Defense in-
formed the HVO of such moves in advance. The HVO
and the Territorial Defense were two military organiza-
R
tions deployed in the same area but serving differing
and sometimes conflicting political agendas. As such,
they could not co-exist in harmony. The HVO accused
the commander of the newly formed Muslim munici-
pal HQ of the Territorial Defense Kiseljak of throwing
his weight around unnecessarily and for the purpose
of fomenting conflict between the HVO and the Terri-
torial Defense. After a few minor incidents and a show
of force the HVO took control of the police station in
4.2.2020. 19:34:50
 The Croatian Nation’s Struggle for Survival, 1991-1995

ru nisu mogle djelovati bez nesuglasja. Hrvatsko vijeće
obrane optuživalo je komandanta novoformiranog mu-
slimanskog općinskog štaba TO-a Kiseljak da unosi raz-
dor i pokušava nametnuti svoju opciju. Nakon nekoliko
manjih incidenata i demonstracije sile, HVO je 5. kolovo-
za 1992. preuzeo milicijsku stanicu u Kiseljaku. Pripadni-
ci TO-a postavili su 6. kolovoza prvi punkt na jednoj od
lokalnih prometnica, a idućega dana još nekoliko. Hrvat-
sko vijeće obrane nije uspjelo mirno ukloniti barikade, a
nakon napada muslimanskog TO-a na selo Potkraj izbio
H
je sukob, koji je završio 8. kolovoza angažiranjem vojno-
ga i političkoga vrha obiju sukobljenih strana.649
M
Kiseljak on August 5, 1992. The Territorial Defense set
up its first check point on a local road on August 6,
1992. The following day the Territorial Defense set up
more checkpoints. The HVO was unsuccessful in con-
vincing the Territorial Defense to remove the check-
points and road blocks. Then, the Territorial Defense at-
tacked the village of Potkraj and a firefight developed
which only ended on August 8 when the political and
military leadership of both sides intervened. One HVO
soldier was killed in the skirmish and two were wound-
ed. The Territorial Defense had challenged the HVO’s
dominance in the area but failed to shake it.
_____ ____ ,,..,.,..,
a___
•••....,n., ,,...,,,.1.,..,w

-·-·-·- .......... . . ,..,

D
C
D
........
,
R
Bosanska Posavina, travanj – lipanj 1992.
649 Regionalni stožer HVO Srednja Bosna, Zapovijed br. 01- Bosanska Posavina, April – June 1992
8/92 od 14. 5. 1992.; Informacija zapovjednika HVO Kisel-
jak od 7. 8. 1992. o destruktivnom djelovanju pojedinaca
iz reda TO Kiseljak; Izvješće IZM Vitez Zap. OS Srednja
Bosna od 8. 8. 1992.; Zap. OS Srednja Bosna, Informacija
o događajima u Kiseljaku br. 04-309/92 od 13. 8. 1992.;
Mesud ŠADINLIJA, Prvi korpus ARBiH: nastanak i razvoj
1992–1995, Ministarstvo za boračka pitanja Kantona Sa-
rajevo, Sarajevo, 2008., 20.

275

Domovinski rat 04-02-2020 Knjiga 1.indd 275 4.2.2020. 19:34:53

 Davor Marijan • Rat za opstojnost Hrvata, 1991. - 1995.
BOSANSKA POSAVINA
Najduža i najkrvavija borbena kampanja 1992.
zbila se na području Bosanske Posavine. Odlučujuće
borbe vodile su se na području općina Bosanski Brod,
Derventa, u sjevernom dijelu općine Doboj, Modriči i
Odžaku – teritoriju ispresijecanom rijekama Ukrinom i
Bosnom. U etničkom pogledu, ni jedan od tri bosan-
skohercegovačka naroda nije imao apsolutnu većinu.
Samo je Orašje, s više od 75 % Hrvata, imalo izrazitu
H
dominaciju jednoga naroda. Više od polovine stanov-
ništva imali su Hrvati u Odžaku (54,4 %) i Muslima-
ni u Gradačcu (59,8 %). U ukupnoj masi stanovništva
(361.104), Hrvati (138.931) i Muslimani (104.774) činili
su malo manje od dvije trećine.650 Stanovništvo je bilo
M
etnički izmiješano, pa se u prvim mjesecima borbi teš-
ko postizala kontinuirana crta razdvajanja. Nekoliko je
mjeseci postojao niz etničkih enklava koje su natjerane
na kružnu obranu i nisu se mogle održati, pa su nestale
predajom ili u borbama u ljeto i jesen 1992. godine.651
U ljeto i kasnu jesen 1991. u Bosanskoj Posavini ma-
sovnije su naoružani dijelovi stanovništva, neki ilegal-
D
no, a drugi navodno legalno. U Posavini je najveći dio
srpskoga stanovništva naoružala JNA.652 Hrvatski oruža-
ni sastavi organizirani su tijekom 1991. pod vrlo teškim
sigurnosnim uvjetima jer se oružje uglavnom kupovalo
i tajno prebacivalo u Posavinu. Početkom studenoga
C
1991. u bosanskoposavskim općinama bio je naoružan
jedan bataljun. Naoružane je sastave nastojalo koor-
dinirati Zapovjedništvo Hrvatske vojske Operativne
grupe Istočna Posavina, koje je osnovano u studenome
1991. u Slavonskom Brodu. Njegov prvi zadatak bila je
obrana Slavonskog Broda od napada iz Bosne, pri čemu
se računalo i na pomoć Hrvata iz Posavine.653
U Bosanskoj Posavini su od početka ožujka 1992.
postojala zapovjedništva pojedinih općina, koja su
poslije prerasla u zapovjedništva brigada. Do sredi-
650 Stanovništvo Bosne i Hercegovine: narodnosni sastav po
naseljima, 18-20.
651 20 godina 108. pješačke brigade HVO Ravne – Brčko
1992.–2012., (bez izdavača i godine izdanja), 31-32.
652 Smail ČEKIĆ, Agresija na Bosnu i genocid nad Bošnjacima
1991–1993, Ljiljan, Sarajevo, 1994., 58.-59.; ICTY: Izjava
svjedoka Stevana Nikolića zvanog “Kriger” dana 10. 12.
2002. godine.
653 Jerko ZOVAK, Rat u Bosanskoj Posavini 1992., Posavska Hr-
vatska, Grad Slavonski Brod, Slavonski Brod, 2009., 78-79.
276
Domovinski rat 04-02-2020 Knjiga 1.indd 276
THE BOSANSKA POSAVINA
REGION
The longest and bloodiest campaign of 1992 took
place in the Bosanska Posavina region. Heavy fighting
developed in the municipalities of Bosanski Brod, Der-
venta, in the northern part of the Doboj Municipality,
in Modriča and in Odžak – a region interspersed by the
Ukrina and Bosna Rivers. The ethnic composition of the
region was fairly balanced – no constituent nation made
up an absolute majority. Only in Orašje did the Croats
make up a significant majority (75%). In Odžak the Croats
made up more than half of the population (54.8%) and
the Muslim in Gradačac (59%). In total, 361,104 people
lived in the region – 138,931 Croats and 104,774 Mus-
lims. Together, the Croats and the Muslims formed a bit
less than two thirds of the population. The population
was ethnically mixed in every locality in the region. For
that reason there were no continuous lines of separation
during the first months of the conflict. There were a num-
ber of ethnic enclaves during those months but they
amounted to isolated pockets of resistance destined to
fall. These pockets of resistance either surrendered be-
fore the conflict escalated in earnest or were overrun
during the fighting in the summer and fall of 1992.
In the summer and late fall of 1991 some parts of the
population of the Bosanska Posavina region received sig-
nificant amount of weaponry. In some cases this arming
of the populace was illegal and in other cases the move
was covered by a veneer of legality. The majority of the
Serbs in the Posavina region were armed by the JNA.
The Croatian armed groups were organized during 1991
in extremely unfavorable circumstances because the
D
weapons in question had to be smuggled into the Posav-
ina region. At the beginning of November, 1991, in each
municipality in the Bosanska Posavina region only one
battalion was armed. The Main HQ of Operational Group
East Posavina of the Croatian Army, formed in November,
R
1991, in Slavonski Brod, tried to coordinate the actions of
the armed groups. The initial task of the Main HQ of Op-
erational Group East Posavina of the Croatian Army was
to defend Slavonski Brod from possible attacks from the
direction of Bosnia. The Main HQ of Operational Group
East Posavina of the Croatian Army counted on help from
the Posavina Croats.
From the beginning of March, 1992, there exist-
ed municipal HQs. Later, these HQs grew into brigade
HQs. By mid-June the following brigades were formed:
4.2.2020. 19:34:53
 The Croatian Nation’s Struggle for Survival, 1991-1995
ne lipnja osnovane su brigade Bosanske Posavine po
teritorijalnom ustroju: 101. u Bosanskom Brodu, 102.
u Odžaku, 103. u Derventi, 104. u Bosanskom Šamcu,
105. u Modriči, 106. u Orašju, 107. u Gradačcu i 108.
brigada u Brčkom. Brigade HZ Bosanske Posavine bile
su neujednačene, slabo uvezane postrojbe organizira-
ne na teritorijalnom principu i mnogo bliže prostornoj
strukturi TO-a, odnosno seoskim stražama. Uglavnom
nisu bile sklone borbi izvan matičnog područja. Do 19.
listopada 1992. postrojbama HVO-a izravno je zapovi-
H
jedalo Zapovjedništvo OG-a Istočna Posavina, a potom
je u drugoj polovini listopada osnovana Operativna
grupa Bosanska Posavina sa sjedištem u Tolisi.654
Početne borbe
M
Uoči sukoba u Bosanskoj Posavini, 5. veljače 1992.
srušen je most između Slavonskog i Bosanskog Šam-
ca. Srušen je očito da se onemogući pružanje pomoći
iz Hrvatske. Početkom ožujka 1992., srpskim napadom
na vitalne objekte na području Bosanskog Broda, koji su
lokalni Hrvati uz pomoć iz Hrvatske odbili, počeo je rat
D
u Bosanskoj Posavini. Lokalne srpske snage bile su pre-
slabe za zahtjevnije zadatke, pa je angažirana JNA koja
je osvajanje sjeveroistočne Bosne i Bosanske Posavine
vodila po planu Drina. Da ovlada Posavinom i širim po-
dručjem Doboja, Komanda Tuzlanskoga korpusa JNA
osnovala je 28. ožujka Prvu operativnu grupu (OG-1) sa
C
sjedištem u Podnovlju jačine preko 12.000 vojnika.655
Glavni cilj napada JNA bio je Bosanski Brod, a sukob
se proširio i na teritorij RH. Od tada pa do srpske okupa-
cije Bosanskog Broda, Slavonski Brod granatiran je go-
tovo svakoga dana. Jedna od glavnih meta napada bio
D
je most na Savi između dva Broda, koji je u napadima
teško oštećen, ali se mogao koristiti za promet. U počet-
nim fazama borbi, zbog zabrane Glavnoga stožera HV-a
da postrojbe HV-a prelaze Savu, iz Hrvatske su u pomoć
dolazili dragovoljci, uglavnom rodom iz BiH.656
654 SVA MORH, ZSB: Zap. Slavonskog bojišta, kl. 8/92-01/01,
ur. br. 1076/5-01-92-444 od 23. 10. 1992.; J. ZOVAK, Rat
u Bosanskoj Posavini 1992., 78-79.
655 SVA MORH, ZOGIP, Izvještaj str. pov. br. 2-11 od 5. 2.
1992.; Boško Radović, “Marš prema ‘Drini’”, Slobodna
Bosna, 26. 3. 1992., 5; Milan STUBLINČEVIĆ, Tako su oni
hteli: razbijanje Jugoslavije, IP Nova Evropa, Beograd,
Dom kulture Obrenovac, ECCOS, Beograd, 1998., 56-57;
D. MARIJAN, Graničari, 164-165.
656 D. MARIJAN, Graničari, 165-167, 181.
277
Domovinski rat 04-02-2020 Knjiga 1.indd 277
the 101st in Bosanski Brod, the 102nd in Odžak, the 103rd
in Derventa, the 104th in Bosanski Šamac, the 105th in
Modriča, the 106th in Orašje, the 107th in Gradačac and
108th in Brčko. The brigades of the HZ Bosanska Posav-
ina were not equal in strength but were mainly orga-
nized as static territorial units of the Territorial Defense.
For all intents and purposes, these formations were not
much more than village patrols and as such were useless
outside of their home areas. Until October 19, 1992, the
HVO units were directly commanded by the Main HQ of
Operational Group East Posavina. In the second half on
October Operational Group Bosanska Posavina with its
HQ in Tolisa was formed.
First battles
On February 5, 1992, the bridge connecting Slavon-
ski Šamac and Bosanski Šamac was destroyed. It was
destroyed to prevent the Bosnian Croats from receiv-
ing help from Croatia. The war in the Bosanska Posav-
ina region started at the beginning of March, 1992, in
Bosanski Brod. The Serbs attacked key locations in the
Bosanski Brod area. The local Croats, having received
help from Croatia, defeated these attacks. The local Serb
forces were too weak to mount successful offensive op-
erations. For that reason JNA units were deployed in the
area. The JNA’s objective, according to the Drina war
plan, was to capture northeast Bosnia and the Bosanska
Posavina region. For the purpose of capturing Posavi-
na and the wider Doboj area, the HQ of Tuzla Corps of
the JNA formed, on March 28, the 1st Operational Group
headquartered in Podnovlje. The 1st Operational Group
had more than 12,000 men.
The focus of the JNA’s offensive was Bosanski Brod.
The conflict soon spread to the Republic of Croatia’s ter-
ritory. From that point and until the Serbian occupation
of Bosanski Brod, the Serbs shelled Slavonski Brod on a
daily basis. One of the main targets of these artillery at-
R
tacks was the bridge across the Sava River, connecting
Slavonski Brod with Bosanski Brod. The bridge sustained
serious damage but the Serbs failed to destroy it or ren-
der it unusable. During the initial phases of the conflict
the General Staff of the Croatian Army did not allow
units of the Croatian Army to cross the Sava. However,
the General Staff of the Croatian Army allowed volun-
teers to cross the river and fight for the Croats in Bosnia.
These volunteers, for the most part, had been born in
Bosnia and Herzegovina.
4.2.2020. 19:34:53
 Davor Marijan • Rat za opstojnost Hrvata, 1991. - 1995.
Do 16. travnja 1992. JNA i srpska TO imale su izvje-
snog uspjeha u napadima na Bosanski Brod. No, tog su
dana poražene kod sela Gornje Kolibe čime je zamisao
brzog okončanja rata propala. U susjednoj Derventi
hrvatske snage su potkraj travnja osvojile vojarnu i re-
lativno su dobro operativno stajale. Na području opći-
ne Odžak lokalne su hrvatske snage uz pomoć manjih
snaga HV-a okružile srpsko uporište u Novom Gradu
koje se održalo do 8. svibnja 1992. godine.657
Značajan uspjeh JNA i Srbi postigli su 17. travnja
H
1992. kada su zaposjeli grad Bosanski Šamac, a potom
napali i zauzeli nekoliko hrvatskih sela istočno od gra-
da. Uz pomoć pojačanja iz Hrvatske, lokalne hrvatske
snage organizirale su obranu s osloncem na Savu te
sela Lijeskovac i Grebnice. Taj dio uvezao se sa susjed-
nim hrvatskim snagama iz Orašja u zasebnu cjelinu
M
oslonjenu na rijeku Savu i bez velike operativne dubi-
ne.658 Potom su 30. travnja srpske snage napale Brčko i
do 2. svibnja zauzele vitalne objekte u njemu. Brčko je
bio grad s muslimanskom većinom i Srbima je bio izni-
mno značajan kao prometno središte i veza Posavine
sa Semberijom. Hrvati su bili donekle organizirani, no
D
nedovoljno jaki da sami naprave nešto u obrani općine
osim da organiziraju obranu u dijelu naselja u kojima
su bili većina.659
Tijekom svibnja 1992. većina oficira i vojnika JNA
rodom iz Srbije povukla se u krnju Saveznu Republi-
ku Jugoslaviju što je na dijelu bosanskohercegovač-
C
kog ratišta izazvalo krizu koja je trajala nekoliko tje-
dana. Hrvatske snage u tom su razdoblju odbacile
srpske snage od Bosanskog Broda prema rijeci Bosni
i selu Podnovlju, a na samom kraju mjeseca zauzele
su Modriču i odvojile srpske krajine od Semberije. Na
taj način otvorena je i veza između središnje Bosne i
Hrvatske preko koje je za nekoliko tjedana izvučen ve-
lik dio civila, ali i naoružanjem i opremom opskrbljeno
više od 20 mjesta.660
657 ZOGIP, Izvješće kl. 81/92-02, ur. br. OG-01-92-89-8 od
29. 4. 1992.; OGIP, Izvješće br. 128-3/92 od 9. 5. 1992.; D.
MARIJAN, Graničari, 171-173.
658 D. MARIJAN, Graničari, 179-180; J. ZOVAK, Rat u
Bosanskoj Posavini 1992., 195-203.
659 ICTY: Pregled događanja i stanja Ratnog predsjedništ-
va opštine Brčko, sa ocjenom postignutog stepena
izvršenja (nedatirano); 20 godina 108. pješačke brigade
HVO, 20-21.
660 D. MARIJAN, Graničari, 181-186. Izjava Zdravka Sočkov-
ića. J. ZOVAK, Rat u Bosanskoj Posavini 1992., 205-237.
278
Domovinski rat 04-02-2020 Knjiga 1.indd 278
By April 16, 1992, the JNA and the Serb Territorial
Defense had achieved a few successes during their at-
tacks on Bosanski Brod. But, on that day they suffered
a defeat at the village of Gornje Kolibe. This setback put
paid to their plans to deliver a knockout blow to the Cro-
ats and finish the war swiftly. In neighboring Derventa
the Croatian forces, at the end of April, captured the JNA
barracks and their strategic position was good. The lo-
cal Croatian forces in the Odžak Municipality, with the
help of a smaller force from the Croatian Army, besieged
the Serb stronghold in Novi Grad. The Croats finally cap-
tured Novi Grad on May 8, 1992.
The JNA and the Serbs achieved a significant success
on April 17, 1992, when they captured Bosanski Šamac
and a few Croatian villages to the east of the city. With
the help of troops from Croatia the local Croat forces or-
ganized a defensive line pivoting on the Sava River and
the villages of Lijeskovac and Grebnice. These defensive
positions were linked to those held by the Croatian forces
from Orašje and together they formed a cohesive whole
with no operational depth to speak of along the Sava
River. On April 30, the Serb forces attacked Brčko and
by May 2 had captured a number of key locations in the
city. Brčko was a city with a Muslim majority and a traffic
junction, connecting Posavina with Semberija. As such, it
was of immense strategic importance for the Serbs. The
Croats were somewhat organized there, but not nearly
sufficiently enough to repulse the Serbs’ attack. All they
could do with some hope of success was to defend the
predominantly Croat neighborhoods of Brčko.
During May, 1992, most of the JNA officers and sol-
diers who hailed from Serbia left Bosnia for the rump
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. As a result, the Serb forc-
D
es in the Bosanska Posavina region and most of the other
areas in Bosnia and Herzegovina were left, from an orga-
nizational standpoint, wrong-footed. It took the Serbs a
few weeks to recover from the loss. During that period
the Croatian forces pushed back the Serbs away from
R
Bosanski Brod towards the Bosna River and the village of
Podnovlje. At the end of the month the Croats captured
Modriča and pushed the Serb forces away from Semberi-
ja, thus opening a link between central Bosnia and Croa-
tia. During the next few weeks a large number of civilians
were evacuated through that corridor. While the civilians
moved one way, a significant amount of weapons and
equipment was transported in the opposite direction.
More than 20 towns and villages thus received weapons,
ammunition, equipment and matériel.
4.2.2020. 19:34:53
 The Croatian Nation’s Struggle for Survival, 1991-1995
Zauzimanjem Modriče hrvatske su snage dostigle
vrhunac u Bosanskoj Posavini. Bio je to najveći, ali i je-
dini veliki uspjeh nakon sredine svibnja 1992. godine.
Poklopio se s Rezolucijom 757 Vijeća sigurnosti UN-a, u
kojoj je Hrvatska ponovno prozvana zbog angažmana
svojih snaga u BiH.661
Operacija Koridor
Početkom lipnja 1992. srpske snage su sanirale
H
krizu zbog povlačenja oficirskoga kadra JNA rođenog
u Srbiji i Crnoj Gori u Saveznu Republiku Jugoslaviju.
Na temelju ratnih ciljeva usvojenih 12. svibnja u Ba-
njoj Luci, izrađene su i prve dalekosežnije smjernice
za uporabu srpske vojske. U direktivi Glavnoga štaba
Vojske SR BiH 6. lipnja 1. krajiški korpus s OG-om Doboj
M
uz pomoć dijela Istočnobosanskoga korpusa dobio je
zadaću da probije koridor između Semberije i Bosan-
ske krajine.662
Koncentriranje srpskih snaga za operaciju poče-
lo je krajem svibnja 1992., a početkom lipnja počelo
je dovođenje snaga 1. krajiškog korpusa, uglavnom s
D
okupiranih područja Hrvatske. Sredinom lipnja formi-
rane su četiri taktičke grupe (TG-1 do TG-4), čije su ko-
mande bile komande triju bivših brigada JNA, a jedna
vojske pobunjenih Srba u Hrvatskoj.663
Dok su Srbi pripremali napadnu operaciju, hrvat-
ske su snage uglavnom mirovale. Teret obrane Bosan-
C
ske Posavine bio je na postrojbama HVO-a. Priprema
operacije počela je srpskim napadima 4. lipnja 1992.
iz Podnovlja, a nekoliko dana kasnije i iz smjera Do-
boja. Do 22. lipnja srpske snage su potisnule hrvatske
prema Derventi i zauzele nekoliko sela među kojima
D
i Foču, Johovac i Kotorsko. Uvođenjem 3. brigade
ZNG-a srpske snage su nakratko zaustavljene.664
Za prvu etapu operacije Koridor VRS je priku-
pio 40.000 vojnika, od kojih je oko 20.000 angaži-
661 ICTY: Rezolucija br. 757 Vijeća sigurnosti UN od 30. 5.
1992.
662 ICTY: GŠ VSR BiH, Direktiva za dalja dejstva, str. pov. br.
02/5-22 od 6. 6. 1992.; ICTY: Zapovest Komande 1. KK od
9. 6. 1992. za odbranu, obezbeđenje teritorije i ofanziv-
na dejstva, Op. br. 04/92.
663 N. SIMIĆ, Operacija “Koridor-92”, 53, 134-135, 137,
138, 140.
664 J. ZOVAK, Rat u Bosanskoj Posavini 1992., 240-269, 613-
624; N. SIMIĆ, Operacija “Koridor-92”, 138-143.
279
Domovinski rat 04-02-2020 Knjiga 1.indd 279
The capture of Modriča was the high point of the
Croatian successes in the Bosanska Posavina region in
1992. This was the only substantial Croatian victory after
mid-May, 1992. It coincided with the passing of Resolu-
tion 757 of the Security Council of the United Nations.
The Security Council, in the resolution, expressed con-
cerns regarding the involvement of the Republic of Croa-
tia in the conflict in Bosnia and Herzegovina.
Operation Koridor
At the beginning of June, 1992, the Serb forces re-
covered from the loss of the officers and soldiers born
in Serbia and Montenegro who had left for the Federal
Republic of Yugoslavia. Based on the objectives de-
termined on May 12 in Banja Luka the first long-term
guidelines were drafted for the future deployment of the
Serbian army. The General Staff of the Serbian Republic
of Bosnia and Herzegovina’s directive of June 6 tasked I
Krajina Corps with Operational Group Doboj, supported
by elements of East Bosnia Corps with creating a corridor
connecting Semberija with Bosanska Krajina.
The Serbs started concentrating their forces for the
offensive at the end of May, 1992. At the beginning of
June they started moving I Krajina Corps to the concen-
tration area, mostly from the occupied territory in the Re-
public of Croatia. In mid-June four tactical groups were
formed: TG-1, TG-2, TG-3 and TG-4. Their HQs were the
HQs of three former JNA brigades and the fourth was the
HQ of the army of the rebel Serbs in Croatia.
As the Serbs busied themselves preparing their of-
fensive, the Croatian forces were, for the most part, idle.
The HVO organized the defense of Bosanska Posavina
and it was clear that it would bear the brunt of the fight-
ing. The Serbs launched their preparatory attacks for the
offensive on June 4, 1992, from the direction of Podnovl-
je and, a few days later, from the direction of Doboj. By
June 22 the Serb forces pushed back the Croats towards
R
Derventa and captured a number of villages, among
them the villages of Foča, Johovac and Kotorsko. The 3rd
Brigade of the ZNG entered the fighting and the momen-
tum of the Serb attacks slackened.
The VRS gathered 40,000 soldiers for the first phase
of Operation Koridor (Corridor). 20,000 of those would
directly cut through the corridor and secure the axis
of advance of the main body of troops. The main force
belonged to I Krajina Corps. The forces tasked with cut-
ting through the corridor were grouped in three tactical
4.2.2020. 19:34:53
 Davor Marijan • Rat za opstojnost Hrvata, 1991. - 1995.
rao izravno za proboj koridora i osiguranje glavnih
snaga u napadu. Glavnina snaga bila je iz sastava 1.
krajiškog korpusa. Snage angažirane za proboj ko-
ridora grupirane su u tri taktičke skupine, u drugoj
etapi u četiri taktičke skupine i jednu motoriziranu
brigadu. Zadatak OG-a Doboj bio je zaštititi snage
u operaciji i spriječiti da ih se iznenadi iz zaleđa do-
linama rijeka Bosne i Spreče. Dio snaga određen je
za izvođenje manjih napada radi skrivanja stvarne
zadaće operacije.665
H
Operacija proboja koridora i izlaska na rijeku
Savu počela je 24. lipnja 1992. godine. Zbog iznimne
premoći i neorganiziranosti protivnika srpske snage
zauzele su 28. lipnja Modriču i napravile koridor sa
Semberijom. Derventu su zauzele 4. srpnja, a 13. srp-
nja Odžak i izbile na Savu između Bosanskog Broda
M
i Šamca. Bosanski Brod zauzele su tek 6. listopada,
premda je završetak operacije planiran za 28. srpnja.
Nakon pada Bosanskog Broda hrvatske snage odr-
žale su Orašje s dijelom općine Bosanski Šamac. U
studenom i prosincu odbijeni su pokušaji VRS-a da
zauzme oraški džep i izbije na Savu, štoviše hrvatske
D
su snage napravile manje pomake na bojištu u svoju
korist. Ipak, u cjelini, na tom dijelu bojišta VRS je us-
pio ispuniti strategijski cilj i povezati RSK sa Sembe-
rijom i Srbijom. U odnosu na plan, kasnio je gotovo
tri mjeseca, uz angažman najjače srpske vojne gru-
pacije na ratištu. Nakon uspjeha u Posavini znatan
C
dio 1. krajiškoga korpusa ostao je na osiguranju Save
na granici Hrvatske i BiH, od općine Nova Gradiška
do Županje.666
Borbe za Bosansku Posavinu trajale su gotovo
godinu dana. U početnim fazama ratna je sreća bila
promjenjiva. U svibnju 1992. hrvatske snage iskori-
stile su krizno razdoblje u kojem se JNA transformi-
rala u vojsku bosanskohercegovačkih Srba i odvojila
Semberiju od Bosanske krajine. Stabiliziranjem crte i
izvlačenjem snaga iz Hrvatske, srpske su snage u lip-
nju počele preokret i do početka listopada osvojile
zapadni dio Bosanske Posavine. Odnijele su pobjedu
665 N. SIMIĆ, Operacija “Koridor-92”, 122-124.
666 Balkan Battlegrounds: A Military History of the Yugoslav
Conflict, 1990-1995, Central Intelligence Agency, Office
of Russian and European Analysis, Washington, DC
20505, May 2002, Volume I, 146; N. SIMIĆ, Operacija
„Koridor-92”, 171-383; J. ZOVAK, Rat u Bosanskoj Posa-
vini 1992., 171-202; D. MARIJAN, Domovinski rat, 238,
242-260.
280
Domovinski rat 04-02-2020 Knjiga 1.indd 280
groups in the first phase and in four tactical groups and
one motorized brigade in the second phase. The task
of Operational Group Doboj was to protect the forces
engaged in the operation and prevent the Croats from
mounting a surprise attack from the Bosna Valley and
from the Spreča Valley. A smaller number of troops were
tasked with making diversionary attacks for the purpose
of masking the real objective of the operation.
The operation commenced on June 24, 1992. The
Serb forces captured Modriča and created a corridor to
Semberija on June 28. The Croatian forces defending
against the attack were poorly organized and vastly
outnumbered. The Serbs captured Derventa on July 4.
On July 13 they captured Odžak and reached the Sava
River between Bosanski Brod and Šamac. The Serbs cap-
tured Bosanski Brod on October 6, even though the end
of the operation was planned for July 28. After the fall
of Bosanski Brod the Croatian forces managed to hold
Orašje and a portion of the Municipality of Bosanski Ša-
mac. In November and December the Croats repulsed
the VRS’s attempts to capture the Orašje pocket and
reach the Sava River. The Croatian forces also pushed the
Serbs back in a number of places. Despite these minor
Croatian gains, the Serbs managed to achieve their stra-
tegic objective and link the RSK with Semberija and Ser-
bia. However, this success was achieved three months
behind schedule. It is also worth pointing out that the
Serbs used their strongest formation in the theater of
war in the operation. After the successes in Posavina the
bulk of I Krajina Corps remained in Posavina to hold the
positions along the Sava River at the Croatian – Bosnian
border, a defensive line stretching from the Nova Gradiš-
ka Municipality to Županja.
D
The fighting for the Bosanska Posavina region lasted
almost one year. In the initial phases both sides jostled
for advantage, without either gaining the upper hand.
In May, 1992, the Croatian forces took advantage of the
Serbs’ ineptitude brought on by the process of transform-
R
ing the JNA in Bosnia and Herzegovina into the army of
Serbs of Bosnia and Herzegovina. During that period
the Croats cut off Semberija from Bosanska Krajina. The
Serbs eventually managed to stabilize the line and later
brought fresh forces from Croatia to the Bosnian theater
of war. The decisive turning point in Posavina occurred in
June. In the period from June to October the Serb forces
achieved a clear victory and occupied the western part
of the Bosanska Posavina region. It has to be pointed out
that the Serb forces vastly outnumbered the Croats and
4.2.2020. 19:34:53
 The Croatian Nation’s Struggle for Survival, 1991-1995

H
M
-
-
D
C
Bosanska Posavina, kolovoz 1992. – siječanj 1993.

Bosanska Posavina, August 1992 – January 1993

D
zbog izrazite brojčane i tehničke premoći, jasnog cilja
i mnogo boljeg sustava zapovijedanja. Zbog demobi-
lizacije i preustroja, hrvatske su snage bile usitnjene
nasuprot kompaktnijim srpskim postrojbama.667
Muslims and enjoyed vast superiority in both the quan-
tity and quality of weaponry and equipment. The system
of command of the Serb army was superior to that of the
Croats and the Muslims. Another important advantage
R
the Serbs had over their foes was the fact that they op-
erated within the context of clearly defined military and
political objectives. The Croatian forces, due to the twin
processes of demobilization and restructuring, did not
form a cohesive whole and as such were no match for
the better led and structured Serbian forces.

667 D. MARIJAN, Graničari, 240-244.

281

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 Davor Marijan • Rat za opstojnost Hrvata, 1991. - 1995.
RATIŠTE NA KRAJU 1992.
GODINE
U odnosu na proljeće, stanje na ratištu krajem
1992. osjetno se smirilo. Završetkom borbi na Južnom
bojištu u Hrvatskoj je vladalo zatišje, no bilo je očito
da nema pomaka prema reintegraciji RSK u Hrvatsku
i zavođenju ustavnoga poretka na cijelom području
države. Hrvatska je u listopadu od Vijeća sigurnosti
tražila da UNPROFOR razoruža paravojne formacije,
H
nadzor međunarodnih granica sa Srbijom i BiH, stav-
ljanje u funkciju prometnica i dalekovoda. Ti zahtjevi
nisu dobili potporu u Vijeću sigurnosti668 i Hrvatska je
bila prinuđena sama riješiti neke od ključnih proble-
ma koji su otežavali koliko-toliko normalno življenje
M
države u ratu. Krajem 1992. počela je izrada planova
za borbena djelovanja prema okupiranim i pobunje-
nim područjima Hrvatske. To je uključivalo i otvaranje
zatvorenih prometnica u sjevernoj Dalmaciji i zapad-
noj Slavoniji.669
Stanje u Bosni i Hercegovini bilo je osjetno lošije.
D
Krajem 1992. završene su pripreme za predstavlja-
nje Vance-Owenova plana u Ženevi o završetku rata i
unutarnjoj podjeli BiH.670 Srbi su objavili da su obranili
“svoje istorijske i etničke teritorije” i da je “međuetnič-
ki i međuvjerski rat u bivšoj SR Bosni i Hercegovini za
Republiku Srpsku završen”.671 To je značilo da je VRS
C
navodno završio napadne operacije i usmjerio se na
čuvanje osvojenog teritorija.
Braneći se od srpskih napada, Herceg-Bosna je uz
potporu Republike Hrvatske održala na životu Bosnu
i Hercegovinu, odnosno ostatak od dijela koji su Srbi
osvojili. To je kod struktura HVO-a razvilo osjećaj veće
vrijednosti u odnosu na ARBiH te spremnost da oruž-
jem održe područja koja su obranili i za koja su računali
da će ih dobiti tijekom međunarodne konferencije o
BiH. Do kraja 1992. HVO je uspostavio stabilnu crtu s
VRS-om i tražio status quo.
668 M. NOBILO, Hrvatski feniks, 258-259.
669 SVA MORH, GSHV, Zapovijed kl. 8/92-01/07, ur. br. 5120-
05-92-273 od 27. 12. 1992.
670 David OWEN, Balkanska odiseja, Hrvatska sveučilišna nak-
lada – Hrvatski institut za povijest, Zagreb, 1998., 126-127.
671 Deklaracija narodne Skupštine Srpske od 17. 12. 1992.
o završetku rata, Službeni glasnik Republike Srpske, br. 19
od 18. 12. 1992.
282
Domovinski rat 04-02-2020 Knjiga 1.indd 282
THE THEATER OF WAR AT
THE END OF 1992
The situation in the Bosnian theater of war at the
end of 1992 was relatively peaceful, especially in com-
parison to the situation that had existed in the theater
in the spring of 1992. With the cessation of the fighting
in the Southern Theater of Operations in Croatia the
overall situation in Croatia was calm, even though the
rebel Serbs refused to countenance any possibility of re-
integrating the territories under their control – the RSK
– into the constitutional and legal order of the Republic
of Croatia. In October Croatia requested that UNPROFOR
disarm the paramilitary formations, monitor the situa-
tion on the Croatian borders with Serbia and Bosnia and
Herzegovina, open the closed roads for traffic and put
the power lines into operation. The request did not gain
much traction in the Security Council and Croatia, if it
wanted to function as a more or less viable state, simply
had no choice but to take action. At the end of 1992 the
General Staff started making plans for offensive actions
against the rebel Serbs and the areas under their con-
trol. The main objective of all these plans was the open-
ing for traffic the closed roads in northern Dalmatia and
western Slavonia.
The situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina was mark-
edly worse than that in Croatia. At the end of 1992, the
preparatory moves for presenting the Vance-Owen Peace
Plan in Geneva were completed. The plan envisaged the
cessation of hostilities and division of Bosnia and Herze-
govina’s territory between the three constituent nations.
The Serbs, for their part, declared that they had success-
D
fully defended “their historic and ethnic lands” and that
“the inter-ethnic and inter-religious war in the former So-
cialist Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, as far as the
Republika Srpska is concerned, is over”. That meant that
the VRS would ostensibly abstain from launching offen-
sive operations and focus exclusively on defending the
R
conquered territory.
Herzeg-Bosnia, with significant help from the Re-
public of Croatia, by staunchly resisting the Serbs’ attacks
against its territory, saved Bosnia and Herzegovina from
total destruction. That achievement boosted the HVOs
pride and feeling of superiority over the Army of the Re-
public of Bosnia and Herzegovina. After all, the territo-
ry the Muslims held had not been overrun by the Serbs
largely thanks to the HVO determined efforts. For that
4.2.2020. 19:34:56
 The Croatian Nation’s Struggle for Survival, 1991-1995
Tijekom 1992. bošnjačka TO, odnosno ARBiH glavni
napor djelovanja stavila je u funkciju potpore strategij-
skom cilju, zadržavanja privida legitimiteta. To je značilo
zadržavanje nazivlja Teritorijalne obrane na štetu Patriot-
ske lige i obranu Sarajeva kao institucionalnoga središta
BiH. Patriotska se liga u poslijeratnim tumačenjima prika-
zuje kao značajan vojnički čimbenik, no njezina učinko-
vitost, organiziranost i borbena sposobnost stvarno nije
bila ni izbliza takva. Ona je bila loše organizirano i loše
vođeno paravojno krilo SDA, što je razvidno po ratnom
H
učinku Muslimana tijekom 1992. godine. Područja gdje
su imali relativnu većinu uglavnom su izgubili, često bez
otpora ili imalo vrijednog spomena otpora. Na kraju 1992.
Armija Republike BiH uz veliku je cijenu, iako u okruže-
nju, uspijevala održati Sarajevo. Na listi uspjeha nalazilo
se održanje Bihaća i manjih enklava u istočnoj Bosni (Go-
M
ražde i Srebrenica).
Etničkim čišćenjem osvojenog teritorija Srbi su izazva-
li trajnu napetost između Muslimana i Hrvata. Ogromne
mase prognanika i izbjeglica slile su se s područja pod nad-
zorom VRS-a na muslimansko-hrvatska područja. “Gledat
ću ih kako jedni druge uništavaju, a onda ću ih oba gurnuti
D
u more”, riječi su generala Mladića koje jasno svjedoče što
su Srbi očekivali od etničkoga čišćenja.672 Dio prognanika
otišao je u Hrvatsku i dalje u inozemstvo, a za oružje spo-
sobna populacija muškaraca uglavnom je ostala. Time je
narušena etnička struktura, što je osobito na miješanim
područjima središnje Bosne dovelo do novog odnosa sna-
C
ga između Hrvata i Bošnjaka. Većina prognanika dolazila
je iz ruralnih sredina u urbane, donoseći drugačiji men-
talitet. Gradovi u etnički miješanim područjima imali su
iskustvo zajedničkoga života, što sa selima u principu nije
bio slučaj. Hrvatsko vijeće obrane bilo je svjesno promjene
D
etničke strukture, koja je pojačala muslimansku poziciju,
pa je prema neizvjesnoj budućnosti karakterističan stav
HVO-a Gornji Vakuf, koji je u izvješću iz druge polovine lip-
nja 1992., dan nakon sukoba s ARBiH, pisao “da na našem
području ima oko 12.000 izbjeglica iz Donjeg Vakufa (a sve
muslimanske narodnosti) s velikim brojem vojnih obvezni-
ka, pa ukoliko se još naoružaju, onda ne da prijeti opasnost
samo našoj općini, nego i susjednim (Bugojno, Novi Trav-
nik, Travnik), a naš je zaključak da smo im mi prvi neprijate-
lji pa tek onda četnici”.673 Na kraju 1992. muslimansko-hr-
vatski rat u BiH bio je samo pitanje vremena.
672 L. SILBER, A. LITTLE, Smrt Jugoslavije, 294.
673 Općinski stožer HVO Gornji Vakuf, Izvješće str. pov. br.
1-574-2/92 od 22. 6. 1992.
283
Domovinski rat 04-02-2020 Knjiga 1.indd 283
reason, the Croats believed that they would officially be
granted autonomy within Bosnia and Herzegovina at the
international conference on implementing peace in Bos-
nia. By the end of 1992, the HVO had established a stable
defensive line opposite the VRS. The overriding strategic
objective for the HVO at that particular point in time was
to maintain the status quo.
During 1992, the Bosniak Territorial Defense, later
the Army of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina,
focused its efforts on achieving the main political objec-
tive, which was to maintain the illusion that its authori-
ty was legitimate. That meant keeping the designation
Territorial Defense at the expense of the Patriotic League
and defending Sarajevo as the institutional center of
Bosnia and Herzegovina. Some scholars perceive the Pa-
triotic League as an important military factor but it has
to be pointed out that its effectiveness, organization and
military value left a lot to be desired. The Patriotic League
was a badly organized, badly led paramilitary wing of the
SDA party. The poor performance of the Muslim forma-
tions during 1992 confirms that point of view. The Mus-
lims lost most of the areas where they formed a relative
majority, often without a fight or offering only a token
resistance. The Army of the Republic of Bosnia and Her-
zegovina managed, at the cost of horrendous casualties,
to hold on to Sarajevo. At the end of 1992 the situation
for the Muslim forces in Sarajevo was not favorable how-
ever. The city was under siege by the Serbs. The list of
the Army of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina’s
successes in 1992 is very short; in addition to holding
Sarajevo it includes the successful defense of the city of
Bihać and a number of small enclaves in eastern Bosnia
(Goražde and Srebrenica).
By ethnically cleansing the conquered territories
the Serbs created lasting tensions between the Muslims
and the Croats. Endless masses of refugees flowed into
the Muslim and Croat areas from the territory controlled
by the VRS. “I’ll stand and watch them at each other’s
R
throats and then I’ll push them all into the sea,” said Gen-
eral Mladić about the Croats and the Muslims. His words
clearly testify to the effect the Serbs wanted their eth-
nic cleansing of the area under their control to achieve.
Some refugees went to Croatia and thence abroad. Most
men of fighting age remained in Bosnia and Herzegov-
ina though. The ethnic structure in the mixed areas of
central Bosnia was thus disrupted and altered. Most refu-
gees were from rural areas. The only places of safety and
refuge for them were urban centers. That mass infusion
4.2.2020. 19:34:56
 Davor Marijan • Rat za opstojnost Hrvata, 1991. - 1995.

H
HVO (fotografiju darovao Mario Filipović). Gornji Vakuf/Uskoplje, 1993. (Fotografiju darovao Zrinko Tokić).

HVO (Photograph donated by Mario Filipović). Gornji Vakuf/Uskoplje, 1993 (Photograph donated by Zrinko Tokić).
M
of rural mentality into urbane populations also played
a significant part in raising racial tensions between the
Muslims and the Croats. People from the villages had
D
had no experience in living in mixed areas, which the
urban centers were. The HVO was acutely aware of the
disruptive nature of the changes in the ethnic structure.
The changes favored the Muslims. One report, issued by
the HVO Gornji Vakuf in the second half of June, 1992,
C
one day after clashing with the Army of the Republic of
Bosnia and Herzegovina, says it all: “…in our area there
are more than 12,000 refugees from Donji Vakuf and all
of them are Muslims. A large number of military-age men
are among them. If these men are armed they will pres-
ent a clear and present danger not just to our municipali-
D
Pokop žrtava zločina ARBiH nad Hrvatima u Uzdolu – Rama, 14.
rujna 1993.
ty but also to the neighboring municipalities of Bugojno,
Novi Travnik and Travnik. Our conclusion is that they per-
Burial of the victims of the ARBiH crime against the Croats at ceive us more of an enemy than they do the Serbs.” At the
Uzdol – Rama, September 14, 1993.
end of 1992, war between the Muslims and the Croats
in Bosnia and Herzegovina was inevitable. It was only a
R
matter of time when it would erupt.

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 The Croatian Nation’s Struggle for Survival, 1991-1995
OPERACIJE U HRVATSKOJ
1993. GODINE
Godinu 1993. obilježile su jake borbe u zaleđu Za-
dra, kod Sinja i Gospića te posebice muslimansko-hr-
vatski rat u Bosni i Hercegovini. Ta su zbivanja osjetno
utjecala na međunarodni položaj Hrvatske. Medijski
tvorci Hrvatskoj su postupno uzimali status žrtve i pre-
tvarali je u izazivača sukoba. Ako je hrvatska politika
tom procesu i dala neki poticaj, stvarana percepcija
H
bila je i alibi za nedjelotvornost dijela međunarodne
zajednice, osobito zemalja koje su tradicionalno bile
sklonije srpskoj strani.
OPERACIJA GUSAR (MASLENICA)
M
U zaleđu Zadra, Zborno područje Split je od 22. do
27. siječnja 1993. realiziralo operaciju Gusar (negdje i
Zima-93) i oslobodilo Maslenički most, Novigrad i šire
područje Zračne luke Zemunik. Uz Maslenicu, hrvatske
snage su 28. siječnja oslobodile i branu na Peručkom
D
jezeru kod Sinja, što je imalo nemjerljiv psihološki uči-
nak, napose u Dalmaciji. Nakon prelaska HV-a u obranu
počeli su intenzivni protunapadi srpskih snaga. Traja-
li su oko 10 dana, a vrhunac su imali 1. i 2. veljače u
borbama oko sela Kašića. Zbog jakih srpskih napada
okosnicu snaga obrane činile su profesionalne snage
C
HV-a. Do jeseni 1993. zaleđe Zadra bilo je najzahtjevni-
ja bojišnica u Hrvatskoj koja je znatno iscrpila hrvatske
snage. Dugoročni učinak operacije bio je za pobunjene
Srbe daleko nepovoljniji. Uz psihološki poraz, iscrplje-
ni su u ljudskom i materijalnom pogledu u razmjeru
D
koji nisu nikada potpuno sanirali. Na međunarodnom
planu, maslenička je operacija poslužila da se Hrvatska
optuži da zaziva rat, što je do tada bilo uglavnom rezer-
virano za Srbiju i Srbe.674
Operacija Gusar ili Zima-93, odnosno Maslenica,
kako se ustalilo u hrvatskom kolektivnom sjećanju,
iznimno je značajno poglavlje Domovinskoga rata.
Bila je to ograničena vojna operacija koja nije realizi-
rana prema planovima zbog nepovoljne reakcije me-
đunarodne zajednice. Međutim, uz to što je omogućila
cestovnu povezanost između sjevera i juga Hrvatske,
što je bilo od iznimnog značaja i zbog situacije u BiH,
operacija je imala i veliko psihološko značenje među
674 D. MARIJAN, Domovinski rat, 261-269.
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Domovinski rat 04-02-2020 Knjiga 1.indd 285
OPERATIONS IN CROATIA IN
1993
The year 1993 was marked by heavy fighting in Za-
dar’s hinterland, around Sinj and Gospić, and especially
by the Muslim-Croat conflict in Bosnia and Herzegovi-
na. These events strongly influenced the international
position of the Republic of Croatia. Many media outlets
gave up on depicting Croatia as a victim of aggression
and ascribed it the role of a war monger. The Croatian
government’s policies at that time may have had or may
not have had something to do with that development.
However, the reports regarding Croatia published and/
or aired by the media outlets in question came as a god-
send to some elements of the international community
that embraced the newly created perception because it
shifted the media focus from their incompetence to the
supposed Croatian recalcitrance. It is worth mention-
ing that these elements of the international community
were traditional supporters of the Serb side.
OPERATION GUSAR (MASLENICA)
In Zadar’s hinterland, Military District Split launched
Operation Gusar (Pirate), in some sources called Zima-93
(Winter-93), on January 22. The Croatian forces liberated
the Maslenica Bridge, Novigrad and the wider area of
the Zemunik airport. The operation ended on January
27, 1993. On January 28 Croatian forces liberated Peruća
Dam near Sinj which raised the morale on many Croatian
citizens, especially in Dalmatia. At that point the Croatian
forces went on the defensive. The Serbs then launched
a series of counterattacks. For ten days the Serbs coun-
terattacked. The heaviest fighting during this spate of
Serbian counterattacks developed on February 1-2 and
around the village of Kašić. The Serbs were determined
to push the Croatian forces back but the Croats were
equally determined to repulse the attack. Professional
R
units of the HV formed the backbone of the Croatian
defense. By fall 1993, fighting in Zadar’s hinterland was
especially fierce. These battles completely exhausted the
HV. On the other hand, the battles cost the Serbs much
more than the Croats. The Serbs suffered crippling loss-
es in men and equipment which they could not replace.
Also, the defeats suffered in Zadar’s hinterland complete-
ly demoralized them. In the international political arena
the successes of the HV in Zadar’s hinterland were used
4.2.2020. 19:34:57
 Davor Marijan • Rat za opstojnost Hrvata, 1991. - 1995.
stanovništvom Dalmacije. Posebice zato što je na kri-
lima početnoga uspjeha operacije Hrvatska, u drugoj
akciji na sinjskom području, otklonila stalnu prijetnju
uništenja HE Peruča u zaleđu Sinja i nakon više od go-
dinu dana redukcija omogućila Dalmaciji redovitu dis-
tribuciju električne energije. Maslenička je operacija
bila i poruka međunarodnoj zajednici da Hrvatska ima
ograničenu dozu strpljenja i da od nje, tj. mirovnih sna-
ga UN-a očekuje više i konkretnije od onoga što se do
tada učinilo.
H
Oslobađanje brane Peruča
Po odredbama Vanceova plana, nadzor nad bra-
nom Hidroelektrane (HE) na Peručkom jezeru u zaleđu
Sinja preuzele su snage Kenijske bojne UNPROFOR-a.
M
Razdvajanjem sukobljenih strana obje su strane povu-
kle teško naoružanje 10 kilometara od crte. Za obranu
Sinja bila je zadužena 1. bojna 16. dp-a ojačana dijelom
topništva i logistike 126. brigade HV-a. Sama 126. bri-
gada imala je pod oružjem dio ekvivalenta pola bojne
čije je ljudstvo bilo angažirano u Južnom sektoru, u
D
sastavu TG-3 i na osiguranju desnoga boka ZP-a Split
prema snagama HVO-a iz Livna. U zaleđu Peruče SVK je
imao dio 1. lake brigade Vrlika.
Nakon napada HV-a na srpske snage u zaleđu Za-
dra, 7. korpus SVK-a doveo je 25. siječnja 1993. vod
tenkova u Laktac, oko 6 kilometara od brane HE Pe-
C
ruča, čime je narušio odredbe mirovnoga sporazuma.
Na hrvatske proteste zapovjednik Kenijske bojne UN-
PROFOR-a ustvrdio je da je izgubio nadzor nad srp-
skim snagama i svaku moguću komunikaciju sa svojim
postrojbama na brani. Zapovjednik 126. brigade HV-a
tada je bez odobrenja zapovjednika OZ-a Split mobili-
zirao dio topništva, dvije posade za tenkove i okrenuo
dva topa 130 mm u području Vagnja s pravca prema
Glamoču na smjer Vaganj – Otišić.
Dva dana poslije, 27. siječnja 1993., četa Cetina 1.
lake brigade SVK-a zaposjela je branu, protjerala snage
UN-a i zaposjela Alebića kulu. Dio snaga koncentrirali
su u Potravlju, na širem području Peruče i u Prolićima.
Ujutro 28. siječnja 1993. počele su manje borbe, a
u 8 sati UNPROFOR je napustio branu. Nakon dojave da
je brana minirana hrvatske su snage izvele koncentri-
čan napad, zauzele branu i izbile na crtu Umac – Pro-
loščići. U napadu je iz 16. dp-a poginuo jedan vojnik,
jedan je zarobljen, a tri su lakše ranjena. Zarobljena su
dva srpska vojnika, protuzrakoplovni top 20 mm, tri
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Domovinski rat 04-02-2020 Knjiga 1.indd 286
by the aforementioned elements of the international
community to accuse Croatia of fomenting war; an accu-
sation hitherto reserved exclusively for the Serb side.
Operation Gusar or Zima-93, popularly known in
Croatia as Operation Maslenica, is an extremely import-
ant episode of the Croatian War of Independence. It was
a limited military operation which did not achieve ev-
erything it was meant to achieve, mainly due to the un-
favorable reactions from the international community.
However, the Croatian forces did manage to open the
roads connecting the south of Croatia with the rest of
the country, which was of crucial importance because
of the situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Also, it did
wonders for the morale of the people in Dalmatia, es-
pecially because the Croatian forces, continuing the
momentum of the operation, chased the Serb troops
away from the hydroelectric power plant Peruća in Sinj’s
hinterland, thus putting an end to constant Serb threats
of blowing the plant up and securing an uninterrupted
supply, after more than a year of reductions, of electric
energy for the Dalmatia region. Operation Maslenica
also showed to the international community that Cro-
atia’s patience with the ineffectiveness of the UN was
wearing dangerously thin.
Liberation of Peruča dam
The Kenyan Battalion of UNPROFOR, as per the
Vance Plan’s provisions, took control of the dam of the
hydroelectric power plant Peruča on Peruča Lake in Sinj’s
hinterland. The warring sides, having been separated,
duly withdrew all heavy weaponry at least 10 kilometers
to the rear from the separation line. The city of Sinj was
D
defended by the 1st Battalion of the 16th Home Guard
Regiment reinforced by elements of the 126th Brigade’s
artillery and logistics. The 126th Brigade had the equiv-
alent of half a battalion deployed in Sector South under
the command of TG 3 and in positions securing the right
R
flank of ZP Split in the direction of the positions manned
by the HVO Livno. In Peruča’s hinterland the SVK had ele-
ments of the 1st Light Brigade Vrlika.
On January 25, 1993, after the Croatian Army had
attacked the Serb forces in Zadar’s hinterland, the SVK
VII Corps brought, in clear violation of the Vance Plan, a
tank platoon to Laktac, some 6 kilometers from the Pe-
ruča dam. Responding to Croatia’s complaints the com-
mander of the Kenyan UNPROFOR Battalion stated that
he had lost control over the Serb forces and that he was
4.2.2020. 19:34:58
 The Croatian Nation’s Struggle for Survival, 1991-1995
minobacača 82 mm, jedno vozilo i određena količina
pješačkoga naoružanja i streljiva. Oštećenja na brani su
sanirana i izbjegnuta je potencijalna katastrofa. Prem-
da nije bio planiran, i uz mnogo samovolje lokalnih
zapovjednika, pothvat oslobađanja brane HE Peruča,
osim što je omogućio redovitiju opskrbu električnom
energijom, imao je iznimnu psihološku važnost i utje-
cao je pozitivno na moral vojske i stanovništva u Dal-
maciji, kao i na ostalom teritoriju Hrvatske.675
H
OPERACIJA DŽEP-93
U rujnu 1993. HV i Specijalne jedinice policije izve-
le su operaciju na području Like. Na tom dijelu bojišta
nakon siječnja 1992. nije bilo većih sukoba, za razliku
od 1993. kada su srpske snage intenzivirale djelovanje,
M
na temelju čega je hrvatska strana zaključila da im je
svrha preuzimanje inicijative i stalno iscrpljivanje hr-
vatskih snaga. Zbog toga su hrvatske snage krenule
u manju napadnu operaciju čija je svrha bila osigurati
položaje na Velebitu i spriječiti napade na Gospić.676
Operacija Džep-93 je uspješno realizirana 9. ruj-
D
na 1993. na području Medačkoga džepa nedaleko od
Gospića (Divoselo, Čitluk, Počitelj), odnosno smjeru Di-
voselo – Lički Čitluk. Po okončanju operacije hrvatske
snage su od 11. do 14. rujna odbile pokušaje srpskih
snaga da u protunapadima vrate izgubljeno područje.
Napadi nisu uspjeli, a do povlačenja hrvatskih snaga
C
s oslobođenoga područja Medačkoga džepa ipak je
došlo tijekom 16. i 17. rujna 1993., na zahtjev među-
narodne zajednice. Područje je preuzeo Kanadski bata-
ljun UNPROFOR-a, koji je mimo postignutog dogovora
pokušao proširiti područje nadzora. Zbog toga je izbio
D
incident u kojem su se Kanađani oglušili na hrvatska
upozorenja, pa je jedan njihov transporter u Divoselu
naišao na protuoklopnu minu od koje su lakše ranje-
na tri Kanađanina. Zbog nedefinirane nove crte raz-
dvajanja zabilježeno je nekoliko incidenata između
hrvatskih vojnika i policajaca i pripadnika Kanadskoga
675 VP br. 2148 Sinj, Izvješće kl. 002-01/93-03-01, ur. br.
2148-01/93-38 od 7. 2. 1993.; 16. domobranska pu-
kovnija, Izvješće kl. 2175-93-1, ur. br. 8289-01/93-4 od 7.
2. 1993.; Izvješće zapovjednika 3. satnije 72. bVP o akciji
Peruča od 29. 1. 1993.; M. SEKULIĆ, Knin je pao u Beogra-
du, 64.
676 9. gardijska brigada HV – Vukovi, 222-233.
287
Domovinski rat 04-02-2020 Knjiga 1.indd 287
unable to communicate with the troops at the Peruča
dam. The commander of the 126th Brigade of the Croa-
tian Army did not waste time reacting. Without asking
the commander of OZ Split for permission he employed
elements of the artillery units, two tank crews and
trained two 130-mm guns deployed in the Vaganj area
on the Vaganj – Otišić line in the direction of Glamoč.
Two days later, on January 27, 1993, the Cetina De-
tachment of the 1st Light Brigade of the SVK occupied
the dam, chased away the UN forces and took control
of Alebića Kula. The Serbs concentrated some of their
forces in Potravlje, in the wider Peruća area and in Prolići.
On the morning of January 27, 1993, there was
some skirmishing and at 0800 hours UNPROFOR left
the dam. The Croats found out that explosives had been
planted on the dam and as a result the Croatian forc-
es mounted a concerted attack, captured the dam and
reached the Umac – Prolići line.
One soldier from the 16th Home Guard Regiment
was killed in the attack, one was taken prisoner by the
Serbs and three suffered light wounds. The Croatian
forces took two Serbian soldiers prisoner and captured
one 20-mm flak gun, three 82-mm mortars, one vehi-
cle and a quantity of small arms and ammunition. The
damage the dam had suffered was quickly repaired,
and, more importantly, a catastrophe with potential-
ly far reaching consequences had been averted. Even
though the action was not planned and came about as
a result of local commanders’ initiative and disregard
for the chain of command, the liberation of the Peruča
dam, apart from securing a regular supply of electrici-
ty for the Dalmatia region, had a positive effect on the
morale of the army and civilians all over Croatia, but es-
pecially those living in Dalmatia.
OPERATION DŽEP-93
In September, 1993, the Croatian Army and Special
R
Police units conducted an operation in the Lika region.
After January, 1992, there had been no serious clashes
in the region. The situation in 1993, when Serb forces
intensified their activities, was exactly the opposite.
The HV concluded that the Serbs’ aim was to seize the
initiative and exhaust the Croatian forces in the region.
For that reason, the Croatian forces launched a small-
scale offensive action the purpose of which was to
secure the positions on Velebit and prevent the Serbs
from attacking Gospić.
4.2.2020. 19:34:58
 Davor Marijan • Rat za opstojnost Hrvata, 1991. - 1995.
H
M
Hrvatski vojnici, operacija „Maslenica“, podizanje zastave na mjestu
srušenoga mosta preko Novskog ždrila, siječanj 1993. (HTV).
Croatian soldiers, Operation Maslenica, raising the Croatian flag
at the site of the destroyed bridge over Novo Ždrilo, January
1993 (HTV).
D
bataljuna.677 Godinama poslije ti su incidenti u Kanadi
dosegnuli mitsku razinu i pretvoreni u bitku protiv Hr-
vatske vojske, a za zaštitu Srba.678
Uoči, tijekom i nakon operacije Džep-93 ratište je
C
na nekoliko dana eskaliralo. Nakon što je operacija po-
čela SVK je 9. rujna 1993. počeo topničke i raketne uda-
re po hrvatskim gradovima duž crte ratišta i u zaleđu.
Na meti su bili Gospić i okolna naselja, Otočac, Ogulin,
Duga Resa, Karlovac, Sisak i šire područje Zagreba. Hr-
vatska je vojska odgovarala topništvom duž cijele crte,
težišno po srpskim položajima na Banovini i Kordunu.
Sukobi su prestali nakon što se HV povukao s područja
Ličkog Čitluka i Divosela.679
677 M. SEKULIĆ, Knin je pao u Beogradu, 75-78; 9. gardijska
brigada HV – Vukovi, 236-244; D. MARIJAN, Domovinski
rat, 269-270.
678 Miro MEĐIMOREC, “Medački džep”, National Security
and the Future, vol. 4-5, Zagreb, 2003./2004.
679 D. MARIJAN, Domovinski rat, 270-271.
288
Domovinski rat 04-02-2020 Knjiga 1.indd 288
Operation Džep-93 (Pocket-93) was successfully con-
cluded on September 9, 1993, in the Medak Pocket area
near Gospić (Divoselo, Čitluk, Počitelj), along the Divose-
lo – Lički Čitluk line. From September 11 to September
14, the Serbs launched a number of counterattacks at-
tempting to recapture the lost positions but their efforts
were not successful. However, the Croatian forces did re-
treat from the liberated area on September 16-17, 1993,
at the request of the international community. The Ca-
nadian Battalion of UNPROFOR moved into the area and
contrary to the agreed terms tried to extend the area un-
der its control. The Croatian Army duly warned the Cana-
dians not to overstep their brief but the Canadian Battal-
ion ignored the warnings. As a result, one Canadian APC
in Divoselo drove over a mine. Three Canadian soldiers
were lightly wounded in the ensuing explosion. The Ca-
nadians’ actions caused a situation where there existed
no clearly defined line of separation between them and
the Croatian forces. As a direct result of that situation, a
number of incidents occurred between Croatian soldiers
and police officers on one side and soldiers of the Cana-
dian Battalion on the other. Years later these incidents
had grown with the telling and reached almost mythical
proportions. In the myth, the Canadian soldiers took on
the entire Croatian Army and protected the Serbs.
Immediately prior to, during and after Operation
Džep-93, all hell was breaking loose in the area. The situ-
ation lasted for a few days. When the operation had be-
gan, the SVK, on September 9, started shelling Croatian
cities along the front line and those in the rear that were
within artillery range. Gospić was shelled, and the sur-
rounding villages, Otočac, Ogulin, Duga Resa, Karlovac,
Sisak and the wider Zagreb area. Croatian artillery also
D
opened up along the whole length of the line, targeting
Serb positions in Banovina and Kordun. These clashes
came to an end when the HV withdrew from Lički Čitluk
and Divoselo.
R
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 The Croatian Nation’s Struggle for Survival, 1991-1995
BOSNA I HERCEGOVINA
1993. – 1994. GODINE
Na bosanskohercegovačkom dijelu ratišta 1993. je
godina u kojoj je rat imao najveći zaplet i vrhunac zbi-
vanja. Obilježio ga je niz događaja, u prvom redu rat
Muslimana i Hrvata uz sudjelovanje islamskih ratnika
iz stranih, uglavnom islamskih država i manjih sastava
HV-a. Njihov su rat Srbi iskoristili za uspješno djelova-
nje u istočnoj Bosni i rasterećenje dijela snaga na ra-
H
tištu. U zapadnoj Bosni izbio je međumuslimanski su-
kob, što je bio pokazatelj podjela među Muslimanima
u zoni 5. korpusa ARBiH.
Fikret Abdić je 27. rujna u Velikoj Kladuši progla-
sio Autonomnu pokrajinu Zapadnu Bosnu.680 Uoči rata
M
Abdić je nesumnjivo bio najutjecajniji i najpopularniji
muslimanski političar u BiH. On je na izborima dobio
najviše glasova i trebao je biti u Predsjedništvu BiH, ali
je poziciju predsjednika prepustio Aliji Izetbegoviću. U
prvim mjesecima rata njegov je utjecaj osjetno pao, di-
jelom zbog odvojenosti od njegove baze u Velikoj Kla-
D
duši, a dijelom i zbog marginaliziranja od strane vrha
SDA, koji je imao sasvim drugačiju političku osnovu od
Abdićeve komunističke prošlosti. Autonomija u zapad-
noj Bosni očito je bila njegov pokušaj da nađe rješenje
za svoju izvornu bazu u ratu čiji se kraj nije nazirao. S
druge strane, to je bilo očito nepovjerenje prema poli-
C
tici SDA i mogućnostima ARBiH u nastavku rata.
D
680 R. DELIĆ, Armija RBiH, I, 298.
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Domovinski rat 04-02-2020 Knjiga 1.indd 289
BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA
IN 1993-1994
The military situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina in
1993 was extraordinarily complex. It was marked by a
string of momentous events, first and foremost among
them the outbreak of the Muslim-Croat war in which
Muslim warriors from foreign, mostly Muslim and Islam-
ic countries and small Croatian Army units participated.
The Serbs took advantage of the Muslim-Croat war and
mounted successful operations in eastern Bosnia and
at the same time freed up many troops from their lines
opposite Muslim and Croat lines for action elsewhere. In
western Bosnia an inter-Muslim conflict flared up, indi-
cating that there existed deep divisions among the Mus-
lims in the zone of the ARBIH V Corps.
On September 27 in Velika Kladuša Fikret Abdić
declared the existence of the Autonomous Province of
Western Bosnia. Before the war Abdić had been, by far,
the most influential and most popular Muslim politician
in Bosnia and Herzegovina. At the presidential elections
he had won the most votes and by right should have
become a member of the Presidency of Bosnia and Her-
zegovina but he waived his tenure in favor of Alija Izet-
begović. During the first few months of the war Abdić’s
influence waned significantly, partly due to the remote-
ness of his base in Velika Kladuša and partly because the
leadership of the SDA party did everything possible to
marginalize him. The reason behind the SDA’s move in
relation to Abdić was the fact that his communist back-
ground was anathema to the SDA’s political platform. Ab-
dić’s bid for autonomy in western Bosnia was an attempt
to secure his original base in a war the end of which was
not in sight. Also, Abdić harbored deep mistrust of the
SDA and did not believe that the Army of the Republic
of Bosnia and Herzegovina would ever develop into an
efficient armed force.
R
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 Davor Marijan • Rat za opstojnost Hrvata, 1991. - 1995.
MUSLIMANSKO-HRVATSKI
RAT U BiH
Rat između Muslimana i Hrvata, odnosno ARBiH i
HVO-a u BiH, u pravom smislu te riječi, započeo je u
travnju 1993. napadom ARBiH na Konjic i Jablanicu
u sjevernoj Hercegovini i, uz kraće prekide, trajao je
do ožujka 1994. i potpisivanja Washingtonskoga spo-
razuma. Uzrokovan je međusobnim nepovjerenjem i
različitim viđenjem unutarnjeg uređenja BiH (bošnjač-
H
ka politika je bila za unitarnu BiH, a hrvatska politika
bila je za uspostavu posebnih hrvatskih, bošnjačkih i
srpskih teritorijalnih jedinica u BiH) te promjenom de-
mografske i nacionalne/vjerske strukture stanovništva
(dolaskom velikog broja Muslimana koje su prognale
M
srpske snage) na područjima na kojima su do tada u
podjednakom broju živjeli Hrvati i muslimani (središ-
nja Bosna, sjeverna i sjeverozapadna Hercegovina). Ne
računajući oružane incidente između muslimanskih i
hrvatskih snaga tijekom 1992., prethodili su mu snažni
sukobi u jesen 1992., koji su počeli 18. listopada napa-
D
dom ARBiH na HVO u Novom Travniku, a 23. listopada
i na HVO u Prozoru. Postignuto krhko primirje između
ARBiH i HVO-a narušeno je novim oružanim sukobom
u Gornjem Vakufu/Uskoplju i napadom ARBiH na hr-
vatska naselja u Lašvanskoj dolini u siječnju 1993., čiji
je intenzitet pokazao da se ni sljedeće primirje neće
C
duže održati.
Politička stajališta Muslimana i Hrvata bila su toli-
ko različita da nije ni moglo biti istinskoga saveza. Po-
litička polazišta Hrvata i Muslimana bila su nespojiva.
Hrvati su željeli entitet i opstanak na područjima na
kojima su živjeli, a Muslimani unitarnu vjersku državu
u kojoj će dominirati, u skladu s razmišljanjem njihova
političkog vođe u BiH Alije Izetbegovića, izraženim u
njegovoj Islamskoj deklaraciji, objavljenoj 1990. godi-
ne. Kod Hrvata je vladalo mišljenje da će dobiti entitet,
što im je uoči referenduma o neovisnosti BiH obećao
muslimanski čelnik Alija Izetbegović, a što su nudili i
međunarodni planovi za unutarnje uređenje BiH, sve
do plana Kontaktne skupine u drugoj polovici 1994.
godine. Sukob je bio neizbježan i nije bio rat “prirod-
nih saveznika”, nego aktera koji su imali zajedničkoga
neprijatelja. Ta okolnost nije bila dovoljna za čvrsto,
nego samo za povremeno savezništvo.
Hrvati su, slično kao i Srbi, uglavnom bili zadovolj-
ni s onim što su nadzirali. Međunarodna je konferenci-
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MUSLIM-CROAT WAR IN
BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA
The Muslim-Croat war in Bosnia and Herzegovina,
that is, the war between the HVO and the Army of the Re-
public of Bosnia and Herzegovina, in the full sense of the
term started in April, 1993, when the Army of the Republic
of Bosnia and Herzegovina attacked Konjic and Jablanica
in northern Herzegovina. It lasted, with brief intervals, un-
til March, 1994, and the signing of the Washington Agree-
ment. One of the main causes of the war was mutual mis-
trust coupled with differing and opposing views on what
system of government should be established in Bosnia
and Herzegovina – the Bosniaks favored the option of a
unitary Bosnia and Herzegovina while the Croats wanted
to establish separate Croatian, Bosniak and Serbian polit-
ical entities in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Exacerbating the
situation further was the change in the demographic and
national/religious structure of the population caused by a
huge influx of Muslim refugees expelled by the Serbs into
areas with roughly equal number of Muslim and Croat res-
idents (central Bosnia, north and northwest Herzegovina).
There were many minor skirmishes between Muslim and
Croat forces in 1992. The situation escalated in the fall of
1992. On October 18 the Army of the Republic of Bosnia
and Herzegovina attacked the HVO in Novi Travnik and on
October 23 the Army of the Republic of Bosnia and Her-
zegovina attacked the HVO in Prozor. The tensions were
briefly defused when both sides agreed to a cease-fire.
The truce was tenuous and it was only a matter of time
before the hostilities would resume. And resume they duly
did with fighting in Gornji Vakuf and Uskoplje and the
Army of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina’s attack
D
on Croatian villages in the Lašva Valley in January, 1993.
The fighting was intense and tensions run so high that no
cease-fire had any chance of holding for long.
The political aspirations of the Muslims and the Cro-
ats were mutually exclusive and for that reason a durable
R
alliance of the two sides against the Serbs was never a
viable option. The Croats wanted autonomy and securi-
ty in the areas where they lived and the Muslims insisted
on a unitary religious fundamentalist state in which they
could lord highhandedly over the other two constituent
nations, as per the political philosophy of their leader in
Bosnia and Herzegovina, Alija Izetbegović which he had
unequivocally expressed in his book Islamska Deklaracija
(The Islamic Declaration), published in 1990. The Croats
modulated their attitude and actions on the basis of the
4.2.2020. 19:34:58
 The Croatian Nation’s Struggle for Survival, 1991-1995
H
M
Ranjeni hrvatski branitelj iz središnje Bosne na dlanu drži mali križ
(autor fotografije: Ante Čakić; fotografiju darovao: Slobodan Lang).
Wounded Croatian soldier from Central Bosnia. In his hand he holds
a small cross (Photograph by Ante Čakić; Photograph donated by
Slobodan Lang).
D
ja obećavala teritorijalno širenje na račun Srba i činilo se
da Hrvati samo trebaju biti kooperativni tijekom prego-
C
vora i čekati međunarodnu potvrdu za područje koje su
držali povijesno i etnički svojim. Uz to je u HVO-u vlada-
lo mišljenje da su vojnički nadmoćniji od ARBiH, što je
na dijelu teritorija doista bila istina. Prelazak VRS-a u ak-
tivnu obranu na kraju 1992. otvorio je ARBiH nove mo-
D
gućnosti za angažiranje snaga. Najvažnija od njih bila je
rat s HVO-om. Muslimani su rat počeli zbog procjene da
imaju vojnu nadmoć nad bosanskohercegovačkim Hr-
vatima. Za razliku od HVO-a, ARBiH se nije vojnički opu-
stila, nego je provela organizacijske promjene kojima
se pripremala za budući sukob. Premda je u mnogo ve-
ćoj mjeri od HVO-a patila od nedostatka oružja i vojne
opreme te imala niz logističkih problema, koje je ubla-
žavala preko Republike Hrvatske, ARBiH je iznad sebe
imala političku opciju koja je očito znala što želi i voj-
nički kadar koji je to bio spreman provesti na bojnom
polju. Najvažnija organizacijska mjera bilo je osnivanje
3. korpusa ARBiH i imenovanje bivšega potpukovnika
JNA Envera Hadžihasanovića njegovim zapovjednikom.
Nije jasno je li u trenutku osnivanja korpusa političko i
291
Domovinski rat 04-02-2020 Knjiga 1.indd 291
assumption that they would be granted autonomy. The
assumption was well founded – prior to the referendum
on Bosnia and Herzegovina’s independence the Muslim
leader Alija Izetbegović made a promise to the Croats that
he would grant them autonomy. Also, Croatian autonomy
was part and parcel of all the international plans for the
country’s future system of government, up to and includ-
ing the plan of the Contact Group in the second half of
1994. Conflict was inevitable and when it broke out it did
not constitute a war in which two “natural allies” fought for
a common cause but a war in which two sides occasionally
banded together to fight a common enemy.
The Croats were, for the most part just like the Serbs,
satisfied with the territory they controlled. The interna-
tional conference was geared towards a settlement by
which the Serbs would be forced to give up some terri-
tory and for a time it seemed that the Croats need only to
be willing to cooperate during the negotiations and wait
for the international recognition of their autonomy in the
areas they lived in and considered historically and ethni-
cally theirs. In addition to that, the HVO considered itself
to be militarily stronger than the Army of the Republic of
Bosnia and Herzegovina, which was, in relation to some
areas, true. When the VRS adopted the strategy of active
defense at the end of 1992 the Army of the Republic of
Bosnia and Herzegovina saw its chance to regroup its forc-
es and attack the HVO. The Muslims decided to attack the
HVO because they believed that their numerical superi-
ority over the Bosnian Croats guaranteed them a military
victory. Unlike the HVO, the Army of the Republic of Bosnia
and Herzegovina had not fallen into the trap of compla-
cency but had undertaken comprehensive organization-
al changes in preparation for their planned attack on the
HVO. The Army of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovi-
na was plagued, even more so than the HVO, by chronic
shortages of weapons and equipment and a whole myr-
iad of logistical difficulties. Ironically, the Muslims were
able to ameliorate somewhat the negative effects of their
R
logistical difficulties with the help of Croatia. Also, the po-
litical masters of the Army of the Republic of Bosnia and
Herzegovina new exactly what they wanted. The Army of
the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, it is worth point-
ing out, was ready and willing to do its masters’ bidding.
The most significant organizational measure was the for-
mation of the ARBIH III Corps and appointment of the for-
mer JNA Lieutenant Colonel Enver Hadžihasanović as its
commander. It is still not clear whether the political and
military leadership of the Army of the Republic of Bosnia
4.2.2020. 19:34:58
 Davor Marijan • Rat za opstojnost Hrvata, 1991. - 1995.
vojno vodstvo ARBiH imalo pred očima samo rat s HVO-
om. No ubrzo je postalo jasno da je svrha korpusa bila
rat s Hrvatima i etničko čišćenje središnje Bosne od ne-
muslimanskog stanovništva.
Tijekom 1992. odnosi između HVO-a i ARBiH bili
su, najblaže rečeno, hladni, a ovisili su u prvom redu
o brojnom odnosu. U mjestima gdje su bili podjedna-
ko zastupljeni odnosi su bili najlošiji jer ni jedna strana
nije imala snage za apsolutnu prevlast i nametanje dru-
goj. Ta mjesta karakterizira borba za prevlast i načelno
H
dvovlašće, što je najvećim dijelom bilo na području
središnje Bosne i u dolini Neretve, dakle upravo na po-
dručju provincija koje su prema prijedlogu međuna-
rodne zajednice (Vance-Owenov plan) trebale pripasti
Hrvatima, i za koje je u Zagrebu, prije 15. siječnja 1993.,
postignut dogovor o pretpočinjavanju postrojbi, koji
M
Armija Republike BiH nije ispoštovala.681 Ni jedna strana
nije uspijevala izboriti apsolutnu prevlast na kompak-
tnom području, što je iz konstantne nesnošljivosti i po-
vremenih sukoba postupno preraslo u otvoreni rat, koji
se prenosio na druga područja. Koristi od tih sukoba
imala je isključivo srpska strana.
D
Političku prevagu nad HVO-om Muslimani su poku-
šali ostvariti instrumentaliziranjem HSP-a, odnosno nje-
gova vojnoga krila HOS-a. Hrvatske oružane snage bile
su prihvatljive Sarajevu zbog zalaganja za jedinstvenu
BiH, iako je jedinstvena BiH za HSP značila zajedničku
državu s Hrvatskom, što je bila baština propaloga ustaš-
C
kog pokušaja s Nezavisnom Državom Hrvatskom. To se
vidi iz pisma što ga je predsjednik HSP-a i vrhovni za-
povjednik HOS-a Dobroslav Paraga napisao u kolovozu
1992. Darku Kraljeviću, časniku HOS-a iz Viteza:
681 To je razvidno iz obraćanja ministra obrane RH Goj-
ka Šuška predsjedniku Aliji Izetbegoviću, na razgo-
vorima u Zagrebu 15. siječnja 1993., koje pokazuje
da je u njihovom prethodnom razgovoru bilo do-
govoreno podčinjavanje postrojbi HVO-a Glav-
nom stožeru ARBiH ondje gdje su pretežno musli-
manske snage, odnosno postrojbi ARBiH Glavnom
stožeru HVO-a ondje gdje je pretežito HVO, što je
Izetbegović 15. siječnja osporio. ICTY: Zapisnik s
razgovora predsjednika RH dr. Franje Tuđmana sa
supredsjedateljima Cyrusom Vanceom i lordom
Owenom te Alijom Izetbegovićem, predsjednikom
Bosne i Hercegovine i Matom Bobanom, predsjed-
nikom Hrvatske zajednice Herceg-Bosna, i suradni-
cima, održanog u Zagrebu, 15. siječnja 1993.; Mi-
roslav TUĐMAN, Druga strana Rubikona – politička
strategija Alije Izetbegovića, Hrvatska sveučilišna
naklada, Zagreb, 2017., 138.
292
Domovinski rat 04-02-2020 Knjiga 1.indd 292
and Herzegovina had, at the time of the formation of III
Corps other strategic plans beside the one for an attack
on the HVO. Regardless of that, it soon became clear that
III Corps had been formed for the purpose of attacking the
HVO and it soon also became clear that the ultimate aim
of the Army of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina
was to ethnically cleanse central Bosnia of non-Muslims.
During 1992 the relationship between the HVO and
the Army of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina was,
generally speaking, strained. In areas where the size of
the Muslim population roughly equaled the size of the
Croatian population the Croats and the Muslims were at
loggerheads because neither side was strong enough to
impose its will on the other. Most of these areas were in
central Bosnia and in the Neretva Valley – exactly the ar-
eas of the provinces which were, according to the interna-
tional community’s recommendation (Vance-Owen Peace
Plan) to be given to the Croats. The situation in these areas
was characterized by struggles for power and an ineffec-
tive system of governance that could best be described
as diarchy. It also has to be stressed that in relation to the
mentioned areas, in Zagreb, some time before January 15,
an agreement on placing troops of one armed force un-
der the command of the other had been signed. The Mus-
lims did not honor the agreement.12 Neither side was able
to gain superiority in a compact area. This directly led to
constant tensions and occasional skirmishes which in turn
gradually led to open warfare spreading from one area to
another, like wildfire. Ironically, only the Serbs benefited
from the Muslim-Croat conflict.
12 This is obvious from what Croatian Defense Minister Gojko
D
Šušak said to President Alija Izetbegović, during the talks
held on January 15, 1993, in Zagreb. Gojko Šušak’s words
reveal that in a previous conversation between the two it
was agreed that the HVO was to be subordinated to the
General Staff of the Army of the Republic of Bosnia and
Herzegovina in the areas where the Army of the Republic
of Bosnia and Herzegovina was numerically stronger,
R
and that the ARBIH was to be subordinated to the HVO
Main Staff in the areas where the HVO was numerically
stronger. Izetbegović denied this on January 15. ICTY:
Minutes of the talks between Croatian President Franjo
Tuđman and the co-chairmen of the Peace Conference on
the Former Yugoslavia, Cyrus Vance and Lord Owen, and
Alija Izetbegović, president of Bosnia and Herzegovina,
and Mate Boban, President of the Croatian Community of
Herzeg-Bosnia, and associates, held on January 15, 1993,
in Zagreb. Tuđman, Miroslav. Druga strana Rubikona –
politička strategija Alije Izetbegovića. Hrvatska sveučilišna
naklada, Zagreb, 2017, p.138.
4.2.2020. 19:34:58
 The Croatian Nation’s Struggle for Survival, 1991-1995
“Ne smijemo dozvoliti da se pogrešna Bobanova
politika prebija preko naših leđa. Mi smo apsolutno za
jedinstvo hrvatskog naroda i za njegovu zajedničku
obranu, ali smo isto tako za jedinstvo sa muslimanskim
narodom. Mi od naše politike cjelovite Bosne i Herce-
govine, odn. Hrvatske do Drine ne odustajemo. Svaka
druga politika značila bi komadanje Herceg-Bosne i
stvaranje nove srpske države s ovu stranu Drine, što bi
bila propast za hrvatski muslimanski narod.”682
Pokušaj je propao jer je HOS pokazao da baštini
H
svjetonazor sredina u kojima je niknuo, a uz to je bio
osjetno manji i slabo organiziran. Do kraja 1992. vi-
še-manje je podijeljen po nacionalnom principu.
Uza sve probleme hrvatska pomoć Muslimanima
iz travnja 1992. nastavljena je i u kontinuitetu je tra-
jala do napada ARBiH na HVO u travnju 1993. godine.
M
Komandant Glavnoga štaba ARBiH general Delić izja-
vio je 26. veljače 1994. u Sarajevu da je HVO od stude-
noga 1992. do svibnja 1993. potpuno blokirao dotok
materijalno-tehničkih sredstava za ARBiH.683 Izjava je
u suprotnosti s tvrdnjom Alije Izetbegovića da je AR-
BiH do sredine 1993. unatoč embargu na uvoz oružja
D
unijela u BiH 30 tisuća pušaka i strojnica, 20 milijuna
metaka, 37 tisuća mina i 46 tisuća protutenkovskih
raketa.684 Ta količina oružja mogla je doći samo preko
Hrvatske i teritorija bosanskohercegovačkih Hrvata jer
je vlast u Sarajevu s Jugoslavijom bila u ratu, morskih
luka nije imala, a zračni promet nad BiH bio je zabra-
C
njen i prekinut rezolucijom UN-a. Za 4. korpus ARBiH
postoji vjerodostojan podatak iz sredine ožujka 1993.,
da je većinu opreme dobivao, iako je HVO tu pomoć
zadržavao i usporavao.685
Međunarodna zajednica tražila je da hrvatska
D
vlast utječe na vodstvo Hrvata u BiH, no sudjelovanje
Hrvatske u pokušaju rješavanja unutarnjih političkih
problema BiH nije dovelo do značajnog pomaka, iako
je dugoročno bilo važan bod za muslimansku stranu.
Za nesuradnju bosanskohercegovačkih Hrvata musli-
mansko je Sarajevo stalno optuživalo Hrvatsku. Slično
je postupala i međunarodna zajednica. Kako je to znalo
682 Glavni stožer HOS-a od 21. 8. 1992. za bojnika Darka
Kraljevića.
683 Rasim DELIĆ, Armija ključ mira, Vojna biblioteka, Saraje-
vo, 1994., 18.
684 A. IZETBEGOVIĆ, Sjećanja, 119-120.
685 ICTY: Komanda 4. korpusa, Pregled opšte situacije u
zoni odgovornosti dj. br. 01-1880/93 od 13. 3. 1993.
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Domovinski rat 04-02-2020 Knjiga 1.indd 293
The Muslims attempted to gain political dominance
over the HVO by affording political clout to the HSP, at the
expense of the HVO, for the purpose of driving a wedge
between the HVO and the HOS/HSP. The HOS was palat-
able for the Muslim leadership because it supported a uni-
tary Bosnia and Herzegovina despite the fact that for the
HOS a unitary Bosnia and Herzegovina meant establishing
a greater Croatian state, which was the political legacy of
the failed Ustasha regime from WWII. The president of the
HSP party and supreme commander of the HOS Dobroslav
Paraga summarized the HOS’ agenda in a letter he wrote in
August, 1992, to Darko Kraljević, a HOS officer form Vitez:
“We must not allow ourselves to be put in a situation
where we have to pay the price for Boban’s mistaken pol-
icies. We are for the absolute unity of the Croatian people
and for a common system of defense but we are also for
unity with the Muslim nation. Our commitment to a uni-
tary Bosnia and Herzegovina, that is, to Croatia as far as
the Drina River, remains staunch. Every other policy would
mean a break-up of Herzeg-Bosnia and the creation of
a new Serbian state on this side of the Drina River. That
would mean the end of the Muslim Croat nation.”
The attempt failed because the HOS clearly cherished
the outlook and attitudes of the areas it had sprung from.
Moreover, the HOS was not as strong and as well orga-
nized as the HVO. By the end of 1992 the HOS was divided
along, more or less, national lines.
Despite all the problems and the tense situation the
Croatian government continued to provide help to Bosnia
and Herzegovina until the Army of the Republic of Bosnia
and Herzegovina’s attack on the HVO in April, 1993. The
Commander of the General Staff of the Army of the Re-
public of Bosnia and Herzegovina General Delić stated,
on February 26, 1994, in Sarajevo that the HVO had, from
November, 1992, to May, 1993, completely blocked the
flow of matériel for the Army of the Republic of Bosnia and
Herzegovina. This statement is in contradiction with Alija
Izetbegović’s claim that the Army of the Republic of Bosnia
R
and Herzegovina, by mid-1993, despite the arms embargo,
had smuggled into the country 30,000 rifles and machine
guns, 20 million rounds of ammunition, 37,000 mines and
46,000 anti-armor missiles. That amount of weaponry
came via Croatia and the territory controlled by Bosnian
Croats. The weapons could not have come into Bosnia and
Herzegovina via any other route because Bosnia and Her-
zegovina was at war with Yugoslavia, it had no access to
the sea, and the UN imposed a no-fly zone over the coun-
try’s airspace. There is documentary evidence dating from
4.2.2020. 19:34:58
 Davor Marijan • Rat za opstojnost Hrvata, 1991. - 1995.
izgledati može se vidjeti na primjeru iz Jajca. Kada je
HVO odbio pustiti električnu energiju bosanskim Srbi-
ma, u skladu sa zaključcima Londonske konferencije
“kako se struja i voda ne smiju koristiti u ratne svrhe
prema civilnom stanovništvu”, međunarodni su pred-
stavnici to isposlovali pritiskom na njih preko Zagre-
ba.686 Ne znajući pozadinu pokušaja, predstavnici AR-
BiH iz Tuzle optužili su HVO za pregovore, zamalo pa
suradnju sa Srbima.687
O vojnoj suradnji Muslimana i Hrvata postoje ra-
H
zličita i oprečna mišljenja. Po tvrdnjama hrvatskoga
člana Predsjedništva Republike BiH Franje Borasa, HVO
je sredinom travnja 1992. Muslimanima nudio osni-
vanje “zajedničkog vojnog stožera za obranu Bosne i
Hercegovine”, o čemu Predsjedništvo nije raspravlja-
lo.688 General ARBiH Stjepan Šiber objavio je nekoliko
M
faksimila dokumenata u kojima se nudi vojna suradnja
HVO-u, a na koje navodno nije bilo hrvatskoga odgo-
vora.689 Tih dokumenata nema u arhivama HVO-a. Nji-
hovu autentičnost dovodi u pitanje izvješće načelnika
Glavnoga stožera HVO-a brigadira Milivoja Petkovića s
prvog zajedničkog sastanka izaslanstava HVO-a, VRS-a
D
i ARBiH u Sarajevu 7. listopada 1992. godine. Petković
je zamjeniku zapovjednika Štaba Vrhovne komande
ARBiH predbacio da nisu željeli stupiti u kontakt s njim,
a mogli su jer su svakodnevno bili u kontaktu s Arifom
Pašalićem, zapovjednikom ARBiH u Mostaru, “koji je od
mene [Petkovića] udaljen svega 300 metara”.690
C
Uz razgovore u Zagrebu 22. srpnja 1992., u kojima
je muslimanski čelnik Alija Izetbegović izbjegao kon-
kretan odgovor na ponudu hrvatskog vodstva o zajed-
ničkom vojnom djelovanju, najozbiljniji pokušaj dogo-
vora suradnje bio je sastanak predsjednika Tuđmana
i Izetbegovića 1. studenoga 1992., na kojem je dogo-
voreno osnivanje Zajedničkoga zapovjedništva ARBiH
i HVO-a na čelu s pukovnikom Jasminom Jaganjcem i
generalom Slobodanom Praljkom. Zapovjedništvo nisu
prihvatili s muslimanske strane. Izetbegović je u svojim
686 MORH, ur. br. 512-01-92-1543 od 26. 9. 1992.
687 Štab odbrane RBiH okruga Zenica, br. 10/1404-2 od 14.
10. 1992., Obavještajni izvještaj.
688 Franjo BORAS, Kako je umirala Socijalistička Republika
Bosna i Hercegovina, Slobodan Praljak (M. P. Cartonprint
Co Stolac), Mostar, 2002., 94-95.
689 S. ŠIBER, Prevare, zablude, istina, 305, 330-331.
690 Glavni stožer HVO, Izvješće o razgovorima u Sarajevu br.
01-2331/92 od 12. 10. 1992.
294
Domovinski rat 04-02-2020 Knjiga 1.indd 294
mid-March, 1993, proving that IV Corps of the Army of the
Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina continued to receive
most of the needed matériel despite the fact that the HVO
sometimes disrupted the transport.
The international community requested Croatia to act
as a moderating influence on the leadership of the Bosnian
Croats in Bosnia and Herzegovina but the participation of
Croatia in trying to solve internal political problems in Bos-
nia and Herzegovina did not bear fruit and was, in the long
term, beneficial for the Muslims. The Muslim leadership
constantly blamed Croatia for the Bosnia Croats’ uncoop-
erative attitude. The international community supported
the Muslim leadership in that. The situation on the ground
was chaotic. For example when the HVO in Jajce refused
to supply the Bosnian Serbs with electricity, in accordance
to the decisions reached at the London conference stipu-
lating that “electricity and water are not to be used for mil-
itary purposes against civilian population”, the internation-
al community’s representatives put pressure on Zagreb to
put pressure on the HVO in Jajce to give electricity to the
Bosnian Serbs. Unaware of these political goings-on, the
representatives of the Army of the Republic of Bosnia and
Herzegovina from Tuzla accused the HVO of negotiating
and, by implication, cooperating with the Serbs.
There exist differing and contradictory opinions about
the military cooperation between the Croats and Muslims.
According to the Croatian member of the Presidency of
the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina Franjo Boras, the
HVO offered to the Muslims, in mid-April, 1992, a formation
of “a joint HQ for the defense of Bosnia and Herzegovina”
but the Presidency never discussed the proposal. Stjepan
Šiber, a general in the Army of the Republic of Bosnia and
Herzegovina, has published a few copies of documents in
D
which the Muslims offer military cooperation to the HVO
to which, ostensibly, the HVO did not bother to respond.
These documents are not in the HVO archives. A report by
the chief of the General Staff of the HVO, Brigadier Milivoj
Petković, on the first joint meeting of the delegations of
R
the HVO, the VRS and the Army of the Republic of Bosnia
and Herzegovina in Sarajevo on October 7, 1992, brings
into question the authenticity of Šiber’s documents. Pet-
ković complained to the deputy chief of staff of the Army
of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina that the Mus-
lim officers had not wanted to get in touch with him but
could easily have done because they were in regular con-
tact with Arif Pašalić, the commander of the Army of the
Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina in Mostar, “who’s only
300 meters away from me (Petković)”.
4.2.2020. 19:34:58
 The Croatian Nation’s Struggle for Survival, 1991-1995
sjećanjima prešutio njegovo postojanje, kao i Rasim De-
lić u svojem pregledu rata i djelovanja ARBiH.691
Postojanje dviju paralelnih, i političkih i vojnih,
struktura na miješanim područjima, u središnjem dijelu
Bosne i sjeverozapadnoj Hercegovini, bilo je inicijalno
punjenje za sukob. Raščlanjujući uzroke sukoba u Pro-
zoru iz listopada 1992., zapovjednik HVO-a u OZ-u Sje-
verozapadna Hercegovina s pravom je zaključio da je
jedini preventivni lijek za izbjegavanje takvih sukoba
zabrana postojanja “dva zapovjedništva, dvije vojske,
H
dvije logistike i sl.”.692 Slično je zaključio i zapovjednik
17. krajiške brigade ARBiH ocijenivši da je jedan od pro-
blema neuspješne obrane Jajca bio i taj “što jedan grad
brane dvije komande”.693 To je bilo zanemarivanje stanja
na bojištu gdje je HVO bio osjetno jači i držao veći dio
bojišta (najmanje 75 % crte prema srpskim snagama).
M
Pokušaj razrješavanja dvovlašća poznata je zapo-
vijed Bože Rajića, ministra obrane Republike Bosne
i Hercegovine, od 16. siječnja 1993., koja je rezultat
spomenutoga dogovora u Zagrebu.694 Prema njoj su
postrojbe ARBiH u 3., 8. i 10. provinciji podređene Glav-
nomu stožeru HVO-a, a postrojbe HVO-a u 1., 5. i 9.
D
provinciji Glavnomu štabu ARBiH.695 Zapovijed je imala
temelj u Vance-Owenovom planu i bila je neuspio po-
kušaj definiranja područja odgovornosti te konačno
rješenje da se razriješi problem dvaju zapovjedništava
na istom području. No, ARBiH je bila sklonija ratnoj op-
ciji što se ubrzo pokazalo.
C
D
691 Oslobođenje, 2. 11. 1992., 1; D. MARIJAN, “Vještački
nalaz”, 232.
692 Zapovjedništvo HVO OZ S/Z Hercegovina, Izvješće br.
135/92 od 10. 11. 1992.
693 Bošnjak, 4. 4. 1995., Feljton o 17. viteškoj krajiškoj briga-
di (2).
694 O tome na prethodnim stranicama uz bilješku broj 555.
695 ICTY: Ministarstvo obrane RBiH, Zapovijed br. 01/93 od
16. 1. 1993.
295
Domovinski rat 04-02-2020 Knjiga 1.indd 295
During the talks in Zagreb on July 22, 1992, the Muslim
leader Alija Izetbegović gave an evasive reply to the Croa-
tian leadership’s offer for a joint military action against the
Serbs. The offer was sincere and genuine. Another serious
attempt to set up military cooperation occurred during a
meeting between President Tuđman and Izetbegović on
November 1, 1992. At that meeting it was agreed that a
Joint Command of the Army of the Republic of Bosnia
and Herzegovina and the HVO be formed and Colonel
Jasmin Jaganjac and General Praljak be appointed as its
commanders. However, the Muslims ignored its existence.
Izetbegović, in his memoirs, does not mention the joint
command. There is no mention of the joint command in
Rasim Delić’s book.
The existence of two parallel, both political and mili-
tary structures in areas with mixed populations in central
region of Bosnia and northwest Herzegovina made these
areas into tinderboxes ready to go off at any moment. Ana-
lyzing the causes of the conflict in Prozor in October, 1992,
the commander of the HVO in Operative Zone Northwest
Herzegovina rightly concluded that the only preventive
measure for avoiding such conflicts was to disallow “the
existence of two commands, two armies, two logistics
structures and thing of that nature”. The commander of
the 17th Krajina Brigade of the Army of the Republic of Bos-
nia and Herzegovina came to a similar conclusion, stating
that one of the causes why the defense of Jajce was un-
successful was that “one city is defended by two separate
commands”. It has to be noted that in Jajce the HVO at its
weakest moment held 75% of the defensive line and put-
ting the ARBIH’s troops under the HVO’s command made
perfect sense. Unfortunately, that did not happen.
Acting on the decisions made during the mentioned
meeting in Zagreb, Bože Rajić, minister of defense of Bos-
nia and Herzegovina, issued an order in an attempt to dis-
band the diarchic structures of governance on January 16,
1993. According to the order the formations of the Army
of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina stationed in the
R
3rd, 8th and 10th Provinces would be subordinated to the
HVO Main Staff and the formations of the HVO stationed
in the 1st, 5th and 9th Provinces would be placed under the
command of the General Staff of the Army of the Republic
of Bosnia and Herzegovina. The order was based on the
provisions of the Vance-Owen Peace Plan and constituted
a failed attempt to define areas of responsibility and finally
resolve the problem of having two commands in the same
area. The initiative failed because the ARBIH was set on go-
ing to war with the HVO.
4.2.2020. 19:34:58
 Davor Marijan • Rat za opstojnost Hrvata, 1991. - 1995.
SUKOBI U SIJEČNJU 1993.
GODINE
Gornji Vakuf/Uskoplje
Gornji Vakuf, općina s relativnom muslimanskom
većinom u dolini Vrbasa, spojnica je doline Vrbasa s
Hercegovinom i središnjom Bosnom, zbog čega je sam
grad bio iznimno važan i za HVO i za ARBiH. O važnosti
za ARBiH govori prijedlog koji je Arif Pašalić uputio u
H
ŠVK ARBiH, da se Gornji Vakuf zbog Prozora dodijeli 4.
korpusu.696 U toj je rečenici ključ i objašnjenje povoda
za rat, a to je nadzor nad prijevojem Makljen, najvažni-
jom strategijskom točkom u Herceg-Bosni.
Tenzije između HVO-a i ARBiH u općini postojale
M
su od osnivanja HVO-a i TO-a, odnosno ARBiH, a u lip-
nju 1992. rezultirale su sukobom u kojem je bilo mrtvih
na obje strane. Na području općine stalno su postojala
dva općinska zapovjedništva, HVO-a i TO-a, a potom
i dvije brigade: HVO-a dr. Ante Starčević i 317. brdske
ARBiH. Međusobni su se odnosi neprestano pogorša-
D
vali, a do obračuna nije dolazilo jer su ga obje strane
nastojale izbjeći, odnosno što više prolongirati. To je
posebice bio interes Muslimana, koji su optuživali HVO
da su fašisti, u čemu je značajnu ulogu imao lokalni list
Behar press.697
Uspostavljena ravnoteža snaga u dolini Vrbasa bila
C
je izvjesni jamac da neće doći do oružanoga obraču-
na. Ravnotežu je u prosincu 1992. narušila Komanda
3. korpusa ARBiH dovođenjem 305. brdske brigade u
dolinu Vrbasa, težišno na područje Gornjeg Vakufa. Bri-
gada je bila popunjena prognanicima iz Jajca i dijelom
je razmještana prema HVO-u u Prozoru i na prijevoju
Makljen. Prosinac je obilježen nizom incidenata i sukob
je bio pitanje dana. Očekujući sukob u dolini Vrbasa,
HVO u Bugojnu pojačan je po zapovijedi Glavnoga sto-
žera od 6. siječnja 1993. s po jednom satnijom iz Livna,
Tomislavgrada i Posušja.698
696 Zapovjedništvo 1. mostarske brigade ARBiH, Prijedlog
organizacije 4. korpusa br. 1013-1 od 16. 11. 1993.
697 Saznajna služba OZSZH, Saznajno izvješće str. pov. br.
497/92 od 22. 12. 1992.
698 Saznajna služba OZSZH str. pov. br. 04-05/92 od 5. 1.
1993.; GSHVO, Zapovijed dj. br. 01-03/93 od 6. 1. 1993.;
ICTY: OZ SZH, Uput postrojbi u Bugojno, zapovijed br.
01/5-11 od 7. 1. 1993.; OZ SZH, Redovno izvješće str.
pov. br. 02/2-42/93 od 8. 1. 1993.
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Domovinski rat 04-02-2020 Knjiga 1.indd 296
BATTLES IN JANUARY 1993
Gornji Vakuf/Uskoplje
Gornji Vakuf, a municipality with a relative Muslim
majority in the Vrbas Valley connects the Vrbas Valley
with Herzegovina and central Bosnia. Because of its
geographical position the city was strategically import-
ant both to the HVO and to the Army of the Republic of
Bosnia and Herzegovina. The fact that Arif Pašalić rec-
ommended to the Supreme Command HQ of the Army
of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina that Gornji
Vakuf, on account of Prozor, should be within IV Corps
area of responsibility testifies to how important the city
was to the Muslims. One can easily discern the logic be-
hind Pašalić’s recommendation. The recommendation
clearly reveals why the Muslims attacked the HVO in this
area – they wanted to gain control of the Makljen pass,
the most important strategic location in Herzeg-Bosnia.
There had been tensions between the HVO and
the Army of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina in
the municipality ever since the formation of the HVO
and the Territorial Defense, that is, the Army of the Re-
public of Bosnia and Herzegovina. In June, 1992, these
tensions led to a skirmish in which both sides suffered
casualties – three men were killed in action. Two munic-
ipal commands existed there from the start; the munic-
ipal command of the HVO and the municipal command
of the Army of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina.
Some time later there were two brigades too; the Ante
Starčević Brigade of the HVO and the 317th Mountain
Brigade of the Army of the Republic of Bosnia and Her-
D
zegovina. The situation continued to deteriorate steadi-
ly but no conflict erupted because both sides strove to
avoid it, or prolong its outbreak for as long as possible.
For the most part the Muslims operated on the basis of
the latter intention while the Croats genuinely tried to
avoid war with the Army of the Republic of Bosnia and
R
Herzegovina. The Muslims regularly accused the Croats
of being fascists. The local publication Behar press played
a prominent role in that particular regard.
The equilibrium established in the Vrbas Valley guar-
anteed, to an extent, that a conflict on a larger scale
would not erupt in the region. That balance of power was
disrupted in December, 1992, by the HQ of III Corps of the
Army of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, when
it deployed the 305th Mountain Brigade in the Vrbas Val-
4.2.2020. 19:34:58
 The Croatian Nation’s Struggle for Survival, 1991-1995
Armija Republike BiH također se pojačavala da bi
rasporedom snaga uspostavila nadzor nad promet-
nicom Prozor – Pidriš – Gornji Vakuf. Jaču postrojbu
pokušala je razmjestiti u miješanom selu Voljicama,
čemu se usprotivilo hrvatsko stanovništvo. U pregovo-
re o smirenju tenzija uključio se i zapovjednik HVO-a
OZ-a Sjeverozapadna Hercegovina, no bez uspjeha.699
Da je bliže ratno rješenje vidjelo se po skidanju hrvat-
ske zastave u gradu, podmetanju eksploziva i uhićenju
osoba s obje strane. Sukob je počeo poslijepodne 11.
H
siječnja i uz povremene prekide trajao je do 25. siječ-
nja. Za smirenje stanja angažirani su promatrači EZ-a
i pripadnici UNPROFOR-a, koji je u Gornjem Vakufu
imao bazu. Hrvatsko vijeće obrane na pregovorima je
predlagalo apsolutni prekid vatre, razdvajanje naoru-
žanih sastava, izvlačenje svih postrojbi iz grada, pu-
M
štanje svih zarobljenika i vraćanje oduzetih sredstava,
osnivanje zajedničke policije i zajedničkih punktova te
uvođenje policijskoga sata od 17 do 5 sati. Premda je
ARBiH načelno prihvatila prijedloge, pregovore je, po
ocjeni HVO-a, koristila za prestrojavanje i pripreme za
napad, te je u tri dana pregovora snajperima ubila 12,
D
a ranila 20 osoba. Položaj HVO-a osnažila je odluka o
provincijama s međunarodnih pregovora, pa je u tom
vremenu izdana zapovijed o podređivanju snaga AR-
BiH u hrvatskim provincijama i obrnuto, o podređiva-
nju HVO-a u muslimanskim provincijama.
Najjače su se borbe vodile u gradu i okolici te u
C
selima Bistrica, Vrse, Uzričje, Duša i Duratbegov Dolac.
U ostalim naseljima borbe su bile rijetke i bez većega
značenja. U prvih par dana ARBiH je imala inicijativu
i manje uspjehe na bojištu. U borbama je imala sna-
ge 305. i 317. brdske brigade te pojačanja iz Bugojna
D
i Novog Travnika. Za pomoć su bile poslane i brigada
4. korpusa Neretvica i jedna četa iz Busovače. Hrvat-
sko vijeće obrane angažiralo je u gradu i okolici snage
brigade Ante Starčević, bojne Zvonko Krajina iz pukov-
nije Bruno Bušić i postrojbi iz Livna. Njihov je zadatak
bio zauzeti Gornji Vakuf, osigurati prometnicu prema
Travniku i spriječiti intervenciju iz smjera Travnika i
Ravnog Rostova. Zadatak brigade Rama s ojačanjem
iz Tomislavgrada bio je blokirati put Jablanica – Prozor
i osigurati desni bok snaga HVO-a na crti Crni vrh –
Mejnik i prema selima Here, Kute i Šćipe te se spojiti
s HVO-om u Gornjem Vakufu. Zadatak brigade Eugen
699 Zapovjedništvo OZ SZH, Izvješće str. pov. br. 02/2-733
od 10. 1. 1993.
297
Domovinski rat 04-02-2020 Knjiga 1.indd 297
ley, focusing on the Gornji Vakuf area. The replacements
the brigade received were refugees from Jajce and some
elements took up positions opposite those of the HVO
in Prozor and the Makljen pass. The month of December
was marked by a string of incidents and it was only a
matter of days when a full-scale conflict would break out.
Expecting trouble in the Vrbas Valley the General Staff or-
dered, on January 6, 1993, that the HVO in Bugojno be re-
inforced by one company from Livno, one company from
Tomislavgrad and one company from Posušje.
The ARBIH was also bringing in reinforcements in or-
der to gain control of the Prozor – Pidriš – Gornji Vakuf
road. The Muslims tried to deploy a strong formation in
the village of Voljice. The population of the village was
mixed and the Croats there opposed the ARBIH’s inten-
tion and the Muslim soldiers withdrew. The negotiations
on defusing the situation were ongoing and the com-
mander of Operative Zone Northwest Herzegovina also
decided to take part in the talks but his participation did
not change anything. The situation was inexorably sliding
towards war – Muslim soldiers took down the Croatian
flag in the city, both sides planted explosives and both
sides started arresting the other side’s soldiers. Fighting
erupted on the afternoon of January 11 and, with brief
intermissions, lasted until January 25. EC observers and
UNPROFOR, which had a base in Gornji Vakuf, managed
to calm the situation down. The HVO proposed an abso-
lute cease-fire, separation of the warring parties, with-
drawal of all armed units from the city, release of all pris-
oners and return of all captured equipment and matériel,
formation of a joint police force and establishment of
jointly manned checkpoints and imposition of a curfew
that would be in effect daily from 1700 to 0500 hours.
The ARBIH accepted the proposal in principle. However,
the HVO accused the Muslims of taking advantage of the
cease-fire to regroup its forces and prepare an all-out
attack. It is a fact that ARBIH snipers, during the three
days of negotiations, killed 12 people and wounded 20.
R
The HVO’s position was somewhat bolstered by the de-
cision about provinces reached during the international
negotiations. As a direct result of that development the
previously mentioned order about subordinating ARBIH
forces in Croatian provinces to the HVO and HVO forces
in Muslim provinces to the ARBIH was issued.
The fiercest fighting took place in the city and its en-
virons and in the villages Bistrica, Vrse, Uzričje, Duša and
Duratbegov Dolac. In other villages and locales there
was little or no fighting. The little fighting that did take
4.2.2020. 19:34:58
 Davor Marijan • Rat za opstojnost Hrvata, 1991. - 1995.
Kvaternik s ojačanjem iz Posušja bio je razbiti musli-
manske snage u Bugojnu, a pomoćnim snagama osi-
gurati prometnicu Bugojno – Gornji Vakuf i blokirati
pravac Ravno Rostovo – Bugojno.
Ocijenivši da u pregovorima gubi prostor, HVO
je 16. siječnja krenuo u protunapad. Na pravcu Pi-
driš – Mačkovac – Uzričje angažirani su dijelovi bri-
gade Kralj Tomislav, Kažnjenička bojna angažirana
je za zauzimanje položaja Repetitor – Strumica, a na
pravcu Ždrimci – Vrse veći dio prve bojne Vojne poli-
H
cije HVO-a. Brigada Rama napala je na pravcu Prozor
– Makljen – Gornji Vakuf. Tijekom 18. siječnja HVO je
razbio muslimanske snage u Gornjem Vakufu, Uzričju
i Ždrimcima i ovladao dijelom Hrasnice. Armija Re-
publike BiH pružala je neorganizirani otpor. Idućega
dana HVO je zauzeo Uzričje, Krupu, Hrasnicu i Repe-
M
titor, s kojeg je odbacio snage ARBiH na Alipašića bri-
jeg. Hrvatsko vijeće obrane tada je držalo gotovo sve
važnije kote oko grada, a ARBiH je ostao spoj samo sa
selom Vrse. Iz Bugojna je ARBiH prijetila da će povući
snage s crte prema Donjem Vakufu ako HVO ne preki-
ne napade. Armija Republike BiH iz Gornjeg Vakufa to
D
je napravila na dijelu bojišta prema Kupresu kada se
18. siječnja povukla s crte duge 2 kilometra. U nastav-
ku borbi HVO je 22. siječnja zauzeo Krč, Malo Seoce,
dio Duratbegova Dolca i dio Bistrice, a 24. siječnja i
Alipašića brijeg. ARBiH je najvećim dijelom bila razbi-
jena i okružena i pristala je na primirje, koje je stupilo
C
na snagu 25. siječnja.700 Iako je HVO tada mogao uzeti
Gornji Vakuf, poštujući zapovijed generala Petkovića
iz Ženeve, odnosno zahtjev međunarodne zajednice,
borbe su zaustavljene.
U borbama do 25. siječnja HVO je imao 46 pogi-
nulih vojnika. Poginulo je 16 civila, a ranjeno više od
230 vojnika i civila. Zarobljeno je 112 muslimanskih
vojnika, a ARBiH je zarobila 24 vojnika HVO-a. Prema
podacima ARBiH, poginulo je oko 50 vojnika i civila.
Materijalna šteta u gradu i okolnim selima bila je ve-
700 OZ SZH, Zapovijed str. pov. br. 01/35-1 od 12. 1. 1993.;
IZM OZ S/ZH od 17. 1. 1993. u 21,00; Zapovjedništvo
OZ SZH str. pov. br. 01-163/93-1 od 18. 1. 1993.; ICTY:
Komanda 3. korpusa ARBiH str. pov. br. 02/33-214 od
23. 1. 1993.; Dnevna izvješća brigade Dr. A. Starčević od
11. do 25. siječnja 1993.; Brigada HVO Dr. A. Starčević,
Izvješće br. 1-5/1-208/93 od 9. 3. 1993.; Izjava generala
Zlatana Mije Jelića.
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Domovinski rat 04-02-2020 Knjiga 1.indd 298
place was indecisive. During the first five days the AR-
BIH held the initiative and scored minor successes. The
Muslims deployed the 305th Mountain Brigade and the
317th Mountain Brigade and reinforcements from Bugo-
jno and Novi Travnik. These units actively participated in
the fighting. The Muslims also sent to the area one bri-
gade of IV Corps Neretvica and one company from Buso-
vača. The HVO deployed, in the city and its environs, the
Ante Starčević Brigade, the Zvonko Krajina Battalion of
the Bruno Bušić Regiment and one unit from Livno. The
task of these troops was to capture Gornji Vakuf, secure
the Travnik road and prevent the Muslims from inter-
vening from the direction of Travnik and Ravno Rostovo.
The task of the Rama Brigade with reinforcements form
Tomislavgrad was to block the Jablanica – Prozor road
and secure the right flank of the HVO on the Crni Vrh –
Mejnik line and in the direction of the villages of Here,
Kute and Šćipe and link up with the HVO forces in Gornji
Vakuf. The task of the Eugen Kvaternik Brigade with rein-
forcement from Posušje was to defeat the Muslim forces
in Bugojno and secure the Bugojno – Gornji Vakuf road
and block the direction of Ravno Rostovo – Bugojno.
The HVO realized that the other side was actually
occupying parts of its territory during the negotiations
and for that reason it mounted a counterattack on Jan-
uary 16. Elements of the Kralj Tomislav Brigade were
deployed along the Pidriš – Mačkovac – Uzričje line, the
Penal Battalion was tasked with capturing the Strumica
repeater and the bulk of the 1st Battalion of the Military
Police from Mostar was deployed on the Ždrimci – Vrse
line. The Rama Brigade attacked in the direction of Pro-
zor – Makljen – Gornji Vakuf. During January 18 the HVO
destroyed the Muslim forces in Gornji Vakuf, Uzričje and
D
Ždrimci and gained control of a part of Hrasnica. The
defense mounted by the ARBIH was disorganized. The
following day the HVO captured Uzričje, Krupa, Hras-
nica and the repeater. The ARBIH troops defending the
repeater retreated to Alipašića Brijeg. The HVO at that
R
point held most of the high ground around the city
and the ARBIH was left with only one communications
route with the village of Vrse. The ARBIH, at that point,
threatened that it would withdraw its forces from the
position opposite Donji Vakuf if the HVO did not halt its
attacks. The ARBIH forces in Gornji Vakuf did withdraw
from a two-kilometer-long part of the Kupres line on
January 18. On January 22 the HVO captured Krč, Malo
Seoce, part of Duratbeg Dolac and part of Bistrica and
on January 24 the HVO captured Alipašića Brijeg as well.
4.2.2020. 19:34:58
 The Croatian Nation’s Struggle for Survival, 1991-1995
lika.701 Na pregovorima održanim 7., 9. i 13. veljače
1993. dogovoreno je da se povuku snage s područja
drugih općina, zatrpaju rovovi i povuče teško oruž-
je na položaje prije sukoba.702 Armija Republike BiH
premjestila je 305. brdsku brigadu u Zenicu. U brošuri
o ratnom putu brigade to se tretira kao “potvrda da
su se jajački borci dokazali kao pravi branioci Bosne i
Hercegovine”, a ne kao čimbenik koji je narušio sigur-
nosnu ravnotežu.703
Hrvatsko vijeće obrane u Gornjem Vakufu bilo je
H
na korak do pobjede i propustilo je priliku da sukob
završi u svoju korist.
Lašvanska dolina
U drugoj polovini siječnja 1993. muslimansko-hr-
M
vatski sukob proširio se iz Gornjeg Vakufa/Uskoplja
na dolinu Lašve u središnjoj Bosni. Armija Republike
BiH imala je u središnjoj Bosni glavninu 3. korpusa. Hr-
vatsko vijeće obrane uz snage OZ-a Srednja Bosna u
prvoj polovini siječnja pojačano je dijelom pukovnije
Bruno Bušić i bojne Ludvig Pavlović u jačini nepotpune
D
pješačke bojne. Zbog sukoba između HVO-a i ARBiH
u Gornjem Vakufu, hrvatske snage su imale zadatak
spriječiti prolaz muslimanskih snaga prema Gornjem
Vakufu, s tim da HVO iz središnje Bosne nije slao po-
jačanja. Iz Sebešića je nadzirao pravce Opara – rudnik
Radovan – Bistrica i Ravno Rostovo – Bojska.
C
Niz incidenata s obje strane i međusobno optu-
živanje obilježili su vrijeme do otvorenog sukoba u
dolini Lašve. U noći 18./19. siječnja ARBiH je zaposjela
prije pripremljene rovove i zemunice na području Ku-
bera te položaje na širem području sela Kaćuni. Idu-
D
ćega je dana u Kaćunima postavila nadzornu točku
na prometnicu Busovača – Kiseljak, čime je prekinut
promet između ta dva mjesta. Par dana trajao je igro-
kaz oko te točke, koja je u jednom trenutku na ulti-
matum HVO-a bila i uklonjena s prometnice. Ponovno
je postavljena 24. siječnja i popodne istoga dana su
701 Spiskovi zarobljenih brigada HVO Dr. A. Starčević od 27.
1. 1993.; ICTY: Državna komisija RBiH, Stanje u G. Vaku-
fu, informacija br. 10/406-1 od 4. 2. 1993.; Brigada HVO
Dr. A. Starčević, Izvješće br. 1-5/1-208/93 od 9. 3. 1993.
702 Rezultati sastanka održanog s članovima PMEZ, ARBiH,
HVO-a i UNPROFOR-a (nedatirano, odnosi se na prego-
vore 7., 9. i 13. 2. 1993.).
703 Ratni put 305. brdske brigade, Zenica, 1994., 10.
299
Domovinski rat 04-02-2020 Knjiga 1.indd 299
The ARBIH forces were, for the most part destroyed and
surrounded. The ARBIH had no option but to sue for
an armistice. The HVO agreed and the armistice went
into effect on January 25. At that point the HVO could
have easily captured Gornji Vakuf. However, the HVO
followed General Petković’s order issued from Geneva
and stopped the offensive, abiding by the wishes of the
international community.
The HVO lost 46 soldiers killed during the fighting
until January 25. 16 civilians were also killed and more
than 230 soldiers and civilians were wounded. The HVO
took 112 Muslim soldiers prisoner and the ARBIH cap-
tured 24 HVO soldiers. The ARBIH admitted to losing 50
soldiers and civilians. Material damage in the city and
surrounding villages was extensive. Negotiations were
held on February 7, 9 and 13, 1993. The HVO and the AR-
BIH agreed that they would withdraw their forces from
the territory of the municipalities controlled by the other
side, fill up the trenches and withdraw heavy weapon-
ry to the positions held before the conflict. The ARBIH
moved the 305th Mountain Brigade to Zenica. In the of-
ficial history of the brigade it is stated that the warriors
from Jajce “distinguished themselves as true defenders
of Bosnia and Herzegovina”. As a matter of fact, the war-
riors from Jajce constituted the main threat to the coun-
try’s security.
The HVO in Gornji Vakuf was on the brink of a deci-
sive victory and missed a perfect opportunity to nip the
Muslims’ plans of conquest in the bud. Ironically, the end
of the conflict in Gornji Vakuf/Uskoplje marked the be-
ginning of the Muslim-Croat war.
Lašva Valley
In the second half of January, 1993, the Muslim-Cro-
at conflict spread from Gornji Vakuf/Uskoplje to the Laš-
va Valley in central Bosnia. The bulk of III Corps of the AR-
BIH was stationed in central Bosnia. The HVO, alongside
R
Operative Zone Central Bosnia had, in the first half of Jan-
uary, an incomplete infantry battalion size contingent of
the Ludvig Pavlović Battalion and elements of the Bruno
Bušić Regiment, in central Bosnia. Due to the conflict be-
tween the HVO and the ARBIH in Gornji Vakuf the Croa-
tian forces were tasked with preventing Muslim troops
from reaching Gornji Vakuf from central Bosnia. It has
to be pointed out that the HVO did not send reinforce-
ments to the HVO forces in the Gornji Vakuf area from
central Bosnia. From Sebešić the HVO controlled the lines
4.2.2020. 19:34:59
 Davor Marijan • Rat za opstojnost Hrvata, 1991. - 1995.
na njoj napali vozilo Vojne policije HVO-a i ranili do-
zapovjednika Vojne policije HVO-a iz Busovače, koji
je iskrvario jer nije dopušteno da mu se pruži pomoć.
Pokušavajući mu pomoći, ubijen je civil koji se slu-
čajno zatekao na barikadi. Ujutro 25. siječnja počeli
su sukobi: HVO je nastojao deblokirati prometnicu, a
ARBiH je iz Kaćuna napala okolna sela s hrvatskim sta-
novništvom: Polje, Prosje, Kulu, Neziroviće, Oselište i
Gusti Grab. Ujutro 26. siječnja snage ARBiH iz Zenice
napale su hrvatske snage u selima Lašva i Dusina. Sela
H
su spaljena i počinjen je ratni zločin nad devet osoba
hrvatske i jednom osobom srpske narodnosti. Civilno
stanovništvo iz sela Dusina i Višnjica zarobljeno je i
odvedeno u logor, vojnici HVO-a su razoružani i za-
robljeni, pa potom strijeljani, a zapovjedniku lokalne
postrojbe HVO-a u Mjesnoj zajednici Lašva, Zvonku
M
Rajiću, izvađeno je srce. Napad ARBiH iz smjera Mer-
dana HVO je odbio. Crta razdvajanja uspostavljena je
27. siječnja na potezu Kuber – Putiš – Grablje – Mer-
dani – Dusina – Nezirovići – Proščica – Kaćuni – Modri
kamen – Pridolci – Luške staje – Busovačke staje –
Rovna. Hrvatsko vijeće obrane uspjelo je razoružati
D
sela Strane i Skradno, a 28. i 29. siječnja odbiti napad
na Prosje, Bare i Roške stijene. Borbe su završile 1. ve-
ljače. Sukob se nije proširio na ostale općine središnje
Bosne zbog stalnih pregovora i posredovanja UNPRO-
FOR-a. Iznimka je bila općina Kiseljak, u kojoj su snage
ARBiH u Bilalovcu 28. siječnja postavile nadzornu toč-
C
ku na prometnicu prema Busovači i zarobile nekoliko
časnika iz brigade Ban Josip Jelačić. Zbog toga je bri-
gada povukla snage angažirane kod Kaćuna, a u noći
28./29. siječnja snage ARBiH iz Bilalovca samovoljno
su se povukle. U obrani Busovače zaključno s datu-
mom 28. siječnja poginulo je 16 pripadnika brigade
Nikola Šubić Zrinski i šest civila. Iz sastava brigade Ban
Josip Jelačić poginula su tri, a ranjeno je šest vojnika.
Iz sastava HVO-a u borbama su sudjelovale snage bri-
gade Nikola Šubić Zrinski i manji sastavi (vod – satnija)
iz Kiseljaka, Viteza, Zenice i profesionalnih postrojbi
Bruno Bušić, Ludvig Pavlović i Vitezovi. Na strani ARBiH
sudjelovale su snage 333. brdske brigade i Općinsko-
ga štaba Busovača, bataljun 17. krajiške brdske briga-
de, četa 309. brigade, snage Općinskoga štaba obrane
Zenica i 7. muslimanske brigade.
Uz pomoć UNPROFOR-a potpisan je sporazum o
prekidu vatre i dogovoreno je da se snage dovedene
sa strane, uglavnom ARBiH, prijepodne 2. veljače po-
vuku s područja općina Kiseljak i Busovača. Armija Re-
300
Domovinski rat 04-02-2020 Knjiga 1.indd 300
of communications along the Opara – Radovan mine –
Bistrica line and along the Ravno Rostovo – Bojska line.
The outbreak of open conflict in the Lašva Valley was
preceded by a period marked by a whole string of inci-
dents and bouts of mutual accusations. During the night
of January 18-19 the ARBIH moved into already prepared
trenches and dug-outs in the Kuber area and took up
positions in the wider area of the village of Kaćuni. The
following day the Muslims set up a checkpoint in Kaćuni
– on the Busovača – Kiseljak road. With that checkpoint
the ARBIH disrupted the flow of traffic between the two
towns. During the next few days the checkpoint was the
locus of a whole drama of moves and countermoves by
both sides. At one point the HVO upped the ante and is-
sued an ultimatum and the ARBIH backed down and re-
moved the checkpoint. However, on January 24 the AR-
BIH set it up again. In the afternoon on the same day the
troops manning the checkpoint fired at a HVO Military
Police vehicle and wounded the deputy commander of
the Busovača HVO Military Police. The deputy command-
er bled to death because the Muslim soldiers did not al-
low an ambulance to pass through. A civilian who found
himself passing through the checkpoint at that moment
tried to help the wounded officer but the Muslim soldiers
shot and killed him. On the morning of January 25 the sit-
uation escalated: the HVO tried to lift the blockade of the
Busovača – Kiseljak road and the ARBIH attacked, from
Kaćuni, the predominantly Croatian villages in the area;
Polje, Prosje, Kula, Nezirovići, Oselište and Gusti Grab. On
the morning of January 26 the ARBIH forces from Zen-
ica attacked the Croatian forces in the villages of Lašva
and Dusina. The villages were burned and the Muslims
also murdered nine Croatian civilians and one Serb civil-
D
ian. The Muslims captured the civilians of the villages of
Dusina and Višnjica and transported them to a concen-
tration camp. The captured HVO soldiers were shot and
the commander of a local HVO unit, Zvonko Rajić, was
taken to the community center building in Lašva where
R
Muslim torturers cut his heart out of his chest. The ARBIH
also attacked from the direction of Merdan but the HVO
repulsed the charge. On January 27 the front line was
stabilized along the Kuber – Putiš – Grablje – Merdani –
Dusina – Nezirovići – Proščica – Kaćuni – Modri Kamen –
Pridolci – Luške Staje – Busovačke Staje – Rovna line. The
HVO disarmed the Muslims in the villages of Strane and
Skradno and, on January 28 and 29 beat back the attacks
on Prosje, Bare and Roške Stijene. The fighting ended
on February 1. The conflict did not spread to the other
4.2.2020. 19:34:59
 The Croatian Nation’s Struggle for Survival, 1991-1995

municipalities in central Bosnia because negotiations

and talks were constant and because of UNPROFOR’s
efforts at mediation. The exception was the municipali-
ty of Kiseljak where ARBIH troops set up a checkpoint in
Bilalovac, on January 28, on the Busovača road and took
a number of officers from the Ban Josip Jelačić Brigade
prisoner. On account of that incident the Brigade with-
drew its forces from Kaćuni and during the night of Janu-
ary 28-29 the ARBIH forces in Bilalovac withdrew of their
own accord. In the fighting in Busovača, until January 28,
H
16 soldiers from the Nikola Šubić Zrinski Brigade were
killed. The Ban Josip Jelačić Brigade lost three soldiers
killed and six wounded. Six civilians were also killed. The
following HVO formations took part in the fighting: the
Gornji Vakuf/Uskoplje, 1993. (fotografiju darovao Zrinko Tokić).
Nikola Šubić Zrinski Brigade, smaller units (platoon-com-
Gornji Vakuf/Uskoplje, 1993 (Photograph donated by Zrinko Tokić). pany) from Kiseljak, Vitez, Zenica and the Bruno Bušić,
M
Ludvig Pavlović and Vitezovi special purpose units. The
ARBIH employed the 333rd Brigade and troops belonging
to the Municipal HQ Busovača, one battalion of the 17th
Krajina Mountain Brigade, one company from the 309th
publike BiH nije, kako tvrdi HVO, ispunila dogovor i na- Brigade, troops from the municipal HQ of TO Zenica and
stavila je pritisak na Busovaču, no u manjem obimu.704 the 7th Muslim Brigade.
D
Po mišljenju američkoga povjesničara Charlesa A cease-fire, mediated by UNPROFOR was signed
Shradera, siječanjski sukobi bili su priprema ARBiH za and it was agreed that the forces that had been brought
travanjsku ofenzivu u središnjoj Bosni.705 into the municipalities of Kiseljak and Busovača – most
of them Muslim – were to be withdrawn from the mu-
nicipalities in February. The ARBIH, according to the HVO,
did not honor the agreement and continued to threaten
C
Busovača, only to a lesser degree than before.
In the American historian Charles Shrader’s opinion,
the ARBIH considered the fighting in January as a prepa-
704 IZM OZ SB, Izvješće br. 03-1-226/93 od 18. 1. 1993.; Zap.
OZ SB, Dnevno izvješće br. 36-8-1/93 od 19. 1. 1993.; ratory step for a large-scale offensive. The Muslims would
OZ SB, Izvješće br. 180/93 od 21. 1. 1993.; IZM OZ SB, launch that offensive in central Bosnia in April.
D
Izvješće br. 01/1-322/93 od 25. 1. 1993.; IZM OZ SB, Izv-
ješće br. 08-364-1/93 od 26. 1. 1993.; ICTY: Zap. OZ SB,
Izvješće ur. br. 02-1-388/93 od 27. 1. 1993.; IZM OZ SB,
Izvješće br. 02-1-399/93 od 28. 1. 1993.; IZM OZ SB, Izv-
ješće br. 03-01-1-381/93 od 28. 1. 1993.; ICTY: Opštinski
štab odbrane Zenica, Sumarni borbeni izvještaj br. pov.
14/02-29/4 od 28. 1. 1993.; ICTY: Komanda 3. korpu-
R
sa RBiH, Obavještenje str. pov. br. 02/33-311 od 29. 1.
1993.; IZM OZ SB, Borbeno izvješće br. 03-1-447/93 od
29. 1. 1993.; OZ SB, Izvješće br. 01-2-27/93 od 1. 2. 1993.;
IZM OZ SB, Vanredno izvješće br. 02-2-63/93 od 4. 2.
1993.; Izvješće Zapovjedništva brigade “Ban J. Jelačić”
od 10. 2. 1993. o tijeku događanja na području Šitluci
– Klokoti – Bilalovac; ICTY: Brigada HVO “Nikola Šubić
Zrinski”, Izvješće br. 827/93 od 27. 4. 1993.
705 Charles R. SHRADER, Muslimansko-hrvatski građanski rat
u srednjoj Bosni: vojna povijest 1992.–1994., Golden mar-
keting-Tehnička knjiga, Zagreb, 2004., 119.

301

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 Davor Marijan • Rat za opstojnost Hrvata, 1991. - 1995.
ZATIŠJE PRED BURU
Tijekom borbi u Gornjem Vakufu/Uskoplju zapo-
vjednik 3. korpusa ARBiH Enver Hadžihasanović obavi-
jestio je 20. siječnja 1993. čelnike snaga ARBiH u Bugoj-
nu da je “za sukob u svim gradovima HZ Herceg Bosna
… preuranjeno, mada je i ta opcija predviđena”.706 U
veljači je Štab Vrhovne komande ARBiH naredio 1., 3.
i 4. korpusu razradu ratnih planova za sukob s HVO-
om.707 Zapovijed je bila osnova za koncentriranje sna-
H
ga 3. korpusa u operativne skupine radi učinkovitijega
djelovanja i zapovijedanja postrojbama. U ožujku su
ustrojene četiri operativne grupe: Lašva za općine Bu-
sovača, Kakanj i Vitez, Zapad za općine Bugojno, Gornji
Vakuf, Novi Travnik i Travnik, Bosna za općine Zavidovi-
M
ći i Žepče te Bosanska krajina. U sastav OG-a Lašva ušle
su 309., 325. i 333. brdska brigada i općinski štabovi
obrane Busovača, Kakanj i Vitez, u sastav OG-a Zapad
307. i 312. motorizirana, 306., 308. i 317. brdska brigada
i općinski štabovi obrane Bugojno, Gornji Vakuf, Novi
Travnik i Travnik, u sastav OG-a Bosna 318. i 319. brd-
ska brigada s općinskim štabovima obrane Zavidovići
D
i Žepče, a u sastav OG-a Bosanska krajina 7. musliman-
ska, 17. i 305. brdska brigada. Skupina je bila glavna
manevarska snaga 3. korpusa. Sličan status imale su
snage u Zenici – 301. mehanizirana, 314. motorizirana,
303. brdska brigada i Općinski štab obrane Zenica – koji
C
su bili pod izravnim zapovjedništvom 3. korpusa. Uz to
je 3. korpusu iz 1. korpusa pridodana OG Visoko, koja
je ubrzo preimenovana u OG Istok. Ona se sastojala od
302. motorizirane i 304. brdske brigade te općinskih
štabova obrane Breza, Fojnica, Ilijaš, Kiseljak, Vareš i Vi-
soko.708 Njezinim je pridodavanjem u zonu djelovanja
3. korpusa ušlo i područje Vareša i nove snage ARBiH
za pritisak na Kiseljak i Kreševo. Tim su promjenama u
zonu 3. korpusa ARBiH ušle sve postrojbe HVO-a u sre-
dišnjoj Bosni osim u Tuzli, Usori i Žepču. Uoči travanj-
skih borbi Komanda 3. korpusa naredila je podređenim
postrojbama izvlačenje iz urbanih područja i prelazak
706 Komanda 3. korpusa RBiH, Odgovor str. pov. br. 02/33-
181 od 20. 1. 1993.
707 ICTY: ŠVK OS RBiH, Naređenje str. pov. br. 02/213-1 od 6.
2. 1993.
708 ICTY: ŠVK OS RBiH, Naređenje str. pov. br. 14/75-7 od
6. 2. 1993.; ICTY: Komanda 3. korpusa, Naređenje str.
pov. br. 02/33-628 od 8. 3. 1993.; ICTY: ŠVK OS RBiH, Na-
ređenje str. pov. br. 02/403-1 od 17. 3. 1993.
302
Domovinski rat 04-02-2020 Knjiga 1.indd 302
CALM BEFORE THE STORM
During the fighting in Gornji Vakuf/Uskoplje the
commander of the ARBIH III Corps Enver Hadžihasanović
informed, on January 20, 1993, the commanders of the
ARBIH forces in Bugojno that “it is too early to provoke
a conflict in all the cities of HZ Herzeg Bosna… even
though there are contingency plans based on that op-
tion”. In February the Supreme Command HQ of the AR-
BIH ordered I, II and IV Corps to make plans for an all-out
conflict with the HVO. The order served as the foundation
stone for forming the forces of III Corps into Operation-
al Groups so as to enhance the overall efficiency of the
troops and improve command and control. Four Opera-
tional Groups were formed in March: Operational Group
Lašva for the municipalities of Busovača, Kakanj and Vi-
tez, Operational Group West for the municipalities of Bu-
gojno, Gornji Vakuf, Novi Travnik and Travnik, Operation-
al Group Bosna for the municipalities of Zavidovići and
Žepče and Operational Group Bosanska Krajina. Opera-
tional Group Lašva consisted of the 309th, 325th and 333rd
Mountain Brigades, the municipal HQs of TO Busovača,
Kakanj, and Vitez. Operational Group West consisted of
the 307th and 312nd Motorized Brigades, 306th, 308th and
317th Mountain Brigade and the municipal HQs of TO Bu-
gojno, Gornji Vakuf, Novi Travnik and Travnik. Operation-
al Group Bosna consisted of the 318th and 319th Moun-
tain Brigades with the municipal HQs of TO Zavidovići
and Žepče. Operational Group Bosanska Krajina consist-
ed of the 7th Muslim, 17th and 305th Mountain Brigade. OG
Bosanska Krajina was the main maneuver element of III
Corps. A similar status had the forces in Zenica – the 301st
Mechanized, 314th Motorized, 303rd Mountain Brigades
D
and the municipal HQ of TO Zenica – which were under
the direct command of the commander of III Corps. Op-
erational Group Visoko from I Corps was attached to III
Corps. Shortly thereafter Operational Group Visoko was
redesignated as Operational Group East. It consisted of
R
the 302nd motorized and 304th Mountain Brigade and the
municipal HQs of TO Breza, Fojnica, Ilijaš, Kiseljak, Vareš
and Visoko. With Operational Group East attached to III
Corps the area of responsibility of III Corps was extended
to the Vareš area. Also, III Corps now had enough troops
to put pressure on Kiseljak and Kreševo. This organi-
zational reshuffling meant that all HVO units in central
Bosnia, apart from those in Tuzla, Usora and Žepče, were
now in the area of responsibility of III Corps. Just prior to
the April offensive the HQ of III Corps ordered all of its
4.2.2020. 19:34:59
 The Croatian Nation’s Struggle for Survival, 1991-1995
H
M
D
Središnja Bosna, dolina Lašve, krajem travnja 1993. godine.
C
na logorski sustav, što je očito bio završni čin priprema
za napad na HVO.709
U središnjoj Bosni HVO je sredinom travnja 1993.
D
imao napisanu zapovijed za obranu OZ-a Srednja Bo-
sna od napada ARBiH, koja je predviđala obranu pod-
ručja držanih pod nadzorom i, ako bude nužno, izvla-
čenje brigade Kotromanić iz Kaknja sa stanovništvom
prema Busovači, odnosno brigade Kralj Tvrtko iz Sara-
jeva sa stanovništvom u Kiseljak. Hipotetska napad-
na djelovanja samo su naznačena uz pomoć snaga iz
dubine, što očito podrazumijeva snage iz operativnih
zona Sjeverozapadna i Jugoistočna Hercegovina.710
709 Naredbe Komande 3. korpusa, str. pov. br. 02/33-826
do 02/33-837 od 11. 4. 1993 (objavljene na web-stranici
Slobodana Praljka).
710 Zapovijed za obranu OZ Srednja Bosna, operativni br. 2
(rukom dopisano: br. 03-4-181/93 od 14. 4. 1993.).
303
Domovinski rat 04-02-2020 Knjiga 1.indd 303
Central Bosnia, Lašva Valley, end of April 1993.
subordinated units to pull out of urban areas and take up
attack positions. The order was clearly the last step in the
preparations for an all-out attack on the HVO.
In central Bosnia the HVO had plans, in mid-April,
1993, for defending Operative Zone Central Bosnia
from the ARBIH’s attack. The plan envisaged defend-
ing the area controlled by the HVO and, if necessary a
withdrawal of the Kotromanić Brigade from Kakanj and
evacuation of Kakanj’s civilians towards Busovača and a
R
withdrawal of the Kralj Tvrtko Brigade from Sarajevo and
evacuation of Croat civilians from Sarajevo to Kiseljak.
Offensive actions were to be conducted with the help
of the forces from the rear. In practical terms that meant
the forces belonging to OZ Northwest Herzegovina and
OZ Southeast Herzegovina.
4.2.2020. 19:35:00
 Davor Marijan • Rat za opstojnost Hrvata, 1991. - 1995.
HERCEGOVINA
Konjic – Jablanica
U Hercegovini se 4. korpus ARBiH s MUP-om u
ožujku 1993. pripremio za eliminiranje organizacija HZ
Herceg-Bosne iz općina Konjic i Jablanica. Cilj je bio us-
postaviti nadzor nad prometnicama Konjic – Sarajevo,
Jablanica – Ostrožac – Parsovići – Dusina – Fojnica – Ze-
nica i lokalnom prometnicom od Ostrošca do Gornjeg
H
Vakufa. Zapovjedništva triju brigada ARBiH (Suad Alić,
Neretva, Neretvica), bataljuna Vojne policije 4. korpu-
sa, Općinskoga štaba obrane Jablanica s načelnicima
stanica javne bezbjednosti Hadžići, Jablanica i Konjic
napravila su 20. ožujka plan mjera protiv HVO-a. Isto-
M
ga dana, radi pripreme ofenzive ARBiH protiv HVO-a,
zapoviješću Sefera Halilovića protuhrvatski orijentiran
Safet Ćibo premješten je u 4. korpus ARBiH, a već ranije
je, odlukom Predsjedništva RBiH od 13. ožujka 1993.,
postavljen za predsjednika ratnog predsjedništva opći-
na Konjic, Jablanica, Prozor, umjesto legalno izabranih
predsjednika.711 Prema hrvatskim podacima, ARBiH je
D
raspolagala snagama od 7000 do 8000 ljudi, a HVO je
imao oko 2000 vojnika.712
Od sredine ožujka tenzije su svakodnevno rasle.
Snage brigade Neretvica okružile su 19. ožujka Homa-
tlije na granici s općinom Prozor i tražile predaju voj-
C
nika koje je navodno zarobila brigada HVO-a Rama.
Potom su počeli sukobi brigada Neretvica i Rama. Hr-
vatsko vijeće obrane zarobilo je predsjednika općine
711 ICTY: Ratno predsjedništvo opštine Konjic, Zahtjev za
ocjenu ustavnosti Odluke Predsjedništva RBiH, br. 01/1-
012-106/93 od 28. 3. 1993.
712 ICTY: Zapisnik sa zajedničkog sastanka predstavni-
ka komandi Armije RBiH, brigada „Suad Alić”, brigada
„Neretvica”, brigada „Neretva”, bVP 4. korpusa, Opš-
tinskog štaba Jablanica, te predstavnika MUP-a RBiH –
Stanica javne bezbjednosti Hadžići, Jablanica i Konjic,
str. pov. br. 16-8/08-62/93 od 20. 3. 1993.; ICTY: Ratno
predsjedništvo opštine Konjic, Zahtjev za ocjenu ustav-
nosti Odluke Predsjedništva RBiH, br. 01/1-012-106/93
od 28. 3. 1993.; VOS GS HVO, Zabilješka str. pov. br. 03-
346/93 od 14. 4. 1993.; VOS GS HVO, Tijek događanja na
prostorima središnje i sjeverne Hercegovine, str. pov.
br. 03-414/93 od 11. 5. 1993.; Ratni put 56. domobran-
ske pukovnije Herceg-Stjepan HVO Konjic (nedatiran i
nepotpisan prikaz, vjerojatno iz 1994.); ICTY: Komisija
za utvrđivanje ratnih zločina HR HB, Kratka kronologija
i prikaz ratnih zločina od strane pripadnika ARBiH, br.
27/95 od 30. 3. 1995., str. 2.
304
Domovinski rat 04-02-2020 Knjiga 1.indd 304
HERZEGOVINA
Konjic – Jablanica
In Herzegovina IV Corps of the ARBIH with the MUP
prepared, in March, 1993, to eliminate the HZ HB orga-
nizations in the municipalities of Konjic and Jablanica.
The aim was to gain control of the Konjic – Sarajevo
road, the Jablanica – Ostrožac – Parsovići – Dusina – Fo-
jnica – Zenica road and the local road leading from Os-
trožac to Gornji Vakuf. The HQs of the three brigades of
the ARBIH (Suad Alić, Neretva, Neretvica), of the Military
Police Battalion of IV Corps, of the municipal HQ of TO
Jablanica with chiefs of public security stations Hadžići,
Jablanica, and Konjic made, on March 20 a detailed plan
of activities against the HVO. On the same day and for
the purpose of preparing the ARBIH’s offensive against
the HVO, by Sefer Halilović’s order, Safet Ćibo, an officer
with strong anti-Croatian leanings, was transferred to IV
Corps of the ARBIH, having already been, by the Presi-
dency of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina’s de-
cision of March 13, 1993, appointed as President of the
war presidency of the municipalities of Konjic, Jablanica,
Prozor, thus replacing the legally elected presidents. Ac-
cording to Croatian sources, the ARBIH deployed 7,000-
8,000 men against the HVO’s 2,000.
Tensions rose steadily from mid-March. The
Neretvica Brigade surrounded Homatlije on the
boundary with the Prozor Municipality on March 19,
requesting that the Croats hand over a Muslim prison-
er that Rama Brigade soldiers had allegedly arrested
before. Then skirmishes between Neretvica Brigade
soldiers and Rama Brigade soldiers started to occur.
D
The HVO arrested the president of the Konjic Munic-
ipality and chief of the MUP Konjic. The ARBIH react-
ed on March 23 by attacking the HVO in the Klis area
and put Konjic under blockade. The Muslims enjoyed
overwhelming numerical superiority and taking full
R
advantage of it expelled the Croats from the villages
of Donji Prijeslop, Jasenik, Mrkosovice, Lukšije, Sola-
kova Kula, Bare, Seonica, Gorani, Goransko Polje and
Podhum. The Muslim troops engaged in expelling the
civilians murdered a number of them. Muslim soldiers
blocked all approaches to Konjic and disarmed about
100 HVO soldiers in the city. The ARBIH also attacked
the barracks in Bradina and disarmed about 30 HVO
soldiers there. On March 25, 1993, the ARBIH attacked
the village of Orlište and killed four elderly civilians and
4.2.2020. 19:35:00
 The Croatian Nation’s Struggle for Survival, 1991-1995
i načelnika MUP-a Konjica, nakon čega je ARBiH 23.
ožujka napala HVO na području Klisa i blokirala Ko-
njic. Zahvaljujući višestrukoj premoći muslimanske su
snage protjerale Hrvate iz sela Donji Prijeslop, Jasenik,
Mrkosovice, Lukšije, Solakova Kula, Bare, Seonica, Go-
rani, Goransko Polje i Podhum. Pritom su ubijani i civili.
U Konjicu su blokirani svi prilazi i razoružano je oko
100 vojnika HVO-a. Napadnuta je i vojarna u Bradini i
razoružano oko 30 vojnika. Armija Republike BiH je 25.
ožujka 1993. napala selo Orlište i ubila četiri civila sta-
H
rije životne dobi te protjerala sve Hrvate iz sela. Borbe
su završile 25. ožujka. U napadu muslimanskih snaga
poginulo je 11 vojnika i civila. U primirju koje je slijedi-
lo muslimanske su snage izbjegle dogovorene obveze
i spriječile povratak protjeranog stanovništva.713
Brzo se pokazalo da je potpisano primirje bio ma-
M
nevar ARBiH za nastavak napada i dovođenje pojača-
nja s Igmana. Uoči nastavka napada preimenovane
su tri njezine brigade na području Konjica i Jablanice:
Suad Alić u 43. brdsku, Neretva u 44. brdsku i Neretvica
u 45. brdsku brigadu.714
Ujutro 14. travnja 45. brdska brigada ARBiH krenu-
D
la je u napad na hrvatska naselja u Klisu i tijekom dana
zauzela vojarnu na tromeđi Konjic – Fojnica – Dusina
i selo Bušćak, u kojem je ubila tri osobe, spalila cijelo
selo i protjerala Hrvate. U nastavku napada zauzela je
sela i zaselke Lukšije, Šagolje, Prijeslop, Goransko Po-
lje, Mrkosovice, Buturović Polje i napala Obre. Hrvat-
C
sko vijeće obrane blokiralo je u Radešinama promet-
nicu Ostrožac – Konjic radi sprečavanja dovođenja
pojačanja ARBiH iz Jablanice. Glavni cilj brigade bila je
dominantna planina Bokševica. Snage 43. brdske bri-
gade i bataljuna VP-a 4. korpusa ojačane Specijalnom
D
postrojbom MUP-a Hadžića i postrojbom Zulfikar na-
pale su 15. travnja položaje HVO-a u Konjicu i okolici.
Plan je bio brzo eliminirati HVO u Konjicu, a potom sa
svim brigadama krenuti u napad na pravcima Konjic –
713 Zapovjedništvo brHVO “Herceg Stjepan”, Redovno bor-
beno izvješće str. pov. br. 02/2-72 od 20. 3. 1993.; Izvješće
brHVO “Herceg Stjepan” od 5. 4. 1993.; VOS GS HVO, Tijek
događanja na prostorima središnje i sjeverne Hercegovi-
ne str. pov. br. 03-414/93 od 11. 5. 1993.; ICTY: Uprava SIS
HR HB, Informacija ur. br. 02-08-1-2158/94 od 20. 4. 1994.;
ICTY: Komisija za utvrđivanje ratnih zločina HR HB, Kratka
kronologija i prikaz ratnih zločina od strane pripadnika
ARBiH, br. 27/95 od 30. 3. 1995., str. 2-3.
714 Komanda 4. korpusa, Dostava elemenata mob. razvoja
dj. br. 03-2683/93 od 7. 4. 1993.
305
Domovinski rat 04-02-2020 Knjiga 1.indd 305
expelled all Croats from the village. The fighting end-
ed on March 25. 11 Croatian soldiers and civilians were
killed. During the cease-fire that followed the Muslims
reneged on everything they had agreed to when sign-
ing the cease-fire and prevented the expelled civilians
from returning to their homes.
It soon transpired that the Muslims had agreed to a
cease-fire for the sole purpose of bringing in reinforce-
ments from Igman without interruption and preparing
another offensive. Just prior to renewing the fighting
the ARBIH redesignated its three brigades in the Konjic
and Jablanica area: the Suad Alić Brigade was redes-
ignated as the 43rd Mountain Brigade, the Neretva Bri-
gade was redesignated as the 44th Mountain Brigade
and the Neretvica Brigade was redesignated as the 45th
Mountain Brigade.
On the morning of April 14, the 45th Mountain Bri-
gade of the ARBIH attacked the Croatian villages in Klis
and during the day captured the village of Bušćak and
the barracks at the Konjic – Fojnica – Dusina junction.
In Bušćak the Muslim attackers killed three people,
burned all the houses in the village and expelled all
Croats from the village. Continuing its advance the AR-
BIH captured the villages of Lukšije, Šagolje, Prijeslop,
Goransko Polje, Mrkosovice, Baturić Polje and attacked
the village of Obre. The HVO blocked the Ostrožac –
Konjic road in Radešine with the aim of preventing
the ARBIH to bring in reinforcements from Jablanica.
The main objective of the 45th Mountain Brigade was
Mount Bokševica, a strategically important feature. The
43rd Mountain Brigade and Military Police Battalion of
IV Corps reinforced by the Special Police Hadžić Unit
and Zulfikar Unit attacked, on April 15 the HVO posi-
tions in Konjic and its environs. The plan was to quickly
eliminate the HVO forces in Konjic and then use all bri-
gades for an onslaught in the direction of Konjic – Jab-
lanica – Mostar and the direction of Konjic – Prozor –
Rama. The attackers focused their efforts on Repovica,
R
Zlatar and Radešina. On April 16 the ARBIH captured
the village of Trusina and killed 22 Croats there – 15
civilians and seven HVO soldiers who had surrendered
because the Muslims had used the civilians as a human
shield. Using a human shield of captured Croatian ci-
vilians the Crni Labudovi special purpose unit (Black
Swans) captured Zlatar on April 18. On the same day
the ARBIH gained control of Konjic, even though the
HVO still held some high ground around the city. The
position of the HVO was precarious but help materi-
4.2.2020. 19:35:00
 Davor Marijan • Rat za opstojnost Hrvata, 1991. - 1995.
Jablanica – Mostar i Konjic – Prozor – Rama. Težište na-
pada bilo je na Repovici i objektima Zlatar i Radešina.
Potom je 16. travnja ARBiH zauzela selo Trusinu i ubila
22 Hrvata – 15 civila i sedam pripadnika HVO-a, koji su
se predali jer su civili iz sela dovedeni kao živi štit. Uz
pomoć živoga štita sastavljenog od civila Hrvata, Spe-
cijalna postrojba Crni labudovi zaposjela je 18. travnja
objekt Zlatar. Istoga je dana ARBiH stavila Konjic pod
nadzor, premda je HVO zadržao dio kota oko grada. Hr-
vatsko vijeće obrane bilo je u teškom stanju i položaj
H
mu je olakšala 2. lpbr VRS-a, koja je topničkom vatrom
tukla položaje ARBiH i bez većega napora 18. travnja
zauzela važno planinsko područje Ljubine iznad Turije.
Hrvatsko vijeće obrane je kao protuuslugu omogućilo
izvlačenje većega broja srpskih civila iz Konjica i oko-
lice na područje Borka. Zahvaljujući Hercegovačkom
M
korpusu VRS-a kao osloncu, HVO se održao u Zaslivlju,
Zabrđu i Turiji na desnoj obali Neretve. Armija Repu-
blike BiH potom se orijentirala na Radešine na cesti
Jablanica – Konjic, koje je nakon višednevnih napada
zauzela 25. travnja.715
Tijekom “čišćenja” konjičke općine od HVO-a i Hr-
D
vata, 44. brdska brigada ARBiH iz Jablanice sa Samo-
stalnim bataljunom Prozor imala je zadatak spriječiti
pomoć dijelovima brigade Herceg Stjepan. Operativna
zona Sjeverozapadna Hercegovina najprije je pomo-
gla topničkom vatrom, a potom je u Prozoru organizi-
rala IZM i 17. travnja krenula s dijelom snaga u pomoć
C
prema Jablanici. Angažirani su dijelovi brigada Kralj
Tomislav, Rama, bojne Ludvig Pavlović i Vojne polici-
je. U zahvatu prometnice Prozor – Jablanica bila su
sela s muslimanskim stanovništvom, Škrobućani, Pa-
roš, Parčani, Gračanica, Klek i Gorica, koja su tijekom
nastupanja razoružana. Istovremeno su postrojbe
HVO-a, predvođene Kažnjeničkom bojnom, zauzele
područje Pasje stijene i selo Sovići i prinudile postroj-
bu ARBiH na predaju, te nastavile napad na smjeru
Doljani – Jablanica. Idućega je dana HVO stavio pod
nadzor Gornje i Donje Višnjane, Lizoperce i ušao u dio
715 Komanda 4. korpusa, Informacija dj. br. 02/1-3200-1/93
od 17. 4. 1993.; Borbeni izvještaj IKM 4. korpusa ARBiH
od 17. 4. 1993.; Komanda 4. korpusa, Informacija dj.
br. 02/1-2560-18/93 od 18. 4. 1993.; ICTY: Komanda 2.
lpbr VRS, str. pov. br. 24-4/98 od 25. 4. 1993.; Sejo Nu-
manović, “Suze zbog nepravde”, Prva linija, br. 6, 23. 5.
1993., 6-7; ICTY: Komisija za utvrđivanje ratnih zločina
HR HB, Kratka kronologija i prikaz ratnih zločina od stra-
ne pripadnika ARBiH, br. 27/95 od 30. 3. 1995., str. 2-3, 5.
306
Domovinski rat 04-02-2020 Knjiga 1.indd 306
alized in the form of the 2nd Light Infantry Brigade of
the VRS which unleashed artillery fire on the ARBIH
positions and on April 18 captured, without much
fighting, the mountainous area of Ljubina above Turija.
The HVO, in return, evacuated a large number of Serb
civilians from Konjic and its environs and transported
them to the Borak area. The HVO, propped up by the
VRS Herzegovina Corps, managed to hold its positions
in Zaslivlje, Zabrđe and Turije on the right bank of the
Neretva River. The ARBIH then focused its efforts on
Radešine on the Jablanica – Konjic road. On April 25
the Muslims captured Radešine.
The task of the 44th Mountain Brigade of the AR-
BIH and the Independent Prozor Battalion in Konjic
was to ethnically cleanse the city of Croats, mop up
the remaining pockets of resistance and prevent HVO
reinforcements from reaching elements of the Herceg
Stjepan Brigade. Operative Zone Northwest Herze-
govina provided artillery support and then organized
the Forward Command Post in Prozor and on April 17,
using parts of its forces, advanced towards Jablanica
to help the beleaguered defenders there. Elements of
the Kralj Tomislav and Rama Brigades, elements of the
Ludvig Pavlović Battalion and Military Police partici-
pated in the operation. Within the area of the Prozor
– Jablanica road there were the predominantly Muslim
villages of Škorbućani, Paroš, Parčani, Gračanica, Klek
and Gorica. The advancing Croatian forces disarmed
the Muslims in those villages. At the same time the
HVO units, spearheaded by the Penal Battalion, cap-
tured the Pasije Stijene area and the village of Sovići,
forced the ARBIH soldiers to surrender and continued
attacking in the direction of Doljani – Jablanica. On
D
the following day the HVO captured Gornji Višnjani,
Donji Višnjani, Lizoperce and a part of Gornja Slatina.
The HVO failed to capture Donja Slatina because of the
timely arrival of Muslim reinforcements from Jablani-
ca. In these battles the HVO lost two soldiers killed and
R
two wounded. On April 19, the HVO forces disarmed
the Muslims in Grevići and Tošćanica, captured Gornja
Slatina and linked up with the Herceg Stjepan Brigade
in Doljani and Sovići. Continuing the advance Opera-
tive Zone Northwest Herzegovina captured, on April
20, Donja Slatina and the Penal Battalion attacked
Tovarnica Hill on the outskirts of Jablanica from Dol-
jani and captured the highest peak. The commander
of the Penal Battalion, Mario “Ćikota” Hrkać, was killed
and the battalion temporarily halted its advance. The
4.2.2020. 19:35:00
 The Croatian Nation’s Struggle for Survival, 1991-1995
Gornje Slatine. Pokušaj zauzimanja Donje Slatine nije
uspio zbog dolaska muslimanskih pojačanja iz Jabla-
nice. Tijekom tih borbi HVO je imao dva poginula i tri
ranjena vojnika. Tijekom 19. travnja HVO je razoružao
Greviće i Tošćanicu, zauzeo Gornju Slatinu i spojio se
sa snagama brigade Herceg Stjepan u selima Doljani i
Sovići. Nastavljajući napad, snage OZ-a Sjeverozapad-
na Hercegovina zauzele su 20. travnja Donju Slatinu,
a Kažnjenička je bojna iz Doljana napala kotu Tovar-
nica na prilazu Jablanici i zauzela najviši vrh. Napad
H
je privremeno prekinut nakon pogibije zapovjednika
Kažnjeničke bojne Maria Hrkaća Ćikote, a potom zbog
stupanja na snagu sporazuma o prekidu vatre 22.
travnja. Sporazum se nije održao i borbe su nastav-
ljene. Hrvatsko vijeće obrane u međuvremenu je po-
jačano s 15 pripadnika bojne Zrinski, čiji su pripadnici
M
uglavnom bili podrijetlom iz BiH. To je bila prva or-
ganizirana skupina iz Hrvatske, pod zapovjedništvom
HVO-a, koja je sudjelovala u muslimansko-hrvatskom
ratu. Postrojbe HVO-a su 24. travnja nastavile napad
na položaje ARBiH s obje strane Neretve, na Tovarni-
ci – bez uspjeha – i na Bokševici, na kojoj su zauzele
D
značajnu kotu Tisov do. U tim je borbama HVO imao
četiri poginula i devet ranjenih vojnika. Daljnje napre-
dovanje prekinuo je sporazum o primirju i neuspjeli
pokušaj da se formira Zajedničko zapovjedništvo AR-
BiH i HVO-a.716
U jugozapadnom dijelu općine Jablanica snagama
C
ARBiH u Doljanima i Sovićima HVO je 16. travnja dao
ultimatum za predaju oružja, koji je odbijen. Idućega
dana, osloncem na Posušje, na smjeru Sovićka vrata –
Sovići – Doljani angažirane su skupine iz Hercegovi-
ne predvođene Kažnjeničkom bojnom. Kao što je već
D
gore spomenuto, one su 18. i 19. travnja bez gubitaka
zauzele Soviće, koje je branila četa 44. brdske brigade,
i spojile se s bojnom HVO-a u Doljanima. Prema poda-
716 IZM OZ S/ZH, Izvanredno izvješće br. 01-202/93 od 16.
4. 1993.; IZM OZ S/ZH, Redovno borbeno izvješće br.
01-208/93 od 16. 4. 1993.; IZM OZ S/ZH, Izvanredno
izvješće br. 01-208/93 od 17. 4. 1993.; IZM OZ S/ZH,
Operativno izvješće br. 01-222/93 od 17. 4. 1993.; IZM
OZ S/ZH, Izvanredno izvješće br. 01-238/93 od 18. 4.
1993.; IZM OZ S/ZH, Redovno izvješće br. 01-255/93
od 19. 4. 1993.; IZM OZ S/ZH, Izvanredno izvješće br.
01-260/93 od 20. 4. 1993.; IZM OZ S/ZH, Redovno bor-
beno izvješće br. 01-276 od 21. 4. 1993.; IZM OZ S/ZH,
Redovno borbeno izvješće br. 01/311 od 24. 4. 1993.;
IZM OZ S/ZH, Informacije br. 01-1933 od 24. 4. 1993.;
Izjava generala Miljenka Lasića.
307
Domovinski rat 04-02-2020 Knjiga 1.indd 307
fighting stopped on April 22 when another cease-fire
was signed. The cease-fire did not hold and the fight-
ing resumed. In the meantime the HVO had been re-
inforced with 15 soldiers from the Zrinski Brigade.
Most of these soldiers had been born in Bosnia and
Herzegovina. This was the first organized group of sol-
diers that arrived from Croatia and participated in the
Muslim-Croat war under the command of the HVO.
The HVO forces continued their advance on April 24
and attacked the ARBIH on both sides of the Neretva
River. On Tovarnica the HVO’s attack was unsuccess-
ful but on Bokševica the HVO captured Tisov Do Hill.
In these battles the HVO lost four soldiers killed and
nine wounded. Yet another cease-fire put a stop to the
fighting. An attempt was made to form a joint com-
mand of the ARBIH and the HVO but it failed.13
In the southwestern part of the municipality of
Jablanica the HVO, on April 16, issued an ultimatum to
hand over the weapons to the ARBIH units in Doljani
and Sovići. The Muslims rejected the Croats’ demand.
On the following day, the Penal Battalion, reinforced
with groups from Herzegovina went into the attack.
Leaning on Posušje the HVO forces advanced along the
Sovićka Vrata – Sovići – Doljani line. On April 18-19 the
Croat forces captured Sovići, defended by one compa-
ny from the 44th Mountain Brigade. The attackers linked
up with the HVO Battalion in Doljani. According to the
ARBIH sources, the 44th Mountain Brigade in Sovići lost
10 soldiers killed and 90 taken prisoner.
The attempt to help the HVO in Konjic and Jab-
lanica by launching an advance from the direction of
Posušje and Prozor had been developing well until the
signing of the cease-fire. When the fighting resumed
the HVO forces could not regain the initiative. The AR-
BIH’s attack on Konjic was, for the most part successful:
the Muslim forces captured parts of the city, effectively
cutting it in half, killed 17 HVO soldiers – most of them
after they had surrendered –and took a large number
R
of HVO soldiers prisoner. The compactness of the Her-
ceg Stjepan Brigade was broken – each battalion was
on its own. The 1st Battalion remained in the Klis area
but it was fractioned into three separate enclaves. One
enclave was in the Bokševica, Kostajnica, Falanovo
Brdo, parts of Goransko Polje, Buturović Polje, Gorica,
Obre and Bukovice area. Another was in the Ljesovi-
13 Statement by General Miljenko Lasić.
4.2.2020. 19:35:00
 Davor Marijan • Rat za opstojnost Hrvata, 1991. - 1995.
cima ARBiH, 44. brdska brigada imala je u Sovićima 10
poginulih i oko 90 zarobljenih vojnika.717
Pružanje pomoći s pravca Posušja i Prozora HVO-u
u Konjicu i Jablanici teklo je uspješno do sporazuma o
prekidu borbi i poslije se nije uspijevalo ponoviti. Armi-
ja Republike BiH uglavnom je uspješno završila napad
na HVO u općini Konjic: prepolovila ga je, ubila 17 voj-
nika, uglavnom izvan borbe, i zarobila veći broj vojni-
ka. Brigada Herceg Stjepan razdvojena je po bojnama
na tri dijela. Prva je bojna ostala na području Klisa, no
H
bila je ispresijecana i odvojena na tri dijela. Jedan je dio
bio na području Bokševice, Kostajnice, Falanova Brda,
u dijelu Goranskog Polja, Buturović Polja, Gorice, Obra
i Bukovice. Drugi je dio bio na području Ljesovinja, Bu-
dišnje Ravni, Žitače, Krtića, Donje Višnjevice i u dijelu
Seonice. Treći dio (jedan vod) bio je u selu Vrci, koje je
M
bilo na glavnom udaru muslimanskih snaga, koje su ga
i zauzele 27. svibnja nakon dvomjesečne opsade. Dru-
ga je bojna bila u okolici Konjica, na području Turije,
Zabrđa i Zaslivlja, a 3. u Doljanima i Sovićima.718
Postignuti dogovor o primirju između 4. korpusa
i HVO-a, ARBiH je izigrala širenjem nadležnosti OG-a
D
Igman na Konjic i Jablanicu. Grupa je odbila dogovo-
rene sporazume o prekidu vatre i normalizaciji života.
Svoj dio dogovora HVO je ispunio i dopustio posjet So-
vićima i Doljanima, a ARBiH je tek 4. svibnja odobrila
posjet Konjicu.719
Unatoč primirju, napadi ARBiH na hrvatska naselja
C
bili su svakodnevni. Težište napada bilo je na Vrcima,
čija je obrana do 3. svibnja odbila više od 30 pješačkih
napada. Za početak svibnja bilo je planirano spajanje
717 IZM OZ S/ZH, Redovno borbeno izvješće br. 01-208/93
od 16. 4. 1993.; Komanda 4. korpusa, Redovni operativni
izvještaj dj. br. 02/1-966-133/93 od 16. 4. 1993.; Koman-
da 4. korpusa, Informacija dj. br. 02/1-2560-18/93 od 18.
4. 1993.; Komanda 4. korpusa, Vanredni operativni izv-
ještaj dj. br. 02/1-3200-15/93 od 20. 4. 1993.; Komanda
4. korpusa, Dnevni operativni izvještaj dj. br. 02/1-3200-
28/93 od 23. 4. 1993.
718 Izvješće Brigade HVO “Herceg Stjepan” od 3. 5. 1993.;
Brigada “Herceg Stjepan” od 27. 5. 1993. u 21.30; Dos-
sier: Zločini muslimanskih postrojbi nad Hrvatima u BiH
od 1992. do 1994., Centar za istraživanje i dokumentaci-
ju, Mostar, 1999., 86-87.
719 OZ JiH, Izvješće dj. br. 01-2478/93 od 22. 4. 1993.; Ko-
manda 4. korpusa, Naređenje dj. br. 02/1-3381-1/93 od
24. 4. 1993.; OZ JiH, Pregled stanja dj. br. 03-0366/93 od
28. 4. 1993.; VOS GSHVO, Tijek događanja str. pov. br. 03-
414/93 od 11. 5. 1993.
308
Domovinski rat 04-02-2020 Knjiga 1.indd 308
na, Budišnja Ravan, Žitače, Krtići, Donje Višnjevice and
parts of Seonica area. The third enclave (defended by
one platoon) was in the village of Vrci. The Muslims
captured the village on May 27, after a two-month
siege. The 2nd Battalion was around Konjic, in the Turija,
Zabrđe and Zaslivlje area. The 3rd Battalion was in Dol-
jani and Sovići.
The Muslims made a travesty of the cease-fire be-
tween IV Corps of the ARBIH and the HVO by expand-
ing the area of responsibility of Operational Group Ig-
man to Konjic and Jablanica. Operational Group Igman
then rejected the agreed terms on the cessation of
hostilities and normalizing everyday life. The HVO, on
the other hand, did honor the agreement and allowed
a Muslim delegation to visit the villages of Sovići and
Doljani. The ARBIH only allowed a Croatian delegation
to visit Konjic on May 4.
Despite the cease-fire agreement the ARBIH con-
tinued to attack Croatian villages on a daily basis. The
focus of these attacks was on the village of Vrci. By
May 3 the defenders of the village had repulsed more
than 30 infantry attacks. It was planned that the forc-
es in Klis would link up with the HVO forces moving
from the direction of Prozor in May but the plan was
not realized because the Croat leadership insisted
on honoring the terms of the cease-fire agreement.
During the night of May 7-8 a group of HVO soldiers
on horseback, reinforced with soldiers from Posušje,
tried to gain control of the Gostovići – Žitače – Trusine
line and lift the blockade of the Croatian villages en-
circled by Muslim forces. The attempt failed and the
Croats lost four soldiers killed. A tactical group from
the Rama Brigade attacked in the direction of Stu-
D
denčica – Čelina with the aim of helping the HVO
troops in the Klis area. This attack also met with fail-
ure because the commander of the Rama Brigade,
Marinko Beljo, was killed and, as a result, the attack
was discontinued, despite the fact that the attackers
R
had managed to break through the Muslim line. The
ARBIH, unlike the HVO, was successful in its attack on
Bokševica, defended by a few groups of HVO soldiers.
In total, the number of troops was equivalent to an in-
complete company. Bokševica was the most import-
ant location in this part of the front because a large
swath of territory could be controlled from there.
Also, it was important for the Muslims to capture it
because the HVO positions there linked the HVO forc-
es in Rama with those in the Neretvica Valley. The AR-
4.2.2020. 19:35:00
 The Croatian Nation’s Struggle for Survival, 1991-1995
snaga u Klisu sa snagama HVO-a iz smjera Prozora, no
to nije realizirano zbog zabrane hrvatskog vodstva
koje je inzistiralo na poštivanju primirja s ARBiH. Potom
je u noći 7./8. svibnja skupina konjičkih vojnika HVO-a,
uz pojačanje iz Posušja, pokušala ovladati crtom Go-
stovići – Žitače – Trusina i deblokirati okružena hrvat-
ska sela. Pokušaj nije uspio i u njemu su poginula četiri
vojnika. Neuspješno je završio i napad taktičke skupine
brigade Rama na smjeru Studenčica – Čelina radi pru-
žanja pomoći HVO-u na području Klisa. Nakon probo-
H
ja muslimanske crte napad je prekinut zbog pogibije
zapovjednika brigade Rama Marinka Belje. Za razliku
od HVO-a, ARBiH je imala uspjeha u napadu na plani-
nu Bokševicu, koju je branilo nekoliko skupina vojnika
HVO-a, jačine slabije satnije. Bokševica je bila najvažniji
objekt na tom dijelu bojišta jer se s nje nadziralo veliko
M
područje i odvajao, odnosno spajao HVO u Rami i doli-
ni Neretvice. Armija Republike BiH zauzela ju je nakon
dvodnevnih borbi 10. svibnja i time dovela u pitanje
cjelokupnu obranu 1. bojne brigade Herceg Stjepan i
sudbinu nekoliko tisuća civila.720
Za vraćanje Bokševice OZ Sjeverozapadna Herce-
D
govina prikupila je dio pukovnije Bruno Bušić, bojne
Zrinski, brigade Kralj Tomislav, 1. i 2. bojne Vojne poli-
cije i brigade Rama. Oni su 18. i 19. svibnja potpuno
vratili izgubljeni dio planine i ponovno otvorili koridor
prema Kostajnici. Problem je bio u snagama koje su dr-
žale položaje na Bokševici i njihovoj redovnoj zamjeni.
C
Nakon što je ARBiH ponovno počela napadati Bokše-
vicu, dijelovi pukovnije Bruno Bušić zauzeli su 10. i 11.
lipnja dominantne kote Tisov do, Bandijera i Silj. Povla-
čenje profesionalnih snaga ARBiH je iskoristila i 14. lip-
nja zauzela Tisov do i Bandijeru.721
D
Za vraćanje izgubljenih položaja prikupljaju se
dijelovi postrojbi iz brigade Kralj Tomislav, 4. brigade
HVO-a, brigade Hrvoje Vukčić Hrvatinić, brigade Her-
ceg Stjepan, pukovnije Bruno Bušić, Kažnjeničke boj-
ne i brigade Rama. Kotu Bandijera vratila je 20. lipnja
720 Izvješće Brigade HVO “Herceg Stjepan” od 3. 5. 1993.;
Brigada HVO “Herceg Stjepan” od 8. 5. 1993.; Izvješće
Brigade HVO “Herceg Stjepan” od 8. 5. 1993.; IZM OZ S/
ZH, Redovno borbeno izvješće str. pov. br. 01-396 od 8.
5. 1993.; Izvješća Brigade HVO “Herceg Stjepan” od 9. i
10. svibnja 1993.
721 IZM OZ S/ZH, Zapovijed br. 01-459 od 11. 5. 1993.; IZM
OZ S/ZH, Izvanredno izvješće br. 01-564/93 od 18. 5.
1993.; Brigada “Herceg Stjepan” od 19. 5. 1993. u 22.00 h;
GS HVO, Izvješće ur. br. 02-2/1-09-1083/93 od 16. 6. 1993.
309
Domovinski rat 04-02-2020 Knjiga 1.indd 309
BIH captured Bokševica after two days of fighting on
May 10 and thus put in jeopardy the whole defensive
line held by the 1st Battalion of the Herceg Stjepan Bri-
gade and, consequently, the lives of a few thousand
Croat civilians.
Operative Zone Northwest Herzegovina wanted
to recapture Bokševica and gathered a force consist-
ing of elements of the Bruno Bušić Regiment, ele-
ments of the Zrinski Battalion, elements of the Kralj
Tomislav Brigade, elements of the 1st and 2nd Military
Police Battalions and elements of the Rama Brigade.
This HVO force, on May 18-19, recaptured most of
the lost positions on the mountain and reopened the
corridor towards Kostajnica. It is worth pointing out
that the positions on Bokševica were held by different
troops on a rotation basis. That system was flawed.
After the ARBIH again started attacking the HVO
positions on Bokševica elements of the Bruno Bušić
Regiment captured, on June 10-11 the dominant po-
sitions of Tisov Do Hill, Bandijera Hill and Silj Hill. Then
the professional soldiers withdrew and the ARBIH
took advantage of that by capturing Tisov Do Hill and
Bandijera Hill on June 14.
The HVO spent days gathering a motley collection
of troops from various units: from the Kralj Tomislav
Brigade, 4th Brigade of the HVO, Hrvoje Vukčić Hrvati-
nić Brigade, Herceg Stjepan Brigade, Bruno Bušić Reg-
iment, Penal Battalion and Rama Brigade. The Penal
Battalion recaptured Bandijera Hill on June 20. At the
end of June Operative Zone Northwest Herzegovina
gathered a force consisting of elements of the Bruno
Bušić Regiment, 2nd Battalion of the Military Police,
Ludvig Pavlović Battalion, Garavi Company, ATG Gr-
dani, Herceg Stjepan Brigade, Hrvoje Vukčić Hrvatinić
Brigade and Rama Brigade for a new attack. The attack
was launched on July 4 but the resistance put up by
the ARBIH was too spirited for the attack to succeed.
The Klis Battalion and the remaining Croat civilians fled
R
on July 7-8 towards Prozor and Kreševo. The defensive
line opposite Konjic was established on a line stretch-
ing from Kućani as far as Tošćica. From men hailing
from the Klis area the Independent Battalion Klis was
formed in Čapljina and placed under the command of
the 3rd Brigade of the HVO and deployed in the wider
Mostar area.14
14 Statement by General Stanko Sopta.
4.2.2020. 19:35:00
 Davor Marijan • Rat za opstojnost Hrvata, 1991. - 1995.
Kažnjenička bojna. Krajem lipnja OZ Sjeverozapadna
Hercegovina prikupila je za novi napad snage iz sastava
pukovnije Bruno Bušić, 2. bojne Vojne policije, bojne Lud-
vig Pavlović, satnije Garavi, ATG-a Grdani, brigade Herceg
Stjepan, brigade Hrvoje Vukčić Hrvatinić i brigade Rama.
Napad je izveden 4. srpnja, no nije uspio jer je otpor AR-
BiH bio prejak. Bojna Klis i preostalo hrvatsko stanovniš-
tvo povukli su se 7. i 8. srpnja prema Prozoru i Kreševu.
Crta obrane prema Konjicu organizirana je na smjeru
Kućani – Tošćanica. Od ljudstva s područja Klisa u Čaplji-
H
ni je osnovana Samostalna bojna Klis i pridodana 3. bri-
gadi HVO-a te angažirana na širem području Mostara.722
Premda su gotovo nepoznate široj javnosti, borbe
za Bokševicu većina angažiranih postrojbi HVO-a drži
najtežim dijelom svojega ratnog puta. Hrvatsko vijeće
obrane izgubilo je Bokševicu zbog slabije koordinacije,
M
posebice u snagama OZ-a Jugoistočna Hercegovina,
premda su Konjic i Jablanica bili u njezinoj zoni nadlež-
nosti. Zbog viših, odnosno političkih interesa, OZ Sjeve-
rozapadna Hercegovina do početka lipnja 1993. dvaput
je zaustavljana u trenutku kada je imala spremne plano-
ve i dovedene snage. To je također utjecalo na porazan
D
ishod borbi za Bokševicu.723
Ostaci jablaničkoga dijela brigade Herceg Stjepan,
bojna Mijat Tomić ostala je sa zonom djelovanja na smje-
ru Doljani – Jablanica. Bojna je ojačana satnijom pripad-
nika HVO-a iz Širokog Brijega i ostala je u sastavu OZ-a
Jugoistočna Hercegovina. Razbijena je 28. srpnja 1993. u
C
iznenadnom prepadu snaga 6. korpusa ARBiH na Doljane
u sklopu rasterećenja snaga koje su osvajale Bugojno, pri
čemu je počinjen jedan od najvećih muslimanskih zloči-
na nad Hrvatima – ubijeno je i izmasakrirano 39 Hrvata,
među njima i veći broj civila. Dio vojnika je ubijen ili za-
robljen, dio se povukao prema Posušju i Tomislavgradu.
Istog dana je Kažnjenička bojna uz potporu topništva i
prestrojenih snaga širokobriješke brigade i bojne Mijat
Tomić vratila izgubljene položaje u Doljanima, Stropu i
722 OZ SZH, Izvanredno izvješće str. pov. br. 01-1099/93 od
19. 6. 1993.; IZM OZ SZH, Izvanredno izvješće str. pov. br.
01-1138/93 od 21. 6. 1993.; IZM OZ SZH, Redovno borbe-
no izvješće str. pov. br. 01-1145/93 od 21. 6. 1993.; Zapo-
vijed za aktivna bojna djelovanja IZM OZ S/ZH od 28. 6.
1993.; Službena zabilješka Vojne policije Konjic od 12. 7.
1993.; IZM OZ S/ZH u Prozoru, Odgovor na upozorenje, str.
pov. br. 01-1738 od 17. 7. 1993.; 3. brigada HVO str. pov. br.
03-528-31/93 od 31. 8. 1993.; Izjava generala Stanka Sopte.
723 ZOZS/ZH, zapisnik sa sastanka sa zapovjednicima br.
01/5-235-1 od 5. 6. 1993.
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Domovinski rat 04-02-2020 Knjiga 1.indd 310
The fighting for Bokševica is relatively unknown to
the general public. However, most of the HVO troops
that participated in the fighting agree that the combat
there was more ferocious and bloody than any other
they took part in during the Muslim-Croat war. The HVO
lost Bokševica because it failed to adequately command
and coordinate the troops engaged in the fighting, es-
pecially with regard to the formations belonging to Op-
erative Zone Southeast Herzegovina – that despite the
fact that Konjic and Jablanica were in Operative Zone
Southeast Herzegovina’s area of responsibility. It has to
be noted though that on account of higher, that is to say
political interests, by the beginning of June, 1993, Op-
erative Zone Northwest Herzegovina’s offensive actions
were stopped twice at moments when it was ready and
able to attack with excellent odds for success. This fact
also influenced the negative outcome, for the HVO, of
the battles for Bokševica.
The remnants of the Jablanica contingent of the
Herceg Stjepan Brigade, the Mijat Tomić battalion, re-
mained in the Doljani – Jablanica area. The battalion
was reinforced with a company consisting of soldiers
from Široki Brijeg and remained in Operative Zone
Southeast Herzegovina. It was destroyed on July 28,
1993, when VI Corps of the ARBIH suddenly attacked
Doljani. The attack was mounted so as to help the
troops attacking Bugojno. During that attack the AR-
BIH committed a gruesome atrocity – Muslim soldiers
bestially killed 39 Croats, most of them civilians. Some
HVO soldiers were killed or captured, some retreated
towards Posušje and Tomislavgrad. On the same the
Penal Battalion, with artillery support, and reinforced
with the regrouped Široki Brijeg Brigade and the Mijat
D
Tomić Battalion recaptured the lost positions in Dolja-
ni, Strop and Stipića Livade. The HVO position in Dol-
jani by that time was pretty much hopeless because
the battalion defending it, due to losses, had been
reduced to a company-size unit. Making matters even
R
more desperate, the positions in Doljani, in terms of
command and control, were located in an undefined
area between the boundaries of Operative Zone
Northwest Herzegovina and Operative Zone South-
east Herzegovina. One battalion of the Široki Brijeg
Brigade of the HVO was also deployed in Doljani. The
situation persisted until the beginning of September,
when the Široki Brijeg Brigade was relieved by the 5th
Brigade of the Posušje HVO. At the end of October,
1993, the Mijat Tomić Battalion was attached to the
4.2.2020. 19:35:00
 The Croatian Nation’s Struggle for Survival, 1991-1995
H
M
Stipića livadama. Doljani su od tada bili u teškom stanju
jer se bojna osula i svela na slabiju satniju, a uz to su bili na
nedefiniranom spoju operativnih zona Sjeverozapadna i
Jugoistočna Hercegovina. Uz njih je bila angažirana boj-
na Širokobriješke brigade HVO-a. Takvo je stanje trajalo
D
do početka rujna, kada su Širokobriježani zamijenjeni, a
obranu sektora Doljani preuzela je 5. brigada HVO-a Po-
sušje. Krajem listopada 1993. bojna Mijat Tomić pridoda-
na je brigadi Kralj Tomislav, čime su Doljani i Slatina ušli u
sastav OZ-a Sjeverozapadna Hercegovina.724
C
Mostar
Mostar je bio najvažnije naseljeno mjesto u zoni
koju je HVO nadzirao i bila mu je namijenjena uloga sre-
dišta Hrvatske zajednice Herceg-Bosne. U gradu je bilo
D
sjedište političkoga i vojnoga vrha HVO-a, zapovjedniš-
tvo operativne zone, 2. i 3. brigade HVO-a te nekoliko
manjih sastava. Armija Republike BiH imala je u gradu
i okolici sjedište 4. korpusa, 41. mtbr i samostalne ba-
taljune Šargan i Nevesinje. Na samom jugu općine bio
je dio 42. brdske brigade. Dio uporišta ARBiH bio je du-
boko na zapadnoj strani, a nastajala su “mobiliziranjem”
zgrada, što je HVO rano uočio i nastojao na miran način,
dogovorima spriječiti jer je bilo očito da se radi o načinu
zauzimanja prostora bez borbe.
724 GS HVO, Zapovijed ur. br. 02-2/1-01-2270/93 od 1. 9.
1993.; IZM OZ S/ZH, Rješavanje problema br. 01-3406/93
od 5. 9. 1993.; GS OS HR HB, Zapovijed ur. br. 02-2/1-01-
3137/93 od 23. 10. 1993.; Dossier: Zločini muslimanskih
postrojbi, 72-74; Izjava generala Miljenka Lasića.
311
Domovinski rat 04-02-2020 Knjiga 1.indd 311
Zločin ARBiH, Stipića livada – ubijeni Hrvati.
Bodies of Croatian civilians murdered by the ARBiH in Stipića livade.
Kralj Tomislav Brigade. With that the forces in Dolja-
ni and Slatina were subordinated to Operative Zone
Northwest Herzegovina.15
Mostar
Mostar was the most important inhabited area in the
HVO-controlled territory and the administrative center
of the Croatian Community of Herzeg-Bosnia. The polit-
ical and military leadership of the HVO, HQ of the oper-
ative zone, HQ of the 2nd Brigade, HQ of the 3rd Brigade
were based in Mostar. A number of smaller formations
were also stationed in the city. The ARBIH had, in the city
and its environs, IV Corps, 41st Motorized Brigade and
Independent Šargan and Nevesinje Battalions. In the
southern part of the municipality elements of the 42nd
Mountain Brigade were stationed. The ARBIH had some
strongholds deep on the western side created by “mo-
bilizing” residential buildings. The HVO was quick on the
uptake and tried to induce, by negotiations, the ARBIH to
desist from the practice.
After elements of the ARBIH IV Corps attacked the
R
HVO forces in Konjic and Jablanica on April 14. the HVO,
on the following day, reacted by blocking the northern
approaches to the city in a bid to prevent the conflict
from spreading to Mostar and other municipalities in the
Neretva Valley. The HVO planned to disarm the Muslims
in Drežnica but gave up on the idea. The HQ of IV Corps
15 Statement by General Miljenko Lasić.
4.2.2020. 19:35:01
 Davor Marijan • Rat za opstojnost Hrvata, 1991. - 1995.
Nakon što su dijelovi 4. korpusa ARBiH 14. travnja
napali HVO u Konjicu i Jablanici, HVO je idućega dana
blokirao sjeverne ulaze u grad želeći spriječiti širenje
sukoba na Mostar i ostale općine u dolini Neretve. Pla-
nirana je i akcija razoružanja muslimanskoga stanovniš-
tva u Drežnici, no nije realizirana. Nakon blokade grada
Komanda 4. korpusa počela je slati izvješća u Sarajevo
da je HV pojačao HVO u Mostaru, što nije bila istina.725
Ujutro 19. travnja izbio je sukob između HVO-a i AR-
BiH u središtu grada Mostara, a potom na južnom dijelu
H
Cernice i području Ribarnice. Tijekom dana se 41. mtbr
ARBiH s ojačanjima pripremila za obranu i prelazak u
napad, spajanje sa snagama samostalne čete Blagaj u
području sela Buna te zauzimanje brda Hum i vojarne
Sjeverni logor, kao i nekoliko vitalnih objekata u gradu,
što joj nije uspjelo. Hrvatsko vijeće obrane držalo je u
M
prevenciji za sukob dijelove 2. i 3. brigade, dio pukovnije
Bruno Bušić i Vojne policije. Povremenih sukoba bilo je
20. travnja i u njima je bilo poginulih i ranjenih. U tim
borbama pripadnici Lakojurišne bojne Vojne policije za-
uzeli su uporišta ARBiH u hotelu Mostar i Đačkom domu,
čime je presječena komunikacija prema zapovjedništvu
D
4. korpusa ARBiH, smještenom u zgradi Vranice. Obje
su se strane trudile smiriti stanje, pa je 21. travnja do-
govoreno povlačenje vojske u vojarne i uklanjanje po-
stavljenih zaklona za borbu, te crta razgraničenja: lijeva
obala, tj. istočni dio Mostara, sve do Bulevara, bio je pod
kontrolom ARBiH, a desna obala, tj. zapadni dio Mosta-
C
ra bio je pod kontrolom HVO-a. Već 23. travnja stanje se
smirilo, premda postignuti dogovor ni jedna strana nije
sasvim realizirala.726 U skladu s postignutim dogovorom,
41. mtbr ARBiH trebala je sve jedinice i materijalno-teh-
nička sredstva povući u vojarne Konak i Južni logor.727
Idućih se dana primirje uz izgrede održalo. Armija
Republike BiH žalila se da pripadnici HVO-a pljačkaju
po gradu, oduzimaju oružje i izbacuju vojnike i civile
725 Zapovjedništvo 4. korpusa, Operativni izvještaj dj. br.
02-2560-14/93 od 14. 4. 1993.; GS HVO, Zapovijed dj. br.
01-639/93 od 15. 4. 1993.
726 Komanda 4. korpusa, Dnevno operativno izvještavanje dj.
br. 02/1-3200-14/93 od 19. 4. 1993.; Komanda 41. mot. br
ARBiH, Zapovijest za odbranu dj. br. 470 od 19. 4. 1993.;
ICTY: Priopćenja za javnost Petra Zelenike i Arifa Pašalića od
20. 4. i 21.4.1993.; GS HVO, Izvješće ur. br. 02-2/1-09-674/93
od 23. 4. 1993.; OZ JiH, Zapovijed dj. br. 01-2471/93 od 21.
4. 1993.; Komanda 41. mtbr ARBiH, Analiza stanja dj. br. 480-
1/93 od 27. 4. 1993.; Izjava generala Zlatana Mije Jelića.
727 ICTY: Komanda 4. korpusa ARBiH, Naredba, pov. br. 01-
3303/93 od 21. 4. 1993.
312
Domovinski rat 04-02-2020 Knjiga 1.indd 312
started sending reports to Sarajevo to the effect that the
Croatian Army reinforced the HVO in Mostar. The claim
was deliberately false.
On the morning of April 19 fighting between the
HVO and the ARBIH erupted in the city center in Mostar
and then in the southern part of Cernica and Ribarnica
area. During the day the 41st Motorized Brigade with rein-
forcements prepared both to defend its positions and go
into the attack and also to link up with the Independent
Blagaj Company in the Buna area and capture Hum Hill
and Sjeverni Logor barracks and a number of key facili-
ties in the city but the plan failed. The HVO kept elements
of the 2nd and 3rd Brigades, elements of the Bruno Bušić
Regiment and Military Police in reserve in case of an AR-
BIH attack. A number of skirmishes occurred on April 20
and both sides suffered casualties, a number of fatalities
among them. During these battles troops belonging to
the Light Military Police Battalion captured the ARBIH
positions at the Mostar Hotel and the student hall, thus
cutting the line of communications with the HQ of the
ARBIH IV Corps, located in the Vranice building.
Both sides strove to defuse the situation and on April
21 they agreed to withdrew the troops to barracks and
remove barricades and establish a clearly delineated line
of separation: the left bank, that is, the eastern part of
Mostar, as far as the Boulevard, would be under the con-
trol of the ARBIH and the right bank, that is the western
part of Mostar would be under the control of the HVO.
On April 23 the situation was calm but neither side fully
stuck to the agreement.16 The 41st Motorized Brigade, as
per the agreement, was supposed to withdraw all of its
troops, equipment and matériel to the Konak barracks
and the Južni Logor barracks.
D
The cease-fire held during the course of the next few
days, even though a number of incidents did take place.
The ARBIH complained that the HVO soldiers were en-
gaged in robbing people in the city, disarming Muslims
and kicking out Muslim soldiers and civilians from their
R
apartments in the city. The HVO claimed ARBIH soldiers
were engaged in exactly the same activities, only tar-
geting Croats as opposed to Muslims. The situation was
getting progressively worse. The main reason for this
was the fact that the ARBIH did not honor the agreement
made in Konjic. It soon became clear to everyone that a
16 Statement by General Zlatan Mijo Jelić.
4.2.2020. 19:35:01
 The Croatian Nation’s Struggle for Survival, 1991-1995
Muslimane iz stanova u gradu. Hrvatsko vijeće obrane
žalilo se na slične postupke ARBiH.728 Stanje se sustavno
pogoršavalo jer je uglavnom bilo odraz nepoštivanja
sporazuma ARBiH u Konjicu. Sukob je bio izvjestan,729
pa je Komanda 4. korpusa ARBiH 8. svibnja izdala “po-
trebne zadatke”.730
Borbe u Mostaru počele su ujutro 9. svibnja. Uz dije-
love 2. i 3. brigade HVO je angažirao dijelove većine pro-
fesionalnih sastava: pukovnije Bruno Bušić, bojne Ludvig
Pavlović, Kažnjeničke bojne, ATG-a Juke Prazine, Vojne
H
policije, kao i dio 4. brigade HVO-a. Bile su to prve velike
gradske borbe HVO-a i ARBiH, a završile su 12. svibnja. Su-
koba je bilo i u široj okolici grada, gdje je ARBiH imala više
uspjeha jer je 10. svibnja razbila satniju HVO-a u Grabovici
i otklonila opasnost od presijecanja prometnice Jablanica
– Mostar. Također je preuzela crtu obrane HVO-a u Podve-
M
ležju. Prema podacima HVO-a od 14. svibnja, u sukobu je
poginulo 25 vojnika, od čega 23 iz HVO-a, a ranjeno je 167
vojnika, od čega 21 muslimanske nacionalnosti. Poginulo
je 12 i ranjeno 45 civila. Za 11 poginulih osoba identifi-
kacija je bila u tijeku. Hrvatsko vijeće obrane zauzelo je
sjedište 4. korpusa, u zgradi Vranice, u zapadnom dijelu
D
Mostara, koji je prema sporazumu bio pod kontrolom
HVO-a, i zarobilo 13 vojnika te zadržalo kontrolu nad di-
jelom Mostara na desnoj obali Neretve, s iznimkom dijela
oko Staroga mosta i uz samu Neretvu. Na lijevoj obali dr-
žalo je vojarnu Sjeverni logor.731
Stanje u gradu bilo je teško, podjele su bile nepre-
C
728 Komanda 4. korpusa, Operativni izvještaj dj. br. 02/1-
3200 od 3. 5. 1993.; Komanda 4. korpusa, Operativni izv-
ještaj dj. br. 02/1-3200-54/93 od 5. 5. 1993.; OZ JiH, Slijed
događaja dj. br. 03-0461-1/93 od 3. 6. 1993.
D
729 Iz izvješća zapovjednika 4. korpusa, Arifa Pašalića od 2.
svibnja 1993. razvidno je da je u zoni korpusa bilo izvrše-
no „uvezivanje sa našim ljudima u HVO-u“, tj. Muslimani-
ma u HVO-u. ICTY: Komanda 4. korpusa ARBiH, Izvještaj
str. pov. br. 01-3573/93 od 2. 5. 1993.
730 Komanda 4. korpusa, Izvještaj str. pov. br. 02-3763/93 od
8. 5. 1993.
731 Spisak ranjenih i poginulih Sektora za zdravstvo Odje-
la obrane HZ HB od 14. 5. 1993.; Pukovnija “Ante Bru-
no Bušić”, Izvješće dj. br. 01-435/93 od 28. 5. 1993.; OZ
JiH, Slijed događaja dj. br. 03-0461-1/93 od 3. 6. 1993.;
Esad ŠEJTANIĆ, Hercegovci na ognjenim vratima Bosne,
IC Štamparija, Mostar, Sarajevo, 2005., 147; Mustafa PO-
LUTAK, “Politička i vojna situacija u zoni odgovornosti 4.
korpusa i 6. korpusa ARBiH tokom 1993. godine”, u: 1993.
– prelomna godina rata za odbranu Bosne i Hercegovine,
Udruženje za zaštitu tekovina borbe u BiH, Sarajevo,
2011., 87; Izjava generala Zlatana Mije Jelića.
313
Domovinski rat 04-02-2020 Knjiga 1.indd 313
large scale conflict was inevitable17. The HQ of IV Corps,
therefore, issued “necessary tasks” on May 8.
The fighting in Mostar started on the morning of
May 9. The HVO deployed elements of the 2nd and 3rd Bri-
gades and smaller elements of most of the professional
formations: the Bruno Bušić Regiment, Ludvig Pavlović
Battalion, Penal Battalion, Juka Prazina’s ATG, Military
Police and elements of the 4th Brigades of the Croatian
Army. The fighting raged in the city until May 12. Fight-
ing occurred around the city as well. There, the ARBIH
was more successful than the HVO. On May 10 the ARBIH
destroyed one HVO company in Grabovica and secured
the Jablanica – Mostar road. The ARBIH also dislodged
the HVO troops from the defensive line on the Podvelež-
je plateau. According to the HVO reports of May 14, 25
soldiers were killed in action during the fighting, 23 of
those HVO soldiers and 167 soldiers were wounded, 21
of those Muslim soldiers. 12 civilians were killed and 45
wounded. When the report was issued the process of
identifying 11 killed civilians was in still progress. The
HVO captured the HQ of IV Corps in the Vranice build-
ing, in west Mostar, and took 13 Muslim soldiers prison-
er and retained control of the parts of the city situated
on the right bank of the Neretva River, except the area
around the Old Bridge and right along the riverbank. On
the left bank the HVO was in possession of the Sjeverni
Logor barracks.
The situation in the city was difficult, the differences
between the Croats and Muslims were insurmountable
and grew with each new incident, skirmish and battle
on other fronts. The situation in the part of Mostar con-
trolled by the ARBIH was especially difficult because of
the HVO’s blockade of the lines of communication lead-
ing to Jablanica and Konjic imposed on May 9. The HVO
and the ARBIH agreed to start releasing POWs and arrest
civilians. The agreement was honored by both sides. The
numerical strength of the HVO brigades diminished, and
also its combat value, because Muslim soldiers serving in
R
them started to desert, taking their weapons with them
and joining the ARBIH. The HZ HB did not react to the
trend. There were still many Muslim soldiers serving in
17 The report by the commander of IV Corps, Arif Pašalić,
of May 2, 1993, clearly shows that, in the area of
responsibility of IV Corps, the Bosnian troops „joined our
men in the HVO“, i.e. the Muslims in the HVO. ICTY: HQ,
IV Corps of the ARBIH. Report No. 01-3573/93 of May 2,
1993, strictly confidential.
4.2.2020. 19:35:01
 Davor Marijan • Rat za opstojnost Hrvata, 1991. - 1995.
mostive i rasle su sa sukobima na drugim dijelovima ra-
tišta. Posebice je teško bilo stanje u dijelu Mostara pod
nadzorom ARBiH, zbog blokade prema Jablanici i Konji-
cu koju je HVO uveo 9. svibnja. U skladu s dogovorom,
krajem mjeseca obje su strane počele puštati pritvorene
civile i zarobljene vojnike. Brojno stanje brigada HVO-a
smanjivalo se zbog odlaska vojnika muslimanske naci-
onalnosti, kao i oružja i opreme koju su oni odnijeli. No
taj proces nisu pratile jasne političke smjernice HZ HB-a
o njihovu angažmanu, pa je u HVO-u i dalje bio relativ-
H
no velik broj vojnika Muslimana. Broj vojnika u Trećoj
brigadi HVO-a u drugoj je polovini svibnja pao s 2200
na 980, a brigada je ostala i bez dijela oruđa za potporu
koja su ostala na području nad kojim je ARBiH preuzela
nadzor. Popuna mostarskih brigada HVO-a bila je spora
i neučinkovita.732
M
U drugoj polovini lipnja gradsko područje Mostara
podijeljeno je na zone odgovornosti mostarskih briga-
da HVO-a. Sjeverno je bila 2., a južno 3. brigada. U zoni
2. brigade osnovan je 1. sektor obrane, a u zoni 3. briga-
de 2. sektor obrane Mostara. Sukobi HVO-a i ARBiH bili
su sve češći i duži, a u drugoj polovini lipnja gotovo sva-
D
kodnevni. Armija Republike BiH izvela je 24. lipnja jak
napad na Bulevar. Cijeli su se dan vodile borbe u Šanti-
ćevoj ulici, posebice oko zgrade HDZ-a i okolnih kuća.733
Bio je to uvod za do tada najveći napad ARBiH, čija
je svrha bila zauzimanje Mostara i otvaranje prometni-
ce prema Jablanici. Nakon ponoći 29./30. lipnja snage
C
41. mtbr s Gackim i Nevesinjskim bataljunom napale su
HVO duž većega dijela crte razdvajanja, težišno vojarnu
Tihomir Mišić i Bijelo polje. Iznenađenje je bilo potpuno.
Uz pomoć, zapravo izdaju muslimana pripadnika HVO-a,
snage ARBiH na prepad su upale u vojarnu u kojoj su bila
zapovjedništva 2. brigade HVO-a i njezinih dviju bojni.
Uz pomoć ATG-a Vojne policije HVO se prijepodne uspio
izvući iz vojarne, a ARBiH ju je zaposjela i počela izvlačiti
oružje i streljivo. Bio je to uspješan dan za ARBiH, bez sum-
nje najuspješniji u zoni 4. korpusa tijekom cijeloga rata.
Zauzela je vojarnu sa Zapovjedništvom 2. brigade HVO-a,
Vrapčiće, branu Salakovac, HE Mostar i Raštane. Na lijevoj
obali Neretve HVO se održao u džepu oko naselja Vojno i
samostanu časnih sestara u Potocima, odnosno Bijelom
polju. Zbog prelaska vojnika muslimanske nacionalnosti
732 SIS 3. brigade HVO, Izvješće dj. br. 149/93 od 22. 5. 1993.;
OZ JiH, Izvješće dj. br. 03-0511/93 od 29. 6. 1993.
733 OZ JiH, Zapovijed dj. br. 01-3543/93 od 19. 6. 1993.; OZ
JiH, Izvješće od 24. 6. 1993. u 18,00 sati.
314
Domovinski rat 04-02-2020 Knjiga 1.indd 314
the HVO. The number of men in the 3rd Brigade of the
HVO in the second half of May fell from 2,200 to 980. The
Brigade also lost a number of support weaponry which
remained in the area the ARBIH had gained control over.
The process of bringing the Mostar brigade back up to
strength was slow and ineffective.
In the second half of June the city area of Mostar was
divided into the area of responsibility of the Mostar bri-
gades of the HVO. The northern part of the city fell into
the area of responsibility of the 2nd Brigade. The southern
part of the city was in the area of responsibility of the
3rd Brigade. In the 2nd Brigade’s area the 1st Defense Sec-
tor was formed and in the 3rd Brigade’s area the Sector of
Mostar Defense was formed. Clashes between the HVO
and the ARBIH were ever more frequent and ever longer
lasting. In the second half of June hardly a day passed
without a skirmish. The ARBIH launched a strong attack
on the Boulevard on June 24. Fighting lasted all day on
Šantić Street, especially around the HDZ building and
nearby houses.
The fighting on June 24 was a prelude to the stron-
gest ARBIH attack to date. The ARBIH’s aim was to capture
Mostar and open the Jablanica road. After midnight on
June 30 the 41st Motorized Brigade with the Gacka and
Nevesinje Battalions attacked the HVO along the most
of the length of the separation line, focusing their main
effort on Bijelo Polje and the Tihomir Mišić barracks. The
ARBIH managed to achieve total tactical surprise. With
the help of, or more accurately, thanks to the betrayal of
Muslim soldiers serving in the HVO, the ARBIH stormed
the barracks housing the headquarters of the 2nd Brigade
of the HVO and its two battalions. The HVO troops there
put up a fight and with the help of the ATG of the Mil-
D
itary Police managed to withdraw in good order from
the barracks during the morning. The attackers captured
the barracks and started to take away all the ammuni-
tion and weapons they found there. It was a successful
day for the ARBIH, undoubtedly the most successful day
R
in IV Corps’ area of responsibility during the entire war.
The ARBIH captured the barracks with the headquarters
of the 2nd Brigade of the HVO, and captured the village
of Vrapčići, Salakovac dam, HE Mostar and Raštane. On
the left bank of the Neretva River the HVO managed to
hold an enclave around the Vojno neighborhood and
the nuns’ monastery in Potoci. Because of the problems
associated with the fact that many Muslim soldiers had
deserted from the HVO the Main Staff of the HVO or-
dered that the Muslims soldiers still serving in the HVO
4.2.2020. 19:35:01
 The Croatian Nation’s Struggle for Survival, 1991-1995
na stranu ARBiH načelnik Glavnoga stožera HVO-a zapo-
vjedio je da se razoružaju Muslimani u svim postrojbama
u kojima ih ima, a vojno sposobni muškarci izoliraju. Ti-
jekom dana HVO je nastojao organizirati crtu obrane u
gradu, posebice na dominantnim visovima. Položaj na
Vrdima pojačan je ojačanom satnijom iz Gruda, a na Đu-
branima satnijom iz Širokog Brijega.734
Od 2. srpnja šire područje Mostara, odnosno OZ-a
Jugoistočna Hercegovina podijeljeno je u tri zone djelo-
vanja. U području od Vrda do Raštana i Goranaca (kasniji
H
Sektor Sjever) angažirane su novoformirane brigade
Grude i Široki Brijeg, dio snaga 2. brigade HVO-a, ATG
Tuta i dijelovi VP-a. Zapovjednik sektora bio je pukovnik
Miro Andrić, a od početka rujna pukovnik Ivan Primorac.
Zadatak sektora bio je spriječiti spajanje snaga ARBiH od
Jablanice i Konjica sa snagama u Bijelom polju, a potom
M
zauzeti Bijelo polje. Središnji dio OZ-a Jugoistočna Her-
cegovina bila je Obrana grada Mostara u zoni od Vrap-
čića i Ravnog Cimora do Rodoča i Miljkovića. U njezinu
sastavu bili su dijelovi 2. i 3. brigade HVO-a, brigade
HVO-a Čitluk, Vojne policije, ATG-a Mostar, Domobran-
ska pukovnija i civilna policija. Zapovjednik je bio briga-
D
dir Miljenko Lasić, a od početka kolovoza bojnik Zlatan
Mijo Jelić. Zadatak Obrane grada Mostara bio je staviti
pod nadzor desnu obalu Mostara i spriječiti prelazak
ARBiH s lijeve na desnu obalu Neretve, a u nastavku oči-
stiti istočni dio grada. Sektor Jug bio je južno od zone
Obrane grada Mostara i uključivao je 1. brigadu HVO-a, a
C
zapovjednik je bio pukovnik Nedjeljko Obradović. U sa-
stavu sektora bili su dijelovi 1., 3. i 4. brigade HVO-a, boj-
na Ludvig Pavlović, dijelovi Vojne policije i domobranske
postrojbe tih općina. Zadatak sektora bio je ovladati
objektom Hum, selima Blagaj i Kosor, a u nastavku čišće-
D
nje područja na smjeru Blagaj – Dračevice – Gnojnice.
Sektori su postojali do završetka muslimansko-hrvatsko-
ga rata. U drugoj polovini srpnja HVO je dovršio sustav
obrane dodjelom zona odgovornosti brigadama iz za-
padne Hercegovine od Vrda do Popova polja. Sredinom
srpnja HVO je nasuprot ARBiH imao oko 3600 ljudi: 900
južno od Mostara, 1200 u gradu, 1200 sjeverno od grada
734 OZ JiH, Izvješće dj. br. 01-3747/93 od 30. 6. 1993.; OZ JiH,
Upozorenje dj. br. 01-0512/93 od 30. 6. 1993.; Izvanred-
no izvješće 2. brigade HVO od 30. 6. 1993.; ICTY: GS HVO,
Zapovijed br. 02-2/1-1244/93 od 30. 6. 1993.; OZ JiH,
Izvješće dj. br. 01-0515/93 od 1. 7. 1993.; Nerzuk Čurak,
“Da Hujke nije poginuo Mostar bi sav bio naš”, Prva linija,
br. 7, 30. 8. 1993., 6; E. ŠEJTANIĆ, Hercegovci na ognjenim
vratima, 150.
315
Domovinski rat 04-02-2020 Knjiga 1.indd 315
be disarmed and all able bodied men of military age
be isolated. During the day the HVO managed to con-
solidate a defensive line in the city, especially on high
ground. The troops manning the position on Vrdi were
reinforced with a reinforced company from Grude and
the HVO troops defending the position on Đubrani were
reinforced with a company from Široki Brijeg.
On July 2 the wider Mostar area, that is Operative
Zone Southeast Herzegovina, was divided into three
areas of operations. In the Vrdi – Raštane – Goranci area
(later designated as Sector North) the newly formed
Grude and Široki Brijeg Brigades, elements of the 2nd Bri-
gade of the HVO, ATG Tuta and elements of the Military
Police were deployed. The commander of the sector was
Colonel Miro Andrić. At the start of September Andrić
was replaced by Colonel Ivica Primorac. The task of the
forces in the sector was to prevent the ARBIH forces in
Jablanica and Konjic from linking up with the ARBIH forc-
es in Bijelo Polje and then capture Bijelo Polje. The cen-
tral part of Operative Zone Southeast Herzegovina was
the Defense of the City of Mostar in a zone stretching
from Vrapčići and Ravni Cimor to Rodoč and Miljkovići.
It consisted of elements of the 2nd and 3rd Brigades of the
HVO, Čitluk Brigade, Military Police, ATG Mostar, Home
Guard Regiment and regular civilian police. The com-
mander was Brigadier Miljenko Lasić. He was replaced,
at the beginning of August, by Major Zlatan Mijo Jelić.
The task of the Defense of the City of Mostar was to put
under control the right bank of the river in the city area
and prevent the ARBIH from crossing to the right bank
of the river and then chase away the Muslim forces from
east Mostar. Sector South was located south of the zone
of the Defense of the City of Mostar. Its commander was
Colonel Nedjeljko Obradović. Sector South had under
its command the 1st Brigade of the HVO, elements of
the 1st, 3rd and 4th Brigades of the HVO, the Ludvig Pav-
lović Battalion, elements of the Military Police and Home
Guard units from the municipalities in the sector’s area.
R
The task of these troops was to capture Hum, villages of
Blagaj and Kosor and then mop up the Blagaj – Dračevice
– Gnojnice area. The sectors were in existence until the
end of the Muslim-Croat war. In the second half of July
the HVO completed organizing its system of defense by
allocating zones of responsibility to the brigades from
western Herzegovina from Vrdi as far as the Popovo field.
In mid-July the HVO had about 3,600 men under arms
deployed opposite the ARBIH positions: 900 men south
of Mostar, 1,200 men in the city, 1,200 north of the city
4.2.2020. 19:35:01
 Davor Marijan • Rat za opstojnost Hrvata, 1991. - 1995.
i oko 300 u profesionalnim sastavima koji su korišteni za
napadna djelovanja.735 U sjeverozapadnom dijelu opći-
ne Mostar, nasuprot ARBiH u Gornjoj Drežnici, crtu je na
padinama Čvrsnice i Čabulje krajem srpnja organizirala
5. brigada HVO-a Posušje. Snage HVO-a iz Posušja tu su
bile od proljeća, no radilo se o povremenim ophodnja-
ma i manjim sastavima Samostalne bojne Rafael Boban.
Crta se u početku držala s oko 700 do 1000 ljudi, ali po-
nekad ih je znalo biti i osjetno manje.736
S naoružanjem i opremom otuđenom i zaroblje-
H
nom od HVO-a, ARBiH je bila u stanju naoružati novo
ljudstvo i krajem lipnja i početkom srpnja osnovala je
dvije nove brigade: 47. brdsku za područje Bijelog po-
lja i Drežnice i 48. brdsku za područje između Mostara i
Blagaja. Prema podacima HVO-a, 4. korpus ARBiH imao
je u prvoj polovini srpnja na širem području Mostara
M
(od Drežnice do Blagaja) oko 5000 ljudi: 1700 sjeverno
od Mostara, 1800 u Mostaru i 1500 južno od Mostara.
Radi lakšega zapovijedanja u kolovozu su snage 4. kor-
pusa podijeljene u operativne grupe: OG Jug 1 za Bla-
gaj, OG Jug 2 za Gnojnice i Kočine, OG Centar za Mostar
i OG Sjever za Drežnicu i Bijelo polje.737
D
Nakon iznenađenja, odnosno napada ARBiH i
izdaje Muslimana - pripadnika HVO-a 30. lipnja, te
konsolidiranja stanja, HVO je planirao protunapad za
vraćanje izgubljenih položaja, a potom i razbijanje
muslimanskih snaga. Za taj je plan pojačan taktičkom
skupinom 5. gardijske brigade HV-a jačine oko 700 lju-
C
di, što je bio početak angažmana te postrojbe u mu-
slimansko-hrvatskom ratu. Skupina je iz zaleđa Zadra
8. srpnja dovedena u Neum i Ploče, a potom od 11. do
14. srpnja prebačena u Heliodrom kod Mostara. Bila je
temelj Prve operativne skupine (OS-1), koja je posto-
jala do kraja mjeseca, a čiji je zapovjednik bio briga-
dir Luka Džanko. HVO je time ojačan i zbog mogućeg
napada ARBiH dolinom Neretve do Ploča, odnosno
radi čuvanja hrvatske granice. Uz pomoć OS-1 Glavni
stožer HVO-a planirao je vratiti izgubljene položaje i
u povoljnom razvoju događanja očistiti od musliman-
735 ICTY: GS HVO, Zapovijed br. 02-2/1-1259/93 od 2. 7. 1993.;
GS HVO, Analiza stanja dj. br. 02-2/1-01-1373/93 od 15. 7.
1993.; OZ JiH, Zapovijed dj. br. 01-4312/93 od 22. 7. 1993.
736 SIS brigade “Posušje”, Izvješće br. 02-2/93 od 2. 8. 1993.;
Brigada “Posušje”, Izvješće br. 01-453/93 od 18. 8. 1993.;
Brigada “Posušje”, Izvješće br. 01-536 od 22. 8. 1993.
737 GS HVO, Analiza stanja dj. br. 02-2/1-01-1373/93 od 15.
7. 1993.; R. DREKOVIĆ, U obruču, 461-463; E. ŠEJTANIĆ,
Hercegovci na ognjenim vratima, 179-180.
316
Domovinski rat 04-02-2020 Knjiga 1.indd 316
and 300 serving in professional units and used for mo-
bile offensive tasks. In the northwestern part of the mu-
nicipality of Mostar, opposite the ARBIH troops in Gornja
Drežnica the 5th Brigade of the HVO Posušje established
a defensive line on the slopes of Čvrsnica and Čabulja at
the end of July. The HVO forces from Posušje had been
tasked with defending the positions on the slopes since
spring, but there was no defensive line to speak of there.
Instead, the Posušje troops had intermittently patrolled
the area and only smaller groups of soldiers from the
Independent Rafael Boban Battalion were used. At first,
700 to 1,000 men held the line, sometimes even less.
With the weapons and equipment captured from
the HVO the ARBIH was capable of arming new recruits
and toward the end of June and at the beginning of
July it formed two new brigades: the 47th Mountain Bri-
gade for the area of Bijelo Polje and Drežnica and the
48th Mountain Brigade for the area between Mostar and
Blagaj. According to the HVO’s reports, the ARBIH V Corps
had in the second half of July in the wider Mostar area
(from Drežnica to Blagaj) around 5,000 men: 1,700 of
those were deployed north of Mostar, 1,800 in Mostar
and 1,500 south of Mostar. In August the forces of IV
Corps were divided into Operational Groups: Operation-
al Group South -1 for Blagaj, Operational Group South-2
for Gnojnice and Kočine, Operational Group Center for
Mostar and Operational Group North for Drežnica and
Bijelo Polje.
The HVO, having recovered from the ARBIH surprise
attack and consequent losses of ground and facilities,
consolidated its positions and planned to mount a coun-
terattack with the aim of recapturing the lost positions
and, following that, decisively defeating the Muslim
D
forces. The HVO received reinforcements from Croatia in
the form of a tactical group, 700 men strong, from the
5th Guards Brigade of the Croatian Army for the task.
This was to be the beginning of the 5th Guards Brigade’s
participation in the Muslim-Croat war. The group was
R
brought from Zadar’s hinterland to Neum and Ploče on
July 8 and thence moved to the Heliodrom near Mostar
between July 11 and July 14. The tactical group formed
the core of the 1st Operational Troop (OS-1) which was
in existence until the end of the month. Its commander
was Brigadier Luka Džanko. The HVO had now enhanced
its offensive capabilities but also its defensive strength as
regards protecting the Croatian border should the ARBIH
choose to attack in the Neretva Valley towards Ploče. The
HVO Main Staff, now that OS-1 was included in the order
4.2.2020. 19:35:01
 The Croatian Nation’s Struggle for Survival, 1991-1995
skih snaga istočni dio Mostara i naselja u okolici.738
Tijekom priprema HVO-a za napad ARBiH je u ranim
jutarnjim satima 13. srpnja ubacila nekoliko diverzant-
skih skupina u zonu 3. brigade HVO-a, a potom napala i
zauzela dio crte obrane brigade u području Zračne luke
Mostar. Uz gubitke od pet poginulih i 11 ranjenih voj-
nika iz satnije Buna i Širokobriješke bojne, 3. brigada je
u protunapadu vratila izgubljene položaje. Ubačene di-
verzantske skupine su pritom razbijene i dijelom unište-
ne. Istovremeno su dijelovi 42. brdske brigade ARBiH 13.
H
srpnja izveli nekoliko diverzantskih napada na postrojbe
1. brigade HVO-a na području Gubavice i Dubravskoj vi-
soravni. Težište napada bilo je na Gubavici. Osvajanjem
Gubavice, gdje je bila vojarna, odnosno središte veze
HVO-a, ARBiH je planirala zaposjesti dominantan polo-
žaj u blizini Neretve, napraviti spoj sa snagama 48. brd-
M
ske brigade u Blagaju i imati otvoren prolaz za prodor
u unutrašnjost Dubrave i dalje prema Stocu, te dolinom
Neretve prema Jadranskom moru. Drugi cilj napada
bio je angažiranje vojno sposobnog ljudstva za ARBiH,
kojeg je u zoni 1. brigade HVO-a bilo nekoliko tisuća.
Muslimanske snage zauzele su selo, osim središta veze
D
HVO-a. Istoga dana HVO je vratio selo uvođenjem sku-
pine pukovnije Bruno Bušić, koja je dovedena s hodnje
prema Rami. Muslimanske skupine su razbijene, nanese-
ni su im veliki gubici, a dio je blokiran u nepristupačnim
područjima kanjona rijeke Bregave i pošumljenom dije-
lu Gagrice – Stanojevići. Hrvatsko vijeće obrane također
C
je imalo velike gubitke: 16 poginulih, šest zarobljenih i
četiri nestala vojnika. Muslimanski napad pokazao je sve
teškoće držanja crte, pa je na zahtjev 1. brigade HVO-a
krajem srpnja obrana ojačana uvođenjem jedne bojne
brigade HVO-a Čitluk na šire područje Gubavice.739
D
Nakon kratkih priprema, hrvatske su snage ujutro
738 OZ JiH, Zapovijed za aktivnu obranu, dj. br. 01-4126/93
od 12. 7. 1993.; GS HVO, Analiza stanja dj. br. 02-2/1-01-
1373/93 od 15. 7. 1993.; Odsjek SIS-a 3. brigade HVO, Iz-
vješće up. br. 05-0052/93 od 18. 7. 1993.
739 GS HVO, Zapovijed ur. br. 02-2/1-01-1350/93 od 13. 7.
1993.; IPD služba 1. brigade HVO (priopćenje o događan-
jima 13. 7. 1993.); 1. brigada HVO “Knez Domagoj”, Izv-
ješće kl. 81/93-02/11-1, ur. br. 1100-01-93-31 od 16. 7.
1993.; 1. brigada HVO “Knez Domagoj”, Izvješće kl. 02-
92/931, ur. br. 1100-11-17-93-92 od 18. 7. 1993.; OZ JiH,
Zapovijed dj. br. 01-4383/93 od 26. 7. 1993.; 3. brigada
HVO, Izvješće, str. pov. br. 03-396-14/93 od 14. 7. 1993.;
Izjava bojnika Željka Naletilića, zapovjednika bojne “Iv-
ica Jelčić Čarls” (nedatirana, dana 2012. godine); Izjava
brigadira Ivana Primorca.
317
Domovinski rat 04-02-2020 Knjiga 1.indd 317
of battle, planned to recapture the lost positions and, cir-
cumstances permitting, defeat the Muslim forces in the
eastern part of the city and its environs.
During the HVO’s preparations for the attack, a num-
ber of ARBIH commando groups infiltrated into the area
of the 3rd Brigade of the HVO and other ARBIH troops at-
tacked and captured a portion of the defensive line held
by the 3rd Brigade in the Mostar airport area. The 3rd Bri-
gade mounted a counterattack and recaptured the lost
position. The Buna Company and the Široki Brijeg battal-
ion lost 5 soldiers killed and 11 wounded in the coun-
terattack. The ARBIH commando groups were defeated
and partially destroyed. At the same time elements of
the 42nd Mountain Brigade of the ARBIH mounted a few
attacks on the 1st Brigade of the HVO in the Gubavica –
Dubrava plateau area. The HVO positions on Gubavica
were of immense importance because the barracks there
housed the communications center of the HVO and with
Gubavica in their hands the Muslims would have a dom-
inant position near the Neretva River and would be in a
good position to link up with the 48th Mountain Brigade
in Blagaj and also to mount an attack towards the interi-
or of Dubrava and further on towards Stolac and down
the Neretva Valley towards the Adriatic sea. Another ob-
jective of the attack was to recruit able-bodied Muslim
military-age men residing in the zone of the 1st Brigade
of the HVO – there were about a few thousand poten-
tial recruits in the area. The Muslim forces captured the
village but could not dislodge the HVO troops from the
barracks. On the same day the HVO threw a group of
soldiers belonging to the Bruno Bušić Regiment, which
was on its way to Rama, into the counterattack and the
group recaptured the village. Some of the attacking
groups were destroyed and some were pinned down on
inaccessible terrain in the canyon of the Bregava River
and densely forested parts of the Gagrice – Stanojevići
area. The defenders inflicted a large number of casualties
on the attacking Muslim troops. The HVO also suffered
R
a high number of casualties: 16 killed, 6 taken prisoner
and four missing soldiers. The Muslim attack exposed
many weaknesses in the defensive line. As a result, the
1st Brigade of the HVO requested, at the end of July, that
one battalion belonging to the Čitluk HVO Brigade be
deployed in the wider Gubavica area.
After short preparations the HVO attacked south of
Mostar on the morning of July 15. The tactical group of
volunteers from the 5th Guards Brigade of the Croatian
Army, to which a platoon of the 3rd HVO Brigade was
4.2.2020. 19:35:01
 Davor Marijan • Rat za opstojnost Hrvata, 1991. - 1995.
15. srpnja 1993. krenule u napad južno od Mostara. Tak-
tička skupina dragovoljaca iz 5. gardijske brigade HV-a,
kojoj je pridodan vod 3. brigade HVO-a smjerom Vina-
rija - Energopetrol - Kočine - Gnjojnice, prema planu i
zapovijedi, napala je crtu 48. brdske brigade ARBiH. Te-
žište napada bilo je na Gnojnicama, no zbog jakog ot-
pora ARBiH napad nije uspio. Skupina HV-a je imala 15
poginulih i 30 ranjenih vojnika, zbog čega je pješački
dio izvučen iz borbi.740 Istovremeno su snage 3. brigade
HVO-a iz samostalne satnije Buna s pridodanim pripad-
H
nicima iz Blagaja, uz potporu skupine Grdani, zauzele
kotu Kičin i bez gubitaka odbacile muslimanske sna-
ge u Malo polje. Crta je postavljena na koti Kičin čiju
je obranu preuzela brigada HVO-a iz Čitluka. Bio je to
težak udarac za hrvatske planove aktivne obrane i na
neko je vrijeme primirio HVO. Njegove snage na po-
M
dručju Mostara u prvim danima kolovoza pojačane su
dragovoljačkim satnijama 1., 2. i 5. gardijske brigade
HV-a, većinom s dragovoljcima podrijetlom iz BiH, koje
su uglavnom držane u svojstvu interventnih postrojbi
na širem području grada. Ojačana satnija 5. gardijske
brigade ostala je do kraja srpnja, kada je prebačena
D
na područje Gornjeg Vakufa/Uskoplja, gdje je, uz HVO,
spriječila njegov pad u napadu ARBiH.741
Radi razvlačenja snaga HVO-a i smanjenja njihova
pritiska u Mostaru, 42. brdska brigada ARBiH izvela je s
oko 250 ljudi napad u blizini Blagaja. Ujutro 14. kolovo-
za probila je crtu obrane brigade HVO-a Knez Branimir
C
na širem području Bune, zauzela kote Hadžajlića kičin,
Kajdin kičin i Goricu na području Buna – Brijeg – izvor
rijeke Bune i ugrozila prometnicu Mostar – Čapljina. Hr-
vatsko vijeće obrane povuklo se na lijevu stranu rijeke
Bunice uz četiri poginula vojnika i s jednom skupinom
koja je ostala okružena u Brijegu.
U protunapadu koji je uslijedio istoga dana Kažnjenič-
ka bojna je, uz pomoć Čitlučke brigade i manjih skupina
dragovoljaca iz satnije „Gromovi“, deblokirala okružene
vojnike i vratila sve izgubljene položaje osim Hadžajlića ki-
740 Izvanredno izvješće (3) od 13. 07. 1993. Radi se o prijepi-
su izvješća koje je Press centar Mostar slao za RTV BiH;
GS HVO, Analiza stanja dj. br. 02-2/1-01-1373/93 od 15.
7. 1993.; Odsjek SIS-a 3. brigade HVO, Izvješće up. br. 05-
0052/93 od 18. 7. 1993.; GS HV, kl. 035-01/93-01/03, ur.
br. 512-06-02-93-303 od 23. 7. 1993.
741 ICTY: Zap. 5. gbr, Presjek angažiranja kl. SP 81/93-02/01,
ur. br. 3132-03-93-101 od 23. 10. 1993.; 1. gardijska briga-
da HV – Tigrovi, 330; 2. gardijska brigada HV – Gromovi,
258; Izjava brigadira Ivana Primorca.
318
Domovinski rat 04-02-2020 Knjiga 1.indd 318
attached, attacked, in accordance with the plan and fol-
lowing direct orders, the defensive line held by the 48th
Mountain Brigade of the ARBIH along the Vinarija – Ener-
gopetrol – Kočine – Gojnice line. The focus of the attack
was on Gnojnice. The attack, due to stiff resistance offered
by the ARBIH, was unsuccessful and the group suffered
heavy casualties: 15 killed and 30 wounded soldiers. The
infantry contingent of the group, as a result, was with-
drawn from combat. At the same time the Independent
Buna company, with troops from Blagaj attached to it,
of the 3rd HVO Brigade and with the Grdani Group’s sup-
port, captured Kičin Hill and pushed the Muslim forces
back into Malo Polje. The HVO did not suffer any casual-
ties in this attack. A new defensive line was established
on Kičin hill. These positions were defended by the HVO
Čitluk Brigade. The failure of the attack south of Mostar
constituted a heavy blow for the HVO’s concept of active
defense. The HVO, trying to recover from the disappoint-
ment, remained idle for quite some time after the failed
attack. At the beginning of August the HVO forces in the
Mostar area were augmented by volunteer companies of
the 1st, 2nd, and 5th Guards Brigades of the Croatian Army.
For the most part, these troops were held in reserve and
used as an intervention force in the wider Mostar area.
Most of these soldiers were born in Bosnia. One rein-
forced company of the 5th Guards Brigade remained in
the area until the end of July when it was moved to the
Gornji Vakuf – Uskoplje area. There, the company and the
HVO forces beat back the ARBIH’s onslaught on the city.
The 42nd Mountain Brigade of the ARBIH, in an at-
tempt to draw HVO forces away from Mostar, sent 250
into attack near Blagaj. On the morning of August 14 the
attackers broke through the defensive line manned by
D
the Knez Branimir Brigade in the wider Buna area, cap-
tured Hadžajlića Kičin Hill, Kajdin Kičin Hill and Gorica
Hill in the Buna – Brijeg – Buna River source area and
threatened the Mostar – Čapljina road. The HVO forces
retreated to the left bank of the Bunica River, having lost
R
four soldiers killed. Also, one group of HVO soldiers re-
mained surrounded in Brijeg. On the same day the Penal
Battalion, with the help of the Čitluk Brigade and small-
er groups of volunteers from the Gromovi Company,
launched a counterattack, broke the encirclement of the
trapped group in Brijeg and recaptured all the lost posi-
tions except Hadžajlića Kičin Hill. On August 17, with the
help of some troops from the volunteer companies from
the 1st and 2nd Guards Brigades of the Croatian Army, all
the positions still in Muslim hands were recaptured too.
4.2.2020. 19:35:01
 The Croatian Nation’s Struggle for Survival, 1991-1995
čina. Uz pomoć dijela ljudstva dragovoljačkih satnija 1. i 2.
gardijske brigade HV-a, 17. kolovoza sasvim su vraćeni iz-
gubljeni položaji. Skupina 2. gardijske brigade HV-a potom
je angažirana na obrani crte Buna – Hodbina – Brijeg.742
Tijekom borbi kod Blagaja, ARBiH je 14. i 15. kolovo-
za izvela jak napad u Mostaru, težišno na Bulevaru, što
je HVO uspješno odbio. U samom gradu borbe su bile
svakodnevne, a pomaci na crti gotovo zanemarivi, izu-
zev u Ulici Alekse Šantića, gdje su pripadnici Lakojuriš-
ne bojne Vojne policije u iscrpljujućim borbama ovlada-
H
li skoro cijelom ulicom. Bio je to iscrpljujući sukob koji je
s hrvatske strane vodila najvećim dijelom Vojna policija,
a s muslimanske strane 41. mtbr i bataljuni Šargan i Ne-
vesinje. Istovremeno s borbama oko Blagaja, 14. kolo-
voza je ARBiH napala Bijelo polje, pri čemu je zatvorila
ispusne otvore na brani, pa je došlo do izlijevanja vode
M
iz akumulacijskog jezera.743
Nakon nekoliko dana uobičajenog ratovanja, HVO
je 24. kolovoza napao snage ARBiH na području Sjever-
nog logora, Vrapčića, Raštana i HE Mostar. U napadu su
angažirane snage Kažnjeničke bojne, ATG-a Baja Kra-
ljević, Vojne policije i 2. brigade HVO-a, koje su tijekom
D
dana zauzele Raštane, HE Mostar i šljunčaru u Bijelom
polju. Tijekom borbi poginula su četiri, a ranjeno je
osam vojnika HVO-a. U ARBiH su držali da je svrha na-
pada HVO-a presijecanje snaga 4. korpusa od brane k
Vrapčićima.744 U noći 25./26. kolovoza HVO je srušio kla-
pnu na brani i ispuštanjem velike količine vode ugrozio
C
neke položaje ARBiH nizvodno u Mostaru. Štab Vrhov-
ne komande ARBiH tražio je od 6. korpusa da pomogne
Mostaru i u skladnom djelovanju s 4. korpusom napad-
ne snage HVO-a sjeverno i sjeverozapadno od Mostara.
Zapovijed je bila uvod u operaciju Neretva na mostar-
D
skom području. U prvoj polovini rujna prikupljene su
snage za operaciju: Specijalni odred Zulfikar, Drežnički
bataljun 4. korpusa i dvije čete iz 9. i 10. brdske brigade
1. korpusa, ukupno 860 vojnika. Njihov je zadatak bio
napasti glavnim snagama na pravcima Kulac – Golubić
742 OZ JiH, Izvješće dj. br. 03-0588/93 od 14. 8. 1993.; OZ
JiH, Izvješće dj. br. 03-0623/93 od 15. 8. 1993.; GS HVO,
Izvješće ur. br. 02-2/1-01-2012/93 od 17. 8. 1993.; E. ŠE-
JTANIĆ, Hercegovci na ognjenim vratima, 173-176; 2. gar-
dijska brigada HV – Gromovi, 260; Izjava generala Miljen-
ka Lasića iz siječnja 2019.
743 GS HVO, Izvješće ur. br. 02-2/1-01-2012/93 od 17. 8. 1993.
744 OZ JIH, Izvješće str. pov. br. 03-0578 od 24. 8. 1993.; ICTY: ŠVK
OS RBiH, Naređenje str. pov. br. 02/1024-1 od 24. 8. 1993.; GS
HVO, Pohvala ur. br. 02-2/1-01-2143/93 od 25. 8. 1993.
319
Domovinski rat 04-02-2020 Knjiga 1.indd 319
A group from the 2nd Guards Brigade of the Croatian
Army was then deployed to defend the Buna – Hodbina
– Brijeg line.
During the fighting around Blagaj the ARBIH, on Au-
gust 14 and 15, launched a determined attack in Mostar,
focusing on the Boulevard. The HVO managed to repulse
the onslaught. In the city itself battles raged every day
but the front line did not shift significantly, except on
Aleksa Šantić Street where the troops from the Light
Battalion of the Military Police, after a ferocious and pro-
longed fight, gained control of almost the whole length
of the street. The fighting was hard and fatiguing in the
extreme. On the Croat side most troops there belonged
to the Military Police and on the ARBIH side most soldiers
participating in combat belonged to the 41st Motorized
Brigade and the Šargan and Nevesinje Battalions. While
the fighting for Blagaj raged on the ARBIH, on August 14,
attacked Bijelo Polje. Expediently the attackers closed
the exhaust valves on the dam and, as a result, the reser-
voir flooded the immediate surrounding area.
On August 24 the HVO attacked the ARBIH forces in
the Sjeverni Logor, Vrapčići, Raštani and HE Mostar areas.
The following formations participated in the attack: the
Penal Battalion, ATG “Baja Kraljević”, Military Police and
2nd Brigade of the HVO. During the day the Croats cap-
tured Raštani, HE Mostar and the gravel plant in Bijelo
Polje. The HVO lost four soldiers killed and eight wound-
ed in the fighting. The ARBIH believed that the purpose
of the HVO attack was to cut off IV Corps forces from the
dam and push them back towards Vrapčići. During the
night of August 25-26 the HVO collapsed the floodgates
on the dam and flooded the surrounding area, thus jeop-
ardizing some ARBIH positions downriver in Mostar. The
General Staff of the ARBIH ordered VI Corps to help the
ARBIH troops in Mostar and, coordinating its actions with
IV Corps, attack the HVO forces deployed to the north
and northwest of Mostar. The order was a prelude to
the launching of Operation Neretva in the Mostar area.
R
During the first half of September the following forma-
tions were gathered for the operation: Special Detach-
ment Zulfikar, Drežnica Battalion of IV Corps and two
companies from the 9th and 10th Mountain Brigades of I
Corps, in total 860 men. Their task was to develop their
main attack in the direction of Kulac – Golubić – Vratnice
and in the direction of Jasenjani – Mandići – Umac and
mount a supporting attack in the direction of Batačke
Lazine – Pločno. The main aim of the operation was to
take control of the Vrdi – Gradina – Veliki Jedinak line in
4.2.2020. 19:35:01
 Davor Marijan • Rat za opstojnost Hrvata, 1991. - 1995.
– Vratnice i Jasenjani – Mandići – Umac te pomoćni-
ma na pravcu Batačke lazine – Pločno, sa zadatkom da
najprije ovladaju crtom Vrdi – Gradina – Veliki Jelinak,
a u nastavku crtom Goranci – Đubrani i objektom Ploč-
no. U završnoj fazi plan je bio u suradnji sa snagama 4.
korpusa iz Mostara i Bijelog polja izbiti na crtu Planini-
ca – Podine. Operaciju je vodio načelnik ŠVK-a Armije
RBiH Sefer Halilović s IKM-om u Dobrom Polju. Tijekom
priprema za napad skupina vojnika iz 9. brdske brigade
ARBiH počinila je zločin 8. rujna u Grabovici ubivši 32
H
civila hrvatske nacionalnosti.745
Operacija Neretva na mostarskom dijelu bojišta po-
čela je 14. rujna napadom odreda Zulfikar na crtu obra-
ne brigade HVO-a Grude na Vrdima, a poslije i susjedne
brigade Široki Brijeg. Tijekom dana zauzeti su objekti
Kličana gruda, Pištet, Ilkina gruda, Golubić i Medvjed,
M
no obrana Vrda je izdržala napad. Idućega dana HVO
je vratio položaj Medvjed. Sljedeći jaki napad ARBiH je
izvela 19. rujna, ponovno osvojila kotu Medvjed i jednu
kotu u Jedrinju. Sljedećega dana, 20. rujna, u protuna-
padu Kažnjeničke bojne, širokobriješke i grudske bri-
gade, te satnije HVO-a iz Vrda vraćene su kote Jedrinje,
D
Velika i Mala Vlajna i Medvjed. Armija Republike BiH bila
je prinuđena prijeći u obranu. Tijekom borbi imala je 10
poginulih i 50 ranjenih vojnika.746
Borbe za Vrda bile su u završnoj fazi kada je 4. kor-
pus počeo operaciju Neretva na užem području Mostara.
U dijelu grada ARBiH je snagama OG-a Centar, koji je či-
C
nila 41. mtbr s ojačanjima iz drugih postrojbi 4. korpusa
i MUP-a (oko 300 ljudi), planirala napad na uže gradsko
područje nastojeći ovladati pravcima HE Mostar – Rašta-
ni – Orlac, Šemovac – Podhum – 1. osnovna škola, Donja
Mahala – Stotina – Rodoč i brdom Hum. Lijevo (južno)
od njih napadala je OG Jug 2 sa zadatkom da ovlada po-
dručjem Avijatičarski most – aerodrom Mostar.747
Nakon ponoći 19./20. rujna ARBiH je ubačenim di-
745 ICTY: ŠVK OS RBiH, Naređenje str. pov. br. 02/1029-1
od 26. 8. 1993.; ICTY: IKM ŠVK RBiH u Jablanici od 29.
9. 1993.; Direktiva za odbrambeno-napadna dejstva
“Neretva-93” (nedatirano). Faksimil u zborniku radova
1993. – Prelomna godina rata, 123-126.
746 OZ JiH, Izvješće dj. br. 03-0623/93 od 15. 9. 1993.; OZ JiH,
Izvješće dj. br. 03-0632/93 od 19. 9. 1993.; OZ JiH, Izvješće
dj. br. 03-0634/93 od 20. 9. 1993.; E. ŠEJTANIĆ, Hercegovci
na ognjenim vratima, 151; Izjava Ivana Primorca.
747 Zapovijest za napad komandanta 41. slavne motorizo-
vane brigade Op. br. 02-174-15 (nedatirano, u gornjem
lijevom kutu rukom je dopisan nadnevak 15. 9. 1993.).
320
Domovinski rat 04-02-2020 Knjiga 1.indd 320
the first phase and then gain control of the Goranci –
Đubrani line and capture the Pločno facility in the follow
up phase. In the final phase the mentioned forces were
to, in coordination with the IV Corps forces in Mostar and
Bijelo Polje, reach the Planinica – Podine line. The oper-
ation was led by the ARBIH’s chief of staff Sefer Halilović
with Forward Command Post in Dobro Polje. During the
preparations for the attack a detachment of soldiers from
the 9th Mountain Brigade committed a crime against hu-
manity on September 8 in Grabovica – the Muslim sol-
diers murdered 32 Croatian civilians.
Operation Neretva in the Mostar area commenced
on September 14, when the Zulfikar detachment at-
tacked the defensive line manned by the Grude Brigade
of the HVO on Vrdi and then the positions of the neigh-
boring Široki Brijeg Brigade. During the day the Muslims
captured Kličana Gruda, Pištet, Ilkina Gruda, Golubić and
Medvjed. The HVO troops defending Vrdi managed to
withstand the onslaught. The next day the HVO recap-
tured Medvjed Hill. The ARBIH launched another deter-
mined attack on September 19 and captured Medvjed
Hill again and a hill in Jedrinje. On September 20 the
Penal Battalion, the Široki Brijeg Brigade, the Gruda bri-
gade and HVO Vrdi Company launched a counterattack
and recaptured the following hills: Jedrinje, Velika Vlajna,
Mala Vlajna and Medvjed, forcing the ARBIH to go on the
defensive. In these battles the Muslims lost 10 soldiers
killed and 50 wounded.
The fighting for Vrdi was ending when IV Corps
launched Operation Neretva in the Mostar area. The AR-
BIH planned to attack in the city with a force consisting of
the following OG Center formations: the 41st Motorized
Brigade with reinforcements from other units of IV Corps
D
and MUP (300 men). The aim was to attack the wider city
center area and take control of Hum Hill and the follow-
ing lines: HE Mostar – Raštani – Orlac, Šemovac, Podhum
– 1st Primary School, Donja Mahala – Stotina – Rodoč and
Hum Hill. To the left (south) of the mentioned force was
R
OG South 2. Its mission was to gain control of the Avia-
tion Bridge – Mostar airport area.
Shortly after midnight on September 19-20 the
ARBIH launched a commando raid on the 2nd Brigade
of the HVO in Raštani. During the day the commandos
captured the village without encountering serious resis-
tance. The HVO was too numerically weak to recapture
the village because most HVO formations were engaged
in the fighting for the most important position in Mostar
– Hum Hill. During the night of September 22/23 a few
4.2.2020. 19:35:01
 The Croatian Nation’s Struggle for Survival, 1991-1995
verzantskim skupinama napala snage 2. brigade HVO-a
u Raštanima i tijekom dana bez većega napora zauze-
la mjesto. Hrvatsko vijeće obrane nije imalo snaga za
povrat jer su se istodobno vodile borbe za najznačaj-
niji objekt u Mostaru – brdo Hum. U noći 22./23. rujna
HVO je ubacio nekoliko ATG-ova iz sastava Kažnjeničke
bojne i PPN Ludvig Pavlović u Raštane. Oni su tijekom
dana ovladali Raštanima. Ujutro 24. rujna crta je uve-
zana i HVO je potpuno vratio sve izgubljene položaje,
pri čemu je imao tri poginula i osam ranjenih vojnika.748
H
Uz potporu srpskoga topništva ARBiH je 20. rujna
napala hrvatske položaje u Mostaru. Težište napada bilo
je na Humu, na kojem su muslimanske snage zauzele dva
bunkera, koje su tijekom dana u protunapadu iz smjera
Gornjeg Vukodola vratili dragovoljci jedne satnije iz 1. i
2. gardijske brigade HV-a. Na području Podhuma musli-
M
manske su snage napravile pomak i dovele franjevački
samostan u poluokruženje, no u protuudaru lakojuriš-
na bojna Vojne policije, uz potporu 4. bojne 3. brigade
HVO-a, razbila je specijalnu postrojbu ARBiH “Šargani“,
koja je pretrpjela velike gubitke, a ARBiH izgubila je
prethodno zauzete položaje i povukla se preko Bulevara
D
i naselja Cernica. U južnom sektoru, ARBiH je 20. rujna
zauzela Višnjicu i prvi red kuća u Stotini. U borbama za
Višnjicu snage HVO-a s promjenjivim su uspjehom zau-
stavile napad ARBiH na smjeru Čekrk – Višnjica. Uz po-
moć skupine dragovoljaca 2. gardijske brigade HV-a, 3.
brigada HVO-a zaustavila je napad ARBiH na Avijatičar-
C
ski most. Most je zadržan, a s njim i prometnica Mostar
– Buna – Čapljina. Bio je to težak dan za HVO, prijepodne
je u borbama poginulo šest, a ranjeno 46 vojnika, od ko-
jih 14 teže. Tijekom 21. rujna s promjenjivim su se uspje-
hom vodile jake borbe za pojedine objekte u Podhumu.
D
U njima je HVO imao dva mrtva i tri ranjena borca. Najvi-
še su uspjeha hrvatske snage imale u borbama na dijelu
Čekrk – Višnjica. Uz pomoć dijela satnije dragovoljaca
2. gardijske brigade HV-a u cijelosti su vraćeni dan prije
izgubljeni položaji u Višnjici, Stotini i Koloniji. Operacija
Neretva, od koje se u Sarajevu očekivalo mnogo na mo-
starskom dijelu bojišta, završila je bez uspjeha. U njoj je
ARBiH u Mostaru imala više od 30 poginulih i oko 100 ra-
njenih. Hrvatsko vijeće obrane je, prema izvorima, imalo
748 OZ JiH, Izvješće dj. br. 03-0633/93 od 20. 9. 1993.; OZ JiH,
Izvješće dj. br. 03-0634/93 od 20. 9. 1993.; OZ JiH, Izv-
ješće dj. br. 01/1-0020/93 od 23. 9. 1993.; Sektor “Obra-
na Mostara”, Operativno izvješće br. 01-115/93 od 23. 9.
1993.; OZ JiH, Izvješće dj. br. 03-0639/93 od 24. 9. 1993.
321
Domovinski rat 04-02-2020 Knjiga 1.indd 321
ATGs from the Penal Battalion and the Ludvig Pavlović
special purpose unit sneaked into Raštani. During the
day the Croats gained full control of the village. On the
morning of September 24 the HVO consolidated its de-
fensive line and recaptured all the lost positions, losing
three soldiers killed and eight wounded.
On September 20 the ARBIH attacked the HVO po-
sitions in Mostar. Artillery support for the attack was
provided by the Serbs. The focus of the Muslims’ efforts
was on Hum. There, Muslim soldiers managed to cap-
ture two bunkers. Volunteers comprising a company-size
force from the 1st and 2nd Guards Brigades of the Croatian
Army counterattacked from the direction of Gornji Vu-
kodol and during the same day recaptured the bunkers.
In the Podhum area the Muslims made headway and
placed the Franciscan monastery in a partial encirlem-
ent. The Light Battalion of the Military Police, supported
by the 4th Battalion of the 3rd Brigade of the HVO, coun-
terattacked and defeated the ARBIH Special Forces Unit
Šargani, inflicting heavy casualties on the Muslims and
recapturing the positions the HVO had previously lost.
The Šargani unit retreated through the Boulevard and
the Cernica neighborhood. In the southern sector the
ARBIH captured Višnjica and the first row of houses in
Stotina on September 20. During the fighting for Višnjica
HVO troops, with a varying degree of success, managed
to repulse the ARBIH’s advance in the direction of Čekrk
– Višnjica. With the help of volunteers belonging to the
2nd Guards Brigade of the Croatian Army the 3rd Brigade
of the HVO defeated the ARBIH’s attack on the Aviation
Bridge. The HVO retained control of the bridge and with
the bridge it held on to the Mostar – Buna – Čapljina road.
The fighting was ferocious and the HVO suffered a high
number of casualties during that morning: six soldiers
killed and 46 wounded, 14 of them seriously. During Sep-
tember 21 the HVO and ARBIH were locked in combat for
various positions in Podhum. The HVO lost two soldiers
killed and three wounded. The HVO had most success in
R
the fighting in the Čekrk – Višnjica area. With the help of a
detachment of the volunteer company of the 2nd Guards
Brigade of the Croatian Army the HVO recaptured all the
positions lost the previous day in Višnjica, Stotina and
Kolonija. Operation Neretva had failed. The failure of the
operation came as a shock to the Muslim leadership in
Sarajevo. The setback was costly: the ARBIH in Mostar
lost more than 30 soldiers killed and about 100 wound-
ed. According to HVO sources, the Croats’ casualties were
23 soldiers killed and 83 wounded.
4.2.2020. 18:35:04
 Davor Marijan • Rat za opstojnost Hrvata, 1991. - 1995.
23 poginula i 83 ranjena vojnika.749
Slom operacije Neretva donekle je primirio ARBiH.
U odnosu na rujan, listopad i studeni bili su mirniji mje-
seci. To je značilo da su se, posebice u Mostaru, vodile
stalne ulične borbe, no bez pomaka na crti bojišta. Tije-
kom tih borbi 9. studenoga srušen je Stari most, kojim
se tijekom sukoba koristila ARBiH. Rušenje se pripisuje
tročlanoj posadi tenka HVO-a (dva Hrvata i jedan Musli-
man), premda je most miniran i srušen s lijeve obale Ne-
retve, koju je nadzirala ARBiH, za potrebe demonizacije
H
hercegovačkih Hrvata i HVO-a.750
Posljednje jače borbe vodile su se u prosincu. Sna-
ge HVO-a iz Kažnjeničke bojne i brigade Grude i Široki
Brijeg napale su Omojnice na području Drežnice i zau-
zele kotu Glavica. Izgubljene je položaje odred Zulfikar
vratio u protunapadu 25. prosinca.751 Armija Republike
M
BiH neuspješno je 24. prosinca napala hrvatske položa-
je u Bijelom polju, kod katoličke crkve u Mostaru i na
području Bune.752 Crta bojišta je ostala i ustalila se na
pravcu Malo polje – Kosor – Velmos – rijeka Neretva –
Bulevar – Šantićeva ulica – Carinski most – rijeka Nere-
tva – HE Salakovac – rijeka Neretva – Vrdi – Drežnica.753
D
Čapljina – Stolac
Travanjski sukob između ARBiH i HVO-a odrazio se i
na zonu 1. brigade HVO-a na području Čapljine i Stoca. U
njezinu zonu ranije je samovoljno ušla 42. brdska brigada
C
ARBiH Bregava čije je ljudstvo postupno preuzimalo Sto-
lac u sklopu muslimanskih planova za zaposjedanje do-
line Neretve. Stoga je Zapovjedništvo 1. brigade HVO-a
zabranilo pripadnicima 42. brdske brigade ulaz u svoju
zonu od Drenovca do Rotimlje, a 17. travnja ultimativno
je traženo da se Komanda brigade Bregava tijekom dana
749 OZ JiH, Izvješće dj. br. 03-0633/93 od 20. 9. 1993.; OZ
JiH, Izvješće dj. br. 03-0634/93 od 20. 9. 1993.; OZ JiH,
Izvješće dj. br. 03-0635/93 od 21. 9. 1993.; Izvješće načel-
nika PU PD HVO od 21. 9. 1993.; E. ŠEJTANIĆ, Hercegovci
na ognjenim vratima, 181-183; 1. gardijska brigada HV –
Tigrovi, 332; 2. gardijska brigada HV – Gromovi, 261-264;
Izjava generala Zlatana Mije Jelića iz siječnja 2019.
750 Slobodan PRALJAK, Kako je srušen Stari most: činjenice,
Oktavijan, Zagreb, 2006.
751 GS HVO, Izvješće ur. br. 02-2/1-02-81/93 od 19. 12. 1993.;
GS HVO, Sumarno izvješće ur. br. 02-2/1-02-99/93 od 25. 12.
1993.; E. ŠEJTANIĆ, Hercegovci na ognjenim vratima, 151-152.
752 GS HVO, Sumarno izvješće ur. br. 02-2/1-02-96/93 od 24.
12. 1993.
753 R. DREKOVIĆ, U obruču, 457.
322
Domovinski rat 04-02-2020 Knjiga 1.indd 322
The defeat smartened the ARBIH. In comparison to
September, the situation on the front line in October
and November was relatively uneventful, meaning that
close urban combat was continuous in Mostar but the
front line did not significantly shift one way or the other.
During these battles the Old Bridge was blown up. The
bridge had been constantly used by the ARBIH. The act
of destroying the bridge is commonly ascribed to the
three member crew of an HVO tank (two Croats and one
Muslim), even though the explosives that destroyed the
bridge were placed on the left bank, controlled by the
ARBIH, of the Neretva River. Placing the blame for de-
stroying the bridge on the tank crew was a ploy to de-
monize the HVO and Bosnian Croats. And it worked.
The last hard battles were fought in December. The
Penal Battalion, Grude Battalion and Široki Brijeg Battal-
ion attacked Omojnice in the Drežnice area and captured
Glavica Hill. On December 25 the Zulfikar squad coun-
terattacked and recaptured the lost positions. The ARBIH
attacked, on December 24, the HVO positions in Bijelo
Polje, at the Catholic Church in Mostar and in the Buna
area but the attack was not successful. The front line did
not shift significantly – it stretched along the Malo Pol-
je – Kosor – Velmos – Neretva River – Boulevard – Šantić
Street – Carinski Bridge – Neretva River – HE Salakovac –
Neretva River – Vrdi – Drežnica line.
Čapljina – Stolac
The April conflict between the HVO and ARBIH had
an effect on the 1st Brigade of the HVO’s area of responsi-
bility in the Čapljina and Stolac areas. The 42nd Mountain
Division Bregava of the ARBIH marched into the 1st Bri-
D
gade’s area of responsibility and gradually started taking
control of Stolac. The 42nd Mountain Brigade’s move was
an integral part of the Muslims’ plan to gain control of
the Neretva Valley. The HQ of the 1st Brigade reacted and
forbade the 42nd Mountain Brigade’s soldiers to venture
R
into the Drenovci – Rotmilje area. On April 17 the HVO
issued an ultimatum to the ARBIH, insisting that the HQ
of the Bregava Brigade be withdrawn from Gubavica that
same day, that is, be withdrawn from the area of respon-
sibility of the 1st Brigade. The HQ of the 42nd Brigade re-
jected the ultimatum, thus forcing the HVO’s hand. On
April 19 elements of the 1st Brigade of the HVO captured
Gubavica and arrested about 700 men from the HQ and
other formations of the 42nd Mountain Brigade. The rest
of the personnel from the HQ withdrew to the Rotimilje
4.2.2020. 18:35:04
 The Croatian Nation’s Struggle for Survival, 1991-1995
povuče iz Gubavice, odnosno da se izmjesti iz zone odgo-
vornosti 1. brigade. Komanda 42. brigade odbila je ulti-
matum, nakon čega su dijelovi 1. brigade HVO-a 19. trav-
nja zauzeli Gubavicu i uhitili oko 700 ljudi iz Komande i
drugih dijelova brigade. Ostatak Komande povukao se na
područje Rotimlje, a u Sarajevo je poslana obavijest da ih
je napala 116. brigada HV-a.754 Kasniji tijek zbivanja poka-
zao je da je HVO time onemogućio iznenađenje i masov-
ne prelaske vojnika muslimanske nacionalnosti na stranu
ARBiH, kao što se dogodilo u Mostaru 30. lipnja 1993. go-
H
dine. Zbog spomenute izdaje u Mostaru, HVO je u noći
1./2. srpnja na prepad razoružao i zarobio četu 42. brdske
brigade ARBiH u Trijebanju. Armija Republike BiH poku-
šala je odgovoriti 13. srpnja upadom snaga 42. brdske
brigade na Dubravsku visoravan, što je nakon početnoga
uspjeha završilo potpunim debaklom. Brigada se nakon
M
toga ograničila na povremeno ubacivanje diverzantskih
skupina u zonu 1. brigade HVO-a na Dubravskoj visoravni
i terorističko djelovanje protiv civila i vojske.755
Rat s ARBiH napregnuo je HVO do krajnjih granica.
Zbog nužnosti da se dio ljudstva HVO-a iz Hercegovine
angažira u dolini Vrbasa i Rami, kao i zbog ugroze grani-
D
ce Republike Hrvatske, HV s Južnoga bojišta preuzeo je
13. kolovoza crtu HVO-a u Hercegovini od rijeke Trebiš-
njice na desnom krilu do crte Podbrđe – Radića Mahala –
korito rijeke Bregave na lijevom krilu. Položaji su preuze-
ti od 4. brigade HVO-a, koja je oslobođena za angažman
na području Gornjeg Vakufa. Radi oslobađanja dijela 1.
C
brigade HVO-a Knez Domagoj za angažman na području
Rame, Južno je bojište 8. siječnja 1994. osnovalo Ope-
rativnu skupinu Neretva, koja je preuzela osiguranje po-
dručja između rijeka Bune i Trebišnjice. Skupina je po-
stojala do travnja 1994., kada je nakon prekida sukoba
D
s ARBiH ugašena, a crta vraćena postrojbama HVO-a.756
754 1. hercegovačka brigada HVO, Izvješće kl. 02-64/93, ur.
br. 1100-11-17-93/64 od 14. 4. 1993.; 1. brigada HVO
Knez Domagoj, Upozorenje kl. 8/93-01/79, ur. br. 1100-
01-01-93-238 od 17. 4. 1993.; Komanda 4. korpusa,
Dnevno operativno izvještavanje dj. br. 02/1-3200-14/93
od 19. 4. 1993.; Komanda 4. korpusa, Izvještaj str. pov. br.
01-3573/93 od 2. 5. 1993.
755 ICTY: Prva brigada HVO “Knez Domagoj”, Zapovijed kl.
8/93-01/159-2, ur. br. 1100-01-01-93-474 od 1. 7. 1993.; E.
ŠEJTANIĆ, Hercegovci na ognjenim vratima, 167, 187-188.
756 ZM Dubrovnik ZJB, Primopredaja prostora odgovornos-
ti, kl. 8/93-03/52, ur. br. 3105-01-01-93-1 od 13. 8. 1993.;
IV ZP OSRH, Raščlamba bojnih djelovanja 1994. godine
na prostoru Južnog bojišta, Kupari, 2002., 7-8, 37.
323
Domovinski rat 04-02-2020 Knjiga 1.indd 323
area, sending a report to Sarajevo in which it was claimed
that the 42nd Mountain Brigade had been attacked by the
116th Brigade of the HVO. Later events showed that the
HVO action prevented many Muslim soldiers serving in
the HVO from deserting to ARBIH and thus disabled the
ARBIH from staging a surprise attack similar to the one
the Muslims had pulled off in Mostar on June 30, 1993.
Because of the mentioned attack in Mostar the HVO,
during the night of July 1-2, in a surprise move, took one
company of the 42nd Mountain Brigade prisoner in Trijeb-
anje. The ARBIH reacted by attempting to send the 42nd
Mountain Brigade into attack on the Dubrava plateau on
July 13. The attacked started to develop well but soon
the Muslims ran into trouble and had to retreat. The 42nd
Mountain Brigade, smarting from the fiasco, limited its
actions to commando raids in the area of responsibility
of the 1st Brigade on the Dubrava plateau and to terroriz-
ing Croatian civilians.
The war with the ARBIH stretched the HVO’s resourc-
es to the limit. The HVO had no choice but to transfer
some personnel from Herzegovina to the Vrbas Valley
and Rama. The newly created situation left the Croatian
border dangerously exposed to attack and for that rea-
son the Croatian Army forces in the Southern Theater of
Operations, on August 13, took over from the HVO the
defensive line in Herzegovina stretching from the Tre-
bišnjica River on the right flank to the Podbrđe – Radića
Mahala – Bregava River basin line on the left flank. The
Croatian Army relieved the 4th Brigade of the HVO in
these positions, thus making it possible for the 4th Bri-
gade to be transferred to the Gornji Vakuf area. In order
to free up elements of the 1st Brigade “Knez Domagoj”
of the HVO for deployment in the Rama area, the Com-
mand of the Southern Theater of Operations formed, on
January 8, 1994, Operational Group Neretva. The newly
formed group was deployed in the area between the
Buna and Trebišnjica Rivers. Operational Group Neretva
was disbanded in April, 1994, when the Muslim-Croat
R
war ended. Its positions were taken over by the HVO.
4.2.2020. 18:35:04
 Davor Marijan • Rat za opstojnost Hrvata, 1991. - 1995.
SREDIŠNJA BOSNA
Borbe u travnju 1993. godine
Prva polovina travnja 1993. u središnjoj Bosni pro-
tekla je u nizu incidenata koje su počinili pripadnici
HVO-a i ARBiH. No oni koje su počinili pripadnici AR-
BiH imali su veću težinu, pa je vojno i političko vod-
stvo Hrvata u središnjoj Bosni zaključilo da 3. korpus
završava pripreme za rat s HVO-om. Naime, u Travniku
H
su pripadnici ARBiH 8. travnja s više mjesta skinuli hr-
vatske zastave, što je kod gradskoga hotela dovelo do
sukoba s Vojnom policijom HVO-a i Postrojbom za po-
sebne namjene (PPN) Vitezovi. U pucnjavi je stradalo
nekoliko pripadnika ARBiH. Nakon toga su incidenti i
M
pucnjava u Travniku i okolici bili svakodnevni, poka-
zujući da ubojstvo zapovjednika travničke brigade
HVO-a 20. listopada 1992. nije bilo slučajan incident.
Na Ravnom Rostovu 10. travnja 1993. ubijena su dva
pripadnika HVO-a Kakanj. Hrvatsko vijeće obrane pri-
javilo je 12. travnja da je ARBiH blokirala ulaz u Travnik,
a potom na jednom punktu ranila pripadnika HVO-a.
D
Slijedila su obostrana zaustavljanja vojnika na nad-
zornim točkama, prijetnje i paljenje zastava. U općini
Busovača HVO je europskim promatračima prijavio
izradu rovova prema HVO-u i ukopavanje pripadnika
ARBiH u selima Milavice i Grablje. No, prava je bura
C
tek slijedila. Poslijepodne 13. travnja u Novom Trav-
niku skupina vojnika 7. muslimanske brigade otela je
tri časnika i vojnika brigade HVO-a Stjepan Tomašević
koji su odvedeni u smjeru Ravnog Rostova. Otmica
je podignula tenzije, HVO je blokirao grad i započela
je potraga u koju se deklarativno uključila i ARBiH iz
Novog Travnika. Navečer je u Kruščici pucano na Dar-
ka Kraljevića, zapovjednika PPN-a Vitezovi. Ujutro 15.
travnja u Podbrežju kod Zenice ARBiH otela je Živka
Totića, zapovjednika brigade HVO-a Jure Francetić, a
njegova su četiri pratitelja ubijena, kao i civil koji se
zatekao na mjestu napada. Za navedene zaroblje-
ne časnike i vojnike HVO-a, mudžahedini u sastavu
muslimanskih oružanih snaga tražili su oslobađanje
324
Domovinski rat 04-02-2020 Knjiga 1.indd 324
CENTRAL BOSNIA
Fighting in April 1993
The first half of 1993 was marked by a whole pleth-
ora of incidents instigated by both HVO and Army
of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina soldiers.
Those instigated by the Army of the Republic of Bos-
nia and Herzegovina, however, were, by far, the more
serious. The military and political leadership of the
Croats in central Bosnia, therefore, concluded that
the ARBIH III Corps was in the process of completing
its preparations for an all-out attack on the HVO. On
April 8 soldiers belonging to the Army of the Republic
of Bosnia and Herzegovina took down Croatian flags
from a number of places in Travnik. That action pro-
voked a firefight with members of the HVO Military
Police and a special purpose unit of the HVO known
as the Vitezovi (Knights). A few Muslim soldiers were
killed in the skirmish. After that shoot-out, incidents
were an everyday occurrence in Travnik. In light of that
fact, the assassination of the commander of the HVO’s
Travnik Brigade on October 20, 1992, had not been an
isolated incident or an action by renegade or maverick
Muslim soldiers. Two members of the HVO Kakanj were
killed on April 10 in Ravno Rostovo. On April 12 the
Army of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina put
Travnik under blockade and wounded one member of
the HVO at a checkpoint. The situation escalated after
that. Both sides challenged the other side’s soldiers at
checkpoints, engaged in provocations and flag burn-
ing. In the Busovača Municipality the HVO informed
the European Observes that soldiers belonging to the
D
Army of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina had
started digging trenches in their positions opposite
those held by the HVO and in the villages of Milavice
and Grablje. Worse was to follow. On the afternoon of
April 13 in Novi Travnik a group of soldiers belonging
R
to the 7th Muslim Brigade kidnapped three officers and
one soldier from the Stjepan Tomašević Brigade of the
HVO. The captives were taken in the direction of Ravno
Rostovo. The kidnapping sparked a crisis – the HVO put
the city under blockade and commenced a search for
the kidnapped officers and soldier. The forces of Army
of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina from Novi
Travnik declared that they would help. In the evening
of the same day shots were fired at Darko Kraljević,
4.2.2020. 18:35:04
 The Croatian Nation’s Struggle for Survival, 1991-1995
svojih zarobljenih pripadnika koji su bili u Kaoniku.757
Charles Shrader je primijetio da su ti napadi podsjećali
na “klasičnu operaciju obezglavljivanja neprijateljskog
zapovjednog i nadzornog sustava”.758 U oba se slučaja
Komanda 3. korpusa ARBiH ograđivala da su počinitelji
pripadnici muslimanskih oružanih snaga (mudžahedi-
ni) i da nemaju ingerenciju nad njima. U HVO-u to nisu
vjerovali i očekivali su napad ARBiH. Takvu pretpostav-
ku osnažio je napad ARBiH na HVO Konjic 14. travnja.759
Poslijepodne 15. travnja na području Kubera ranje-
H
na su dva vojnika HVO-a, a navečer istoga dana uočeno
je prikupljanje jačih snaga oko Kubera, što je za HVO
bio još jedan znak da slijedi napad muslimanskih sna-
ga. U očekivanju napada ARBiH na Vitez i sjedišta insti-
tucija HVO-a, pukovnik Tihomir Blaškić je nakon ponoći
15./16. travnja zapovjedio Policijskoj stanici Vitez da osi-
M
guraju svoju zgradu. Četvrtoj bojni VP-a zapovjeđeno je
da blokira cestu Ahmići – Nadioci, a PPN-u Vitezovi da
brane Zapovjedništvo OZ-a od napada ARBiH iz Viteza.
Viteškoj brigadi i PPN-u Tvrtko II dana je zapovijed da
blokiraju Kruščicu i Vranisku. Ukupno je HVO imao na
raspolaganju oko 330 ljudi, najvećim dijelom iz 4. bojne
D
VP-a i PPN-a Vitezovi. Na drugoj strani, ARBiH je u općini
Vitez imala 325. brdsku brigadu i prostorne snage po
selima s muslimanskim stanovništvom.760
Da bi u tako nepovoljnom odnosu snaga pokušao
omesti planirani napad na svoje snage, HVO je primije-
nio „aktivnu obranu“. Borbe su počele ujutro 16. travnja
C
preventivnim napadom HVO-a i brzo su se proširile do-
757 IV. bojna VP HVO, Izvješće o radu br. 02-4/3-07-677/93 od
14. 4. 1993.; SIS OZ SB, Izvješće br. 56/93 od 15. 4. 1993.;
IZM OZ SB, Informacija za javnost br. 08-4-172/93 od 12.
4. 1993.; IZM OZ SB, Redovito borbeno izvješće br. 03-4-
D
173/93 od 12. 4. 1993.; Zap. IV. bojne VP, Izvješće br. 02-
4/3-07-679/93 od 14. 4. 1993.; IZM OZ SB, Izvješće br. 03-
4-188-1/93 od 14. 4. 1993.; ICTY: Zap. OZ SB, Priopćenje
za javnost br. 08-4-194/1/93 od 14. 4. 1993.; Zap. OZ SB,
Informacija za javnost br. 08-4-209/93 od 14. 4. 1993.; Izv-
ješće Živka Totića o kidnapiranju i držanju u zatočeništvu
od 14. 4. 1993. do 15. 5. 1993. (nepotpisano i nedatirano);
90. domobranska pukovnija „Stjepan Tomašević“, Zaro-
bljavanje časnika HVO-a dana 13. 4. 1993., str. pov. br.
1742-07/12-07/96-80 od 12. 4. 1996.
758 C. R. SHRADER, Muslimansko-hrvatski građanski rat, 139.
759 IZM OZ SB, Izvješće br. 03-4-230/93 od 15. 4. 1993.; IZM
OZ SB, Zapovijed br. 01-4-222/93 od 15. 4. 1993.
760 IZM OZ SB, Borbena zapovijed br. 01-4-235/93 od 16. 4.
1993.; IZM OZ SB, Borbena zapovijed od 16. 4. 1993.; IZM
OZ SB, Borbena zapovijed br. 01-4-237/93 od 16. 4. 1993.;
ICTY: IZM OZ SB, Borbena zapovijed od 16. 4. 1993.; C. R.
SHRADER, Muslimansko-hrvatski građanski rat, 142-144.
325
Domovinski rat 04-02-2020 Knjiga 1.indd 325
the commander of the Vitezovi unit. On the morning
of April 15, in Podbrežje near Zenica, the Army of the
Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina kidnapped Živko
Totić, the commander of the Jure Francetić Brigade
of the HVO. Four of his friends were killed along with
one civilian bystander. The Mujahideen from the Mus-
lim armed forces demanded the release of their cap-
tured comrades held in Kaonik for the release of the
kidnapped HVO officers and soldiers. Charles Shrader
observed that “the ambush had all the hallmarks of a
classic Spesnaz “decapitation” operation”. In both cas-
es the HQ of III Corps of the Army of the Republic of
Bosnia and Herzegovina denied that the perpetrators
were members of the Muslim armed forces (Mujahi-
deen) and claimed that the HQ had no authority over
the Muslim armed forces. The HVO scoffed at the ex-
planation and concluded that an attack by the Army of
the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina was imminent.
The Army of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina
attacked the HVO in Konjic on April 14, further solidify-
ing the HVO’s conclusion that the Army of the Republic
of Bosnia and Herzegovina would shortly launch an all-
out attack on the Croats.
On April 15, in the afternoon, two HVO soldiers
were wounded in the Kuber area. In the evening on the
same day HVO soldiers noticed that the Muslims were
concentrating their forces around Kuber. That was yet
another indication that the Army of the Republic of
Bosnia and Herzegovina was getting ready to attack.
Colonel Blaškić, anticipating that the Army of the Re-
public of Bosnia and Herzegovina would attack Vitez,
the seat of the HVO’s institutions, ordered, after mid-
night on April 16 the Police Station Vitez to secure the
building. He also ordered the 4th Battalion of the Mili-
tary Police to block the Ahmići – Nadioci road and the
Vitezovi unit to guard the HQ of the OZ from a Muslim
attack from the direction of Vitez. The Vitez Brigade
and the Tvrtko II special purpose unit were ordered to
R
block Kruščica and Vraniska. The HVO had about 330
men. Most of those soldiers belonged to the 4th Bat-
talion of the Military Police and the Vitezovi unit. The
forces of the Army of the Republic of Bosnia and Herze-
govina in the Vitez Municipality consisted of the 325th
Mountain Brigade and local units in the predominantly
Muslim villages.
The forces of the Army of the Republic of Bosnia
and Herzegovina outnumbered those of the HVO. The
HVO had no choice but to resort to active defense
4.2.2020. 18:35:04
 Davor Marijan • Rat za opstojnost Hrvata, 1991. - 1995.
linom Lašve. Hrvatsko vijeće obrane nastojalo je zapo-
sjesti Donju Večerisku, Ahmiće, Sivrino Selo i Vrhovine.
Namjeravalo je riješiti džepove u zaleđu općine i učvrsti-
ti crtu na sjeveroistočnom dijelu te ujedno osigurati pro-
metnice prema Travniku, Zenici i Busovači. Zbog svojega
položaja blizu prometnice Travnik – Busovača Ahmići su
bili vrlo važno selo, a osiguravala ih je slabija četa lo-
kalnoga sastava ARBiH. Selo je napala skupina pripad-
nika 4. bojne VP-a. Tijekom borbi muslimanske snage u
Ahmićima ojačane su četom 7. muslimanske brigade, a
H
potom i ojačanim bataljunom 303. brdske brigade iz Ze-
nice, koji je dobio zadatak da ovlada dijelom prometnice
Vitez – Busovača na dijelu od Kaoničke kose do Ahmića.
Hrvatsko vijeće obrane zauzelo je selo, odbacilo musli-
manske snage sjeverno od sela pri čemu je ubijeno oko
100 osoba, a selo je potpuno uništeno.761
M
U zaključku o akciji HVO-a na Ahmiće, američki voj-
ni povjesničar Shrader zaključio je: “S isključivo vojnog
motrišta, neočekivani napad HVO-a na Ahmiće bio je
vrlo uspješan. Planirani muslimanski napad preko ceste
Travnik – Busovača kod Ahmića u potpunosti je onemo-
gućen i nije mogao biti obnovljen. Međutim, uništava-
D
nja u selu bila su užasavajuća, a civilne žrtve strašne”.762
U Vitezu su PPN Vitezovi i dio snaga Viteške brigade
u borbama od 16. do 20. travnja sabili muslimanske sna-
ge u stari dio grada (mahalu), u kojem su se one održale
unatoč upornim hrvatskim napadima. U Donjoj Večeriski
u neposrednoj blizini Viteza i iznad tvornice eksploziva
C
„Slobodan Princip Seljo“ (SPS) bio je jači vod s 40 - 50 lju-
di prostorne strukture ARBiH. Od 16. do 18. travnja selo
su zauzele slabije snage HVO-a iz sastava PPN-a Tvrtko
II i žitelja sela. Zauzimanjem sela HVO je osigurao tvor-
nicu eksploziva i onemogućio napad na Vitez iz zaleđa.
U tom je pothvatu HVO imao nekoliko ranjenih vojnika,
od kojih je jedan poslije podlegao ranama, a Muslimani
su imali 6-7 mrtvih i devet zarobljenih. Selo Gaćice jugo-
zapadno od Viteza imalo je sličnu važnost kao i Donja
Večeriska jer je bilo u neposrednoj blizini tvornice ek-
sploziva i na mjestu s kojeg je ARBiH ugrožavala grad.
761 ICTY: IZM OZ SB, br. 01-4-259/93 od 16. 4. 1993.; ICTY: Iz-
vješće Zapovjedništva IV. bojne VP od 16. 4. 1993.; ICTY:
Komanda 3. korpusa RBiH, Naređenje str. pov. br. 02/33-
872 od 16. 4. 1993.; ICTY: Komanda 3. korpusa RBiH,
Naređenje str. pov. br. 02/33-898 od 16. 4. 1993.; C. R.
SHRADER, Muslimansko-hrvatski građanski rat u središn-
joj Bosni – vojna povijest 1992.-1994., Golden marketing
– tehnička knjiga, Zagreb, 2004., 146-152.
762 Charles R. SHRADER, Muslimansko-hrvatski građanski rat,
146-152.
326
Domovinski rat 04-02-2020 Knjiga 1.indd 326
tactics to foil the Army of the Republic of Bosnia and
Herzegovina’s imminent attack. The fighting started on
the morning of April 16, when the HVO launched a pre-
emptive strike, and soon spread throughout the Lašva
Valley. The HVO’s aim was to occupy Donja Večeriska,
Ahmići, Sivrino Selo, Vrhovine, the enclaves in the rear,
solidify the line in the northeastern part of the munic-
ipality and secure the roads leading to Travnik, Zenica
and Busovača. The village of Ahmići was strategically
important because of its proximity to the Travnik –
Busovača road. It was defended by a small group of
local Army of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina
soldiers. A group from the 4th Battalion of the Military
Police of the HVO attacked the village. During the fight-
ing the Muslims in Ahmići were reinforced with a squad
from the 7th Muslim Brigade and later with a reinforced
battalion of the 303rd Mountain Brigade from Zenica,
which was ordered to gain control of the stretch of the
Vitez – Busovača road from Kaonička Kosa to Ahmići.
The HVO captured the village, pushed back the Mus-
lim forces to the north of the village. About 100 people
were killed and the village was completely destroyed.
The American military historian Charles Shrader
wrote about the battle for Ahmići: “From a purely mil-
itary point of view, the HVO spoiling attack at Ahmići
was very successful. The planned Muslim attack across
the Travnik – Busovača road in the Ahmići area was
completely disrupted and could not be resumed. How-
ever, the destruction in the village was horrific, and ci-
vilian casualties were appalling.”
In Vitez the Vitezovi unit and elements of the Vitez
Brigade forced the Muslim forces to retreat to the old
part of the city (Mahala) during the fighting between
D
April 16 and 20. The Croats launched determined at-
tacks on Mahala but were unable to dislodge the Mus-
lims from their positions there. In Donja Večeriska, near
Vitez and above the Slobodan Princip Seljo explosives
factory the Army of the Republic of Bosnia and Her-
R
zegovina had a platoon consisting of 40-50 local sol-
diers. On April 18, after two days of fighting, a small
HVO force consisting of elements of the Tvrtko II unit
and villagers captured the village. The HVO thus se-
cured the explosives factory and prevented an attack
on Vitez from the rear. A number of HVO soldiers were
wounded in the attack on the village and one of them
later succumbed to his wounds. The Muslim lost 6 or 7
men killed and 9 taken prisoner. The village of Gaćice,
located southwest of Vitez, was of similar strategic im-
4.2.2020. 18:35:04
 The Croatian Nation’s Struggle for Survival, 1991-1995
Selo je bilo miješanog sastava, a Muslimani su postali
većina dolaskom oko 200 izbjeglica iz Bosanske krajine.
Hrvatsko vijeće obrane nastojalo je zaposjesti selo pre-
govorima, bez borbi. Nakon njihova neuspjeha, ujutro
19. travnja miješana skupina HVO-a (nekoliko policaja-
ca, 20 mještana i 10-15 pripadnika Vitezova) zaposjela je
selo tijekom dana. Imala je jednog poginulog, a ARBiH
tri poginula i 47 zarobljenih ljudi.763
Težište travanjskih borbi bilo je na području susjed-
ne općine Busovača, koju je branila brigada HVO-a Niko-
H
la Šubić Zrinski s oko 1300 vojnika uz povremenu pomoć
PPN-a Vitezovi. Ona je bila prinuđena organizirati kružnu
obranu na crti dugoj oko 45 kilometara. Težište obrane
bilo je na planini Kuber, raskrižju u Kaoniku, selu Bare i
na smjeru Pezići – Gornja Rovna. Na drugoj strani bila
je 333. brdska brigada ARBiH, koja je 16. travnja ojačana
M
bataljunom 303. brdske brigade i dvjema četama Općin-
skoga štaba obrane Zenica, koje su pojačale prostorne
snage ARBiH u selima Putiš, Jelinak, Lončari i Nadioci i
koje su planirane za djelovanje na pravcu Nadioci – Si-
vrino Selo. U istočni dio općine, na područje Solakovići
– Milavice odnosno Dusina – Merdani, dovedene su sna-
D
ge iz Kaknja: bataljun 309. brigade i protudiverzantski
odred Općinskoga štaba.764
Ujutro 16. travnja 1993. počeo je napad ARBiH na
Busovaču iz smjera Gornja Rovna – Pezići i Kuber – Obla
glava – Grablje. Busovačka brigada HVO-a odbila je na-
pad uz velike gubitke. Idućega dana muslimanske su
C
snage napale Kuber, težišno sela Jelinak i Putiš, da bi
osvojile dio prometnice Kaonik – Vitez i okružile Busova-
ču. Hrvatsko vijeće obrane trudilo se održati na Kuberu
i odsudnom obranom spriječiti prodor muslimanskih
snaga prema Kaoniku i Nadiocima. Dana 18. travnja
D
uspjelo je odbiti napade ARBiH na području Polom, Vra-
ta – Skradno i Roške stijene.765
763 IZM OZ SB, str. pov. br. 11-14-274/93 od 17. 4. 1993.; C. R.
SHRADER, Muslimansko-hrvatski građanski rat, 152-159.
764 IZM OZ SB, Borbena zapovijed br. 01-4-239/93 od 16.
4. 1993.; ICTY: Komanda 3. korpusa RBiH, Naređenje
str. pov. br. 02/33-867 od 16. 4. 1993.; ICTY: Komanda 3.
korpusa RBiH, Naređenje str. pov. br. 02/33-890 od 16. 4.
1993.; IZM OZ SB, Borbena zapovijed br. 01-4-280/93 od
16. 4. 1993.; Brigada HVO “Nikola Šubić Zrinski”, Izvješće
br. 827/93 od 27. 4. 1993.
765 IZM OZ SB, Izvješće br. 01-4-302/93 od 17. 4. 1993.; IZM OZ
SB, Zapovijed br. 01-4-319/93 od 17. 4. 1993.; IZM OZ SB,
Izvješće br. 03-4-334/93 od 18. 4. 1993.; Brigada HVO “Ni-
kola Šubić Zrinski”, Izvješće br. 827/93 od 27. 4. 1993.; C. R.
SHRADER, Muslimansko-hrvatski građanski rat, 168-170.
327
Domovinski rat 04-02-2020 Knjiga 1.indd 327
portance as the village of Donja Večeriska because it
was situated in the immediate vicinity of the explosives
factory. Also, the village provided a good position to
the Army of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina
for attacks on Vitez. The population of the village, be-
fore the war, was dived, roughly equally, between Mus-
lims and Croats. But, when about 200 Muslims refugees
from Bosanska Krajina arrived in the city, the ethnic
composition of the population shifted decisively in
favor of the Muslims. The HVO tried to gain control of
the village through negotiations, without fighting. The
negotiations failed and on the morning of April 19 an
HVO combat group consisting of a few policemen, 20
residents of the village and 10-15 members of the Vi-
tezovi unit occupied the village. The HVO lost one men
killed in the engagement. The Army of the Republic of
Bosnia and Herzegovina lost three men killed and 47
taken prisoner.
The fighting in April centered on the neighboring
Busovača Municipality. The municipality was defended
by the Nikola Šubić Zrinski Brigade of the HVO – about
1,300 men strong. The Vitezovi unit, when needed and
when possible, provided support. The Nikola Šubić Bri-
gade had to set up all-round defense on a 45-kilometer
line. The strongest defensive positions were on Mount
Kuber, crossroads in Kaonik, the village of Bare and on
a line stretching from Pezići to Gornja Rovna. Opposite
the HVO forces in that area was the 333rd Mountain Bri-
gade of the Army of the Republic of Bosnia and Her-
zegovina. On April 16 the Brigade was reinforced with
one battalion of the 303rd Mountain Brigade and two
squads belonging to the municipal HQ of TO Zenica.
The Muslim order of battle in this area also included
local troops in the villages of Putiš, Jelinak, Lončari and
Nadioci. These local forces were to advance in the di-
rection of Nadioci – Sirvino Selo. The Muslims brought
forces from Kakanj to the eastern part of the munici-
pality, to the area of Solakovići – Milavice – Dusina –
R
Merdani; one battalion of the 309th Brigade and the
municipal HQ’s anti-sabotage detachment.
On the morning of April 16, 1993, the Army of the
Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina launched an at-
tack on Busovača from two directions; Gornja Rovna
– Pezići and Kuber – Obla Glava – Grablje. The Buso-
vača Brigade of the HVO repulsed the attack, suffering
a high number of casualties. On the day following the
Muslims attacked Kuber and the villages of Jelinak and
Putiš with the aim of capturing one part of the Kaonik –
4.2.2020. 18:35:04
 Davor Marijan • Rat za opstojnost Hrvata, 1991. - 1995.
U nastavku borbi ARBiH je promijenila težište djelo-
vanja i 19. travnja napala na gotovo neprohodnu i stoga
teško branjivu pravcu Polom – Kapak – Očenići. Borbe su
20. travnja nastavljene na sljedećim područjima: Polom,
Roške stijene, Putiš – Gradina – Jelinak i Bare – Donja
Rovna. Potpisano primirje na nekoliko je dana prekinulo
borbe. U vrijeme hrvatsko-muslimanskih pregovora u
Zagrebu, ARBiH je 25. travnja ponovno napala Busova-
ču s pravca Dusina – Šudine – Solakovići. Granatirana su
sela Polje, Kula, Krčevine, Ravan, Carica i sam grad. Isto-
H
dobno je ARBiH napala na Kuberu iz smjera Saračevice i
odbacila HVO na crtu Lončari – Gradina – Strane. U novi
je napad ARBiH krenula 28. travnja na crtu HVO-a na Ku-
beru i Kuli. Nije bilo pomaka, a napadi su se nastavili do
kraja mjeseca. Do 27. travnja HVO je imao velike gubitke:
12 poginulih, 54 ranjena i sedam nestalih vojnika. U gra-
M
natiranju je poginulo troje i ranjeno šest civila. Borbe za
Busovaču bile su vrlo teške, o čemu svjedoče veliki gubi-
ci HVO-a. Premda je ARBiH uspjela napraviti pomake na
terenu zauzevši dio općine, njezin temeljni cilj – zauzi-
manje Busovače i raskrižja u Kaoniku – nije realiziran.766
U Busovači se lokalni HVO uglavnom branio sam, a
D
ARBiH je dovodila snage iz Zenice i zone OG-a Lašva. Da
pomogne obrani Busovače, pukovnik Blaškić dao je 17.
travnja zadatak brigadi Ban Jelačić u Kiseljaku i Kreševu
da se uključi u sukob.767 Od brigade se tražilo da deblo-
kira prometnicu Kiseljak – Busovača i razoruža snage
ARBiH u okolici Kiseljaka. Bojna HVO-a iz Fojnice bila je
C
dužna osigurati lijevi bok i spojiti se sa snagama HVO-a u
Kreševu i Kiseljaku, a potom se spojiti sa snagama u Se-
bešiću. Kiseljačka brigada krenula je 18. travnja u napad
na Gomionicu, Višnjicu, Doce, Hercege i Svinjarevo. Za-
uzela je dio Gomionice, Svinjarevo i Rotilj, a razoružala
sela Palež, Potkraj, Paleška Ćuprija, Radanovići i dio Han
Ploče. No HVO je izgubio kotu Zavrtaljka blizu Velikih
Sotnica, koja je bila važna za prodor prema Mehurićima
i Prosju.768 Brigada je 19. travnja odbila jak napad ARBiH
766 IZM OZ SB, Izvješće br. 03-4-621/93 od 25. 4. 1993.; Briga-
da HVO “Nikola Šubić Zrinski”, Izvješće br. 827/93 od 27.
4. 1993.; C. R. SHRADER, Muslimansko-hrvatski građanski
rat, 170-175.
767 IZM OZ SB, Pripremna borbena zapovijed br. 01-4-
303/93 od 16. 4. 1993.
768 Zap. br. “Ban Jelačić”, Upute br. 01-822-1/93 od 18. 4.
1993.; IZM OZ SB, Upute za dalje djelovanje br. 01-4-
351/93 od 18. 4. 1993.; ICTY: Vojna pošta 1751, Znača-
jnija b/d brigade “Ban Josip Jelačić”, br. 03-858-1/94
od 26. 2. 1994.; C. R. SHRADER, Muslimansko-hrvatski
građanski rat, 179.
328
Domovinski rat 04-02-2020 Knjiga 1.indd 328
Vitez road and encircling Busovača. The HVO troops on
Kuber offered spirited resistance in an effort to prevent
the Muslims from advancing towards Kaonik and Nadi-
oci. The HVO, on April 18, defeated the Army of the Re-
public of Bosnia and Herzegovina’s attacks in the area
of Polom, Vrata – Skradno and Roške Stijene.
The Army of the Republic of Bosnia and Herze-
govina shifted the focus of its attacks. On April 19 it
attacked in the direction of Polom – Kapak – Očenići.
The ground there was rugged, in places impassable
but also very difficult to defend. On April 20 the fight-
ing continued in the following areas: Polom, Roške Sti-
jene, Putiš – Gradina – Jelinak and Bare – Donja Rovna.
A cease-fire was then signed but it was not destined
to last. During the negotiations between the Croats
and the Muslims in Zagreb the Army of the Republic
of Bosnia and Herzegovina again attacked Busovača
on April 25. The attack developed along the Dusina –
Šudine – Solakovići line. The Army of the Republic of
Bosnia and Herzegovina shelled the villages of Polje,
Kula, Krčevine, Ravan, Carica and the city of Busovača.
Simultaneously the Army of the Republic of Bosnia
and Herzegovina attacked the positions on Kuber from
the direction of Saračevice and pushed the HVO back
to the Lončari – Gradina – Strane line. The Army of the
Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina mounted anoth-
er attack on April 28 against the HVO’s positions on
Kuber and Kula. The attack was not successful but the
Army of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina was
not dissuaded by the setback. Attacks continued until
the end of the month, without success. By April 27 the
HVO had suffered serious casualties: 12 men killed, 54
wounded and 7 missing. Three civilians were killed and
D
six wounded in the shelling. The fighting for Busovača
was ferocious. Even though the Army of the Republic
of Bosnia and Herzegovina captured some parts of the
municipality, it failed to achieve the main objectives of
the offensive – the capture of Busovača and the Kaonik
R
crossroads.
The local HVO forces in Busovača bore the brunt
of the fighting for the city. The Army of the Republic of
Bosnia and Herzegovina, on the other hand, brought
troops from Zenica and those belonging to Operation-
al Group Lašva. Colonel Blaškić ordered, on April 17,
the Ban Jelačić Brigade, at that time deployed in Kreše-
vo and Kiseljak, to help the defenders of Busovača by
lifting the Muslim blockade of the Kiseljak – Busovača
road and disarm the Muslim forces in the Kiseljak area.
4.2.2020. 18:35:04
 The Croatian Nation’s Struggle for Survival, 1991-1995
na selo Pobrđe i nastavila napad na Gomionicu i Višnji-
cu. Armija Republike BiH je pak napala i zauzela Lisovo
brdo. Gubici brigade HVO-a bili su sedam poginulih i 10
ranjenih vojnika.769 Tijekom 20. travnja brigada HVO-a
zauzela je Višnjicu i borila se za Gomionicu. Gubici su
bili veliki, osam poginulih i 13 ranjenih vojnika. U Kre-
ševu je HVO razoružavao muslimanske snage. Idućega
je dana branio crtu organiziranu na položajima Badnje,
Pobrđe i Gomionica. U obrani je imao tri poginula i 20
ranjenih vojnika. Toga je dana (21. travnja) HVO napra-
H
vio određeni pomak kod Gomionice potisnuvši snage
ARBiH oko 500 metara sjeverno od prometnice Buso-
vača – Kiseljak. Primirje je zateklo HVO na položajima u
dijelu Gomionice i Svinjareva.770
Najveći uspjeh u travanjskim borbama postigla
je ARBiH u Zenici, gdje je HVO u odnosu na nju imao
M
osjetno manje snage – dvije brigade, od kojih je Zenič-
ka bila u ustrojavanju. Unatoč nazivu, HVO je imao oko
700 ljudi, što je osjetno manje i od jedne brigade. Ar-
mija Republike BiH imala je u Zenici sjedište i glavninu
snaga 3. korpusa, po procjenama HVO-a oko 7000 ljudi.
Uvod u sukob bila je otmica Živka Totića, zapovjednika
D
brigade HVO-a Jure Francetić, i ubojstvo njegove četve-
ročlane pratnje. Hrvatsko vijeće obrane zbog Totićeve
je otmice munjevito blokiralo Zenicu i držalo pola gra-
da pod nadzorom. HVO je Zenicu u blokadi držao dan
i pol i prekinuo je s njom na inzistiranje europskih pro-
matrača i nakon konzultacija s OZ-om Srednja Bosna
C
da smanje tenzije. Nakon povlačenja hrvatskih snaga s
glavnih prometnica, ARBiH je 17. travnja napala snage
obiju brigada HVO-a. U napadu je angažirala 7. musli-
mansku i 314. motoriziranu brigadu, dijelove 303. brd-
ske brigade i snage Općinskoga štaba Zenica. U ponoć
D
17./18. travnja OZ Srednja Bosna izvijestila je Glavni
stožer da su postrojbe HVO-a u Zenici okružene i u ra-
sulu. Oko 1500 izbjeglih Hrvata spas je potražilo u trav-
ničkim selima Brajkovićima i Grahovčićima. Dio vojnika
HVO-a uspio se s oružjem probiti do Viteza i Busovače i
od njih je poslije reorganizirana brigada Jure Francetić.
Po završetku sukoba ARBiH se domogla većega dijela
naoružanja i opreme HVO-a (oko 500 cijevi). Većina hr-
769 ICTY: Vojna pošta 1751, Značajnija b/d brigade “Ban Jo-
sip Jelačić”, br. 03-858-1/94 od 26. 2. 1994.
770 Zap. br. “Ban Jelačić”, Izvješće str. pov. br. 01-878-1/93 od
23. 4. 1993.; ICTY: Vojna pošta 1751, Značajnija b/d bri-
gade “Ban Josip Jelačić”, br. 03-858-1/94 od 26. 2. 1994.;
C. R. SHRADER, Muslimansko-hrvatski građanski rat, 179.
329
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The HVO battalion from Fojnica was tasked with secur-
ing the left flank and linking up with the HVO forces in
Kreševo and Kiseljak and then linking up with the HVO
forces in Sebešić. The Kiseljak Brigade attacked Gomi-
onica, Višnjica, Doci, Hercezi and Svinjarevo on April
18. It captured Gomionice, Svinjarevo and Rotilj and
disarmed the Muslims in the villages of Palež, Potkraj,
Paleška Ćuprija, Radanovići and in parts of Han Ploča.
However, the HVO lost Zavrtaljka Hill near Velike Sot-
nice. To the HVO, the hill was an important position
because it offered an avenue for an attack towards Me-
hurići and Prosje. On April 19 the Brigade beat back a
determined attack on the village of Pobrđe and contin-
ued attacking Gomionica and Višnjica. The Army of the
Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina attacked and cap-
tured Lisovo Brdo. The HVO lost seven men killed and
ten wounded. On April 20 the Brigade captured Višnjica
and was still engaged in the fighting for Gomionica. On
that day the number of casualties was especially high:
eight men killed and thirteen wounded. In Kreševo the
HVO was busy disarming the Muslims. On the following
day the HVO defended the positions in Badnja, Pobrđe
and Gomionica. It lost 3 men killed and 20 wounded. On
the same day (April 21) the HVO made some headway
at Gomionica and pushed back the Army of the Repub-
lic of Bosnia and Herzegovina forces about 500 meters
to the north of the Busovača – Kiseljak road. When the
cease-fire was signed the HVO held positions in parts of
Gomionica and Svinjarevo.
The Army of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegov-
ina, during April, achieved its biggest successes in Ze-
nica where it outnumbered the HVO. The HVO in the
Zenica area had only two brigades, but one of those
was in the process of forming. These formations were
brigades in name only. The HVO had only 700 men un-
der arms in the Zenica area – considerably less than
the nominal strength of one brigade. III Corps of the
Army of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina was
R
headquartered in Zenica. Also, the bulk of III Corps was
stationed in Zenica. According to the HVO’s estimates,
the Army of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina
had about 7,000 men in the Zenica area. The prelude
to the conflict there was the kidnapping of Živko Totić,
the commander of the Jure Francetić Brigade of the
HVO and the murder of his four bodyguards. The HVO,
in response, rapidly put Zenica under blockade and
gained control of one half of the city. The HVO per-
sisted with blockading Zenica for one and a half days.
4.2.2020. 18:35:04
 Davor Marijan • Rat za opstojnost Hrvata, 1991. - 1995.
H
M
Prosvjed Hrvata koje su muslimanske snage protjerale iz Zenice
(autor fotografije: Srećko Stipović).
Protest rally of the Croats expelled from Zenica by Muslim forc-
es (Photograph by Srećko Stipović).
D
vatskoga stanovništva postupno je protjerana iz Zenice,
a sela zapadno i sjeverozapadno od grada “očišćena” su.
C
Uz to je blokirana prometnica koja je povezivala HVO
Žepča i Usore s dolinom Lašve.771
U ostalim dijelovima središnje Bosne nije bilo ve-
ćih sukoba, premda je postojala velika napetost i spre-
mnost za potezanje oružja. U Travniku je 19. travnja
izbio sukob u naselju Kalibunar, no nije se proširio. U
Kaknju se 20. travnja zbio incident u kojem su poginuli
po jedan pripadnik HVO-a i ARBiH.772
771 ICTY: Komanda 303. slavne bbr, Zapovijest str. pov. br.
01/2532-1 od 16. 4. 1993.; IZM OZ SB, Izvješće br. 03-4-
334/93 od 18. 4. 1993.; IZM Vitez OZ SB, Izvješće br. 03-
4-373/93 od 19. 4. 1993.; Izvješće Vinka Barešića o orga-
nizaciji HVO Zenica od 23. 4. 1993.; Centar SIS-a OZ SB,
Izvješće br. 63-01-11/93 od 25. 6. 1993.; C. R. SHRADER,
Muslimansko-hrvatski građanski rat, 181-183.
772 IZM OZ SB, Obrana od agresije, zapovijed br. 01-4-
379/93 od 19. 4. 1993.; Izvješće VOS OZ SB o stanju od
20. 4. 1993.; IZM OZ SB, Izvješće br. 03-4-423/93 od 20.
4. 1993.; Ured za informiranje ZOZSB, Informacija za jav-
nost br. 08-4-430/93 od 20. 4. 1993.
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Domovinski rat 04-02-2020 Knjiga 1.indd 330
The European observers insisted that the HVO lifted
the blockade so as to diffuse the situation. Having dis-
cussed the matter with Operative Zone Central Bosnia
the HVO complied. When the HVO withdrew its forces
from the main roads the Army of the Republic of Bosnia
and Herzegovina attacked both HVO brigades in Zen-
ica on April 17. The 7th Muslim Brigade and the 314th
Motorized Brigade, elements of the 303rd Mountain Bri-
gade and units belonging to the Municipal HQ Zenica
participated in the attack. At midnight on April 17-18
Operative Zone Central Bosnia informed the Main HQ
that the HVO forces in Zenica were surrounded and
near collapse. About 1,500 Croatian refugees fled to
the villages of Brajković and Grahovčići in the Travnik
area. Some HVO soldiers managed to retreat to Vitez
and Busovača. These troops later formed the nucleus
of the reorganized Jure Francetić Brigade. The Army of
the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina captured most
of the HVO’s equipment and weapons in Zenica (about
500 small arms). Most of the Croats from the Zenica
area were gradually expelled and the villages located
to the north and northwest of the city were ethnically
cleansed. The Army of the Republic of Bosnia and Her-
zegovina also blocked the road connecting the HVO
units in Žepče and Usora with the Lašva Valley.
Heavy fighting did not develop in the other parts
of central Bosnia. Tensions ran high though. On April
19 there was fighting in the Kalibunar settlement, but
it did not spread. On April in Kakanj violence flared up
between the HVO and the Army of the Republic of Bos-
nia and Herzegovina. Both sides lost one soldier killed
in the incident.
The speed and ferocity of the reaction of the Army
D
of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina to the HVO’s
preemptive strike at Vitez shows that the Muslims had
been preparing an attack on the HVO. The Army of the
Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina put sustained and
growing pressure on the HVO in Vitez and Busovača.
R
That the Army of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovi-
na was able to do so was due to the fact that the Army’s
combat value and the efficiency of its organizational
structure were steadily on the increase. The HVO’s per-
formance, on the other hand, revealed the local nature
of its character. This inherent flaw in the HVO’s struc-
ture became painfully obvious in Fojnica when the Fo-
jnica HVO Battalion refused to attack Dusina so as to
help the Croatian forces in Konjic. The Fojnica Battalion
also refused to provide assistance in Busovača, regard-
4.2.2020. 18:35:04
 The Croatian Nation’s Struggle for Survival, 1991-1995
Brzina i silina odgovora ARBiH na preventivni na-
pad HVO-a kod Viteza potvrđuje da je bila zatečena u
pripremama za sukob s HVO-om. Tijek događanja i su-
stavni pritisak na HVO u Vitezu i Busovači pokazuju da
su njezina borbena sposobnost i organizacija sustavno
rasle. Hrvatsko je vijeće obrane pak pokazalo da lokalni
karakter vojske i dalje egzistira. To je posebice bilo izra-
ženo u Fojnici, gdje se bojna HVO-a odbila angažirati
da pomogne hrvatskim snagama u Konjicu pritiskom
na Dusinu, ali i u Busovači, s kojom su bili u istoj brigadi
H
(Nikola Šubić Zrinski). Nije pomoglo ni operativno pri-
dodavanje bojne brigadi HVO-a Kiseljak.773
Sudeći prema izvješćivanju medija i njegovom
odjeku u svjetskoj javnosti, sukob u travnju 1993. obi-
lježio je zločin u Ahmićima, u kojem su, uz pripadnike
ARBiH ubijene u borbi, pripadnici HVO-a izvan borbe-
M
nih djelovanja ubili i civile. U tom je selu HVO kom-
promitirao svoje pravo na obranu. Posljedice su bile
trenutačne i još traju. Napad ARBiH na HVO u Konjicu
i etničko čišćenje općine gurnuto je u drugi plan. Pre-
ma hrvatskim podacima od 26. travnja 1993., na strani
HVO-a u središnjoj Bosni do tada su, u desetak dana od
D
početka napada, poginula 72 vojnika i 12 civila, ranje-
na su 163 vojnika i 14 civila, zarobljeno je 676 civila i
vojnika, nestala je 91 osoba, a prognana su 194 vojnika
i 1820 civila.774
U travnju su u HVO-u shvatili da je ARBiH počela rat
zbog čega su joj sasvim blokirali dovoz oružja i vojne
C
opreme. Iznimka je konvoj propušten za Srebrenicu,
koji je ARBiH u Visokom istovarila, a oružje iskoristila za
napad na HVO.775 Treći je korpus u predahu nastalom
nakon potpisanog primirja 22. travnja dao smjernice
za razbijanje i razoružavanje HVO-a. Operativna grupa
D
Bosanska krajina zadužena je da razbije HVO u Travniku
i Novom Travniku. Operativna grupa Lašva s glavninom
7. muslimanske brigade i po jednim bataljunom 303.,
305. i 306. brigade i Samostalnim diverzantskim bata-
ljunom određena je da razbije HVO u Busovači, Kaknju
773 IZM OZ SB, Zapovijed br. 01-04-335/93 od 18. 4. 1993.;
IZM OZ SB br. 01-4-377/93 od 19. 4. 1993.; IZM OZ SB,
Zapovijed br. 01-4-418/93 od 20. 4. 1993.
774 IZM OZ SB, Vanredno izvješće br. 01-4-653/93 od 26. 4.
1993.; C. HODGE, Velika Britanija i Balkan od 1991. do da-
nas, 134-147.
775 O tome je svjedočio jedan zaštićeni svjedok na ICTY-u u
slučaju protiv generala Tihomira Blaškića. Podatak sam
dobio upravo od generala Blaškića.
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Domovinski rat 04-02-2020 Knjiga 1.indd 331
less of the fact that the battalion formed part of the
Busovača Brigade. The situation did not improve even
when the battalion was placed under the command of
the Kiseljak Brigade of the HVO.
In the context of the world media, the conflict in
central Bosnia in April, 1993, was indelibly marked by
the crime in Ahmići. In that incident members of the
HVO deliberately killed a number of civilians. It is fair
to point out that what happened in the village of Ah-
mići compromised the HVO’s right to self-defense. The
consequences of the media exposure of the crime in
Ahmići were both immediate and long-lasting. The
crime in Ahmići, deservedly or not, completely over-
shadowed the Army of the Republic of Bosnia and Her-
zegovina’s attack on the HVO in Konjic and the subse-
quent ethnic cleansing of the municipality. According
to the Croatian report of April 26, 1993, the Croatian
losses in central Bosnia, until that day from the begin-
ning of the attack – a period of ten days – were: 72 sol-
diers and 12 civilians killed, 163 soldiers and 14 civilians
wounded, 676 soldiers and civilians taken prisoner and
91 persons missing. The Muslims expelled 194 Croatian
soldiers and 1,820 civilians from the region.
In April the HVO realized that the Army of the Re-
public of Bosnia and Herzegovina started a war against
them. The HVO’s reacted by blocking the routes by
which the Army of the Republic of Bosnia and Herze-
govina was getting weapons and matériel. The HVO
made one exception; it let a convoy for Srebrenica
through. The convoy never reached its stated destina-
tion though. The Army of the Republic of Bosnia and
Herzegovina unloaded the weapons and equipment in
Visoko and used it for their attack on the HVO. III Corps,
taking advantage of the cease-fire signed on April 22
created plans for destroying and disarming the HVO
in Travnik and Novi Travnik. Operational Group Lašva,
with the bulk of the 7th Muslim Brigade, one battalion
of the 303rd Brigade, one battalion of the 305th Brigade,
R
one Battalion from the 306th Brigade and the Indepen-
dent Commando Battalion was to destroy the HVO in
Busovača, Kakanj and Vitez and then help Operational
Group East and Operational Group Igman to capture
Kiseljak. Group Bosna was tasked with destroying the
HVO forces in Žepče and Zavidovići and Operational
Group East, assisted by Operational Group Lašva, to
destroy the HVO forces in Vareš.
4.2.2020. 18:35:05
 Davor Marijan • Rat za opstojnost Hrvata, 1991. - 1995.
i Vitezu, a potom pomogne operativnim grupama Istok
i Igman da zauzmu Kiseljak. Operativna grupa Bosna
određena je da razbije HVO u Žepču i Zavidovićima, a
OG Istok da uz pomoć snaga iz OG-a Lašva razbije HVO
u Varešu.776
Travnik i Novi Travnik
Nakon zatišja dužeg od mjesec dana, ARBiH je u lip-
nju ponovno krenula u napad. Cilj je bio Travnik i Novi
H
Travnik. U tri brigade u Travniku (17. i 306. brdska i 312.
motorizirana) ARBiH je krajem svibnja imala 5260 ljudi,
a u Novom Travniku 308. brdsku brigadu s 1920 vojni-
ka. Glavna snaga ARBiH bila je 17. brdska brigada, čije
je ljudstvo – koje li ironije – organizirano i opremljeno
godinu dana prije u Hrvatskoj.777
M
Hrvatsko vijeće obrane Travnika sastojalo se od dvi-
je brigade jačine pet bojni, koje su zajedno imale izme-
đu 2500 i 3000 ljudi. Travnička brigada imala je tri, a bri-
gada Frankopan (osnovana 1. travnja 1993.) dvije bojne.
Sjedište HVO-a bilo je u Jankovićima iznad Travnika. Uz
držanje crte, prioritetna zadaća Travničke brigade bila
D
je obrana platoa Vilenice i osiguranje repetitora, a no-
votravničke brigade Stjepan Tomašević obrana Logistič-
ke baze u Stojkovićima i blokada cesta na smjeru Opara
– Kruščica. Prema podacima HVO-a, upravo su oni drža-
li dvije trećine crte prema VRS-u na travničkom dijelu
bojišta. Novotravnička brigada HVO-a držala je crtu od
C
Slatke vode do Petkovića, gdje je crtu preuzimala ARBiH.
Travnička brigada HVO-a držala je crtu od Slatke vode
pa sjeveroistočno do Kazića (oko 4,5 kilometra), potom
je ARBiH držala dionicu crte od oko 2 kilometra do sjeve-
roistočnoga kraja Giganića. Travnička brigada potom je
preuzimala crtu na isturenom dijelu prema Turbetu, pa
istočno do kote 1109. Ondje je crtu preuzimala brigada
Frankopan i držala je na Vlašiću do Vlaške gromile, gdje
ju je ponovno preuzimala ARBiH. Travnik je nadzirala AR-
BiH, a HVO je zadržao jedan stožer i dio grada. Ulaz u
grad nadzirala je ARBiH na nadzornoj točki Plava voda.778
776 ICTY: Komanda 3. korpusa, Naređenje str. pov. br. 02/33-
957 od 22. 4. 1993.
777 ICTY: Pregled popune jedinica 3. korpusa na dan 24. 5.
1993.; C. R. SHRADER, Muslimansko-hrvatski građanski
rat, 199-200.
778 IZM OZ SB, Zapovijed, str. pov. br. 01-5-381/93 od 16. 5.
1993.; C. R. SHRADER, Muslimansko-hrvatski građanski
rat, 201.
332
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Travnik and Novi Travnik
After a lull lasting more than a month the Army of
the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina attacked again
in June. The aim was to capture Travnik and Novi Travnik.
In Travnik the Army of the Republic of Bosnia and Her-
zegovina had three brigades (17th, 306th Mountain and
312th Motorized) with 5,260 men altogether. In Novi
Travnik the Army of the Republic of Bosnia and Herze-
govina had, at the end of May, the 308th Mountain Bri-
gade with 1,920 soldiers. The main formation of the Army
of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina was the 17th
Mountain Brigade – formed, organized and equipped a
year before in Croatia.
The HVO in Travnik consisted of two brigades with
between 2,500-3,000 men altogether. The two bri-
gades, between them, had five battalions. The Travnik
Brigade had three and the Frankopan Brigade (formed
on April 1, 1993) two battalions. The HQ of the HVO
Travnik was in Jankovići above Travnik. The main task
of the Travnik Brigade, in addition to holding the de-
fensive line, was to defend the Vilenica plateau and se-
cure the repeater. The Novi Travnik Stjepan Tomašević
Brigade’s task was to defend the logistics base in Sto-
jkovići and block the Opara – Kruščica road. The HVO
held two thirds of the line opposite the VRS forces in
the Travnik area. The positions of the Novi Travnik Bri-
gade of the HVO stretched from Slatka Voda to Petkov-
ić. The remainder of the line was held by the Army of
the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina. The Travnik
Brigade of the HVO held the portion of the line from
Slatka Voda to Kazić (this part of the line stretched in
northeasterly direction and was 4.5 kilometers long).
D
From Kazić the line continued in the same direction for
about two kilometers as far as the end of the village of
Giganić. That part of the line was held by the Army of
the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina. The positions
where the line bulged towards Turbe were held by the
R
Travnik Brigade of the HVO. These positions stretched
as far as the high ground designated as Hill 1109. From
there the positions along the defensive line were held
by the Frankopan Brigade. This part of the line extend-
ed from Vlašić to Vlaška Gomila. From there, the posi-
tions were held by the Army of the Republic of Bosnia
and Herzegovina. The Army of the Republic of Bosnia
and Herzegovina controlled Travnik. The HVO had one
HQ in the city and controlled only one neighborhood
of the city. The Army of the Republic of Bosnia and
4.2.2020. 18:35:05
 The Croatian Nation’s Struggle for Survival, 1991-1995
Kao i na drugim etnički miješanim područjima,
nacionalno motivirani incidenti bili su česti, posebice
krajem svibnja 1993. godine. Obje su strane optuživale
onu drugu da izaziva nemire. Odgovarajući na prosvjed
ARBiH, pukovnik Blaškić odbacio je 1. lipnja njihove
optužbe i ustvrdio da incidenti i zbivanja u Travniku
pokazuju da ARBiH provodi obimne vojne aktivnosti.
UNPROFOR je upozoren da ARBiH priprema otvaranje
novog ratnog žarišta.779
Nakon nekoliko dana ispunjenih incidentima i
H
manjom razmjenom vatre, muslimanske su snage 3.
lipnja krenule u napad na grad Travnik iako su u nje-
mu trajali pregovori civilnih i vojnih vlasti o uređenju
odnosa u 10. provinciji. Napad je vodila i organizirala
Komanda OG Bosanska krajina, pod čijim su zapovjed-
ništvom bile snage 17. brdske brigade, dijelovi 306. i
M
312. brigade, bataljun 7. muslimanske brigade, pro-
storne snage Općinskoga štaba Travnik i Stanice javne
bezbjednosti Travnik. Navečer 3. lipnja muslimanske
su snage napale HVO i hrvatska sela u blizini Doca i
zauzele okolne gospodarske objekte. Tijekom 4. lipnja
najžešće su se borbe vodile u gradskom naselju Kali-
D
bunar. Važnu ulogu u napadu odigrali su dijelovi 17.
krajiške brdske brigade ARBiH ubačeni u zaleđe snaga
HVO-a koje su držale crtu prema Srbima. Travničkoj
brigadi HVO-a pomogle su postrojbe posebne namje-
ne i dio brigade Stjepan Tomašević. Snage ARBiH ušle
su 6. lipnja u sela Prići i Šipovik i osvojile dio platoa
C
Vilenice. Iz pravca Vakufa i Ilovače snage ARBiH zauze-
le su hrvatska sela Gornji Dolac i Grahovik i osigurale
spoj od Heldova do Slimene. Nakon dvodnevnih borbi
HVO je potisnut iz Travnika u zapadni dio općine, u na-
selja Kalibunar, Šipovik, Kraljevice, Paklarevo i Ovčare-
D
vo. Jedini izlaz bilo je prestrojavanje snaga s položaja
prema VRS-u i povlačenje prema Novom Travniku i Bi-
loj. Brigada se u noći 6./7. lipnja podijelila i s glavnim
snagama i pokretnim civilima probila preko planina
Kajabaše i Bukovice do Guče Gore i dalje prema Biloj
kod Viteza. Ranjenici, nepokretni invalidi, starci i djeca
izvučeni su poslijepodne 7. lipnja na Galicu, teritorij
koji je nadzirao VRS. S njima je ostao odsječen i dio za-
laznice brigade koji je osiguravao njihov prijelaz. Srp-
ske su snage izdvojile 880 vojno sposobnih muškaraca
i 8. lipnja odvezle ih na Manjaču. Nakon što je sasvim
779 ICTY: OG “Bosanska Krajina”, Protest br. 09/115-2 od 31.
5. 1993.; IZM OZ SB, Odgovor br. 01-6-15/93 od 1. 6.
1993.
333
Domovinski rat 04-02-2020 Knjiga 1.indd 333
Herzegovina had a checkpoint at Plava Voda, thus con-
trolling the main entry point into the city.
Just like in the other ethnically mixed areas, ethnic
tensions ran high and ethnically motivated incidents
were common, especially towards the end of May, 1993.
Both sides regularly accused the other of provoking in-
cidents. On June 1 Colonel Blaškić rejected the Army of
the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina’s complaints
and concluded that the incidents and the situation in
Travnik irrefutably proved that the Army of the Republic
of Bosnia and Herzegovina was conducting preparations
for a large-scale operation. The HVO duly informed and
warned UNPROFOR of the Army of the Republic of Bos-
nia and Herzegovina’s activities and intentions.
After a string of numerous incidents and minor skir-
mishes lasting a few days, the Army of the Republic of
Bosnia and Herzegovina finally launched its attack on
Travnik on June 3, completely disregarding the fact that
negotiations between the civil and military authorities
of the Croats and the Muslims about regulating the Mus-
lim-Croat relationship were in progress in the city. The
attack was planned and led by the HQ of Operational
Group Bosanska Krajina. Under its command were the
17th Mountain Brigade, elements of the 306th and 312th
Brigades, one battalion of the 7th Muslim Brigade, local
forces belonging to the municipal HQ of Travnik and
the Travnik police station. On the evening of June 3 the
Muslims attacked the HVO and the Croatian villages
near Doc and captured all the important facilities and
installations in the area. On June 4 ferocious fighting de-
veloped in the Kalibunar neighborhood of Travnik. The
pivotal role in the attack was played elements of the 17th
Krajina Mountain Brigade of the Army of the Republic
of Bosnia and Herzegovina which infiltrated the defen-
sive line the HVO held opposite the VRS’s positions. The
Travnik Brigade of the HVO received help from the spe-
cial purpose unit and elements of the Stjepan Tomašević
Brigade. The Army of the Republic of Bosnia and Her-
R
zegovina entered the villages of Prići and Šipovik and
captured a part of the Vilenica plateau on June 6. The
Muslim forces attacking from the direction of Vakuf and
Ilovača captured the Croatian villages of Gornji Dolac
and Grahovik and thus established a line from Heldovo
to Slimena. After two days of fighting the HVO forces
were pushed back from Travnik into the western part of
the municipality – into the neighborhoods of Kalibunar,
Šipovik, Kraljevice, Paklarevo and Ovčarevo. The only
option available to the HVO at that point was to with-
4.2.2020. 18:35:05
 Davor Marijan • Rat za opstojnost Hrvata, 1991. - 1995.
ovladala Travnikom, ARBiH je 7. lipnja napala hrvatska
naselja istočno i sjeveroistočno od njega. Do 14. lipnja
zauzela je Grahovčiće, Brajkoviće, Plavičiće, Guču Goru
i Bukovicu, očistila područje sjeveroistočno od Travni-
ka i potpuno stavila pod nadzor prometnicu Travnik –
Guča Gora – Zenica. Prodor ARBiH prema Novoj Biloj
brigada HVO-a Frankopan zaustavila je u borbama 12.
i 13. lipnja 1993., kada je vratila izgubljeni položaj Hra-
šće. U tim je borbama brigada imala 17 poginulih i 72
ranjena vojnika. Obje travničke brigade HVO-a preu-
H
zele su crtu obrane na području općine Novi Travnik:
Travnička brigada od Kule do Nević Polja, a brigada
Frankopan od Kule do Pokrajčića. Ljudstvo Travničke
brigade koje se predalo Srbima prebačeno je 13. lipnja
u Vareš, a 21. lipnja na područje Kiseljaka i Kreševa, u
zonu brigade Ban Jelačić.780
M
Napad ARBiH na HVO u Travniku bio je najkrvaviji
dio muslimansko-hrvatskoga rata. U borbama od 3. do
15. lipnja Travnička brigada imala je 43 poginula i 124
ranjena vojnika, a brigada Frankopan 90 poginulih i
127 ranjenih vojnika. Tih je dana ubijena većina od 118
civila i nenaoružanih Hrvata tijekom toga sukoba. Naj-
D
više ih je ubijeno 8. lipnja u selima Čukle (22) i Maljine
(37 osoba). Većina hrvatskoga stanovništva evakuirana
je i protjerana na područje Nova Bila – Vitez – Busovača
– Novi Travnik, a sela su opljačkana i spaljena. Gubici
ARBiH također su bili veliki. Glavna postrojba, 17. kra-
jiška brdska brigada, imala je do 10. lipnja 12 poginulih
C
i 52 ranjena borca, a 312. motorizirana osam poginulih
i 68 ranjenih.781
Nakon što je ovladala Travnikom, OG Bosanska Kra-
jina ARBiH u rano jutro 9. lipnja napala je HVO u op-
ćini Novi Travnik. Najprije su napadnuta sela između
Gornjeg Vakufa i Novog Travnika. Đakovići i Kasapovići
780 IZM OZ SB, Prosvjed str. pov. br. 03-6-117/93 od 4. 6.
1993.; IZM OZ SB, Izvješće str. pov. br. 01-6-128/93 od
4. 6. 1993.; IZM OZ SB, Izvješće str. pov. br. 01-6-168/93
od 5. 6. 1993.; IZM OZ SB, Izvješće str. pov. br. 03-6-
194/93 od 6. 6. 1993.; IZM OZ SB, Vanredno izvješće str.
pov. br. 01-6-345/93 od 13. 6. 1993.; Vanredno izvješće
Zapovjedništva “Travničke brigade” od 15. 6. 1992.; Izv-
ješće Bojne “Dr. Nikola Tusun” od 30. 7. 1993. o borben-
om putu bojne; C. R. SHRADER, Muslimansko-hrvatski
građanski rat, 202-205.
781 ICTY: Zapovjedništvo 312. mtbr, Zbirni borbeni izvještaj
str. pov. br. 02/33-423-11/93 od 11. 6. 1993.; IZM OZ SB,
Tabelarni spisak str. pov. br. 13-6-384/93 od 16. 6. 1993.;
A. KLIKO, F. ĆUSKIĆ, 17. Viteška Krajiška brdska brigada
ARBiH, 146.
334
Domovinski rat 04-02-2020 Knjiga 1.indd 334
draw most of the forces manning the positions opposite
the VRS and retreat towards Novi Travnik and Bila. The
Brigade split during the night of June 6-7 and joined
the retreating main force and civilians. The soldiers and
civilians retreated across Mount Kajabaša and Mount
Bukovica and reached Guča Gora whence they contin-
ued the trek towards Bila near Vitez. The wounded, im-
mobile invalids, infirm and children were evacuated on
the afternoon of June 7 to Galica, an area controlled by
the VRS. The rear guard of the brigade was cut off. The
Serbs separated 880 men fit for military service from the
group and transported them, on June 8, to Manjača. On
June 7, having gained full control of Travnik, the Army
of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina attacked the
Croatian villages located to the north and northeast of
the city. By June 14 the Army of the Republic of Bosnia
and Herzegovina had captured Grahovčići, Brajkovići,
Plavičići, Guča Gora and Bukovica, mopped up the area
to the northeast of Travnik and gained complete control
of the Travnik – Guča Gora – Zenica road. The advance
of the Army of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina
towards Novo Bila was halted by the Frankopan Brigade
of the HVO on June 12 and 13. The Frankopan Brigade
also managed to retake Hrašće. This success of the Fran-
kopan Brigade was achieved at the cost of 17 men killed
and 72 wounded. The Travnik Brigade and the Franko-
pan Brigade took up positions in the Novi Travnik area:
the Travnik Brigade from Kula as far as Nević Polje and
the Frankopan Brigade from Kule as far as Pokrajčić. The
men from the Travnik Brigade who had surrendered to
the Serbs were transported to Vareš on June 13 and on
June 21 to the Kiseljak and Kreševo area, a region con-
trolled by the Ban Jelačić Brigade.
D
The ARBIH’s attack on the HVO in Travnik was the
bloodiest episode of the Muslim-Croatian war in Bosnia
and Herzegovina. In the fighting from June 3 to June
15 the Travnik Brigade lost 43 killed and 124 wounded
soldiers and the Frankopan Brigade lost 90 men killed
R
and 127 wounded. The majority of the 118 civilians and
unarmed Croats who lost their lives in the conflict were
killed during that battle. Most of them were killed on
June 8 – 22 in the village of Čukle and 37 in the village
of Maljine. Most of the Croatian population was evacu-
ated and/or expelled to the Nova Bila – Vitez – Busovača
– Novi Travnik area and their houses looted and torched.
The Army of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina also
suffered horrendous casualties. The main formation, the
17th Krajina Mountain Brigade had lost, by June 10, 12
4.2.2020. 18:35:05
 The Croatian Nation’s Struggle for Survival, 1991-1995
zauzeti su 10. lipnja. Idućega dana okružena su sela
Zubići, Margetići, Gornje i Donje Pećine i Ruda. Napad
na Logističku bazu u Stojkovićima HVO je odbio. U taj
je kaos upao humanitarni konvoj s pomoći za Tuzlu,
koji su u Novom Travniku pobješnjeli civili napali, ubili
nekoliko vozača i dijelom ga opljačkali. Nastavljajući
napad, ARBiH je 12. lipnja zauzela tvornicu Bratstvo i
ozbiljno ugrozila Stojkoviće. Posebice je jak napad bio
14. lipnja u zoni brigade HVO-a Stjepan Tomašević u
selima oko Novog Travnika i zapadno od njega: Ruda,
H
Brkanove kuće, Budušići, Zubići, Rastovci, Margetići i
u Logističkoj bazi Stojkovići. Od 9. do 14. lipnja briga-
da je imala 35 poginulih vojnika. U zonama travničkih
brigada ARBiH je pomaknula crtu u Docu na Lašvi i
intenzivno napadala na Gostunju i smjeru Brankovac
– Pokrajčići. Hrvatsko vijeće obrane branilo se uz veli-
M
ke gubitke, premoreno i malobrojno ljudstvo. Dnevni
gubici po brigadi HVO-a bili su u prosjeku 15-17 pogi-
nulih i oko 30 ranjenih. Hrvatska sela zapadno od Trav-
nika nisu izdržala i 15. lipnja stanovništvo se povuklo
u selo Ruda i iz njega prešlo na područje Republike
Srpske. Vojsci je naređeno da se, nakon što se osigura
D
izvlačenje civila, probije prema Pribilovićima, što nije
uspjelo, pa se jedna bojna povukla u zonu VRS-a te je
poslije prebačena u Livno. Njihovo izvlačenje pokuša-
la je iskoristiti 30. krajiška divizija VRS-a da zaposjedne
napuštene položaje HVO-a na Kamenjašu i Mravinjcu
između Donjeg Vakufa i Novog Travnika, što je ARBiH
C
uspjela spriječiti.782
Armija Republike BiH potom je nastavila pritisak
na Sebešić i Rostovo, planinsko područje između Gor-
njeg Vakufa i Lašvanske doline, radi odsijecanja središ-
nje Bosne od Hercegovine i spajanja snaga ARBiH iz
D
Novog Travnika, Gornjeg Vakufa i Fojnice. Na području
Sebešića HVO je imao oko 250 vojnika. Preko Sebeši-
ća i Busovačkih staja HVO iz Prozora doturao je oružje
i opremu. Operativna grupa ARBiH Bosanska Krajina
782 IZM OZ SB, Izvješće str. pov. br. 03-6-275/93 od 9. 6.
1993.; IZM OZ SB, Izvješće str. pov. br. 03-6-288/93 od
10. 6. 1993.; IZM OZ SB, str. pov. br. 01-6-291/93 od 10.
6. 1993.; IZM OZ SB, Izvješće str. pov. br. 03-6-306/93 od
11. 6. 1993.; IZM OZ SB, Vanredno izvješće str. pov. br.
01-6-317/93 od 12. 6. 1993.; Vanredno izvješće IZM OZ
SB od 14. 6. 1993.; IZM OZ SB, Izvješće str. pov. br. 03-6-
375/93 od 15. 6. 1993.; IZM OZ SB, Borbena zapovijed
str. pov. br. 01-6-370/93 od 15. 6. 1993.; IZM OZ S/ZH,
Redovno borbeno izvješće str. pov. br. 01-1684/93 od
15. 7. 1993.; A. KLIKO, F. ĆUSKIĆ, 17. Viteška Krajiška brds-
ka brigada ARBiH, 142-145.
335
Domovinski rat 04-02-2020 Knjiga 1.indd 335
men killed and 52 wounded and the 312th Motorized
Brigade eight killed and 68 wounded.
Having gained control of Travnik Operational
Group Bosanska Krajina of the Army of the Republic of
Bosnia and Herzegovina attacked the HVO forces in the
Travnik Municipality on the morning of June 9. The first
targets of the attack were the villages between Gornji
Vakuf and Novi Travnik. The village of Đakovići and the
village of Kasapovići were captured on June 10. During
the following day the Army of the Republic of Bosnia
and Herzegovina encircled the villages of Zubići, Mar-
getići, Gornje Pećina, Donja Pećina and Ruda. The HVO
managed to repulse the attack on the logistics base in
Stojkovići. A convoy bringing humanitarian aid to Tuzla,
unsuspectingly, drove straight into the chaos of battle
in Novi Travnik. Enraged civilians attacked the convoy,
killed a number of drivers and looted some vehicles.
The Army of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina
continued to attack and on June 12 it captured the
Bratstvo factory and stood poised to capture Stojkov-
ići. On June 14 the Army of the Republic of Bosnia and
Herzegovina launched especially determined forays
against villages around Novi Travnik and villages to the
north of the city – the area of responsibility of the Stje-
pan Tomašević Brigade. During the period from June 9
to June 14 the Stjepan Tomašević Brigade lost 35 men
killed. In the fighting against the Travnik Brigade the
Army of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina man-
aged to push the defenders back at Dolac na Lašvi and
continued pressing in Gostunje and in the direction of
Brankovac – Pokrajčići. The HVO was hard pressed to
hold the line; casualties were heavy, the Muslims were
numerically vastly superior and the Croat soldiers were
physically and mentally exhausted. Every HVO Brigade
lost between 15-17 men killed and about 30 wounded
a day. The defenders of the Croatian villages to the west
of Travnik could not hold their positions any longer.
On June 15, the residents of the villages fled to the vil-
R
lage of Ruda and thence to the Republika Srpska. The
soldiers were ordered to protect the civilians on their
trek to the Republika Srpska and then fight their way
to Pribilovići. The Croatian soldiers did not manage to
break through the Muslim lines and reach Pribilovići.
One battalion retreated into the area controlled by the
VRS and was later moved to Livno. The 30th Krajina Di-
vision of the VRS tried to take advantage of the retreat
of these Croatian forces by occupying the vacated po-
sitions on Kamenjaš and Mravinac between Donji Vakuf
4.2.2020. 18:35:05
 Davor Marijan • Rat za opstojnost Hrvata, 1991. - 1995.
za napad je angažirala 308. brdsku brigadu, bataljun
17. krajiške brdske brigade i dio Odreda CSB-a Banja
Luka. Najprije su pala sela Zeke i Perići, a navečer 24.
lipnja osvojeni su Dahovo, Rat i Potkraj. Sebešić je pao
2. srpnja nakon neuspješnog pokušaja da se obrani
pomogne s pravca Busovače u pothvatu zvanom Klin.
Hrvatsko vijeće obrane imalo je 13 poginulih i 12 za-
robljenih vojnika. Oko 220 vojnika povuklo se u Gornji
Vakuf/Uskoplje i od njih je osnovana Lašvanska bojna
HVO-a, koja je angažirana na uskopaljsko-ramskom di-
H
jelu bojišta.783
Kakanj
Kakanj je bila općina s većinskim muslimanskim
stanovništvom, kojega je bilo dvostruko više od Hr-
M
vata. Hrvati su bili grupirani u istočnom dijelu općine,
oko Kraljeve Sutjeske. U općini je ARBiH formirala 309.
brdsku brigadu, a dio ljudstva je bio u 7. muslimanskoj
brdskoj brigadi. Krajem 1992. od HVO-a Kakanj i Vareš
osnovana je brigada Bobovac. U ožujku i travnju 1993.
iz brigade Bobovac izdvojen je kakanjski dio, od kojega
D
je osnovana brigada Kotromanić.784
Izvidničko-diverzantska skupina ARBIH upala je
8. lipnja 1993. u Lučiće i ubila jednog vojnika HVO-a.
Hrvatske su snage rastjerale muslimansku skupinu,
što je ARBIH iskoristila kao povod za napad na HVO
u Kaknju. Napad je počeo 9. lipnja na sela naseljena
C
Hrvatima: Teševo, Seoce, Velike Trnovce, Dujmoviće,
Bjelaviće, Goru, Crnač, Slapnicu, Lipnicu i Kraljevu
Sutjesku. Brigada Bobovac pomogla je brigadi Kotro-
manić s jednom satnijom vojnika. Armija Republike
BiH ultimativno je 12. lipnja tražila da se HVO preda,
što je odbijeno. Idućega dana ARBiH je probila crtu
HVO-a u selu Teševu, na Krevniku i Bistranima, čime je
pala obrana hrvatskoga dijela Kaknja. Brigada Kotro-
manić potom se s oko 15.000 civila povukla u Vareš.
Do kraja listopada 1993. civili su postupno preko po-
783 IZM OZ SB, Vanredno izvješće br. 01-6-550/93 od 24.
6. 1993.; IZM OZ SB, Izvješće br. 03-6-564/93 od 25. 6.
1993.; Komanda 3. korpusa RBiH, Obavještenje str. pov.
br. 02/33-1670 od 2. 7. 1993.; IZM OZ SB, Izvanredno izv-
ješće br. 01-7-55/93 od 3. 7. 1993.; SIS ZP TG, Rješavanje
problema u Lašvanskoj bojni kl. 2-64/93, ur. br. 723/93
od 7. 11. 1993.; A. KLIKO, F. ĆUSKIĆ, 17. Viteška Krajiška
brdska brigada ARBiH, 147-148.
784 Zapovjedništvo brigade HVO “Bobovac”, Zapovijed br.
01-214-3/93 od 15. 3. 1993.
336
Domovinski rat 04-02-2020 Knjiga 1.indd 336
and Novi Travnik. The Army of the Republic of Bosnia
and Herzegovina managed to foil the attempt.
The Army of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovi-
na then advanced on Sebešić and Rostovo, a mountain-
ous terrain between Gornji Vakuf and the Lašva Valley.
The aim of the attack was to cut off central Bosnia from
Herzegovina and link up with the Army of the Repub-
lic of Bosnia and Herzegovina forces from Novi Travnik,
Gornji Travnik and Fojnica. In the Sebešić area the HVO
had about 250 men. The HVO transported weapons
and equipment through Sebešić and Busovačke Sta-
je. Operational Group Bosanska Krajina of the Army of
the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina engaged the
308th Mountain Brigade, one battalion of the 17th Kra-
jina Mountain Brigade and elements of the CBS squad
Banja Luka for the attack. The villages of Zeka and Perići
quickly fell under the onslaught and during the evening
on June 24 the Muslims captured Dahovo, Rat and Pot-
kraj. Sebešić fell on July 2 after a failed counterattack
codenamed Klin (Wedge) launched from the direction
of Busovača. The HVO lost 13 men killed and 12 taken
prisoner. About 220 HVO soldiers retreated into Gorn-
ji Vakuf/Uskoplje. The Lašva Battalion of the HVO was
formed out of these men. The Battalion was then de-
ployed in the Uskoplje – Rama area.
Kakanj
Kakanj was a predominately Muslim municipality –
there were twice as many Muslims there than Croats. The
Croats were grouped in the eastern part of the munici-
pality, around Kraljeva Sutjeska. The Army of the Repub-
lic of Bosnia and Herzegovina formed the 309th Mountain
D
Brigade in the municipality. A number of men from Ka-
kanj served in the 7th Muslim Mountain Brigade. At the
end of 1992 the Bobovac Brigade was formed out of the
HVO Kakanj and Vareš. In March and April, 1993, the per-
sonnel from Kakanj was detached from the Brigade and
R
formed into the Kotromanić Brigade.
The reconnaissance-sabotage group of the Army of
the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina sneaked into
Lučići on June 8 and killed one HVO soldier. The Croatian
forces chased the commandos out of the village. The
Army of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina used
the skirmish as a pretext to attack the HVO in Kakanj.
The attack started on June 9. The first targets were the
following Croatian villages: Teševo, Seoci, Veliki Trnovci,
Dujmovići, Bjelavići, Gora, Crnač, Slapnica, Lipnica and
4.2.2020. 18:35:05
 The Croatian Nation’s Struggle for Survival, 1991-1995
dručja pod nadzorom Srba prebačeni u Hercegovinu.
Dvije bojne brigade Kotromanić prebačene su u Kise-
ljak, a jedna u Stolac.785
Dolina Lepenice
U siječnju 1993. ARBiH počinje s operacijama ši-
rih razmjera te je nakon trodnevnih borbi zaposjela
Kaćune i Bilalovac, pa su Fojnica, Kiseljak i Kreševo
odsječeni od snaga HVO-a u Lašvanskoj dolini. U isto
H
vrijeme napadnut je i „put spasa“, na kojem su zaro-
bljeni strojevi i pripadnici HVO-a - radnici na izgradnji
puta koji je trebao povezati Fojnicu s Ramom. Hrvat-
sko vijeće obrane u Fojnici je bilo organizirano u jednu
bojnu u sastavu brigade Nikola Šubić Zrinski sa sjedi-
štem u Busovači, koja je zbog prekida komunikacije
M
u travnju pridodana brigadi Ban Jelačić iz Kiseljaka. U
travnju, kada je započeo sukob između ARBiH i HVO-a
i u Lepeničkoj i u Lašvanskoj dolini, zapovjednik bojne
HVO-a Fojnica odbio je zapovijed pukovnika Blaškića
da se bojna angažira u tim borbama na pružanju po-
moći Busovači, Kiseljaku i HVO-u Konjica. Njegovo su
D
stajalište podržale i hrvatske i muslimanske organiza-
cije i strukture u općini. Tim je potezom HVO za Fojni-
cu kupio nekoliko mjeseci relativnog mira, što je, kao
što je izbilo na vidjelo u srpnju 1993., loše iskorišteno i
pokazalo se pogubnim za Hrvate toga kraja. Uz bojnu
HVO-a iz Fojnice iz brigade Nikola Šubić Zrinski iz Bu-
C
sovače, obrana Kiseljaka i Kreševa je 22. lipnja 1993.
pojačana s 859 ljudi Travničke brigade i policajaca iz
Travnika, od kojih je formirana bojna Dr. Nikola Tusun
i angažirana po satnijama na području Fojnice, Kise-
ljaka i Kreševa (nakon povlačenja iz Travnika i predaje
D
Srbima na Vlašiću, bili su prebačeni u logor Manjaču,
a zatim u Kiseljak). U listopadu je iz Vareša u Kiseljak
doveden i dio brigade Kotromanić, koja je nakon pada
Kaknja u lipnju praktički prestala postojati, a njeni pre-
živjeli pripadnici i Hrvati Kaknja privremeno su spas
našli u Varešu.786
785 IZM OZ SB, Vanredno izvješće str. pov. br. 03-6-329/93
od 13. 6. 1993.; IZM OZ SB, str. pov. br. 03-6-346/93 od
14. 6. 1993.; Centar SIS-a HVO Tomislavgrad, Neven
Marić, informativni razgovor ur. br. 02-08-4-116/97 od
30. 1. 1997.
786 IZM OZ SB, Izvješće str. pov. br. 03-6-509/93 od 23. 6.
1993.; IZM OZ SB, Izvješće str. pov. br. 03-6-530/93 od
23. 6. 1993.; Izvješće bojne “Dr. Nikola Tusun” od 30. 7.
1993. o borbenom putu bojne.
337
Domovinski rat 04-02-2020 Knjiga 1.indd 337
Kraljeva Sutjeska. The Bobovac Brigade detached one
platoon and placed it under the command of the Kotro-
manić Brigade. The Army of the Republic of Bosnia and
Herzegovina sent a surrender ultimatum to the HVO on
June 12. The HVO refused. The next day the Army of the
Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina broke the HVO lines
in the village of Teševo, on Krevnik and Bistrani. With that,
the whole Kakanj defensive line collapsed. The Kotro-
manić Brigade, with about 15,000 civilians, retreated to
Vareš. By the end of October, 1993, all the civilians had
been moved to Herzegovina via the Serb-controlled ter-
ritory. Two battalions from the Kotromanić Brigade were
moved to Kiseljak and one to Stolac.
Lepenica Valley
In January, 1993, the Army of the Republic of Bosnia
and Herzegovina began mounting operations on a larger
scale. After three days of fighting the Muslims captured
Kaćune and Bilalovac, thus cutting off Fojnica, Kiseljak
and Kreševo from the HVO forces in the Lašva Valley. At
the same time the ARBIH attacked the “Road of Hope”
where it captured a number of HVO personnel building
a road that was to connect Fojnica and Rama and the all
the tools and machinery they were using. The HVO Fojni-
ca was formed into one battalion which was under the
command of the Nikola Šubić Zrinski Brigade. The HQ of
the brigade was located in Busovača. However, due to a
breakdown in communications between the Fojnica Bat-
talion and Busovača, the Fojnica Battalion was attached
to the Ban Jelačić Brigade from Kiseljak. In April, when
the conflict between the ARBIH and the HVO started in
the Lepenica and Lašva Valleys, the commander of the
Fojnica Battalion rejected Colonel Blaškić’s order to em-
broil the battalion in the fighting so as to help the HVO
forces in Busovača, Kiseljak and Konjic. The commander’s
decision received support from both the Croatian and
Muslim organizations and structures in the municipality.
The move did buy a few months of breathing space to
R
the HVO forces in Fojnica. However, the HVO did not take
the full advantage of the situation and suffered serious
consequences as a result in July, 1993. Also, the lacklus-
ter approach of the HVO to the situation proved disas-
trous for the Croatian residents of the region. In addition
to one HVO battalion from Fojnica of the Nikola Šubić
Zrinski Brigade, the defense of Kiseljak and Kreševo was
reinforced, on June 22, 1993, with 859 men of the Travnik
Brigade and policemen from Travnik. These men were
4.2.2020. 18:35:05
 Davor Marijan • Rat za opstojnost Hrvata, 1991. - 1995.
Nakon što je 18. travnja 1993. u ranim jutarnjim
satima započeo opći sukob između ARBiH i HVO-a u
Kiseljaku, sljedećih dana HVO je uz ogromne žrtve us-
pio obraniti dio općine Kiseljak, ali je ARBiH pod svoju
kontrolu stavila kompletno područje Bilalovca prema
Busovači te Zabrđa i Bukovice na drugom kraju općine,
nadomak Lepenici.
Tijekom travanjskih sukoba HVO je 22. i 23. travnja
razoružao Muslimane u Duhrima, a selo Han Ploča od-
bilo je predati oružje. U borbama od 20. do 23. svibnja,
H
kada je ARBiH pokušala zapriječiti cestu Kiseljak – Sara-
jevo, HVO je razoružao i to selo. Od 23. do 25. svibnja
HVO je očistio džep kod Gomionice i otklonio prijetnju
za fojničko raskrižje. Armija Republike BiH je 30. svib-
nja napala i zauzela selo Badnje i značajnu kotu „Radar“
iznad Brestovskog. U pothvatu Osveta-93 HVO je 1.
M
lipnja zauzeo Stojkoviće i Gomionicu te visove Obješe-
njak i Ljeskovicu.787
Nakon napada ARBiH na HVO u dolini Lašve, HVO
je 12. lipnja 1993. uz jak otpor razoružao ARBiH u Tuli-
ci. Razoružanje Muslimana u Grahovcima počelo je 14.
lipnja. Otpor je bio jak i akcija se nastavila 15. lipnja.
D
U protunapadu je ARBiH zauzela kotu Kokoška, koju
je HVO u protunapadu uspio vratiti istoga dana. Ra-
zoružanje Grahovaca završilo je 16. lipnja, kada su ra-
zoružana i naselja Mratinići, Sopot, Han Ivica i Volujak,
uz prometnicu Lepenica – Kreševo. Armija Republike
BiH odgovorila je 17. lipnja napadom jedinica 1. kor-
C
pusa, iz smjera Zabrđa i Bukovice (Hadžići) na položa-
je kreševskoga dijela brigade Ban Jelačić na području
Dujakovića potok – Zabašće – Han Ivica i Gradac te s
pravca Zabrđe – Toplica – Gunjani na položaje u po-
dručju Volujak – Hrnkaš – Pirin – Kržanj – Dugi Do –
Blinje. U napadu su muslimanske snage zauzele sela
Gojakovac i Pirin i nadzorni punkt Blinje. Hrvatsko
vijeće obrane organiziralo je obranu na crti Ravnica
– Žeželovo – Gradac – Čemišće – Međuvršje – Kralji-
čina stijena – Jagodina – Hamišće – Deževice. U tim
je borbama HVO imao pet poginulih i 18 ranjenih voj-
nika. Pritisak ARBiH je nastavljen 20. lipnja napadom
na Meoršje kod Kreševa iz smjera Tarčina i Konjica i na
područje Ravnica – Lepenica. U bližoj okolici Kreševa
ARBiH je 23. lipnja osvojila planinu Inač, a 24. lipnja i
masive planina Meoršje, Blinje i Lopata, čime su bra-
787 ICTY: Vojna pošta 1751, Značajnija b/d brigade “Ban Jo-
sip Jelačić”, br. 03-858-1/94 od 26. 2. 1994.; C. R. SHRAD-
ER, Muslimansko-hrvatski građanski rat, 211-212.
338
Domovinski rat 04-02-2020 Knjiga 1.indd 338
formed into the Dr. Nikola Tusun Brigade and deployed
in the area of Fojnica, Kiseljak and Kreševo (after retreat-
ing from Travnik and surrendering to the Serbs on Vlašić
they were transported to the Manjača camp and thence
to Kiseljak). In October elements of the Kotromanić Bri-
gade were brought from Vareš to Kiseljak (the Brigade
was all but wiped out during the fighting for Kakanj) and
the survivors and Croatian civilians from Kakanj fled to
the relative and temporary safety of Vareš.
On April 18, 1993, early in the morning, an all-out
conflict between the HVO and ARBIH in Kiseljak erupt-
ed. During the following few days the HVO, at the cost
of tremendous casualties, managed to defend a part
of the Kiseljak Municipality. The ARBIH, on the other
hand, gained control of almost the entire area of Bi-
lalovac in the direction of Busovača and also of Zabrđe
and Bukovica located at the other end of the munici-
pality, near Lepenica.
During the fighting in April the HVO disarmed the
Muslims in Duhri (April 22-23). The Muslims in the village
of Han Ploče refused to surrender their weapons. In the
fighting from May 20 to May 23, while the Army of the
Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina was trying to block
the Kiseljak Sarajevo road, the HVO disarmed the Mus-
lims in Han Ploče. In the period from May 23 to 25 the
HVO mopped up the Gomionica pocket and secured the
Fojnica crossroads. On May 30 the Army of the Republic
of Bosnia and Herzegovina captured the village of Bad-
nje and tactically important “Radar” Hill above Brestovs-
ko. The HVO, during operation Osveta-93 (Revenge-93)
captured Stojkovići and Gomionica and Obješenjak and
Ljeskovica Heights.
After the Army of the Republic of Bosnia and Herze-
D
govina’s attack on the HVO in the Lašva Valley the HVO,
on June 12, 1993, entered the village of Tulica with the
aim of disarming the Army of the Republic of Bosnia and
Herzegovina troops there. The process of disarming the
ARBIH troops did not go smoothly and a firefight devel-
R
oped. In the end the resistance was crushed and the AR-
BIH soldiers were disarmed. The HVO attacked Grahovci
on June 14. The Muslims put up a stiff resistance and the
fighting continued on June 15. The Army of the Republic
of Bosnia and Herzegovina mounted a counterattack and
captured Kokoška Hill. But the Muslims could not hold it.
During the day the HVO managed to recapture the posi-
tion. The disarming of the Muslims in the village of Gra-
hovac ended on June 16. On the same day the Muslims
in Mratinići, Sopot, Han Ivica and Volujak, villages and
4.2.2020. 18:35:05
 The Croatian Nation’s Struggle for Survival, 1991-1995
nitelji Kreševa bili prinuđeni crtu obrane uspostaviti
iznad samog grada.788
Potkraj ožujka 1993. Armija Republike BiH je
napala hrvatska sela na sjeveru općine Konjic i pre-
sjekla planinske puteve od središnje Bosne prema
Hercegovini. S tog je pravca, konkretno sa snagama
ARBiH iz sela Dusine, HVO Fojnice imao 1. i 2. lipnja
1993. manji sukob, pri čemu je bilo mrtvih i ranjenih,
no sukob nije eskalirao, dijelom i zbog angažmana
UNPROFOR-a na njegovom smirivanju. Mjesec dana
H
poslije sukoba sa snagama iz Dusine, a nakon neu-
spješne kampanje na Kiseljak, ARBiH je napala HVO u
Fojnici i Kreševu. U napadu su angažirane snage OG-a
Istok iz Fojnice i Visokog uz pomoć dijela 6. korpusa
iz Gornjeg Vakufa.
U Fojnici, gdje je još uvijek vladao relativni mir iz-
M
među HVO-a i ARBiH, 30. lipnja 1992. zapovjednik sna-
ga UNPROFOR-a, francuski general Philippe Morillon,
dogovorio je s predstavnicima HVO-a i ARBiH „očuva-
nje“ mira u gradu. Potpisan je sporazum o zaštićenoj
sanitetskoj zoni Fojnica kao humanitarnom središtu. U
znak dobre volje HVO Fojnica je napustio dominantne
D
objekte i ključne položaje neposredno iznad grada Foj-
nice. No, od 2. srpnja ARBiH je snagama 3. i 6. korpusa
zaposjela položaje koje je napustio HVO. Napadnuta
su sela Gradina, Tješilo i Valjevac te sam grad Fojnica.
Tijekom dana muslimanske su snage zauzele domi-
nantne objekte Matorac i Vran stijene, a idućega dana
C
kote Gvozdjanske staje i Gruda. Navečer 3. srpnja HVO
je uspio organizirati obranu oko sela Deževica, Pod-
gore te u rajonu Dugog Brda, Kozovgrada, Malkoča i
na desnoj obali Fojničke rijeke na području Ostružni-
ce. ARBiH je 15. srpnja probila hrvatsku crtu i zauzela
D
Runjavicu i Malkoč, što je dezorganiziralo obranu i iza-
zvalo povlačenje civila i vojske. Uz velike napore obra-
na se 16. srpnja pokušala organizirati južno od grada
i uz prometnicu Fojnica – Dusina. Muslimanske snage
izbile su tijekom dana na crtu Zvjezdice – Alibegovo
brdo – hotel Reumal. Borbe su završile 17. srpnja kada
je ARBiH zauzela grad Fojnicu i okolna sela. Hrvatsko
stanovništvo povuklo se preko planine Jasikovica pre-
788 IZM OZ SB, Izvješće br. 03-6-412/93 od 18. 6. 1993.; IZM
OZ SB, Obavijest str. pov. br. 01-6-458/93 od 20. 6. 1993.;
IZM OZ SB, Izvješće br. 03-6-468/93 od 20. 6. 1993.; IZM
OZ SB, Izvješće str. pov. br. 01-6-510/93 od 23. 6. 1993.;
ICTY: Vojna pošta 1751, Značajnija b/d brigade “Ban Jo-
sip Jelačić”, br. 03-858-1/94 od 26. 2. 1994.
339
Domovinski rat 04-02-2020 Knjiga 1.indd 339
settlements positioned along the Lepenica – Kreševo
road, were disarmed. The Army of the Republic of Bosnia
and Herzegovina responded on June 17 by sending ele-
ments of I Corps into attack from the direction of Zabrđe
and Bukovica (Hadžići) against the positions held by
the Kreševo elements of the Ban Jelačić Brigade in the
Dujakovića Potok – Zabašće – Han Ivica area and from
the direction of Zabrđe – Toplica – Gunjani against the
positions in the Volujak – Hrnkaš – Pirin – Kržanj – Dugi
Do – Blinje area. The Muslims captured the villages of Go-
jakovac and Pirin and the Blinje checkpoint. The HVO es-
tablished defensive positions on the Ravnica – Žeželovo
– Gradac – Čemišće – Međuvršje – Kraljičina Stijena – Ja-
godina – Hamišće – Deževice line. The HVO lost five men
killed and 18 wounded in the fighting. The Army of the
Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina continued to pile up
the pressure on June 20 by attacking Meoršje near Kreše-
vo from the direction of Tarčin and Konjic and attacking
the Ravnica – Lepenica area. On June 23 the Army of the
Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina captured Inač Hill, a
dominant position, near Kreševo. On the following day
the Army of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina fol-
lowed up the success by capturing the Meoršje, Blinje
and Lopata massifs, thus forcing the defenders to set up
a defensive line above right above the city itself.
Towards the end of March, 1993, the Army of the Re-
public of Bosnia and Herzegovina attacked the Croatian
villages in the northern part of the Konjic Municipality
and cut the mountain roads leading from central Bosnia
to Herzegovina. On June 1 and 2, 1993, the HVO engaged
the Army of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina
forces from Dusina. The engagement could best be de-
scribed as a minor skirmish but both sides lost a number
of men killed and wounded nevertheless. The skirmish
did not escalate, thanks, in large measure, to UNPRO-
FOR’s intervention. One month after this engagement
and after the failed offensive against Kiseljak, the Army
of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina attacked in
R
Fojnica and Kreševo. The attack was carried out by the
forces of Operational Group East deployed in Fojnica and
Visoko and elements of VI Corps from Donji Vakuf.
In Fojnica, where the situation was still relatively calm,
the commander of the UNPROFOR forces, French General
Philippe Morillon, reached an understanding with repre-
sentatives of the HVO and ARBIH regarding “maintaining”
the peace in the city on June 30, 1992. An agreement
obliging both sides to treat the Fojnica safe zone as a hu-
manitarian center was signed. In a show of good faith the
4.2.2020. 18:35:05
 Davor Marijan • Rat za opstojnost Hrvata, 1991. - 1995.
ma Kiseljaku. Do kraja godine u općini Fojnica gotovo
nije bilo Hrvata. HVO Fojnica organizirao je obranu na
potezu Diljke – Otigošće – Jasikovica – Mrakovi čime su
spriječili dalji prodor ARBiH prema Kiseljaku. 789
Tijekom napada na Fojnicu ARBiH je 5. srpnja izvela
jak napad na Kiseljak, čija je svrha bila spriječiti anga-
žman hrvatskih snaga prema Fojnici. U jednodnevnim
borbama HVO je zadržao crtu, no samo toga dana
imao je 13 mrtvih i 36 ranjenih vojnika. Muslimanske
snage 11. srpnja su napale selo Crnički Kamenik na
H
kreševskoj bojišnici i nakon teških borbi primorale HVO
na povlačenje. Nakon pada Fojnice, 3. bojna povukla
se 17. srpnja na Jasikovac i u selo Otigošće. Do kraja
mjeseca, ARBiH je 27. srpnja ovladala Bašinim brdom.
U novu ofenzivu ARBiH je krenula početkom ko-
lovoza 1993. godine. Planirala je presijecanje doline
M
Lepenice i odvajanje HVO-a od VRS-a. Napadala je niz
crtu Ostje – Kokoška i 11. kolovoza zauzela Bakoviće.
U borbama od 21. do 26. kolovoza HVO je odbio na-
pad. Na fojničkom bojištu ARBiH je tijekom kolovoza
pokušavala zauzeti vrh masiva Jasikovice što bi HVO-u
jako otežalo obranu Kiseljaka. U rujnu je težište nasr-
D
taja ARBiH stavila na Lašvansku dolinu, što je dolini
Lepenice donijelo razmjeran mir. Da pomogne snaga-
ma u Lašvanskoj dolini i odbaci muslimanske snage
od samoga grada Kreševa, HVO je 1. listopada napao i
nakratko ovladao masivom Meoršja južno od Kreševa.
U protuudaru 2. listopada ARBiH ponovo zauzima to
C
područje, međutim nakon teških borbi 3. i 4. listopada
HVO je konačno uspio ovladati Meoršjem i otkloniti ne-
posrednu opasnost po sam grad Kreševo.
U novi, ambiciozniji napad HVO je krenuo 10. stu-
denoga 1993. godine. Poduzeo je pothvat Istok, čiji je
cilj bio pomaknuti crtu prema Fojnici i osvojiti Ploču
789 ICTY: 3. bojna Fojnica brigade HVO “Nikola Šubić Zrinski”
br. 70-01-121/93 od 20. 4. 1993.; ICTY: Zapovjedništvo
3. bojne brigade HVO “Ban J. Jelačić”, Odluka br. 70-01-
122/93 od 20. 4. 1993.; ICTY: Izjava Stranke demokratske
akcije, Opštinskog štaba ARBiH, Islamske zajednice i
Kulturnog društva Muslimana “Preporod” iz Fojnice sa
sastanka održanog 20. 4. 1993.; Izvješće III bojne Fojnica
brigade HVO “Nikola Šubić Zrinski” o događajima 1. i 2. 6.
1993.; ICTY: Komanda 3. korpusa ARBiH, Redovni borbeni
izvještaj str. pov. br. 02/31-565 od 3. 7. 1993.; Operativno
izvješće III bojne Fojnica brigade HVO “N. Š. Zrinski” od 3. 7.
1993.; IZM OZ SB, str. pov. br. 03-7-233/93 od 15. 7. 1993.;
ICTY: Komanda 3. korpusa, Vanredni borbeni izvještaj str.
pov. br. 02/31-583 od 16. 7. 1993.; Davor MARIJAN, Rat
Hrvata i Muslimana u Bosni i Hercegovini od 1992. do 1994.,
Hrvatski institut za povijest, Zagreb, 2018., 364-367.
340
Domovinski rat 04-02-2020 Knjiga 1.indd 340
HVO withdrew its forces from the dominant and key posi-
tions above Fojnica. But, on July 2, troops belonging to III
and VI Corps of the ARBIH started moving into the vacat-
ed positions. The ARBIH also attacked the villages of Gra-
dina, Tješilo and Valjevac and the city of Fojnica. During
the day the Muslim captured the dominant positions in
Motorac and Vran Stijene and the following day Gvozd-
janske Staje Hill and Gruda Hill. On the evening of July 3
the HVO managed to organize its defenses around the
village of Deževica, Podgora and in the Ostružnica area.
On July 15 the ARBIH broke through the HVO defensive
line and captured Runjavica and Malkoč. This complete-
ly disorganized the defenders. Civilians and HVO soldiers
started to flee. On July 16 the HVO did its utmost to set
up defensive positions to the south of the city and along
the Fojnica – Dusina road. The Muslim forces, during the
day, reached the Zvjezdice – Alibegovo Brdo – Hotel Re-
umal line. The fighting ended on July 17 when the ARBIH
captured the city of Fojnica and the surrounding villages.
Many Croatian civilians fled towards Kiseljak. By the end
of the year almost all Croats had left the municipality of
Fojnica. The HVO Fojnica established its defenses along
the Diljke – Otigošće – Jasikovica – Mrakovi line. This new
defensive line prevented the ARBIH from advancing fur-
ther towards Kiseljak.
During its attack on Fojnica the Army of the Republic
of Bosnia and Herzegovina also launched a determined
attack on Kiseljak on July 5. The purpose of that attack
was to prevent deployment of Croatian forces in the di-
rection of Fojnica. The battle lasted one day and the HVO
held the line but at a high cost in casualties: 13 killed and
36 wounded. The Army of the Republic of Bosnia and
Herzegovina, on July 11, attacked the village of Crnički
D
Kamenik in the Kreševo area and after a round of heavy
fighting forced the HVO to retreat. After the fall of Fojni-
ca the 3rd Battalion retreated on Jasikovac and into the
village of Otigošće on July 17. On July 27 the Army of the
Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina had full control of
R
Bašino Brdo.
The Army of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovi-
na launched a new offensive at the beginning of August
1993. The plan was to cut through the Lepenica Valley
and cut off the HVO from the VRS. The Muslims attacked
along the Ostje – Kokoška line and captured Bakovići on
August 11. During the fighting from August 21 to 26 the
HVO beat back the attack. In the Fojnica area, during the
month of August, the ARBIH tried to capture the peak of
the Jasikovica massif in a bid to place the defenders of
4.2.2020. 18:35:05
 The Croatian Nation’s Struggle for Survival, 1991-1995
i Bašino brdo, te stvoriti preduvjete za oslobađanje
Fojnice. Zamisao je realizirana 12. studenoga, kada
HVO uspijeva doći na prilaze Fojnici, međutim zbog
snažnog protuudara snaga 3. i 6. korpusa ARBiH, HVO
se 14. studenoga morao povući i uspostaviti crtu Ba-
kovići – Bašino brdo – Orlovača. Sljedeća promjena
crte dogodila se 26. prosinca, kada je ARBiH na pre-
pad zauzela Brajkoviće sjeverozapadno od Kiseljaka.
U sklopu operacije Tvigi-94 HVO je 29. siječnja 1994.
u izrazito nepovoljnim vremenskim uvjetima vratio
H
Brajkoviće i zauzeo Brezovicu, Zavrtaljku i Oglavak.
Tim je pothvatom HVO počeo deblokadu prometni-
ce Kiseljak – Busovača. U nastavku napada HVO je 3.
veljače zauzeo kotu 923. Dva dana poslije, 5. veljače,
HVO je zauzeo Velike Sotnice i zaselak Graniće. U kon-
tekstu stanja na uskopaljsko-ramskom bojištu bio je
M
to jasan pokazatelj da HVO preuzima inicijativu u mu-
slimansko-hrvatskom ratu.790
Vareš
Vareš je rudarski gradić na prometnici koja od Sa-
D
rajeva i Breze vodi prema Banovićima i Tuzli. Općina je
imala relativnu hrvatsku većinu, a od 1. srpnja 1992. iz-
vršna vlast bila je u rukama HVO-a. Uz manji oružani su-
kob u ljeto 1992. predstavnici lokalnoga HVO-a uspjeli
su postići dogovor da neka srpska sela predaju oružje
uz zajamčenu sigurnost života i imovine. Lokalni HVO
C
bio je organiziran u brigadu Bobovac, koja je početkom
studenoga 1993. imala oko 1500 ljudi. Snage ARBiH
bile su organizirane u Općinski štab obrane Vareš, koji
je sredinom listopada 1993. imao 1016 ljudi.791
Ugrožavanje Vareša počelo je sredinom lipnja, kada
D
je u grad i općinu stiglo oko 12.000 prognanika iz Ka-
knja, što je uz 6000 prognanika Muslimana s područja
Olova bilo veliko opterećenje za općinu. Uz prognanike
je stiglo i 1200 vojnika iz brigada HVO-a Kakanj i Travnik,
no pitanje je koliko su bili spremni uključiti se u obranu
Vareša. Takva masa ljudi odrazila se na međusobne od-
790 ICTY: Vojna pošta 1751, Značajnija b/d brigade “Ban Jo-
sip Jelačić”, br. 03-858-1/94 od 26. 2. 1994.; C. R. SHRAD-
ER, Muslimansko-hrvatski građanski rat, 212, 215.
791 ICTY: HVO Vareš br. 01-sl. od 10. 7. 1992.; ICTY: Komanda
OG “Istok” ARBiH, Preformiranje jedinica u z/o OG Istok
br. 09/03-1844 od 18. 10. 1993.; ICTY: Izvješće Zapov-
jedništva OG-2 HVO Kiseljak od 4. 11. 1993. o uzrocima
pada i sadašnjem stanju na teritoriji općine Vareš; Istina
o Varešu Ante Pejčinovića od 18. 3. 1994.
341
Domovinski rat 04-02-2020 Knjiga 1.indd 341
Kiseljak in a desperate situation. In September the Army
of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina focused its
efforts on the Lašva Valley. That move brought relative
peace to the Lepenica Valley. To relieve the pressure on
the defenders of the Lašva Valley and throw back the
Muslim forces away from Kreševo the HVO attacked the
Meoršje massif located to the south of Kreševo on Octo-
ber 1. The ARBIH launched a counterattack on October 2
and recaptured the area. However, after heavy fighting
on October 3 and 4 the HVO finally managed to gain con-
trol of Meoršje and remove the immediate threat to the
city posed by ARBIH forces.
On November 10, 1993, the HVO launched a more
ambitious attack. The operation was codenamed Istok
(East) and the aim was to move the front line towards
Fojnica and capture Ploča and Bašino Brdo and create
favorable conditions for launching an operation with the
aim to liberate Fojnica. All the objectives were achieved
on November 12, when the HVO managed to reach the
outskirts of Fojnica. However, troops from III Corps and
VI Corps mounted a determined counterattack and the
HVO had no choice but to retreat and set up new de-
fensive positions along the Bakovići – Bašino Brdo – Or-
lovača line. The front line shifted again on December 26
when the Army of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovi-
na launched a sudden attack and captured the village of
Brajkovići, to the northwest of Kiseljak. The HVO, during
Operation Tvigi-94 the HVO, fighting in adverse weather
conditions, managed to recapture Brakovići and capture
Brezovica, Zavrtaljka and Oglavak on January 29, 1994.
Three HVO soldiers were killed and four wounded in the
operation. With that success the HVO was in a good po-
sition to lift the Muslim blockade of the Kiseljak – Buso-
vača road. The HVO continued the attack and captured
Hill 923 on February 3 at the cost of four killed and six
wounded soldiers. Two days later, on February 5 the HVO
captured Velike Sotnice and Granići hamlet. In regard to
the situation on the Uskoplje-Rama front the HVO was
R
clearly gaining the initiative in the Muslim-Croat conflict
in Bosnia and Herzegovina.
Vareš
Vareš is a mining town situated alongside the road
connecting Sarajevo and Breza with Banovići and Tuz-
la. The Vareš Municipality was predominantly Croatian.
From July 1, 1992, the executive power in the municipali-
ty was in the hands of the HVO. Representatives of the lo-
4.2.2020. 18:35:05
 Davor Marijan • Rat za opstojnost Hrvata, 1991. - 1995.
nose domicilnoga stanovništva u Varešu. Zbog napada
ARBiH na Kakanj HVO je bez problema razoružao dio
muslimanskih snaga u zoni svoje mjerodavnosti.792
Zbog položaja poput usamljenog i prometno izo-
liranog otoka okruženog uglavnom muslimanskim
snagama, Vareš se ARBiH činio lakom zadaćom za na-
pad, što je i bio. Muslimanski se napad doista očekivao
nakon protjeravanja Hrvata iz Kaknja. Komanda ARBiH
OG Istok, u čijoj je zoni Vareš bio, predlagala je 9. srpnja
1993. Komandi 3. korpusa napad i zauzimanje općine.
H
Kao izgovor za napad tvrdilo se da se HVO priprema
napasti ARBiH uz pomoć Srba. Sredinom kolovoza Ko-
manda 3. korpusa zatražila je i 21. kolovoza 1993. do-
bila odobrenje Štaba Vrhovne komande ARBiH za na-
pad na Liješnicu i na pravcu Jezero – Borovica. Ubrzo
je Vareš ponovno vraćen u zonu djelovanja 2. korpusa
M
ARBiH, što je HVO-u dalo nekoliko mjeseci mira, prem-
da je došao u neposredno susjedstvo 6. korpusa ARBiH,
koji je osnovan isključivo za rat s Hrvatima.793
Predvečer 17. listopada 6. korpus ARBiH napao je
položaje HVO-a u Liješnici, Kopijarima, Pliješu i Jezeru.
Uspio je zauzeti Liješnicu i dio crte u Pliješu. Idućega
D
dana HVO je u protunapadu uspio vratiti dio izgublje-
ne crte u Pliješu. Napad je izveden bez ikakva povoda,
pa je 18. listopada 1993. zapovjednik 2. korpusa ARBiH
Hazim Šadić prosvjedovao osobno generalu Deliću u
Sarajevu, tražeći da se napad prekine jer je zbog njega
ugrožena zona djelovanja 2. korpusa. Novu crtu HVO je
C
postavio na području Slavina, Planinice i Grede. U vrije-
me muslimanskoga napada HVO je organizirao slanje
civila prognanika iz Kaknja u Hercegovinu. S njima su
otišli i za rat sposobni muškarci, koje se bez uporabe
oružja nije moglo spriječiti da odu.794
Potom su 21. listopada muslimanske snage iz Dra-
govića napale položaje HVO-a na crti Kopijari – Pliješ
792 Izvješće brigade HVO “Bobovac” Vareš od 16. 6. 1993.;
Istina o Varešu Ante Pejčinovića od 18. 3. 1994.
793 ICTY: Komanda ARBiH OG Istok, Informacija br. 2221 od
9. 7. 1993.; ICTY: ŠVK OS RBiH str. pov. br. 02/1016-1 od
21. 8. 1993.; ICTY: Savjetovanje starješina GŠ i koman-
danata korpusa, održano 21. i 22. 8. 1993. u Zenici.
794 Brigada HVO “Bobovac”, Informacija br. 01-613-15/93
od 18. 10. 1993.; ICTY: Komanda 2. korpusa ARBiH, In-
tervencija str. pov. br. Z-116/93 od 18. 10. 1993.; Briga-
da HVO “Bobovac”, Vanredno operativno izvješće br.
06-687-2/93 od 18. 10. 1993.; Brigada HVO “Bobovac”,
Izvješće br. 06-689-2/93 od 19. 10. 1993.; Brigada HVO
“Bobovac” br. 02-675-5/93 od 20. 10. 1993.
342
Domovinski rat 04-02-2020 Knjiga 1.indd 342
cal HVO managed to convince, after a few skirmishes, the
Serbs in some Serb villages to hand over their weapons.
In return, the HVO guaranteed safety of life and property.
The local HVO forces were formed into the Bobovac Bri-
gade. At the beginning of November, 1993, the Brigade
had about 1,500 men. The forces of the Army of the Re-
public of Bosnia and Herzegovina were formed into the
municipal HQ of TO Vareš. In mid-October there were
1,016 men under arms under its command.
In mid-June about 12,000 refugees from Kakanj ar-
rived in the city and the municipality, adding to the 6,000
Muslim refugees from the Olovo area already in the mu-
nicipality. This mass influx of refugees was a tremendous
burden for the municipality and the fact that the refu-
gees were Muslims presented a clear and present men-
ace to both the city and municipality. 1,200 soldiers from
the Kakanj and Travnik HVO Brigades arrived with the ref-
ugees but their willingness and ability to participate in
the defense of Vareš was questionable. The presence of
a huge mass of people in Vareš soon created ethnic ten-
sions. When the Army of the Republic of Bosnia and Her-
zegovina attacked Kakanj the HVO reacted by disarming
a part of the Muslim forces in its area of responsibility.
Vareš was surrounded by Muslim forces and the
Army of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina be-
lieved it could take the city without much effort. The HVO,
after the Army of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegov-
ina expelled the Croats from Kakanj, expected that the
Muslims would attack Vareš too. The HQ of Operational
Group East, in whose area of responsibility Vareš was lo-
cated, suggested, on July 9, 1993, to the HQ of III Corps
to attack and capture the municipality. Unsubstantiated
claims that the HVO was preparing, in collusion with the
D
Serbs, to attack the Army of the Republic of Bosnia and
Herzegovina, were to be used as a pretext for attacking
the HVO. In mid-August the HQ of III Corps requested
from the Supreme Command HQ of the Army of the Re-
public of Bosnia and Herzegovina, on August 21, 1993,
R
permission to attack Liješnica and advance along the
Jezero – Borovica line. Shortly thereafter Vareš was again
included in the area of responsibility of II Corps of the
Army of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina. On the
one hand, this reshuffling of areas of responsibility pro-
vided a few months of breathing space for Vareš but on
the other the area of responsibility of II Corps bordered
with that of the ARBIH VI Corps and VI Corps was formed
exclusively for the purpose of attacking the Croats.
On the evening of October 17, the ARBIH VI Corps
4.2.2020. 18:35:05
 The Croatian Nation’s Struggle for Survival, 1991-1995
– Založnik – Smrdan – Jezero i zauzele Kopijare. U tim
je borbama HVO imao četiri mrtva i šest ranjenih vojni-
ka. Za obranu je HVO angažirao sve raspoložive snage
te je ispraznio crtu prema VRS-u i organizirao 115 ki-
lometara dugu crtu obrane na pravcima Slavin – Pla-
ninica – Poljanice – Pajtov Han – Mir, Slavin – Pomol
– Karasovina – Veokovac – Papale – Suvo brdo – Meća
kamen – Lučevac – Založnik, Založnik – Smrdan – Jeze-
ro – Tisovača – Igrište – Mrka kosa – Rudeljak – Kraljeva
kosa – Prisoje – Obršine – Veliko brdo – Stožac – Na-
H
seoci – Vranova stijena – Rajčevac – Vrantolovo brdo
– Dragoljub – Zvijezda – Mekuše.795
Iz Kiseljaka je preko područja pod srpskim nadzo-
rom 22. listopada 1993. stigla pomoć od oko 250 vojni-
ka, a zapovijedanje je preuzeo zapovjednik OG-2 Ivica
Rajić. Skupine PPN-a Maturice i Apostoli angažirane su
M
23. listopada za napad na Stupni Do i kotu Bogoš iznad
sela jer se odande mogao nadzirati dio grada i dio pro-
metnice Vareš Majdan – Planinica. Nakon višesatne
borbe HVO je zauzeo Bogoš i Stupni Do. U borbama
je stradao dio muslimanskih civila, a HVO je imao dva
poginula i sedam ranjenih vojnika.796
D
Nakon nekoliko dana pripreme, 30. listopada 1993.
počeo je napad ARBiH duž cijele crte obrane HVO-a.
Uz pomoć vojnika iz Kiseljaka, brigada Bobovac neu-
spješno je nastojala zadržati crtu. Prijepodne 30. listo-
pada HVO je izgubio položaje Vojnički grob i Srednja
planina, kao i dominantne kote Vis, Djedovača i Donji
C
Ljig te selo Dubošticu. Učestali pritisak muslimanskih
snaga doveo je 30. i 31. listopada do povlačenja civila
iz Gornje i Donje Borovice. Istodobno se prema Varešu
povlačilo i stanovništvo iz ostalih dijelova općine.
D
795 Brigada HVO “Bobovac”, Borbeno izvješće br. 06-689-
5/93 od 21. 10. 1993.; Brigada HVO “Bobovac”, Borbeno
izvješće br. 06-689-7/93 od 21. 10. 1993.; Brigada HVO
“Bobovac”, Podaci o pružanju crte obrane br. 06-697-
2/93 od 21. 10. 1993.
796 Zapovjedništvo OG-2 HVO, br. 10-4248-02/93 od 23.
10. 1993.; ICTY: Brigada HVO “Bobovac”, Izvješće br.
01-703-1/93 od 23. 10. 1993.; Informacija Zapovjed-
ništva OG-2 HVO Kiseljak od 23. 11. 1993. o borbenim
djelovanjima u Varešu; ICTY: Brigada HVO “Bobovac”,
Borbeno izvješće br. 01-689-8/93 od 23. 10. 1993.;
ICTY: Brigada HVO “Bobovac”, Dopuna procjene br. 06-
714-3/93 od 26. 10. 1993.; Zapovjedništvo OG-2 HVO,
Informacija o događanjima u Varešu (s prilozima) br.
10-3242-1/93 od 31. 10. 1993.; HVO Općine Vareš od
31. 10. 1993. za Predsjednika HR HB.
343
Domovinski rat 04-02-2020 Knjiga 1.indd 343
attacked the HVO positions in Liješnica, Kopijare, Pliješ
and Jezero. The Muslims captured Liješenica and a part
of the defensive line in Pliješ. The next day the HVO
counterattacked and recaptured some positions in Pli-
ješ. VI Corps attacked without provocation and that led
the commander of the ARBIH II Corps, Hazim Šadić, to
remonstrate with General Delić in Sarajevo on October
18, 1993. Hazim Šadić requested that the attack be abort-
ed because the area of responsibility was, as a direct re-
sult of the attack, under threat. The HVO established its
new defensive line in the Slavin, Planice and Grede area.
When the Muslims attacked, the HVO transported the
civilian refugees from Kakanj to Herzegovina. Among
the refugees were men capable of military service. These
men could not be restrained from going with the refu-
gees without the undue use of force.
On October 21 the Muslim forces from Dragovići
attacked the HVO positions on the Kopijari – Pliješ –
Založnik – Smrdan – Jezero line and captured Kopijare.
The HVO lost four soldiers killed and six wounded. All the
available HVO forces in the area participated in the fight-
ing. The troops manning the defensive line opposite the
Serbs were withdrawn to fight the Muslims. The HVO es-
tablished a 115-kilometer long defensive front opposite
the Muslims. The defensive positions were set up along
the following lines: Slavin – Planinica – Poljanice – Paj-
tov Han –Mir; Slavin – Pomol – Karasovina – Veokovac –
Papale – Suvo Hill – Meća Kamen – Lučevac – Založnik;
Založnik – Smrdan – Jezero – Tisovača – Igrište – Mrka
Kosa – Rudeljak – Kraljeva Kosa – Prisoje – Obršine – Ve-
liko Brdo – Stožac – Naseoci – Vranova Stijena – Rajčevac
– Vrantolovo Hill – Dragoljub – Zvijezda – Mekuše.
Help in the form of about 250 HVO soldiers arrived
from Kiseljak via the Serb-controlled territory on October
22, 1993. The commander of the TG-2 Ivica Rajić assumed
command of the Croatian forces in Vareš. The special pur-
pose unit Maturice and special purpose unit “Apostoli”
(Apostles) attacked the village of Stupni Do and Bogoš
R
Hill above the village on October 23. From the latter posi-
tion the occupants could control of a part of the city and
a part of the Vareš Majdan – Planinica road. After a few
hours of fighting the HVO captured Bogoš and Stupni
Do. A number of Muslim civilians were killed in the fight-
ing. The HVO lost two soldiers killed and seven wounded.
On October 30, 1993, the Army of the Republic of
Bosnia and Herzegovina attacked on a broad front. The
Bobovac Brigade, helped by troops from Kiseljak could
not hold its positions. In the morning the HVO lost its
4.2.2020. 18:35:05
 Davor Marijan • Rat za opstojnost Hrvata, 1991. - 1995.
Završni udar na Vareš ARBiH je počela 2. stude-
noga 1993. napadom združenih snaga iz tri korpusa
s polukružne osnovice. Taktička grupa Vareš 6. kor-
pusa glavnim je snagama napala na pravcu Površje
– Karasovina, a pomoćnima na pravcu Pajtov Han –
Veliki kamen. Operativna grupa Kladanj iz sastava 2.
korpusa ARBiH napala je na pravcu Daštansko – Mir,
a snage 3. korpusa iz OG-a Lašva napadale su na prav-
cu Nažbilj – Borovice. Sedma muslimanska bbr anga-
žirana je na pravcu Budoželje – Stupni Do – Višnjići.
H
Pod muslimanskim pritiskom 2. studenoga počelo
je izvlačenje civila, koje je nastavljeno 3. studenoga.
Brigada Bobovac nije pružila veći otpor, a pomoć iz
Kiseljaka koja je stigla tijekom dana (dvije manevar-
ske satnije) koristila se da zaštiti bokove mase od oko
12.000 civila koja se izvlačila prema snagama VRS-a.
M
Zapovjednik OG-2 Ivica Rajić ustvrdio je da su otpor
pružala samo pojačanja iz Kiseljaka i da su upravo oni
uz pomoć VRS-a organizirali crtu obrane Zvijezda –
Mekuše – Vis – Daštansko – Stanovi – Budoželje – Ži-
žići. Stanovništvo je izvučeno preko područja koje je
držao VRS (sela Brgule i Nišić) i prebačeno na područ-
D
je Kiseljaka i Kreševa.797
Dolina Lašve
Nakon što je ovladala Travnikom i dijelom općine
Novi Travnik, ARBiH je zbila i okružila hrvatske snage
C
u dolini Lašve. U prvoj polovini lipnja 1993. HVO je u
pet brigada imao oko 6000 ljudi okruženih višestru-
ko brojnijim muslimanskim snagama. Stanje u dolini
Lašve pukovnik Blaškić opisao je rečenicom: “Situa-
cija je malo gora no u paklu.”798 U dolini je bio veći
dio od 38.000 prognanika iz okolnih mjesta. Napadi
ARBiH iscrpili su zalihe streljiva, a pokušaj dopreme
smjerom preko Sebešića prema Busovači 15. lipnja
797 Brigada HVO “Bobovac”, Borbeno izvješće br. 06-718-6/93
od 30. 10. 1993.; Brigada HVO “Bobovac”, Borbeno izvješće
br. 06-718-7/93 od 30. 10. 1993.; ICTY: TG “Vareš” 6. kor-
pusa ARBiH, Zapovijest za napad od 1. 11. 1993.; Izvješće
Zapovjedništva OG-2 HVO Kiseljak od 3. 11. 1993. o stanju
u Varešu; ICTY: Izvješće Zapovjedništva OG-2 HVO Kisel-
jak od 4. 11. 1993. o uzrocima pada i sadašnjem stanju na
teritoriju općine Vareš; ICTY: 3. korpus ARBiH, Dostava izv-
ještaja str. pov. br. 02/33-2431 od 13. 11. 1993.; ICTY: Vojna
pošta 1751, Značajnija b/d brigade “Ban Josip Jelačić”, br.
03-858-1/94 od 26. 2. 1994.; ICTY: Općinsko vijeće općine
Vareš, Informacija br. OVV-M.P.-74/97 od 21. 5. 1997.
798 IZM OZ SB, str. pov. br. 01-6-293/93 od 11. 6. 1993.
344
Domovinski rat 04-02-2020 Knjiga 1.indd 344
positions on Vojnički Grob Hill and Srednja Planina as
well as the dominant positions on Vis Hill, Djedovača and
Donji Ljig and the village of Duboštica. The Army of the
Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina’s determined ef-
forts forced the civilians from Gornja Borovica and Donja
Borovica to flee on October 30 and 31. At the same time
civilians from the other parts of the municipality were
fleeing towards Vareš.
The Army of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina
began its final onslaught against Vareš on November 2,
1993 by sending a combined force from all three Corps
into the attack from a crescent shaped front line. The
main force of the Tactical Group Vareš from VI Corps at-
tacked in the direction of Površje – Karasovina. The sup-
porting axis of attack was in the direction of Pajtov Han
– Veliki Kamen. Operational Group Kladanj of II Corps
of the Army of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina
attacked in the direction of Daštansko – Mir and Opera-
tional Group Lašva of III Corps attacked in the direction
of Nažbilj – Borovice. The 7th Muslim Brigade attacked in
the direction of Budoželje – Stupni Do – Višnjići. Many
Croatian civilians fled on November 2 and many more
the following day. The Bobovac Brigade did not put up
much of a resistance. The troops that arrived from Kisel-
jak during the day (two maneuver companies) secured
the flanks of the column of about 12,000 civilians fleeing
towards the area controlled by the VRS. The command-
er of Operational Group 2 Ivica Rajić observed that only
the reinforcements from Kiseljak put up a fight and that
it was these troops, with the help of the VRS, that estab-
lished a defensive line running along the Zvijezda – Me-
kuše – Vis – Daštansko – Stanovi – Budoželje – Žižići. The
civilians fled through VRS-controlled territory (villages of
D
Brgule and Nišić) to the Kiseljak and Kreševo area.
Lašva Valley
Having gained control of Travnik and part of the
R
municipality of Novi Travnik the Army of the Republic
of Bosnia and Herzegovina pushed the Croatian forces
into the Lašva Valley and encircled them. During the first
half of June, 1993, the HVO had around 6,000 men in five
brigades. The encircling Muslims forces vastly outnum-
bered them. Colonel Blaškić described the situation in
the Lašva Valley in one sentence: “This is worse than hell.”
Most of the 38,000 refugees from the nearby towns and
villages were in the Lašva Valley. Resisting the Army of
the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina’s attacks deplet-
4.2.2020. 18:35:06
 The Croatian Nation’s Struggle for Survival, 1991-1995
nije uspio. U tim je borbama HVO imao 10 poginulih i
18 ranjenih vojnika.799
Nakon zauzimanja Sebešića OG ARBiH Bosanska
Krajina zadužena je za zauzimanje Lašvanske doline.
Uz postojeće, pridodane su joj snage iz sastava OG-a
Lašva: 306., 308., 312. i 325. brigada i općinski štabovi
obrane Travnik, Novi Travnik i Vitez. U zoni OG-a Lašva
ostale su 309. i 333. brdska brigada do početka stude-
noga 1993., kada je Operativna grupa ukinuta.800
S obzirom na odnos snaga i brojnu premoć AR-
H
BiH, borbe u Lašvanskoj dolini bile su možda i naj-
krvavije u muslimansko-hrvatskom ratu. One su bile
izravan nastavak lipanjskih borbi i tek su u siječnju
1994. počele gubiti intenzitet jer su napadi ARBiH
splasnuli. Bio je to rat u okruženju: HVO je bio u okru-
ženju ARBiH, a ona je bila u okruženju VRS-a i HVO-a.
M
Opća značajka borbi bilo je pozicijsko ratovanje. Hr-
vatsko vijeće obrane branilo se na kompaktnom pro-
storu širine 6 - 10 kilometara i dubine 10 - 12 kilo-
metara, što je mogućnost manevra svodilo na nisku
razinu. Unutar toga prostora bila je muslimanska en-
klava u Starom Vitezu. Sukob je obilježio nedostatak
D
svega, od hrane do streljiva, i ogromna masa civila na
bojnom polju. Hrvatsko vijeće obrane opskrbljivalo
se na kapaljku, riskantnim letovima helikoptera Mi-8
smjerom Posušje – Lašvanska dolina, a ARBiH je očito
dobivala pomoć od UNPROFOR-a. Pripadnici HVO-a
pokazali su iznimnu domišljatost u pravljenju raznih
C
improviziranih eksplozivnih naprava od eksploziva iz
tvornice SPS u Vitezu (mine usmjerenog djelovanja i
fugase), koje su se potom izbacivale po crtama i po-
strojbama ARBiH nanoseći im velike gubitke i sma-
njujući moral ljudstva.801
D
U srpnju su se teške borbe vodile u Vitezu i bližoj
okolici. Na crti Prosje – Kaćuni – Busovača HVO je 5.
srpnja 1993. s malim uspjehom pokušao proboj prema
Kiseljaku – snage PPN-a Vitezovi ovladale su objektom
Prosje. Muslimanske su snage 10. srpnja napale Zabrđe
799 IZM OZ SB, Vanredno izvješće str. pov. br. 01-6-317/93
od 12. 6. 1993.; IZM OZ SB, Izvješće str. pov. br. 03-6-
380/93 od 16. 6. 1993.
800 ICTY: Komanda 3. korpusa, Odgovor i dopuna str. pov.
br. 02/33-1589-1 od 12. 7. 1993.; ICTY: Komanda 3. kor-
pusa, Naređenje str. pov. br. 05/900-179 od 25. 10. 1993.
801 IZM OZ SB, Vanredno izvješće str. pov. br. 01-7-166/93
od 10. 7. 1993.; A. KLIKO, F. ĆUSKIĆ, 17. Viteška Krajiška
brdska brigada ARBiH, 149.
345
Domovinski rat 04-02-2020 Knjiga 1.indd 345
ed the HVO’s ammunition reserves. The HVO attempted
to send a supply of ammunition to the forces in the Laš-
va Valley through Sebešić and towards Busovača on June
15 but the attempt failed. The HVO lost 10 killed and 18
wounded soldiers.
Having captured Sebešić, Operational Group
Bosanska Krajina of the Army of the Republic of Bosnia
and Herzegovina’s new task was to capture the Lašva
Valley. The 306th Brigade, 308th Brigade, 312th Brigade,
325th Brigade from Operational Group Lašva and mu-
nicipal HQs of TO Travnik, Novi Travnik and Vitez were
attached to Operational Group Bosanska Krajina. The
309th and 333rd Mountain Brigades remained in the area
of responsibility of Operational Group Lašva until the
beginning of November, 1993, when Operational Group
Lašva was disbanded.
The Army of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina
enjoyed significant numerical superiority over the HVO
in the Lašva Valley. Partly for that reason the battles in the
Lašva Valley were arguably the bloodiest engagements
of the Muslim-Croat war in Bosnia and Herzegovina.
These battles were a direct continuation of the fighting
in June. The ferocity of the fighting in the Lašva Valley
only abated in January, 1994, when the Army of the Re-
public of Bosnia and Herzegovina’s attacks petered out.
The battles were those of the encirclement type; the
HVO forces were encircled by those of the Army of the
Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina but the Army of the
Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina was, in turn, encir-
cled by the VRS and the HVO. The pattern of fighting was
that of positional warfare. The HVO defended a compact
area 6-10 kilometers wide and 10-12 kilometers deep.
Possibilities for mobile warfare in that area were scant to
non-existent. Reducing the HVO’s ability to conduct mo-
bile operations in the area further was a Muslim enclave
in Stari Vitez located within the area. Complicating mat-
ters further was a chronic shortage of everything – from
food to ammunition – and a swelling mass of civilians in
R
the areas of operations. The bulk of the supplies the HVO
received were transported by Mi-8 helicopters flying into
the area along the direction of Posušje – Lašva Valley.
The flights were extremely risky because the helicopters
presented easy and temping targets to the enemy. The
Army of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina’s supply
situation, on the other hand, was much better because
UNPROFOR was always ready and willing to offer a help-
ing hand. HVO members displayed impressive improvi-
sation skills in terms of creating various explosive devices
4.2.2020. 18:35:06
 Davor Marijan • Rat za opstojnost Hrvata, 1991. - 1995.
H
Armija RBiH granatira Vitez, 1993. (autor fotografija: Srećko
Stipović).
M
ARBiH shells Vitez, 1993 (Photograph by Srećko Stipović).
D
u zoni Viteške brigade. Borbe su trajale tri dana i završile
obranom Zabrđa.
Posebice su se jake borbe vodile u rujnu. Najprije
je HVO 7. rujna 1993. napao i idućega dana zauzeo selo
C
Grbavicu na raskrižju putova Travnik – Zenica – Vitez
i uspio ga zadržati unatoč nizu napada ARBiH. Tim je
uspjehom otvorena prometnica Vitez – Nova Bila. Po-
tom je slijedio udar OG-a Bosanska Krajina ARBiH. Gru-
pa je koordinirala djelovanje sa snagama 4. i 6. korpusa
u operaciji Neretva i 19. rujna 1993. krenula je u napad
da presiječe prometnicu Vitez – Busovača, uđe u Vitez i
odvoji snage HVO-a u Lašvanskoj dolini. Glavne snage
u napadu bili su 17. brdska brigada i Odred El Mudža-
hid s južne strane te 7. muslimanska brigada sa sjever-
ne strane. Armija Republike BiH probila je crtu HVO-a
s južne strane i ovladala Čerkezom i Bobašima. Napad
sa sjeverne strane nije uspio, pa je HVO prestrojio sna-
ge i u protuudaru vratio izgubljene položaje na južnim
prilazima Vitezu. Nije bio uspješan ni napad 333. i 305.
brigade na Busovaču.802
802 ICTY: Komanda 306. brdske brigade, Informacija br.
04/68-53 od 21. 9. 1993.; A. KLIKO, F. ĆUSKIĆ, 17. Viteška
Krajiška brdska brigada ARBiH, 152-153.
346
Domovinski rat 04-02-2020 Knjiga 1.indd 346
Cisterna s vodom za opskrbu stanovništva Viteza, nakon što je
Armija RBiH onemogućila dovod vode (autor fotografija: Srećko
Stipović).
The water tank in Vitez, the only source of water for the resi-
dents of Vitez after the ARBiH cut the water supply to the city
(Photograph by Srećko Stipović).
using explosives from the explosives factory SPS in Vitez.
Equally creative was their way of bombarding the enemy
with some of those devices – they made makeshift cata-
pults and used them efficiently as mortars and artillery
pieces, inflicting a large number of casualties and thus
lowering the morale of the ARBIH troops, who were con-
vinced that the Croats’ arsenal contained a substantial
number of mortars and artillery pieces.
Heavy fighting developed in Vitez and its environs in
D
July. On July 5, 1993, the HVO attempted to advance to-
wards Kiseljak from the Prosje – Kaćuni – Busovača line.
The attempt was not successful but it was not a total fail-
ure either – the Vitezovi unit captured the Prosje facility. On
July 10 the Muslims attacked Zabrđe which was in the area
of responsibility of the Vitez Brigade. The fighting ended
R
after three days when the defenders defeated the attack.
Especially ferocious engagements occurred in Sep-
tember. On September 7, 1993, the HVO attacked and the
next day captured the village of Grbavica on the Travnik
– Zenica – Vitez junction and managed to hold it in the
face of numerous determined attacks by the Army of the
Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina. The Vitez – Nova
Bila road, as a direct result of the success, was opened for
traffic. The Army of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegov-
4.2.2020. 18:35:07
 The Croatian Nation’s Struggle for Survival, 1991-1995
H
M
D
C
D
Neuspjeh i veliki gubici primirili su ARBiH. Ipak, ona
je 9. listopada 1993. probila crtu obrane HVO-a u Boba-
šima i došla do ulaza u Vitez. Napad su zaustavili pripad-
nici PPN-a Vitezovi, a uvođenjem novih snaga dio crte je
vraćen. Sljedeći pomak bio je na Zabrđu, koje je ARBiH
zauzela dio po dio, u sustavnim višemjesečnim napadi-
ma. Dio vikend-naselja zauzet je početkom studenoga,
a do kraja studenoga i preostali dio. U prosincu su se
najžešće borbe vodile za Križančevo Selo nakon što su
muslimanske snage 22. prosinca probile hrvatsku crtu
obrane i počinile jedan od većih zločina u ratu ubivši
ukupno 63 hrvatska civila i vojnika HVO-a. Angažira-
347
Domovinski rat 04-02-2020 Knjiga 1.indd 347
Identifikacija Hrvata nad kojima je Armija RBiH počinila zlo-
čin u Križančevu Selu (autor fotografije: Srećko Stipović).
Identification of the Croat victims murdered by the ARBiH
in Križančevo Selo (Photograph by Srećko Stipović).
ina did not rest however. Operational Group Bosanska
Krajina went into the attack, coordinating its actions with
IV and VI Corps in Operation Neretva. On September 19,
R
1993, Operational Group Bosanska Krajina attacked with
the aim of cutting the Vitez – Busovača road, entering Vi-
tez and cutting off the HVO forces in the Lašva Valley. The
main units in the attack were the 17th Mountain Brigade
and the El-Mudžahid squad advancing on the southern
side and the 7th Muslim Brigade advancing on the north-
ern side. The Army of the Republic of Bosnia and Herze-
govina broke through the HVO’s defensive positions on
the southern side and captured Čerkez and Bobaši. The
4.2.2020. 18:35:07
 Davor Marijan • Rat za opstojnost Hrvata, 1991. - 1995.
H
M
D
Buhine Kuće, posljedica napada muslimanske ARBiH (autor fo-
tografija: Srećko Stipović).
C
Buhine Kuće, devastation wrought by ARBiH attacks (Photo-
graphs by Srećko Stipović).
njem svih raspoloživih snaga HVO-a spriječeno je spaja-
nje s muslimanskim snagama u Starom Vitezu.803
Ujutro 9. siječnja 1994. ARBiH je iskoristila maglu,
u napadu iz Sivrina Sela probila crtu obrane HVO-a u
Buhinim Kućama i ubila 25 vojnika HVO-a (među njima
i one koji su se predali) i civila, zapalila kuće i gospodar-
ske objekte u vlasništvu Hrvata, te izišla na prometnicu
Vitez – Buhine Kuće. Istodobno je na južnom dijelu vi-
teškoga dijela bojišta izveden napad na području Sofa
803 ICTY: Izvješće pukovnika Darka Kraljevića o učešću pri-
padnika PPN Vitezovi u ofenzivnim akcijama u rejonu
Busovače i Viteza tijekom 1993. godine; A. KLIKO, F.
ĆUSKIĆ, 17. Viteška Krajiška brdska brigada ARBiH, 154-
155; Dossier: Zločini muslimanskih postrojbi nad Hrvatima
u BiH 1992. – 1994., 167-170.
348
Domovinski rat 04-02-2020 Knjiga 1.indd 348
attack on the northern side failed. The HVO regrouped
its forces and in a counterattack recaptured the lost po-
sitions on the southern side. The 333rd and 305th Brigade
attacked Busovača but without success.
The Army of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegov-
ina suffered serious casualties in these failed attacks.
However, on October 9, 1993, the Muslims managed to
break through the HVO’s defensive positions in Bobaši
and reached the outskirts of Vitez. The Vitezovi unit man-
aged to halt the onslaught and when the HVO brought
in reinforcements some parts of the defensive line were
recaptured. The Army of the Republic of Bosnia and
Herzegovina was determined to capture Zabrđe. The
Muslims made a steady, if slow headway, capturing one
part of Zabrđe at a time over a period of a few months.
A part of the weekend-settlement was captured at the
beginning of November and the other parts by the end
of the month. In December the bloodiest engagements
took place during the fighting for Križaničevo Selo. On
December 22 the Muslims broke the defensive line and
then committed one of the worst war crimes of the war,
murdering 63 Croatian civilians and HVO POWs. The HVO
reacted by deploying all its available forces and man-
aged to prevent the attackers from linking up with the
Muslim forces in Stari Vitez.
On the morning of January 9, 1994, the Army of the
Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina attacked from the
morning mist and overrun the HVO positions in Buhine
Kuće, killing 25 HVO soldiers (including those who had
surrendered) and civilians, burned houses, industrial fa-
cilities and workshops owned by Croats and reached the
Vitez – Buhine Kuće road. At the same time the Army of
the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina also attacked
D
in the southern part of the Vitez battlefield. The attack
was directed against the Sofa – Kruščica area. The HVO
regrouped and managed, at the cost of heavy casualties,
to push the attackers back. It was of crucial importance
for the HVO to recapture Buhine Kuće because the pos-
R
session of the village gave the Muslims control of the Vi-
tez – Busovača road. The HVO, after two days of heavy
fighting, succeeded in recapturing Buhine Kuće. With
that success the fighting in the Lašva Valley came to an
end. Both sides were exhausted and the end of the war
was not in sight. The HVO had managed not only to sur-
vive but also inflict debilitating casualties on the numer-
ically vastly superior enemy. The Army of the Republic
of Bosnia and Herzegovina had lost its ability to mount
large-scale and ambitious offensive operations.
4.2.2020. 18:35:08
 The Croatian Nation’s Struggle for Survival, 1991-1995
– Kruščica. Uz prestrojavanje i značajne gubitke, HVO je
zaustavio napad. Važan zadatak da vrati Buhine Kuće,
jer su Muslimani njihovim zauzimanjem presjekli pro-
metnicu Vitez – Busovača, HVO-u je uspjelo ostvariti
nakon dva dana borbi.804 Time su borbe u Lašvanskoj
dolini privedene kraju. Obje su strane bile iscrpljene u
sukobu čiji se kraj nije nazirao. Hrvatsko vijeće obrane
održalo se unatoč nadmoći ARBiH, koja nije više bila u
stanju za ozbiljnije napade.
H
Žepče
Nakon napada snaga 3. korpusa ARBiH na HVO u
dolini Lašve bilo je samo pitanje dana kada će se isti sce-
narij primijeniti i na Žepče. U Žepču je HVO imao 111. xp
brigadu i bojnu Andrija Tadić iz sastava pukovnije Bruno
M
Bušić. Potkraj 1993. HVO je u Žepču i okolici imao 4800
vojnika. Od 15. travnja 1993. Zenica je za HVO Žepče
bila nepristupačna, čak ni sanitetska vozila nisu mogla
ući u grad. Hrvatsko vijeće obrane Žepče nije se moglo
kretati dalje od Nemile, odnosno granice općine Zeni-
ca. U 111. brigadi HVO-a predviđali su da se napad na
D
Žepče neće moći izbjeći. Od osnutka 3. korpusa ARBiH u
prosincu 1992. odnosi ARBiH i HVO-a u središnjoj Bosni
postajali su sve lošiji.
Dvije brigade 3. korpusa ARBiH bile su u zoni 111.
brigade HVO-a: 318. brdska iz Zavidovića i 319. brdska iz
C
Žepča, u sastavu OG-a Bosna, koja je “zadužena” za HVO
u Žepču. Osim njih, u sastavu OG-a Bosna bili su i općin-
ski štabovi obrane Žepče i Zavidovići. Na sjevernoj strani
zone 111. xp brigade na području Tešnja bile su snage
OG-7 Jug 2. korpusa ARBiH jačine oko pet brigada.805
Rasplet je počeo 23. lipnja 1993. incidentom izme-
D
đu ARBiH i HVO-a oko položaja na koti 803 iznad Bre-
zova Polja. Prema tvrdnjama HVO-a, ujutro 24. lipnja
muslimanske su snage iz smjera Željeznog Polja i Zeni-
ce napale položaje 111. brigade. Jake borbe počele su
804 ZP Vitez, Izvanredno izvješće br. 08-1-141/93 od 9. 1.
1994.; ZP Vitez, Izvanredno izvješće br. 08-1-147/93 od
9. 1. 1994.; A. KLIKO, F. ĆUSKIĆ, 17. Viteška Krajiška brdska
brigada ARBiH, 155; Dossier: Zločini muslimanskih postro-
jbi nad Hrvatima u BiH 1992. – 1994., 170-174.
805 ICTY: Komanda 3. korpusa, Naređenje, str. pov. br.
02/33-1 od 10. 12. 1992.; ICTY: Komanda 3. korpusa,
Naređenje str. pov. br. 02/33-628 od 8. 3. 1993.; 110.
brigada HVO, br. 05-18-0107/93 od 18. 8. 1993.; 111. xp
brigada HVO, Izvješće o b/s za 1994. godinu, str. pov. br.
01/1-3 od 1. 2. 1994.
349
Domovinski rat 04-02-2020 Knjiga 1.indd 349
Žepče
When the ARBIH III Corps attacked the HVO in the
Lašva Valley it was obvious that the Muslims’ attack on
Žepče was just a matter of time. The HVO had the 111xp
Brigade and the Andrija Tadić Battalion from the Bruno
Bušić Regiment in Žepče. At the end of 1993 the HVO and
its environs had 4,800 men under arms in Žepče. From
April 15 Zenica was out of bounds for the HVO forces in
Žepče, even ambulances were not allowed in. The HVO
forces in Žepče could not move beyond Nemila, that is to
say the boundary of the municipality of Zenica. The 111th
HVO Brigade was aware that nothing could be done to
prevent the Army of the Republic of Bosnia and Herze-
govina’s attack on Žepče. The relationship between the
Army of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina with the
HVO in Central Bosnia had been deteriorating steadily
since the formation of III Corps of the Army of the Repub-
lic of Bosnia and Herzegovina in December, 1992.
Two brigades of the ARBIH III Corps were stationed in
the area of responsibility of the 111th Brigade of the HVO:
the 318th Mountain Brigade from Zavidovići and the 319th
Mountain Brigade from Žepče, both belonging to Opera-
tional Group Bosna which was tasked with “dealing” with
the HVO in Žepče. The municipal HQs of TO Žepče and
Zavidovići were also under the command of Operation-
al Group Bosna. In the northern part of the area of re-
sponsibility of the 111xp Brigade in the Tešanj area there
was Operational Group-7 South 2 of the ARBIH II Corps
whose strength was roughly equal to five brigades.
The situation came to a head on June 23, 1993, with
an incident on Hill 803 above Brezovo Polje. According to
the claims made by the HVO the Muslim forces attacked,
on the morning of June 24, the positions held by the 111th
Brigade from the direction of Željezno Polje and Zenica.
Heavy fighting developed in Žepče too. The HQ of the
ARBIH III Corps accused the HVO of attacking first and
claimed that they had activated the appropriate contin-
gency plan as a response to the HVO’s aggression. Army
R
of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina attacked the
HVO from the direction of Zenica, Tešanj, Maglaj, Zavi-
dovići and Kakanj. The HQ of III Corps sent, on June 27,
one battalion of the 303rd Brigade to the front line. On
June 28-29 the remained of the 303rd Brigade was pulled
out from the Vitez and Busovača front. On June 29, one
battalion of the 314 Motorized Brigade and one compa-
ny of the 305 Mountain Brigade were deployed on the
front line.
4.2.2020. 18:35:08
 Davor Marijan • Rat za opstojnost Hrvata, 1991. - 1995.
i u samom Žepču. S druge strane, Komanda 3. korpu-
sa ARBiH optužila je HVO da je prvi počeo napad te da
su zbog toga aktivirali plan o uporabi snaga u slučaju
sukoba s njima. Armija Republike BiH napala je zonu
HVO-a iz smjera Zenice, Tešnja, Maglaja, Zavidovića i
Kaknja. Komanda 3. korpusa poslala je 27. lipnja jedan
bataljun 303. brigade, 28. i 29. lipnja s fronte je prema
Vitezu i Busovači izvukla i ostatak 303. brigade, a 29.
lipnja angažirala je bataljun 314. mtbr i jednu četu 305.
brdske brigade.806
H
Od 24. do 30. lipnja vodile su se jake borbe u gra-
du i oko njega duž cijele crte. Hrvatsko vijeće obrane
imalo je pomoć srpskih tenkova u borbama za grad.
Glavnina 319. brdske brigade ARBiH u gradu predala
se 30. lipnja, a preostale muslimanske snage protjera-
ne su preko rijeke Bosne u prigradsko naselje Orlovik. U
M
okolici grada HVO se 24. lipnja nakon borbi za kotu 803
povukao na crtu Novakova kosa – Čekrk – Brezova kosa
– Čimen, koju je s pojačanjima zadržao. Tijekom dana
osvojio je važnu kotu Martinski vis. Kod Žepča je HVO
zaposjeo crtu Orahovica – Bukovik – Drenjak – Kicelj i
zauzeo objekt Previlu. U Zavidovićima je ARBiH potisnu-
D
la hrvatske snage na crtu Vinište – Dubravica – Karau-
la – Dubrava – Debelo brdo – Pleć – Devetine uz rijeku
Bosnu. Južno i jugozapadno od Maglaja HVO je stavio
pod nadzor sela Tujnicu, Lugove, Bradiće i dio Vrbice,
a idućega je dana postavio crtu na pravcu Globarica –
Krušik – Tomići – Fojnica – Pazarić – Komšići – Marijina
C
kosa – Borik – Ključ – Ošvanska bandera, gdje se zbog
nedostatka ljudstva i nemogućnosti istodobnog drža-
nja crte prema ARBiH i VRS-u uvezao sa srpskim snaga-
ma. Srbi su preuzeli crtu HVO-a na dijelu od Dubrave
do Hatkinih njiva i potom napali Maglaj. Oslobođene
snage HVO je angažirao prema ARBiH u Novom Šehe-
ru, koja se predala 28. lipnja s okolnim selima Kopice,
Čobe i Domislica. Nakon što su muslimanske snage 26.
lipnja potisnule srpske s prijevoja Tocilo na Crnom vrhu,
HVO je pomagao u organiziranju nove crte na dijelu
Pasja glava – Krč. Srpske su snage 29. lipnja preuzele i
crtu kod Novog Šehera, a HVO je snage angažirao na
južnom dijelu bojišta. Vrlo jak udar ARBiH je izvela 27.
806 IZM OZ SB, Vanredno izvješće str. pov. br. 03-6-533/93
od 24. 6. 1993.; IZM OZ SB, Vanredno izvješće str. pov. br.
03-6-546/93 od 24. 6. 1993.; ICTY: Komanda 3. korpusa,
Informacija str. pov. br. 02/31-538 od 24. 6. 1993.; ICTY:
Komanda 3. korpusa, Vanredni izvještaj str. pov. br. 1968-
69 od 14. 7. 1993.
350
Domovinski rat 04-02-2020 Knjiga 1.indd 350
Heavy fighting took place from June 24 to June 30 in
the city and along the whole length of the defensive line.
The HVO, in the fighting for the city, was supported by
Serbs tanks. The bulk of the 319th Brigade of the Army of
the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina surrendered, in
the city, on June 30 and the other Muslim units fighting
in the city retreated across the Bosna River to the suburb
of Orlovik. In the area outside the city, on June 24, after
fighting for Hill 803, the HVO withdrew to the Novakova
Kosa – Čekrk – Brezova Kosa – Čimen line. The defend-
ers received reinforcements and managed to hold the
line. During the day the HVO captured Martinski Vrh, a
strategically important position. At Žepče the HVO set
up positions along the Orahovica – Bukovik – Drenjak –
Kicelj line and captured the Previla facility. In Zavidovići
the Army of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina
pushed back the Croat forces to the Vinište – Dubravi-
ca – Karaula – Dubrava – Debelo Brdo – Pleć – Devetine
line along the Bosna River. To the southwest of Maglaj
the HVO gained control of the villages of Tujnica, Lugovi,
Bradići and parts of the village of Vrbica. On the follow-
ing day the HVO established positions on the Globarica
– Krušik – Tomići – Fojnica – Pazarić – Komšići – Marijina
Kosa – Borik – Ključ – Ošvanska Bandera line. There, The
HVO, due to the lack of manpower and inability to hold,
simultaneously, the defensive line opposite the Serbs
and the one opposite the Muslims, allowed Serb troops
to take up positions on the HVO frontline with the ARBIH.
The Serbs took up positions on the HVO’s line from Du-
brava as far as Hatkine Njive and then attacked Maglaj.
The HVO forces freed up by the deployment of the VRS
units attacked the Army of the Republic of Bosnia and
Herzegovina forces in Novi Šeher. The Muslims there sur-
D
rendered on June 28. The neighboring villages of Kop-
ice, Čobe and Domislica also surrendered to the Croats.
When the Muslim forces pushed back the Serbs from the
Tocilo pass on Crni Vrh on June 26 the HVO helped in es-
tablishing a new defensive line in the Pasija Glava – Krč
R
area. The Serbs relieved the HVO troops in the positions
at Novi Šeher too on June 29. The HVO deployed these
troops in the southern part of the area of operations.
Having brought reinforcements to the Žepče crossroads
and pushing back the HVO forces there to the Široka
Kosa – Zovik line the Army of the Republic of Bosnia and
Herzegovina mounted an especially determined attack
against the HVO troops deployed to the south of Žepče
on June 27. On June 28 the Muslims continued attacking
and pushed back the Croat forces to the Žepče bridge
4.2.2020. 18:35:08
 The Croatian Nation’s Struggle for Survival, 1991-1995
lipnja južno od Žepča, nakon dovođenja pojačanja na
raskrižje u Žepču, gdje je odbacila HVO na crtu Široka
kosa – Zovik. U nastavku napada na istom pravcu 28.
lipnja odbacila je hrvatske snage na crtu most u Žepču
– Stražva – Vrančug – Milosavac – Zovik – Varda – Peji-
ći – Lupići – Mišići – Ristići do rijeke Bosne. Nakon što
je izdržao višednevni pritisak ARBiH, HVO je 30. lipnja
zauzeo selo Gornju Ozimicu.807
Od početka srpnja 1993. do Washingtonskoga
sporazuma u ožujku 1994. borbe su bile svakodnevne,
H
ARBiH je često napadala dominantne točke, a HVO je
interventnim snagama pukovnije Bruno Bušić i 111. xp
brigade uglavnom vraćao izgubljene položaje. Musli-
manske su snage 5. srpnja potisnule hrvatske s kote
Drenjak i odbacile ih na crtu Divove vode – Lazina – Vis.
Zauzele su i greben Oštruljak, koji je HVO vratio sljede-
M
ćega dana. Napad ARBiH na Vardu 9. srpnja HVO je od-
bio i 16. srpnja zauzeo kotu Vis. Armija Republike BiH
ponovno je 20. srpnja napala snage HVO-a na Zoviku
i odbacila ih na crtu Rudina – Milosavac. Potom je 28.
srpnja napala položaje koje su držale srpske snage i za-
uzela kote Martinski vis i Kozja stopa. Dva dana poslije
D
interventne snage HVO-a vratile su izgubljene kote.808
U kolovozu je HVO bio agilniji. Dana 11. kolovoza
potisnuo je muslimanske snage s područja Biljačića i us-
postavio čvršću i racionalniju obranu. Armija Republike
BiH odgovorila je 16. kolovoza upadom skupine u selo
Kiseljak, gdje je ubila nekoliko civila, a 20-ak ih je odvela
C
sa sobom kao taoce. U rujnu je bilo više borbi. Armija
Republike BiH zaposjela je 13. rujna kotu Maglaj, koju su
držale srpske snage. Idućega dana HVO je vratio izgu-
bljenu kotu i ponovno je dao na čuvanje srpskim snaga-
ma. Potom su interventne snage HVO-a 16. rujna izvele
D
pothvat XP, čija je svrha bila odbaciti ARBiH dalje od
Žepča i omogućiti koliko-toliko normalan život u gradu.
U pothvatu su osvojeni vrh Drenjka i naselje Preko i one-
mogućena je veza muslimanskih snaga tokom rijeke
Bosne prema Zavidovićima. U nastavku pothvata HVO
je 18. rujna zauzeo kote Kik i Orlovik i selo Hrastušje. S
obzirom na to da nije imala uspjeha u napadima na crtu
koju je držao HVO, ARBiH je 26. rujna napala crtu koju
su držale srpske snage i potisnula ih s kota Borik, Ključ
807 Davor MARIJAN, Rat Hrvata i Muslimana u Bosni i Herce-
govini od 1992. do 1994., Hrvatski institut za povijest, Za-
greb, 2018., 380-384.
808 Isto, 384.; 111. xp brigada HVO, Izvješće o b/s za 1994.
godinu, str. pov. br. 01/1-3 od 1. 2. 1994.
351
Domovinski rat 04-02-2020 Knjiga 1.indd 351
– Stražva – Vrančug – Milosavac – Zovik – Varda – Pejići –
Lupići – Mišići – Ristići as far as the Bosna River line. The
HVO managed to withstand the pressure and on June 30
captured the village of Gornja Ozimica.
From the beginning of July, 1993, until the signing
of the Washington Agreement in March, 1994, fighting
raged on without respite. The Army of the Republic of
Bosnia and Herzegovina launched numerous attacks
on dominant positions, often with success. The HVO re-
sponded by sending the intervention forces of the Bruno
Bušić Regiment and the 111xp Brigade into counterat-
tacks to recapture lost positions. Most of these counterat-
tacks were also successful. On July 5 the Muslims pushed
back the Croats from Drenjak Hill to the Divove Vode
– Lazina – Vis line. The Muslims also captured Oštruljak
Ridge. The HVO recaptured the ridge the following day.
On July 9 the HVO repulsed the Army of the Republic of
Bosnia and Herzegovina’s attack on Varda. On July 16 the
HVO captured Vis Hill. The Army of the Republic of Bos-
nia and Herzegovina again attacked the HVO forces on
Zovik on July 20. The Muslims threw the Croats back to
the Rudina – Milosavac line. Then, on July 28 the Muslims
attacked the positions held by the Serbs and captured
Martinski Vis and Kozja Stopa Hills. Two days later the
HVO intervention forces recaptured the hills.
In August the HVO performed with more agility. On
August 11 the Croats forced the Muslim forces to retreat
from the Biljačić area and established strong defensive
positions. The Army of the Republic of Bosnia and Her-
zegovina reacted on August 16 by launching a foray into
the village of Kiseljak where the attackers killed a number
of civilians and took 20 civilians away as hostages. There
was more fighting in September than in August. On Sep-
tember 13 the Army of the Republic of Bosnia and Herze-
govina defeated the Serb soldiers defending Maglaj Hill.
The following day the HVO counterattacked and chased
the Muslims away. The Serbs then again set up defensive
positions on the hill. On September 16 the HVO interven-
R
tion forces carried out Action XP the aim of which was
to push back the Army of the Republic of Bosnia and
Herzegovina away from Žepče and ensure at least some
semblance of normalcy in the city. The intervention forc-
es captured Drenjak Hill and the Preko neighborhood
and prevented the Muslims from using the Bosna River
as a communications route towards Zavidovići. Follow-
ing this success up on September 18 the HVO captured
Kik and Orlovik hills and the village of Hrastušje. Having
failed to make any significant headway in attacking the
4.2.2020. 18:35:08
 Davor Marijan • Rat za opstojnost Hrvata, 1991. - 1995.
i Bijeli klanci. Idućega dana HVO je vratio Bijele klance.
Kote Borik i Ključ vraćene su 14. listopada i ponovno su
ih preuzele srpske snage. Sljedeće borbe protekle su u
vraćanju položaja s kojih su se povukle srpske snage:
16. listopada Cerove ravni i 4. studenoga Ključa.809
U prosincu je HVO preuzeo inicijativu. Početkom
mjeseca zauzete su kote Srgovi i Gajić na novošeher-
skom dijelu bojišta, na pravcu prema Tešnju. Slijedio je
mnogo veći uspjeh, kada je 20. prosinca zauzeta kota
Bukovik južno od Žepča, s koje se nadzirao prilaz gradu
H
i položajima na Previli i Orloviku. Muslimanske su je sna-
ge brzo vratile, no HVO ju je 22. prosinca ponovno za-
uzeo. Armija Republike BiH više je puta napadala kotu,
ali HVO je odbio sve napade. Do Washingtonskoga
sporazuma veće borbe tijekom 1994. vodile su se oko
kote Bukovik (28. siječnja), na crti Pazarić – Rovine na
M
maglajskom dijelu bojišta 21. siječnja, Golom brdu 23. i
24. siječnja, na koti Sedra i oko Rovina krajem siječnja.810
809 111. xp brigada HVO, Izvješće o b/s za 1994. godinu, str.
pov. br. 01/1-3 od 1. 2. 1994.
D
810 Bojna “Andrija Tadić”, Izvješće br. 310/93 od 17. 9. 1993.;
Bojna “Andrija Tadić”, Izvješće br. 201/93 od 20. 8. 1993.;
Bojna “Andrija Tadić”, Izvješće br. 406/93 od 4. 12. 1993.;
Bojna “Andrija Tadić”, Izvješće br. 423/93 od 23. 12. 1993.;
111. xp brigada, Zapovijed br. 02/1-422/93 od 23. 12.
1993.; Bojna “Andrija Tadić”, Izvješće br. 424/93 od 25.
12. 1993.; 111. xp brigada, Zapovijed br. 02/1-427/93 od
C
19. 12. 1993.; 111. xp brigada, Zapovijed br. 01/21-2 od
21. 1. 1994.; 111. xp brigada, Zapovijed br. 01/21-3 od
23. 1. 1994.; Bojna “Andrija Tadić”, Izvješće br. 441/94 od
24. 1. 1994.; 111. xp brigada HVO, Izvješće o b/s za 1994.
godinu, str. pov. br. 01/1-3 od 1. 2. 1994.; “Kronologija
borbenih aktivnosti bojne ‘Andrija Tadić’ Žepče”, Drmaj,
travanj 1994., 14. Prema navedenim izvorima, tijekom
rata s Muslimanima HVO Žepče imao je 203 poginula
i 571 ranjenog vojnika, a 44 je zarobila ARBiH. Prema
iskazima zapovjednika iz Žepča, u obrani hrvatskih pro-
stora od Vojske Republike Srpske, od svibnja 1992. do
svibnja 1993., 111. xp brigada imala je 136 poginulih
i više od 270 ranjenih pripadnika, a u obrani od musli-
manske agresije poginula su 272 branitelja i oko 700 ih
je ranjeno (neki od njih i više puta). Ukupno, od 1992.
do 1995. poginulo je 408 pripadnika HVO-a, ranjena su
najmanje 963, a u obrani Republike Hrvatske, u sastavu
Hrvatske vojske, poginulo je 18 dobrovoljaca sa žepač-
kog područja. Prema podacima iz literature, u ratu od
1992. do 1996. ukupno je poginulo, nestalo i umrlo od
posljedica ranjavanja 399 pripadnika 111. xp brigade iz
Žepča, a ranjeno je 899, od toga 260 u sukobu sa srpskim
postrojbama, a 639 u sukobu s muslimanskim postroj-
bama (Mirko Šimunović, Zbornik hrvatskih branitelja 111.
xp. brigade Žepče poginulih i nestalih u ratu 1992. - 1996.,
Žepče, 2001., 11-410, 411-427).
352
Domovinski rat 04-02-2020 Knjiga 1.indd 352
HVO positions the Army of the Republic of Bosnia and
Herzegovina attacked the portion of the line held by the
Serbs on September 26. The attackers pushed the Serbs
back from Borik, Ključ and Bijeli Klanci hills. The next day
the HVO recaptured Bijeli Klanci Hill. The HVO recaptured
Borik and Ključ Hills on October 14 and the Serbs again
took up defensive positions there. The fighting that fol-
lowed was all about, for the HVO, retaking the positions
the Army of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina had
captured from the Serbs: on October 16 the HVO chased
the Muslims from Cerove Ravni and on November 4 from
Ključ Hill.
In December the HVO gained the initiative. At the
beginning of the month the Croats captured Srgovi
and Gajić Hills in the Novi Šeher area, in the direction of
Tešanj. On December 20 the HVO scored a pivotal suc-
cess by capturing Bukovik Hill to the south of Žepče. The
hill afforded the occupants control of the approaches to
the city and positions on Previla and Orolovik. It did not
take long for the Muslims to recapture the position but
the HVO attacked again on December 22 and took the
hill. The Army of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina
then launched a number of attacks on the hill but could
not dislodge the HVO troops from their positions. During
1994 and until the signing of the Washington Agreement
heavy fighting developed around Bukovik Hill (January
28), along the Pazarić – Rovine line in the Maglaj area on
January 21, on Golo Brdo on January 23-24, on Sedra Hill
and around Rovin at the end of January.18
18 During the Muslim-Croat war the HVO Žepče lost 203
killed, 571 and 44 soldiers taken prisoner. According to
statements made by the commander of Žepče, the 111xp
D
Brigade, while defending the Croatian areas from the
VRS during the period from May, 1992, until May, 1993,
lost 136 soldiers killed and more than 270 wounded. By
way of comparison, the brigade lost 272 soldiers killed
and around 700 soldiers were wounded (some of them
multiple times) while resisting Muslim aggression. In
total, from 1992 until 1995, 408 HVO soldiers were killed
R
and at least 963 wounded. 18 volunteers from the Žepče
area were killed, as Croatian Army soldiers, defending
the Republic of Croatia. According to available sources,
from 1992 until 1996 in total, 399 members of the 111xp
Brigade from Žepče were killed, died of wounds or are
still listed as missing. In the same period 899 soldiers
were wounded, or more specifically, 260 soldiers were
wounded while fighting against Serb forces, and 639
while fighting against the Muslims (Šimunović, Mirko.
Zbornik hrvatskih branitelja 111. Xp. brigade Žepče
poginulih i nestalih u ratu 1992.-1996. Žepče, 2001, pp.11-
410, 411-427).
4.2.2020. 18:35:08
 The Croatian Nation’s Struggle for Survival, 1991-1995
Sarajevo, Tuzla, Usora
U Sarajevu, Tuzli i Usori Hrvati su 1992. osnovali bri-
gade koje su fizički bile odvojene od glavnine HVO-a u
središnjoj Bosni. Muslimansko-hrvatski rat odrazio se na
položaj svih triju brigada, koje su tijekom toga rata imale
različitu sudbinu. Ni jedna od njih nije ugrožavala većin-
ske postrojbe ARBiH, no radikalan kurs muslimanskoga
političkog i vojnog vrha tražio je da se one uklope u njihov
sustav, koji se bez osnove zvao Oružane snage Republike
H
Bosne i Hercegovine. Stranka demokratske akcije tada je
već čvrsto stavila ruku na vojnu silu i dala joj snažan mu-
slimanski i islamski štih. Privid jedine legalne vojne opcije
muslimanski je vrh planirao pojačati prevođenjem briga-
da HVO-a u sastav ARBiH, o čemu je Izetbegović 14. pro-
sinca 1993. potpisao i posebnu odluku. Tom je odlukom
M
postrojbama HVO-a promijenjeno ime i prevedene su u
sastav ARBiH. Postrojbe HVO-a koje nisu provele odluku
proglašene su paravojnim sastavima.811 Bez problema je
u ARBiH preimenovana 107. brigada HVO-a iz Gradačca,
koja je imala apsolutnu muslimansku većinu i čija lojal-
nost Sarajevu nikada nije bila upitna.812
D
U vrijeme kada se pisala, odluka o preimenovanju
je u Sarajevu već bila realizirana. Ondje je HVO od ljeta
1992. bio pod sustavnim pritiskom muslimanskih tijela
vlasti, koji je međusobni rat samo zaoštrio. Brigada HVO-a
Kralj Tvrtko bila je dežurni krivac i predmet na kojem su se
C
liječile frustracije službenoga Sarajeva zbog rata s Hrvati-
ma. U tome su Muslimani imali potporu dijela sarajevskih
Hrvata, koji su ih podržavali iz osobnih razloga. Ujutro 6.
studenoga 1993. Specijalna policija MUP-a RBiH napala
je i zauzela Stožer brigade, a potom su napadnute i za-
robljene ostale postrojbe koje nisu pružile otpor. Zapo-
D
vjedništvo brigade je uhićeno, a zapovjednik Slavko Zelić
optužen je na insceniranom sudskom procesu i držan u
zatvoru nekoliko mjeseci prije no što je razmijenjen u Mo-
staru. Zalaganjem spomenutih promuslimanskih političa-
ra, od ljudstva HVO-a organizirana je 142. hrvatska brdska
brigada Kralj Tvrtko u sastavu 1. korpusa ARBiH.813
811 Odluka Predsjednika Predsjedništva RBiH od 14. 12.
1993. o preimenovanju postrojbi HVO, Službeni list RBiH,
br. 27, 31. 12. 1993.
812 R. DELIĆ, Armija RBiH, I, 309.
813 Slavko ZELIĆ, HVO u obrani Sarajeva (prilozi za istraživanje
uloge HVO-a u obrani Sarajeva i BiH), Republika Hrvatska i
Domovinski rat 1990.-1995., memoarsko gradivo, knjiga
9., HMDCDR, Zagreb – Mostar, 2014.
353
Domovinski rat 04-02-2020 Knjiga 1.indd 353
Sarajevo, Tuzla, Usora
In Sarajevo, Tuzla and Usora the Croats formed, in 1992,
one brigade in each city. These brigades were geographi-
cally separated from the main HVO force in central Bosnia.
The exigencies of the Muslim-Croat war influenced the
fates of the three brigades and ensured that each brigade’s
story would follow a different path. However, there were
similarities. None of the three brigades was in a position
to threaten the numerically superior Muslim formation in
their respective areas. It is important to mention that the
radical attitude of the Muslim political and military leader-
ship called for the incorporation the three Croat brigades
into the Muslim military system which the Muslim leaders
called, rather unrealistically, the Armed Forces of the Re-
public of Bosnia and Herzegovina. The Party of Democratic
Action usurped control of the army and turned it, for all
intents and purposes, into a Muslim institution. It was im-
portant, for the leadership of the party, to keep up the pre-
tense that the Armed Forces of the Republic of Bosnia and
Herzegovina was a non-partisan entity whose main mis-
sion was to protect the sovereignty of the country. For that
reason Izetbegović signed a special decision on December
14, 1993, by which the HVO brigades were to be incorpo-
rated into the Army of the Republic of Bosnia and Herze-
govina. The decision also stipulated that the designations
and names of the HVO units should be changed according
to the Army of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina’s
system of designations. Those HVO units that refused to
abide by the decision were proclaimed paramilitary forma-
tions. The renaming of the 107th Brigade of the HVO from
Gradačac went smoothly because the vast majority of its
soldiers were Muslims and the brigade’s loyalty to the Sara-
jevo regime was absolute.
It is important to note that the decision on renaming
the units had already been implemented in Sarajevo even
before it was written. In Sarajevo, from the summer of
1992, the HVO was under constant pressure from the Mus-
lim authorities. This only made the already bad situation
R
worse. The Muslim leadership in Sarajevo needed to find a
scapegoat to blame for the war with the Croats. The Mus-
lims duly put the blame for all their ills on the shoulders
of the Kralj Tvrtko Brigade of the HVO. Ironically, a number
of Croats in Sarajevo, currying favor with the Muslims, lend
their tacit support to this witch-hunt. On the morning of
November 6, 1993, the Special Police of the MUP of the Re-
public of Bosnia and Herzegovina attacked and captured
the HQ of the Kralj Tvrtko Brigade. The other units of the
4.2.2020. 18:35:08
 Davor Marijan • Rat za opstojnost Hrvata, 1991. - 1995.
U Tuzli je HVO imao 115. brigadu Zrinski, koja je
djelovala u zoni 2. korpusa ARBiH. Ujesen 1993. ljud-
stvo brigade počelo je osjećati posljedice musliman-
sko-hrvatskoga rata. Na brigadu se vršio pritisak da
prijeđe u sastav ARBiH, što je ona, uz političku potporu
HVO-a Hrvatske zajednice Soli, odbila. Kada je pritisak
postao prevelik, u brigadi je odlučeno da se postrojba
raspusti, što je realizirano 10. siječnja 1994. godine.814
Sličan pritisak napravljen je iz Sarajeva i Tuzle na
110. brigadu HVO-a Usora. Ona je bila u sastavu OG-7
H
Jug, koja je od kraja lipnja 1993. bila okružena snaga-
ma 111. brigade HVO-a i VRS-a te fizički odsječena od
2. korpusa ARBiH. Odsječenost i držanje crte nasuprot
srpskim snagama dali su 110. brigadi HVO-a status koji
su u OG-7 Jug i općini Tešanj dobro shvaćali. To je utje-
calo na to da ne idu do kraja s provedbom odluke iz
M
Sarajeva, posebice nakon što je Zapovjedništvo 110.
brigade stavilo na znanje da je spremno oružjem bra-
niti svoj status i ime. Brigada je tako preživjela pokušaj
preimenovanja.815
Muslimanski pritisak izdržala je i 108. brigada Rav-
ne-Brčko, koja je bila u zoni 2. korpusa ARBiH i u dome-
tu topništva HVO-a iz OZ-a Bosanska Posavina. Unatoč
D
pritiscima potkraj 1993. i početkom 1994. brigada je
ostala u sastavu HVO-a. Nakon raspuštanja 115. briga-
de HVO-a iz Tuzle dio vojnika je prešao u sastav 108.
brigade. Osim njih u sastavu brigade je bilo i Hrvata iz
općina: Banovići, Lukavac, Gradačac i Srebrenik.816
C
814 Zvonko Jurić, “115. brigada HVO-a ‘Zrinski’ Tuzla”, Bojo-
vnik, br. 5, ožujak 1995., 28-29.
815 Službena zabilješka SIS-a 110. brigade HVO-a (ne-
datirano, pisano nakon 14. 12. 1993.). Dokument na
web-stranici Slobodana Praljka.
816 HDA, GSHVO: ZP Orašje, Izvješće 108. brigade
HVO, str. pov. br. 01-02/94-216/2 od 11. 3. 1994.;
Filip Ilijanić, „Svoji na svom”, Odjek branitelja, gla-
silo hrvatskog naroda općine Brčko i Srebrenik, br.
7 od 2. 4. 1994., 3; Izjava brigadira Ive Filipovića
dana 24. 9. 2019.
354
Domovinski rat 04-02-2020 Knjiga 1.indd 354
Brigade were then attacked also. The Croats surrendered
without a fight. The commanding officers of the Brigade
were arrested and the commander of the Brigade, Slavko
Zelić, was tried on trump up charges and convicted to
a prison sentence in a kangaroo court. He spent a few
months in prison until he was exchanged in Mostar. Thanks
to the efforts of the mentioned pro-Muslim politicians the
142nd Croatian Mountain Brigade Kralj Tvrtko was formed
out of HVO personnel and was placed under the command
of the ARBIH I Corps.
In Tuzla the HVO had the 115th Zrinski Brigade. The Bri-
gade was stationed in the zone of the ARBIH II Corps. In the
fall of 1993, the personnel of the Brigade started to feel the
pinch of the Muslim-Croat war. The Muslims insisted that
the Brigade be incorporated into the Army of the Republic
of Bosnia and Herzegovina. The leadership of the Brigade,
with political support of the HVO of the Croatian commu-
nity in Soli, refused. When the Muslims increased the pres-
sure the leadership of the Brigade decided to disband the
unit. That was duly done on January 10, 1994.
Similar pressure was put, from Sarajevo and Tuzla, on
the 110th Brigade of the HVO in Usora. The Brigade was
under the command of the OG-7 South. The OG-7 South
was, from the end of June, 1993, surrounded by the 111th
Brigade of the HVO and the VRS and cut off from the AR-
BIH II Corps. The pivotal importance of the fact that the
110th Brigade held the line opposite the VRS and the fact
that it was cut off from II Corps was not lost on Operation-
al Group South and those in charge of the municipality of
Tešanj. For that reason the HQ of the OG-7 South and the
Muslim authorities in Tešanj were reluctant to push for the
implementation of the Sarajevo decision, especially after
the HQ of the 110th Brigade let it be known that the Brigade
was ready and willing to fight for its status and name. The
D
Brigade thus survived in its original form.
Izetbegović’s decision was only partially implemented.
The HVO brigade in Sarajevo was coerced into changing
its name but the other brigades, the 110th and 115th, stood
firm. The 108th Brigade Ravne-Brčko also remained in the
R
HVO. This Brigade was in the area of the ARBIH II Corps
and within range of the HVO artillery of Operative Zone
Bosanska Posavina. At the end of 1993 and beginning of
1994, pressure was put on the 108th Brigade of the HVO to
allow itself to be incorporated into the ARBIH. The brigade
refused to be coerced. When the 115th Brigade of the HVO
from Tuzla was disbanded, some of its soldiers joined the
108th Brigade. In addition to these troops, Croats form the
following municipalities also served in the 108th Brigade:
Banovići, Gradačac and Srebrenik.
4.2.2020. 18:35:08
 The Croatian Nation’s Struggle for Survival, 1991-1995
DOLINA VRBASA I RAMA
Nakon siječanjskoga sukoba 1993., dolina Vrbasa
nekoliko je mjeseci živjela u stanju ni rata ni mira. Inci-
denti su bili svakodnevni, što je značilo stalno dizanje
borbene spremnosti, cestovno razbojništvo i povreme-
na ubojstva putnika. Bila je to igra iscrpljivanja u kojoj
je ARBiH dugoročno, zbog brojnosti snaga, bila u pred-
nosti. U drugoj polovini travnja 1993., nakon sukoba u
dolinama Neretve i Lašve, Komanda 3. korpusa ARBiH
H
naredila je 22. travnja OG-u Zapad da bude spreman
razbiti i razoružati HVO u Bugojnu i Gornjem Vakufu.817
Hrvatsko vijeće obrane kasnilo je u pripremama za sraz.
U prvoj polovini svibnja HVO u Bugojnu i Gornjem Vaku-
fu izradio je plan djelovanja u slučaju sukoba s ARBiH.818
M
Bugojno
Nakon ofenzive ARBiH u središnjoj Bosni u lipnju i
početkom srpnja 1993., HVO u Bugojnu došao je u ne-
zavidan položaj. Bio je u poluokruženju snaga ARBiH i
srpskih snaga na Kupreškoj visoravni. S OZ-om Sjevero-
D
zapadna Hercegovina imao je nestabilnu vezu u Usko-
paljskoj dolini. Nezavidan položaj pogoršan je i neod-
lučnošću dijela političkog i vojnog vodstva u gradu.
Uoči sukoba HVO je u Bugojnu imao brigadu Eugen
Kvaternik i Domobranstvo jačine pukovnije, ukupno
C
oko 3200 ljudi. Armija Republike BiH je imala 307. mtbr
i Općinski štab obrane s prostornim strukturama s oko
4500 ljudi. Vojske su se izmještale u skladu s demograf-
skom strukturom općine. U odnosu na brojniju ARBiH,
HVO je imao prednost u naoružanju i opremi.819
Sukob je počeo 18. srpnja 1993., prema hrvatskim
D
izvorima zbog napada ARBiH na skupinu HVO-a koja se
vraćala s crte, a prema muslimanskima zbog postavljanja
punkta kod sela Vrbanje. Uslijedilo je postavljanje pun-
ktova po gradu, zarobljavanje vojnika i civila, oduzimanje
vozila i naoružanja. Navečer je HVO odbio muslimanski
napad na selo Kulu. Idućega dana ARBiH je zauzela dio
sela Vučipolja, koje je HVO u protunapadu vratio. Hrvat-
sko vijeće obrane bez borbe je zaposjelo Vrbanju. U na-
817 ICTY: Komanda 3. korpusa, Naređenje str. pov. br. 02/33-
957 od 22. 4. 1993.
818 ZOZS/ZH, Zapovijed br. 01/5-190 od 4. 5. 1993.
819 Hasib MUŠINBEGOVIĆ, Boj odbrana Bugojna 1993., Biljeg,
Sarajevo, 2011., 43.
355
Domovinski rat 04-02-2020 Knjiga 1.indd 355
VRBAS VALLEY AND RAMA
After the fighting in January, 1993, people in the Vr-
bas Valley existed in a state of limbo, caught between a
phony war and spurious peace. Incidents were a daily oc-
currence; highway robberies, sometimes accompanied
by murder were frequent. Both the HVO and the Army of
the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina were constant-
ly kept at the highest level of battle readiness. It was a
contest of endurance and attrition in which the Army of
the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, on account of
its numerical superiority, held every advantage. In the
second half of April, 1993, after the battles in the Neretva
Valley and Lašva Valley, the HQ of III Corps ordered, on
April 22, Operational Group West to be prepared to de-
feat and disarm the HVO in Bugojno and Gornji Vakuf.
The HVO’s preparations for the upcoming clash lagged
behind those of the Army of the Republic of Bosnia and
Herzegovina. In the first half of May the HVO in Bugojno
finalized its contingency plan for a conflict with the Army
of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina.
Bugojno
After the Army of the Republic of Bosnia and Her-
zegovina’s offensive in central Bosnia in June and at the
beginning of July, 1993, the HVO in Bugojno found itself
in a precarious situation. It was partially encircled by the
Army of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the
Serb forces deployed in the Kupres plateau. The HVO
forces in Bugojno were connected to Operative Zone
Northeast Herzegovina in the Uskoplje Valley but the link
was tenuous. The unfavorable situation was further ex-
acerbated by the indecisiveness of certain political and
military leaders in the city.
Just prior to the outbreak of hostilities the HVO had
the Eugen Kvaternik Brigade and a regiment-strength
Home Guard formation in Bugojno, altogether 3,200
R
men. The Army of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovi-
na had the 307th Motorized Brigade and municipal HQ of
TO static territorial units – 4,500 men in total – in Bugoj-
no. The deployment of military formations matched the
demographic structure of the municipality. The Army of
the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina was numerically
superior to the HVO, but the HVO had better weapons
and equipment.
The conflict started on July 18, 1993. According to
Croatian sources hostilities began when the Army of the
4.2.2020. 18:35:08
 Davor Marijan • Rat za opstojnost Hrvata, 1991. - 1995.
stavku borbi 20. srpnja ARBiH je imala značajnije uspjehe
u borbama u gradu. Brigadi HVO-a zapovjeđeno je da se
prestroji i prikupi na područjima gdje se može braniti te
čeka pomoć s pravca Gornji Vakuf – Gračanica. Navečer je
HVO držao položaje Goruša – Golo Brdo – Kandija – Vuči-
polje – Lokve – Bristovi – Kula – Donji Boganovci – Rosulje
– Ćurčića Lug – Udurlije – Čaušlije – objekt Stolarija. U
gradu je držao naselje Voznik – hotel „Kalin“ – Ljubljanska
banka – robna kuća. Prema gradu je crta razgraničenja
bila naselje Jaklić – sredina Sultanovića – Gorica – Novo
H
naselje – Jasika – Mandalac – Gornji Podovi – Perizovci –
Crniče – Okolišće – Humac. Težište napada ARBiH 21. srp-
nja bilo je s pravca Ravno Rostovo prema Rosuljama, Bri-
stovima i Vučipolju i pravcu Bugojno – Vrbanja – Zlavast.
Idućega dana ARBiH je uspjela odsjeći hrvatske snage u
gradu, a 23. srpnja zauzela je baze bojni brigade Eugen
M
Kvaternik u gradu. U gradu se HVO 24. srpnja branio samo
u hotelu „Kalin“. Armija Republike BiH okružila je sela sje-
verno od grada i HVO je bio na rubu poraza. Crtu Kula –
Donji Boganovac muslimanske su snage probile 25. srp-
nja, a potom i crtu kod Kule, te su se spojile sa snagama iz
Travnika. Obrana hotela „Kalin“ se predala, a HVO je počeo
D
pripreme za izvlačenje preko srpskih položaja na Kupresu
za Tomislavgrad. Povlačenje je počelo 26. srpnja i završilo
29. srpnja porazom HVO-a i protjerivanjem većega dijela
hrvatskoga stanovništva.820
Dok je ARBiH osvajala Bugojno, hrvatske snage iz
susjednih općina malo su pomogle. Borbene skupine iz
C
Livna koje su bile u Prozoru, 19. i 20. srpnja povukle su se
u Livno, gdje su angažirane za razoružanje lokalnih Musli-
mana. Pokušaj da ih se ponovno angažira nije bio uspje-
šan. Hrvatsko vijeće obrane Gornjeg Vakufa uspjelo je 21.
srpnja zauzeti Gračanicu i bilo je blizu spajanja sa snaga-
ma HVO-a Bugojna. Nedostatak snaga onemogućio je tu
namjeru i ARBiH je u noći 23./24. srpnja u protunapadu
zauzela Gračanicu i napala Humac, čime je otklonila mo-
gućnost pružanja pomoći iz Gornjeg Vakufa. Skupina boj-
ne Zrinski i pukovnije Bruno Bušić prekinula je 27. srpnja
napad na Voljice zbog lažne dojave o padu prijevoja Ma-
kljena. Te su skupine poslije angažirane da na Raduškom
kamenu prihvate dio razbijene brigade HVO-a Bugojno.821
820 GS HVO, Kronološki tijek događanja str. pov. br. 02-
2/1-02-1827/93 od 10. 8. 1993.; H. MUŠINBEGOVIĆ, Boj
odbrana Bugojna 1993., 89-93.
821 GS HVO, Kronološki tijek događanja str. pov. br. 02-2/1-
02-1827/93 od 10. 8. 1993.; Izjava bojnika Željka Na-
letilića, zapovjednika bojne “Ivica Jelčić Čarls”.
356
Domovinski rat 04-02-2020 Knjiga 1.indd 356
Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina attacked a group
of HVO soldiers returning from the frontline, having
completed their shift there. According to Muslim sourc-
es, on the other hand, the situation escalated because
the HVO set up a checkpoint at the village of Vrbanja.
In any event, both sides stared setting up checkpoints
all over the city, arresting the other side’s soldiers, con-
fiscating the other side’s vehicles and weapons. In the
evening the HVO beat back a Muslim attack on the vil-
lage of Kula. The following day the Army of the Repub-
lic of Bosnia and Herzegovina captured a part of the
village of Vučipolje but the HVO counterattacked and
recaptured the village. The HVO occupied the village of
Vrbanja without a fight. On July 20, the Army of the Re-
public of Bosnia and Herzegovina achieved a few nota-
ble successes in the city. The HVO Brigade was ordered
to regroup and concentrate its troops in good defen-
sive positions and hold on until help arrived from the
direction of Gornji Vakuf – Gračanica. In the evening the
HVO held positions on the Goruša – Golo Brdo – Kandija
– Vučipolje – Lokve – Bristovi – Kula – Donji Boganovci
– Rosulje – Ćurčića Lug – Udurlije – Čaušlije – Stolarija
workshop line. In the city the HVO controlled the Voznik
neighborhood – Kalin Hotel – Ljubljanska bank – Su-
permarket line. On the approaches to the city the front
line stretched along the Jaklić neighborhood – center
of Sultanovići – Gorica – Novo Naselje – Jasika – Man-
dalac – Gornji Podovi – Perizovci – Crniče – Okolišće
– Humac line. On July 21 the Army of the Republic of
Bosnia and Herzegovina attacked from Ravno Rostovo
in the direction of Rosulje, Bristovi and Vučipolje and in
the direction of Bugojno – Vrbanja – Zlavast. The next
day the Army of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina
D
managed to cut off the Croatian forces in the city and on
July 23 the Muslims captured the base of the battalions
belonging to the Eugen Kvaternik Brigade in the city. On
July 24 the area defended by the HVO in the city was re-
duced to the position around the Kalin Hotel – the HVO
R
was on the brink of defeat. The Muslims broke through
the Kula – Donji Boganovac line on July 25. The Muslims
followed up that success by pushing through the line at
Kula and linked up with the Muslim forces from Travnik.
The HVO troops defending the positions around the Ka-
lin hotel surrendered and the HVO started preparing for
a retreat to Tomislavgrad through the Serb positions on
Kupres. The retreat started on July 26 and ended on July
29. The HVO had suffered a defeat. Most of the Croatian
population was expelled.
4.2.2020. 18:35:08
 The Croatian Nation’s Struggle for Survival, 1991-1995
Pobjedom u Bugojnu ARBiH je spojila snage OG-a
Zapad i stavila pod nadzor velik dio doline Vrbasa, što
je olakšavalo napad na HVO u Gornjem Vakufu. Brigada
HVO-a Eugen Kvaternik u srpanjskim je borbama razbi-
jena, a od njezinih je ostataka prikupljena slabija boj-
na koja je angažirana na ramsko-uskopaljskom bojištu.
Teško oružje (tenk i topništvo) brigade HVO-a ARBiH je
zarobila i iskoristila za napad na HVO u Gornjem Vaku-
fu. U Bugojnu su muslimanske postrojbe tijekom napa-
da, ali i kasnije, ubile 110 civila, a kasnije i zarobljenika
H
i protjerale većinu Hrvata iz općine. Armija Republike
BiH imala je 92 poginula i oko 210 ranjenih vojnika.822
Uskoplje (Gornji Vakuf)
Nakon pobjede u Bugojnu ARBiH je pokrenula sna-
M
ge za napad na HVO u Gornjem Vakufu/Uskoplju. Ko-
manda OG-a Zapad ARBiH ojačala je svoje snage u Volji-
cama i Bistrici te zapovjedila 317. brdskoj brigadi napad
na položaje HVO-a na Crnom vrhu, a Općinskomu štabu
TO Gornji Vakuf pripremu napada na Glavicu, Grebine i
Zvižđe. Muslimanske su snage 31. srpnja 1993. napale
D
HVO i potisnule ga iz Krupe. Pokušaj organiziranja nove
crte obrane HVO-a u donjem dijelu Bistrice pretvorio se
u neorganizirano povlačenje vojnika i civila kroz zase-
lak Trnovaču prema Pidrišu. To je destabiliziralo i osta-
le snage brigade Dr. Ante Starčević i 1. kolovoza dovelo
C
do njezina povlačenja iz Pajić Polja, Vilić Polja, Podgra-
đa, Gornjeg Vakufa i Podova. Ostale su dvije satnije u
Ždrimcima i Dobrošinu, koje se nisu željele povući.
Osobnom intervencijom generala Praljka i dovođenjem
pojačanja iz sastava pukovnije Bruno Bušić, brigada Lju-
buški i Grude, povlačenje je istoga dana prekinuto, a
D
postojeće su snage pojačane. Idućega je dana HVO bez
gubitaka uspio vratiti položaje u gradu, Podovima, Vo-
ljicama, Podgrađu i na koti Rajci. Armija Republike BiH
uspjela je iskoristiti paniku i bez napora zaposjesti Bi-
stricu, Krupu i Pavić Polje. Izbila je na crtu selo Ždrimci
– planina Baba – naselje Potrlica – vrh Mačkovac – vrh
Glavice, a crta razdvajanja u okolici grada bila je Podgra-
đe – Volari – Mošćani – Šugine Bare – lijeva obala rječice
Voljišnice – selo Gaj (isključno) – rječica Did – Oglavak.
Iznad Dobrošina ARBiH je držala položaje na Škarinoj
glavi i Podlisju. Relativno zatišje 3. kolovoza 1993. išlo
je u prilog hrvatskim snagama, koje su pojačane ojača-
822 H. MUŠINBEGOVIĆ, Boj odbrana Bugojna 1993., 98.
357
Domovinski rat 04-02-2020 Knjiga 1.indd 357
As the Army of the Republic of Bosnia and Herze-
govina was attacking Bugojno the Croatian forces from
the neighboring municipalities did close to nothing to
help the beleaguered defenders of Bugojno. The combat
groups from Livno, which were in Prozor on July 19 and
20, withdrew into Livno where they were kept busy dis-
arming the local Muslims. An attempt was made to de-
ploy them again in Livno but the attempt failed. The HVO
forces in Gornji Vakuf captured Gračanica on July 21 and
almost managed to link up with the HVO forces from Bu-
gojno. Unfortunately for the Croats, they were simply not
numerically strong enough for the feat. The Army of the
Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, during the night of
July 23-24 captured Gračanica in a counterattack and at-
tacked Humac, thus preventing the HVO from bringing
reinforcements from Gornji Vakuf. A combat group of the
Zrinski Battalion and Bruno Bušić Regiment aborted its
attack on Voljice on July 27 after receiving a false report
about the fall of the Makljen pass. These two combat
groups later covered elements of the defeated HVO Bu-
gojno Brigade on Raduški Kamen.
With the victory in Bugojno the Army of the Repub-
lic of Bosnia and Herzegovina linked up all the forces
of Operational Group West and gained control over a
large part of the Vrbas Valley and stood poised to attack
the HVO in Gornji Vakuf. The Eugen Kvaternik Brigade
of the HVO was decimated during the fighting in July.
The remnants of the Brigade were formed into a bat-
talion-strength unit and then deployed in the Rama –
Uskoplje area. The Army of the Republic of Bosnia and
Herzegovina captured a number of artillery pieces and
one tank from the HVO brigade and used them against
the HVO forces in Gornji Vakuf. In Bugojno the Muslims
killed, during and after the attack, 110 civilians. Later
they killed a number of POWs and expelled most of the
Croats from the municipality. The Army of the Republic
of Bosnia and Herzegovina lost 92 soldiers killed and
about 210 wounded.
R
Uskoplje (Gornji Vakuf)
After its victory in Bugojno the Army of the Repub-
lic of Bosnia and Herzegovina concentrated its forces
for an attack on the HVO in Gornji Vakuf/Uskoplje. The
HQ of Operational Group West reinforced its forces in
Voljice and Bistrica and ordered the 317th Mountain
Brigade to attack the HVO positions on Crni Vrh. It also
ordered the municipal HQ of the TO Gornji Vakuf to pre-
4.2.2020. 18:35:08
 Davor Marijan • Rat za opstojnost Hrvata, 1991. - 1995.
nom satnijom 5. gardijske brigade HV-a i skupinom bri-
gade Ljubuški.823 Zaključno s danom 9. kolovoza HVO
je u Uskoplju prikupio 1901 vojnika iz brigade Dr. Ante
Starčević, lokalnoga Domobranstva, 4. brigade HVO-a
Ljubuški, 6. brigade HVO-a Grude, pukovnije Bruno Bu-
šić, ATG-a Grdani i ojačane satnije 5. gardijske brigade
HV-a.824 Obrana Uskoplja reorganizirana je 26. kolovo-
za u osam sektora: Podovi, Podgrađe, Grad, Mačkovac,
Ždrimci, Dobrošin, Crni vrh i Raduša. Sektorima su zapo-
vijedali zapovjednici angažiranih postrojbi.825
H
Borbe su ponovno počele 4. kolovoza neuspješnim
napadom ARBiH na veći dio hrvatske crte. Do druge po-
lovine kolovoza težište napada ARBiH bilo je na crtama
u gradu i bližoj okolici, osobito na značajnim točkama
hrvatske obrane, koti Rajci i selu Galičici, odakle se osi-
guravala obrana snaga HVO-a u Voljicama, Trnovači, Po-
M
dgrađu i Mošćanima. Nakon niza neuspjeha musliman-
ske su snage 28. kolovoza napale s boka i zauzele kotu
Stublić blizu Mačkovca. U tim je borbama HVO imao pet
poginulih i 26 ranjenih pripadnika, a trojica su nestala. S
osvojenih položaja na Mačkovcu ARBiH je ugrozila pro-
metnicu Mačkovac – Uskoplje, pa je promet prema gra-
D
du usmjeren na put preko Podova. Nakon višednevne
pripreme hrvatske su snage u protunapadu 3. i 4. rujna
vratile izgubljene položaje.826
U tom je razdoblju Komanda 3. korpusa ARBiH teži-
šte napada stavila na pravac Gornji Vakuf – Makljen te
se dogovorila sa 6. korpusom da preuzme pravac napa-
C
da Crni vrh – Makljen. Bio je to uvod u glavni dio ope-
823 ICTY: Komanda OG “Zapad”, Naređenje str. pov. br.
01/546-93 od 30. 7. 1993.; Komanda OG “Zapad”, Vanred-
ni izvještaj str. pov. br. 01/553-93 od 2. 8. 1993.; IZM OZ
S/ZH, Redovno borbeno izvješće str. pov. br. 01-2138/93
od 3. 8. 1993.; SIS brigade “Dr Ante Starčević” od 6. 8.
1993., Sigurnosna situacija na području općine Uskoplje;
Ratni put bojne “Zvonko Krajina” Uskoplje, travanj 2012.
824 Brigada “Dr Ante Starčević“, Pregled snaga br. 1-5/1-
83/93 od 9. 8. 1993.
825 Brigada “Dr Ante Starčević”, Zapovijed br. 1-5/1-146/93
od 25. 8. 1993.; IZM OZ S/ZH, Zapovijed str. pov. br. 01-
3660/1 od 26. 8. 1993.
826 SIS brigade “Dr Ante Starčević” od 6. 8. 1993., Sigurnosna
situacija na području općine Uskoplje; IZM OZ S/ZH, str.
pov. br. 01-3334/1 od 28. 8. 1993.; IZM OZ S/ZH, Redovno
borbeno izvješće str. pov. br. 01-3336/93 od 29. 8. 1993.;
IZM OZ S/ZH, str. pov. br. 01-3354/1 od 31. 8. 1993.; IZM
OZ S/ZH, Redovno borbeno izvješće str. pov. br. 01-
3379/93 od 3. 9. 1993.; IZM OZ S/ZH, Redovno borbeno
izvješće str. pov. br. 01-3386/93 od 4. 9. 1993.; Ratni put
bojne “Zvonko Krajina” Uskoplje, travanj 2012.
358
Domovinski rat 04-02-2020 Knjiga 1.indd 358
pare an attack on Glavica, Grebine and Zvižđe. The Mus-
lims attacked the HVO forces and pushed them away
from Krupa on July 31, 1993. The HVO tried to establish
a new defensive line but the attempt soon deteriorated
into a rout. Soldiers and civilians fled through the ham-
let of Trnovača towards Pidriš. The retreat destabilized
the other units of the Dr. Ante Starčević Brigade. On Au-
gust 1, the brigade was forced to withdraw from Pajić
Polje, Vilić Polje, Podgrađe, Gornji Vakuf and Podovi. Two
companies refused to withdraw and remained in Ždrim-
ci and Dobrošin. General Praljak personally intervened,
reinforcements from the Bruno Bušić Regiment were
brought forward – the Ljubuški and Grude Brigades –
and the withdrawal was halted on that same day. The
following day the HVO recaptured the lost positions in
the city, Podovi, Voljice, Podgrađe and Rajci Hill with-
out suffering casualties. The Army of the Republic of
Bosnia and Herzegovina, taking advantage of the HVO
forces’ retreat, easily captured Bistrica, Krupa and Pavić
Polje and reached the Ždrimci – Mount Baba – Potrili-
ca neighborhood – Mačkovac peak – Glavice peak line.
The front line in the wider area of the city ran along the
Podgrađe – Volari – Mošćani – Šugine Bare – left bank
of the Voljišnica River – Gaj village – Did rivulet – Ogla-
vak line. Above Dobrošin the Army of the Republic of
Bosnia and Herzegovina held positions on Škarina Gla-
va and Podlisje. There was a relative lull in the fighting
on August 3 and the situation favored the Croat forces
which were reinforced by a reinforced company of the
5th Guards Brigade of the HV and a combat group of the
Ljubuški Brigade. By August 9 the HVO had concentrat-
ed 1,901 soldiers of the Dr. Ante Starčević Brigade, local
Home Guard units, 4th Brigade of the HVO Ljubuški, 6th
D
Brigade of the HVO Grude, Bruno Bušić Regiment, ATG
Grdani and a reinforced company of the 5th Guards Bri-
gade of the HV in Uskoplje. The defense of Uskoplje was
reorganized on August 26 into eight sectors: Podovi,
Podgrađe, Grad, Mačkovac, Ždrimci, Dobrošin, Crni Vrh
R
and Raduša. The commanders of the sectors were the
commanders of the deployed formations.
Fighting resumed on August 4 by the Army of the
Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina’s failed attack
on most of the HVO’s defensive line. Until the second
half of August the Army of the Republic of Bosnia and
Herzegovina shifted the focus of its attacks on the de-
fensive positions in the city and the city’s immediate
environs and especially on the pivotal positions of the
HVO’s defense – Rajci hill and the village of Galičica.
4.2.2020. 18:35:08
 The Croatian Nation’s Struggle for Survival, 1991-1995
racije Neretva, koja je pokrenuta s ciljem ovladavanja
dolinama Vrbasa i Neretve i prijevojem Makljenom. Za
napad na području Gornjeg Vakufa i Prozora 317. brd-
ska brigada ARBiH ojačana je dijelovima Samostalnog
bataljuna Prozor, bataljunom 45. brdske brigade, dije-
lom bataljuna Sutjeska i mješovitom haubičko-minoba-
cačkom baterijom. Zadatak 317. brdske brigade bio je
da obuhvatom razbije snage HVO-a na području Crnog
vrha, Uzdola, Jurića, Gliba i Brajki, a potom produži na-
pad i ovlada Makljenom. Operativna grupa Zapad anga-
H
žirana je na pravcu Gornji Vakuf – Vilića guvno, a dijelovi
44. brdske brigade na pravcu Doljani – Risovac.827
Operativna grupa Zapad je 15. rujna 1993. s neko-
liko diverzantskih skupina potisnula hrvatske snage na
Mačkovcu na području Strmica – Košute, a na pravcu
Kik – Aražinove staje potisnuli su HVO s kote Barakovac.
M
S borbenom skupinom sastavljenom od više postrojbi
(pukovnije Bruno Bušić, satnije Alpha Force, Samostalne
uskočke satnije HV-a i 5. gardijske brigade HV-a) HVO
je toga i sljedećega dana vratio izgubljene položaje na
području Strmice i uspostavio staru crtu obrane. Armija
Republike BiH napadala je na više pravaca i hrvatske su
D
crte zbog manjka ljudstva često probijane (Rajci, Galiči-
ca i Hrasnica), ali i vraćane protunapadima manjih bor-
benih skupina. Takva je taktika dovela HVO do krajnjih
granica izdržljivosti. Domicilna brigada Dr Ante Starče-
vić pala je na 800 ljudi i bila razvučena duž crte cijele
općine. No i ARBiH je imala velike gubitke i krajem rujna
C
njezin je pritisak splasnuo.828
U listopadu 1993. jače su se borbe vodile u samom
gradu, no bez značajnih pomaka. Dijelovi pukovnije
Bruno Bušić i dijelovi brigada HVO-a Ljubuški i Rama
zauzeli su 22. listopada kote Brenovac, Čeljine i Oglavci
D
827 ICTY: Komanda 3. korpusa, Dopuna borbenog izvještaja
str. pov. br. 02/31-678-2 od 5. 9. 1993.; ICTY: Glavni štab
Vrhovne komande RBiH, Naređenje str. pov. br. 21-1 od
15. 9. 1993.
828 IZM OZ S/ZH, Redovno borbeno izvješće str. pov. br.
01-3992 od 15. 9. 1993.; IZM OZ S/ZH, Izvanredno izv-
ješće str. pov. br. 01-4006 od 16. 9. 1993.; IZM OZ S/ZH,
Izvanredno izvješće str. pov. br. 01-4065 od 20. 9. 1993.;
IZM OZ S/ZH str. pov. br. 04-127/93 od 20. 9. 1993.; IZM
OZ S/ZH, Vanredno izvješće str. pov. br. 04-128/93 od
20. 9. 1993.; IZM OZ S/ZH, Redovno borbeno izvješće
str. pov. br. 01-4184/93 od 27. 9. 1993.; IZM OZ S/ZH, Iz-
vanredno izvješće str. pov. br. 01-4186/93 od 28. 9. 1993.;
IZM OZ S/ZH str. pov. br. 01-4283/93 od 5. 10. 1993.; Rat-
ni put bojne “Zvonko Krajina” Uskoplje, travanj 2012.
359
Domovinski rat 04-02-2020 Knjiga 1.indd 359
These positions secured the HVO’s defenses in Voljice,
Trnovača, Podgrad and Mošćani. After a series of fail-
ures the Muslims, on August 28, attacked from their
flank and captured Stublić Hill near Mačkovac. In the
fighting the HVO lost five men killed, 26 wounded and
three missing. The Army of the Republic of Bosnia and
Herzegovina threatened the Mačkovac – Uskoplje road
from the captured positions. For that reason traffic in
and out of the city was redirected to the Podovi route.
The Croats spent a few days preparing a counterattack
and then moved into action and recaptured the posi-
tions on September 3-4.
During that period the HQ of the ARBIH III Corps cen-
tered its attacks along the Gornji Vakuf – Makljen line. VI
Corps attacked along the Crni Vrh – Makljen line. These
attacks were a prelude to Operation Neretva which was
mounted with the aim of gaining control of the Vrbas
Valley, Neretva Valley and the Makljen pass. For its at-
tack on the HVO forces in the Gornji Vakuf area the 317th
Mountain Brigade was reinforced with elements of the
Independent Prozor Battalion, one battalion of the 45th
Mountain Brigade, elements of the Sutjeska Battalion
and a mixed howitzer-mortar battery. The task of the
317th Mountain Brigade was to encircle and destroy the
HVO forces in Crni Vrh, Uzdol, Jurić, Glib and Brajki and
then capture Makljen. Operational Group West was de-
ployed in the direction of Gornji Vakuf – Vilića Guvno
and elements of the 44th Mountain Brigade were de-
ployed in the direction of Doljani – Risovac.
On September 15, 1993, Operational Group West,
supported by a number of commando groups, pushed
back the Croatian forces on Mačkovac in the area of Str-
mica – Košute and in the direction of Kik – Aražinove
the Muslims pushed back the HVO forces from Barako-
vac Hill. The HVO responded by composing a combat
group consisting of the Bruno Bušić Regiment, Alpha
Force Company, Independent Uskok Company of the
HV and 5th Guards Brigade of the HV and sending it into
R
attack on the same day. The combat group managed to
retake some of the lost positions in the Strmica area on
the same day and the others on the following day. The
combat group followed up the success by reestablish-
ing the original defensive line. The Army of the Republic
of Bosnia and Herzegovina advanced on multiple axes
and in many places broke through the HVO’s defensive
positions (Rajci, Galičica and Hrasnica) but in most cas-
es smaller HVO groups counterattacked and recaptured
the positions. This war of attrition did not favor the HVO.
4.2.2020. 18:35:08
 Davor Marijan • Rat za opstojnost Hrvata, 1991. - 1995.
na Crnom vrhu.829 Za veće pothvate HVO nije imao ljud-
stvo. Početkom studenoga hrvatske su snage pojačale
dvije dobrovoljačke skupine HV-a iz Slavonije. Na dijelu
bojišta Mačkovac – Potrlica angažirana je dragovoljačka
borbena skupina 5. dp HV-a iz Osijeka, koja je imala 307
ljudi. Istodobno je u gradu angažirana dragovoljačka
borbena grupa Mustafa, koja se sastojala od 177 vojni-
ka, uglavnom iz 11. dp-a HV-a iz Vinkovaca. Skupine su
ostale do početka prosinca.830
Ofenziva ARBiH u središnjoj Bosni na Lašvansku do-
H
linu i područje Žepča nakon osvajanja Vareša natjerala
je Glavni stožer HVO-a da pokuša pomoći okruženim
hrvatskim snagama u središnjoj Bosni. Operativnoj zoni
Sjeverozapadna Hercegovina zapovjeđen je napad na
pravcu Uskoplje – Sebešić – Novi Travnik te napadna
djelovanja na svim ostalim pravcima gdje je postojao
M
dodir s ARBiH.831 Tom su zapovijedi počele intenzivne
pripreme HVO-a za kampanju koja je ubrzo dobila ime
operacija Buna.
Od snaga HVO-a na području Uskoplja i Rame
osnovana je Operativna grupa Buna, za čijeg je zapo-
vjednika postavljen general-bojnik Žarko Tole. U nje-
D
nom sastavu bilo je oko 4700 ljudi na širem području
Rame i Uskoplja, koje je podržavao mješoviti divizijun
topništva raznih kalibara i ojačana satnija tenkova.
Ljudstvo je bilo iz 13 postrojbi HVO-a i dragovoljci iz
pet postrojbi HV-a (540 vojnika). Zadatak OG-a Buna
bio je izvesti napadnu operaciju oslobađanja širega
C
područja Uskoplja, poboljšati strategijsko-operativni
položaj snaga HVO-a i stvoriti uvjete za produženje
borbenih djelovanja prema Novom Travniku i Vitezu, a
potom i Bugojnu. Uoči napada hrvatske su snage poja-
čane nepotpunom bojnom 5. gardijske brigade i satni-
jom 7. gardijske brigade HV-a.832
829 IZM OZ S/ZH, Izvanredno izvješće str. pov. br. 01-4524/93
od 22. 10. 1993.; IZM OZ S/ZH, Redovno borbeno izv-
ješće str. pov. br. 01-4523/93 od 22. 10. 1993.; Brigada
“Dr A. Starčević” br. 3980 od 23. 10. 1993.
830 Sektor 3 ZP TG, Izvješće kl. 81/93-02, ur. br. 8233-41/1-
93-83 od 5. 12. 1993.; IZM ZPTG, Ocjena pov. br. 01/384
od 5. 12. 1993.
831 GS HVO, Zapovijed str. pov. br. 02-2/1-101-3365 od 8. 11.
1993.; IZM OZ S/ZH, Zapovijed str. pov. br. 01-4769/93 od
8. 11. 1993.
832 GS HVO, Zapovijed s prilozima str. pov. br. 02-2/1-01-
3377/93 od 9. 11. 1993.; IZM ZP TG, Redovno borbeno
izvješće str. pov. br. 01-4931/93 od 12. 11. 1993.; IZM ZP
TG, str. pov. br. 01-4991/93 od 14. 11. 1993.
360
Domovinski rat 04-02-2020 Knjiga 1.indd 360
The Croats were, in terms of endurance, at the end of
their tether. The Dr. Ante Starčević Brigade had suffered
serious casualties and had only 800 combat-ready men.
Moreover, the Brigade was dangerously overstretched
along the whole length of the line. But, the Army of the
Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina had also suffered a
high number of casualties and toward the end of Sep-
tember the Muslims’ élan abated significantly.
In October, 1993, there was heavy fighting in the
city itself but neither side was able to gain decisive ad-
vantage. Elements of the Bruno Bušić Regiment and
elements of the Ljubuški and Rama Brigades captured
the following hills on October 22: Brenovac, Čeljine and
Oglavci on Crni Vrh. The HVO did not have enough men
to undertake more ambitious operations. At the begin-
ning of November the Croatian forces were augmented
by two volunteer groups of the HV from Slavonia. The
volunteer Combat Group of the 5th Home Guard Regi-
ment of the HV from Osijek was deployed in the Mačko-
vac – Potrlica area. The Combat Group numbered 307
men. At the same time the volunteer Combat Group
Mustafa, numbering 177 soldiers, mostly from the 11th
Home Guard Regiment of the HV from Vinkovci was de-
ployed in the city. These groups remained in the theater
until the beginning of December.
The Army of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovi-
na’s offensive in Central Bosnia against the Lašva Valley
and Žepče area launched after the occupation of Vareš
forced the General Staff of the HVO to mount an opera-
tion with the aim of helping the beleaguered Croatian
forces in Central Bosnia. Operative Zone North West
Herzegovina was ordered to attack in the direction of
Uskoplje – Sebešić – Novi Travnik and in every other
D
direction at the point of contact with the Army of the
Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina. The order marked
the beginning of preparations for a campaign that was
codenamed Buna.
Operational Group Buna was formed out of the
R
HVO forces in the Uskoplje and Buna area. The HQ of
Operational Group Buna was given to Major General
Žarko Tole. The group numbered around 4,700 men de-
ployed in the wider Rama and Uskoplje area and was
supported by a mixed artillery battalion equipped with
artillery pieces of various calibers and a reinforced tank
company. The personnel belonged to 13 HVO units and
volunteers from five HV units (540 soldiers). Operation-
al Group Buna’s task was to mount an offensive opera-
tion with the aim of liberating the wider Uskoplje area,
4.2.2020. 18:35:08
 The Croatian Nation’s Struggle for Survival, 1991-1995
Glavne snage OG Buna planirane su na pravcu Sa-
rajvilić – Baba – tt 992, a pomoćne na pravcu Ždrimci
– Kik – Alibegova gruda. U operaciji su angažirane sna-
ge pukovnije Bruno Bušić, 5. i 7. gardijske brigade HV-
a, bojne Ludvig Pavlović, 2. lakojurišne bojne VP-a, Ku-
preške bojne, ATG-a Garavi i satnija tenkova. Napad je
dva puta odgođen, 14. studenoga 1993. zbog obećanja
UNPROFOR-a da će osigurati prekid vatre i u središnjoj
Bosni, čega se ARBiH nije držala, a 15. studenoga zbog
kašnjenja dijela snaga predviđenih za napad na izlazak
H
na početne položaje. Samo je dio 5. gardijske brigade
napao, bez uspjeha, na pravcu prema Batuši. Tijekom
toga dana snage su prestrojene, pri čemu je pukovni-
ja Bruno Bušić s brigadom HVO-a Livno pripremljena
za napad na pravcu Šugine Bare – Šarića Staje. Idućega
dana zaposjednuta je crta Mošćani – Vilića gaj i zauzete
M
Šugine Bare. Zauzimanje Šarića Staja 17. studenoga nije
uspjelo. Zbog lošeg vremena i iscrpljujućih djelovanja
OG Buna je 22. studenoga prešla u djelatnu obranu. Uki-
nuta je 26. studenoga, čime je neslavno završila opera-
cija od koje se mnogo očekivalo.833
Do druge polovine prosinca 1993. na bojištu nije
D
bilo značajnijih događanja. Borbe su bile svakodnevne,
a HVO je crtu držao na već ustaljen način, što znači s
kroničnim nedostatkom ljudstva i problemima u smje-
nama postrojbi. Snage 6. korpusa ARBiH izvele su 22.
prosinca jak i iznenadan napad na pravcima Mošćani –
Površje, Vranjača – Rastića kosa, Podlisje – Seoci – Do-
C
brošin i Podlisje – Vidak. Do kraja dana uspjeli su poti-
snuti snage HVO-a na području Seoca, Vidaka i Vranjače
te izbiti na crtu Lučica – Vedrine – Vidak – Vranjača i di-
jelom na Rastića kosu. Nakon prestrojavanja HVO je 23.
prosinca u sektoru Dobrošin vratio izgubljene položaje.
D
Muslimanske su snage 24. prosinca ponovile napad na
pravcima Seoci – Vedrine i Škarina glava – Dobrošin,
nastojeći zauzeti Dobrošin i presjeći put Boljkovac –
Karamustafić. Hrvatsko vijeće obrane angažiralo je u
833 IZM ZP TG, Zapovijed za napad OP. br. 1 od 13. 11. 1993.;
IZM Prozor od 13. 11. 1993. za IZM GS HVO; GS HVO, br.
01-4959/93 od 13. 11. 1993.; OG “Buna”, Sumarno bojevo
izvješće br. 04/5 od 15. 11. 1993.; OG “Buna”, Nadopuna
bojeve zapovijedi za napad op. br. 1 od 15. 11. 1993.; Re-
dovito dnevno izvješće OG “Buna” za 16. 11. 1993.; OG
“Buna”, Presjek trodnevnih operacija na uskopaljskoj bo-
jišnici br. 04-30-93 od 17. 11. 1993.; OG “Buna”, Uređenje
crte obrane, br. 01/126 od 22. 11. 1993.; Dnevnik službu-
jućeg OG “Pidriš”, zabilješka za 26. 11. 1993.; Pukovnija
“Ante Bruno Bušić”, Informacija dj. br. 11-09/12-50/93 od
28. 11. 1993.
361
Domovinski rat 04-02-2020 Knjiga 1.indd 361
improve the strategic-operational position of the HVO
and create conditions for new offensive operations in
the direction of Novi Travnik and Vitez, and then also in
the direction of Bugojno. Before the offensive started
the Croatian forces were reinforced with an incomplete
battalion of the 5th Guards Brigade and a company of
the 7th Guards Brigade of the HV.
The plan called for the main force of Operational
Group Buna to attack in the direction of Sarajvilić –
Baba – Hill 992. The other formations would support
the main force’s advance by attacking in the direction
of Ždrimci – Kik – Alibegova Gruda. The following for-
mations were allocated to participate in the offensive:
the Bruno Bušić Regiment, 5th and 7th Guards Brigades
of the HV, the Ludvig Pavlović Battalion, the 2nd Light
Military Police Battalion, the ATG Garavi and one tank
company. The offensive was postponed twice – on
November 14, 1993 – on account of promising UN-
PROPFOR that the cease-fire in Central Bosnia would
be honored (The Army of the Republic of Bosnia and
Herzegovina did not honor the cease-fire agreement)
and on November 15 because some formations were
late assembling in their starting positions for the offen-
sive. On that day only elements of the 5th Guards Bri-
gade went into the attack in the direction of Batuša but
their efforts were fruitless. During the day the Croatian
forces regrouped and the Bruno Bušić Regiment, with
the HVO Livno Brigade, completed the preparations for
attacking in the direction of Šugine Bare – Šarića Staje.
On the following day the Croats occupied the Mašćani
– Vilića Gaj line and captured Šugine Bare. The Croats’
attack on Šarića Staje on November 17 failed. Due to
adverse weather conditions and heavy fighting, Opera-
tional Group Buna went on the defensive on November
22. Operational Group Buna was disbanded on Novem-
ber 26 and with that Operation Buna, an undertaking
that was to reap decisive results, ignominiously ended
in failure.
R
Until the second half of December nothing of im-
portance occurred. Fighting was continuous and the
HVO held the line despite its, by this stage, chronic ills:
shortages of everything and battle fatigue. On Decem-
ber 22, VI Corps of the Army of the Republic of Bosnia
and Herzegovina mounted a sudden and determined
attack in the direction of Mošćani – Površje, in the di-
rection of Vranjača – Rastića Kosa, in the direction of
Podlisje – Seoci – Dobrošin and in the direction of Pod-
lisje – Vidak. By the end of the day the Muslims had
4.2.2020. 18:35:09
 Davor Marijan • Rat za opstojnost Hrvata, 1991. - 1995.
obrani Dobrošina dragovoljačku satniju 2. gardijske
brigade HV-a koja je dovedena iz Mostara, skupinu pu-
kovnije Bruno Bušić i lokalni HVO. Zajedno s pojačanji-
ma – satnijom dragovoljaca iz 7. gardijske brigade HV-a
i brigada HVO-a Čapljina i Rama, muslimanski je napad
odbijen. Tijekom borbi hrvatske su snage imale jednog
poginulog i jednog ranjenog vojnika.834
Krajem 1993. na ramsko-uskopaljsko bojište iz Za-
greba je dovedena 175. brigada popunjena vojnim
obveznicima iz Herceg-Bosne. Njezinim je dolaskom
H
HVO dijelom riješio stalni problem nedostatka vojnika
na bojištu. Zbog napada ARBiH na Lašvansku dolinu, u
Glavnom stožeru HVO-a u prvoj polovini siječnja 1994.
pripremljena je ambiciozna operacija Tvigi-94, čiji je cilj
bio razbiti muslimanske snage na ramsko-uskopaljskom
bojištu i napraviti spoj s enklavama u Lašvanskoj dolini
M
i Kiseljaku. Na uskopaljskom dijelu bojišta, na pravcu od
Dobrošina prema Voljevcu, angažirane su pomoćne sna-
ge iz sastava Kažnjeničke bojne i bojne Ludvig Pavlović.
Operacija je počela 24. siječnja 1994. godine. Bojna Lud-
vig Pavlović zauzela je kotu Vedrine, Kažnjenička bojna
kotu Škarina glava, a 175. brigada kotu 1176 na područ-
D
ju Zavišća. U nastavku napada Kažnjenička je bojna 28.
siječnja sa Škarine glave bez uspjeha napala kotu Berač,
a iz smjera Zavišća bojna Ludvig Pavlović je također bez
uspjeha napala selo Boljkovac. Nakon desetak dana za-
tišja borbe su nastavljene. Dijelovi bojne Ludvig Pavlović
i satnije Alpha Force ovladali su 12. veljače zapadnim di-
C
jelom kote Ciganske livade i potisnuli muslimanske sna-
ge na crtu Relej – Krč – Malo Seoce – Alipašića brijeg.
Sljedeći korak, osvajanje Krča i releja, prekinuli su primir-
je i završetak muslimansko-hrvatskoga rata.835
834 IZM ZP TG, Sumarno dnevno izvješće, str. pov. br.
01/5795/93 od 22. 12. 1993.; IZM ZP TG, Bojeva zapovi-
jed, str. pov. br. 01/5798/93 od 22. 12. 1993.; IZM ZP TG,
Sumarno dnevno izvješće, str. pov. br. 01/5828/93 od 23.
12. 1993.; IZM ZP TG, Redovno borbeno izvješće, str. pov.
br. 01-5859/93 od 24. 12. 1993.; 2. gardijska brigada HV –
Gromovi, 266-267.
835 ICTY: GS HVO, Zapovijed str. pov. br. 02-2/1-01-89/94 od
10. 1. 1994.; IZM ZP TG, Dnevno bojevo izvješće str. pov.
br. 02-2/1-89/45 od 24. 1. 1994.; Podcentar SIS-a Rama,
Informacija ur. br. 02-4/2-7-138/94 od 28. 1. 1994.; SIS ZP
TG, Informacija “B” br. 1, str. pov. br. 02-4-01-89/94 od 14.
2. 1994.; GS HVO, Kratka ocjena kl. 818-01/94-02/06, ur.
br. 02-10-07-94/14 od 10. 5. 1994.; Izvješće zapovjedni-
ka satnije “Alpha Force” od 15. 2. 1994.; Prilozi za povijest
Rame u Domovinskom ratu (1990.–1995.), HMDCDR, Za-
greb, 2011., 196.
362
Domovinski rat 04-02-2020 Knjiga 1.indd 362
pushed back the HVO forces in the Seoce, Vidak and
Vranjača area and reached the Lučica – Vedrine – Vi-
dak – Vranjača Rastića Kosa (partially) line. Having re-
grouped its forces the HVO recaptured the positions in
the Dobrošin sector on December 23. On December 24
the Muslims again attacked in the direction of Seoci –
Vedrine and the direction of Škarina Glava – Dobrošin,
trying to capture Dobrošin and cut the Boljkovac –
Karamustafić road. The HVO deployed, for the defense
of Dobrošin, the volunteer company of the 2nd Guards
Brigade of the HV which had arrived from Mostar, a
group from the Bruno Bušić Regiment and local HVO
forces. These forces, together with reinforcements – a
company of volunteers from the 7th Guards Brigade of
the HV and HVO Čapljina and Rama Brigades beat back
the Muslims’ attack. In the fighting the Croats lost one
soldier killed and one soldier wounded.
At the end of 1993 the 175th Brigade from Zagreb ar-
rived in the Rama – Uskoplje area. The Brigade was filled
with conscripts from Herzeg-Bosnia. With the arrival of
the 175th Brigade the shortage of manpower problem
was, in large measure, solved. Reacting to the Army of
the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina’s attack on the
Lašva Valley the General Staff of the HVO prepared an
ambitions offensive operation in January, 1994. The
operation was codenamed Tvigi-94 and aim was to
destroy the Muslim forces in the Rama – Uskoplje area
and link up with the enclaves in the Lašva Valley and
Kiseljak. In the Uskoplje area, along the Dobrošin – Vol-
jevac line, auxiliary units from the Penal Battalion and
Ludvig Pavlović Battalion were deployed. The operation
commenced on January 24, 1994. The Ludvig Pavlović
Battalion captured Vedrine Hill, the Penal Battalion cap-
D
tured Škarina Glava Hill and the 175th Brigade captured
1176 Hill in the Zavišće area. The attack continued and
the Penal Battalion attacked Berać Hill from Škarina Gla-
va on January 28 but the Muslims repulsed the attack.
From Zavišće the Ludvig Pavlović Battalion attacked the
R
village of Boljkovac, also without success. After these
failed attacks there was a lull in the fighting, lasting
more than a week. Then fighting resumed. Elements of
the Ludvig Pavlović Battalion and Alpha Force Company
gained control of the west side of Ciganske Livade Hill
and pushed the Muslims back to the radio-relay – Krč
– Malo Seoce – Alipašića Brijeg line on February 12. The
next planned phase – capturing Krč and the radio-relay,
was halted by the signing of the cease fire agreement
and the end of the Muslim-Croat war.
4.2.2020. 18:35:09
 The Croatian Nation’s Struggle for Survival, 1991-1995
Rama
Nakon poraza na Bokševici, HVO je obranu Rame
organizirao osloncem na sela Studenčica – Kućani – To-
šćanica – Hudutsko – Slatina i potom je podijelio na četiri
sektora. Sektore Makljen i Uzdol držala je brigada Rama,
sektor Kućani brigada Hrvoje Vukčić Hrvatinić, a sektor
Slatina brigada Kralj Tomislav. Nakon razbijanja HVO-a u
Bugojnu, ostatak bugojanske brigade angažiran je na dr-
žanju crte na planini Raduši i oslonjen na brigadu Rama.
H
Zona je ponovno podijeljena, na sedam sektora, na koji-
ma je sredinom kolovoza 1993. bilo angažirano oko 2170
vojnika iz brigada HVO-a Rama, Bugojno, Jajce, Tomislav-
grad i satnije Komušina. U pričuvi i na drugim zadacima
bilo je oko 400 vojnika brigade Rama i Vojne policije. Na
ovom dijelu bojišta bio je najvažniji objekt u Herceg-Bo-
M
sni, prijevoj Makljen.836
Kada je 3. korpus ARBiH napao HVO u Bugojnu, 6. kor-
pus je manjim napadima s pravca Konjica vezao hrvatske
snage i sprečavao da odvoje dio ljudi za pomoć Bugojnu.
Muslimanski napad na Banju Lučicu, Juriće, Uzdol i Gra-
dac 25. srpnja 1993. HVO je odbio. Armija Republike BiH
D
više je uspjeha imala 28. srpnja, kada je napala Doljane i iz
njih zauzela kotu Pisvir te izbila na kotu Pomen zapadno
od Slatine. Istodobno je napadnuta crta kod Hudutskog.
U vraćanje izgubljenih položaja zapadno od Slatine HVO
je krenuo 29. srpnja i 1. kolovoza zaposjeo je Pomen.837
Do početka operacije Neretva na ramskom dijelu bo-
C
jišta nije bilo značajnijih događanja. U operaciji je brigada
HVO-a Rama bila na glavnom pravcu napada 6. korpusa
ARBiH. Zadatak 45. brdske brigade i dijela Samostalnog
prozorskog bataljuna bio je presijecanje prometnice Ja-
blanica – Prozor i zauzimanje Prozora. Zadatak 317. brdske
D
brigade, dijela bataljuna Prozor, bataljuna Sutjeska i bata-
ljuna 45. brdske brigade bio je napad glavnim snagama
na pravcu Voljevac – Crni vrh – Makljen, a pomoćnima na
pravcu Here – Uzdol – Lug.838 Operacija je počela 13. rujna
1993. napadom na Makljen, koji je odbijen. Muslimani su
uspjeli zauzeti položaje Bukvu i Golušnicu na Crnom vrhu,
836 IZM OZ S/ZH, Izvješće str. pov. br. 01-1568 od 9. 7. 1993.;
IZM OZ S/ZH, Zapovijed str. pov. br. 01-1591 od 11. 7.
1993.; Pregled rasporeda postrojbi u zoni brigade Rama
od 18. 8. 1993.
837 ZOZS/ZH, Redovno borbeno izvješće str. pov. br. 02-
2870/93 od 25. 7. 1993.; ZOZS/ZH, Redovno borbeno
izvješće str. pov. br. 02/2965 od 28. 7. 1993.; Prilozi za po-
vijest Rame, 146-148.
838 1993. – Prelomna godina rata, 123-126.
363
Domovinski rat 04-02-2020 Knjiga 1.indd 363
Rama
After its defeat on Bokševica, the HVO pivoted its de-
fensive positions around Rama on the villages on Studenči-
ca – Kućani – Tošćanica – Hudutsko – Slatina and divided
this area into four sectors; Makljen, Uzdol, Kućani and Slati-
na. The Makljen and Uzdol sectors were held by the Rama
Brigade, the Kućani sector was held by the Hrvoje Vukčić Hr-
vatinić Brigade and the Slatina sector was held by the Kralj
Tomislav Brigade. Having been badly mauled in Bugojno,
the HVO Bugojno Brigade was deployed on Mount Raduša
and tasked with holding the positions there. The positions
held by the Bugojno Brigade bordered those held by the
Rama Brigade. The zone was again divided, this time into
seven sectors. In mid-August, 1993, about 2,170 soldiers be-
longing to the HVO Rama, Bugojno, Jajce and Tomislavgrad
brigades and Komušina Company were deployed in those
seven sectors. A further 400 soldiers were held in reserve.
They belonged to the Rama Brigade and Military Police. The
most important location in this area was the Makljen pass.
When the ARBIH III Corps attacked the HVO in Bugoj-
no, VI Corps launched a number of small-scale attacks from
the direction of Konjic, thus pinning down Croatian forces
and preventing the Croats from reinforcing Bugojno from
that area. On July 25 the HVO repulsed the Muslims’ attack
on Banja Lučica, Jurići, Uzdol, and Gradac. The Army of the
Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina was more successful
on July 28 when it attacked Doljani and advancing from
the direction of the village captured Pisvir Hill and reached
Pomen Hill located to the west of Slatina. At the same time
the Muslims attacked the defensive line at Hudutski. The
HVO mounted a counterattack on July 29 and on August 1
captured Pomen.
Until the start of Operation Neretva nothing of strategic
importance occurred in the Rama area. During Operation
Neretva the HVO Rama Brigade was deployed right in the
path of the main axis of advance of VI Corps of the Army
of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina. The task of the
45th Brigade and elements of the Independent Prozor Bat-
R
talion was to cut the Jablanica – Prozor road and capture
Prozor. The task of the 317th Mountain Brigade, elements of
the Prozor Battalion, Sutjeska Battalion and a battalion of
the 45th Mountain Brigade was to attack with the main force
in the direction of Voljevac – Crni Vrh – Makljen and with
supporting units in the direction of Here – Uzdol – Lug. The
operation began on September 13, 1993, with an attack on
Makljen. The Croats repulsed the attack. The Muslims did
manage to capture Bukva and Golušnica on Crni Vrh but
4.2.2020. 18:35:09
 Davor Marijan • Rat za opstojnost Hrvata, 1991. - 1995.
H
koje je HVO istoga dana vratio. Dan poslije snage Samo-
stalnog bataljuna Prozor upale su u selo Uzdol i počinile
M
zločin masakriravši 29 civila i 12 vojnika brigade Rama. U
protunapadu hrvatskih snaga selo je istoga dana vraće-
no. Dva dana poslije, 16. rujna, ARBiH je nastavila napad i
zauzela Križ, Tošćanicu i Hudutsko, te počinila novi zločin
ubivši 22 vojnika HVO-a nakon zarobljavanja. Pokušaj vra-
ćanja izgubljenih položaja od 18. do 22. rujna nije uspio.
D
Više uspjeha HVO je imao u pokušaju vraćanja Pisvira 25.
rujna, kada je zauzeo obližnje kote Oklajnica i Kik.839
Do sredine studenoga nije bilo većih borbi. Dijelovi
brigade Rama napravili su 12. studenoga prodor u dubi-
nu muslimanskih položaja u predjelu Zgona na Zavišću
(TT 1167). U tom su pothvatu poginula tri, a ranjeno je 11
C
vojnika. Od 13. do 19. studenoga ARBiH je bez uspjeha
pokušavala vratiti izgubljene položaje.840 U obrani dosti-
gnutih položaja na TT 1167 poginuo je jedan pripadnik
brigade HVO-a Rama.
Posljednje velike borbe vodile su se u siječnju 1994.
u sklopu operacije Tvigi-94 na planiranom pravcu Here –
Kute – Šćipe – Otunski vis – Zečja glava. U napadnoj ope-
raciji je angažiran dio brigade Rama s vodovima za poseb-
ne namjene iz brigade i satnijom Vojne policije iz Rame. Te
su snage 24. siječnja napale i ovladale utvrđenim selom
Here te izbile na crtu Bobare – Pale – Rosulje – Herska
krivina – Jurići, na kojoj su prešle u obranu. U napadu su
poginula dva, a ranjeno je 14 vojnika HVO-a, među njima
i zapovjednik brigade Rama.841
839 Prilozi za povijest Rame, 159-164.
840 Isto, 174-175.
841 ICTY: GS HVO, Zapovijed str. pov. br. 02-2/1-01-89/94 od
10. 1. 1994.; Prilozi za povijest Rame, 189-191.
364
Domovinski rat 04-02-2020 Knjiga 1.indd 364
Pokop žrtava bošnjačko-muslimanskog zločina nad Hrvatima u
Uzdolu, 14. rujna 1993. godine (fotografiju darovao IPD brigade
Rama).
Burial of the victims of the Bosniak/ Muslim crime against Croats
at Uzdol, September 14, 1993.
the HVO recaptured the positions on the same day. One day
later the Independent Prozor Battalion raided the village
of Uzdol, massacred 29 civilians and 12 soldiers from the
Rama Brigade and occupied the village. The Croats mount-
ed a counterattack and chased the Muslims out. Two days
later, on September 16, the Army of the Republic of Bosnia
and Herzegovina continued the attack and captured Križ,
Tošćanica and Hudutsko and committed yet another war
crime by murdering 22 POWs. The HVO attempted to re-
capture the lost positions from September 18 to 22 but the
attempt failed. The HVO was more successful in its attempt
to recapture Pisvir on September 25 when it captured two
near-by hills; Oklajnica Hill and Kik Hill.
Until mid-November there was no heavy fighting in
the region. Elements of the Rama Brigade pushed through
the Muslims’ defensive line and penetrated deep into the
enemy rear in the area of Zgon on Zavišće (TT 1167) on No-
vember 17. The feat cost the Croats three soldiers killed and
11 wounded. The Army of the Republic of Bosnia and Her-
D
zegovina launched a number of counterattacks between
November 13 to 19 in a bid to recapture the lost position
but every attack failed. In these actions around TT 1167 the
Rama Brigade lost only one soldier killed.
The last serious fighting took place in January, 1994,
R
during Operation Tvigi-94 along the Here – Kute – Šćipe –
Otunski Vis – Zečja Glava line. The bulk of the Rama Brigade,
including the special purpose platoons and one company
of the Rama Military Police participated in this offensive.
These forces, on January 24 attacked and captured the for-
tified positions in the village of Here and reached the Bo-
bare – Pale – Rosulje – Herska Krivina – Jurići line. There the
Croats halted their advance and set up defensive positions.
Two HVO soldiers were killed in the attack and 14 wounded,
including the commander of the Rama Brigade.
4.2.2020. 18:35:09
 The Croatian Nation’s Struggle for Survival, 1991-1995
WASHINGTONSKI SPORAZUM
I ZAVRŠETAK RATA
Muslimansko-hrvatski rat u BiH završio je mirovnim
sporazumom, a ne na ratištu. Pritisak na Hrvatsku zbog
sudjelovanja dijelova HV-a u ratu i prijetnja sankcijama,
a s druge strane katastrofalno stanje teritorija BiH pod
nadzorom Muslimana dali su poticaj za mirovni dogo-
vor. U siječnju 1994. u Bonnu su predsjednici Tuđman
i Izetbegović napravili prve političke korake oko unije
H
BiH, koji su 23. veljače u Zagrebu doveli do potpisivanja
sporazuma o prekidu vatre i otvaranju humanitarnih
putova. Uz snažan pritisak SAD-a prekid vatre je zaživio
i doveo do završetka rata. Konačni sporazum potpisan
je 18. ožujka 1994. u Washingtonu i njime je dogovore-
M
no osnivanje hrvatsko-muslimanske federacije.842
Vojni dio sporazuma potpisan je 12. ožujka 1994.
u Splitu. Dogovoreno je da se zadrži postojeća orga-
nizacija vojski, da se snage odvoje na razmak od 2 do
20 kilometara, ovisno o vrsti rodova, i da sve postrojbe
stranih država napuste teritorij Federacije. Dogovoreno
D
je i ustrojavanje savezne vojske. Realizacija dogovore-
noga trajala je nekoliko mjeseci. Najbrže je realizirano
povlačenje dijelova HV-a iz zbornih područja Mostar i
Tomislavgrad. Razdvajanje sukobljenih strana počelo je
nakon zajedničke zapovijedi generala Ante Rose i Ra-
sima Delića potpisane 26. ožujka 1994. i dovršeno je u
C
kolovozu iste godine. Združeni stožer Vojske Federaci-
je ustrojen je 15. svibnja i odigrao je značajnu ulogu u
razdvajanju snaga, a poslije u održavanju veza između
Glavnoga stožera HVO-a i Glavnoga štaba ARBiH. Čelnici
Stožera bili su generali Ante Roso i Fikret Muslimović.843
D
842 M. NOBILO, Hrvatski feniks, 562-582, 604-611.
843 Okvirni sporazum potpisan između HVO-a i ARBiH u
Splitu 12. 3. 1994.; Ustrojstvo Združenog stožera i zada-
ci potpisani u Sarajevu 26. 3. 1994.; Zajednička zapovi-
jed komandanta GŠ ARBiH i GS HVO od 26. 3. 1994.; ZZP
TG, Zapovijed br. 01-4096/94 od 15. 7. 1994.; GS HVO,
Zaključci i zadaće kl. str. pov. 818-01/94-02/15, ur. br.
02-10-06/01-94-49 od 2. 8. 1994.; R. DELIĆ, Armija RBiH,
II, 27-29.
365
Domovinski rat 04-02-2020 Knjiga 1.indd 365
WASHINGTON AGREEMENT
AND THE END OF THE WAR
The Muslim-Croat war in Bosnia and Herzegovina
ended with a peace agreement and not with a decisive
clash of arms. Both sides had good reasons to end the
conflict with a peace deal. The international community
had been threatening Croatia with economic sanctions
for a considerable period of time on account of the Cro-
atian Army’s active presence in the Muslim-Croat war.
On the other hand, the situation in the areas under the
control of the Army of the Republic of Bosnia and Her-
zegovina was beyond catastrophic. In January, 1994, in
Bonn, Tuđman and Izetbegović made the initial political
steps regarding a Bosnian-Herzegovinian union. These
moves led directly to the signing of a cease-fire agree-
ment and opening humanitarian routes on February 23,
1994, in Zagreb. The USA put a considerable amount of
pressure on both sides to honor the agreement and the
agreement thus remained in effect until the end of the
war. The final agreement was signed on March 18, 1994,
in Washington. The agreement, among other things,
stipulated the creation of a Croat-Muslim federation.
The military portion of the agreement was signed
in Split on March 12. It was agreed that the existing or-
ganizational structure of both armies remain unaltered
and that the forces withdraw between 2 to 20 kilometers
from one another, the distance depending on the branch
of the army. The agreement also stipulated that military
units belonging to foreign armed forces were to leave
the territory of the Federation and that a federal army
should be formed. The process of implementing the
above stipulations lasted for a few months. The clause
about foreign troop vacating the Federation was solved
first – the Croatian Army units from Military Districts Mo-
star and Tomislavgrad duly withdrew from the country.
The separation of the two sides commenced after Gen-
eral Ante Roso and Rasim Dalić signed a joint order on
R
March 26, 1994. The process was successfully completed
in August of the same year. The Joint Staff of the Army of
the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina was formed
on May 15 and played an important role in the process
of separating the army formations of the two sides and
later in maintaining viable communications between the
HVO Main Staff and the General Staff of the Army of the
Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina. The commanders
of the Main Staff were Ante Roso and Fikret Muslimović.
4.2.2020. 18:35:09
 Davor Marijan • Rat za opstojnost Hrvata, 1991. - 1995.
ODNOS VRS-a PREMA
MUSLIMANSKO-HRVATSKOM
RATU U BiH
Srbima je muslimansko-hrvatski rat „dobro došao“.
Njihove obavještajne i sigurnosne strukture pažljivo su
pratile stanje između Hrvata i Muslimana, pa ih rat nije
iznenadio. U kojoj su mjeri, odnosno jesu li Srbi utjecali
na početak rata pitanje je o kojem se može spekulirati.
H
Kada je rat počeo, nastojali su ga iskoristiti što je više
moguće. Prema svojim interesima, pomagali su suko-
bljenim stranama i naplaćivali te usluge. U VRS-u su
krajem lipnja 1993. držali da je vojni cilj ARBiH postići
kontinuiranu dominaciju nad središnjom Bosnom i, po
mogućnosti, osigurati izlaz na more u dolini Neretve i
M
na rijeku Savu na području Brčkog. Za sukob između
Hrvata i Muslimana držali su da je možda rat do istre-
bljenja, pa su nastojali “razumnim vojnim i političkim
potezima” prinuditi Hrvate da im predaju položaje i
oružje.844 Najkonkretniju suradnju s nekim dijelom
HVO-a VRS je imao na području Žepča, gdje je tenkovi-
D
ma pomogao 111. brigadi da zauzme Žepče. Zauzvrat,
HVO ih je pustio preko svojih položaja pa su nakon
toga Srbi u višemjesečnoj i neuspješnoj kampanji po-
kušali zauzeti Maglaj, presjeći vezu 2. i 3. korpusa AR-
BiH i uspostaviti promet u dolini rijeke Bosne.845
Takva je suradnja bila iznimka – prevladavala je
C
praksa da se teritorij Republike Srpske koristi za izvla-
čenje civila i vojske (Travnik, Novi Travnik, Bugojno,
Vareš) i manji manevar HVO-a (Kiseljak – Vareš). Takve
usluge Srbi su skupo naplaćivali, uglavnom gorivom,
koje im je kronično nedostajalo.846
Vjerojatno je prvo miješanje VRS-a u sukob bila
njihova intervencija tijekom napada ARBiH na HVO Ko-
njica sredinom travnja 1993. godine. Hercegovački je
korpus VRS-a topničkom vatrom pomogao HVO-u i 18.
travnja zauzeo planinsko područje Ljubine iznad Turije.
Hrvatsko vijeće obrane za protuuslugu je omogućilo iz-
844 ICTY: GŠ VRS, Direktiva za dalja dejstva VRS, op. br. 5, DT
pov. br. 02/2-479 od 25. 6. 1993.
845 ICTY: GŠ VRS, Dopuna Direktive str. pov. br. 02/2-1015
od 12. 12. 1993.
846 ICTY: IKM Komande 1. KK, Naređenje str. pov. br. 382-
1/93 od 24. 6. 1993.; ICTY: Komanda 1. KK, Redovni
pozadinski izveštaj pov. br. 16/1-307 od 17. 8. 1993.;
ICTY: Komanda 1. KK, Izveštaj o primljenom gorivu pov.
br. 18/6-54 od 9. 11. 1993.
366
Domovinski rat 04-02-2020 Knjiga 1.indd 366
THE VRS’S ATTITUDE
TOWARDS THE MUSLIM-
CROAT WAR
The Serbs welcomed the Muslim-Croat war. Their
intelligence and security structures monitored closely
the situation between the Croats and the Muslims. The
Muslim-Croat war, when it erupted, did not, therefore,
surprise the Serbs. The issue whether the Serbs influ-
enced, and if so, in what measure the conflict between
the Muslims and Croats remains open. What is certain is
that when the Muslim-Croat war started the Serbs tried
to take as much advantage of the situation as possible.
At different times the Serbs, in pursuance of their own
interests at a given time, provided help and support to
either side and invariably exacted a steep price for doing
so. The leadership of the VRS believed, at the end of June,
1993, that the overriding aim of the Army of the Republic
of Bosnia and Herzegovina was to establish a continued
dominance over central Bosnia and, if possible, secure
access to the sea in the Neretva Valley and reach the Sava
River in the Brčko area. The VRS leaders were also of the
opinion that the Muslim-Croat war was a total war waged
for the purpose of total annihilation. For that reason, they
strove to induce the Croats by “reasonable military and
political moves” to hand over their positions and weap-
ons to Serb formations. The closest cooperation the HVO
established with the VRS was in the Žepče area. There,
VRS armor supported the 111th Brigade’s (HVO) attack
on and subsequent capture of Žepče. In return the HVO
let Serb formations to pass through Croat territory in the
Serb’s months-long and ultimately unsuccessful attempt
D
to capture Maglaj, cut the link between II and III Corps of
the Army of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina and
open the Bosna Valley for traffic.
The cooperation between the VRS and the HVO es-
tablished in the Žepče area was an exception though.
Usually the Serbs would allow Croatian refugees and re-
R
treating military formations to pass through their territo-
ry (Travnik, Novi Travnik, Bugojno, Vareš) and allow HVO
units to use their territory for minor maneuvers (Kiseljak
– Vareš). The currency the Serbs insisted on as payment
for these favors, more often than not, was fuel, and vast
amounts of it, because fuel was a commodity in danger-
ously short supply in the territory controlled by the VRS.
Arguably the first VRS interference in the Mus-
lim-Croat war was its intervention during the Army of the
4.2.2020. 18:35:09
 The Croatian Nation’s Struggle for Survival, 1991-1995
H
M
vlačenje većega broja srpskih civila iz Konjica i okolice
na područje Borka.847 Zahvaljujući srpskoj pomoći HVO
se uspio održati u tri sela kod Konjica do završetka rata.
Tijekom napada ARBiH na HVO Travnika i Novog
D
Travnika VRS je prihvatio izbjeglo i prognano hrvat-
sko stanovništvo i prevezao ga u Hrvatsku. Prihvatio je
i dijelove brigada HVO-a, koje je poslije obavještajne
obrade prebacio do Livna i Vareša, odnosno Kiseljaka.
Srpski pokušaj da preuzmu položaje HVO-a koji im tak-
tički odgovaraju na području Komara nije uspio.848
C
Osim raširenog šverca u središnjoj Bosni, s Musli-
manima su Srbi imali dodirnu točku u dolini Neretve,
gdje su u lipnju 1992. poraženi od HVO-a. Izlazak na
Neretvu bio je jedan od strategijskih ciljeva Republike
Srpske, pa su koristili Muslimane da to realiziraju. Pru-
D
žali su materijalnu i vatrenu potporu 4. korpusu ARBiH,
posebice u borbama za Mostar i u vrijeme operacije
Neretva u rujnu 1993. godine.849
847 ICTY: Komanda 2. lpbr VRS, str. pov. br. 24-4/98 od 25. 4.
1993.
848 ICTY: GŠ VRS, Postupak str. pov. br. 03/8-110 od 7. 6.
1993.; ICTY: Predsjednik RS, Naređenje br. 01-133/93 od
9. 6. 1993.
849 R. DREKOVIĆ, U obruču, 467; E. ŠEJTANIĆ, Hercegovci na
ognjenim vratima, 181-183.
367
Domovinski rat 04-02-2020 Knjiga 1.indd 367
HVO, Kupres, 1995. (fotografiju darovao Zrinko Tokić).
HVO, Kupres, 1995 (Photograph donated by Zrinko Tokić).
Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina’s attack on the HVO
Konjic in mid-April, 1993. The VRS Herzegovina Corps
provided artillery support for the HVO and captured the
mountainous area of Ljubina above Turija on April 18. In
return the HVO made it possible for a large number of
Serb civilians from Konjic and the wider Konjic area to
flee to the Borak area. Thanks to the help provided by the
Serbs the HVO was able to hold its positions in three vil-
lages near Konjic until the end of the war.
During the Army of the Republic of Bosnia and
Herzegovina’s attack on the HVO Travnik and HVO Novi
Travnik the VRS accepted the expelled Croatian refugees
and transported them to Croatia. The VRS also accepted
retreating elements of HVO Brigades. The VRS’ intelli-
gence officers questioned the soldiers and then the VRS
transported them to Livno, Vareš and Kiseljak. The Serbs
attempted to move into the abandoned Croatian posi-
tions in the Komar area so as to improve their tactical sit-
uation but the attempt failed.
The Serbs cooperated with the Muslims in central
Bosnia in smuggling operations. The Muslims and Serbs
R
were also geographically linked in the Neretva Valley.
There the Serbs suffered a defeat at the hands of the Cro-
ats in June, 1992. Reaching the Neretva River was one of
the strategic objectives of the Republika Srpska and the
Serbs were not averse to using Muslims to achieve that
goal. They provided material help and military support
to IV Corps of the Army of the Republic of Bosnia and
Herzegovina, especially during the fighting for Mostar
and during Operation Neretva-93 in September, 1993.
4.2.2020. 18:35:10
 Davor Marijan • Rat za opstojnost Hrvata, 1991. - 1995.
Suštinu rata protiv HVO-a vojni čelnik ARBiH gene-
ral Rasim Delić sažeo je u veljači 1994. u tvrdnji da je
“HVO eliminisan sa područja Jablanice, Konjica, Fojnice,
Kaknja, Zenice, Travnika i Bugojna. Znači, kompletna
jedna pokrajina po Vens-Ovenovom planu sa centra-
lom u Travniku”.850 Njegova samohvala ogoljuje do srži
pobude i svrhu rata koji je ARBiH povela protiv HVO-a.
Ona je ratovala za teritorij koji je najvećim dijelom i et-
nički očistila. Postigla je uspjeh na etnički miješanim
područjima, kojima je prije izbijanja otvorenog sukoba
H
demografska slika promijenjena u korist Muslimana.
Druga značajka na područjima uspjeha bilo je neposto-
janje kontinuirane crte razdvajanja, nego niza izmiješa-
nih etničkih džepova gdje je brojnost odnijela prevagu.
Na dijelu teritorija iskorišten je i čimbenik iznenađenja.
Hrvatsko vijeće obrane održalo se u enklavama poput
M
Žepča gdje nisu imali nikakvih iluzija o namjerama
ARBiH. Na područjima gdje je uspostavljena crta raz-
dvajanja ARBiH, kao ni HVO, nije imala većih uspjeha.
Operacija Neretva ARBiH u dolini Neretve i Vrbasa nije
uspjela, kao ni Buna, operacija HVO-a u dolini Vrbasa.
Nisu uspjeli ni pokušaji ARBiH da ovlada Žepčem.
D
Gledano u cjelini, Muslimani su bolje prošli u ratu
jer su ga poveli kada su bili spremni za rat. Najviše uspje-
ha imali su u travnju, lipnju i srpnju 1993. u dolinama
Lašve, Lepenice i Neretve, kada su razbili HVO u Konjicu,
Jablanici, Travniku, Kaknju, Fojnici i Bugojnu. Hrvatsko
je vijeće obrane uz pomoć pojačanja iz Hrvatske u ko-
C
lovozu konsolidirano i uz povremene krize, posebice u
rujnu 1993., postupno je preuzimalo inicijativu u svoje
ruke. Početkom 1994., s operacijom Tvigi-94, znatno je
bolje stajalo od ARBiH u Rami i dolinama Vrbasa, Nere-
tve i Lepenice. Iznimka je bila dolina Lašve, koja je uz
maksimalan napor izdržala napade višestruko brojnije
ARBiH u prosincu 1993. i siječnju 1994. godine.
850 R. DELIĆ, Armija ključ mira, 19.
368
Domovinski rat 04-02-2020 Knjiga 1.indd 368
Rasim Delić, the commander of the Army of the Re-
public of Bosnia and Herzegovina, succinctly described
the essence of the war against the HVO in February,
1994, when he stated, “the HVO has been eliminated
from the areas of Jablanica, Konjic, Fojnica, Kakanj, Ze-
nica, Travnik and Bugojno. A whole region, according to
the Vance-Owen Peace Plan, with its center in Travnik.”
Delić’s smug statement lays bare the purpose behind
the Army of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina’s
decision to go to war against the HVO. The Army of the
Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina waged an aggres-
sive war for territory and engaged in ethnic cleansing in
the areas it conquered. It is important to mention that
the Army of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina
was most successful in those ethnically mixed territo-
ries where the demographic picture had been altered
in the Muslims’ favor prior to the outbreak of the Mus-
lim-Croat war. It is interesting to note that the Muslims
were generally successful in areas where there existed
no continuous front line, that is, in areas dotted with an
array of ethnically clean pockets – the number of such
pockets always favoring the Muslims. The Army of the
Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina skillfully and suc-
cessfully used the element of surprise on a number of
occasions. The HVO managed to hold its positions in the
face of Muslim attacks in enclaves such as Žepče, where
the defenders harbored no illusions as to the Army of the
Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina’s intentions. In the
area where a front line was established the Army of the
Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina did not achieve no-
table successes. That said, neither did the HVO. The Army
of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina launched a
number of offensives that failed. Operation Neretva-93
D
in the Neretva Valley and Vrbas Valley was a fiasco, ditto
the HVO’s Operation Buna in the Vrbas Valley. The Army
of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina’s attempts to
capture Žepče also met with failure.
Overall, the Muslims gained more from the war than
R
the Croats, if for no other reason than owning to the fact
that they attacked the HVO when they were prepared for
such a conflict, catching the HVO on the wrong foot. The
Muslims achieved their biggest successes in April, June
and July, 1993, in the Lašva Valley, Lepenica Valley and
Neretva Valley when they defeated the HVO in Konjic,
Jablanica, Travnik, Kakanj, Fojnica and Bugojno. The HVO,
with the help of reinforcements from Croatia which ar-
rived in August, first consolidated its position, albeit with
occasional setbacks, especially in September, 1993, and
4.2.2020. 18:35:10
 The Croatian Nation’s Struggle for Survival, 1991-1995

H
M
D
Središnja Bosna, dolina Lašve nakon borbi u travnju i lipnju 1993. godine. Central Bosnia, Lašva Valley, after the fighting in April and June 1993.
C
D
then gradually gained the initiative. At the beginning
of 1994 and Operation Tvigi-94 the HVO had the upper
hand over the Army of the Republic of Bosnia and Herze-
govinian Rama, Vrbas Valley, Neretva Valley and Lepenica
Valley. The exception was the situation in the Lašva Val-
R
ley. There, the Croatian forces continuously put up stiff
resistance to the vastly numerically superior forces of
the Army of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina and
beat back every attack mounted against their positions
in December, 1993, and January, 1994.

369

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 Davor Marijan • Rat za opstojnost Hrvata, 1991. - 1995.
SRPSKI DIO RATA
1993. – 1994. GODINE
Krajem 1992. Srbi su držali oko 70 % teritorija BiH
i uvjerljivo su najbolje stajali na bojnom polju. Premda
je planirao, VRS nije uspio značajnije proširiti koridor u
Posavini, izbiti na lijevu obalu Neretve, izići na more,
uništiti muslimanske skupine u istočnoj Bosni (Cerska,
Goražde, Srebrenica i Žepa) i osvojiti Bugojno, Grada-
čac, Maglaj, Olovo i Orašje.851 Dio tih planova planirao
H
se realizirati 1993. godine. Početkom 1993. u Glavnom
štabu ARBiH planirala se uporna obrana područja koja
su Srbi napadali. Od slobodnih snaga glavnina je plani-
rana za djelovanje u Posavini i za deblokadu Sarajeva, a
pomoćne su snage planirane za napadna djelovanja u
M
dolinama Drine, Vrbasa, Une i Neretve.852
Jak intenzitet napada ARBiH iz prosinca 1992. osjet-
no je splasnuo u siječnju 1993. godine. Toga je mjeseca
ARBiH jači pritisak na VRS imala na pravcu Srebrenica –
Bratunac. Početkom druge polovine siječnja snage AR-
BiH zauzele su dio teritorija na području Sasa, Kravice,
D
Glogove planine na području Bratunca, Skelana i Seti-
hova na širem području gradića Rudo. Strahujući da je
to najava povezivanja Sandžaka, Podrinja i Semberije
sa središnjom Bosnom, VRS je brzo odgovorio. Od 11.
do 20. siječnja dio Drinskoga korpusa s ojačanjima iz
drugih korpusa VRS-a izveo je operaciju Pesnica, kojom
C
je odvojio Srebrenicu od Cerske i stavio u funkciju pro-
metnicu Milići – Konjević Polje – Zvornik. Uz pomoć di-
jela Užičkoga korpusa Vojske Jugoslavije prikupljenog
u Loznici, Ljuboviji i Malom Zvorniku, Drinski je korpus
s ojačanjima od 24. siječnja do 3. veljače u operaciji
Proboj zauzeo područje Skelana, učvrstio obranu Ruda,
obranio Bratunac, osvojio dio područja prema rudniku
Sase, pomaknuo crtu na pravcu Pešurići – Međeđa i
poboljšao taktički položaj prema Skugrićima i Cerskoj.
Muslimanske su snage sabijene na manje područje, a za
promet su osposobljene prometnice Drinjača – Zvor-
nik i Rogatica – Sjemač – Višegrad. Sredinom veljače
1993. Drinski korpus VRS-a s ojačanjima je u operaciji
Udar u srednjem Podrinju razbio snage ARBiH i zauzeo
Cersku, Konjević Polje, Kamenicu, Kravicu i Novu Kasa-
851 ICTY: GŠ VRS, Direktiva op. br. 4, str. pov. br. 02/5-210 od
19. 11. 1992.
852 ICTY: ŠVK OS RBiH, Direktiva br. 4, DT str. pov. br. 02/131-
7 od 13. 1. 1993.
370
Domovinski rat 04-02-2020 Knjiga 1.indd 370
SERB PERSPECTIVE
1993 – 1994
By the end of 1992 the Serbs held about 70% of the
territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina and their position in
the theater seemed unassailable. However, the VRS did
not manage to realize its plans to significantly widen the
corridor in Posavina, reach the left bank of the Neretva
River, secure access to the sea, destroy the Muslim for-
mations in eastern Bosnia (Cerska, Goražde, Srebrenica
and Žepa) and capture Bugojno, Gradačac, Maglaj, Olovo
and Orašje. Some of these objectives the VRS hoped to
achieve in 1993. At the beginning of 1993 the General
Staff of the Army of the Republic of Bosnia and Herze-
govina planned to determinedly defend the areas under
Serb attack and use the bulk of the troops not thus en-
gaged for operations in Posavina and for lifting the block-
ade of Sarajevo. The other units, according to the General
Staff’s intentions, would mount supporting attacks in the
Drina Valley, Vrbas Valley, Una Valley and Neretva Valley.
The determined intensity of the ARBIH attacks from
December, 1992, diminished significantly in January,
1993. During that month the Army of the Republic of
Bosnia and Herzegovina pressed the VRS hard on the Sre-
brenica – Batunac line. At the begging of the second half
of January the Army of the Republic of Bosnia and Her-
zegovina captured some territory in the Sas area, Kravice
area, Glogove Planine area and around Bratunac, Skelana
and Setihov in the wider Rudo area. The VRS, assuming
that the aggressiveness of the Army of the Republic of
Bosnia and Herzegovina heralded the Muslims’ inten-
tion to link Sandžak, the Podrinje region and Semberi-
D
ja with central Bosnia, reacted swiftly. From January 11
to January 20, elements of Drina Corps, reinforced with
units from other corps of the VRS, conducted Operation
Pesnica (Fist). The Serb forces succeeded in cutting off
Srebrenica from Cerska and opened for traffic the Milići
– Konjević Polje – Zvornik road. Following up the success
R
Drina Corps, having received more reinforcements and
supported by elements of Užice Corps of the Yugoslav
Army assembled in Loznica, Ljubovija and Mali Zvornik
launched Operation Proboj (Breakthrough). From Janu-
ary 24 to February 3 the Serbs captured the Skelani area,
fortified the defenses around Rudo, successfully defend-
ed Bratunac, captured a part of the area in the direction
of the Sase mine, pushed the front line forward in the di-
rection of Pešurići – Međeđa and improved the tactical
4.2.2020. 18:35:11
 The Croatian Nation’s Struggle for Survival, 1991-1995
bu.853 U Podrinju je ARBiH ostala u tri enklave: Goraždu,
Srebrenici i Žepi.
Srebrenica i Žepa bile su sljedeća meta Drinskoga kor-
pusa. Napadi su počeli u ožujku i sredinom travnja 1993.
godine. Armija Republike BiH bila je u gotovo bezizla-
znom položaju. Zahvaljujući angažmanu međunarodne
zajednice Srebrenica je 16. travnja 1993. proglašena si-
gurnosnom zonom, a 5. svibnja i Žepa. S njom je popis
sigurnosnih zona proširen i na Bihać, Goražde, Sarajevo
i Tuzlu. Armija Republike BiH bila je prisiljena 17. travnja
H
potpisati s VRS-om sporazum o demilitarizaciji Srebreni-
ce, a 8. svibnja i sporazum o demilitarizaciji Žepe i ponov-
no Srebrenice. Armija Republike BiH pristala je predati na-
oružanje i streljivo UNPROFOR-u, koji je preuzeo nadzor
demilitariziranih zona.854
Nakon demilitarizacije Srebrenice Drinski se korpus
M
okrenuo Gornjem Podrinju i Goraždu operacijom Mač. Dio
snaga određen je da drži crtu i spriječi pojačanja ARBiH iz
smjera Kladnja, Kalesije i Vitinice i eventualno izvlačenje
snaga iz Srebrenice i Žepe. Prije napada VRS je zauzeo
objekte Mirkovicu i Kacelj i presjekao opskrbni put prema
Goraždu preko Grepka. Napad na goraždansko područje
D
počeo je 27. svibnja 1993. godine. Na širem području Go-
ražda ARBiH je imala Istočnobosansku operativnu grupu s
oko 9500 ljudi. Vojska Republike Srpske napala je iz smjera
Višegrada, Foče i Čajniča i do sredine lipnja potisnula mu-
slimanske snage prema Goraždu te prepolovila područje
koje je ARBiH nadzirala prije početka operacije. Napad je
C
prestao kada je 15. lipnja 1993. potpisan Generalni spora-
zum o prestanku sukoba u BiH, koji su potpisali zapovjed-
nici odnosno komandanti HVO-a, ARBiH i VRS-a.855
D
853 ICTY: Komanda Drinskog korpusa, Vanredni izvještaj str.
pov. br. 03/05-32 od 11. 1. 1993.; ICTY: Komanda Drinskog
korpusa, Borbeno naređenje op. br. 2, str. pov. br. 01/5-
53 od 23. 1. 1993.; ICTY: Komanda Drinskog korpusa, str.
pov. br. 01/4-49 od 24. 1. 1993.; ICTY: Komanda Drinskog
korpusa, Borbeno naređenje str. pov. br. 01/5-75 od 1. 2.
1993.; ICTY: Analiza izvođenja borbenih dejstava u op-
eraciji pod kodnim imenom “Pesnica”; ICTY: Analiza iz-
vođenja borbenih dejstava u operaciji pod kodnim imen-
om “Proboj”; ICTY: Komanda Drinskog korpusa, Borbeno
naređenje za dalja dejstva str. pov. br. 01/5-97 od 12. 2.
1993.; ICTY: Komanda Drinskog korpusa, Realizacija plan-
iranih zadataka str. pov. br. 370/1 od 15. 9. 1993.
854 ICTY: Sporazum o demilitarizaciji Srebrenice od 8. 5.
1993.; R. DELIĆ, Armija RBiH, I, 323-324.
855 ICTY: Komanda Drinskog korpusa, Realizacija planiranih
zadataka str. pov. br. 370/1 od 15. 9. 1993.; R. DELIĆ,
Armija RBiH, I, 325-329.
371
Domovinski rat 04-02-2020 Knjiga 1.indd 371
position in the direction of Skugrići and Cerska. The Mus-
lim forces were pushed into a small area and the Drinjača
– Zvornik road and the Rogatica – Sjemač – Višegrad road
were opened for traffic. In mid-February, 1993, the VRS
Drina Corps, again with reinforcements, mounted Oper-
ation Udar (Strike) in central Podrinje and decisively de-
feated the Army of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegov-
ina forces and captured Cerska, Konjević Polje, Kamenica,
Kravica and Nova Kasaba. The territory held by the Army
of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina in the Podrin-
je area was reduced to three enclaves: Goražde, Srebren-
ica and Žepa.
Srebrenica and Žepa were Drina Corps’ next targets.
The Serbs started attacking in March, 1993. The Army
of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina forces there
were in a hopeless situation. Thanks to the international
community’s efforts, Srebrenica was proclaimed a safe
zone on April 16, 1993. On May 5 Žepa was proclaimed
a safe zone as well. After Srebrenica and Žepa the Bihać
area, the Goražde area, the Sarajevo area and the Tuzla
area were also proclaimed safe zones. The Army of the
Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina was forced to sign,
on April 17, an agreement on the demilitarization of Sre-
brenica with the VRS and on May 8 an agreement on the
demilitarization of Žepa and Srebrenica again. UNPRO-
FOR undertook a monitoring and security role in the safe
areas. The Army of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegov-
ina agreed to hand over their weapons and ammunition
to UNPROFOR.
With Srebrenica demilitarized Drina Corps lavished
its attention to the upper Podrinje region and Goražde
in Operation Mač (Sword). Some units were deployed
to hold the line and prevent the Army of the Republic
of Bosnia and Herzegovina from sending reinforcements
from the direction of Kladanj, Kalesija and Vitinica and
break out from Srebrenica and Žepa. Before the attack
the VRS captured Mirkovica and Kacelj and cut the sup-
ply route towards Goražde via Grebak. The attack on
R
the Goražde area started on May 27, 1993. In the wider
Goražde area the Army of the Republic of Bosnia and
Herzegovina had East Bosnia Operational Group with
about 9,500 men. The VRS attacked from the direction of
Višegrad, Foča and Čajniče and by mid-June had pushed
the Muslims towards Goražde and captured half the terri-
tory the Army of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina
had held before the start of the offensive. The offensive
was halted on June 15 when the General Agreement to
Halt the Conflict in Bosnia and Herzegovina was signed
4.2.2020. 18:35:11
 Davor Marijan • Rat za opstojnost Hrvata, 1991. - 1995.
Nakon neutralizacije ARBiH u Podrinju, VRS je teži-
šte djelovanja stavio na Sarajevo, premda se borbe oko
grada nisu prekidale. Već u ožujku VRS je pojačao pritisak
na grad na području Donjeg Kotorca, a 18. travnja 1993.
zauzeo je dominantne kote na širem području Hadžića.
Krajem svibnja ARBiH je bez uspjeha pokušala zauzeti
dio prometnice Pale – Lukavica. U prvim danima srpnja
1993. VRS je započeo operaciju Lukavac-93 na Sarajevo,
Trnovo i Igman, čiji je cilj bio proširiti blokadu Sarajeva i
zauzimanjem Igmana napraviti spoj sa snagama iz Hadži-
H
ća. Na sarajevskom dijelu bojišta Sarajevski korpus VRS-a
veći je dio srpnja napadao plato Žuči, koji je 1. korpus AR-
BiH uz velika naprezanja i gubitke obranio. Više je uspje-
ha VRS imao u napadu na Trnovo, koje je branila jedna
brdska brigada ARBiH. Uz prištabne postrojbe Glavnoga
štaba VRS-a angažirani su i dijelovi Sarajevskoga i Her-
M
cegovačkoga korpusa. Rogoj i Delijaš VRS je zauzeo 11.
srpnja, a idućega dana Grebak i Trnovo. Armija Republike
BiH povukla se, uz zanemariv otpor, prema Igmanu i uz
velika naprezanja i s nekoliko različitih sastava 1. i 6. kor-
pusa i prištabnih postrojbi Glavnoga štaba organizirala
obranu na dominantnim visovima Hojta, Šiljak i Proskok
D
na Bjelašnici. Obrana se održala do 31. srpnja, kada je VRS
prodro s pravca Ljute i Rakitnice i zauzeo repetitor na Bje-
lašnici. Istoga je dana VRS zauzeo Hojtu, a 1. kolovoza i
Proskok. Obrana ARBiH potpuno se raspala i uz velika na-
prezanja i dovođenje pojačanja iz 3. korpusa, Sarajeva i
MUP-a organizirana je nova crta između Velikog i Malog
C
polja na Igmanu. Konsolidaciji ARBiH doprinijela je živa
diplomatska aktivnost međunarodne zajednice, koja je
30. srpnja dovela do potpisivanja Sporazuma o prekidu
svih borbenih djelovanja. Daljnji politički pritisak na Srbe
i prijetnja zračnim udarima doveli su 14. kolovoza u Žene-
vi do potpisivanja Sporazuma o povlačenju VRS-a na crtu
od 30. srpnja. Vojska Republike Srpske povukla se na tu
crtu, a osvojeni prostor na Igmanu i Bjelašnici predala je
UNPROFOR-u, koji je bio dužan organizirati tampon-zo-
nu. Po tvrdnjama srpske strane, ARBiH je mimo dogovora
i bez otpora UNPROFOR-a do kraja rujna 1993. zaposjela
tampon-zonu. Time je ublažen poraz u kojem je ARBiH uz
velike teritorijalne gubitke imala 153 poginula i 180 teže
ranjenih vojnika.856
Do kasne jeseni 1993. na širem području Sarajeva
bilo je mirno, a potom je Sarajevsko-romanijski korpus s
856 Z. RUJANAC, Opsjednuti grad Sarajevo, 310-312; R. DELIĆ,
Armija RBiH, I, 332-336; M. MILOVANOVIĆ, Istine i zablude,
84-85.
372
Domovinski rat 04-02-2020 Knjiga 1.indd 372
by the commanders of the HVO, Army of the Republic of
Bosnia and Herzegovina and the VRS.
Having neutralized the Army of the Republic of Bos-
nia and Herzegovina in the Podrinje region, the VRS shift-
ed the focus of its efforts to Sarajevo even though the
fighting around the city continued unabated. Already in
March the VRS increased its pressure on the city in the
area of Donji Kotorac. On March 18, 1993, the Serbs cap-
tured the dominant positions in the wider Hadžići area.
At the end of May the Amy of Bosnia and Herzegovina
unsuccessfully attempted to recapture a part of the Pale
– Lukavica road. During the first days of July, 1993, the
VRS launched Operation Lukavac-93, attacking Sarajevo,
Trnovo and Igman. The objective of the offensive was
to tighten the blockade of Sarajevo and by capturing
Igman to link up with the Serb forces in Hadžići. In the
Sarajevo area Sarajevo Corps spent most of the month of
July attacking the Žuč plateau but I Corps of the Army of
the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina put up a spirited
resistance and at the cost of a huge number of casualties
beat the Serbs’ attacks back. The VRS was more success-
ful in its attack on Trnovo. Trnova was defended by one
mountain brigade of the Army of the Republic of Bosnia
and Herzegovina. Elements of Sarajevo Corps and Her-
zegovina Corps with HQ units of the General Staff of the
VRS participated in that attack. The VRS captured Rogoj
and Delijaš on July 11 and Grebak and Trnovo on the fol-
lowing day. The Army of the Republic of Bosnia and Her-
zegovina put up nothing more than a token resistance
and withdrew towards Igman and in the face of consider-
able difficulties managed, with elements of I and VI Corps
and HQ units of the General Staff to establish a defen-
sive line on the following dominant peaks on Bjelašnica:
D
Hojta, Šiljak and Proskok. The Muslims held the line until
July 31 when the VRS attacked from the direction of Ljuta
and Rakitnica and captured the repeater on Bjelašnica.
On the same day the VRS captured Hota and on August
1 Proskok as well. The defensive line of the Army of the
R
Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina collapsed. The Mus-
lims brought in reinforcements from III Corps, Sarajevo
and the MUP and with utmost effort managed to estab-
lish a new defensive line between Veliko Polje and Malo
Polje on Igman. The international community’s political
activities helped the Army of the Republic of Bosnia and
Herzegovina to consolidate its position. At the instiga-
tion of the international community an agreement on
the cessation of hostilities was signed on July 30. The
international community went a step further and threat-
4.2.2020. 18:35:11
 The Croatian Nation’s Struggle for Survival, 1991-1995
ojačanjima iz VRS-a i Vojske Jugoslavije krenuo u opera-
ciju Pancir-93, čija je svrha bila ovladati kotama Žuč, Orlić
i Hum, a potom Hrasnicom i Butmirom. Borbe su počele
20. prosinca napadom VRS-a na položaje ARBiH na Žuči
i trajale su do sredine siječnja 1994., kada su završile bez
pomaka na bojištu. Nepunih mjesec dana poslije, 5. ve-
ljače 1994., zbio se masakr na sarajevskoj tržnici Markale.
Od ispaljene mine 120 mm poginulo je 69, a ranjeno oko
200 osoba. Vojska Republike Srpske negirala je odgovor-
nost za taj zločin. Masakr je doveo do pojačanog diplo-
H
matskog djelovanja, koje je VRS natjeralo da pristane na
primirje i stavljanje teškog topništva pod nadzor UNPRO-
FOR-a. To je dijelom realizirano i smanjilo je intenzitet
granatiranja Sarajeva.857
Jake i dugotrajne borbe između Srba i Muslimana
vodile su se i u zoni 2. korpusa ARBiH. Sjeveroistočno od
M
Sarajeva, gradić Olovo bio je konstantna meta napada
srpskih snaga čija je svrha bila vezivanje muslimanskih
snaga i popravljanje taktičkoga položaja. Jače su se bor-
be vodile u drugoj polovini ožujka 1993. i u njima nije
bilo pomaka. Najesen je Olovo ušlo u zonu 1. korpusa
ARBiH. Vojska Republike Srpske u studenome je pojačala
D
napade na Olovo, a u prosincu su manje snage Drinskoga
i Sarajevskoga korpusa pokušale staviti pod nadzor pro-
metnicu Vareš – Olovo – Han Pijesak. Napad nije donio
očekivani uspjeh, kao ni ponovljeni pokušaj od kraja pro-
sinca 1993. do druge polovine siječnja 1994. godine.858
Na području Teočaka VRS je ujesen 1993. izveo ne-
C
uspješnu operaciju Kladanj-93, čiji je cilj bio ovladati
dominantnim objektima, skratiti crtu bojišta i spojiti
snage Istočnobosanskoga s Drinskim korpusom na crti
Vis – Vranovac. U operaciji koja je trajala od 10. stude-
noga do 21. prosinca 1993. sudjelovale su snage obaju
D
korpusa. Nakon manjih teritorijalnih gubitaka ARBiH se
obranila uz pomoć drugih snaga 2. korpusa i vratila crtu
prije početka operacije.859
857 ICTY: GŠ VRS, Dopuna direktive br. 6, str. pov. br. 02/2-
1014 od 14. 12. 1993.; ICTY: IKM-2 Komande SRK, Redovni
borbeni izveštaj str. pov. br. 20/15-1413-98 od 5. 2. 1994.;
ICTY: Komanda 4. map-a, Rad međunarodne komisije za
utvrđivanje činjeničnog stanja masakra na Markalama,
izveštaj str. pov. br. 2-37 od 14. 2. 1994.; R. DELIĆ, Armija
RBiH, I, 337-338; M. ŠADINLIJA, Prvi korpus ARBiH, 38.
858 ICTY: GŠ VRS, Borbeno naređenje str. pov. br. 02/2-105
od 12. 12. 1993.; R. DELIĆ, Armija RBiH, I, 338-339.
859 ICTY: GŠ VRS str. pov. br. 02/2-“Kladanj-93”/6 od 2. 12.
1993.; ICTY: GŠ VRS, Borbeno naređenje str. pov. br. 02/2-
105 od 12. 12. 1993.; 1993. – prelomna godina rata, 63-65.
373
Domovinski rat 04-02-2020 Knjiga 1.indd 373
ened the Serbs with air strikes. This bore fruit and on
August 14 an agreement on the VRS’s withdrawal to the
line held on July 30 was signed in Geneva. The VRS duly
withdrew to that line and handed over the captured ter-
ritory on Igman and Bjelašnica to UNPROFOR, which had
a mandate to set up a buffer zone there. According to
the Serbs’ claims, the Army of the Republic of Bosnia and
Herzegovina, contrary to the signed agreement, moved
into the zone and occupied it by the end of Septem-
ber, 1993, meeting no resistance from the UNPROFOR
troops. With that, the Army of the Republic of Bosnia and
Herzegovina ameliorated somewhat the huge losses in
both territory and men suffered at the hands of the VRS.
During the Serb offensive the Army of the Republic of
Bosnia and Herzegovina lost 153 soldiers killed and 180
seriously wounded.
Until the late fall of 1993 the situation in the wider
Sarajevo area was quiet. Then, Sarajevo-Romanija Corps
with reinforcements from the VRS and Yugoslav Army
launched Operation Pancir-93. The aim of the operation
was to capture Žuč Hill, Orlić Hill, Hum Hill and then Hras-
nica and Butmir, too. The operation started on December
20 with the VRS’ attack on the Army of the Republic of
Bosnia and Herzegovina’s positions on Žuč. The fighting
lasted until mid-January 1994 with no decisive result. The
front-line stayed pretty much where it was when the of-
fensive started. Less than a month later, on February 5,
1994, a large number of civilians were massacred at the
Sarajevo Markale market. A 120-mm shell was fired on
the market, killing 69 and wounding about 200 people.
The VRS denied responsibility for the crime. The massa-
cre provoked a heightened diplomatic activity which
forced the Serbs to agree to a cease-fire and to place all
their heavy artillery pieces under UNPROFOR’s control. In
the event not all heavy Serb weaponry was placed un-
der UNPROFOR’s control but the newly created situation
significantly reduced the intensity of shelling of Sarajevo.
Long and heavy fighting between the Serbs and
R
Muslims developed in the zone of II Corps of the Army of
the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina. The Serbs con-
stantly attacked the town of Olovo, located to the north-
east of Sarajevo with the aim of pinning down the Mus-
lim forces and improving their tactical situation. Heavy
fighting occurred in the second half of March, 1993, but
neither side managed to gain the upper hand. In the fall
of 1993, Olovo was included in the area of responsibility
of the ARBIH I Corps. In November the Army of the Re-
public of Bosnia and Herzegovina stepped up its offen-
4.2.2020. 18:35:11
 Davor Marijan • Rat za opstojnost Hrvata, 1991. - 1995.
U Posavini je VRS imao strategijski važan koridor s
trajnim zadatkom njegova proširenja i boljega osigura-
nja. Na tom je prostoru VRS imao snage Istočnobosan-
skoga korpusa i TG-5 iz 1. krajiškog korpusa. Na sjeve-
roistočnoj strani koridora bio je HVO iz OZ-a Bosanska
Posavina, a na jugozapadnoj dijelovi 2. korpusa i 108.
brigada HVO-a. Tijekom 1993. VRS je nekoliko puta po-
kušao proširiti koridor. Borbe su počele 8. ožujka srp-
skim napadom na obranu 108. brigade HVO-a i osvaja-
njem Boderišta. Hrvatsko vijeće obrane vratilo je selo u
H
protunapadu uz pomoć ARBiH. Na sjeveroistočnoj stra-
ni koridora OZ Bosanska Posavina HVO-a napravila je
26. ožujka 1993. s TG-145 HV-a manji pomak na pravcu
Vidovice – Lepnica, što je bio jedan od rijetkih napada
na srpsku crtu. Vojska Republike Srpske bila je glavni
pokretač zbivanja na bojištu i 30. travnja kod Brčkog je
M
potisnula ARBiH iz Dizdaruše, a sredinom svibnja i s Lič-
kog mosta, što je u protunapadu vraćeno. Glavni udar
VRS-a u Posavini bio je dio operacije Lukavac-93 (negdje
se naziva i operacija Sadejstvo-93), koja je počela 21. i
završila 31. srpnja. Cilj operacije bio je osvojiti prostor
južnoga dijela Brčkog i selo Brod te omogućiti prijenos
D
električne energije od Ugljevika do Bosanske krajine.
Operaciju je izveo Istočnobosanski korpus s ojačanjem
iz 1. krajiškog korpusa. Vojska Republike Srpske zauzela
je Lički most i Brod i odbacila snage ARBiH s područja
općine Brčko, koje je od tada potpuno nadzirala.860
Pokušaji 1. krajiškog korpusa VRS-a da proširi kori-
C
dor zauzimanjem Gradačca nisu uspjeli. Osobito su se
jaki napadi izvodili od 17. do 19. rujna 1993., no 107.
brigada (tada još HVO-a) odbila je napad uz pomoć po-
jačanja iz 2. korpusa ARBiH.861
Na području Tešnja i Doboja snage OG-7 Jug ARBiH
i 110. brigade HVO-a u ožujku su odbile jak napad VRS-a
kod ušća Usore u Bosnu. Nakon što je 24. lipnja 1993.
počeo sukob Hrvata i Muslimana u Žepču, ARBiH se na
području Maglaja i Tešnja našla u vrlo teškom položaju.
Hrvatsko vijeće obrane ovladalo je Žepčem i odsjeklo
OG-7 Jug 2. korpusa ARBiH, ali i 110. brigadu HVO-a
Usora od 3. korpusa ARBiH. Bio je to početak blokade
koja je trajala gotovo devet mjeseci. Snage 1. krajiškog
860 Zapovjedništvo Slavonskog bojišta, Vanredno izvješće
kl. SP 81/93-01/02, ur. br. 3189-01-93-18 od 26. 3. 1993.;
ICTY: GŠ VRS, Direktiva op. br. 5, DT br. 02/2-479 od 25. 6.
1993.; R. DELIĆ, Armija RBiH, I, 339-340.
861 ICTY: IKM Komande 1. KK, Raspored jedinica str. pov. br.
368-1/93 od 15. 6. 1993.; R. DELIĆ, Armija RBiH, I, 341.
374
Domovinski rat 04-02-2020 Knjiga 1.indd 374
sive efforts to capture Olovo and in December elements
of Drina and Sarajevo Corps attempted to gain control
of the Vareš – Olovo – Han Pijesak road. The attack did
not achieve the desired results. The Serbs tried again and
the fighting lasted from the end of December, 1993, until
mid-January, 1994, but victory proved equally elusive as
in the earlier attempt.
In the fall of 1993 the VRS mounted Operation
Kladanj-93 in the Teočak area. The aim was to take con-
trol of the dominant locations, shorten the front line
and link up East Bosnia Corps with Drina Corps at the
Vis – Vranovac line. The operation lasted from Novem-
ber 10 to December 21, 1994, and units belonging to
both Corps took part in it. The Army of the Republic of
Bosnia and Herzegovina lost some territory initially but
managed to defeat the attack with the help of reinforce-
ments from other units of II Corps and in the end recap-
tured the lost territory.
In Posavina the VRS controlled an important corridor
and it was of utmost strategic importance for the Serbs
to widen it and secure it better. In the area the VRS de-
ployed East Bosnia Corps and TG-5 from I Krajina Corps.
On the northeaster side of the corridor there was the HVO
– Operative Zone Bosanska Posavina and on the south-
western side there were elements of II Corps and the 108th
Brigade of the HVO. During 1993 the VRS made a number
of attempts to widen the corridor. On March 8 the Serbs
attacked the defensive positions of the 108th Brigade and
captured Boderište. The HVO, with the help of the Army
of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, mounted a
counterattack and recaptured the village. On the north-
eastern side of the corridor, HVO Operative Zone Bosans-
ka Posavina with TG-145 of the Croatian Army took a sliver
D
of territory in the direction of Vidovice – Lepnica on March
26. The action was untypical for the usual pattern of fight-
ing in the area in the sense that the Croats attacked the
Serbs’ defensive line and not the other way around. The
VRS held the initiative and on April 30 the Serbs pushed
R
back the Army of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina
from Dizdaruša and in mid-May from the Lički bridge near
Brčko as well but the Muslims mounted a counterattack
and recaptured the Lički bridge. The main VRS’s effort in
Posavina came with Operation Lukavac-93 (some com-
mentators call the operation Sadejstvo-93) which com-
menced on July 21 and finished on July 31. The aim of the
operation was to capture the southern part of Brčko and
the village of Brod and enable electricity transmission
from Ugljevik to Bosanska Krajina. East Bosnia Corps with
4.2.2020. 18:35:11
 The Croatian Nation’s Struggle for Survival, 1991-1995
H
M
HVO, Kupres, 1994. (fotografiju darovao Ivica Budimir, Arhiv 1.
gbr HVO).
HVO, Kupres, 1994 (Photograph donated by Ivica Budimir).
D
korpusa VRS-a preuzele su dio crte 111. brigade HVO-a
C
i preko njezine zone napale ARBiH u Maglaju. Cilj VRS-a
bio je zauzeti Maglaj i dolinu rijeke Bosne između Ma-
tuzića i Liješnice. Borbe na tom području i blokada Ma-
glaja trajale su do druge polovine ožujka 1994., odno-
sno do odobrenja 111. brigade HVO-a snagama ARBiH,
nakon prestanka sukoba između ARBiH i HVO-a, da
D
deblokiraju Maglaj. Vojska Republike Srpske 19. ožujka
bez borbe se povukla prema Tesliću i na Ozren, čime su
Maglaj i OG-7 Jug deblokirani.862
U odnosu na ARBiH u zapadnoj Bosni, zadatak 2.
krajiškog korpusa VRS-a bio je da na desnoj obali Une
od Bosanskog Novog do planinskoga vrha Veliki Ljutoč
drži čvrstu crtu i sprečava rasijecanje korpusa iz smjera
Bihaća prema Bosanskom Petrovcu. Borbe u 1993. po-
čeo je 5. korpus ARBiH uspješnim napadom iz Bužima
na srpske snage u Banjanima 11. siječnja i pomicanjem
crte na istok od kote Ćorkovača, odnosno do granice s
862 ICTY: GŠ VRS, Borbeno naređenje str. pov. br. 02/2-105
od 12. 12. 1993.; R. DELIĆ, Armija RBiH, I, 342-343 i II, 27-
28; 1993. – prelomna godina rata, 61-63.
375
Domovinski rat 04-02-2020 Knjiga 1.indd 375
reinforcements from I Krajina Corps carried out the oper-
ation. The VRS captured the Lički bridge and the village of
Brod and pushed the Muslim forces back from the Brčko
Municipality. From that point on the entire territory of the
municipality was in Serb hands.
I Krajina Corps’ attempts to widen the corridor by
capturing Gradačac failed. The Serbs launched especial-
ly determined attacks from September 17 to September
19, 1993, but the 107th Brigade (at that time still in the
order of battle of the HVO) repulsed the attacks with the
help of reinforcements from the ARBIH II Corps.
In Tešanj and Doboj OG 7 South of the Army of the
Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina and 110th Brigade
of the HVO defeated a determined attack by the VRS at
the mouth of the Usora River, where the river flows into
the Bosna River, in March. When the conflict between the
Croats and Muslims started in Žepče on June 24, 1993,
the Army of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina
found itself in a difficult position in Tešanj and Maglaj.
The HVO gained control of Žepče and cut off the OG
South of II Corps of the Army of the Republic of Bosnia
and Herzegovina, and also the 110th Usora Brigade of the
HVO from III Corps of the Army of the Republic of Bosnia
and Herzegovina. This was the beginning of a blockade
that would last for almost nine months. The VRS I Kraji-
na Corps deployed in the positions in the defensive line
hitherto held by the 111th Brigade of the HVO and pass-
ing through its area of responsibility attacked the Army
of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina forces in Mag-
laj. The goal of the VRS was to capture Maglaj and the
Bosna Valley between Matuzić and Liješnica. Fighting in
this area and blockade of Maglaj lasted until the second
half of March, 1994, that is, until the 111th Brigade of the
HVO gave the go-ahead, following the cessation of hos-
tilities between the Croats and Muslims, to the Army of
the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina to lift the block-
ade of Maglaj. The VRS, without offering any resistance,
withdrew towards Teslić and to Ozren on March 19. With
R
that the blockade of Maglaj and OG 7 South was lifted.
The task of the VRS II Krajina Corps, in relation to
the Army of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina in
central Bosnia, was to hold the line on the right bank of
the Una River from Bosanski Novi as far as Veliki Ljutoč
mountain peak and prevent enemy incursions from the
direction of Bihać towards Bosanski Petrovac. Fighting
in 1993 started when the ARBIH V Corps successfully at-
tacked the Serb forces in Banjani on January 11, moving
the front line eastwards. The front line now stretched
4.2.2020. 18:35:11
 Davor Marijan • Rat za opstojnost Hrvata, 1991. - 1995.
Hrvatskom. Nakon tih borbi bilo je mirno do proljeća i
napada 39. korpusa SVK-a na muslimanske snage na po-
dručju Bosanske Bojne 27. travnja 1993. godine. Srpske
su snage probile crtu i napravile pomak prema Bosan-
skoj Bojni, a idućega je dana 5. korpus ARBiH u protu-
napadu vratio izgubljeno područje. Posljednji veći su-
kob muslimanskih i srpskih snaga zbio se 26. i 27. lipnja
1993. uslijed neuspješnog napada dijelova 2. krajiškog
korpusa VRS na položaje 5. korpusa ARBiH na Grmeču.863
H
MEĐUMUSLIMANSKI RAT
U ZAPADNOJ BOSNI 1993.
GODINE
Nakon proglašenja Autonomne pokrajine Zapadne
M
Bosne 27. rujna 1993., pristalice Fikreta Abdića preuze-
le su 30. rujna 521. brdsku i 527. laku brigadu iz Veli-
ke Kladuše i od njih formirale Narodnu obranu. Peti je
korpus 3. listopada počeo manji pothvat 502. brdske
brigade prema Velikoj Kladuši, čiji je cilj bio spriječiti
stvaranje i učvršćivanje AP-a Zapadne Bosne. Idućega
D
su ih dana Abdićeve pristalice zaustavile u manjem
okršaju kod Johovice. Tako je počeo međumuslimanski
rat u zapadnoj Bosni.
U manjim je sukobima 5. korpus 15. i 16. listopada
1993. uspio spriječiti širenje AP-a Zapadna Bosna na
područje Cazina. U prvoj polovini studenoga Narod-
C
na obrana AP-a Zapadna Bosna, uz topničku potporu
SVK-a, potisnula je snage 5. korpusa ARBiH iz Hadžina
Potoka i Šturlića. Peti je korpus u protunapadu od 13.
do 15. studenoga vratio dio izgubljenih položaja i zau-
zeo Todorovo. Do kraja studenoga vodile su se svakod-
nevne borbe na području Todorova i Šturlića. Pomaci
na crtama bili su mali, a gubici obiju sukobljenih strana
veliki. Borbe su se nastavile do kraja godine, a posebno
su bile jake u prvim danima prosinca na području Tršca
i Tržačkih Raštela, koje je Narodna obrana uspjela zau-
zeti na prepad, a nakon nekoliko dana borbi 5. korpus
vratio ih je pod svoj nadzor i napravio pomak crte do
Pećigrada. Gubici u borbama i dalje su bili veliki, a bili
su česti prelasci pripadnika 5. korpusa u sastav Narod-
ne obrane.864
863 ICTY: GŠ VRS, Direktiva op. br. 4, str. pov. br. 02/5-210 od
19. 11. 1992.; B. FELIĆ, Peti korpus, 135-143.
864 B. FELIĆ, Peti korpus, 150-159.
376
Domovinski rat 04-02-2020 Knjiga 1.indd 376
from Ćorkovača Hill as far as the Croatian border. After
these battles the area remained quiet until the spring
when XXXIX Corps of the SVK attacked the Muslim forces
in the Bosanska Bojna area on April 27, 1993. The Serbs
broke through the defensive line and advanced towards
Bosanska Bojna. The next day V Corps of the Army of the
Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina counterattacked
and recaptured the lost ground. The last larger-scale
engagement between Serb and Muslim forces occurred
on June 26 and 27 when elements of II Krajina Corps of
the VRS attacked the positions of the ARBIH V Corps on
Grmeč. The attack was not successful.
INTER-MUSLIM CONFLICT IN
WESTERN BOSNIA IN 1993
When the Autonomous Province of Western Bosnia
was established on September 27, 1993, followers of Fikret
Abdić took control of the 521st Mountain Brigade and the
527th Light Brigade from Velika Kladuša and formed the
National Defense. On October 3, V Corps, reinforced with
the 502nd Mountain Brigade, slowly began advancing to-
wards Velika Kladuša. The aim was to prevent the forma-
tion and consolidation of the AP Western Bosnia. During
the next few days Abdić’s followers stopped the 502nd Bri-
gade after a minor skirmish near Johovica. This was the
start of the inter-Muslim war in western Bosnia.
V Corps managed, during small scale fighting on
October 15 and 16, to prevent the expansion of the AP
Western Bosna into the Cazin area. In the first half of No-
vember the National Defense of Western Bosnia, with
artillery support provided by the SVK, pushed back the
D
forces of V Corps from Hadžin Potok and Šturlić. V Corps
counterattacked and from November 13 to 15 recap-
tured some of the lost positions and captured Todorovo.
Until the end of November fighting was continuous in
the area of Todorovo and Šturlić. There was little or no
changes in the front line but both sides suffered serious
R
casualties. Fighting continued until the end of the year
– heavy fighting developed during the first days of De-
cember in the Tržac and Tržačke Raštele area. The Nation-
al Defense managed to capture the villages in a sudden
attack but after a few days of fighting V Corps recaptured
the villages and advanced as far as Pećigrad. The number
of casualties on both sides continued to mount. It is in-
teresting to note that many soldiers from V Corps defect-
ed to the National Defense.
4.2.2020. 18:35:12
 1994. – 1995.:
OD ZAGREBAČKOGA V
SPORAZUMA DO KRAJA RATA
H
M
1994 – 1995
D
FROM THE ZAGREB
AGREEMENT TO THE END
C
OF THE WAR
D
R

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 Davor Marijan • Rat za opstojnost Hrvata, 1991. - 1995.
REPUBLIKA HRVATSKA 1994.
GODINE
Stanje na teritoriju RH tijekom 1994. obilježila su
dva sporazuma (Zagrebački i Gospodarski) i jedan su-
kob manjega intenziteta (za planinski vrh Trla na ličkom
bojištu). Hrvatska vojska prošla je velike organizacijske
promjene, ukinut je dio pričuvnih brigada, Domobran-
stvo je temeljito preustrojeno, a profesionalni sastav
oružanih snaga pojačali su 1. hrvatski gardijski zbor i pet
H
samostalnih gardijskih bojni, s tim da je ukinut i dio pro-
fesionalnih postrojba.
Zagrebački sporazum
M
Nakon nekoliko produljenja Božićnoga primirja
u Zagrebu je, uz posredovanje Rusije, između RH i po-
bunjenih Srba 29. ožujka 1994. potpisan sporazum o
prekidu neprijateljstava. Obje su strane prihvatile zamr-
zavanje taktičkoga stanja na crti dodira i unutar 10 kilo-
metara u oba smjera, pa se na tom području nisu smjele
D
pomicati postrojbe osim u smislu provedbe sporazuma
ili po unaprijed izdanom odobrenju UNPROFOR-a. Pot-
pisnici su se obvezali da će do 5. travnja na 20 kilome-
tara od crte povući topništvo i tenkove, odnosno na 10
kilometara minobacače i protuzrakoplovno topništvo.
Pješaštvo se do 8. travnja trebalo povući najmanje 1000
C
metara od crte dodira te tako onemogućiti razmjenu
vatre pješačkim oružjem. Za nadzor vatre zaduženi su
UNPROFOR i europski promatrači.865 Snage su izvučene
na vrijeme, a područje s kojega su izvučene, kao u ZP-u
Karlovac, nadziralo se motrenjem, ophodnjama i po-
stavljanjem zasjeda.866
Gospodarski sporazum
U Zagrebu je 2. prosinca 1994. potpisan Gospo-
darski sporazum između RH i predstavnika pobunjenih
Srba. Sporazumom je regulirano pitanje korištenja vode,
električne energije, autoceste i naftovoda. Po njegovim
odredbama, 21. prosinca za slobodan je promet otvore-
na autocesta Zagreb – Lipovac. U prva tri dana autocesta
je bila otvorena od 8 do 16 sati, a potom neprekidno. Na-
865 ICTY: Sporazum o prekidu vatre od 29. ožujka 1993.
866 MORH, GSHV: ZZP Karlovac, Zapovijed kl. 8/94-01/114,
ur. br. 1078-03/1-94-7 od 6. 4. 1994.
378
Domovinski rat 04-02-2020 Knjiga 1.indd 378
THE REPUBLIC OF CROATIA
IN 1994
The situation in the Republic of Croatia during 1994
was marked by the signing of two agreements (Zagreb
Agreement and Economic Agreement) and one low-lev-
el battle (for the mountain peak Trla in the Lika area). The
Croatian Army had undergone significant organization-
al changes, some reserve brigades had been disbanded.
The Home Guard Force had been completely reorga-
nized and the professional contingent had been aug-
mented by the 1st Guards Corps and five independent
guards battalions, even though some professional units
had been disbanded.
Zagreb Agreement
After a few extensions of the Christmas ceasefire
the Croatian government and the rebel Serbs signed
an agreement on the cessation of hostilities in Zagreb,
on March 29, 1994. It has to be pointed out that the
agreement was brokered by Russia. Both sides accepted
to maintain the current situation at the line of contact
and within 10 kilometers in both directions. No military
units were allowed to move within that area except for
the purpose of implementing the agreement or follow-
ing special permission of UNPROFOR. Both sides agreed
to withdraw artillery and tanks from the front line 20 or
more kilometers to the rear and mortars and flak guns 10
kilometers to the rear by April 5. The infantry units were
to be pulled back at least 1,000 meters from the point of
contact by April 8. UNPROFOR and European observers
D
were tasked with monitoring the cease-fire. The forces
were pulled back on time and the areas from where they
were pulled back, like the ZP Karlovac, were controlled
by monitoring, patrols and setting up ambushes.
Economic Agreement
R
On December 2, 1994, in Zagreb the Croatian gov-
ernment and representatives of the rebel Serbs signed
the Economic Agreement. The Agreement regulated the
usage of water, electricity, highway and the oil pipeline.
According to its provisions, the Zagreb – Lipovac road
was opened for traffic on December 21. During the first
three days the road was open from 0800 to 1600 hours
and later 24 hours a day. After the opening of the Zagreb
4.2.2020. 18:35:12
 The Croatian Nation’s Struggle for Survival, 1991-1995
kon otvaranja autoceste povećalo se krijumčarenje na
području zapadne Slavonije. Duž trase autoceste otvo-
reno je nekoliko ilegalnih ulaza, koji su se održali iako
ih je milicija pobunjenih Srba više puta zatvarala. Naj-
važniji predmet krijumčarenja bilo je gorivo, po koje su
pobunjeni Srbi dolazili s okupiranoga dijela Hrvatske.867
Stanje na pobunjenom području
Pobunjeni Srbi do kasne jeseni 1994. i prve bihaćke
H
krize nisu imali većih problema na crti ratišta. Osim bor-
bi za Trla, SVK nije imao većih sukoba s HV-om. No do
jeseni 1994. imao je povremene okršaje s postrojbama
5. korpusa ARBiH. U međumuslimanskom razračunava-
nju SVK je podržavao Fikreta Abdića.868 Sukobi manjega
obima bili su česti koliko i krijumčarenje. U jednom od
M
takvih sukoba snage 39. korpusa SVK-a zauzele su 1. ruj-
na dominantne položaje na širem području Bosanske
Bojne i popravile svoj taktički položaj. Položaj su držale
dvije čete, koje su ujutro 2. rujna napale snage 5. kor-
pusa ARBiH. Srpske su snage potpuno razbijene i odba-
čene na početne položaje uz gubitke od četiri poginula
D
i 12 nestalih vojnika, za koje se pretpostavljalo da su
zarobljeni i ubijeni. Zbog propusta u zapovijedanju smi-
jenjeno je nekoliko oficira, među kojima su bili koman-
dant 39. korpusa pukovnik Stanko Letić i komandant 24.
pješačke brigade.869
C
Nisu to bili jedini veliki gubici Srpske vojske Krajine.
Nekoliko mjeseci prije, 28. veljače 1994., Vazduhoplov-
stvo SVK-a bez odobrenja M. Martića i M. Čeleketića po-
držalo je s aerodroma Udbina snage VRS-a oko Novog
Travnika i Bugojna i pritom je zrakoplovstvo NATO-a po-
godilo šest zrakoplova tipa Jastreb, od kojih je pet sru-
D
šeno, a jedan se uspio vratiti u Udbinu. Poginula su tri
pilota, jedan iz sastava SVK-a i dva iz VRS-a.870
867 D. MARIJAN, Novska u Domovinskom ratu, 369.
868 HMDCDR: GŠSV RSK, Potsetnik str. pov. br. 3-36 od 17. 1.
1994.
869 HMDCDR: GŠSV RSK, Vanredni borbeni izveštaj str. pov.
br. 188-58 od 9. 9. 1994.
870 HMDCDR: GŠSV RSK, Redovni operativni izveštaj str.
pov. br. 3-124 od 6. 3. 1994.
379
Domovinski rat 04-02-2020 Knjiga 1.indd 379
– Lipovac road smuggling activities increased dramati-
cally in western Slavonia. A number of illegal exits from
the highway sprung up along the length of it. The Serb
militia did its best to stop to prevent the smugglers from
using the illegal exits but without much success. Most
important commodity that was being smuggled was
fuel. Rebel Serbs would venture to the government-con-
trolled territory to buy fuel and then tried to smuggle it
into the occupied territory.
The Situation in the Rebel Areas
The rebel Serbs did not experience any major prob-
lems on the front lines until late fall, 1994, and the first
Bihać crisis. Except for the battle for Trla, there was no
serious combat between the SVK and the Croatian Army.
However, by the fall of 1994 there were a number of bat-
tles and skirmishes between the Croatian Army and V
Corps of the ARBIH. During the inter-Muslim conflict the
SVK supported Fikret Abdić. Skirmishes were as frequent
as were the instances of smuggling. In one such skirmish
XXXIX Corps of the SVK captured the dominant positions
in the wider Bosanska Bojna area and improved its tac-
tical position on September 1. The positions were then
held by two detachments. On the morning of Septem-
ber 2, V Corps of the ARBIH attacked the positions. The
Serb troops defending the positions were badly mauled
and pushed back to their starting positions from the day
before. The Serbs lost four killed and 12 missing soldiers.
The missing soldiers were presumed captured and then
executed. A number of Serb officers were blamed for
the setback and consequently sacked, among them the
commander of XXXIX Corps Colonel Stanko Letić and
commander of the 24th Infantry Brigade.
The SVK suffered losses in other engagements as
well. A few months before the above described engage-
ment, on February 28, 1994, the SVK Air Force, without
permission from Martić and Čeleketić, launched a sortie
R
from Udbina airport in support of the VRS forces in Novi
Travnik and Bugojno. On that occasion NATO aircraft
shot down five Serb Jastreb jets and damaged one. The
damaged aircraft managed to land at Udbina airport.
Three Serb pilots were killed – one from the SVK and the
other two from the VRS.
4.2.2020. 18:35:12
 Davor Marijan • Rat za opstojnost Hrvata, 1991. - 1995.
RASPLET RATA
BOSNA I HERCEGOVINA 1994.
GODINE
Završetkom muslimansko-hrvatskoga rata HVO je
dobio nekoliko mjeseci mira 1994. godine. U tom je
razdoblju najvažniji zadatak bio razdvajanje snaga s
crta između HVO-a i ARBiH i demilitarizacija Mostara.
H
Nekadašnja se crta izvjesno vrijeme nadzirala susta-
vom motrilišta i nadzornih punktova. U proljeće je po-
novno počeo intenzivan sukob Srba i Bošnjaka. Glavne
su se borbe vodile oko Sarajeva, Konjica, Kupresa, Te-
slića i Bihaća. Armija Republike BiH postupno se pre-
strojila i krenula u manje zahtjevne borbe s VRS-om, a
M
u zapadnoj Bosni u radikalni obračun s autonomašima
Fikreta Abdića.871
Od proljeća do kasne jeseni, odnosno početka
studenoga 1994., ARBiH je u sukobima s VRS-om po-
stigla manje uspjehe, osvajanje poneke dominantne
kote i sela, čime se popravljao taktički položaj snaga,
D
no operativnoga uspjeha nije bilo. Takvih sukoba bilo
je na planinama Bjelašnici, Treskavici i Vlašiću, u širem
području Vareša, Nišićkoj visoravni, širem području Tu-
zle i Bugojna.872
Najveće uspjehe ARBiH je zabilježila u sukobu svo-
jega 5. korpusa sa snagama Fikreta Abdića u zapadnoj
C
Bosni. Abdića su podržavali Srbi s obje strane granice
jer je njegovo održanje rastakalo bošnjačke snage, a
VRS je planirao taj sukob iskoristiti da izbije na Unu i
ostvari svoj ratni cilj. U borbama od 16. do 21. kolovo-
za 1994. snage 5. korpusa ARBiH porazile su Abdićevu
vojsku i ušle u Veliku Kladušu. Oko 45.600 izbjeglica
povuklo se na privremeno okupirani teritorij Hrvatske:
u Turanj kod Karlovca, Batnogu kod Slunja i Staro Selo
kod Vrginmosta.873
Najvažniji događaj 1994. u Republici Srpskoj bio je
bojkot Srbije, odnosno Jugoslavije. Vlada Savezne Repu-
871 D. MARIJAN, Domovinski rat, 319.
872 ICTY: Uprava za operativno planiranje ŠVK OS RBiH,
Značajni uspjesi ARBiH za poslednja dva mjeseca, str.
pov. br. 02-1/1004-1 od 12. 8. 1994.; Rasim DELIĆ, Lice i
naličje rata: Na čelu Armije u ratu i miru, Vijeće kongresa
bošnjačkih intelektualaca, Sarajevo, 2005., 268, 271; M.
ŠADINLIJA, Prvi korpus ARBiH, 38-41.
873 M. SEKULIĆ, Knin je pao u Beogradu, 91; D. MARIJAN, Do-
movinski rat, 319.
380
Domovinski rat 04-02-2020 Knjiga 1.indd 380
THE WAR ENDS
BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA
IN 1994
When the Muslim-Croat war ended, the HVO was ef-
fectively granted a few months of peace in 1994. During
this period the most important task was to establish a
clearly defined separation line between the HVO and
the ARBIH and demilitarize the city of Mostar. The ex-
isting front line was monitored, for a period of time,
through a system of observation post and checkpoints.
In spring, the conflict between the Serbs and Bosniaks
flared up again with a vengeance. The main battles were
waged around Sarajevo, Konjic, Kupres, Teslić and Bihać.
The ARBIH gradually regrouped its forces and launched
small-scale operations against the VRS. The ARBIH’s main
push at that time was against Fikret Abdić’s supporters
in western Bosnia.
In the period from spring to the beginning of No-
vember, 1994, the ARBIH scored minor successes in bat-
tles against the VRS, capturing a few dominant positions
and villages. These successes improved the tactical po-
sition of the ARBIH but a success at the operational level
remained out of the ARBIH’s reach. The ARBIH got the
better of the VRS on Mount Bjelašnica, Treskavica and
Vlašić, the wider Vareš area. The Nikšić plateau, wider Tu-
zla and Bugojno areas.
The ARBIH scored its biggest successes in western
Bosnia, where it pitted its V Corps against Fikret Abdić’s
forces. The Serbs on both sides of the border (Croatia,
BiH) supported Fikret Abdić because his bid for auton-
D
omy tied down Bosniaks’ forces. The VRS planned to
take advantage of this inter-Muslim conflict and reach
the Una River. In the fighting that lasted from August
16 to August 21, the ARBIH V Corps soundly defeated
Abdić’s army and entered Velika Kladuša. About 45,600
people fled to the rebel-controlled area in Croatia; to
R
Turanj near Karlovac, Batnoga near Slunj and Staro Selo
near Vrginmost.
The most important event in 1994, for Bosnian
Serbs, was Serbia/Yugoslavia’s decision to impose eco-
nomic sanctions on the Republika Srpska. The govern-
ment of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia severed all
economic and political ties with the Republika Srpska
because the assembly of the Republika Srpska had re-
fused to sign the Contact Group’s peace plan. The move
4.2.2020. 18:35:12
 The Croatian Nation’s Struggle for Survival, 1991-1995
blike Jugoslavije prekinula je 4. kolovoza sve gospodar-
ske i političke veze s Republikom Srpskom zbog odbijanja
Skupštine RS-a da potpiše mirovni plan Kontaktne skupi-
ne.874 Taj se potez nepovoljno odrazio i na položaj VRS-a,
čiji je vrh bio sklon Slobodanu Miloševiću.875
Zbog kontinuiranih napada ARBiH, VRS je najveći
dio 1994. proveo u protunapadima i nastojanju da vra-
ti izgubljene položaje. Iznimka je operacija Zvezda-94
protiv bošnjačkih snaga u Goraždu. Operacija je počela
krajem ožujka i do 4. travnja VRS je obranu Goražda sveo
H
na uže gradsko područje na desnoj obali Drine i na obje
strane rijeke nizvodno od grada. Goražde se održalo za-
hvaljujući zračnim udarima NATO-a po srpskim položaji-
ma. Nakon njih je u organizaciji UNPROFOR-a dogovore-
na demilitarizacija Goražda.876
M
PRVA BIHAĆKA KRIZA
Nakon dužega sređivanja i odmora, 5. korpus ARBiH
realizirao je od 24. listopada do 10. studenoga 1994. na-
padnu operaciju Grmeč-94. Cilj operacije bio je odbaciti
srpske snage od Bihaća i zauzeti šire područje na desnoj
D
obali Une. Operacija je poduzeta nakon izvlačenja dijela
snaga VRS-a s bojišta i njihova angažmana prema središ-
njoj Bosni i dolini Vrbasa. Peti je korpus postigao velik
uspjeh, osvojio vojarnu Grabež i goneći razbijene snage
2. krajiškog korpusa VRS-a na pravcima Ripač – Dubov-
C
sko – Vrtoče i Dubovsko – Orašac – Kulen Vakuf, do 28.
listopada izbio do Dubovskog, Lipe i Kulen Vakufa. Na
bosanskokrupskom pravcu 5. korpus je u noći 30./31.
listopada prešao Unu sjeverno od grada i uspostavio
mostobran.877
Napad i izlazak 5. korpusa iz zaštićene zone šoki-
D
rao je vodstva RS-a i RSK. U dijelu RS-a koji odgovara
području djelovanja 2. krajiškog korpusa, 29. listopada
proglašeno je ratno stanje i potpuno mobilizirano vojno
sposobno stanovništvo. Vojska Republike Srpske uspje-
la je pojačati obranu dovođenjem manjih snaga s nekih
874 D. RADIŠIĆ, Hronologija događaja, 455-456.
875 HMDCDR: Komanda 2. KK, Informacija br. 11/94 pov. br.
13-385 od 12. 10. 1994.
876 Balkan Battlegrounds: A Military History of the Yugoslav
Conflict, 1990–1995, Central Intelligence Agency, Offi-
ce of Russian and European Analysis, Washington, DC
20505, May 2002., II, 459-461; M. ŠADINLIJA, Prvi korpus
ARBiH, 38-39.
877 B. FELIĆ, Peti korpus, 309-346, 429.
381
Domovinski rat 04-02-2020 Knjiga 1.indd 381
had detrimental effects on the VRS as well, because its
leadership supported Slobodan Milošević.
The ARBIH held the initiative throughout the better
part of 1994. During that period the VRS launched many
counterattacks, desperately trying to recapture the lost
ground and positions. One exception to this pattern of
events was Operation Zvezda-94 (Star) launched against
the Bosniak forces in Goražde. The operation began at
the end of March. By April 4 the VRS had pushed the de-
fenders into a small pocket of resistance encompassing
the city center on the right bank of the Drina and the
area on both sides of the river immediately downriver
from the city. Goražde did not fall to the Serbs thanks
to NATO air strikes on Serb positions. Following the air
strikes UNPROFOR brokered an agreement according to
which Goražde would be demilitarized.
THE FIRST BIHAĆ CRISIS
After a longer period of rest and regrouping, V
Corps launched Operation Grmeč-94 on October 24,
1994. The operation was offensive in character and
lasted until November 10, 1994. The aim was to push
back the Serb forces from Bihać and capture a large
swath of territory on the right bank of the Una River.
The operation commenced after elements of the VRS
forces from the area had been sent to central Bosnia
and the Vrbas Valley. V Corps’s offensive was successful.
The Bosniaks captured the Grabež barracks and, pursu-
ing the defeated the VRS II Krajina Corps in the direc-
tion of Ripač – Dubovsko – Vrtoče and in the direction
of Dubovsko – Orašac – Kulen Vakuf, reached Dubovs-
ko, Lipe and Kulen Vakuf by October 28. Advancing in
the direction of Bosanska Krupa, V Corps crossed the
Una River during the night of October 30-31 and estab-
lished a bridgehead.
V Corps’s attack shocked the leaders of the RS and
the RSK. In that part of the RS that corresponded to the
R
area of responsibility of II Krajina Corps a state of emer-
gency was declared and all capable military-age men
were mobilized. The VRS managed to strengthen its de-
fensive positions by bringing smaller forces from other
fronts and started forming a combined brigade-strength
unit consisting of men from all parts of the RS for the
purpose of sending it into counterattack on the Bihać
front. Until the unit was ready, smaller forces belonging
to the SVK, the MUP and the RSK were deployed to stem
the Bosniak attacks.
4.2.2020. 18:35:12
 Davor Marijan • Rat za opstojnost Hrvata, 1991. - 1995.
bojišta i pripremala je kombiniranu postrojbu veličine
brigade sa svih prostora RS-a radi protuudara na bihać-
kom bojištu. Do njezina dovođenja, u zaustavljanju boš-
njačkih napada od 28. listopada angažirane su manje
snage SVK-a i MUP-a RSK.878
Za zajedničku operaciju SVK-a i VRS-a protiv 5. kor-
pusa ARBiH, za djelovanje na pravcu Bosanski Petrovac
– Vrtoče, SVK je formirao dvije taktičke skupine. Ope-
racija je počela 1. studenoga i, za razliku od prethod-
nih borbi, cilj je bio uništiti 5. korpus i zauzeti Bihać.
H
Do 8. studenoga srpske su snage očistile dolinu Une
od Kulen Vakufa do Lohova i blokirale Ripač. Bošnjač-
ke su snage bile u teškom položaju, pa je 12. studeno-
ga predsjednik RBiH Alija Izetbegović uputio zahtjev
predsjedniku RH Franji Tuđmanu da Hrvatska poduz-
me mjere s ciljem sprečavanja napada na Bihać s hrvat-
M
skoga teritorija.879
Do 17. studenoga srpske su snage vratile gotovo
cijeli teritorij koji su bošnjačke snage zauzele u opera-
ciji Grmeč-94. Uz pomoć SVK-a angažirane su snage Fi-
kreta Abdića prema Velikoj Kladuši, a snage 2. krajiškog
korpusa izbile su na dva kilometra od Bihaća. Angažira-
D
ne snage SVK-a prestrojene su i od 16. studenoga bile
su pod zapovjedništvom Operativne grupe Pauk, koja
je do sloma Srpske vojske Krajine vodila i koordinirala
djelovanje SVK-a s okupiranog teritorija Hrvatske pre-
ma bihaćkom džepu. Drugi krajiški korpus prešao je 20.
studenoga Unu kod Egeljića mosta, zauzeo Kobiljnjak i
C
napravio mostobran na koji su ubačena dva bataljuna.
U idućim danima srpske su snage postupno potiskivale
ARBiH i sužavale crtu. Petom je korpusu 27. studenoga
upućen ultimatum da se preda do 20 sati istoga dana.
Armija Republike BiH ponudila je prekid vatre na ne-
određeno vrijeme, a VRS je inzistirao na sporazumu o
potpunom prekidu rata.880
Kao što su Srbi predviđali, na njihov je protunapad
reagirala i međunarodna zajednica. UNPROFOR je 9.
studenoga upozorio krajinske Srbe da će uporabiti sva
raspoloživa sredstva ako ne prestanu granatirati zašti-
ćeno područje Bihaća. Napadi nisu prestali, pa su 21.
studenoga zrakoplovi NATO-a napali zračnu luku SVK-a
878 D. MARIJAN, Domovinski rat, 321.
879 Hrvoje ŠARINIĆ, Svi moji tajni pregovori sa Slobodanom
Miloševićem 1993.–1995. (1998.), Globus International,
Zagreb, 1999., 170-171; D. MARIJAN, Domovinski rat,
321-322.
880 D. MARIJAN, Domovinski rat, 322.
382
Domovinski rat 04-02-2020 Knjiga 1.indd 382
The SVK formed two tactical groups for a joint SVK-
VRS attack against the ARBIH V Corps. The groups would
advance along the Bosanski Petrovac – Vrtoče line. The
operation started on November 1. The aim was ambi-
tious – destroy V Corps and capture Bihać. By November
8 the Serb forces had mopped up the Una Valley from
Kulen Vakuf as far as Lohovo and put Ripač under block-
ade. The Bosniak forces were in a desperate situation. On
November 12, the president of the Republic of Bosnia
and Herzegovina, Alija Izetbegović, sent a request to
the president of the Republic of Croatia, Franjo Tuđman,
asking that Croatia take active measures to prevent the
Serbs from attacking Bihać from Croatian territory.
By November 17, the Serb forces had recaptured
almost all territory the Bosniaks had captured during
Operation Grmeč-94. With the help of the SVK, Fikret Ab-
dić’s forces were deployed towards Velika Kladuša, and
II Krajina Corps reached an area that was only two kilo-
meters away from Bihać. The SVK forces then regrouped
and, on November 16, were placed under the command
of OG Pauk. OG Pauk, until the collapse of the SVK, com-
manded and coordinated the SVK forces’ actions from
the occupied territory of the Republic of Croatia towards
the Bihać pocket. On November 20, II Krajina Corps cross
the Una River at the Egeljića bridge, captured Kobiljnjak
and established a bridgehead, protected by two battal-
ions. During the next few days the Serb forces gradually
pushed back the ARBIH, shortening the front line. The
Serbs issued an ultimatum to V Corps on November 27,
requesting its surrender by 2000 hours on the same day.
The ARBIH offered a cease-fire of undetermined dura-
tion. The VRS insisted on a complete cessation of hostil-
ities in that area.
D
The international community reacted to the Serb
counterattack, just as the Serbs had predicted. UNPRO-
FOR, on November 9, warned the Krajina Serbs that
available means would be used against them if they did
not stop shelling the protected Bihać area. The Serbs
R
continued shelling Bihać and NATO aircraft attacked
the SVK airfield in Udbina on November 21. Five per-
sons were wounded, one of which died of the received
wounds shortly thereafter. The NATO aircraft destroyed
and damaged a lot of equipment and machinery at
the airfield. Despite the airstrike, the Serbs continued
attacking Bihać. NATO responded on November 23 by
launching another airstrike, this time against VRS posi-
tions at Bušević, Urije and to the east of Čardak. Because
of these attacks, and constant warnings issued by NATO,
4.2.2020. 18:35:12
 The Croatian Nation’s Struggle for Survival, 1991-1995
u Udbini. Ranjeno je pet osoba, jedna je ubrzo premi-
nula, a zračnoj luci i pokretnoj opremi nanesena je veća
materijalna šteta. Unatoč upozorenju, Srbi su nastavili
napad, pa su zrakoplovi NATO-a 23. studenoga napali
snage VRS-a kod Buševića, Urija i istočno od Čardaka.
Zbog tih napada i stalnih upozorenja, snagama Fikreta
Abdića dana je uloga glavnih snaga u napadu, a zada-
tak SVK-a bio je organizirati, opremiti i usmjeravati nji-
hovo djelovanje.881
U smanjenom opsegu pritisak srpskih snaga nasta-
H
vio se i u prosincu. Snage Fikreta Abdića zauzele su 17.
prosinca uz potporu SVK-a Veliku Kladušu i potisnule
ARBiH prema Cazinu i Bužimu. Već se tada srpski pri-
tisak značajno smanjio jer je u prvim danima prosinca
dio snaga izvučen i poslan na livanjski dio bojišta zbog
napada hrvatskih snaga. Srpska kampanja oko Bihaća
M
privremeno je završila 25. prosinca. Snage su počele
prestrojavanje i utvrđivanje crte, a još jedan dio snaga
izvučen je i poslan na grahovsko-glamočki dio bojišta,
zbog prijetnje napada hrvatskih snaga s područja Liv-
na. To je značilo da je kampanja osvajanja Bihaća odgo-
đena za povoljniji trenutak.882
D
OPERACIJA CINCAR
Osim kod Bihaća, ARBiH je napala srpske snage i
na pravcu Bugojno – Kupres. Snage 7. korpusa ARBiH iz
C
Bugojna 22. listopada 1994. razbile su srpsku obranu i
ugrozile grad Kupres. Radi zaustavljanja napada poče-
lo je prebacivanje manjih snaga 1. i 2. krajiškog korpu-
sa sa sjeverozapadnoga dijela ratišta radi protunapada
na pravcu Kupres – Bugojno. U borbe se 1. studenoga
uključio i HVO. U sastavu HVO-a na pravcu Alagina kosa
D
– Zanaglina – Rilić bila je 1. gardijska brigada Ante Bruno
Bušić; na pravcu Razvršće – Ravno bojna Ludvig Pavlović
i satnija 42. domobranske bojne; na pravcu Idovac – Bu-
ćevača satnija 3. gardijske brigade i 55. domobranska
pukovnija. Te su snage 1. studenoga zauzele Ravanjska
vrata i sela Mušiće, Ravno, Bućevaču i Gornje Vukovsko,
a dan kasnije sela Donje Vukovsko i Zanaglinu, kada su
ojačane skupinom 1. hrvatskog gardijskog zdruga. Na
lijevom operacijskom pravcu Karagin vrh – Malovanske
poljane – Ristića vrh – Jaram – Tikva – Kurljaj – Osječeni-
ca bila je 2. gardijska brigada HVO-a, ojačana s dva voda
881 Isto, 322.
882 D. MARIJAN, Domovinski rat, 322.
383
Domovinski rat 04-02-2020 Knjiga 1.indd 383
Fikret Abdić’s forces were used as the main force in the
attack. The SVK’s task was to organize, equip and com-
mand them.
The Serbs continued attacking in December, albeit
on a somewhat reduced scale. Fikret Abdić’s forces cap-
tured, on December 17, with the SVK’s support, Velika
Kladuša, and threw back the ARBIH towards Cazin and
Bužim. By that time the Serb attack had lost much of
its initial momentum because, during the first days of
December, some Serb units had been sent to the Livno
area to defend the area against a Croatian attack. The
Serb Bihać campaign came to a temporary halt on De-
cember 25. The Serbs started regrouping their forces
and fortifying the line. More troops were sent to the
Grahovo-Glamoč area, because Croatian forces stood
poised to attack the area from the direction of Livno.
The plan to capture Bihać was postponed until a more
opportune moment.
OPERATION CINCAR
The ARBIH did not attack only the Serbs at Bihać. The
Bosniaks also attacked the Serb forces in the direction
of Bugojno-Kupres. The ARBIH VII Corps attacked from
Bugojno on October 22, 1994. The Bosniaks overran the
Serb defensive positions and threatened the city of Ku-
pres. In an effort to stop the Bosniaks’ advance, the Serbs
moved smaller forces of I and II Krajina Corps from the
northwest part of the theater to the threatened area for
the purpose of mounting a counterattack in the direc-
tion of Kupres-Bugojno. On November 1, the HVO got
involved in the fighting. The HVO forces included: the 1st
Guards Brigade Ante Bruno Bušić in the direction of Ala-
gina Kosa – Zanaglina – Rilić; the Ludvig Pavlović Battal-
ion and one company of the 42nd Home Guard Battalion
in the direction of Razvršće – Ravno; one company of the
3rd Guards Brigade and the 55th Home Guard Regiment in
the direction of Idovac – Bućevača. On November 1 these
R
forces captured the Ravno pass and the following villages:
Mušiće, Ravno, Bućevača and Gornje Vukovsko. On the day
following the same forces captured the villages of Donje
Vukovsko and Zanaglina when they were reinforced with
a group belonging to the 1st Croatian Guards Corps. The
2nd HVO Guards Brigade, reinforced with two MP platoons
belonging to the MUP HR HB, was deployed along the left
operational direction: Karagin Vrh – Malovanske Poljane –
Ristića Vrh – Jaram – Tikva – Kurljaj - Osječenica. After two
days of fighting the Croats captured the following domi-
4.2.2020. 18:35:12
 Davor Marijan • Rat za opstojnost Hrvata, 1991. - 1995.
Specijalne policije MUP-a HR HB. Nakon dvodnevnih
borbi zauzeli su dominantne objekte Osječenica - Risti-
ća Vrh - Javor - Tikva i Kurljaj, čime je omogućen brz pro-
dor glavnih snaga na smjeru napada Šuica – Malovan
– Kupres, kao i osiguranje lijevog boka od protunapada
iz smjera Glamoča. Na smjeru Šuica – Gornji Malovan
– Donji Malovan – Kupres napadao je 22. diverzant-
ski odred. Njega je 2. studenoga zamijenila Specijalna
policija MUP-a HR HB, koja je u žestokim dvodnevnim
borbama, zahvaljujući pomacima snaga na lijevom i de-
H
snom boku, razbila srpske snage i u ranim popodnev-
nim satima 3. studenoga oslobodila Kupres. U Uskoplju
– Gornjem Vakufu između HVO-a i ARBiH dogovorena
je crta razgraničenja na Kupreškoj visoravni za vrijeme
borbi i od tada se može govoriti o međusobnoj koordi-
naciji na tom dijelu ratišta.883
M
Oslobađanje Kupresa postalo je neplanirani zajed-
nički uspjeh ARBiH i HVO-a. Bio je to prvi grad koji je
preotet srpskim snagama od zauzimanja Trnova u ljeto
1992. godine. Premda su srpske snage uspjele zausta-
viti napredovanje hrvatskih i bošnjačkih snaga prema
Blagaju i Šipovu, operacija je značajna zbog ponovnog
D
angažiranja HVO-a u ratu s VRS-om.
Do kraja studenoga srpske su snage izvele nekoli-
ko manjih protunapada. U jednom od napada uspjele
su od 42. domobranske bojne preoteti dominantnu
kotu Opaljenica, koju su idućega dana vratile snage
Specijalne policije MUP-a HR HB. U borbama za Kupres
C
HVO je imao devet poginulih i 33 ranjena pripadnika.
U cjelokupnoj operaciji, uključujući obranu 80. dp-a
na livanjskom dijelu bojišta, sudjelovala su 6202 pri-
padnika HVO-a iz 15 postrojbi i nepotpuna satnija 1.
hrvatskog gardijskog zdruga, odnosno bojna Zrinski s
oko 50 ljudi.884
OPERACIJA ZIMA-94
S oslobađanjem Kupresa počeo je operacijski ci-
klus hrvatskih snaga u jugozapadnoj Bosni koji je go-
dinu dana kasnije doveo do okončanja rata. Zbog srp-
skih napada na Bihać hrvatsko vrhovništvo je odlučilo
883 Radni zemljovid napadne operacije Cincar – faze napa-
da; D. MARIJAN, Domovinski rat, 322-323; Podaci preuzeti
sa savjetovanja ratnih zapovjednika sudionika operacije
Cincar održanog na dan oslobađanja Kupresa 2014. godi-
ne.
884 D. MARIJAN, Domovinski rat, 324.
384
Domovinski rat 04-02-2020 Knjiga 1.indd 384
nant positions: Osječenica – Ristića Vrh – Javor – Tikva and
Kurljaj. These successes enabled the main force to mount
a swift attack in the direction of Šuica – Malovan – Kupres.
Also, the left flank could now be secured against a coun-
terattack from the direction of Glamoč. The 22nd Comman-
do Detachment attacked in the direction of Šujica – Gornji
Malovan – Donji Malovan – Kupres. The commandos
were relieved by the Special Police of the MUP HR HB. The
Special Police, advancing on both flanks simultaneously,
defeated the Serb forces and in the early afternoon on
November 3 liberated Kupres. In Uskuplje – Gornji Vakuf
the HVO and ARBIH agreed to establish a separation line
on the Kupres plateau for the duration of the fighting. It
could be argued that the event marked the beginning of
the HVO-ARBIH coordination in this area.19
The liberation of Kupres was an unplanned joint
HVO-ARBIH success. Kupres was the first town recap-
tured from the Serb forces since Trnovo in the summer of
1992. Even though the Serb forces managed to stop the
advance of the Croat and Bosniak forces towards Blagaj
and Šipovo, the operation was important because of the
HVO’s renewed deployment against the VRS.
By the end of November Serb forces launched a few
small-scale counterattacks. In one counterattack the
Serbs attacked the dominant position on Opaljenica
Hill, defended by the 42nd Home Guard Battalion. The
counterattack was successful, but on the following day
the Special Police forces of the MUP HR HB managed
to recapture the position. In the fighting for Kupres the
HVO lost nine soldiers killed and 33 wounded. In the
operation as a whole, including the defensive actions of
the 80th Home Guard Regiment in the Livno area, 6,202
Home Guard soldiers from fifteen units and an incom-
D
plete company of the 1st Croatian Guards Corps, that is,
the Zrinski Battalion with about 50 men, took part.
OPERATION ZIMA-94
(WINTER-94)
R
A new operational cycle of the Croatian forces in
southwest Bosnia commenced with the liberation of Ku-
pres. This new cycle, one year later, would bring about
19 Military map used in Operation Cincar – phases of the
attack; Marijan, D. Domovinski rat. Pp. 322-323: Data
obtained from the minutes of the meeting of the war
commanders who participated in Operation Cincar, held
on the date of the liberation of Kupres in 2014.
4.2.2020. 18:35:12
 The Croatian Nation’s Struggle for Survival, 1991-1995
pomoći da se grad održi jer je onemogućavao pot-
puno povezivanje RSK i RS-a i vezao značajan dio nji-
hovih snaga. Nedoumica je bila oko smjera pružanja
pomoći, pritiskom na Okučane i Knin radi razvlačenja
snaga ili prodorom preko Slunja radi pružanja pomoći
5. korpusu ARBiH. Nakon što su snage HVO-a, u koor-
dinaciji s ARBiH, 3. studenoga 1994. zauzele Kupres i
veći dio Kupreške visoravni, otvorena je mogućnost
za napad snaga Zbornog područja Split HV-a i snaga
HVO-a na srpske snage na livanjskom i glamočkom di-
H
jelu bojišta radi rasterećenja ARBiH na bihaćkom bo-
jištu te poboljšanja operativnoga položaja u zoni od
Kupreških vrata do granice s RH na Dinari.885
Operacija je planirana na četiri operativna prav-
ca: Kujača (Zima-1), Koričina – Golija (Zima-2), Čelebić
(Zima-3) i Dinara (Zima-4). Na prva tri pravca, od Čele-
M
bića na Livanjskom polju do Kupreških vrata, operaci-
ju je vodio Glavni stožer HVO-a, a na četvrtom pravcu
Zapovjedništvo ZP-a Split. Na livanjskom i glamočkom
dijelu bojišta angažirani su dijelovi 5. gardijske briga-
de HV-a, 2. bojna Vojne policije HVO-a, bojna Zrinski,
bojna 2. gardijske brigade HVO-a, bojna Ludvig Pavlo-
D
vić, SP MUP-a HR HB, 22. DO, 80. dp HVO-a, a na ku-
preškom dijelu 1. gardijska brigada HVO-a, manji di-
jelovi 3. gardijske brigade HVO-a, 55. i 79. dp HVO-a
i miješana bojna domobranskih postrojbi ZP-a Vitez.
Zborno područje Split za napad je angažiralo dijelove
126. dp-a i 114. brigade te 4. gardijsku brigadu HV-a.886
C
Operacija je počela 29. studenoga 1994. na plani-
ni Dinari i nastavila se na Livanjskom polju na smje-
ru Livno – Bosansko Grahovo. Operacija je trajala 27
dana, na teškom terenu, u izrazito teškim vremenskim
uvjetima, na snijegu i niskim temperaturama. Do 25.
D
prosinca hrvatske snage su zauzele područje dubine
20, a širine 10 km. Operacija Zima na smjeru Livno –
Bosansko Grahovo sasvim je ispunila svoj cilj: rastereti-
la je Bihać i približila HV Kninu s pravca koji u RSK nisu
očekivali. Na Kupreškoj visoravni HVO nije napravio
pomak jer desni susjed, 7. korpus ARBiH nije zauzeo
dvije dominantne točke što je bio preduvjet za pokre-
tanje snaga HVO-a. U operaciji je poginulo 29, nestao
je jedan, a ranjeno je 58 pripadnika hrvatskih snaga.887
885 Isto, 324-325.
886 Isto, 325.
887 Isto, 325-328; A. GOTOVINA, Napadajni bojevi i operaci-
je, 31-32, 187.
385
Domovinski rat 04-02-2020 Knjiga 1.indd 385
the end of the war. When the Serbs started the offen-
sive against Bihać, the Croatian leadership decided to
help the defenders of Bihać. The reasoning behind the
decision was simple; with Bihać in Bosniak hands, the
Serbs could not viably link the RSK to the RS. Also, a sig-
nificant portion of the Serb forces was tied down on the
Bihać front. There were two viable scenarios the Croa-
tian strategists could choose from. One was attacking in
the direction of Okučani and Knin with the objective of
stretching the Serb forces and the other was to advance
via Slunj for the purpose of providing direct support to
the ARBIH V Corps. After the HVO forces, in a coordinat-
ed effort with the ARBIH, had liberated Kupres and most
of the Kupres plateau on November 3, 1994, another
possibility presented itself; forces belonging to Military
District Split and the HVO could attack the Serb forces
in the Livno and Glamoč areas for the purpose of im-
proving the ARBIH’s position on the Bihać front and also
improving the operational position in the area from the
Kupress pass as far as the Croatian-Bosnian border on
the Dinara Mountain.
The operation was to include four axes of advance:
Kujača (Zima-I), Korečina – Golija (Zima-II), Čelebić (Zi-
ma-III) and Dinara (Zima-IV). The HVO Main Staff com-
manded the troops deployed along the first three axes
of advance from Čelebić on the Livno field as far as the
Kupres pass. The troops deployed along the fourth axis
of advance were under the command of the HQ of Mil-
itary District Split. Elements of the 5th Guards Brigade
of the Croatian Army, 2nd Battalion of the Military Po-
lice of the HVO, Zrinski Battalion, one battalion of the
2nd Guards Brigade of the HVO, Ludvig Pavlović Battal-
ion, Special Police of the MUP HR HB, 80th Home Guard
Regiment of the HVO were deployed in the Livno and
Glamoč areas. The 1st Guards Brigade of the HVO, ele-
ments of the 3rd Guards Brigade of the HVO, 55th and
79th Home Guard Regiment of the HVO and mixed
battalion of Home Guard units of Military District Vi-
R
tez were deployed in the Kupres area. Military District
Split employed elements of the 126th Home Guard Reg-
iment and 114th Brigade and 4th Guards Brigade of the
Croatian Army.
The operation started on November 29, 1994, on
Dinara and continued on the Livno field in the direc-
tion of Livno – Bosansko Grahovo. The operation lasted
for 27 days and it was conducted on rugged terrain, in
adverse weather conditions, in snow and low tempera-
tures. By December 25 the Croatian forces captured a
4.2.2020. 18:35:12
 Davor Marijan • Rat za opstojnost Hrvata, 1991. - 1995.
ČETVEROMJESEČNO PRIMIRJE
Na samom kraju 1994., uz posredovanje bivšega
predsjednika SAD-a Jimmyja Cartera, Srbi i Muslimani
potpisali su četveromjesečno primirje. U ime Hrvata,
2. siječnja 1995. primirje je potpisao Krešimir Zubak,
predsjednik Predsjedničkoga vijeća HR HB. U nekim se
komentarima to primirje najavljivalo kao kraj rata, no
pokazalo se samo kao duži predah nakon kojega je rat
nastavljen punim intenzitetom. I predstavnici međuna-
H
rodne zajednice držali su da je primirje uvod u mirovni
sporazum i završetak rata.888
Sve strane u sukobu optuživale su druge da povre-
meno krše primirje, a iz ARBiH su tvrdili da na području
bihaćkoga džepa primirje uopće nije zaživjelo, za što su
M
optuživali snage VRS-a. Unatoč bošnjačkim tvrdnjama,
čini se da je 5. korpus ARBiH predvodio u kršenju primir-
ja ubacivanjem diverzantskih skupina u zaleđe srpskih
snaga, posebice u siječnju 1995. godine. ARBiH je kod
Travnika od 19. do 25. travnja zauzela plato Vlašića. Hr-
vatske snage u jugozapadnoj Bosni u tom su razdoblju
uglavnom mirovale. Bile su u djelatnoj obrani uz plansku
D
zamjenu snaga iz sastava ZP-a Split i HVO-a. Hrvatsko vi-
jeće obrane bilo je od 24. siječnja 1995. u obrambenoj
operaciji Vrilo-95. Cilj operacije bio je očuvati dostignutu
crtu i spriječiti protuudar srpskih snaga.889
U tom je razdoblju Hrvatska zabilježila značajan po-
C
litički uspjeh. Zaprijetila je 12. siječnja 1995. najavom da
31. ožujka otkazuje gostoprimstvo UNPROFOR-u jer nije
ispunio hrvatska očekivanja. Diplomacija je našla kom-
promis i Vijeće sigurnosti UN-a prihvatilo je 31. ožujka
1995. hrvatske zahtjeve i Rezolucijom 981 potvrdilo te-
ritorijalni integritet Republike Hrvatske. Priznalo se da
glavne postavke Vanceova plana nisu provedene. Uloga
mirovnih snaga je redefinirana, naziv UNPROFOR promi-
jenjen je u UNCRO (United Nations Confidence Restora-
tion Operation in Croatia) – Operacija UN-a za povratak
povjerenja u Hrvatskoj, s mandatom do 30. studenoga
1995. godine. U novom mandatu snage UN-a bile su
dužne uspostaviti učinkovit nadzor na međunarodno
priznatim granicama Hrvatske i nadzirati dolazi li u zašti-
ćena područja vojna oprema i ljudstvo s područja Save-
zne Republike Jugoslavije ili Republike Srpske.890
888 D. MARIJAN, Domovinski rat, 328.
889 R. DELIĆ, Armija RBiH, II, 89-93; D. MARIJAN, Domovinski
rat, 328-329.
890 D. MARIJAN, Oluja, 50-51.
386
Domovinski rat 04-02-2020 Knjiga 1.indd 386
portion of territory 20 kilometers deep and 10 kilome-
ters wide. The forces operating in the direction of Livno
– Bosansko Grahovo achieved their objective; Bihać was
no longer in immediate danger from Serb forces and the
Croatian Army had approached closer to Knin from an
unexpected direction. On the Kupres plateau the HVO
failed to make headway because VII Corps of the ARBIH,
operating on the HVO’s left side, failed to capture two
dominant positions. Without these positions in Bosniak
hands the HVO could not move into action. During the
operation 29 Croatian soldiers were killed, one was list-
ed as missing in action and 58 were wounded.
FOUR-MONTH TRUCE
At the very end of 1994, a truce, brokered by the for-
mer US president Jimmy Carter, was signed between the
Serbs and Bosniaks. On January 2, 1995, Krešimir Zubak,
president of the Presidential Council of the HR HB, rep-
resenting the Croats, also signed the truce agreement.
Some commentators at the time perceived the agree-
ment as the end of the war. However, later events showed
that the agreement provided a relatively lengthy respite
for the belligerent sides. When the truce expired, fighting
resumed with undiminished intensity. Even the represen-
tatives of the international community were of the opin-
ion that the truce was the first step towards reaching a
peace agreement and ending the war.
All sides accused the others of violating the truce.
The ARBIH claimed that the VRS forces in the Bihać pocket
area never honored the truce at all. However, the existing
evidence suggests that it was the ARBIH V Corps that was
the primary violator of the truce. On a number of occa-
D
sions ARBIH commando groups infiltrated into the Serb
rear for the purpose of creating havoc there, especially in
January, 1995. The ARBIH captured, from April 19 to April
25 the Vlašić plateau near Travnik. The Croatian forces
in southwest Bosnia were, for the most part, idle during
R
that period. They were on the defensive, waiting to be re-
lieved by forces from Military District Split and the HVO.
The HVO, on January 24, began conducting Operation
Vrilo-95. The operation was a defensive undertaking the
aim of which was to hold the line and prevent the Serbs
from launching a counterattack.
During that period Croatia pulled off an important
political coup. On January 12, 1995, Croatia announced
that on March 31 it would cease to extend welcome to
UNPROFOR because the UN troops had failed in their mis-
4.2.2020. 18:35:12
 The Croatian Nation’s Struggle for Survival, 1991-1995
H
M
D
HV, Dinara, travanj 1995. (fotografija: Arhiv Udruge 7. gbr).
HV, April 1995.
C
OPERACIJA SKOK-1
Tijekom četveromjesečnoga primirja napravljeno
je nekoliko manjih taktičkih pomaka na crti bojišta ZP-a
D
Split. Približavanjem proljeća rasla je mogućnost da Srbi
ugroze hrvatske položaje na planinama Dinari i Stareti-
ni, zbog čega se ZP Split odlučio za provedbu taktičke
operacije Skok-1. Cilj operacije bio je potiskivanje srp-
skih snaga s dominantnih uzvišenja Dinare i stavljanje
Srpske vojske Krajine u dolini Cetine pod vatreni nadzor.
Pothvat je 7. travnja 1995., uspješno i bez gubitaka, izve-
la 7. gardijska brigada uz pomoć 126. dp-a. Ovladano je
područjem Dinare dubine 5 i širine 15 kilometara, doš-
lo se nadomak selu Uništa. Crta hrvatskih snaga na Li-
vanjskom polju i Dinari dobila je željenu stabilnost, pa u
istočnom dijelu Livanjskoga polja više nije bilo značajni-
jih djelovanja srpskih snaga.891
891 7. gardijska brigada HV – Pume, 196-202.
387
Domovinski rat 04-02-2020 Knjiga 1.indd 387
sion, contrary to Croatian expectations. After a round of
diplomatic wrangling, a compromise was reached and on
March 31, 1995, the Security Council accepted the Croa-
tian demands and, by way of Resolution 981, confirmed
the territorial integrity of the Republic of Croatia. The Se-
curity Council admitted that the main provisions of the
Vance Plan had not been implemented. The role of the
peacekeeping force was redefined, the designation “UN-
PROFOR” was changed into UNCRO (United Nations Con-
fidence Restoration Operation in Croatia). The mandate of
UNCRO, according to the agreement, would expire on No-
vember 30, 1995. According to the new mandate, the UN
forces were obligated to monitor, in an effective manner,
the situation along the internationally recognized Croa-
tian borders and assist in controlling, by monitoring and
reporting, the crossing of military personnel, weapons
and equipment over the international borders between
Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina and Croatia and the
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia or the Republika Srpska.
OPERATION SKOK-1
During the four-month truce the frontline shifted in-
significantly in the area of responsibility of ZP Split. With
the coming of spring it became probable that the Serbs
would attack the Croatian positions on Dinara and Staret-
ina mountains. Because of that, Military District Split de-
cided to launch Operation Skok-1 (Leap-1). The aim of
the operation was to push back the Serb forces from the
dominant peaks on Dinara and gain the ground neces-
sary to place the SVK forces in the Cetina Valley within
artillery range. On April 7 the 7th Guards Brigade, sup-
ported by the 126th Home Guard Regiment, successfully
completed the mission without suffering a single casual-
ty. The Croats gained control over a stretch of territory 5
kilometers deep and 15 kilometers wide and reached the
village of Unište. The line held by the Croats on the Livno
field and Dinara was now stable and Serb forces were no
R
longer capable of operating with any degree of efficiency
in the eastern part of the Livno field.
4.2.2020. 18:35:14
 Davor Marijan • Rat za opstojnost Hrvata, 1991. - 1995.
OPERACIJA BLJESAK
Sljedeća operacija HV-a izvedena je u zapadnoj
Slavoniji zbog narušavanja odredbi Gospodarskog
sporazuma iz prosinca 1994. godine. Izvjesno vrije-
me vladao je optimizam kod hrvatskoga vrhovništva,
koje je očekivalo da pobunjeni Srbi poštuju spora-
zum. Otvaranje autoceste pogodovalo je širenju kri-
jumčarenja na okupiranom području RH, što je ne-
povoljno utjecalo na moral pobunjenih Srba, pa je
H
njihovo vrhovništvo 21. travnja 1995. naredilo da se
krijumčarenje onemogući, a krijumčari sankcioniraju.
Pobunjeni su Srbi 24. travnja zatvorili autocestu na 24
sata. Nekoliko se dana napetost pojačavala i smanji-
vala, pa je Glavni stožer HV-a mijenjao zapovijedi o
M
dovođenju snaga za operaciju i storniranju pokreta.
Kada se činilo da neće biti potrebe za pokretanjem
snaga, na okupiranom području zapadne Slavonije
od 25. do 27. travnja boravili su politički i vojni čelnici
pobunjenih Srba, Milan Martić i Milan Čeleketić, te su
podignuli tenzije na višu razinu. Stanje se pogoršalo
kada je na benzinskoj crpki u Novoj Gradiški iz osvete
D
za ubijenog brata Hrvat ubio Srbina s okupiranog po-
dručja s kojim je odrastao u istom selu. Za odmazdu
su pobunjeni Srbi u noći 28./29. travnja na dijelu au-
toceste koja je prolazila kroz pobunjeni teritorij ubili
nekoliko hrvatskih građana, a pet ih je zarobljeno i
C
ubrzo pušteno. Autocesta je potom zatvorena, a 18.
korpus SVK-a izvršio je mobilizaciju i doveden je u sta-
nje pune borbene spremnosti. Zahtjev UNCRO-a da
se cesta otvori, pobunjeni Srbi nisu ispunili. Hrvatsko
je vrhovništvo tada odlučilo oružjem riješiti problem
zapadne Slavonije te je zapovjedilo da počnu završne
pripreme za operaciju Bljesak.892
Cilj operacije Bljesak bio je razbiti srpske snage i
osloboditi okupirano područje zapadne Slavonije, iz-
biti na rijeku Savu i prijeći u obranu na njoj. Operacija
je počela 1. svibnja 1995., a već dan kasnije glavni-
na srpskih snaga je bila poražena ili odbačena preko
Save na teritorij BiH. Okružene srpske snage blizu
Pakraca predale su se 4. svibnja. Operacijom Bljesak
hrvatske snage oslobodile su zapadnu Slavoniju – UN
sektor Zapad (oko 600 km2) i ostvarile sve zadane ci-
ljeve. U operaciji su poginula 42 i ranjena 162 pripad-
nika Hrvatske vojske i policije (devetorica su preminu-
892 D. MARIJAN, Novska u Domovinskom ratu, 385-388.
388
Domovinski rat 04-02-2020 Knjiga 1.indd 388
OPERATION FLASH
Operation Bljesak (Flash) was launched by the HV
because the Serbs in western Slavonia did not honor
the provisions of the Economic Agreement signed in
1994. For a period of time after the signing of the agree-
ment the Croatian leadership had been confident that
the Serbs would honor the agreement. This confidence
proved misplaced. The opening of the highway for traf-
fic facilitated smuggling operations in the occupied area
of the Republic of Croatia. This development actually
had a detrimental effect on the rebel Serbs’ morale. The
rebel Serb leadership, therefore, ordered, on April 21,
1995, that measures be taken for preventing smuggling
operations and that the smugglers be prosecuted. On
April 24 the rebel Serbs’ closed the highway for traffic
for 24 hours. Tensions flared up only to quickly decrease
again. The situation vacillated constantly between pe-
riods of increasing tensions and relative calm for the
next few days. On a number of occasions the General
Staff of the Croatian Army ordered the deployment
of troops for offensive action only to cancel the order.
When it finally appeared that there would be no need
for a military intervention, Milan Martić, the political
leader of the rebel Serbs, and Milan Čeleketić, his mil-
itary chief of staff, showed up in the occupied area of
western Slavonia, stayed there from April 25 to April 27
and raised tensions a few notches up again. The bad sit-
uation got significantly worse when, at a gas station in
Nova Gradiška, a Croat killed, in revenge for the murder
of his brother, a Serb from the occupied area with whom
he had grown up in the same village. The rebel Serbs re-
taliated on the night of April 28-29 by killing a number
D
of Croatian citizens who were driving on the stretch of
the highway that passed through the occupied territory.
The Serbs took five more Croatian citizens prisoner but
released them shortly afterwards. The highway was then
closed for traffic again and the SVK’s XVIII Corps con-
R
ducted mobilization and raised its combat readiness to
the highest level. UNCRO demanded from the Serbs to
open the highway for traffic. The Serbs refused. At that
point the Croatian leadership decided to solve the prob-
lem of western Slavonia by military action and ordered
the Croatian Army to start preparing for Operation Flash.
The aim of Operation Flash was to defeat the Serb
forces and liberate the occupied area of western Slavo-
nia, reach the Sava River and establish a defensive line
along the river. The operation began on May 1, 1995. It
4.2.2020. 18:35:14
 The Croatian Nation’s Struggle for Survival, 1991-1995

H
Sanitet i Crveni križ RH odmah su pružali zdravstvenu skrb stari- Predaja zapovjednika 51. (pakračke) pješačke brigade 18. korpu-
jim i nemoćnim Srbima; sela iznad Pakraca, svibanj 1995. godine sa Srpske vojske Krajine potpukovnika Steve Harambašića i Vel-
(autor fotografije: Toni Hnojčik). jka Džakule, jednog od vođa srpske pobune protiv demokratski
M
izabrane vlasti RH, zapovjedniku hrvatske policije Nikoli Ivkancu
The Medical Corps of the Croatian Army Red Cross of the Re- u popodnevnim satima 4. svibnja 1995. na Gavrinici ponad Pakra-
public of Croatia provided health care to elderly and disabled ca (autor fotografije: Toni Hnojčik).
Serbs without hesitation; villages above Pakrac, May, 1995 (Pho-
tograph by Toni Hnojčik). Colonel Stevo Harambašić, the commander of the 51st (Pakrac)
Infantry Brigade of the 18th “SVK” Corps, and Veljko Džakula,
one of the leaders of the Serbian rebellion against the demo-
cratically elected government of the Republic of Croatia, sur-
D
render to the commander of the Croatian police forces Nikola
Ivkanec, on the afternoon of May 4, 1995, at Gavrinica (above
Pakrac); Photograph by Toni Hnojčik.
C
D
R
Pripadnici 125. domobranske pukovnije Novska na ulazu u Jase-
novac (zapovjednik 2. bojne Ivica Čaja, razgovara Motorolom,
malo kasnije pogiba od neprijateljskog rafala), 1. svibnja 1995.
godine (autor fotografija: Željko Gašparović).
Povratak prognanih Hrvata na zgarišta svojih kuća, zapadna Sla-
vonija, svibanj 1995. (nakon operacije „Bljesak“).
Soldiers from the 125th Home Guard Novska Regiment enter
Jasenovac, May 1, 1995. (The commander of the 2nd Battalion,
When the Serbs occupied western Slavonia they forcibly ex-
Ivica Čaja, talks on his combat radio. Moments after the photo-
pelled most Croats from the region. The expelled Croats in the
graph was taken he was shot and killed by an enemy soldier);
photograph returned to their homes after Operation Flash only
Photographs by Željko Gašparović.
to find their houses destroyed, western Slavonia, May 1995.

389

Domovinski rat 04-02-2020 Knjiga 1.indd 389 4.2.2020. 18:35:15

 Davor Marijan • Rat za opstojnost Hrvata, 1991. - 1995.
la nakon operacije od posljedica ranjavanja), a gubici
srpskih snaga procjenjuju se na oko 350 - 450 mrtvih i
više od 1000 ranjenih.893
Za odmazdu, raketama „zemlja-zemlja“ s oku-
piranog područja Banovine srpske snage gađale su
Zagreb i pogodile Dječju bolnicu, Hrvatsko narodno
kazalište, Akademiju dramskih umjetnosti i druge ci-
vilne objekte u središtu grada. Pritom je ubijeno sed-
mero, a ranjeno najmanje 176 civila. Tijekom i nakon
operacije Bljesak, hrvatske vlasti osigurale su huma-
H
ni postupak i sva građanska prava srpskom stanov-
ništvu, a pripadnicima srpskih postrojbi zajamčena
je primjena Zakona o oprostu. Unatoč tomu, većina
stanovnika srpske narodnosti na okupiranom dijelu
zapadne Slavonije napustila je to područje uoči i ti-
jekom operacije Bljesak. Pod golemim pritiskom srp-
M
skoga vodstva i uz prijetnju nastavka bombardiranja
Zagreba, UN je potom organizirao operaciju Sigurni
prolaz, kojom je najveći dio preostaloga stanovništva
srpske narodnosti napustio zapadnu Slavoniju.894
POLITIČKO I SIGURNOSNO
D
STANJE U RSK
U vrijeme oslobađanja zapadne Slavonije RSK je
proživljavao tešku političku i gospodarsku krizu. Pot-
pisivanje Gospodarskoga sporazuma s Hrvatskom
C
u Zagrebu 2. prosinca 1994., bez obzira na različita
tumačenja, bilo je znak slabosti te paradržave. Spora-
zumom se reguliralo pitanje korištenja vode, električ-
ne energije, autoceste i naftovoda. Ubrzo potom, 21.
prosinca, za slobodan promet otvorena je autocesta
Zagreb – Beograd. Njezino otvaranje djelovalo je po-
razno na moral stanovništva i vojske krajinskih Srba.
Omogućilo je porast krijumčarenja, a otvorilo je vrata
hrvatskoj promidžbi.895 Vojničkim uspjesima na Dinari
i Livanjskom polju ona je postala ozbiljna prijetnja za
moral krajinskih Srba, koji je GŠ SVK početkom srpnja
1995. opisao mračnim tonovima: “Mnogi borci i njiho-
893 I. BRIGOVIĆ, „Osvrt na operaciju 'Bljesak'”, 64; D. MARI-
JAN, Domovinski rat, 330-335.
894 Ante NAZOR, Velikosrpska agresija na Hrvatsku 1990-ih /
Greater-Serbian Aggression on Croatia in the 90's, HMD-
CDR, Zagreb, 2011., 167-168.
895 D. MARIJAN, Domovinski rat, 335.
390
Domovinski rat 04-02-2020 Knjiga 1.indd 390
took the Croatian forces only a day to soundly defeat
the Serb forces. Some Serb troops managed to retreat
across the Sava River to Bosnia and Herzegovina. The
encircled Serb forces near Pakrac surrendered on May 4.
With Operation Flash the Croatian Army liberated west-
ern Slavonia – UN Sector West (about 600 km2) and ac-
complished all the objectives. 42 HV soldiers and police
officers were killed and 162 wounded in the operation (9
of them succumbing to their wounds after surgical pro-
cedures). The Serb losses are estimated at 350-450 killed
and more than 1,000 wounded.
In retaliation, the Serbs launched ground-to-ground
missiles from the occupied area in Banovina at Zagreb.
The missiles hit the Children’s Hospital, a high school,
the Academy of Dramatic Arts and other civilian tar-
gets, killing seven and wounding at least 176 civilians.
During and after Operation Flash, the Croatian authori-
ties secured all civil rights and humane treatment for the
Serbian population, and also implemented the Law on
Abolition of Criminal Prosecution and Criminal Proceed-
ings for Criminal Acts Perpetrated in the Armed Conflicts
and in the War Against the Republic of Croatia with re-
gard to all members of Serb military units. Despite this,
most Serbs from western Slavonia fled the area imme-
diately prior to and during Operation Flash. The Serb
leadership put a lot of pressure on the UN to organize
transport for the fleeing Serbs, reinforcing the pressure
by threatening new rocket attacks on Zagreb. The UN
caved in and organized Operation Safe Passage. During
that operation the majority of the remaining Serb popu-
lation in western Slavonia left the region.
POLITICAL AND SECURITY
D
SITUATION IN THE RSK
When the Croatian Army launched Operation Flash,
the RSK was experiencing a serious political and eco-
nomic crisis. There are many explanations as to why the
R
statelet signed the Economic Agreement with Croatia.
Hard evidence, however, shows that the act of signing
the Economic Agreement on December 2, 1994, was
a show of weakness on the part of the RSK. The agree-
ment regulated the issue of usage of water, electricity,
highway and the oil pipeline. Shortly after the signing of
the agreement, on December 21, the Zagreb-Belgrade
highway was open for traffic. The opening of the high-
way had a devastating effect on the morale of the Serb
4.2.2020. 18:35:15
 The Croatian Nation’s Struggle for Survival, 1991-1995
ve porodice su očajni, razočarani i gladni.”896
Politička scena RSK bila je burna. Aktualni premi-
jer Borislav Mikelić bio je izložen nizu napada jer je
dio političkih snaga u njemu vidio eksponenta Slo-
bodana Miloševića koji čini sve da Krajina “ostane u
okviru granica nekadašnje Socijalističke Republike
Hrvatske”. Nakon Bljeska njegov je položaj postao ne-
održiv jer se suzdržano ponašanje Savezne Republike
Jugoslavije držalo izdajom. Konačno, 29. svibnja Mi-
kelić je smijenjen jer se usprotivio ujedinjenju RSK i
H
RS-a. Ujedinjenju se usprotivilo i vodstvo pobunjenih
Srba u istočnoj Slavoniji, Baranji i zapadnom Srijemu.
Ono je osnovalo Koordinacioni odbor pet općina, na
čijem je čelu bio Goran Hadžić. Na političku scenu vra-
tio se Milan Babić, čija je Vlada prihvaćena 27. srpnja
u Topuskom.897 U GŠ-u SVK-a predviđali su “da će izbor
M
nove vlade i odlazak kompromitovanih ličnosti tako-
đe doneti bar malo jedinstva i političke sloge”.898
Drugi niz problema koji je mučio Krajinu bio je
odnos s međunarodnom zajednicom. Predsjednik RH
Franjo Tuđman upoznao je 12. siječnja 1995. javnost s
odlukom da Republika Hrvatska s danom 31. ožujka
D
otkazuje gostoprimstvo UNPROFOR-u. U pismu Bo-
utrosu Boutrosu Ghaliju Tuđman je naglasio da otka-
zivanje mandata UNPROFOR-u ne znači odustajanje
od mirnog rješenja sukoba s pobunjenim Srbima,
nego nastojanje da se do dogovora dođe izravnim
pregovorima Zagreba i Knina.899
C
Nakon vojnih uspjeha Hrvatske vojske na područ-
ju Dinare krajem 1994. i početkom 1995. područje
Kninske krajine našlo se ugroženo s Dinare i Livanjsko-
ga polja, s teritorija koji je do tada bio u sastavu Re-
publike Srpske. Pritisnuti istom opasnošću, krajinski
D
i bosanskohercegovački Srbi osnovali su 20. veljače
1995. zajednički Savjet narodne obrane.900 U mjeseci-
ma koji su slijedili njegovo djelovanje nije se vidjelo.
U svibnju 1995. Republika Srpska Krajina „skraćena“ je
za okupirani dio u zapadnoj Slavoniji, što je bio težak
896 HMDCDR: GŠSV RSK, Vanredni operativni izveštaj str.
pov. br. 3-412 od 9. 7. 1995.
897 N. BARIĆ, Srpska pobuna, 480-486.
898 HMDCDR: GŠSV RSK, Vanredni operativni izveštaj str.
pov. br. 3-412 od 9. 7. 1995.
899 Otkaz mandata UNPROFOR-u: Treća obljetnica međuna-
rodnog priznanja Republike Hrvatske, MORH, Politička
uprava, Zagreb, 1995., 12-18.
900 D. RADIŠIĆ, Hronologija događaja, 539.
391
Domovinski rat 04-02-2020 Knjiga 1.indd 391
population and the army of the Krajina Serbs. It dramati-
cally increased the instances of smuggling and exposed
the Serbian population to the Croatian media reports.
These reports, after the Croatian military successes on
Dinara and the Livno field, became a serious threat to
the morale of the Krajina Serbs. The General Staff of the
Serbian Army of Krajina, at the beginning of July, 1995,
described the situation in dire terms: “Many fighters and
their families are desperate, disappointed and hungry.”
The political arena within the RSK was volatile. The
Prime Minister, Borislav Mikelić, was exposed to a series
of attacks because some political factions perceived
him as a puppet of Milošević, who was determined to
“keep Krajina within the borders of the former Social-
ist Republic of Croatia”. After Operation Flash, his posi-
tion became untenable because, according to popular
opinion and sentiment, Serbia’s reserved attitude was
viewed as treason. Finally, on May 29, Mikelić was sacked
because he was against a union between the RS and the
RSK. The leadership of the rebel Serbs in Eastern Slavo-
nia, Baranja and western Sirmium also opposed such a
union. The leadership of the rebel Serbs there formed
the Coordination Commission of the five municipalities,
at whose helm was Goran Hadžić. Milan Babić returned
to politics and his government was accepted on July 27
in Topusko. At the General Staff of the Serbian Army of
Krajina the officers predicted that “the new government
and the exit of the compromised characters from the
political scene will bring at least some unity and polit-
ical harmony”.
Krajina was also plagued by a whole plethora of
problems arising from the statelet’s relationship with
the international community. The president of Croatia,
Franjo Tuđman, announced to the public on January
12, 1995, that Croatia would cancel UNPROFOR’s man-
date on March 31. In a letter to Boutros Boutros-Ghali,
Tuđman emphasized that cancelling UNPROFOR’s man-
date did not mean giving up on trying to find a peaceful
R
solution to the rebel Serbs issue, but an honest attempt
to reach an accommodation by direct talks between Za-
greb and Knin.
After the Croatian Army’s successes on Dinara at the
end of 1994 and beginning of 1995, the Kninska Krajina
found itself threatened from Dinara and the Livno field,
a territory that had been, up to that point, a part of the
Republika Srpska. Faced with that danger, the Krajina
Serbs and Bosnian Serbs formed, on February 20, the
Joint National Defense Council. In the months that fol-
4.2.2020. 18:35:15
 Davor Marijan • Rat za opstojnost Hrvata, 1991. - 1995.
udarac za nju. Njezin predsjednik Milan Martić poža-
lio se nakon nekoliko dana predsjedniku Republike
Srbije Slobodanu Miloševiću da
„tragedija koja je zadesila srpski narod najnovi-
jom agresijom Hrvatske na zapadnu Slavoniju ima
teške i nesagledive posljedice po rješenje cjeloku-
pnog srpskog pitanja. Ne samo da je izgubljen teri-
torij i ne samo da je stradalo na stotine civila, ono što
u ovom času užasa nespokoj čini još i većim je toliko
prošireno uvjerenje kod naroda da je srpsko pitanje
H
izdano, i to od strane samih Srba. Duž cijele Krajine širi
se glas o njenoj predaji; ljudi sa nevjericom konstatu-
ju da nas je zaboravila i Srbija i Republika Srpska. U
mnogim selima i gradovima narod se pakuje i sprema
za iseljavanje”.901
Nakon operacije Bljesak i razbijanja 18. korpusa,
M
pobunjeni Srbi poduzeli su niz mjera da srede stanje
u vojsci Krajine. Generala M. Čeleketića zamijenio je
general-potpukovnik Mile Mrkšić. On je poboljšao
stegu u vojsci i pokušao spriječiti rašireni šverc s pro-
tivnikom. Ustroj SVK-a dopunio je osnivanjem pro-
fesionalnoga Korpusa specijalnih jedinica. Mrkšić je
D
krajem lipnja 1995. tvrdio da nova organizacija SVK-a
treba završiti početkom listopada iste godine. Od 1.
lipnja 1995. počela je mobilizacija vojnih obveznika u
SR Jugoslaviji koji su nakon 17. kolovoza 1990. napu-
stili RSK. Očekivalo se ljudstvo za dvije lake brigade.
Prioritet popune bio je po redoslijedu: KSJ, 15., 7., 39.
C
i 21. korpus. Ta je akcija imala kratkotrajne učinke: već
je početkom srpnja bila u opadanju i s manjim bro-
jem vojnih obveznika no što se očekivalo. Uz to su se
sinovi povlaštenih i dužnosnika RSK uglavnom uspi-
jevali izvući od regrutiranja u SVK. Na Vidovdan 28.
lipnja 1995. na vojnom poligonu kod Slunja održan
je mimohod na kojem je predstavljen Korpus speci-
jalnih jedinica. Mimohod je bio glavni dio “Vidovdan-
ske smotre”, čija je svrha bila podizanje morala vojsci i
stanovništvu. U SVK-u se tvrdilo da je smotra ispunila
očekivanja i da su u Hrvatskoj ozbiljno uzimali u obzir
osnivanje Korpusa specijalnih jedinica.902
901 USMKSMP: Molba Predsjednika Republike RSK od 6. 4.
1995. Iz konteksta dokumenta razvidan je pogrešan nad-
nevak. Pismo identičnog sadržaja dostavljeno je i pred-
sjedniku Savezne Republike Jugoslavije Zoranu Liliću.
902 D. MARIJAN, Domovinski rat, 336-337.
392
Domovinski rat 04-02-2020 Knjiga 1.indd 392
lowed, however, the Council did not do anything con-
structive. In May, 1995, the RSK lost its part of western
Slavonia. The loss of western Slavonia was a hard pill to
swallow for the Krajina Serbs. The president of the RSK,
Milan Martić, complained, a few days after western Sla-
vonia had been lost, to Slobodan Milošević, that
“the tragedy that has befallen the Serb nation as a
result of this newest Croatian aggression against west-
ern Slavonia will have dire and profound consequences
in relation to solving the Serb issue in its entirety. Not
only has territory been lost, not only have hundreds of
civilians lost everything, but what at this time of horrors
is the source of the greatest anxiety is the wide-spread
belief among people that the Serb cause has been be-
trayed, and betrayed by Serbs themselves. The length
and breadth of Krajina there are rumors of its impend-
ing surrender; people conclude, with disbelief, that both
Serbia and RS have abandoned us. In many villages and
towns people are packing, getting ready to flee.”
After Operation Flash and the defeat of XVIII Corps,
the rebel Serbs implemented a number of measures to
improve the poor state of the Army of Krajina. Gener-
al Čeleketić was replaced by Lieutenant General Mile
Mrkšić. He improved military discipline in the army and
tried to put a stop to the widespread smuggling prob-
lem. He formed Professional Special Forces Corps, thus
giving the SVK an additional dimension. At the end of
June, 1995, he insisted that the process of reorganiz-
ing the SVK should be satisfactorily completed by the
beginning of October that same year. On June 1, 1995,
in Yugoslavia, the mobilization of those conscripts who
had left the RSK after August 17, 1990, got under way.
The army authorities expected to conscript enough men
D
for two light brigades. The replacement priority was as
follows. KSJ, XV, VII, XXXIX, XXI Corps. This mobilization
did not have much effect; already at the beginning of
July it was clear that the mobilization had, for all intents
and purposes, failed. The number of conscripted men
R
was lower than expected. Most of the sons of RSK offi-
cers and privileged persons dodged mobilization. On St.
Vitus Day (Vidovdan), on June 28, 1995, at the Slunj mil-
itary training grounds formal military parade presenting
the Special Forces Corps was held. The parade was the
main attraction of the “Feast of St. Vitus”. The purpose of
the event was to raise the morale of the army and popu-
lation. The SVK claimed that the event fulfilled expecta-
tions and that Croatia noted with concern the formation
of Special Forces Corps.
4.2.2020. 18:35:15
 The Croatian Nation’s Struggle for Survival, 1991-1995
OPERACIJA PLAMEN-95
Od jeseni 1994. do početka svibnja 1995. i ope-
racije Bljesak srpske su snage bilježile poraz za pora-
zom u sukobima s hrvatskim snagama. Nakon Bljeska
im je trebao brz i dojmljiv uspjeh za poljuljani moral.
To je očito bio povod za napad 1. krajiškog korpusa
na Orašje, koje je još od 1992. bilo visoko na listi pri-
oriteta VRS-a. Operacija je obrazložena procjenom da
su po oslobađanju zapadne Slavonije hrvatske snage
H
prestrojene na području Županje, Vukovara i Đakova
radi presijecanja „Koridora“ i odvajanja snaga 1. KK-a
od ostalih snaga VRS-a i SRJ. Da se to onemogući,
planiralo se razbijanje hrvatskih snaga na području
Orašja, izlazak na Savu i organiziranje obrane na de-
M
snoj obali rijeke. Operacija je nazvana Plamen-95. Po-
čela je 5. svibnja napadom na snage HVO-a u Orašju, a
posljednji jači napad izveden je 21. svibnja, s tim da je
VRS povremeno napadao još 20-ak dana. Ništa od pla-
niranih ciljeva srpske snage nisu realizirale. Umjesto
potrebne samopotvrde, VRS je potvrdio samo da se
neuspjesima u sukobima s hrvatskim snagama ne vidi
D
kraj. Hrvatsko vijeće obrane imalo je u ZP-u Orašje oko
6000 ljudi u 4. gardijskoj brigadi i 106., 201. i 202. dp-u.
Po nekim procjenama, VRS je imao oko 8000 ljudi, od
kojih oko 2000 iz postrojbi za napadna djelovanja.903
C
OPERACIJA SKOK-2
Nakon oslobađanja zapadne Slavonije hrvatske
su snage izvele novu operaciju u jugozapadnoj Bosni.
Nastavile su napredovanje na smjeru Livno – Bosansko
D
Grahovo u operaciji Skok-2. Cilj operacije bio je zauzeti
cijelo Livanjsko polje i tako spojiti snage na oba ope-
racijska pravca u polju, odbaciti srpske snage prema
Bosanskom Grahovu i Glamoču i oba grada staviti u do-
met dalekometnoga topništva. U napadu je angažirana
4. gardijska brigada HV-a, 3. gardijska brigada HVO-a,
126. dp HV-a, 1. hrvatski gardijski zdrug, dio 1. gardijske
brigade HV-a, snage Specijalne policije MUP-a HR Her-
ceg-Bosne i 264. izvidničko-diverzantska satnija HV-a.904
903 GSHVO, Sumarno dnevno izvješće kl. 818-01/95-02/12,
ur. br. 02-10-06/03-95-148 od 5. 5. 1995.; Balkan Battle-
grounds, I, 298; D. MARIJAN, Domovinski rat, 337-339.
904 A. GOTOVINA, Napadajni bojevi i operacije, 45-46; 1. gar-
dijska brigada HV – Tigrovi, 395-397.
393
Domovinski rat 04-02-2020 Knjiga 1.indd 393
OPERATION PLAMEN-95
In the period from fall, 1994, until the beginning of
May, 1995, and until the beginning of Operation Flash,
the Serbian forces suffered one defeat after another at
the hands of Croatian forces. After Operation Flash, the
Serbs desperately needed a quick and impressive mil-
itary success to bolster their shaken morale. This con-
sideration, more than any other, was behind I Krajina
Corps’s attack on Orašje. Orašje had been high on the
VRS’s priority list since 1992. The operation was based
on the assumption that the bulk of the Croatian forces,
after the completion of Operation Flash, had been de-
ployed in the Županja, Vukovar and Đakovo areas for the
purpose of cutting the “corridor” and separating I Krajina
Corps from the rest of the VRS and SRY forces. To foil that
supposed plan, the rebel Serbs intended to destroy the
Croatian forces in the Orašje area, reach the Sava River
and form a defensive line alone the right bank. The op-
eration was codenamed Plamen-95 (Flame-95). It started
on May 5 with an attack on the HVO forces in Orašje. The
last serious attack was mounted on May 21, but the VRS
continued to launch small-scale attacks for the next 20
or so days. The Serb forces failed to achieve any of the
objectives. Instead of achieving a victory and restoring
the fledgling morale of its troops, the VRS only made the
already bad situation worse. The HVO had about 6,000
men in Military District Orašje – in the 4th Guards Brigade
and the 106th, 201st and 202nd Home Guard Regiments.
According to some estimates, the VRS had 8,000 men,
2,000 of them in units slated for offensive roles.
OPERATION SKOK-2
Having liberated Western Slavonia, the Croatian
forces launched another operation in southwest Bos-
nia. The Croats continued to advance along the Livno
– Bosansko Grahovo line during Operation Leap-2. The
R
objective of the operation was to capture the Livno
field and thus link the troops moving on both axes of
advance on the Livno field. Throw back the Serbian forc-
es towards Bosansko Grahovo and Glamoč and advance
towards both towns so as to place then within artillery
range. The 4th Guards Brigade of the Croatian Army, 3rd
Guards Brigade of the HVO, the 126th Home Guard Reg-
iment of the HV, 1st Guards Corps, elements of the 1st
Guards Brigade of the HV, Special Police of the MUP HR
4.2.2020. 18:35:15
 Davor Marijan • Rat za opstojnost Hrvata, 1991. - 1995.
Operacijom, koja je uspješno izvedena od 4. do 11.
lipnja 1995., hrvatske snage realizirale su postavljene
ciljeve, zauzele prostor širine 30 i dubine 15 kilometara,
odnosno površine oko 450 km2. Tijekom operacije po-
ginula su četiri, a ranjena 34 vojnika hrvatskih snaga, od
kojih 15 teže.905
Nakon operacije hrvatske snage (1. hrvatski gar-
dijski zdrug, ojačana 1. bojna 1. gardijske brigade HV-a
i Specijalna policija MUP-a HR HB) su do kraja lipnja i
početka srpnja 1995. napravile manje pomake na sje-
H
veroistočnom dijelu planine Staretine na smjeru pre-
ma Glamočkom polju. Od kraja lipnja do druge polo-
vine srpnja 1995. hrvatske snage na livanjskom dijelu
bojišta bile su u djelatnoj obrani. U tom je razdoblju
težište obrane bilo na području planina Dinare i Šator,
a pomoćne su snage držane na smjeru Livanjsko po-
M
lje – Glamoč. Cilj je bio zadržati taktičku inicijativu u
odnosu na srpske snage i sustavno ih iscrpljivati radi
stvaranja uvjeta za prijelaz u napad prema Bosanskom
Grahovu i Glamoču.906
PONIŽAVANJE UNPROFOR-a
D
I SNAGE ZA BRZO
DJELOVANJE
U svibnju 1995. Vojska Republike Srpske obnovila je
topničke napade na zaštićena područja. Uz to su njezini
C
pripadnici iz jednoga skladišta UNPROFOR-a kod Sara-
jeva oteli nekoliko topničkih oruđa. UNPROFOR je tražio
da se to oružje vrati, a topnički napadi na zaštićena po-
dručja prekinu. Kada VRS nije udovoljio zahtjevu, zrako-
plovi NATO-a napali su 25. svibnja srpsko skladište kod
Pala. Napad je ponovljen idućega dana. Srbi su odgo-
vorili uhićenjem oko 300 pripadnika UNPROFOR-a, koje
su koristili kao živi štit od tih napada. Od vatre srpskoga
topništva po gradovima 26. svibnja u Tuzli je ubijen 71
civil, a ranjeno ih je oko 150.907
U jednom od zračnih napada VRS je 2. lipnja srušio
američki lovac-bombarder F-16, od čijeg je spašavanja
napravljena medijska predstava. Srbi su polako uz pre-
905 A. GOTOVINA, Napadajni bojevi i operacije, 50, 187; 1. hr-
vatski gardijski zdrug, Ministarstvo obrane Republike Hr-
vatske, Glavni stožer Oružanih snaga RH, Zagreb, 2011.,
179-183.
906 D. MARIJAN, Domovinski rat, 338-339.
907 Kronologija rata, 483.
394
Domovinski rat 04-02-2020 Knjiga 1.indd 394
HB and 264th Reconnaissance-Commando Company of
the Croatian Army participated in the operation.
The operation lasted from June 4 to June 11, 1995,
and ended in a Croatian victory. The Croat forces
achieved all the objectives set by the planners of the
operation, captured an area 30 kilometers deep and 15
kilometers wide –about 450 square kilometers. During
the operation, the Croatian forces lost 4 men killed,
and 34 wounded, 15 of them seriously.
After the operation the Croatian forces (1st Croatian
Guards Corps, reinforced 1st Battalion of the 1st Guards
Brigade of the Croatian Army and special purpose unit
of MUP HR HB) gained some ground, by the end of
June, 1995, and beginning of July, on the northeastern
part of Mount Staretina in the direction of the Glamoč
field. From the end of June until the second half of July,
1995, the Croatian forces conducted active defense in
the Livno area. During this period the defense pivoted
on the positions in the Dinara area and Mount Šator
area. Supporting forces were deployed in the direction
of the Livno field – Glamoč. The aim was to retain the
tactical initiative in relation to the Serb forces and wear
them systematically down so as to create favorable
conditions for mounting an attack towards Bosansko
Grahovo and Glamoč.
HUMILIATION OF UNPROFOR
AND RRF
In May, 1995, the VRS renewed its artillery attacks
on protected areas. VRS soldiers also broke into one
UNPROFOR depot near Sarajevo and took off with a
D
few artillery pieces. UNPROFOR demanded that the
artillery pieces be returned and the artillery attacks
on the protected areas be stopped. The VRS ignored
the demands and NATO aircraft attacked a Serb ware-
house at Pale on May 25. The following day NATO air-
craft attacked again. The Serbs reacted by arresting
R
about 300 members of UNPROFOR, using them as a
human shield from further aerial attacks. Serb artillery
killed 71 civilians in Tuzla and wounded around 150
on May 26.
On June 2 the VRS managed to shoot down an
American F-16 fighter bomber. The Serb media hyped
up the event for all it was worth, and more. Negotia-
tions for the release of the UNPROFOR hostages were
ongoing and the Serbs were releasing one small group
4.2.2020. 18:35:15
 The Croatian Nation’s Struggle for Survival, 1991-1995
govore oslobađali dio po dio talaca, ne obazirući se na
osudu Vijeća sigurnosti UN-a donesenu 9. lipnja. U vrhu
Vijeća sigurnosti odlučeno je da mirovne snage ostanu
u BiH, ali da se ojačaju radi uspješne provedbe misije.
To su ojačanje bile Snage za brzo djelovanje (Rapid Re-
action Force – RRF), koje su UNPROFOR-u trebale dati
mnogo učinkovitiju zaštitu i osigurati zaštićene zone u
istočnoj Bosni. Njihova je organizacija tekla usporeno,
a uz to su politički čelnici Hrvata u BiH Krešimir Zubak
i Jadranko Prlić tražili da im se pobliže objasni njihov
H
mandat i da se za njihovo upućivanje potpiše poseban
sporazum. Neki bošnjački autori drže da je zbog toga
kasnio dolazak RRF-a i da je počeo djelovati u drugoj
polovini kolovoza, nakon što je VRS uništio bošnjačke
enklave u istočnoj Bosni. S druge strane, neki hrvatski
autori drže da je svrha RRF-a bila razmještaj na Dinari
M
i blokada hrvatskih snaga dok VRS ne zauzme bihaćki
džep i da je to spriječio vrh HR Herceg-Bosne.908
BOŠNJAČKO-SRPSKE BORBE
U LJETO 1995.
D
Nakon što je 7. korpus ARBiH osvojio Vlašić i odbio
srpske protunapade, borbi je bilo i u zonama drugih kor-
pusa. U prvoj polovini lipnja 1. korpus je u sukobima s
Hercegovačkim korpusom VRS-a osvajao i gubio značaj-
ne kote na Treskavici. U zoni 2. korpusa od druge polovi-
C
ne ožujka do početka svibnja vodile su se borbe oko rele-
ja na Stolicama, koje su završile povratkom srpskih snaga
na prvobitne položaje. Korpus je više uspjeha imao u
borbama s Drinskim korpusom VRS-a na zvorničkom
pravcu, gdje je u prvoj polovini svibnja zauzeo nekoliko
D
dominantnih kota. U lipnju je 2. korpus imao izvjesne po-
make na majevičkom i kalesijskom dijelu bojišta. Snage
3. korpusa ARBiH napravile su krajem svibnja pomak na
ozrenskom bojištu, na smjeru prema Vozući.909
U vrijeme talačke krize ARBiH privodila je kraju
pripreme za novi pokušaj deblokade Sarajeva - Opera-
ciju T, za koju su uz snage 1. korpusa u gradu i okolici
prikupljeni i dijelovi 7., 3. i 4. korpusa, ukupno 34.000
ljudi. Operacija je počela 15. lipnja i nakon početnih
908 R. DELIĆ, Armija RBiH, II, 122-124; Davor DOMAZET
LOŠO, Hrvatski domovinski rat 1991.–1995.: strateški po-
gled, Udruga Hrvatski identitet i prosperitet – Matica
hrvatska, Ogranak Sinj, Zagreb, 2010., 370-371.
909 HMDCDR: Komanda 2. KK, Informacija str. pov. br. 9-135
od 16. 5. 1995.; R. DELIĆ, Armija RBiH, II, 125-126.
395
Domovinski rat 04-02-2020 Knjiga 1.indd 395
of hostages at a time, completely ignoring the con-
demnation contained in the UN Security Council’s res-
olution adopted on June 9. The UN Security Council
decided to keep the peacekeepers in Bosnia and Her-
zegovina and also to reinforce them for the purpose
of enabling them to accomplish their mission. These
reinforcements materialized in the form of the Rapid
Reaction Force (RRF). The RRF was supposed to provide
adequate protection to UNPROFOR and secure the
protected zones in eastern Bosnia. The process of orga-
nizing the RRF, however, was slow and the Croats’ polit-
ical leaders in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Krešimir Zubak
and Jadranko Prlić demanded that the mandate of the
RRF be explained in detail to them and that a sepa-
rate agreement in relation to the RRF’s deployment be
signed. Some Bosniak historians claim that the deploy-
ment of the RRF was delayed on account of the Croats’
political leaders obstructing tactics and point out the
fact that the RRF was deployed only after the VRS had
eliminated the Bosniaks’ enclaves in eastern Bosnia, in
the second half of August. On the other hand, some
Croatian historians are of the opinion that the RRF was
to be deployed on Dinara for the purpose of putting
the Croatian forces there under blockade until the VRS
had captured the Bihać pocket. These historians claim
that the political leadership of the HR HB prevented
that scenario from taking place.
BATTLES BETWEEN THE
BOSNIAKS AND SERBS IN
THE SUMMER OF 1995
After the ARBIH VII Corps captured Vlašić and re-
pulsed Serb counterattacks, fighting flared up in the
areas of responsibility of other Corps. In the first half
of June, I Corps fought a number of battles with the
VRS Herzegovina Corps. A number of important posi-
tions in Treskavica changed hands multiple times. In
R
the area of responsibility of II Corps heavy fighting last-
ed from the second half of March until the beginning
of May. The fighting revolved around the radio-relay
tower in Stolice and ended with the Serbs ending up in
their starting positions. The corps was more successful
fighting against the VRS Drina Corps in the direction
of Zvornik, where, in the first half of May the Bosniaks
captured a number of dominant hills. In June, II Corps
made some headway in the Majevica and Kalesija ar-
4.2.2020. 18:35:15
 Davor Marijan • Rat za opstojnost Hrvata, 1991. - 1995.
uspjeha završila neuspjehom, odnosno manjim teri-
torijalnim pomacima na pravcu Kalinovika u srpnju,
kada je dio snaga 4. korpusa preusmjeren na taj pra-
vac radi odvlačenja srpskih snaga koje su napale Sre-
brenicu. Operacija je nakon 45 dana završila krajem
srpnja. U njoj je ARBiH imala oko 300 poginulih i 600
teško ranjenih pripadnika.910
Srebrenica i Žepa
H
U proljeće 1993. Srebrenica i Žepa postale su
demilitarizirane i zaštićene zone UN-a. U Srebrenici
je zaštitna postrojba bila Nizozemska bojna UNPRO-
FOR-a. Bošnjački su predstavnici stalno prigovarali
UNPROFOR-u da ne izvršava svoje obveze i da Srbi
sustavno krše potpisano primirje. Početkom 1995.
M
OG-8 iz Srebrenice preustrojena je u 28. diviziju, u čiji
je sastav ušla i brigada iz Žepe. Zbog obveza iz spo-
razuma o demilitarizaciji te su postrojbe bile samo
blijeda sjena vojne formacije. U Srebrenici je stanje
bilo loše i zbog neslaganja između dužnosnika i in-
stitucija vlasti. Uz to je komandant 28. divizije Naser
D
Orić bio u Tuzli na Ratnoj školi. Početkom svibnja
pojačane su srpske provokacije i prikupljanje snaga
oko Srebrenice. Zauzimanje Srebrenice bio je zada-
tak Drinskoga korpusa VRS-a s ojačanjima, a nazvan
je Krivaja-95. Napad na Srebrenicu počeo je 6. srpnja
C
i bio je potpuno iznenađenje za ARBiH. Na zahtjev dr-
žavnih tijela RBiH, UNPROFOR je VRS-u uputio ultima-
tum u kojem je tražio povlačenje iz zaštićene zone i
zaprijetio zračnim udarima. Srbi su odbili ultimatum,
zračni su udari izostali, a Srebrenica je bez napora
zauzeta 11. srpnja. Manji dio ljudstva 28. divizije us-
pio se uz borbu probiti do Tuzle, a preostalo odraslo
muško stanovništvo srpske su snage pobile u zločinu
(procjene su oko 8000 prema podacima Memorijal-
nog centra u Potočarima), koji je međunarodno pra-
vosuđe okarakteriziralo kao genocid. Civile su srpske
snage prevezle do Kladnja, čime je Srebrenica potpu-
no očišćena od Bošnjaka.911
Istovremeno s napadom na Srebrenicu, Drinski
je korpus 11. srpnja napao i zaštićenu enklavu Žepu.
Za razliku od Srebrenice, Žepa se žilavo branila do 24.
srpnja, kada je pristala na pregovore sa Srbima. Ot-
910 R. DELIĆ, Armija RBiH, II, 131-132, 138-144.
911 Isto, II, 153-164.
396
Domovinski rat 04-02-2020 Knjiga 1.indd 396
eas. The ARBIH III Corps scored some successes in the
Ozren area, in the direction of Vozuća.
At the time of the hostage crisis the ARBIH was put-
ting the finishing touches on its preparations for a new
attempt to lift the blockade of Sarajevo. The operation
was codenamed Operation T. The forces assigned to
carry out the operation were as follows: I Corps in the
city and surrounding areas, elements of VII, III and IV
Corps with a total of 34,000 men. The operation com-
menced on June 15 and after a number of minor initial
successes ended in failure. The ARBIH did gain some
ground in the direction of Kalinovik in July, when ele-
ments of IV Corps were deployed there for the purpose
of relieving Serb pressure on Srebrenica. The opera-
tion lasted 45 days and ended towards the end of July.
The ARBIH lost about 300 killed and about 600 heavily
wounded soldiers.
Srebrenica and Žepa
In the spring of 1993, Srebrenica and Žepa became
demilitarized and protected UN zones. In Srebrenica
the UN unit tasked with protecting the civilians was
the Dutch Battalion of UNPROFOR. The Bosniak rep-
resentatives constantly warned that UNPROFOR was
not fulfilling its obligations and that the Serbs were
violating the truce on a regular basis. At the begin-
ning of 1995, OG-8 from Srebrenica was reformed as
the 28th Division. The Žepa Brigade was incorporated
into the 28th Division. Due to the agreement’s stipu-
lations regarding demilitarization the 28th Division
was only nominally a military formation. The bad sit-
uation in Srebrenica was further exacerbated because
D
there were divisions and discord among the various
governmental institutions and officials there. The fact
that the commander of the 28th Division, Naser Orić,
was not even there but in some capacity at the War
College in Tuzla also played a part in the upcoming
R
disaster. At the beginning of May the Serbs stepped
up their provocations and speeded up the gathering
of their forces around Srebrenica. The VRS Drina Corps
received reinforcements and was tasked with captur-
ing Srebrenica. The operation was codenamed Kriva-
ja-95. The attack on Srebrenica began on July 6. The
VRS took the ARBIH completely by surprise. At the re-
quest of the official organs of the Republic of Bosnia
and Herzegovina, UNPROFOR issued an ultimatum to
the VRS in which it demanded that the Serbs withdrew
4.2.2020. 18:35:15
 The Croatian Nation’s Struggle for Survival, 1991-1995
por je prestao 27. srpnja, a brigada se u skupinama
tijekom kolovoza probijala prema snagama 2. korpu-
sa ili Srbiji. Civilno je stanovništvo u organizaciji Srba
prebačeno na teritorij pod nadzorom ARBiH.912 Tako je
VRS tri godine nakon usvajanja strategijskih ciljeva, s
iznimkom Goražda, gotovo realizirao jedan od njih –
„čišćenje“ Podrinja.
DRUGA BIHAĆKA KRIZA –
OPERACIJA MAČ-95 (ŠTIT-95)
H
Mogućnost da se Hrvatska vojska spoji sa snagama
5. korpusa ARBiH u bihaćkom džepu stalno se razmatra-
la u SVK-u i VRS-u. Nakon što su hrvatske snage oslobo-
dile zapadnu Slavoniju, Bihać je ponovno dobio visoko
M
mjesto na listi prioriteta u obje srpske vojske, napose
zato što je djelovanje HV-a natjeralo snage SVK-a da se
od Bihaća okrenu prema obrani Korduna i Banovine jer
su uočena prikupljanja većih hrvatskih snaga prema
tim područjima. Operativna grupa Pauk prestala je s
pritiskom na Bihać, što su snage 5. korpusa ARBiH isko-
D
ristile da počnu napadati srpske položaje. Mogućnost
spajanja hrvatskih i bošnjačkih snaga na smjeru Bihać
– Bosansko Grahovo jasno se uočavala, kao i opasnost
od takva scenarija za Knin.913
Pripreme za srpsku ofenzivu počele su nakon što
su se o njoj 4. srpnja 1995. dogovorili glavni štabovi
C
VRS-a i SVK-a. Operacija se vodila pod imenom Mač-95
za SVK, odnosno Štit-95 za VRS. Plan operacije pred-
viđao je da se 5. korpus ARBiH razbije tako da se naj-
prije okruži i uništi dio njegovih snaga i da se ovlada
dijelom teritorija na kojem su bile pristalice Fikreta Ab-
D
dića. Udio SVK-a bio je da preventivnom spremnošću
osigura operaciju od mogućeg napada Hrvatske voj-
ske. Za sam napad SVK je angažirao dvije operativne i
jednu taktičku skupinu, sastavljene od snaga iz 15., 21.
i 39. korpusa, Korpusa specijalnih jedinica i OG-a Pauk.
Operacija je počela 19. srpnja napadom snaga SVK-a,
a VRS se u napad uključio 23. srpnja. Srpski je pritisak
trajao nekoliko dana, težišno s pravca Velike Kladuše
prema Cazinu. Prodori su bili 2 - 3 kilometra, a na ne-
kim pravcima i do 15 kilometara. Zahvaljujući srpskim
uspjesima, Fikret Abdić je u Velikoj Kladuši 26. srpnja
proglasio Republiku Zapadnu Bosnu. Istoga je dana
912 Isto, II, 167-170.
913 D. MARIJAN, Domovinski rat, 341.
397
Domovinski rat 04-02-2020 Knjiga 1.indd 397
from the protected area and threatened the Serbs
with air strikes in case of noncompliance. The Serb re-
jected the ultimatum but UNPROFOR did not launch
air strikes. The Serbs effortlessly captured Srebrenica
on July 11. A small number of soldiers from the 28th
Division managed to fight their way to safety in Tuzla.
The Serbs then proceeded to murder all the male Mus-
lims in Srebrenica (according to the Memorial center
in Potočari some 8,000 men). The International Court
of Justice characterized the massacre as genocide. The
Serbs transported the remaining civilians to Kladanj.
With that, Srebrenica had been completely ethnically
cleansed of Bosniaks.
Drina Corps also attacked the protected enclave
of Žepa on July 11. Unlike Srebrenica, Žepa did not fall
without a vicious fight. The defenders held on until
July 24 when they agreed to negotiate with the Serbs.
All resistance ceased on July 27 and the soldiers of the
Žepa Brigade, divided in groups, fought their way to
II Corps or to Serbia during the month of August. The
Serbs transported the civilian population of Žepa to
the ARBIH-controlled territory. And so, three years after
adopting the strategic objectives, the VRS had finally
albeit partially, because Goražde was still in Bosniak
hands, realized one of them – capturing and ethnically
cleansing the Podrinje region.
THE SECOND BIHAĆ CRISIS
– OPERATION MAČ (SWORD)
95 (ŠTIT-SHIELD 95)
The SVK and the VRS strategists never ceased to
give due consideration to the possibility that the Croa-
tian Army might link up with the ARBIH V Corps in the
Bihać pocket. After the Croatian forces had liberated
western Slavonia, Bihać was again high on the prior-
ity list of both Serbian armies, especially because the
HV’s actions had forced the SVK forces to shift their at-
R
tention from Bihać to Kordun and Banovina. The Serb
intelligence reports insisted that the HV was gathering
a significant force in those areas. OG Pauk ceased to
exert pressure on Bihać. The ARBIH V Corps was quick
to take advantage of the development and started at-
tacking Serb positions. The Serbs feared that Croatian
forces might link up with Bosnian forces in the direc-
tion of Bihać – Bosansko Grahovo. Now that scenario
was not only possible, it was probable. Making things
4.2.2020. 18:35:15
 Davor Marijan • Rat za opstojnost Hrvata, 1991. - 1995.
operacija zastala, a 28. srpnja, zbog napada hrvatskih
snaga na Bosansko Grahovo, završila je jer je dio snaga
izvučen i poslan u jugozapadnu Bosnu.914
Komanda 5. korpusa ARBiH upoznala je 21. srp-
nja 1995. Glavni stožer HV-a s podacima da je korpus
pretrpio velike gubitke u “živoj sili i značajan gubitak
teritorije. […] Zalihe municije i borbenih sredstava su
ispod kritičnog nivoa, te se ne može dugotrajnije su-
protstaviti agresoru. […] Pri ovakvom tempu napada
agresora, može pružati organizovanu odbranu u na-
H
redna dva do tri dana.”915
O dramatičnosti situacije u Bihaću govori i pismo
načelnika bihaćke općine upućeno istoga dana pred-
sjedniku RH Franji Tuđmanu:
“Vaša ekscelencijo, dugo pripremana i od strane
Srbije otvoreno potpomognuta ofanziva na bihać-
M
ko područje započeta je prije nekoliko dana. Glavni
pravci napada usmjereni su iz privremeno okupiranih
dijelova Republike Hrvatske, a koncentracija četnič-
kih snaga evidentirana je i na ostalim linijama u zoni
odgovornosti Petog korpusa Armije Republike Bosne
i Hercegovine, Glavnog stožera Hrvatskog vijeća obra-
D
ne Regije Bihać i Ministarstva unutrašnjih poslova Bi-
hać. Zbog siline artiljerijskih djelovanja stanovništvo
iz pograničnih zona se iseljava i kreće prema gradu
Bihaću. Dramatičan položaj se iz sata u sat usložnjava
jer je humanitarna situacija još od ranije katastrofalna.
Već vam je vjerojatno poznata činjenica da smo imali
C
prve slučajeve umiranja od gladi. Nada da će se sta-
nje koliko-toliko popraviti nakon skidanja žita sa za-
sijanih prigradskih prostora sada je propala. Upravo
ta područja agresor najviše drži pod vatrom, gađajući
ih zapaljivim granatama. Posebno je teško u bihaćkoj
bolnici, kojoj nedostaju lijekovi i sanitetski materijal,
a zbog nedostatka hrane bolesnici primaju samo je-
dan obrok dnevno. Sudbina oko 180.000 stanovnika
Unsko-sanskog kantona je neizvjesna.
Mi možemo samo obećati da ćemo se boriti bez
obzira na cijenu i neodlučnost međunarodne zajednice.
Jedinu nadu polažemo u naše hrabre borce i prijateljski
hrvatski narod, pošto nam je sudbina koju nam je agre-
sor namijenio ista. Stoga vas molim da sa svoje strane
učinite sve što je u vašoj moći da se spasi ovaj herojski
914 M. SEKULIĆ, Knin je pao u Beogradu, 160-165; D. MARI-
JAN, Domovinski rat, 341-342.
915 Obavještajna informacija Komande 5. korpusa i Zapo-
vjedništvo GS HVO Bihać od 21. 7. 1995.
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Domovinski rat 04-02-2020 Knjiga 1.indd 398
worse for the Serbs was the fact that a similar scenario
seemed probable also for the Knin area.
The preparations for the upcoming Serb offensive
started on July 4, 1995, when the general Staffs of the
SVK and the RSK decided to launch it. The SVK code-
named the operation Mač-95 (Sword-95) but the VRS
codenamed it Štit-95 (Shield-95). The plan called for
the destruction of the ARBIH V Corps. The Serb forces
would first encircle V Corps, then destroy some of its
forces and then gain control of the area where a large
number of Fikret Abdić’s supporters resided. The role
of the SVK was to prevent Croatian forces from mount-
ing an attack in support of V Corps. The SVK employed
two Operational Groups and one tactical group, com-
posed of forces from XV, XXI and XXXIX Corps, Special
Units Corps, and OG Pauk. The operation commenced
on July 19, when the SVK attacked. The VRS joined the
attack on July 23. The intensity of the Serbs’ attack re-
mained high for a few days. The focus of their efforts
was on Cazin from the direction of Velika Kladuša. The
Serbs, in some places, advanced 2-3 kilometers, and in
others they managed to advance up to 15 kilometers.
Emboldened by these Serb successes, Fikret Abdić pro-
claimed, in Velika Kladuša, on July 26, the Republic of
Western Bosnia. On that same day, however, the opera-
tion stalled, and on July 28, due to Croatian attacks on
Bosansko Grahovo, it ended altogether because some
Serb troops had to be moved to southwest Bosnia.
The HQ of the ARBIH V Corps informed the Gener-
al Staff of the Croatian Army on July 21 that the Corps
had suffered heavy losses in “men and territory (…).
Supplies of ammunition and armaments are all but
depleted, denying us the ability to resist the aggressor
D
for any significant period of time (…). If the aggressor
keeps up this pressure, we can only maintain an orga-
nized defense for two, maybe three days.”
The letter sent on that same day by the head of the
Bihać Municipality to the president of the Republic of Cro-
R
atia attests to the seriousness of the situation in Bihać:
“Your Excellency, a few days ago the Serbs final-
ly launched their long-prepared offensive against
the Bihać area. Serbia openly supports the offensive.
The main axes of attack originate in the temporarily
occupied areas of Croatia and large concentrations of
Chetnik forces have been noted in other zones of the
area of responsibility of the ARBIH V Corps, the Gener-
al Staff of the HVO of the Bihać region and MUP Bihać.
Due to the ferocious artillery bombardment the civil-
4.2.2020. 18:35:15
 The Croatian Nation’s Struggle for Survival, 1991-1995
grad i njegovo napaćeno stanovništvo. S poštovanjem,
Adnan Alagić, načelnik općine Bihać.”916
Dva dana poslije, 23. srpnja, Komanda 5. korpusa
ARBiH javila je Glavnom stožeru HV-a da se stanje po-
goršalo i izmaklo nadzoru te da postoji mogućnost da
bihaćko područje do večeri bude rasječeno na dva di-
jela, “a 5. korpus razbijen”.917 Idućega su dana Komanda
5. korpusa, Glavni stožer HVO-a Bihać i Općinski odbor
HDZ-a Bihać uputili političkim i vojnim tijelima u Zagre-
bu apel za pomoć: „Molimo Vas, shvatite ovu nastalu
H
situaciju krajnje ozbiljno i poduzmite hitne i radikalne
mjere u cilju spašavanja stanovništva i teritorije Un-
sko-Sanskog kantona.”918
SPLITSKI SPORAZUM
M
Kao na prvu, Hrvatska je spremno odgovorila i na
drugu bihaćku krizu. Vrhovništvo RH pažljivo je pratilo
novu srpsku ofenzivu.919 Kada je kriza bila na vrhuncu, u
Splitu su se sastali predsjednici Tuđman i Izetbegović i
22. srpnja 1995. potpisali Deklaraciju o provedbi Spora-
zuma iz Washingtona. Najvažniji dio sastanka bio je do-
D
govor o vojnoj suradnji.920 Povodom sporazuma Glavni
štab SVK-a informirao je podređene da je to još jedan
dokaz da hrvatski režim namjerava “da silom pokuša na-
staviti sa otimanjem dijelova teritorije RSK sa krajnjim
ciljem okupacije RSK” te da su posebno “pretnje iskaza-
C
ne u slučaju pada Bihaća”.921
Vojni dio sporazuma počeo se primjenjivati 25. srp-
nja, s prvim danom operacije hrvatskih snaga Ljeto-95.
Sam sporazum o djelovanju HVO-a i ARBiH potpisali su
D
916 Miroslav Tuđman, Korespondencija predsjednika Republi-
ke Hrvatske dr. Franje Tuđmana od 1990. do 1999. godine,
knj. VI., Hrvatska sveučilišna naklada i Hrvatski institut
za povijest, Zagreb, 2015., 530-531.
917 Informacija Komande 5. korpusa i Zapovjedništvo GS
HVO Bihać od 23. 7. 1995. o stanju u z/o 5. K i HVO Bihać.
918 Presjek vojno-političke situacije na teritoriji Unsko-San-
skog kantona od Komande 5. korpusa, Zapovjedništva GS
HVO Bihać i Općinskog odbora HDZ Bihać od 24. 7. 1995.
919 H. ŠARINIĆ, Svi moji tajni pregovori, 261.
920 M. TUĐMAN, Istina o Bosni i Hercegovini, 614-616: De-
klaracija o oživotvorenju Sporazuma iz Washingtona,
zajedničkoj obrani od srpske agresije i postizanju po-
litičkog rješenja sukladno naporima međunarodne za-
jednice od 22. 7. 1995.
921 ICTY: GŠSV RSK, Informacija potčinjenim jedinicama
pov. br. 6-179 od 26. 7. 1995.
399
Domovinski rat 04-02-2020 Knjiga 1.indd 399
ians from the border areas are fleeing towards Bihać.
The situation is dire, and is getting worse by the hour
because the humanitarian situation was bad to begin
with. You are probably aware of the fact that a num-
ber of people have died of hunger. Our hopes that the
food situation would improve somewhat after har-
vesting the grain planted in fields around the city have
now been dashed. It is exactly these areas that the ag-
gressor keeps under constant bombardment, firing in-
cendiary rounds. The situation in the Bihać hospital is
especially difficult because of shortages of medicines
and medical supplies. The patients, on account of the
lack of food, eat only one meal a day. The fate of about
180,000 citizens of the Una-Sana Canton hangs in the
balance. We can only give our promise that we’ll fight
regardless of the cost and indecisiveness of the in-
ternational community. We invest our only hope into
our brave fighters and into the comradely Croatian
people, because the fate the aggressor has assigned
to both our peoples is the same. In that spirit I beg of
you to do your utmost to save this heroic city and its
anguished citizens.
Sincerely Yours,
Adnan Alagić, Head of the Bihać Municipality.”
Two days later, on July 23, the HQ of the ARBIH V
Corps informed the General Staff of the Croatian Army
that the situation had gotten worse and gone out of
control and that there was a real danger that the Bi-
hać area would be cut in half by nighttime and that “V
Corps would be destroyed.” The following day the HQ
of V Corps, the HVO Main Staff Bihać and the municipal
committee of the HDZ Bihać sent an appeal for help
to the political and military organs in Zagreb. “Please,
take this newly developed situation extremely serious-
ly and take urgent and radical measures for saving the
population and territory of the Una-Sana Canton.”
SPLIT AGREEMENT
R
Croatia readily and efficiently responded to the
first Bihać crisis. Its response to the second Bihać crisis
was equally effective. The leadership of the Republic
of Croatia kept close tabs on the new Serb offensive.
When the crisis reached its peak, Tuđman and Izetbe-
gović met in Split on July 22, 1995, and signed the dec-
laration on implementing the Washington Agreement.
The most important part of the meeting was a deal on
military cooperation. The General Staff of the SVK re-
4.2.2020. 18:35:16
 Davor Marijan • Rat za opstojnost Hrvata, 1991. - 1995.
H
Predsjednik RH Franjo Tuđman i predsjednik Predsjedništva
RBiH Alija Izetbegović te predsjednik Federacije RBiH Krešimir
Zubak i predsjednik Vlade RBiH Haris Silajdžić potpisuju „Split-
sku deklaraciju“, 22. srpnja 1995.; osobit značaj imao je spora-
M
zum o vojnoj suradnji (autor fotografije: Gordan Laušić).
The Croatian President Franjo Tuđman and the President of the
Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina Presidency Alija izetbe-
gović sign the Split Declaration with the President of the RBH
Federation Krešimir Zubak and BH Prime Minister Haris Silajdžić
(July 22, 1995); the agreement on military cooperation was par-
ticularly significant (Photograph by Gordan Laušić).
D
C
26. srpnja u Vitezu generali Blaškić i Delić. Radi rastereće-
nja bihaćkoga bojišta dogovoreno je djelovanje HVO-a
na smjeru Livno – Glamoč – Drvar s granicom desno De-
mirovac – Sjenokosić – Ravna gora – Gorica, lijevo Repu-
blika Hrvatska. Snage 7. korpusa ARBiH usmjerene su na
smjer Bugojno – Donji Vakuf, granica lijevo HVO, desno
Vlašić. Početak djelovanja dogovoren je za isti dan.922
OPERACIJA LJETO-95
Na temelju dogovora predsjednika Tuđmana i
Izetbegovića u Splitu 22. srpnja 1995., hrvatske snage
su na pravcima Livno – Bosansko Grahovo i Livno – Gla-
moč poduzele konkretne mjere za pružanje pomoći
okruženom Bihaću. Provele su operaciju Ljeto-95, koja
je imala nekoliko ciljeva: razbiti srpske snage na područ-
922 Sporazum načelnika GS HVO i komandanta GŠ ARBiH
od 26. 7. 1995.; Kabinet Načelnika GSHVO, Izvješće sa
sastanka N GS HVO i K-ta GŠA kl. 818-01/95-02/03, ur. br.
02-10-03-95-134 od 27. 7. 1995.
400
Domovinski rat 04-02-2020 Knjiga 1.indd 400
acted to the Agreement by informing its subordinate
units that the agreement was yet another proof that
the Croatian regime intended to “use force to continue
conquering RSK territory with the aim of totally occu-
pying the RSK” and that Croatia’s intentions would be
“especially dangerous if Bihać fell”.
The implementation of the military part of the
agreement began on July 25, with the commencement
of Operation Ljeto-95 (Summer-95), mounted by the
Croatian Army. The part of the agreement concerning
HVO and ARBIH operations was signed in Vitez on July
26 by Generals Blaškić and Delić. It was agreed that,
for the purpose of relieving pressure on Bihać the HVO
would advance in the direction of Livno – Glamoč –
Drvar within the Demirovac – Sjenokosić – Ravna Gora
– Gorica line on the right and the Croatian border on
the left and the ARBIH would advance in the direction
of Bugojno – Donji Vakuf, with the border and HVO on
the left and Vlašić on the right. The offensive, according
to the agreement, would begin on the day of the sign-
ing of the agreement.
OPERATION SUMMER-95
Based on the agreement reached by Tuđman and
Izetbegović in Split on July 22, 1995, the Croatian
forces mounted an operation for helping Bihać by ad-
vancing in the direction of Livno – Bosansko Grahovo
and in the direction of Livno – Glamoč. This was Op-
eration Summer-95 which had a number of objectives:
to destroy the Serb forces in the Dinara area – to the
east and northeast of the Livno field, force the Serbs’
long-range artillery to withdraw and thus improve the
D
security situation in Livno and Kupres, gain control of
Bosansko Grahovo and cut the Knin – Drvar road, gain
control of Mount Šator, Mount Staretina and Mount
Golija, capture Glamoč, shortened the front line in the
Cincar and the Kupres plateau areas and free up forces
R
for further offensive actions, stop the enemy offensive
against Bihać and create conditions for the liberation
of Knin and other areas under Serb occupation in Dal-
matia and Lika.
The 4th and 7th Guards Brigades of the Croatian
Army, reinforced with forces from TG-1 (two compa-
nies of the Special Police of the MUP HR HB and one
reinforced company of the 114th Brigade) were de-
ployed along the Livno field – Bosansko Grahovo line.
The 81st Guards Battalion, 1st Croatian Guards Corps,
4.2.2020. 18:35:16
 The Croatian Nation’s Struggle for Survival, 1991-1995
ju Dinare – istočno i sjeveroistočno od Livanjskog polja,
prisiliti dalekometno topništvo na izmještanje po dubini
i na taj način povećati sigurnost gradova Livno i Kupres,
ovladati Bosanskim Grahovom i presjeći prometnicu
Knin – Drvar, ovladati planinama Šator, Staretina i Golija
te zauzeti Glamoč, skratiti crtu bojišta na području Cin-
cara i Kupreške visoravni i osloboditi dio snaga za dalj-
nja napadna djelovanja, zaustaviti neprijateljsku ofenzi-
vu na Bihać i stvoriti preduvjete za oslobađanje Knina i
ostalog područja pod srpskom okupacijom u sjevernoj
H
Dalmaciji i Lici.923
Na smjeru Livanjsko polje – Bosansko Grahovo an-
gažirane su 4. i 7. gardijska brigada HV-a, ojačane po-
strojbama TG-1 (Specijalna policija MUP-a HR HB i oja-
čana satnija 114. brigade). Na smjeru Šator – Glamoč
bili su 81. gardijska bojna, 1. HGZ, 3. bojna 1. gardijske
M
brigade HV-a (ojačana IDS-om GSHV-a i združenom sat-
nijom ATG-a) i TG-2 s 3. gardijskom brigadom HVO-a. Na
smjeru Golija – Glamoč angažirane su postrojbe HVO-a:
2. gardijska brigada, PPN Gavran-2, TG-3, 60. gardijska
bojna i dio snaga ZP-a Tomislavgrad. Na smjerovima Cin-
car – Kujača, Malovan – Procip i Kupres – Rastičevo bile
D
su snage ZP-a Tomislavgrad.924
Operacija Ljeto-95 počela je 25. srpnja 1995. i za-
vršena je do kraja mjeseca. Svi postavljeni ciljevi su u
cijelosti ostvareni. Uz Oluju, Ljeto-95 je možda i najzna-
čajnija operacija hrvatskih snaga 1995. i imala je strate-
gijsko značenje. Temeljna značajka operacije jest u tome
C
što se ona planirala i izvodila na dva odvojena, ali ipak
usko povezana smjera, za koje je bilo jasno kako je onaj
prema Bosanskom Grahovu bio glavni kada je u pitanju
razbijanje srpskih snaga na okupiranom području RH.
Zauzimanjem Bosanskog Grahova prekinuta je vitalna
D
prometnica Drvar – Knin, a srpske snage na području
sjeverne Dalmacije dovedene su u poluokruženje, sa
samo dva moguća izlaska prema BiH, od kojih ni jedan
nije bio posve siguran: Knin – Otrić – Srb i Obrovac – Gra-
čac. Zauzimanjem Glamoča, srpske snage su odbačene
u dubinu bojišta, s tim da je stvorena pretpostavka za
daljnje nastupanje prema Jajcu. Većina postrojbi 2. KK-a
bila je razbijena. Oslobođeno područje smjerom Crni
Lug – Bosansko Grahovo bilo je širine 15 km i dubine
20 km, odnosno površine oko 300 četvornih km, a na
području Glamoča oko 1300 četvornih km prostora. Ti-
923 D. MARIJAN, Domovinski rat, 343.
924 Isto; 7. gardijska brigada HV – Pume, 206-214.
401
Domovinski rat 04-02-2020 Knjiga 1.indd 401
3rd Battalion of 1st Guards Brigade (reinforced with
the Recon-Commando Company of the General Staff
of the Croatian Army and a combined ATG company)
and TG-2 with 3rd Guards Brigade of the HVO were de-
ployed along the Šator – Glamoč line. The HVO forces
deployed along the Golija – Glamoč line were: the 2nd
Guards Brigade, the Gavran-2 special purpose unit,
TG-3, the 60th Guards Battalion and elements of Mil-
itary District Tomislavgrad. Forces belonging to Mil-
itary District Tomislavgrad were deployed along the
following lines: Cincar – Kujača, Malovan – Procip and
Kupres – Rastičevo.
Operation Summer-95 started on July 25, 1995,
and ended by the end of the month. All the objec-
tives were achieved. With Operation Storm, Operation
Summer-95 is arguably the most important operation
undertaken by the Croatian forces. In 1995, the im-
portance of Operation Summer-95 was strategic. The
fundamental feature of the operation is the fact that it
was conceived as a two-pronged attack. The two axes
of advance were separate, but, on the other hand, also
closely connected. The main axis of advance in terms
of destroying the Serb forces in the occupied territo-
ry of Croatia was the one leading in the direction of
Bosansko Grahovo. By capturing Bosansko Grahovo,
the Croatian forces cut the vital Drvar – Knin road and
the Serb forces in northern Dalmatia found them-
selves in a semi-encirclement, with only two possible
gateways towards Bosnia and Herzegovina, neither of
which was entirely secure: Knin – Otrić – Srb and Obro-
vac – Gračac. By capturing Glamoč, the Croatian forces
threw back the Serb forces and created necessary con-
ditions for a further advance towards Jajce. Most of the
units of II Krajina Corps were destroyed. The liberated
area in the direction of Crni Lug – Bosansko Grahovo
was 15km wide and 20km deep (about 300m2) and in
the Glamoč area about 1,300m2. During the operation
the Croatian forces lost 18 men killed and 155 wound-
ed, 26 of them seriously.
R
The operation stopped the Serb attack on the AR-
BIH V Corps in its tracks, and forced the Serbs to move
some of their forces from the area. The RSK admitted,
in a circular, that “this Croatian operation saved, for a
second time, the ARBIH V Corps, from ‘destruction’ be-
cause the Serb army was forced shift some of its forc-
es from the Bihać area for the purpose of preventing
the Croatian Army from deeper penetrations along the
mentioned direction of advance”.
4.2.2020. 18:35:16
 Davor Marijan • Rat za opstojnost Hrvata, 1991. - 1995.
jekom operacije hrvatske snage imale su 18 poginulih i
155 ranjenih vojnika, od kojih 26 teže.925
Operacijom je prekinut srpski napad na 5. korpus
Armije RBiH i odvučen dio snaga s toga dijela bojišta.
Srpska vojska Krajine priznala je u informaciji za podre-
đene da je “ovakvom akcijom Hrvatska po drugi put ‘spa-
sila’ od slamanja 5. korpus Alijine vojske, jer je primorala
Srpsku vojsku da izvrši pregrupisavanje snaga sa Biha-
ćkog ratišta u cilju zaustavljanja dubljih prodora HV na
već pomenutom pravcu napada”.926
H
Srpske reakcije na Ljeto-95
Završetak operacije Ljeto-95 RSK je dočekala u najte-
žim trenucima svojega postojanja. Knin je bio prometno
odsječen od Republike Srpske i Savezne Republike Ju-
M
goslavije. Na cjelokupnom području RSK ratno je stanje
proglašeno 28. srpnja. Svim postrojbama SVK-a zabra-
njen je odmor po sustavu smjenskoga rada. Odmor se
mogao koristiti samo na položajima u okviru borbenoga
rasporeda. Kao mjeru osiguranja u očekivanom sukobu
pojedine postrojbe SVK-a pripremale su blokadu snaga
D
UN-a, onemogućivanje odlaska u Hrvatsku, razoružanje
i držanje UN-ovaca kao talaca.927
Radi podizanja poljuljanog morala stanovništva i
vojske general Ratko Mladić izjavio je 30. srpnja u Kni-
nu da su hrvatske snage osvajanjem Glamoča i Grahova
C
napravile odlučujuću grešku u ratu i da će ih ona sku-
po stajati.928 M. Martić se 31. srpnja 1995. obratio no-
vinarima. Izjavio je da je razgovarao s predsjednikom
Republike Srbije Slobodanom Miloševićem i da je od
njega dobio obećanje da u slučaju hrvatskoga napada
na Knin „Srbija ne bi mogla biti ravnodušna“.929
U Glavnom štabu SVK-a poduzeli su mjere da se
ojača 7. korpus i zatvori prilaz Kninu iz smjera Bosan-
skog Grahova. To je trebao biti uvod u operaciju Va-
ganj-2 i vraćanje pod nadzor prometnice Knin – Graho-
vo – Drvar i grebena Dinare. Drugi krajiški korpus VRS-a
nastojao je stabilizirati obranu na smjeru Bosansko
925 A. GOTOVINA, Napadajni bojevi i operacije, 63-64, 187; D.
MARIJAN, Domovinski rat, 343-346.
926 HMDCDR: Komanda 50. pbr SVK, Informacija potčinje-
nim jedinicama pov. br. 50-21-55/95 od 31. 7. 1995.
927 D. MARIJAN, Domovinski rat, 348-349.
928 D. RADIŠIĆ, Hronologija događaja, 605.
929 Isto.
402
Domovinski rat 04-02-2020 Knjiga 1.indd 402
Serb Reactions to Summer-95
By the time Operation Summer-95 was completed,
the situation in the RSK was worse than it had ever been
during the statelet’s existence. Knin was cut off from the
Republika Srpska and the Socialist Republic of Yugosla-
via. Martial law was declared in the entire territory of the
RSK on July 28. Leave was cancelled in all units. Troops
could only rest on the front line within the constraints of
deployment. Some SVK units, as a precautionary mea-
sure, started preparations for placing UN troops under
blockade, taking UN personnel as hostages and pre-
venting people from travelling to Croatia.
On July 30 in Knin, Ratko Mladić announced, in a
bid to raise the morale of the army and civilians, that
the Croatian forces, by capturing Glamoč and Bosansko
Grahovo, had made a decisive blunder and that Croa-
tia would pay dearly for the mistake. On July 31, 1995,
Martić held a press conference. He stated that he had
talked to the president of Serbia, Slobodan Milošević,
and that Milošević had promised him that in the event
of a Croatian attack on Knin, “Serbia could ill-afford to
remain on the sidelines.”
The SVK’s General Staff implemented measures for
strengthening VII Corps and blocking the approach-
es to Knin from the direction of Bosansko Grahovo.
These measures were to constitute the opening act of
Operation Vaganj-2 the main aim of which was to re-
gain control of the Knin – Grahovo – Drvar road and
Dinara ridge. The VRS II Krajina Corps tried to stabilize
the defenses along the Bosansko Grahovo – Drvar line.
The Corps was reinforced with a unit from East Bosnia
Corps for the purpose.
D
During Operation Summer-95, on July 28, 1995,
martial law was declared in the territory of the RS,
which meant mobilizing all human and material re-
sources for the defense of the republic. Mobilization
of all military capable men was ordered, with the ex-
R
ception of the minimal number of persons needed for
the proper functioning of the armed forces and civilian
society. The universities and other institutions of high-
er education were closed and the students mobilized
into the army.
The loss of Glamoč and Grahovo was an event the
political and military leadership of the RS could ill-af-
ford to ignore, especially because of the rumors that
they had given up on the lost territory. The chief of the
General Staff of the Army of the Republika Srpska, Gen-
4.2.2020. 18:35:16
 The Croatian Nation’s Struggle for Survival, 1991-1995
Grahovo – Drvar, za što ga se ojačavalo postrojbom iz
Istočnobosanskoga korpusa.930
Tijekom operacije Ljeto-95, 28. srpnja 1995. progla-
šeno je ratno stanje i na teritoriju RS-a, što je značilo
stavljanje svih ljudskih i materijalnih potencijala u obra-
nu Republike.931 Naređena je mobilizacija svih vojno
sposobnih stanovnika “sem minimalnog neophodnog
za funkcionisanje potreba oružanih snaga i stanovništva
u ratnom stanju”. Prekinut je rad fakulteta i visokoškol-
skih ustanova, a studenti su poslani u postrojbe.932
H
Pad Glamoča i Grahova bio je događaj koji političko i
vojno vodstvo RS-a nije moglo ignorirati, posebice zbog
glasina da su se odrekli toga dijela teritorija. Načelnik Glav-
noga štaba VRS-a general Manojlo Milovanović izjavio je
31. srpnja u Bosanskom Petrovcu da je od predsjednika
Republike Srpske Radovana Karadžića dobio naredbu da
M
zaustavi prodor hrvatskih snaga i prijeđe u protuudar za
oslobađanje Grahova i Glamoča.933 Pripreme za vraćanje
počele su već 30. srpnja kada su poslana pojačanja prema
Bosanskom Grahovu i Glamoču. Operacija vraćanja izgu-
bljenog teritorija nazvana je Vaganj-95 i u obliku direktive
napisana je 3. kolovoza u Drvaru na IZM-u Glavnoga štaba
D
VRS-a. U operaciji u tri etape u trajanju 20 - 30 dana Glav-
ni štab VRS-a namjeravao je zaustaviti prodore hrvatskih
snaga i ARBiH, prestrojiti snage i na izabranim pravcima u
protunapadu vratiti se na položaje koje su držali u listopa-
du 1994., prije operacije Cincar, tj. zauzeti Glamoč, Bosan-
sko Grahovo i Kupres.934
C
U ime Vrhovnoga savjeta obrane Republike Srpske i
Republike Srpske Krajine, koji je 2. kolovoza 1995. zasje-
dao u Drvaru, Radovan Karadžić je zatražio da međuna-
rodna zajednica sankcionira hrvatsko ponašanje. Od Ju-
goslavije se zatražila pomoć jer, držao je Karadžić, tu se
D
više ne radi o građanskom ratu, nego o nastavku Drugo-
ga svjetskog rata i pokušaju stvaranja velike Hrvatske.935
Moral krajinskih Srba je tih dana bio na vrlo niskoj
razini. Republički štab Civilne zaštite RSK naredio je 2. ko-
lovoza 1995. podređenim štabovima da odmah počnu s
930 D. MARIJAN, Domovinski rat, 347.
931 ICTY: Predsednik RS, Odluka br. 01-1573/95 od 28. 8.
1995.
932 ICTY: Komanda Drinskog korpusa, Naređenje str. pov. br.
01/159-2 od 29. 7. 1995.
933 D. RADIŠIĆ, Hronologija događaja, 605.
934 D. MARIJAN, Domovinski rat, 347-348.
935 D. RADIŠIĆ, Hronologija događaja, 608.
403
Domovinski rat 04-02-2020 Knjiga 1.indd 403
eral Milovanović, stated, on July 31, in Bosanski Petro-
vac, that he had been ordered by the president of RS,
Radovan Karadžić, to stop the advance of the Croatian
forces and launch a counterattack with the aim of lib-
erating Grahovo and Glamoč. The preparations for the
counterattack started on July 30 when reinforcements
were sent towards Bosansko Grahovo and Glamoč. The
operation was codenamed Vaganj-95 and the plan was
committed to paper in the form of a directive on August
3 in Drvar at Forward Command Post of the General Staff
of the VRS. The operation was to be conducted in three
phases, lasting 20-30 days. The General Staff of the VRS
intended to stop the advance of the Croatian forces and
the ARBIH, regroup its forces and, in a counterattack re-
gain the positions held in October, 1994, before Opera-
tion Cincar; in effect, recapture Glamoč, Bosansko Gra-
hovo and Kupres.
On behalf of the Supreme Defense Council of the
Republika Srpska and the RSK, which held a session in
Drvar on August 2, 1995, Radovan Karadžić requested
that the international community punish Croatia for its
behavior. Karadžić also requested help from Yugoslavia
because, according to him, this was not a civil war any-
more but a continuation of WWII and an attempt to cre-
ate a Greater Croatia.
The morale of the Krajina Serbs was at a low ebb.
On August 2, 1995, the Republic HQ of civilian defense
of the RSK ordered its subordinate HQs to immediate-
ly start preparing for the evacuation of material goods,
archives, registers, files and confidential documents,
movable cultural assets, monetary assets, securities and
other documentation. The implementation of the order
had been prepared beforehand. The next day, August
3, 1995, at 1400 hours, the General Staff of the SVK was
informed that “the aggression will start on August 4 at
0500 hours.”
The SVK mobilized all available reservists and the
army was placed at the highest level of combat readi-
R
ness. The SVK swelled to 60,000 men during those days.
On paper, it was 80,080 strong. When General Mrkšić
arrived, the SVK had about 62,000 men under arms, or
78% of its nominal strength. The SVK forces in western
Croatia, from May until July 1995, numbered 36,000
soldiers. Mrkšić claims that at the start of the opera-
tion there were only 27,000 men and that 9,000 were
absent for various reasons and that the real number
was 25,000 because 2,000 men had left the RSK in the
period from the fall of Bosansko Grahovo until August
4.2.2020. 18:35:16
 Davor Marijan • Rat za opstojnost Hrvata, 1991. - 1995.
pripremama za evakuaciju materijalnih dobara, arhiva,
matičnih knjiga, evidencija i materijala povjerljivog karak-
tera, pokretnih kulturnih dobara, novčanih sredstava, vri-
jednosnih popisa i druge odgovarajuće dokumentacije.
Provedba te naredbe već je prije pripremljena.936 Sljede-
ćega dana, 3. kolovoza 1995. u 14 sati, Glavni štab SVK-a
informiran je da će “agresija početi 04. 08. u 05,00 č”.937
U SVK-u su mobilizirani svi raspoloživi pričuvnici, a
vojska je stavljena u punu borbenu spremnost. Srpska
vojska Krajine tih je dana narasla na oko 60.000 ljudi. Po
H
ustroju je imala 80.080 vojnih obveznika, a pri dolasku
generala Mile Mrkšića brojno je stanje bilo oko 62.000
ili 78 %. Brojno stanje SVK-a u zapadnom dijelu Hrvat-
ske od svibnja do srpnja 1995. iznosilo je oko 36.000 lju-
di. Mrkšić tvrdi da je na početku operacije stvarno bilo
samo 27.000 ljudi, a da ih je 9000 bilo u rashodu, odno-
M
sno da je stvarno stanje bilo 25.000 jer je 2000 ljudi na-
pustilo RSK od pada Bosanskog Grahova do 4. kolovoza.
Brojno stanje milicije nije uračunato.938
Na srpske planove nepovoljno je utjecao i sukob iz-
među vojnog i političkog vrha RS-a koji je počeo još u
rujnu 1993. godine. Radovan Karadžić je 2. kolovoza kao
D
vrhovni komandant preimenovao Glavni štab VRS-a u
Generalštab VRS-a, a generala Ratka Mladića imenovao
„specijalnim savjetnikom vrhovnoga komandanta (tj.
sebe) za koordinaciju zajedničke odbrane RS-a i RSK-a“.
Mladić je odluku odbio nazvavši je neustavnom i opa-
snom samovoljom predsjednika Karadžića. U verbal-
C
nom ratu koji je trajao do kraja kolovoza 1995. pobijedio
je general Mladić kojeg je uz vojsku, podržala javnost,
Srpska pravoslavna crkva, srpski intelektualni krugovi i
udruženja građana. Karadžić nije imao izbora i 27. kolo-
voza je poništio svoju odluku.939
Politička priprema Oluje
U poslanici kojom se predsjednik RH Franjo Tuđ-
man obratio javnosti 3. svibnja 1995., dan nakon ope-
racije Bljesak, istaknuo je da je Hrvatska pokazala po-
bunjenim Srbima i međunarodnoj zajednici da ima
936 D. MARIJAN, Oluja, 59.
937 ICTY: GŠSV RSK, Operativni izveštaj o agresiji na RSK i
aktivnostima SVK str. pov. br. 30-1/33 od 26. 8. 1995.
938 ICTY: GŠSV RSK, Operativni izveštaj o agresiji na RSK i
aktivnostima SVK, str. pov. br. 30-1/33 od 26. 8. 1995.; D.
MARIJAN, Domovinski rat, 350.
939 D. MARIJAN, Domovinski rat, 351.
404
Domovinski rat 04-02-2020 Knjiga 1.indd 404
4. The numerical strength of the militia is not included
in the above numbers.
The Serbs’ plans were also affected by a rift between
the military and political leadership of the RS that had
opened in September, 1993. On August 2, Karadžić, as
the supreme commander, redesignated the Main Staff
of the VRS as the General Staff of the VRS and appoint-
ed General Mladić as special advisor of the supreme
commander (himself ) for coordinating the RS-RSK Joint
Defense. Mladić rejected the appointment and charac-
terized it as unconstitutional and as dangerous arbitrary
action on the part of President Karadžić. A war of words
ensued. It lasted until the end of August. General Mladić
got the better of Karadžić. Mladić enjoyed the support of
the army, general public, Serb Orthodox Church, Serbi-
an intellectuals and citizen organizations. Karadžić had
no choice and on August 27 he canceled his decision.
Political Preparations for Operation
Storm
In a message to the Croatian public announced on
May 3 President Franjo Tuđman stated that Croatia had
shown to the rebel Serbs and international communi-
ty that it possessed an armed force “which is capable
of liberating all occupied areas, if the same outcome is
not effected in cooperation with the international com-
munity”. Operations Leap-2 and Summer-95 justified the
president’s optimism but also gave credibility to the
opinion that a peaceful reintegration of the occupied
territories was a pipe dream. From a military perspec-
tive, the Croatian Army could ill-afford to be idle in west-
ern Bosnia because at that moment it held every ad-
D
vantage over the Serb forces there; a situation that had
never existed before and if the Croatian Army did not
take advantage of it soon, it probably would not occur
again. For these reasons the Croatian Army was given
the green light to start the process of liberating the tem-
R
porarily occupied territory of the Republic of Croatia. On
July 31, Tuđman held a meeting with high ranking HV
officers on the Brijuni Islands where they discussed the
upcoming operation and available political justifications
for it. Tuđman demanded that the rebel Serbs be dealt a
decisive defeat in as short a time as possible.
In the political arena the last attempt to solve the
problem peacefully was made on August 3 in Geneva.
Before the meeting, Slobodan Milošević, through the
General Staff of the Yugoslav Army, suggested to Mile
4.2.2020. 18:35:16
 The Croatian Nation’s Struggle for Survival, 1991-1995

oružanu silu “koja je kadra osloboditi sva još okupirana

područja, ako se to ne ostvari na miran način u surad-
nji s međunarodnom zajednicom”.940 Operacije Skok-2 i
Ljeto-95 potvrdile su njegov optimizam, ali i sumnju da
do mirne reintegracije neće doći, a da mirovanje HV-a
oko zapadne Bosne može samo pogoršati opći odnos
snaga, koji nikada do tada nije bio tako povoljan. Bio
je to razlog da se HV-u odobri pokretanje procesa za
oslobađanje privremeno okupiranih područja RH. Na
sastanku predsjednika Tuđmana s visokim časnicima
H
HV-a, održanom 31. srpnja na Brijunima, razmatrala se
predstojeća operacija i traženje političkoga opravdanja
za nju. Tuđman je zatražio da se pobunjenim Srbima u
što kraćem vremenu nanese totalni poraz.941
Na političkom planu posljednji pokušaj mirnog ra- Predsjednik RH Franjo Tuđman i ministar obrane RH Gojko Šušak
zrješenja problema pobunjenih područja učinjen je 3.
M
obilaze počasni stroj 4. i 7. gardijske brigade HV-a, Knin, 6. kolovo-
kolovoza 1995. u Ženevi. Uoči susreta, Slobodan Milo- za 1995. (autor fotografije: Gordan Laušić).
šević je preko Generalštaba Vojske Jugoslavije sugerirao Croatian President Franjo Tuđman and Minister of Defence Gojko
generalu Mili Mrkšiću da utječe na čelnike RSK da pri- Šušak inspect the honors detachment of the 4th and 7th Guards
hvate dogovor o uvjetima pregovora u Ženevi kako bi Brigades, Knin, August 6, 1995 (Photograph by Gordan Laušić).
dobili na vremenu i odgodili hrvatski napad na RSK.942
Hrvatsko izaslanstvo, u kojem su bili Ivić Pašalić (sabor-
D
ski zastupnik), Vesna Škare Ožbolt (pomoćnica predstoj-
nika Predsjednikova ureda), Smiljan Reljić (pomoćnik
ministra unutarnjih poslova) i general-pukovnik Petar Mrkšić to influence the leaders of the RSK to accept the
Stipetić (pomoćnik načelnika Glavnoga stožera HV-a), na agreement about conditions for negotiations in order to
pregovorima je zatražilo mirnu reintegraciju okupiranih gain time and postpone the Croatian attack on the RSK.
područja, otvaranje svih prometnica na okupiranom po-
C
The Croatian delegation, consisting of Ivić Pašalić (mem-
dručju, primjenu hrvatskoga Ustava na cijelom području ber of parliament), Vesna Škare Ožbolt (assistant to the
Hrvatske te provedbu Ustavnoga zakona za srpsku etnič- head of the President’s Office) Smiljan Reljić (assistant to
ku zajednicu, kojoj hrvatske vlasti jamče politička, gra- the interior minister) and Colonel General Petar Stipetić
đanska i nacionalna prava. Srpska delegacija negativno (assistant to the chief of the General Staff ) demanded, at
je odgovorila na hrvatske zahtjeve. Zadatak reintegracije the talks, a peaceful reintegration of the occupied areas,
D
okupiranih područja dobila je Hrvatska vojska.943 opening of all roads in those areas for traffic, application
of the Croatian Constitution on the entire area of Croa-
tia and implementation of the constitutional law for the
ethnic Serb community to which the Croatian authori-
ties guaranteed all political, national and civil rights. The
R
Serb delegation rejected the demands. The task, there-
fore, of reintegrating the occupied territories of the Re-
public of Croatia was given to the Croatian Army.

940 HDA, HUPMEZ: Poslanica Predsjednika Republike dr. Fra-

nje Tuđmana 3. svibnja 1995.
941 D. MARIJAN, Oluja, 55.
942 ICTY: Načelnik GŠVJ, str. pov. br. 1275-1 od 18. 7. 1995.
943 D. MARIJAN, Domovinski rat, 351-352.

405

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 Davor Marijan • Rat za opstojnost Hrvata, 1991. - 1995.
OPERACIJA OLUJA
Nakon Bljeska ratni plan Oružanih snaga RH preime-
novan je u Oluju i usklađen sa stanjem na ratištu. Zbor-
na područja Zagreb, Karlovac, Gospić i Split zadužena su
za izvedbu operacije, a zborna područja Osijek, Bjelovar,
Južno bojište i Hrvatska ratna mornarica za osiguranje
operacije prema Jugoslaviji i Republici Srpskoj. Opera-
tivno podređivanje pridodanih snaga zapovjedništvima
zbornih područja završeno je do 3. srpnja, a do 15. srpnja
H
sve su snage trebale biti spremne za operaciju. Zbornom
području Bjelovar 2. kolovoza promijenjen je zadatak –
umjesto u osiguranje uključeno je u operaciju na području
Banovine. Za praćenje i osiguranje operacije Glavni stožer
HV-a osnovao je IZM-ove u Ogulinu i Đakovu. Premda u
M
Glavnom stožeru HV-a nisu planirane, u osiguranju ope-
racije angažirane su i postrojbe HVO-a u jugozapadnoj
Bosni radi skrivanja glavnoga smjera napada ZP-a Split i
vezivanja operativne pričuve VRS-a. Navečer 3. kolovoza
načelnik Glavnoga stožera HV-a general Zvonimir Červen-
ko zapovjedio je postrojbama da ujutro 4. kolovoza budu
spremne za napad odnosno obranu.944
D
Pobunjeni hrvatski Srbi napravili su u veljači 1995. plan
uporabe oružanih snaga pod imenom Gvozd. Predviđali su
da HV nema snaga za napad na cjelokupno područje RSK i
da planira napade po dijelovima, na rubove RSK, sjevernu
Dalmaciju i zapadnu Slavoniju da bi razbio i uništio Sjever-
C
nodalmatinski i Zapadnoslavonski korpus SVK-a. Nakon
toga se očekivao napad na Lički i Kordunaški korpus SVK-a
uz sukladno djelovanje s 5. korpusom ARBiH. Temelj plana
Gvozd bila je odsudna obrana, a potom u suradnji s voj-
skom SRJ i vojskom RS-a protunapad u istočnoj Slavoniji,
Dalmaciji, Gorskom kotaru i odvajanje Gorskoga kotara
od Dalmacije. U predviđanom protunapadu pobunjeni
Srbi planirali su da u istočnoj Slavoniji osvoje Spačvanske
šume, a u Dalmaciji izbiju na more između Šibenika i Bi-
ograda.945 General Mrkšić tvrdio je nakon Oluje da se SVK
pripremao za upornu obranu od pet do sedam dana “ve-
rujući da će to biti dovoljno za reagovanje međunarodnog
faktora, a ako bude neophodno i Vojske Jugoslavije”.946
Operaciji Oluja prethodio je angažman HVO-a (ZP-a
Tomislavgrad) na pravcima Glamočko polje – Vitorog i
944 D. MARIJAN, Oluja, 59, 62-63.
945 Isto, 60-61.
946 ICTY: GŠSV RSK, Operativni izveštaj o agresiji na RSK i ak-
tivnostima SVK str. pov. br. 30-1/33 od 26. 8. 1995.
406
Domovinski rat 04-02-2020 Knjiga 1.indd 406
OPERATION STORM
After Operation Flash the war plan of the Croa-
tian armed forces was renamed Storm and adjusted
according to the situation in the theater. Military Dis-
tricts Zagreb, Karlovac, Gospić and Split were tasked
with carrying out the offensive part of the operation
while Military Districts Osijek, Bjelovar, the Southern
Theater and the Croatian Navy were tasked with se-
curing the operation by remaining on the defensive
opposite Yugoslavia and the Republika Srpska. By
July 3, the process of subordinating units to their as-
signed Military District Commands was completed. By
July 15, all the formations were to be ready for action.
On August 2 Military District Bjelovar was given new
orders – instead of fulfilling a defensive role, Military
District Bjelovar was included in offensive operations
in Banovina. For the purpose of monitoring and secur-
ing the operation the General Staff formed Forward
Command Posts in Ogulin and Đakovo. Even though
not included in the General Staff’s plan, the HVO units
in western Bosnia were also employed in the opera-
tion for the purpose of masking the main direction of
advance of Military District Split and tying down the
VRS’s operational reserve. On the evening of August
3, the chief of the General Staff of the Croatian Army,
General Zvonimir Červenko, ordered all units to be
ready for action in the morning on August 4.
In February, 1995, the rebel Serbs in Croatia cre-
ated a plan for using their armed forces. The plan was
codenamed Gvozd. The Serb planners predicted that
the Croatian Army was not sufficiently strong to attack
the entire territory of the RSK and that the Croatian Ar-
D
my’s plans were to launch a series of attacks, targeting
different areas at different times – fringes of the RSK’s
territory, northern Dalmatia, and western Slavonia
with the aim of defeating and destroying North Dal-
matia Corps and West Slavonia Corps of the SVK. The
R
Serb planners expected the Croatian Army to follow
up these attacks with an attack on Lika Corps and Kor-
dun Corps of the SVK in coordinaton with the ARBIH
V Corps. The fundamental principle of the Gvozd plan
was determined defense and then, in coordinaton
with the SRY Army and VRS, launching a counterattack
in eastern Slavonia, Dalmatia, Gorski Kotar and sepa-
rating Gorski Kotar from Dalmatia. With this counter-
attack the rebel Serbs planned to capture the Spačva
forest complex in eastern Slavonia and in Dalmatia
4.2.2020. 18:35:16
 The Croatian Nation’s Struggle for Survival, 1991-1995
H
M
Hrvatska vojska prelazi Savu kod sela Krapja, u zoru 4. kolovoza
D
1995. (autor fotografija: Željko Gašparović).
Croatian Army forces cross the Sava River near the village of
Krapje in the early morning on August 4, 1995 (Photographs by
Željko Gašparović).
C
Kupres – Demirovac radi stvaranja uvjeta za daljnje na-
predovanje prema Šipovu i Jajcu. Od 3. kolovoza HVO je
napadao na tim pravcima, no bez većih pomaka. No učinio
je ono što se tražilo od njega, osigurao je ZP-u Split izvo-
đenje operacije Oluja i vezao za sebe snage 1. i 2. krajiškog
korpusa VRS-a.947
D
U prvim satima Oluje hrvatski predsjednik Franjo Tu-
đman pozvao je pripadnike srpskih postrojbi da predaju
oružje, uz jamstvo da će svi koji nisu počinili ratne zločine
po hrvatskim zakonima biti amnestirani, a građani srpske
narodnosti na dotad okupiranom području pozvani su da
ostanu kod kuće i bez straha dočekaju hrvatsku vlast.948
Završnu oslobodilačku operaciju, nazvanu Oluja, Hr-
vatska je provela od 4. do 7., odnosno 10. kolovoza 1995.
godine.949 Hrvatske snage (Hrvatska vojska i specijalne
947 D. MARIJAN, Domovinski rat, 353.
948 D. MARIJAN, Oluja, 140.
949 Opširnije o Oluji vidi: Davor Marijan, Storm, Zagreb,
2010.; Isti, Domovinski rat, Zagreb, 2016., 351-374.
407
Domovinski rat 04-02-2020 Knjiga 1.indd 407
reach the sea between Šibenik and Biograd. General
Mrkšić claimed that the SVK had been planning to of-
fer determined resistance lasting five to seven days,
“believing that this period of time would be enough
for the international factor to react, and also, if neces-
sary, enough for the Yugoslav Army to react.”
The commencement of Operation Storm was
preceded by HVO actions (ZP Tomislavgrad, in the
direction of the Glamoč field – Vitorog and Kupres –
Demirovac) for the purpose of creating conditions for
a further advance towards Šipovo and Jajce. From Au-
gust 3, the HVO attacked in said direction, but without
making much headway. But, the attacks served their
purpose – enabling ZP Split to attack and tying down
the VRS I and II Krajina Corps.
Within the first few hours of Operation Storm Pres-
ident Tuđman called on all members of Serb forma-
tions to lay down their arms and guaranteed that all
those who had not, according to Croatian laws, com-
mitted war crimes, be granted amnesty. He also called
on the citizens of Serb ethnicity in the occupied areas
to remain in their homes and await without fear the
arrival of Croatian authorities.
The final operation for the liberation of occupied
territories, codenamed Storm, started on August 4 and
ended on August 10. The Croatian forces (Croatian
Army and Special Police units) moved into action on
August 4, 1995, at 0500 hours along a line stretching
from Bosansko Grahovo in the south to Jasenovac in
the east, a front line more than 630km long. The Croa-
tian forces in eastern Slavonia and southern Dalmatia
(defensive operations Feniks – from July 15 until Oc-
tober 30, 1995, a continuation of a defensive opera-
tion codenamed Zid [Wall], conducted during and
after Operation Flash that lasted from May 1 to May
26 and Maestral) were at the highest level of combat
readiness prepared to defend against a possible attack
by the Yugoslav army and VRS from Bosnia and Herze-
R
govina. The most notable success in the operation was
achieved on the afternoon of August 5, 1995, when
troops from the 4th and 7th Guards Brigades liberated
Knin. Because of Knin’s strategic and symbolic impor-
tance, August 5 was declared Croatian Victory Day and
Homeland Thanksgiving Day and later also Croatian
Veterans Day. During the next few days Croatian forc-
es took control of the country’s border in the area and
started mopping up operations in the liberated terri-
tory in Northern Dalmatia, Lika, Banovina and Kordun.
4.2.2020. 18:35:16
 Davor Marijan • Rat za opstojnost Hrvata, 1991. - 1995.
H
M
D
Operacija „Oluja” – borbe na Banovini i stradavanje hrvatskog vo-
jnika (autor fotografija: Žarko Peša).
C
Operation Storm – fighting in Banovina and a severely wounded
Croatian soldier (Photographs by Žarko Peša).
jedinice policije) krenule su 4. kolovoza 1995. u 5 sati u
napad duž crte od Bosanskog Grahova na jugu do Jase-
novca na istoku, na bojišnici dugoj više od 630 kilometa-
ra. Hrvatske snage u istočnoj Slavoniji i južnoj Dalmaciji
(obrambene operacije Feniks – od 15. srpnja do 30. listo-
pada 1995., kao nastavak obrambene operacije Zid, prove-
dene tijekom i nakon operacije Bljesak od 1. do 26. svibnja,
i Maestral) stavljene su u stanje pripravnosti radi mogućeg
napada Vojske Jugoslavije i Vojske Republike Srpske iz Bo-
sne i Hercegovine. Najveći uspjeh u operaciji postignut
je u prijepodnevnim satima 5. kolovoza 1995., kad su pri-
padnici 4. i 7. gardijske brigade Hrvatske vojske oslobo-
dili Knin. Zbog njegova strateškog i simboličkog značaja,
dan oslobođenja Knina u Hrvatskoj je proglašen Danom
pobjede i domovinske zahvalnosti, a potom i Danom hr-
vatskih branitelja. U sljedećim danima hrvatske snage za-
posjele su državnu granicu, osigurale je i krenule u pretres
408
Domovinski rat 04-02-2020 Knjiga 1.indd 408
One of the more important successes in the operation
was putting the main force of Kordun Corps into en-
circlement with about 35,000 civilians in the Topusko
area. After negotiations the Corps surrendered on Au-
gust 8. The Croatian forces allowed the Serb soldiers
and civilians to leave along the following directions:
Topusko – Glina – Sisak – Lipovac highway and Glina
– Donji Žirovac – Dvor na Uni. The Croatian authorities
secured a safe passage for the soldiers and civilians,
who left between August 9 to August 12, 1995.
Croatia had waited for years for an operation like
Operation Storm. An opportunity for launching it pre-
sented itself in the summer of 1995 after a few suc-
cessful operations which showed that the Croatian
Army was capable of solving the rebel Serbs problem
militarily. On account of the genocide committed by
the VRS in Srebrenica, Croatia enjoyed a tacit support
from an influential part of the international communi-
ty for taking measures to quickly solve the RSK issue.
The Croatian forces enjoyed a 3:1 advantage over
the rebel Serbs during Operation Storm. The ratio re-
garding heavy weapons, on the other hand, was 1:1,
and in some areas even favorable to the Serbs. All HV
ZPs participated in the operation except ZP Osijek and
the Southern Theater of Operations. The forces of these
two ZPs were on the defensive during the operation.
Five guards brigades participated in the offensive ac-
tion, 1st Croatian Guards Corps, one Guards Battalion,
23 Home Guard regiments, 17 Croatian Army brigades
(15 reserve and 2 conscript), three PZO brigades, 4
electronic warfare groups, elements of the artillery
rocket brigade, elements of the anti-armor, artillery
rocket brigade, elements of the engineer brigade, sig-
D
nals regiments, the whole of the Croatian Air Force and
Air Defense, elements of the Croatian Navy (transport)
and 3,100 members of the special units of the MUP RH.
In total, 127,000 men participated in the operation.
The Serbs had around 40,000 men organized into five
R
corps, with 11 infantry brigades, 4 motorized brigades,
three light brigades, one armored brigade, special bri-
gade, independent infantry battalion, two detachments,
border squad, recon-commando squad, mixed artillery
regiment, mixed anti-armor regiment, light artillery rock-
et regiment of the Air Defense, two mixed artillery battal-
ions, two mixed anti-armor battalions, five rear echelon
bases and air force with air defense.
The Croatian forces liberated 10,400 square ki-
lometers or 18.4 % of the total area of the Republic
4.2.2020. 18:35:17
 The Croatian Nation’s Struggle for Survival, 1991-1995

oslobođenog prostora sjeverne Dalmacije, Like, Banovine

i Korduna. Jedan od značajnijih uspjeha u operaciji bilo
je okruženje glavnine Kordunaškog korpusa SVK-a i oko
35.000 civila na širem području Topuskog. Nakon prego-
vora korpus se predao 8. kolovoza, s tim da je dogovore-
no izvlačenje vojnika i civila smjerovima Topusko – Glina
– Sisak – autocesta Lipovac i Glina – Donji Žirovac – Dvor
na Uni. Hrvatske su im vlasti osigurale neometan i siguran
prolaz koji je realiziran od 9. do 12. kolovoza 1995. godine.
Operaciju kakva je bila Oluja Hrvatska je čekala godi-
H
nama. Povoljan trenutak nastao je u ljeto 1995., nakon ne-
koliko uspješnih operacija na ratištu koje su pokazale da je
HV u stanju vojno riješiti pobunu Srba. Zbog zločinačkoga
ponašanja VRS-a u Srebrenici Hrvatska je dobila prešutnu
potporu utjecajnog dijela međunarodne zajednice da u
kratkom vremenu riješi problem RSK.
M
Vojnici Hrvatske vojske i Armije RBiH na državnoj granici kod
Odnos snaga u Oluji u ljudstvu bio je oko 3 : 1 u hr- mjesta Tržačka Raštela, 6. kolovoza 1995. godine.
vatsku korist, a u teškom oružju izjednačen ili u nekim
Croatian Army and ARBiH soldiers on the state border at Tržačka
slučajevima u srpsku korist. U operaciji su sudjelovala sva Raštela, August 6, 1995.
zborna područja HV-a osim ZP-a Osijek i Južnoga bojišta,
koji su provodili obrambeni dio operacije. U napadnom
dijelu operacije sudjelovalo je pet gardijskih brigada HV-
D
a, 1. hrvatski gardijski zdrug, jedna gardijska bojna, 23
domobranske pukovnije, 17 brigada HV-a (15 pričuvnih
i dvije ročne), tri brigade PZO-a, četiri središnjice za ED,
dijelovi topničko-raketne brigade, dijelovi protuoklopne
topničko-raketne brigade, dijelovi inženjerijske brigade,
pukovnija veze, cijeli HRZ i PZO, dijelovi HRM-a (za prijevoz
C
postrojbi) i 3100 pripadnika Specijalnih postrojbi MUP-a
RH. Ukupno je sudjelovalo oko 127.000 ljudi.
Na srpskoj je strani bilo oko 40.000 ljudi organiziranih
u pet korpusa, u kojima je bilo 11 pješačkih brigada, če- Susret saveznika: general HV-a Marijan Mareković i general
tiri motorizirane brigade, tri lake brigade, oklopna briga- ARBiH Atif Dudaković, 6. kolovoza 1995. kod mjesta Tržačke
D
da, specijalna brigada, samostalni pješački bataljun, dva Raštele; u pozadini ravnatelj HIS-a Miroslav Tuđman.
odreda, granični odred, izvidničko-diverzantski odred, Meeting of allies: Croatian Army General Marijan Mareković and
mješoviti artiljerijski puk, mješoviti protuoklopni artiljerij- ARBiH General Atif Dudaković near Tržačka Raštela, August 6,
ski puk, laki artiljerijsko-raketni puk PZO-a, dva mješovita 1995; Miroslav Tuđman, Director of the Croatian Intelligence
Service, in the background.
artiljerijska divizijuna, dva mješovita protuoklopna arti-
R
ljerijska divizijuna, inženjerijski bataljun, pet pozadinskih
baza i Ratno zrakoplovstvo s protuzračnom obranom.
U operaciji je oslobođeno 10.400 km2 ili 18,4 % ukupne
površine RH. Ukupni gubici iznosili su 1322 ljudi, odnosno of Croatia. The Croatian forces suffered 1,322 casual-
0,12 %, od čega 204 poginula, 1100 ranjenih (teže 572 i lak- ties – 0.12% of the men deployed – 204 killed, 1,100
še 528), tri zarobljena i 15 nestalih. Gubici srpskih snaga bili wounded (572 soldiers suffered serious wounds and
su nekoliko puta veći. Do 21. kolovoza 1995. asanirano je i 528 suffered light wounds), three taken prisoner and
uredno pokopano 560 poginulih pripadnika SVK-a.950 15 missing in action. The losses of the Serb forces were
a few times higher. By August 21, 1995, 560 bodies of
950 D. MARIJAN, Oluja, 136-137. killed SVK soldiers had been properly buried.

409

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 Davor Marijan • Rat za opstojnost Hrvata, 1991. - 1995.
ZAVRŠNE OPERACIJE U
BOSNI I HERCEGOVINI
Borbe u jugozapadnoj Bosni do kraja
kolovoza 1995. godine
Povlačenje stanovništva i SVK-a iz Hrvatske, kao i iz
Drvara, zakrčilo je prometnice u zapadnoj i jugozapadnoj
Bosni i otežavalo opskrbu VRS-a na tom dijelu ratišta. Uz
H
velike probleme s iseljavanjem stanovništva Drvar je bra-
nila OG-1, Mlinište i Šipove branila je OG-2, a 30. krajiška
divizija zatvarala je pravce od Kupresa prema Donjem Va-
kufu i Vlašiću.951 Od ostataka SVK-a izvučenih na područje
RS-a general R. Mladić i M. Martić nastojali su organizirati
postrojbe radi angažmana u borbama i “radi priprema za
M
oslobađanje okupiranih teritorija RSK i RS”.952
Nakon oslobađanja sjeverne Dalmacije Zapovjedniš-
tvo ZP-a Split preuzelo je kao Zapovjedništvo združenih
hrvatskih snaga zapovijedanje i nad postrojbama HVO-a
na području Glamoča i Kupreške visoravni. Zadaća zdru-
ženih hrvatskih snaga bila je djelatna obrana čiji je cilj bio
D
zadržati operativno-taktičku nadmoć i spriječiti prodor
srpskih snaga na svoj teritorij. Snage HV-a i HVO-a podije-
ljene su u tri operativne skupine: OG Otrić, Sajković i Vrba.
HVO je bio u sastavu OG-a Vrba čija je zadaća bila spriječiti
prodor srpskih snaga prema Glamoču i Kupresu.953
Srpske snage pokušale su prodor iz Drvara prema
C
Bosanskom Grahovu. Cilj je bio zauzeti Bosansko Gra-
hovo i realizirati operaciju Vaganj-95. S ojačanjima iz
istočne Bosne i postrojbama izravno podređenim Glav-
nom štabu VRS-a, srpske snage su u noći 12./13. kolovo-
za 1995. probile crtu obrane hrvatskih snaga i zauzele
nekoliko dominantnih objekata na prijevoju Derala na
prilazima Bosanskom Grahovu, nanijevši velike gubitke
141. brigadi HV-a (14 poginulih vojnika). U protunapadu
od 13. do 15. kolovoza hrvatske snage vratile su izgu-
bljene položaje i trajno osigurale prijevoj Derala. Plani-
rani srpski protuudar kao uvod u vraćanje izgubljenog
teritorija pretvorio se u poraz i pogoršanje operativnoga
položaja. Hrvatske su snage pomaknule crtu prema Dr-
varu i oslonile obranu na planinu Jadovnik.954
951 D. MARIJAN, Domovinski rat, 375.
952 ICTY: GŠVRS, Naređenje str. pov. 02/2-3 od 8. 8. 1995.
953 D. MARIJAN, Domovinski rat, 375-376.
954 Isto, 376-377.
410
Domovinski rat 04-02-2020 Knjiga 1.indd 410
FINAL OPERATIONS IN
BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA
Battles in Southwest Bosnia until
August 1995
Civilians and SVK soldiers fleeing Croatia, and Drvar,
clogged the roads in western and southwest Bosnia,
thus creating a supply problem for the VRS. Drvar was
defended by OG-1. Civilians fleeing the city made OG-
1’s task that much more difficult. Mlinište and Šipovo
was defended by OG 2 and the 30th Krajina Division
blocked the lines of communications leading to Donji
Vakuf and Vlašić from Kupres. From the remnants of the
SVK units that had managed to flee to the RS, General
Mladić and Martić tried to form units for the purpose
of deploying them in combat and “for the purpose of
preparing the liberation of the occupied territories of
the RSK and RS.
After the liberation of northern Dalmatia the HVO
forces in the Glamoč and the Kupres plateau area were
placed under the command of ZP Split, acting as the HQ
of the joint Croatian forces. Their task was to conduct ac-
tive defense and retain operational-tactical superiority
and prevent Serb forces form advancing into the area.
The HV and HVO forces were divided into three OGs: OG
Otrić, OG Sajković and OG Vrba. The HVO was in OG Vrba.
The task of this group was to prevent Serb forces from
advancing towards Glamoč and Kupres.
The Serb forces attempted to advance from Drvar
towards Bosansko Grahovo. The aim was to capture
Bosansko Grahovo and conduct Operation Vaganj-95.
D
With reinforcements from eastern Bosnia and units di-
rectly subordinated to the General Staff of the VRS, the
Serb forces, during the night of August 12-13, 1995,
broke through the Croatian defensive line and captured
a few dominant positions in the Derala pass on the ap-
proaches to Bosansko Grahovo, inflicting serious casu-
R
alties on the 141st Brigade of the HV (14 soldiers killed).
Croatian forces counterattacked and from August 13 to
August 15 recaptured the lost positions and permanent-
ly secured the Derala pass. The planned Serb counter-
strike as an opening move for the recapture of the lost
territory turned out to be another defeat. The Serbs’
operational position was now worse than before. The
Croatian forces moved the front line towards Drvar and
leaned their defenses on Mount Jadovnik.
4.2.2020. 18:35:18
 The Croatian Nation’s Struggle for Survival, 1991-1995
Masakr na tržnici Markale i operacija
Deliberate force
Dugo očekivano pokretanje snaga NATO-a, ARBiH je
dočekala nakon što je 28. kolovoza 1995. mina ispaljena iz
minobacača kalibra 120 mm ubila 39 i ranila 86 građana
na tržnici Markale u Sarajevu. Glavni štab VRS-a negirao
je da je mina ispaljena sa srpskih položaja i nudio formi-
ranje mješovite komisije vještaka da se utvrdi tko je ispa-
lio minu.955 Prognoza iz jedne divizije VRS-a da će možda
H
„‘masakr’ poslužiti kao alibi za upotrebu snaga za brze in-
tervencije“ pokazala se točnom.956
Nakon ponoći 30. kolovoza 1995. snage NATO-a po-
čele su zračne napade i topničke udare po položajima
VRS-a oko Sarajeva i okolice. Prema podacima VRS-a,
M
NATO je tijekom dana napao položaje na širem područ-
ju Sarajeva, Čajniča, Ozrena, Foče i Majevice. Registrirano
je 209 aviopolijetanja, od čega 166 borbenih. Istodobno
je topništvo snaga za brze intervencije ispalilo oko 2000
projektila po širem području Sarajeva. Bio je to početak
operacije Deliberate force.957
Na zahtjev UNPROFOR-a zračni su udari privreme-
D
no prekinuti da bi se pregovorima s VRS-om dogovorilo
povlačenje srpskoga topništva iz zone isključenja oko Sa-
rajeva. Vojska Republike Srpske odbila je UNPROFOR-ov
zahtjev, a NATO je 5. rujna 1995. nastavio zračne napade.
Zrakoplovi su napadali ciljeve u okolici Sarajeva i Goražda,
C
a radiorelejno središte na Majevici izbačeno je iz uporabe.
Osim zrakoplova u operaciju su uključene i Snage za brzo
djelovanje, koje su topništvom napale nekoliko srpskih
uporišta oko Sarajeva. Napadi na vojne i civilne objekte
trajali su do 13. rujna. Uništeno je nekoliko telekomuni-
kacijskih središta, više tvornica i mostova, skladišta strelji-
D
va, hangari za vozila i oruđa, topnički položaji i aerodrom
Zalužani kod Banje Luke. Zračni su udari bili kaznenog
karaktera i nisu bili potpora ARBiH za teritorijalno napre-
dovanje. Srbi su 13. rujna prihvatili ultimatum o povlače-
nju naoružanja, nakon čega je proglašena pauza koja je
21. rujna, nekoliko dana nakon povlačenja topničkoga
oružja, prerasla u prekid zračnih napada. Iako ograničena,
operacija je narušila srpske sustave zapovijedanja i veze,
a imala je nepovoljan utjecaj i na moral srpskih vojnika.
955 Isto, 377.
956 Obaveštajni odsek Komande 30. pd, Obaveštajna infor-
macija, str. pov. br. 14-254 od 29. 8. 1995.
957 D. MARIJAN, Domovinski rat, 377-378.
411
Domovinski rat 04-02-2020 Knjiga 1.indd 411
Massacre at the Markale market and
Operation Deliberate Force
On August 28, 1995, a 120-mm mortar round was
fired on the Markale market in Sarajevo. The round killed
39 and wounded 86 civilians. As a result of the massacre,
NATO sprang into action. The ARBIH had long been wait-
ing for NATO to move against the Serbs. The General Staff
of the VRS denied that the round had been fired from
Serb positions and offered the formation of a mixed com-
mission of experts for the purpose of ascertaining who
had fired the round. The prediction made by one VRS di-
vision that “‘the massacre’ would be used as a pretext to
use rapid reaction force” proved correct.
After midnight on August 30, 1995, NATO forces
launched air and artillery strikes on VRS positions around
Sarajevo and in the surrounding area. According to the
VRS, during the day NATO attacked positions in the wider
Sarajevo, Čajniče, Ozren, Foča and Majevica areas. 209 sor-
ties were logged, 166 of them combat sorties. At the same
time, the RRF’s artillery fired 2,000 shells on the wider Sara-
jevo area. This was the start of Operation Deliberate Force.
At UNPROFOR’s request the airstrikes were tempo-
rarily halted so that the VRS could be persuaded through
negotiations to withdraw its artillery from the exclusion
zone around Sarajevo. The VRS rejected UNPROFOR’s
demand and NATO, on September 5, 1995, resumed at-
tacking Serb positions from the air. The planes attacked
targets around Sarajevo and Goražde and disabled the
radio-relay station on Majevica. NATO artillery shelled a
number of Serb strongholds around Sarajevo. The attacks
on military and civilian targets lasted until September 13.
A number of telecommunication centers, bridges and
factories, ammunition depots, hangars for vehicles and
equipment, gun emplacements, and Zalužani airport
near Banja Luka were destroyed. The airstrikes were of a
punitive character in no way supported ARBIH ground
troops. On September 13, the Serbs agreed to withdraw
R
their heavy weapons. After that the air strikes were halted
again. On September 21, after the Serbs had withdrawn
their artillery, NATO officially ended the air offensive. Even
though limited in objectives and execution, the operation
disturbed the Serbs’ command and communications sys-
tems and had a detrimental effect on the morale of Serb
soldiers. Even though the VRS did not suffer significant
losses in men and matériel, its combat value was compro-
mised, a fact which the Croatian forces and ARBIH would
take advantage of in the days and months to come.
4.2.2020. 18:35:18
 Davor Marijan • Rat za opstojnost Hrvata, 1991. - 1995.
Premda VRS nije imao značajnije gubitke u naoružanju,
njegova je vojna moć bila narušena, što su hrvatske snage
i Armija RBiH iskoristile u nastavku rata.958
OPERACIJA MAESTRAL
Nakon malo više od mjesec dana mirovanja hr-
vatske su snage izvele novu operaciju – Maestral. Cilj
operacije bio je zauzeti prijevoj Mlinište, ovladati Vito-
rogom i prisiliti srpske snage na povlačenje s Kupreške
H
visoravni te dostići povoljne uvjete za napredovanje
prema Šipovu i Jajcu.
Na glavnom smjeru napada prema prijevoju Mlini-
šte angažirane su 7. i 4. gardijska brigada, a na pomoć-
nom pravcu prema planini Vitorog napadali su 1. HGZ, SP
M
MUP-a HR HB i 60. gdb HVO-a. U završnoj fazi operacije
za oslobađanje Kupreške visoravni planirane su 1. i 2. gar-
dijska brigada HVO-a i 22. diverzantski odred. Operativna
grupa Jug bila je u aktivnoj obrani na smjeru Bosansko
Grahovo – Drvar, a OG Zapad na dijelu državne granice
na smjeru Srb – Drvar. Za potporu su zaduženi 10. topnič-
ko-raketni puk HVO-a te 14. i 20. topnički divizijun HV-a.
D
Operacija je počela 8. rujna 1995., uz jutarnju maglu koja
je donekle usporila početni napad, a završila je 15. rujna.
S obzirom na vrijeme, prostor i učinak, Maestral je opera-
cija bez presedana tijekom rata u BiH. U njoj su hrvatske
snage potpuno razbile 2. krajiški korpus VRS-a i postigle
C
strategijski učinak. Zauzele su područje površine oko
2500 km2, uključujući tri grada: Šipovo (12. rujna), Jajce
(13. rujna) i Drvar (14. rujna), te dva važna prijevoja, Mlini-
šte (9. rujna) i Oštrelj (14. rujna). Imale su 55 poginulih, 67
teže i 110 lakše ranjenih vojnika.959 Ispred hrvatskih snaga
do Banje Luke je bio samo Mrkonjić Grad.960
OPERACIJA UNA
Potencijal uspješnih operacija hrvatskih snaga u
jugozapadnoj Bosni američka je diplomacija, odnosno
njezin dio, prepoznala kao još jednu priliku za pritisak
na vodstvo Republike Srpske. Američki pregovarač
Richard Holbrooke susreo se 14. rujna 1995. s Tuđma-
nom i preporučio nastavak ofenzive. Tri dana poslije,
17. rujna, uvjeravao je Tuđmana da “uzme Sanski Most,
958 R. DELIĆ, Armija RBiH, II, 171-175.
959 A. GOTOVINA, Napadajni bojevi i operacije, 98, 187.
960 D. MARIJAN, Domovinski rat, 378-380.
412
Domovinski rat 04-02-2020 Knjiga 1.indd 412
OPERATION MAESTRAL
After more than a month of standing relatively still,
the Croatian forces launched another operation – Opera-
tion Maestral. The aim of the operation was to capture the
Mlinište pass, gain control of Vitorog and force the Serb
forces to retreat from the Kupres plateau and create favor-
able conditions for advancing towards Šipovo and Jajce.
The main axis of advance was in the direction of
Mlinište. The 7th and 4th Guards Brigades were deployed
there. The supporting axis of advance led towards
Mount Vitorog. The 1st Croatian Guards Corps, Special
Police of the MUP HR HB and 60th gdp HVO were de-
ployed there. The 1st and 2nd Guards Brigades of the HVO
and 22nd Commando Detachment were to participate
in the final phase of the operation for the liberation of
the Kupres plateau. OG South was conducting active de-
fense in the direction of Bosansko Grahovo – Drvar and
OG West along the Srb – Drvar stretch of the border. The
10th Artillery Rocket Regiment of the HVO and 14th and
20th Artillery Division of the HV would provide support.
The operation started on September 8, 1995. The morn-
ing mist somewhat slowed down the initial onslaught
but everything eventually went according to plan. The
operation ended on September 15. In terms of time,
area and effect, Operation Maestral is arguably the most
successful undertaking of Croatian forces of the entire
war in Bosnia and Herzegovina. In it the Croatian forces
utterly defeated the VRS II Krajina Corps and achieved a
success of strategic importance. They captured an area
25,000m2 in size, including three cities, Šipovo (Septem-
ber 12), Jajce (September 13) and Drvar (September 14),
D
and two important passes; Mlinište (September 9) and
Oštrelj (September 14). The Croatian forces lost 55 men
killed, 67 seriously wounded and 110 lightly wounded
soldiers. Only Mrkonjić Grad stood between Banja Luka
and the Croatian forces.
R
OPERATION UNA
The political potential of the successful Croatian
military operations in southwest Bosnia was recognized
by a number of American diplomats. The diplomats
used the successes as leverage during negotiations
with the leaders of the RS. On September 14, 1995,
the American negotiator Richard Holbrooke met with
Tuđman and recommended that the offensive contin-
4.2.2020. 18:35:18
 The Croatian Nation’s Struggle for Survival, 1991-1995
Prijedor i Bosanski Novi – sve važne gradove koji su
postali svjetski poznati simboli etničkog čišćenja”. Bio
je to potpuni obrat: samo nekoliko dana prije SAD
je tražio da Hrvatska zaustavi operacije u središnjoj
i zapadnoj Bosni. Holbrooke je držao da hrvatski mi-
nistar obrane Gojko Šušak želi zauzeti i Banju Luku,
što je Amerikancima bilo neprihvatljivo. To bi izazva-
lo nove valove izbjeglica, a uz to Federacija Bosne i
Hercegovine ne bi mogla zadržati Banju Luku već bi
je morala vratiti Srbima.961 Iz hrvatske perspektive či-
H
nilo se da je prilika povoljna. Operacija Maestral bila
je velik uspjeh, srpske su snage pretrpjele niz poraza
i bile su u nepovoljnom položaju. Uz to je izbjeglički
val koji se kretao prema Banjoj Luci otežavao mane-
var srpske vojske, čiji 2. krajiški korpus, po hrvatskim
vojnoobavještajnim procjenama, nije nadzirao stanje
M
na području svoje mjerodavnosti. Držalo se da taj kor-
pus bez značajnijega ojačanja neće moći organizirati
obranu na crtama na koje je odbačen. Uopće, držalo
se da organizirana obrana postoji samo na području
Ključa i Bosanske Krupe, a uočeno je i poduzimanje
mjera za obranu Prijedora. Tijekom 16. rujna snage
D
ARBiH sasvim su ovladale planinom Grmeč, zauzele
Ključ i nastavile napad prema Bosanskoj Krupi, San-
skom Mostu i Mrkonjić Gradu. To je bio povod da se u
Glavnom stožeru HV-a 17. rujna 1995. zaključi, svaka-
ko na temelju informacija Obavještajne uprave, da su
snage 2. krajiškog korpusa „potpuno razbijene“, pose-
C
bice zbog prodora snaga 5. korpusa ARBiH na smjeru
Ključ – Sanski Most – Prijedor.962
Na temelju Holbrookeova prijedloga i povoljnih
obavještajnih procjena o slabostima srpskih snaga
odlučeno je da se HV vojno angažira u zapadnoj Bo-
D
sni u operaciji Una. Na donošenje odluke svakako je
utjecao niz vojnih uspjeha u prethodnim mjesecima,
pa se u napad odlučilo krenuti brzo i bez pripreme.
Snage predviđene za napad imale su na raspolaga-
nju desetak sati tijekom kojih su trebale izraditi bor-
bene dokumente i pripremiti postrojbe za još jednu
zahtjevnu akciju. Zamisao operacije bila je nasilan
prijelaz Une na području Bosanskog Novog i Bosan-
ske Dubice te Save na području Jasenovca, uspostava
961 Richard HOLBROOKE, Završiti rat, Šahinpašić, Sarajevo,
1998., 164-165.
962 Davor MARIJAN, “Zborno područje Bjelovar u opera-
ciji Una”, Scrinia Slavonica, br. 8, Slavonski Brod, 2008.,
318-319.
413
Domovinski rat 04-02-2020 Knjiga 1.indd 413
ue. Three days later, on September 17, Holbrooke tried
to convince Tuđman to “take Sanski most, Prijedor and
Bosanski Novi – towns that had become worldwide
known symbols of ethnic cleansing.” It was a complete
volte-face; only a few days before the USA had demand-
ed that Croatia halt operations in Central and western
Bosnia. Holbrooke thought that the Croatian minister
of defense Gojko Šušak wanted to capture Banja Luka
too, which was unacceptable to the Americans. The fall
of Banja Luka would create more waves of refugees. Be-
sides, the Federation of BiH would have to return the
city to the Serbs in any event. From the bird’s eye view
of Croatia, the situation was favorable. Operation Mae-
stral had been a huge success; the Serb forces had suf-
fered a string of defeats and were in a bad shape. Mak-
ing things even worse for the Serbs was a huge wave of
refugees descending on Banja Luka and thus disrupting
the movements of the Serbian army, whose II Krajina
Corps, according to Croatian intelligence estimates, did
not control the situation in its area of responsibility. It
was believed that II Krajina Corps, without ample rein-
forcements, would not be able to hold the positions it
had been thrown back to. Moreover, the Croatian strat-
egists were of the opinion that organized defense ex-
isted only in the Ključ and Bosanska Krupa areas. The
Croatian forces also noted that the Serbs were taking
measures for organizing the defense of Prijedor. During
September 16, the ARBIH gained full control of Mount
Grmeč, captured Ključ and continued attacking to-
wards Bosanska Krupa, Sanski Most and Mrkonjić Grad.
Those successes of the ARBIH led the General Staff of
the Croatian Army to conclude, on September 17, 1995,
that, based on the information provided by the intel-
ligence service, II Krajina Corps had been “completely
destroyed”, especially as a result of V Corps’s advance in
the direction of Ključ – Sanski Most – Prijedor.
Based on Holbrooke’s suggestion and intelligence
reports about the Serb forces’ weaknesses, it was de-
R
cided to employ the Croatian Army in central Bosnia in
Operation Una. The successes achieved during the pre-
vious months certainly influenced the decision because
the planners opted for launching the operation immedi-
ately without preparations. The forces slated to carry out
the attack had only about 10 hours to create necessary
documents for another demanding operation. The idea
was to force the crossing of the Una River in the Bosanski
Novi and Bosanska Dubica areas and the Sava River in
the Jasenovac area, establish bridgeheads, gain control
4.2.2020. 18:35:18
 Davor Marijan • Rat za opstojnost Hrvata, 1991. - 1995.
mostobrana, ovladavanje planinom Prosarom i stva-
ranje povoljnih uvjeta za prodor prema Prijedoru. Za
napad su angažirane snage zbornih područja Zagreb
i Bjelovar, 1. gardijske brigade HV-a i Hrvatskoga rat-
nog zrakoplovstva. S 5. korpusom ARBiH planiralo
se sukladno djelovanje na smjerovima Ključ – Sanski
Most – Prijedor i Bosanska Krupa – Bosanski Novi. Na
glavnom smjeru napada na Uni napadalo je Zborno
područje Zagreb, a na pomoćnom na Savi Zborno po-
dručje Bjelovar.963
H
Nasuprot hrvatskim snagama bila je 10. operativ-
na grupa (OG-10) VRS-a, koja je formirana po zapo-
vijedi Komande 1. krajiškog korpusa od 4. kolovoza.
Grupa se počela osnivati na samom početku Oluje i
njezina je svrha bila osiguranje sjeverozapadne gra-
nice Republike Srpske, odnosno na Uni i Savi od sela
M
Donja Blatna u općini Bosanski Novi do sela Trstenci u
općini Derventa.964
Operacija je počela ujutro 18. rujna 1995., a okon-
čana je povlačenjem snaga na lijevu obalu rijeka Une
i Save navečer 19. rujna. Zbog načina na koji je zapo-
čela, operacija Una u cjelini je sporna i duže je vrijeme
D
bila predmet medijskih kontroverzija. Od dobivanja
direktive Glavnoga stožera HV-a do kretanja u napad
proteklo je samo 16 sati. To je bilo tako kratko vrije-
me da o nekakvoj pripremi ne treba uopće razmišljati.
Nije je ni moglo biti. Operacija nije uspjela u prvom
redu zbog pogrešne prosudbe protivnika. Samo se
C
tako može objasniti pokretanje napadne operacije
čija je osnova nasilni prijelaz rijeke, što je jedan od
najtežih oblika napada. Način na koji je provedena
zorno pokazuje koliko je Vojska Republike Srpske bila
podcijenjena. To se najbolje vidi na smjeru napada
Zbornoga područja Bjelovar, koje je poslano u napad
s pričuvnim postrojbama. Iako je to Zborno područje
u Oluji imalo uspješan nasilan prijelaz rijeke, to ne op-
ravdava istu formulu.965
Una je bila jedina neuspjela operacija HV-a u za-
mašnom operacijskom ciklusu koji je počeo u stude-
nome 1994. operacijom Cincar na Kupreškom polju,
963 Isto, 319-320.
964 Agresija Republike Hrvatske na Republiku Srpsku: Poslje-
dice u opštinama Novi Grad, Kostajnica i Kozarska Dubica
– septembar 1995. godine, Republički sekretarijat za od-
nose sa MKS u Hagu i istraživanje ratnih zločina, Banja
Luka, 2008., 13-14.
965 D. MARIJAN, Domovinski rat, 381-383.
414
Domovinski rat 04-02-2020 Knjiga 1.indd 414
of Mount Prosara and create favorable conditions for an
advance towards Prijedor. The attacking force consist-
ed of troops from Military District Zagreb and Military
District Bjelovar, 1st Guards Brigade of the Croatian Army
and the Croatian Air Force. The plan was also to advance,
in coordination with the ARBIH V Corps in the direction
of Ključ – Sanski Most – Prijedor and in the direction of
Bosanska Krupa – Bosanski Novi. The forces from ZP Za-
greb attacked in the main direction of the offensive. The
forces from ZP Bjelovar operated along the supporting
axis of advance in the direction of the Sava River.
Ranged against the Croatian forces was the VRS’s
OG-10, which had been formed by order of the HQ of
I Krajina Corps of August 4. The start of the process of
forming the group coincided with the commencement
of Operation Storm and its role was to secure the north-
western border of the RS. This border ran along the Sava
and Una Rivers, from the village of Donja Blatna in the
Bosanski Novi Municipality as far as the village of Trsten-
ci in the municipality of Derventa.
The operation started on the morning of Septem-
ber 18, 1995, and ended when the Croatian forces with-
drew to the left banks of the Sava and Una Rivers on
the evening of September 19. Operation Una is contro-
versial and for a while it was the subject of many dis-
cussions aired and published by various media outlets.
It has to be noted that only 16 hours passed between
the moment when the General Staff of the Croatian
Army issued the directive for attack and the moment
when the troops moved into action. The operation was
not prepared properly for the simple reason that there
was not enough time to prepare it. However, the op-
eration ultimately failed because the planners had un-
D
derestimated the enemy. This is the only explanation
for launching an offensive operation the lynchpin of
which was a forced crossing of a river, one of the most
demanding attacking maneuvers. Again, the Croatian
forces badly underestimated the enemy. For that rea-
R
son, for no other reason seems logical, ZP Bjelovar’s re-
serve forces were picked to lead the attack. It has to be
pointed out that ZP Bjelovar’s forces had successfully
effected a forced crossing of a river during Operation
Storm. Still, the fact does not justify trying to repeat the
formula in less favorable conditions.
Operation Una was the only failed operation of the
HV in the momentous operational cycle that started in
November, 1994, with Operation Cincar on the Kupres
field, and Operation Winter-94 on the Livno field. As a
4.2.2020. 18:35:18
 The Croatian Nation’s Struggle for Survival, 1991-1995
odnosno Zima-94 na Livanjskom polju. Kao gorka
iznimka, brzo je gurnuta u stranu i zaborav. Bila je ne-
promišljena, napravljena bez priprema, a protivnik je
bio potpuno podcijenjen. To su bili preduvjeti da ope-
racija pretrpi neuspjeh.
Napadne operacije ARBiH i protunapad
VRS-a u zapadnoj Bosni
U rujnu 1995. i Armija RBiH zabilježila je nekoliko
H
velikih uspjeha. Posebice je značajna bila operacija
u dolini rijeke Krivaje i na južnim dijelovima Ozrena,
koja je nazvana Vozućka operacija po naselju Vozući.
Vozućki je džep na širini od 3 do 3,5 kilometra razdva-
jao snage 2. i 3. korpusa, čiji su dijelovi angažirani u
operaciji s oko 20.000 vojnika. Operacija je počela 10.
M
rujna i završila 10. listopada, kada je dio snaga izvu-
čen i poslan u pomoć 5. korpusu u zapadnu Bosnu.
Operacija je ostvarila potpuni uspjeh, zauzeto je oko
500 km2 u dolini Krivaje i na Ozrenu i spojene su sna-
ge 2. i 3. korpusa.966
Slom 2. krajiškog korpusa VRS-a u zapadnoj Bo-
D
sni 5. korpus ARBiH iskoristio je za provedbu opera-
cije Sana-95. Operacija je počela 13. rujna 1995. go-
dine. U vrijeme kada su hrvatske snage bile u petom
danu operacije Maestral, Armija RBiH pokrenula je
snage prema Kulen Vakufu i Bosanskom Petrovcu,
C
Sanskom Mostu i Bosanskom Novom. Na smjeru pre-
ma Kulen Vakufu, Bosanskom Petrovcu i Ključu srpski
otpor nije bio vrijedan spomena i bošnjačke su sna-
ge u ta mjesta ušle 14. rujna. Zbog loše koordinaci-
je došlo je do kraćega sukoba između bošnjačkih i
hrvatskih snaga na prijevoju Oštrelj između Drvara i
D
Bosanskog Petrovca.967
Na pravcu prema Bosanskom Novom i Sanskom
Mostu VRS je pružio otpor i snage 5. korpusa ARBiH uz
borbu su 17. rujna 1995. zauzele Bosansku Krupu. Na-
predovanje korpusa prema Mrkonjić Gradu, Bosanskom
Novom i Sanskom Mostu VRS je zaustavila 21. rujna.968
U drugoj polovini rujna 1995. VRS je loše stajao u
zapadnom i središnjem dijelu BiH. Izgubili su Šipovo,
Donji Vakuf, Jajce, Drvar, Ključ, Bosanski Petrovac i Bo-
sansku Krupu te Vozuću na padinama Ozrena, uklju-
966 R. DELIĆ, Armija RBiH, II, 177-181.
967 Isto, 193-195.
968 Isto, 196.
415
Domovinski rat 04-02-2020 Knjiga 1.indd 415
bitter exception, it was soon relegated to a footnote in
most Croatian accounts of the war. Operation Una was
a reckless undertaking launched without due prepara-
tions and on the basis of a gross underestimation of en-
emy capabilities – a sure recipe for disaster.
ARBIH’s Offensive Operations and VRS’s
Counterattack in Western Bosnia
In September, 1995, the ARBIH too achieved several
important military successes. Worthy of note is the op-
eration conducted in the Krivaja Valley and on southern
slopes of Mount Ozren. The operation was codenamed
Vozućka, after the village of Vozuća. The Vozuća pock-
et, 3-3.5km wide, separated II and III Corps, whose ele-
ments, numbering 20,000 soldiers, were deployed in the
operation. The operation commenced on September
10 and ended on October 10, when some of the forces
were pulled out and sent to relieve the ARBIH V Corps in
western Bosnia. The operation achieved a total military
success. An area of 500 square kilometers in the Krivaja
Valley and on Mount Ozren was captured and the II and
III Corps were rejoined.
The ARBIH V Corps used the defeat of the VRS II
Krajina Corps in western Bosnia to conduct Operation
Sana 95. The operation commenced on September
13, 1995. During day 5 of Operation Maestral the AR-
BIH started advancing towards Kulen Vakuf, Bosanski
Petrovac, Sanski most and Bosanski Novi. In the direc-
tion of Kulen Vakuf, Bosanski Petrovac and Ključ, the
Serb forces did not put up any significant resistance
and the Bosniak forces entered the villages on Septem-
ber 14. Due to a mistake in coordinating the action of
the two armed forces, Bosniak and Croatian troops en-
gaged in a short conflict on the Oštrelj pass, between
Drvar and Bosanski Petrovac.
In the direction of Bosanski Novi and Sanski Most,
the VRS put up a stiff resistance but the ARBIH V Corps
managed to capture Bosanska Krupa on September 17,
R
1995. The VRS forces stopped the Corps’s advance to-
wards Mrkonjić Grad, Bosanski Novi and Sanski Most on
September 21.
In the second half of September, 1995, the VRS’s
position in the western and central part of Bosnia and
Herzegovina was not favorable. The VRS lost possession
of Šipovo, Donji Vakuf, Jajce, Drvar, Ključ, Bosanski Petro-
vac and Bosanska Krupa as well as the village of Vozuća
on the slopes of Mount Ozren, including the areas sur-
4.2.2020. 18:35:18
 Davor Marijan • Rat za opstojnost Hrvata, 1991. - 1995.
čujući i okolicu spomenutih mjesta. Glavni štab VRS-a
priznao je 21. rujna da se radi o operativnom uspjehu.
Uz vojnički poraz i pad morala, VRS-u je velike pro-
bleme pričinjavao novi val od oko 100.000 izbjeglica.
General Manojlo Milovanović kao komandant IKM-a
Glavnoga štaba VRS-a zadužen je da zaustavi rasulo
srpskih snaga i stabilizira frontu. Od njega se očekiva-
lo da tijekom 19. i 20. rujna organizira odsudnu obra-
nu i prijeđe u protuofenzivu radi vraćanja izgubljenog
teritorija. Položaje na obalama Une i Save trebalo je
H
maksimalno utvrditi, sve gradove u zoni 1. KK-a bra-
niti na trenutnim crtama obrane, a u gradovima ne-
posredno uz bojište ili u njegovoj blizini morali su se
odrediti zapovjednici obrane.969
Nakon raspada 2. krajiškog korpusa, 1. krajiški
korpus nastojao je s OG-10 spriječiti prodor ARBiH
M
prema Sanskom Mostu i Bosanskom Novom i stvo-
riti uvjete za uvođenje svježih snaga za protunapad
radi zauzimanja Ključa i Bosanskog Petrovca. Od 21.
rujna 1995. VRS je u protunapadima na 5. korpus AR-
BiH počeo vraćati dio izgubljenog teritorija na smjeru
Bosanski Novi – Bosanska Krupa, Gornji Rakani i Bu-
D
dimlić Japre, kao i dio teritorija na širem području Bo-
sanske Krupe.970
Krajem rujna 1995. VRS se pripremao za napad-
nu operaciju pod imenom Štit-95. Plan je bio krenuti
svim raspoloživim snagama na zapadnom dijelu rati-
šta, glavnim snagama napasti na pravcima Mrkonjić
C
Grad – Ključ – Glamoč i Sanski Most – Lušci Palanka
– Bosanski Petrovac – Drvar, razbiti protivnika i bez
zadržavanja izbiti na crtu Bosanska Krupa – greben
Grmeča (prijevoj Risovac) – Krnjeuša – Vrtoče – Bo-
sanski Petrovac – Lanište – Baraći, a potom nakon
prestrojavanja snaga produžiti napad prema Bihaću,
Drvaru, Bosanskom Grahovu i Glamoču. Napad je po-
čeo 28. rujna.971
Plan je bio megalomanski, no na smjeru napada
na kojem su bile bošnjačke snage činio se realnim.
Peti korpus ARBiH našao se u teškom stanju i prijetila
je opasnost da bude protjeran prema Bihaću kao go-
dinu dana prije. U pomoć 5. korpusu u prvoj polovini
listopada dovedeno je oko 11.000 bošnjačkih vojnika
iz središnje Bosne, koji su bili jedan od razloga da se
969 D. MARIJAN, Domovinski rat, 383-384.
970 R. DELIĆ, Armija RBiH, II, 196-197.
971 D. MARIJAN, Domovinski rat, 384.
416
Domovinski rat 04-02-2020 Knjiga 1.indd 416
rounding the mentioned locations. The VRS’s General
Staff admitted on September 21 that the enemy had
achieved a success at the operational level. In addition
to the military defeat and low morale, the VRS had to
deal with a new wave of around 100,000 refugees. Gen-
eral Manojlo Milovanović acting in the capacity of Com-
mander of the Forward Command Post of the General
Staff of the VRS was tasked with stabilizing the Serb forc-
es and the situation on the front line. He was expected
to organize a determined defense on September 19-20,
and engage in a counteroffensive action for the purpose
of recapturing the lost territories. The positions on the
banks of the Una and Sava Rivers were to be completely
fortified, all cities in the area of I Krajina Corps were to be
defended on the current defensive lines, and in the cit-
ies, directly at the front lines or in their vicinity, defense
commanders were to be appointed.
After II Krajina Corps was destroyed, I Krajina Corps,
reinforced with OG-10, tried to prevent the ARBIH from
advancing towards Sanski Most and Bosansko Novo,
and to create conditions for deploying fresh units for
a counterattack the aim of which was to capture Ključ
and Bosanski Petrovac. From September 21, 1995, in the
counterattacks on the ARBIH V Corps, the VRS started re-
gaining some of the lost territory on the Bosanski Novi –
Bosanska Krupa – Gornji Rakani – Budimilić Japre line, as
well as some territory in the wider Bosanska Krupa area.
At the end of September, 1995, the VRS was pre-
paring to conduct an offensive operation codenamed
Shield-95. The plan was to deploy all available forces in
the western part of the theater. The main force was to
attack in the direction of Mrkonjić Grad – Ključ – Glamoč,
in the direction of Sanski Most – Lušci Palanka – Bosans-
D
ki Petrovac – Drvar, defeat the enemy and without de-
lay reach the Bosanska Krupa – Grmeča ridge (Risovac
pass) – Krnjeuša – Vrtoče – Bosanski Petrovac – Lanište –
Baraći line, and then after regrouping resume the attack
towards Bihać, Drvar, Bosansko Grahovo and Glamoč.
R
The attack commenced on September 28.
The plan was extremely ambitious, but neverthe-
less, realistic in the direction defended by Bosniak forc-
es. The ARBIH V Corps found itself in a desperate situ-
ation and there existed a real danger that it would be
thrown back towards Bihać, just like one year before.
During the first half of October, 11,000 Bosniak troops
were brought from central Bosnia to help V Corps. These
reinforcements were one of the reasons why the Serb
counteroffensive eventually failed. Another major rea-
4.2.2020. 18:35:18
 The Croatian Nation’s Struggle for Survival, 1991-1995
srpska protuofenziva zaustavi. Drugi, ili prvi, razlog
bila je operacija Južni potez, koja je dogovorena izme-
đu HV-a, HVO-a i ARBiH.972
OPERACIJA JUŽNI POTEZ
Nakon izvlačenja iz Jajca, VRS je za obranu Mrko-
njić Grada angažirao snage OG-2 i 30. pješačke divi-
zije. Početkom listopada 30. pješačka divizija organi-
zirala je obranu na crti rijeka Vrbas (ušće rijeke Ugar)
H
– rijeka Ugar – uzvodno prema Skender Vakufu i dalje
selo Vitovlje.973
Sa završetkom Maestrala hrvatske su snage počele
pripreme za Južni potez. Cilj operacije bio je okružiti i
uništiti srpske snage na širem području Mrkonjić Grada,
M
ovladati prometnicama koje od Mrkonjić Grada vode
prema Banjoj Luci i u nastavku zaposjesti pogodne po-
ložaje, prijeći u obranu i biti u spremnosti za odbijanje
protunapada s desne obale Vrbasa. Glavne snage treba-
le su se grupirati na smjeru Jajce – Mrkonjić Grad – Ma-
njača, a pomoćne na smjeru Dimitor – Dubica. Dio za-
datka bio je slabljenje srpskoga pritiska na 5. i 7. korpus
D
ARBiH. Glavne snage u operaciji bile su 4. i 7. gardijska
brigada HV-a, 1. hrvatski gardijski zdrug, 1., 2. i 3. gar-
dijska brigada HVO-a, 126. dp HV-a, 60. gardijsko-de-
santna bojna, 22. diverzantski odred HVO-a i Specijalna
policija MUP-a HR HB.974
C
Operacija je počela ujutro 9. listopada, a okončana
je 12. listopada 1995. kada su hrvatske snage realizira-
le sve postavljene ciljeve i zaustavile se na 23 km od
središta Banje Luke, najvećega grada RS-a. Bilo je to i
u skladu s planovima međunarodne zajednice koja je
smatrala da su tim uspjehom postignuti uvjeti za pre-
D
kid borbi i povratak diplomata za pregovarački stol.
Osvojeno je područje od oko 800 km2, uključujući Mr-
konjić Grad i hidrocentrale na Vrbasu, a snagama AR-
BiH omogućeno je napredovanje prema dolini Sane. U
operaciji je poginulo 10, teže ranjeno 186, a lakše 478
hrvatskih vojnika.975
972 R. DELIĆ, Armija RBiH, II, 196-199.
973 D. MARIJAN, Domovinski rat, 385.
974 A. GOTOVINA, Napadajni bojevi i operacije, 104-105.
975 A. GOTOVINA, Napadajni bojevi i operacije, 109-110, 187.
417
Domovinski rat 04-02-2020 Knjiga 1.indd 417
son why it failed was Operation Southern Move, which
was incepted as a result of an agreement between the
HV, the HVO and the ARBIH.
OPERATION SOUTHERN MOVE
After pulling their forces out of Jajce, the VRS de-
ployed OG-2 and the 30th Infantry Division for the pur-
pose of defending Mrkonjić Grad. At the beginning of
October, the 30th Infantry Division set up defensive po-
sitions along the Vrbas River (mouth of the Ugar River) –
Ugar River – upstream in the direction of Skender Vakuf
and towards the village of Vitovlje.
After the end of Operation Maestral, the Croatian
forces started preparing for Operation Southern Move.
The aim of the operation was to encircle and destroy
the Serb forces deployed in the wider Mrkonjić Grad
area, gain control of lines of communications, estab-
lish a defensive line and remain prepared to beat back
counterattacks coming from the direction of the right
bank of the Vrbas River. The main Croatian forces were
to regroup in the direction of Jajce – Mrkonjić – Man-
jača, and the supporting forces were to be deployed in
the direction of Dimitor – Dubica. One part of their task
was to weaken the Serb pressure on the ARBIH V and VII
Corps. The main Croatian forces conducting the oper-
ation were 4th and 7th Guards Brigade of the HV, the 1st
Croatian Guards Corps, HVO’s 1st, 2nd and 3rd Guards Bri-
gade, HV’s 126dp Brigade, 60th Guards Assault Battalion,
22nd Commando Detachment of the HVO and Special
Police of the MUP HR HB.
The operation began on the morning of October 9,
and ended on October 12, 1995, when the Croatian forc-
es, having attained all of the objectives, stopped their
advance on the outskirts of Banja Luka, the largest city
in the RS. They were only 23 kilometers away from the
city center. The decision to stop the advance towards
Banja Luka was in accordance with the plans of the inter-
R
national community. The international community be-
lieved that the Croatian forces’ success created a favor-
able situation on the ground for a cessation of hostilities
and induced the diplomats to return to the negotiating
table. The Croatian forces captured around 800 square
kilometers of terrain, including Mrkonjić Grad and the
hydroelectric power plants on the Vrbas River and en-
abled the ARBIH to advance towards the Sana Valley. 10
Croatian soldiers were killed, 186 were seriously wound-
ed and 478 suffered light wounds in the operation.
4.2.2020. 18:35:18
 Davor Marijan • Rat za opstojnost Hrvata, 1991. - 1995.
ZAVRŠNE BORBE I
NEREALIZIRANI PLANOVI
Tijekom operacije Južni potez Armija Republike BiH
krenula je u svoj dio operacije. Snage 5. korpusa s ojača-
njima su 9. listopada 1995. ušle u Sanicu, a 10. listopada
u Sanski Most. Idućega je dana zauzeto nekoliko naselja
jugoistočno od Prijedora. Operacije su završile 12. listo-
pada, što je bio i kraj sukoba.976
Nakon Južnog poteza hrvatske su snage prešle u
H
djelatnu obranu i prestrojavanje snaga. Zadatak OG-a
Istok bio je spriječiti prodor srpskih snaga na pravcima
prema Mrkonjić Gradu i Jajcu. Drugi je zadatak bio one-
mogućiti infiltriranje i nekontrolirano prometovanje
postrojbi ARBiH na području nadzora OG-a Istok. Pot-
M
pisano primirje srpske su snage prekršile 18. listopada
1995. neuspješnim napadom prema Bočcu i Čađavici.
Poslije nije bilo ozbiljnijih kršenja i primirje se održalo.977
Postrojbe HV-a ostale su u zapadnoj odnosno jugo-
zapadnoj BiH do početka prosinca 1995., kada je HVO
preuzeo i njihovu zonu djelovanja. Zbornom području
D
Tomislavgrad zona djelovanja proširena je na jugoza-
padnu Bosnu, odnosno na područje Drvara, iz kojeg su
povučene snage ZP-a Split. Zbog toga je zona ZP-a Vitez
proširena desno od Demirovca do lijevo rijeke Sane.978
U Hrvatskoj je gorući problem ostao okupirani dio
istočne Hrvatske. Hrvatsko je vrhovništvo dalo pred-
C
nost političkim pregovorima, ali je u spremnosti držalo
HV i ratni plan oslobađanja istočne Slavonije, Baranje
i Srijema pod imenom Dunav. On se trebao realizirati
ako pobunjeni Srbi ne bi pristali na mirnu reintegraciju
u Hrvatsku. Sličnu je sudbinu imao i plan Burin, koji nije
realiziran, a razrađen je za šire zaleđe Dubrovnika.979
976 R. DELIĆ, Armija RBiH, II, 200.
977 D. MARIJAN, Domovinski rat, 386.
978 Isto, 386.
979 Isto; Jakša RAGUŽ, „Operacija 'Burin' – planovi Hrvatske
vojske za zauzimanje istočne Hercegovine 1995. godi-
ne“, Časopis za suvremenu povijest, 3/43, 2009., 633-657.
418
Domovinski rat 04-02-2020 Knjiga 1.indd 418
FINAL BATTLES AND
UNREALIZED PLANS
During Operation Southern Move the ARBIH moved
into the attack as well. On October 9, 1995, the ARBIH
V Corps, with reinforcements, entered Sanica, and on
October 10 the corps entered Sanski Most. The follow-
ing day the Corps captured several villages southeast
of Prijedor. The operations ended on October 12, which
marked the end of the hostilities.
After Operation Southern Move, the Croatian forc-
es started conducting active defense and reorganizing
their forces. The task of OG East was to prevent Serb forc-
es from advancing towards Mrkonjić Grad and Jajce and
to prevent the ARBIH’s units from infiltrating OG East’s
area of responsibility and monitoring the ARBIH’s units’
transit through the area. On October 18, the Serb forc-
es violated the cease-fire by launching an unsuccessful
attack in the direction of Bočac and Čađavica. After that
the cease-fire was not violated in any significant way
and therefore it held.
The HV units remained in western and southwest
Bosnia until the beginning of December, 1995, when the
HVO took over their area of responsibility. Military Dis-
trict Tomislavgrad’s area of responsibility was expanded
to include southwest Bosnia, that is, the Drvar area, from
where the forces of Military District Split were pulled
out. For that reason, the area of Military District Vitez
was expanded to include the area south of Demirovac,
as far as the left bank of the Sana River.
For the Croatian government and its citizens the
fact that eastern Croatia was still occupied presented a
D
grievous and ongoing problem. Nevertheless, the Croa-
tian leadership insisted on solving the problem peace-
fully, through political dialogue. However, the Croatian
government was prepared to use the Croatian Army to
solve the problem militarily, if everything else failed. A
plan for such an eventuality existed. It was codenamed
R
Dunav (Danube), and its aim was to liberate Eastern Sla-
vonia, Baranja and Sirmium. It was never implemented
because the Serbs eventually agreed to be reintegrat-
ed peacefully into Croatia. There existed another plan,
Burin, for the liberation of the wider hinterland of Du-
brovnik. Due to successful negotiations, that plan suf-
fered the same fate as the Dunav plan.
4.2.2020. 18:35:18
 RATNI ZLOČINI I
ETNIČKA ČIŠĆENJA VI
H
M
WAR CRIMES AND
D
ETHNIC CLEANSING
C
D
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 Davor Marijan • Rat za opstojnost Hrvata, 1991. - 1995.

H
M
D
C
VUKOVAR - sjećate li se 18. studenoga 1991. (autor: Boris Ljubičić, Studio International, Tisak: Grafički zavod Hrvatske, Zagreb 1993.).

VUKOVAR - do you remember November 18, 1991 (Author: Boris Ljubičić, Studio International, Printed by Grafički zavod Hrvatske, Zagreb, 1993).
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 The Croatian Nation’s Struggle for Survival, 1991-1995
Rat je opreka miru. U ratu se ubija, ruši i uništava
materijalno dobro koje je nastajalo godinama, pa i sto-
ljećima. Dvadeseto je stoljeće donijelo totalni rat, sveo-
buhvatni rat protiv protivnika, od čega se mnogo vidjelo
u ratovima u Hrvatskoj i BiH.
U Hrvatskoj su većinu zločina počinili pripadnici JNA
i pobunjenih Srba. Oni su bili sastavni dio stvaranja srp-
ske države na dijelu teritorija RH. Srpski rat za hrvatsku
zemlju podrazumijevao je da ona bude “očišćena” od
nesrpskoga stanovništva. Povoljnije rješenje za Srbe bilo
H
je da oružanim sukobima i prijetnjama navedu stanov-
ništvo da napusti teritorij koji se želio pripojiti, a manje
povoljno, no učinkovitije rješenje bio je izravan progon,
koji je prečesto praćen počinjenjem ratnih zločina. U
tom su poslu veliku ulogu odigrale srpske paravojne
postrojbe, čije je nasilje s jedne strane stvaralo ozračje
M
za evakuaciju ili progon nesrpskoga stanovništva, a s
druge strane uvjetovalo je angažman JNA. Postrojbe
JNA u manjoj su mjeri izravno činile zločine, ali su ih
svojim postupcima omogućile. One su željeni cilj pretež-
no postizale udarom s distance, uglavnom topničkom
vatrom i napadima iz zraka. Vukovar je ogledni primjer
D
takve strategije i u njemu su srpske snage počinile svoj
najveći zločin. Tijekom i nakon kampanje za osvajanje
grada JNA i pobunjeni Srbi primijenili su više načina
nečovječnog djelovanja, koji su doveli do osvajanja Vu-
kovara i protjerivanja nesrpskoga stanovništva iz njega.
Nakon osvajanja grada iz gradske bolnice odvedeno je
C
i potom ubijeno 266 ranjenika i medicinskog osoblja,
od toga broja 200 je ubijeno na poljoprivrednom dobru
Ovčara kraj Vukovara. U gradiću Iloku odigrao se igrokaz
o izjašnjavanju, koji je također doveo do protjerivanja
stanovništva. Uz to je dio vojnika i stanovništva držan u
D
višemjesečnom zatočeništvu u logorima u Srbiji (u Be-
ogradu, Nišu, Novom Sadu, Padinskoj Skeli, Somboru,
Srijemskoj Mitrovici, Stajićevu, Begejcima, Šidu i drugim
logorima i zatvorima) i u samom Vukovaru.980
U Hrvatskoj su JNA i srpske snage u zoni borbenog
djelovanja počinile velik broj zločina koji su doveli do
egzodusa nesrpskoga stanovništva. Gotovo da nema di-
980 ICTY: Reynaud THEUNENS, Dobrovoljci SRS/SČP i sukob u
Hrvatskoj i BiH – Izveštaj veštaka Tima vojnih analitičara
za predmet br. IT-03-67, Haag, mart 2006.; ICTY: Reyna-
ud THEUNENS, Vojni aspekt uloge Jovice Stanišića i Franka
Simatovića u sukobima u Hrvatskoj i Bosni i Hercegovini
(1991–1995), Izveštaj za potrebe predmeta br. IT-03-69,
Haag, 30. 6. 2007.; D. MARIJAN, Obrana i pad Vukovara,
169-173, 262-265, 346-354.
421
Domovinski rat 04-02-2020 Knjiga 1.indd 421
War is the opposite of peace. Warfare is a destruc-
tible activity resulting in loss of life and eradication of
assets, material resources and civilized achievements.
The 20th century ushered in the era of total war, a type of
unrestricted warfare committed to achieving total vic-
tory at the cost of any sacrifice in lives and property and
waged with absolute or near-absolute disregard for all
moral and ethical values. The wars in Croatia and Bosnia
and Herzegovina featured many aspects of total war.
Most war crimes and crimes against humanity in
Croatia were committed by the JNA and rebel Serbs. It is
important to stress that the JNA and rebel Serbs deliber-
ately used terror as a war measure against Croatia in a bid
to create a Serb state within the internationally recog-
nized borders of the Republic of Croatia. The Serbs’ cru-
sade for acquiring Croatian land was predicated on the
need to ethnically cleanse the captured areas of all non-
Serb residents. In this particular regard the Serbs strove
to induce, by military action and threats, the non-Serbs
to flee the territory under their attack. The results of this
strategy were not satisfactory enough in terms of the
number of refugees. In many cases the Serbs opted for
the more efficient, even though less desirable solution
of directly expelling the non-Serbs from the conquered
areas. More often than not these expulsion drives were
accompanied by war crimes and crimes against human-
ity. The pivotal role in this campaign of ethnic cleansing
was played by Serb paramilitary formations. Their brutal
treatment of non-Serb civilians prompted many non-
Serbs to flee their homes or forced the Croatian govern-
ment to evacuate the populations of whole towns and
villages. At the same time it gave a pretext to the JNA to
intervene, ostensibly to stop the violence but in reality
to solidify Serb conquests and facilitate further instanc-
es of ethnic cleansing, war crimes and crimes against
humanity. Sometimes JNA units also perpetrated war
crimes and crimes against humanity. For the most part
though, the JNA used long range artillery and air power
R
to strike at civilian targets and thus induce civilians to
flee. During the Battle of Vukovar the JNA relied heavily
on the strategy of indiscriminate shelling. The Serb forc-
es committed the worst war crimes and crimes against
humanity of the entire war during the siege of Vukovar
and after the fall of the city. When the city surrendered
the Serbs marched out 266 wounded people and medi-
cal staff from Vukovar Hospital and executed them. 200
of them the Serbs bestially murdered at the Ovčara farm
near Vukovar. In the town of Ilok the JNA organized a
4.2.2020. 18:35:19
 Davor Marijan • Rat za opstojnost Hrvata, 1991. - 1995.
jela teritorija gdje su bile borbe da nije napravljen ratni
zločin. Uz općinu Vukovar (što uključuje grad i okolna
sela) posebice je stradala Banovina s dolinom rijeke Une.
U široj memoriji najpoznatija mjesta stradanja najvjero-
jatnije su Škabrnja, Baćin, Voćin, Saborsko i Široka Kula.
Selo Kostrići u općini Hrvatska Kostajnica manje je po-
znato, premda je to statistički mjesto možda najvećega
zločina u ratu jer su sredinom studenoga 1991. ubijeni
svi seljani, njih 16. Nakon dolaska i razmještaja mirovnih
snaga UN-a i formalnog povlačenja JNA, pobunjeni Srbi
H
nastavili su protjerivanje nesrpskoga stanovništva s oku-
piranog teritorija Hrvatske. Na primjer, samo od travnja
1992. do 20. srpnja 1993. s područja Hrvatske pod zašti-
tom UN-a protjerane su 23.472 osobe, među kojima je
bilo i oko tisuću Srba. U istom se vremenu na okupirano
područje vratilo pet (5) Hrvata i osam (8) pripadnika dru-
M
gih nacionalnosti. “Sa slobodnog teritorija na okupirani
prostor Republike Hrvatske prešlo je oko 1200 Srba, na
osobni zahtjev.“981 Oko 2500 Srba u zapadnoj Slavoniji
vratilo se na teritorij pod nadzorom hrvatskih vlasti. U
tom su vremenu na privremeno okupiranom području
zabilježena 273 ubojstva civila, 10 silovanja i 640 slučaje-
D
va fizičkoga maltretiranja i drugih oblika kršenja ljudskih
prava. Do kraja mandata UN-a, prema podatku iz pisma
predsjednika Tuđmana glavnom tajniku UN-a Boutrosu
Boutrosu Ghaliju od 22. ožujka 1995., na okupiranom
području pod nadzorom snaga UN-a pripadnici srpskih
snaga ubili su oko 600 osoba nesrpske narodnosti, a pre-
C
ma još neslužbenim podacima taj broj bi mogao biti oko
1200. Nakon rata je u zoni srpske pobune i srbijanske
agresije otkriveno najmanje 150 masovnih i 1200 po-
jedinačnih grobnica u kojima se nalaze posmrtni ostaci
žrtava zločina srpskih postrojbi.982
Zločina je bilo i na hrvatskoj strani, no – za razliku od
srpskih – nisu bili sustavni niti ih je politički i vojni vrh
poticao. Najvećim su dijelom bili neprimjerena reakcija
na srpske zločine. Većina tih zločina počinjena je 1991.
i 1993., i to u Osijeku, Paulinu Dvoru, Pakračkoj Polja-
ni, Sisku i Gospiću, odnosno Medačkom džepu. Nakon
Oluje u Gruborima, Varivodama i Gošićima u sjevernoj
981 Ured za UNPROFOR i PMEZ Vlade RH, kl. 004-01/93-
01/01, ur. br. 50303-03-93-136 od 28. 7. 1993.
982 Isto; M. Piškor, “Četnici ubili sve u banijskom selu, a još
nitko nije odgovarao”, Slobodna Dalmacija, 15. 11. 2010.;
Ante NAZOR, Velikosrpska agresija na Hrvatsku 1990-ih
(Republika Hrvatska i Domovinski rat: pregled političkih i
vojnih događaja 1990., 1991.–1995./1998.), HMDCDR, Za-
greb, 2011., 372.
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Domovinski rat 04-02-2020 Knjiga 1.indd 422
referendum in which the residents could opt for either
staying in the town or leaving. Since the town was sur-
rounded with Serb tanks the vast majority of the resi-
dents voted for leaving the town. The whole charade
with the referendum directly led to the expulsion of the
non-Serb residents. A significant number of Croatian
POWs and civilians were sent to prisons and concentra-
tion camps in Serbia (Belgrade, Niš, Novi Sad, Padinska
Skela, Sombor, Srijemska Mitrovica, Stajićevo, Begejci,
Šid and other locations) where they were inhumanely
treated and held for months. Some POWs and civilians
were incarcerated in Vukovar.
The JNA and rebel Serbs committed a large number
of war crimes and crimes against humanity in the areas
under their control in the Republic of Croatia. That orgy
of violence caused an exodus of the non-Serb popula-
tion from these areas. In almost every area where there
was fighting the JNA and rebel Serbs committed war
crimes and crimes against humanity. Most crimes were
committed in the Vukovar Municipality (the city and
surrounding villages) and Banovina including the Una
Valley. Arguably the most notorious crimes were those
committed in Škrabrnja, Baćin, Voćin, Saborsko and Širo-
ka Kula. The crime committed in the village of Kostrići
in the Kostajnica Municipality is not as well known to
the general public as those mentioned above but it is
arguably, relatively speaking, the worst crime commit-
ted by the Serbs during the war. In mid-November, 1991,
the Serbs killed all the 16 residents of Kostrići. After the
arrival and deployment of the UN peacekeeping force
the Serbs continued to expel non-Serbs from the oc-
cupied areas of the Republic of Croatia. For example,
from April, 1992, until July 1993, 23,472 persons were
D
expelled from areas of the Republic of Croatia under
the protection of the UN. Interestingly enough, among
them were about 1,000 Serbs. During that same period
only five Croats and eight members of other ethnicities
returned to their homes in the occupied areas. “From
R
the government-controlled territory about 1,200 Serbs
were moved, at their own request, to the occupied ar-
eas of the Republic of Croatia.” Around 2,500 Serbs in
western Slavonia returned to their homes in the govern-
ment-controlled territory. During that period 273 mur-
ders of civilians, 10 rapes and 640 instances of physical
abuse and other violations of human rights were report-
ed in the Serb-occupied area of the Republic of Croatia.
By the end of the UN mandate, according to the infor-
mation contained in President Tuđman’s letter of March
4.2.2020. 18:35:19
 The Croatian Nation’s Struggle for Survival, 1991-1995
Dalmaciji ubijena je 21 osoba srpske nacionalnosti.983
Tijekom Oluje krajinski su Srbi napustili Hrvatsku.
Iz srpske perspektive to je bilo etničko čišćenje, a iz ve-
ćinske hrvatske perspektive otišli su svojevoljno. Uoči i
tijekom pobune kod Srba u Krajini bilo je dominantno
stajalište da se s Hrvatima ne može živjeti. S obzirom na
masovan odziv na plebiscitu o autonomiji Krajine i ma-
sovno sudjelovanje u oružanoj pobuni, masovan odlazak
iz Hrvatske je logičan. Uostalom, već prvoga dana Oluje
Vrhovni savjet obrane Republike Srpske Krajine donio
H
je odluku koja je dovela do iseljavanja većine srpskoga
stanovništva iz Hrvatske.984 Možemo se složiti s mišlje-
njem da je odlazak Srba odgovarao hrvatskim vlastima,
“koji su smatrali da je na taj način riješen problem Srba
kao čimbenika koji ugrožava hrvatsku državu, ali to, na
osnovi raspoloživih izvora, ne znači da je hrvatska strana
M
planirala i provela protjerivanje pobunjenih Srba”.985
U Bosni i Hercegovini smrt i razaranje imali su osjet-
no veće razmjere nego u Hrvatskoj. Uz pomoć JNA, bo-
sanskohercegovački Srbi ponovili su sličan scenarij kao
u Hrvatskoj. Do kraja 1992. stavili su pod nadzor veći dio
teritorija BiH (oko 70 posto). Vojne uspjehe pratili su ma-
D
sovni zločini i etničko čišćenje nesrpskoga stanovništva,
koje je najveće razmjere imalo u istočnoj Bosni, Posavi-
ni i Bosanskoj krajini. Ti su nečovječni postupci obilje-
žili Srbe kao glavne negativce u ratu u BiH.986 U skladu
s time, široko je prihvaćen opći smisao zaključka koji
sumira brojna izvješća i tekstove: “Organizacije koje su
C
se bavile prikupljanjem činjenica, kao UN, Ministarstvo
vanjskih poslova SAD, CIA, Helsinki Watch i druge, jed-
noglasno su zaključile da su Srbi počinili 90 posto zlo-
čina u ovom balkanskom ratu i da su izvršili 100 posto
genocida sukladno definiciji genocida koju je dao UN,
D
naime organizirano, planirano i sustavno uništavanje
naroda u cjelini ili djelomično, temeljem etniciteta, reli-
gije ili drugog grupnog identiteta”.987
983 A. NAZOR, Velikosrpska agresija na Hrvatsku, 373.
984 Nikica BARIĆ, “Je li 1995. godine Hrvatska počinila ‘etnič-
ko čišćenje’ Srba?”, Časopis za suvremenu povijest, 2/36,
2004., 441-446; D. MARIJAN, Oluja, 138-140.
985 N. BARIĆ, “Je li 1995. godine Hrvatska počinila ‘etničko
čišćenje’ Srba?”, 461.
986 ICTY: E. BROWN, Vojna situacija u Bosanskoj krajini –
1992.: Analiza situacije; E. BEĆIREVIĆ, Genocid u istočnoj
Bosni.
987 O. ŽUNEC, Goli život. Socijetalne dimenzije pobune Srba u
Hrvatskoj I i II, Demetra, Zagreb, 2007., 111, bilj. 181.
423
Domovinski rat 04-02-2020 Knjiga 1.indd 423
22, 1995, to the Secretary-general of the United Nations,
Boutros Boutros-Ghali, members of the Serb forces had
killed around 600 non-Serbs in the areas under the con-
trol of the UN. According to unofficial sources, the real
number of victims is closer to 1,200. After the war in the
areas that had been under Serb occupation at least 150
mass graves and 1,200 individual graves with the re-
mains of victims of Serb forces were found.
Crimes were committed by Croats too, but these
crimes, unlike those committed by Serb forces, were
not part of a deliberate and systematic strategy of ter-
ror nor were they ordered and/or indirectly instigated
by the military and political leadership of the country.
For the most part the crimes committed by Croat sol-
diers were done as retribution for Serb depredations
visited on civilians and POWs. Most of these crimes
were perpetrated in 1991 in Osijek, Paulin Dvor, Pa-
kračka Poljana, Sisak and Gospić and in 1993 in the Me-
dak Pocket. In the wake of Operation Storm, 21 people
of Serb ethnicity were killed in Grubori, Varivode and
Gošići in northern Dalmatia.
During Operation Storm most of the Krajina Serbs
left Croatia. From Serb perspective their flight was
tantamount to ethnic cleansing. However, the Krajina
Serbs left of their own accord and for that reason the
Croatian position regarding the issue is that no ethnic
cleansing, or anything remotely akin to it, took place.
Prior to and during the rebellion most of the Krajina
Serbs subscribed to the notion that it was impossible
to coexist with the Croats. The vast majority of the Kra-
jina Serbs voted in favor of Krajina’s autonomy in the
plebiscite and took active part in the subsequent rebel-
lion against the legally elected Croatian government. If
the flight of most of the Krajina Serbs during Operation
Storm is considered through the prism of their attitude
before the rebellion started and their actions during
the rebellion their mass exodus from Croatia is a logical
consequence of their military defeat. It has to be point-
R
ed out that already on the first day of Operation Storm
the Supreme Defense Council of the Republic of Serbi-
an Krajina reached a decision that directly prompted
the majority of Serbs in Croatia to leave the country. In
a final analysis it is logical to conclude that the Croatian
government welcomed the mass exodus of Serbs from
Croatia “because it reasoned that these Serbs would
have constituted a destabilizing factor for the Republic
of Croatia, but this attitude, based on available sources,
in no way, shape or form means that the Croatian gov-
4.2.2020. 18:35:19
 Davor Marijan • Rat za opstojnost Hrvata, 1991. - 1995.
Stanje se dodatno zakompliciralo izbijanjem mu-
slimansko-hrvatskoga rata u BiH. U njemu su mediji
i dio međunarodnih tijela Hrvatima pripisali ulogu
počinitelja ratnih zločina i etničkih čistača, iako su ih
Muslimani nadvisili u gotovo svim segmentima. Do
travnja 1993. bilo je čestih sukoba u kojima je bilo
poginulih na obje strane i nekoliko zločina u kojima
je ubijen manji broj osoba. U tom su razdoblju najve-
ći zločin počinili pripadnici ARBiH koji su 26. siječnja
1993. u Dusini (općina Zenica) ubili 10 civila (devet
H
Hrvata i jednog Srbina). Za te su poslove Muslimani
u središnjoj Bosni koristili 7. muslimansku brigadu i
vjerske ratnike – mudžahedine, koji su preuzeli sličan
obrazac kao srpske paravojne formacije i po obavlje-
noj su zadaći ušli u sastav ARBiH.988
U travnju 1993. Armija Republike BiH napala je
M
HVO Konjica, što je pratio i napad na civile i njihovo
protjerivanje. Sukob se proširio u dolinu Lašve, gdje su
postrojbe HVO-a 16. travnja počinile zločin u Ahmići-
ma, a ARBiH istoga dana u Trusini, te u Bušćaku i Orli-
štu prije toga. Zahvaljujući medijskoj prezentaciji zlo-
čina u Ahmićima koju su tjedan dana poslije napravili
D
predstavnici Britanske bojne UNPROFOR-a, Ahmići su
gotovo preko noći promijenili sliku o ratu u BiH i utje-
cali na storniranje američkoga prijedloga o ukidanju
embarga na uvoz oružja i zračnim udarima po položa-
jima VRS-a.989
Nakon Ahmića sasvim su se ignorirali zločini i etnič-
C
ko čišćenje koje je prije i poslije počinila ARBiH protiv
Hrvata (zločini ARBiH nad civilima Hrvatima počinjeni
su u naseljima: Dusina, Busovača, Travnik, Križančevo
Selo, Buhine Kuće, Uzdol, Stipića livade, Grabovica, Bu-
gojno, Kakanj, Vareš, Travnik, Miletići, Maljine, Trusina,
Bušćak, Orlište…). Hrvatsko vijeće obrane doista je od
travnja 1993. reagiralo na etničko čišćenje Konjica od
Hrvata, provodeći katkad iste postupke kao odgovor
na ofenzivna djelovanja ARBiH, a radi zaštite hrvatskih
civila, najprije u dolini Neretve, a poslije i u drugim di-
jelovima općina gdje je bilo sukoba s ARBiH. Posebice
su jake reakcije bile zbog napada ARBiH na HVO u Mo-
staru 30. lipnja i izdaju muslimana pripadnika HVO-a,
nakon čega su, zbog gubitka povjerenja i preventivne
zaštite vlastitih snaga, slijedila masovna uhićenja Mu-
988 Sektor za sigurnost Odjela obrane HVO-a, Izvješće br.
02-4/1-621/93 od 22. 4. 1993.
989 C. HODGE, Velika Britanija i Balkan od 1991. do danas,
139-147.
424
Domovinski rat 04-02-2020 Knjiga 1.indd 424
ernment planned and conducted a forced expulsion of
rebel Serbs from the country.”
The war in Bosnia and Herzegovina was more vicious
and costly both in terms of lives and material damage
than the war in Croatia. With the help of the JNA the Bos-
nian Serbs enacted pretty much the same scenario as the
one that had taken place in Croatia. By the end of 1992
the JNA and Bosnian Serbs had gained control of most
of the territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina (about 70%).
Military successes of the Serbs were regularly accompa-
nied by mass murder and ethnic cleansing. The worst
Serb crimes took place in eastern Bosnia, Posavina and
Bosanska Krajina. These atrocities marked the Serbs as
the main villains in the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina. In
relation to that it is important to note that the widely ac-
cepted view regarding the Serbs’ criminal and genocidal
conduct during the war is often found in summaries of
numerous reports and articles: “The organization whose
brief was fact-finding, such as the United Nations, the US
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the CIA, Helsinki Watch and
many others, unanimously concluded that the Serbs had
committed 90 percent of all crimes in this Balkan war and
that they perpetrated 100 percent of genocidal acts, in
accordance to the UN’s definition of the term genocide –
the Serbs acted with the intent to destroy, in whole or in
part, national, ethnical, racial or religious groups.”
The situation in the country became even more com-
plicated with the outbreak of the Muslim-Croat war in
Bosnia and Herzegovina. Many media outlets and some
international organizations depicted the Croats as perpe-
trators of crimes and ethnic cleansing despite the fact that
the Muslims outdid the Croats both in scale and frequen-
cy of said acts. From the beginning of the conflict until
D
April, 1993, fighting between the Croats and Muslims was
frequent, with both sides suffering casualties. During that
period a few war crimes were committed in which a small
number of people were killed. The worst crime in that pe-
riod was committed by Army of the Republic of Bosnia
R
and Herzegovina soldiers on January 26, 1993, in Dusina
(municipality of Zenica), killing 10 civilians (nine Croats
and one Serb). In central Bosnia the Muslims saddled the
7th Muslim Brigade and religious warriors – Mujahedeen
with the task of murdering civilians. The mujahideen act-
ed on the same principle as the Serb paramilitary forma-
tions. Every time a mujahideen group completed its grue-
some task of perpetrating a war crime or a crime against
humanity it was officially incorporated into the Army of
the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina.
4.2.2020. 18:35:19
 The Croatian Nation’s Struggle for Survival, 1991-1995
slimana vojnih obveznika na području općina Stolac,
Čapljina, Mostar i Neum.990
Vojne uspjehe ARBiH u ljeto 1993. u središnjoj
Bosni i Bugojnu pratili su zločini nad Hrvatima i pro-
tjerivanje hrvatskoga stanovništva. Za protjerivanje
Hrvata muslimanske su vlasti optuživale same žrtve.
Alija Izetbegović ustvrdio je 28. lipnja 1993. u pismu
Franji Tuđmanu da nakon što ARBiH nije odgovorila na
etničko čišćenje koje su napravile postrojbe HVO-a u
Mostaru, Čapljini i Stocu, “HVO je isplanirao akciju ma-
H
sovnog pokretanja hrvatskog stanovništva iz središnje
Bosne. Hoće se dokazati da je zajednički život nemo-
guć i da je etnička podjela Bosne neminovnost.”991 To
je tzv. reverzibilno etničko čišćenje u okviru kojega se
putem medija pokušalo uvjeriti javnost da mudžahedi-
na nema u središnjoj Bosni, a da HVO propagandom o
M
mudžahedinima plaši Hrvate kako bi ih prisilili da na-
puste to područje. Slučajeve nasilja i nezakonitih po-
stupaka postrojbi ARBiH Izetbegović nije negirao, no
ustvrdio je da “te slučajeve osuđujemo i progonimo”,992
što je bilo licemjerno, budući da je ARBiH nastavila
protjerivati Hrvate, kao što je licemjerno tvrditi da je
D
hrvatska propaganda izmislila mudžahedine, koji su
počinili najgore zločine nad Hrvatima u središnjoj Bo-
sni. U vrijeme pisanja toga pisma ARBiH je etnički oči-
stila područje općine Travnik i dio općine Novi Travnik.
Doista, ARBiH je poslije sankcionirala ubojstvo dvojice
franjevačkih svećenika u Fojnici, no to je bila gotovo
C
sva njezina reakcija.
D
990 ICTY: Zapovjedništvo III satnije III bojne VP HVO Čapljina,
Izvješće dj. br. 02-4/3-06/4-12-208/93 od 1. 7. 1993.
991 ICTY: Alija Izetbegović, predsjednik Predsjedništva RBiH
od 28. 6. 1993. za dr. Franju Tuđmana, predsjednika RH.
992 ICTY: Alija Izetbegović, predsjednik Predsjedništva RBiH
od 28. 6. 1993. za dr. Franju Tuđmana, predsjednika RH.
425
Domovinski rat 04-02-2020 Knjiga 1.indd 425
In April, 1993, the Army of the Republic of Bosnia and
Herzegovina attacked the HVO Konjic, also targeting and
expelling Croat civilians. The conflict spread to the Lašva
Valley where HVO troops, on April 16, committed a crime
in Ahmići. On the same day the Army of the Republic of
Bosnia and Herzegovina committed a similar crime in Tru-
sina, and on the day before also in Bušćak and Orlište. One
week after the crime in Ahmići the representatives of the
British Battalion of UNPROFOR presented the atrocity to
the media. Almost overnight the perception of the world
public regarding the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina
shifted against the Croats. This circumstance crushed the
American initiative to lift the arms embargo and launch
air strikes against the VRS.
Following the atrocity in Ahmići the world media
systematically ignored the crimes committed by the
Army of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina; both
those perpetrated before the Ahmići incident and
especially those that occurred after. The Army of the
Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina committed mass
murders of Croatian civilians and engaged in ethnic
cleansing in the following cities, towns and villages:
Dusina, Busovača, Travnik, Križančevo Selo, Buhine
Kuće, Uzdol, Stipića Livade, Grabovica, Bugojno, Ka-
kanj, Vareš, Miletići, Maljine, Trusina, Bušćak, Orlište…).
The HVO began reacting to the ARBiH’s acts of ethnic
cleansing in Konjic and responding to ARBIH’s offen-
sive actions so as to protect Croatian civilians in April,
1993. At first the HVO targeted Muslim civilians in the
Neretva Valley and later in other municipalities where
there was fighting between Croat and Muslim forces.
The HVO reacted in an especially firm and energetic
manner to the Army of the Republic of Bosnia and Her-
zegovina’s attack on the HVO in Mostar on June 30 – the
HVO, having lost all trust and confidence in the Muslim
troops in its ranks, arrested, in a bid to protect its own
troops, a large number of Muslim conscripts in the mu-
nicipalities of Stolac, Čapljina, Mostar and Neum.
R
The Army of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina
followed up its successes in the summer of 1993 in central
Bosnia and Bugojno by expelling Croats and committing
other crimes against them. The Muslim authorities, in a
display of shameless effrontery, accused the victims of
ethnic cleansing of being responsible for their own plight.
Alija Izetbegović stated on June 28, 1993, in a letter to
Franjo Tuđman that after the Army of the Republic of Bos-
nia and Herzegovina had not reacted to the acts of ethnic
cleansing perpetrated by HVO forces in Mostar, Čapljina
4.2.2020. 18:35:19
 Davor Marijan • Rat za opstojnost Hrvata, 1991. - 1995.

and Stolac, “the HVO planned and executed a massive ex-

odus of the Croats from central Bosnia. The HVO wants
to provoke a situation which will indicate that peaceful
coexistence between the Muslims and Croats is impossi-
ble and that a break-up of Bosnia and Herzegovina along
ethnic lines is inevitable.” This is a good example of the so-
called reverse ethnic cleansing within the framework of
which it was attempted to use the media for propagating
the claim that there were no Mujahedeen in central Bos-
nia and that the HVO was engaged in spreading the Muja-
H
hideen myth to scare the Croatian population into fleeing
central Bosnia. Alija Izetbegović did not deny crimes and
other illegal actions committed by the Army of the Re-
Gornji Vakuf/Uskoplje, crta razdvajanja 1994. (fotografiju daro- public of Bosnia and Herzegovina but he did assert that
vao Zrinko Tokić) . “the Muslim authorities do not condone such acts and
are actively engaged in prosecuting the perpetrators.”The
M
Gornji Vakuf/Uskoplje, line of separation 1994 (Photograph do-
nated by Zrinko Tokić). assertion was sanctimonious in the extreme because the
Army of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina contin-
ued to expel Croats. Equally sanctimonious was the claim
that the Mujahideen were the figment of the HVO’s imag-
ination, especially since these, according to Izetbegović,
phantom Mujahideen had perpetrated gruesome crimes
D
against Croats in central Bosnia. At the time of the writing
of the letter the Army of the Republic of Bosnia and Her-
zegovina had ethnically cleansed the Travnik Municipality
and parts of the Novi Travnik Municipality of Croats. Some
time later the Army of the Republic of Bosnia and Herze-
govina did prosecute those responsible for the murder
C
of two Franciscan priests in Fojnica but that legal action
HVO, Pješčara, središnja Bosna. was the sum of all the Muslims authorities’ efforts to be
“actively engaged in prosecuting the perpetrators”, as
HVO, Pješčara, Central Bosnia. Izetbegović so eloquently put it in the letter to Tuđman.
D
R
Hrvatsko vijeće obrane.

Croatian Defense Council.

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 PREDRASUDE I
KONTROVERZIJE VII
H
M
PREJUDICES AND
D
CONTROVERSIES
C
D
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 Davor Marijan • Rat za opstojnost Hrvata, 1991. - 1995.

H
M
D
URBICID – Mostar, 1992.: Ulica maršala Tita (transverzala grada sjever-jug), na lijevoj obali Neretve.

Mostar, 1992: M. Tito’s Street (City’s Thoroughfare North-South), on the left bank of the Neretva.

“(…) Izvršen je urbicid nad Mostarom. (…) U kratkom vremenu granatiranjem s brda nestaju cijela naselja, ulice, gore domovi, ljudi bježe pred
C
smrću. Ruše se svi mostovi izuzev Starog mosta. Od 14 džamija samo su dvije neoštećene. Gore crkve u Potocima i Franjevačka u Mostaru, gori
Biskupski dvor, gori Samostan časnih sestara, mostarska katedrala se granatira. Dom kulture, muzej, arhiv i knjižnica su oštećeni. Uništen je
cijeli niz mostarskih hotela, škola, studentskih domova i fakulteta. Gori gradska ljepotica hotel „Neretva“. Gore gradske kuće: banja, sud, opći-
na, katastar. Upravne zgrade mnogih poduzeća više ne postoje, stotinu zapaljenih i uništenih poslovnih prostora zjape. Uništeni su ili znatno
oštećeni pošta, sve glavne trafo-stanice, izvorište Studenac, mnogi primarni i sekundarni dijelovi gradske infrastrukturne mreže. (…) Rušenjem
mostarskih mostova prekinute su sve infrastrukturne veze s gradom na lijevoj obali. (…) Pokušali su ubiti dio grada. (…) Kompletna naselja
stare urbane strukture grada, mahale Carina, Luka, Donja mahala, Karađozbegova mahala (današnja Fejićeva ulica) sa lijeve obale Neretve, te
D
naselja Podhum, Zahum, Balinovac, Cernica, teško i brutalno su razorena. Također novije urbane strukture individualnog stanovanja, naselja
Cim, Ilići, Jasenica, Zalik, Bijelo Polje, Buna, Hodbina su pretrpjela isto tako velika razaranja i oštećenja. Prema okvirnim procjenama, od ukupno
17.500 objekata individualnog stanovanja, uništeno je ili oštećeno oko 6500” (Mostar ‘92 – urbicid, Borislav Puljić, Almas Bavčić, Jasmina Ćeha-
jić, Meliha Terzić, Zagreb, 1992., 10, 11, 13; autori fotografija – str. 428, 489, 490 – Vladimir Kolopić, Ćiro Raić, Vladimir Raić, Sanja M. Vuković).

An urbicide was comitted against Mostar. (…) In a short time, as a result of the shelling from the surrounding hills, whole quarters and atreets
disappear, homes are ablaze with fire, people flee before death. All the bridges have been destrojyed except the Old Bridge; out of 14 town
R
mosques only two have remained undamaged. The Catholic church at Potoci village, the Franciscan church in Mostar, the Episcopal Residence,
the monastery of the Franciscan sisters at Bijelo Polje have been burnt, the cathedral of Mostar shelled. The Palace of Culture, the museum,
the archives and the library have been damaged. The whole number of the Mostar hotels, schools, dormitories and colleges have been ruined.
The town beauty the hotel „Neretva“ is on fire. The „town houses“ are ablaze: the bath, the court, the Town Hall, the cadaster. The administra-
tion buildings of many companies do not exist any longer, hundreds of burnt and destroyed business offices gape. Destroyed or considerably
damaged are the post office, all the major transforming stations, the water source „Studenac“, many primary and secondary parts of the city
infrastructural network. (…) With the destruction of the Mostar bridges all the infrastructural links with the town of the left bank have been
cut. (…) The enemy tried to kill a part of the town. (…) Whole quarters of the old urban structure of the town have been brutally destroyed:
the mahallas of Carina, Luka, Donja Mahala, Karadjoz-bey’s mahalla (today Fejića Street) on the left bank; as well as the residential districts of
Podhum, Zahum, Balinovac, Cernica. Likewise, the more recent urban structures of the individual housing, the residential districts of Cim, Ilići,
Jasenica, Zalik, Bijelo Polje, Buna, Hodbina have suffered equally heavy destruction and damage. According to the rough estimations, out of
the total of 17,500 buildings of individual housing 6,500 have been destroyed or damaged (Mostar ‘92 – urbicid, by Borislav Puljić, Almas Bavčić,
Jasmina Ćehajić, Meliha Terzić, Zagreb, 1992, 26, 27, 30; Photographs by Vladimir Kolopić, Ćiro Raić, Vladimir Raić, Sanja M. Vuković).

428

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 The Croatian Nation’s Struggle for Survival, 1991-1995
Domovinski rat od 1991. prati niz predrasuda i
kontroverzija. Uglavnom ih šire i zastupaju osobe
nesklone politici Franje Tuđmana ili oni koji su bili
njegovi politički protivnici. Svakako je najraširenija
teza o „dogovorenom“ ratu, koja je posebice učesta-
la kod autora muslimansko-bošnjačke provenijenci-
je.993 Temelji se na sastanku čelnika Srbije i Hrvatske
Slobodana Miloševića i Franje Tuđmana 25. ožujka
1991. u Karađorđevu, na kojem se razgovaralo o ak-
tualnoj jugoslavenskoj krizi. Sreli su se ponovno 15.
H
travnja u Tikvešu, a potom uz nazočnost Alije Izetbe-
govića 12. lipnja 1991. u Splitu. Premda nema nika-
kvih dokaza o nekakvu sporazumu niti to potvrđuje
naknadni razvoj događanja, stvorena je percepcija
da je na tim sastancima Bosna i Hercegovina podi-
jeljena između Srbije i Hrvatske.994 Sastavni dio ove
M
predrasude sastanak je Mate Bobana i Radovana Ka-
radžića, čelnika Herceg-Bosne i Republike Srpske, u
Grazu u svibnju 1992., na zahtjev predstavnika me-
đunarodne zajednice, u fazi dogovaranja mirnog
rješenja i potpisivanja sporazuma, na kojem se pre-
govaralo o spornim pitanjima između Hrvata i Srba.
D
I taj se sastanak smatra “uspješnim”, premda se na
njemu ništa nije dogovorilo i premda se nakon njega
rat između Hrvata i Srba nastavio bez prekida sve do
kasne jeseni 1992. godine.995
Nakon sastanka u Karađorđevu sljedeća krono-
loška kontroverzija jest neuključivanje Hrvatske u su-
C
kob Slovenije i JNA. Tadašnji ministar obrane i zapo-
vjednik ZNG-a RH general Martin Špegelj selektivnim
odabirom činjenica brani tezu da se Hrvatska trebala
uključiti i napasti vojarne JNA. Aktualno stanje na rati-
štu pokazuje da je Tuđman s pravom odbio Špegeljev
D
zahtjev, jer je vodio nespremnu i nenaoružanu državu
u rat protiv JNA, te da bi to bio potez koji bi štetio
Hrvatskoj na međunarodnom planu.996
993 Sejo OMERAGIĆ, Dogovoreni rat, Proton, Sarajevo,
2000.; V. KARAVELIĆ, Agresija na BiH, 12-13; R. DELIĆ, Ar-
mija RBiH, I, 78-79.
994 I. LUČIĆ, Uzroci rata, 383-415.
995 R. DELIĆ, Armija RBiH, I, 79; Detaljno o susretu u
Grazu: Davor MARIJAN, „Bosanskoposavski kori-
dor – značenje, borbe, tumačenja“, Slavonski Brod
i Brodsko-posavska županija u Domovinskom ratu,
Hrvatski institut za povijest, Podružnica za povi-
jest Slavonije, Srijema i Baranje, Slavonski Brod,
2018., 13-38.
996 D. MARIJAN, Smrt oklopne brigade, 216-218.
429
Domovinski rat 04-02-2020 Knjiga 1.indd 429
It is safe to assert that the Croatian War of Indepen-
dence is shrouded in a myriad of prejudices and con-
troversies. The existence and political potency of these
prejudices and controversies comes, for the most part,
as courtesy of those who were Franjo Tuđman’s polit-
ical opponents and those who, for whatever reason,
are not satisfied with the lasting results of his presi-
dency. The hypothesis that the Croatian War of Inde-
pendence was a conflict staged behind the scenes by
Tuđman and Milišević is one such controversy and the
conspiracy theory of choice for many Muslim-Bosniak
historians and authors. The premise of the “staged
war” theory revolves around the meeting between
Serbian leader Slobodan Milošević and Croatian pres-
ident Franjo Tuđman which took place on March 25,
1991, in Karađorđevo. The main topic of discussion at
the meeting was the current Yugoslav crisis. The two
leaders met again on April 15 in Tikveš and then again
on June 12, 1991, in Split. Alija Izetbegović was also
present at the latter meeting. There exists no evidence
whatsoever that Milošević and Tuđman reached an
underhanded agreement and the subsequent events
clearly show that the two leaders did not see eye to
eye on anything. However, certain elements find it con-
venient to subscribe to the belief that the two leaders
decided to carve up Bosnia and Herzegovina between
Serbia and Croatia during those meetings. An integral
part of this particular conspiracy theory is the meeting
between Mate Boban and Radovan Karadžić, leaders of
Herzeg-Bosnia and the Republika Srpska respectively,
in Graz in May, 1992. It is important to note that the
meeting occurred at the instigation of the represen-
tative of the international community for the purpose
of finding a peaceful solution to the crisis and signing
an agreement. Contentious issues regarding the Serb
– Croatian relations were discussed at the meeting.
For some inexplicable reason many historians depict
that meeting as successful, even though no agreement
R
was made. Moreover, after the meeting the conflict be-
tween the Serbs and Croats continued without inter-
ruption until late fall, 1992.
Another controversy that has spawned many con-
spiracy theories has Croatia’s decision not to get em-
broiled in the conflict between Slovenia and the JNA
and its core. The then minister of defense and com-
mander of the ZNG of the Republic of Croatia, General
Martin Špegelj, holds the position that Croatia should
have gotten involved in the conflict and attacked the
4.2.2020. 18:35:21
 Davor Marijan • Rat za opstojnost Hrvata, 1991. - 1995.
I prekid vatre u siječnju 1992. (Sarajevsko primirje)
neki autori smatraju štetnim za Hrvatsku, a neki ga čak
tretiraju i kao rezultat dogovora Milošević – Tuđman da
bi se krenulo u rat za BiH, što je apsurdno.997 Naime, HV
je na kraju 1991. imao taktičku razinu, operativnu vrlo
rijetko – može se reći samo u zapadnoj Slavoniji, a stra-
tegijska razina (GS HV) nije funkcionirala. Krajem 1991.
HV nije imao streljiva ni za kraću obranu, a kamoli za
zahtjevnu operaciju.998
Kontroverzijama su obilježene i višemjesečne bor-
H
be za Bosansku Posavinu 1992. godine. Jaku medijsku
potporu imaju stajališta da su Hrvati u Bosanskoj Posa-
vini izgubili zbog izdaje hrvatskoga političkog vrha, a
ne zbog vojne pobjede VRS-a.999
Sudjelovanje dijela HV-a u BiH također je kontro-
verzno. Hrvatska je vojska u tri vremenska intervala ra-
M
tovala u BiH. Godine 1992. pomagala je HVO-u da obra-
ni teritorij pod nadzorom Hrvata od napada srpskih
snaga, što je izravno utjecalo i na opći tijek rata. Dijelovi
hrvatskih snaga bili su angažirani u muslimansko-hr-
vatskom ratu 1993. - 1994., što je najsporniji dio njezina
angažmana u BiH. Posljednji, treći angažman Hrvatske
D
vojske bio je od studenoga 1994. do kraja 1995. u za-
vršnim borbama protiv srpskih snaga u BiH i slomu srp-
ske dominacije u BiH. Iz srpske perspektive, cjelokupni
angažman HV-a bila je agresija na Republiku Srpsku, a
bošnjačko-muslimanskim autorima sporan je udio HV-a
u muslimansko-hrvatskom ratu. Iz redova ovih zadnjih
C
tumača povijesti tvrdi se da je Hrvatska vojska u ratu
između ARBiH i HVO-a imala angažirano i do 13 (!) bri-
gada, a da su gubici iznosili više od 13.000 (!) vojnika.
Izvor ove posljednje netočne tvrdnje je general Martin
Špegelj.1000 Od siječnja 1993., kad je Armija Republike
BiH započinjala rat protiv HVO-a, bošnjačko-musliman-
sko vodstvo optuživalo je Hrvatsku da postrojbe HV-a
sudjeluju u sukobima. Na sastanku u Zenici održanom
20. travnja 1993. između čelnika ARBiH i HVO-a, Sefer
997 Norman CIGAR, “Okončanje rata i hrvatski rat za neza-
visnost: odluka u času zaustavljanja”, Erasmus, br. 20,
Zagreb, 1997., 37-54; D. MARIJAN, Smrt oklopne brigade,
218-220.
998 D. MARIJAN, “The Sarajevo ceasefire”, 103-122.
999 M. ŠPEGELJ, Sjećanja vojnika, 335-341; J. ZOVAK, Rat u
Bosanskoj Posavini 1992., 665-677.
1000 Nedžad LATIĆ, Zehrudin ISAKOVIĆ, Rat u Srednjoj Bosni:
ratna sjećanja generala Alagića, “Bemus”, Zenica, 1997.,
30; R. DELIĆ, Armija RBiH, I, 364.
430
Domovinski rat 04-02-2020 Knjiga 1.indd 430
JNA barracks in Croatia. At the time he vociferously
advocated that course of action but President Tuđman
dismissed the idea. The subsequent events on the bat-
tlefield clearly show that Tuđman was absolutely right
in refusing to countenance any impetuous move on the
part of the nascent Croatian army. Giving in to Špegelj’s
urgings would have pitted an untrained and debilitat-
ingly underequipped motley collection of reservists,
conscripts and a small number of professionals against
the fourth largest armed force in Europe and would
have caused a lot of damage for Croatia’s aspirations
for independence in the international political arena.
The fact that Špegelj staunchly continues to insist on
the correctness of the idea that Croatia should have
attacked the JNA during the Ten-Day War in Slovenia
seems to indicate that the former minister of defense
and commander of the ZNG has a selective memory
about the events that led to the war in Croatia.
Some historians and authors claim that by signing
the Sarajevo cease-fire agreement in January, 1992,
the Croatian government shot itself in the foot. Oth-
ers go even further by somehow detecting a shady
deal struck between Milošević and Tuđman behind the
cease-fire. According to the latter group of authors, the
two leaders decided to defuse the Serb-Croat conflict
in Bosnia and Herzegovina for the purpose of launch-
ing aggression against Bosnia and Herzegovina. The
mass of available evidence clearly shows that this par-
ticular conspiracy theory is absurd. The Croatian Army,
at the end of 1991, could only successfully operate at
the tactical level, except in western Slavonia where it
was able to operate at the operative level as well. Op-
erating at the strategic level, however, at that time, was
D
beyond the capabilities of the Croatian Army.
Controversy also marks the months-long battles for
the Bosanska Posavina region during 1992. Many me-
dia outlets in Croatia are obviously bent on ramming
down their readers’ and viewers’ collective throats the
R
theory that the Croats lost in the Bosanska Posavina re-
gion not on account of the VRS’s military victory but on
account of the Croatian government’s betrayal of the
Bosnian Croats.
The participation of elements of the Croatian Army
in the conflict in Bosnia and Herzegovina is also mired
in controversy. The Croatian Army participated in the
war in Bosnia and Herzegovina during three separate
time periods. In 1992 it helped the HVO to defend its
territory against Serb attacks. These battles directly in-
4.2.2020. 18:35:21
 The Croatian Nation’s Struggle for Survival, 1991-1995
Halilović je tvrdio da u sukobima sudjeluju i postrojbe
HV-a, pri čemu se pozvao na komandanta 4. korpusa
Arifa Pašalića, no konkretne dokaze nije dao.1001 Vlada
BiH 13. svibnja javno je optužila RH da se na teritoriju
BiH nalaze „113. splitska brigada i dijelovi brigade iz
Metkovića (na području Bune, Dubrave i Stoca), 114.
splitska i 123. varaždinska na području Lašve te jedna
tenkovska postrojba na području Čvrsnice”.1002 Ne samo
da te ili druge brigade tada nisu bile ondje, nego pri-
tom čak ni nazivi pojedinih brigada nisu točni. U tom
H
je razdoblju u sukobima s ARBiH bila samo malobrojna
bojna Zrinski, postrojba koju su uglavnom činili Hrvati
Herceg-Bosne. Početkom srpnja 1993. u sukob su poče-
le ulaziti i druge postrojbe HV-a, najčešće dragovoljački
sastavi. Angažirane su uglavnom na mostarskom dijelu
bojišta i ramsko-uskopaljskom bojištu.
M
Na mostarskom dijelu bojišta od početka srpnja do
kraja kolovoza 1993. bila je angažirana borbena skupina
5. gardijske brigade HV-a. Početkom kolovoza iz 1. i 2.
gardijske brigade HV-a angažirane su dvije nepotpune
satnije dragovoljaca (90 i 113 ljudi). Krajem srpnja anga-
žirana je i dragovoljačka postrojba Vojne policije, koja je
D
u drugoj polovini listopada imala 87 policajaca.1003
Pripadnici HV-a u kolovozu 1993. se usmjeravaju
na ramsko-uskopaljsku bojišnicu, gdje će se zadržati
do svibnja 1994. godine. Najbrojnija je bila 5. gardijska
brigada, koja je na bojišnici duže vrijeme imala postroj-
bu jačine bojne. Od sredine studenoga 1993. do veljače
C
1994. ondje je bila skupina 7. gardijske brigade HV-a sa
snagama jačine satnije. Ostale profesionalne postrojbe
i razne specijalne skupine brojno su bile u rasponu od
voda do ojačanog voda. Dragovoljačke skupine iz pri-
čuvnih postrojbi masovnije su bile zastupljene iz domo-
D
branskih pukovnija iz Slavonije, a iz nekoliko pričuvnih
brigada HV-a bilo je skupina jačine pješačkoga voda.
Intenzitet dolazaka bio je najveći u razdoblju kolovoz
- studeni 1993. godine. Na samom kraju 1993. od voj-
nih bjegunaca i vojnih obveznika Hrvata iz BiH ustroje-
na je u Zagrebu 175. brigada, koja je od kraja prosinca
1001 Sektor za sigurnost Odjela obrane HVO, Izvješće br. 02-
4/1-621/93 od 22. 4. 1993.
1002 ICTY: Saopštenje Vlade RBiH od 13. 5. 1993.
1003 Davor MARIJAN, „Expert opinion: On the War Conne-
ctions of Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina (1991-
1995)“, Časopis za suvremenu povijest 36, br. 1, Zagreb,
2004., 281; Brojno stanje postrojbi u sektoru obrane
Mostara na dan 26. 10. 1993.
431
Domovinski rat 04-02-2020 Knjiga 1.indd 431
fluenced the subsequent course of the war. Elements
of the Croatian Army were deployed in Bosnia and Her-
zegovina during the Muslim-Croat conflict in 1993 and
1994 and the role played by the Croatian Army forces
during this time period invites more controversy than
the participation of Croatian Army units in Bosnia and
Herzegovina during the other two time periods. The
third time period during which Croatian Army forma-
tions were deployed in Bosnia and Herzegovina lasted
from November, 1994, to the end of 1995. This was a
period during which the Croats had the upper hand
in the theater and decisively defeated the Serb forces
in Bosnia and Herzegovina. From the Serbian perspec-
tive, the involvement of the Croatian Army in Bosnia
and Herzegovina constituted aggression against the
Republika Srpska. Bosniak-Muslim historians, on the
other hand, do not treat kindly the involvement of the
Croatian Army in the Muslim-Croat conflict. Some Bos-
niak Muslim historians claim that the Croatian Army
deployed no less than 13 brigades and suffered more
than 13,000 casualties in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The
source of the latter figure is, interestingly enough,
Marin Špegelj. From January, 1993, when the Army
of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina started its
war against the HVO, the Bosniak-Muslim leadership
accused Croatia of deploying elements of its armed
forces in Bosnia and Herzegovina. At a meeting in Zen-
ica, held on April 20, 1993, between the leaders of the
Army of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina and
the HVO, Sefer Halilović claimed that, according to the
commander of IV Corps Arif Pašalić, the Croatian Army
units were involved in the conflict. However, Sefer Hali-
lović did not provide any concrete evidence to back up
his claim. The government of Bosnia and Herzegovina
publically accused Croatia, on May 13, of deploying the
113th Split Brigade and elements of the Metković Bri-
gade in the Buna, Dubrava and Stolac areas; the 114th
Split Brigade and 123rd Varaždin Brigade in the Lašva
R
area and one tank unit in the Čvrsnica area. As a matter
of fact, these brigades were not deployed at that time
in the mentioned areas. Furthermore, the designations
of the brigades as given by the Bosnian government
are wrong. During that period only the Zrinski Brigade
was deployed in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The numeri-
cal strength of the unit was considerably below that of
a brigade and it consisted of, for the most part, Croats
from Herzeg-Bosnia. At the beginning of July, 1993, the
Croatian Army started deploying other units in Bosnia
4.2.2020. 18:35:21
 Davor Marijan • Rat za opstojnost Hrvata, 1991. - 1995.
1993. do svibnja 1994. po bojnama bila angažirana na
ramsko-uskopaljskom bojištu. Po završetku musliman-
sko-hrvatskoga rata te su snage u proljeće 1994. povu-
čene iz BiH. Pripadnici HV-a u BiH u dokumentima se
uglavnom vode kao dragovoljci, što je za većinu ned-
vojbeno. Njihov broj nikad nije prešao snagu formacij-
ske lake brigade JNA (najviše 1400 - 1800, a najčešće
se radilo o 500 - 600 pripadnika iz HV-a, uglavnom dra-
govoljaca podrijetlom iz BiH), uz potporu ekvivalenta
topničke bitnice i oklopne satnije.1004 Nikada nisu bili
H
koncentrirani na jednom taktičkom pravcu ili mjestu,
nego su, pod zapovijedanjem HVO-a, dijeljeni na manje
skupine radi „krpanja“ prevelike crte obrane.1005 Najveća
od tih postrojbi, koja je uporabljena na jednom prav-
cu, bila je pješačka bojna. S takvim snagama ne ide se u
agresiju i secesiju druge države, a pogotovo se ne rabi
M
razdijeljena na manje skupine i razbacana na širokom
području od Mostara do Uskoplja. Njihova uloga je u pr-
vom redu bila psihološka i, s obzirom na brojnost, stvar-
1004 Istražujući broj vojnika HV-a u sukobu s ARBiH na su-
đenju u Haagu u predmetu Prlić i ostali, na temelju
D
transkripta iz Ureda predsjednika RH sa sastanka Franje
Tuđmana, Mate Granića, Gojka Šuška i Drage Krpine u
Predsjedničkim dvorima, 29. siječnja 1994., na kojem je,
između ostaloga, Franjo Tuđman izjavio da se u BiH nalazi
između 1500 i 2000 dobrovoljaca iz Hrvatske, sudac An-
tonetti je primijetio: „Kako se čini, broj dobrovoljaca nije
bio velik (2000) i upozoreno je na nepovredivost granica.“
C
O spomenutoj problematici, u svom izdvojenom mišlje-
nju napisao je da je RH intervenirala u BiH prije svega do-
brovoljcima i časnicima upućenim na lice mjesta, a glede
izravne intervencije HV-a tvrdi da je ona, ako je uopće
postojala, bila ograničenih razmjera. Pritom je upozo-
rio na selektivnu prezentaciju dokumenata u postupku:
„Moram izraziti žaljenje zbog činjenice da je tužilaštvo
po meni imalo vrlo selektivan pristup tim dokumentima,
zadržavajući, da bi dokazalo svoju tezu, samo dokumen-
te koji mu idu u prilog, a ostavljajući po strani sve one
koji bi mogli baciti drugačije svjetlo na njegove nazore.
Takva praksa mi se ne čini najkonstruktivnijom kada je
riječ o krivičnim djelima iz domena međunarodnog hu-
manitarnog prava. Smatram da je u situaciji kad na tere-
nu koegzistira više suprotstavljenih snaga, uz prisustvo
tri vojske (VRS, HVO i ARBiH), apsolutno neophodno
ukazati na to da se vojni događaji mogu razumjeti samo
horizontalnim analiziranjem krivičnih djela, a ne tako što
će se ponuditi samo neki dokumenti iz samo jedne od
vojski, i to oni koji idu u prilog tezi tužilaštva.“ ICTY: Izdvo-
jeno i djelomično suprotno mišljenje sudije Jean-Claude
Antonettia, predsjedavajućeg Pretresnog vijeća od 29. 5.
2013., tom 6, 53, 74-75.
1005 D. MARIJAN, „Expert opinion”, 281; 7. gardijska brigada
HV – Pume, 157.
432
Domovinski rat 04-02-2020 Knjiga 1.indd 432
and Herzegovina. These units, mostly, consisted of vol-
unteers and most of them were deployed in the Mostar
area and in the Rama-Uskoplje area.
The Combat Group of the 5th Guards Brigade of
the Croatian Army was deployed in the Mostar area
from the beginning of July to the end of August, 1993.
At the beginning of August two incomplete compa-
nies consisting of volunteers of the 1st and 2nd Guards
Brigades of the Croatian Army, 90 and 113 men strong
respectively, were deployed in Mostar. At the end
of July a Military Police volunteer unit was also de-
ployed. In the second half of October this unit consist-
ed of 87 policemen.
Croatian Army units, in August, 1993, were de-
ployed in the Rama-Uskoplje area and remained there
until May, 1994. The 5th Guards Brigade of the Croatian
Army had more soldiers deployed in Bosnia and Herze-
govina than any other unit of the Croatian Army – for a
long period of time a battalion-size unit of the brigade
remained deployed in the country. From mid-Novem-
ber, 1993, until February, 1994, a company-size unit
consisting of soldiers of the 7th Guards Brigade was in
Bosnia and Herzegovina. Other professional formations
and various special purpose formations had units rang-
ing in size from platoon to reinforced platoon present
in Bosnia and Herzegovina at one time or another. The
most numerous volunteer groups from reserve forma-
tions were those from Slavonia regiments. A number
of reserve brigades of the Croatian Army sent platoon
size groups to Bosnia and Herzegovina. The Croatian
Army sent most soldiers to Bosnia and Herzegovina
during the period from August to November 1993. At
the end of 1993, the 175th Brigade, consisting of mobi-
D
lization dodgers and Croatian conscripts from Bosnia
and Herzegovina, was formed in Zagreb. The brigade
was gradually, from the end of December, 1993, until
May, 1994, one battalion at a time, deployed in the Ra-
ma-Uskoplje area. When the Muslim-Croat war ended
R
these forces were withdrawn from Bosnia and Her-
zegovina in the spring of 1994. Most of the Croatian
Army soldiers deployed in Bosnia and Herzegovina are
listed in the Croatian Army documents as volunteers. A
majority of those soldiers undoubtedly did volunteer
for service in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Their number
never exceeded the numerical strength of a JNA light
brigade (at most 1,400-1,800 soldiers but in most cases
500-600 soldiers, mostly volunteers who were born in
Bosnia and Herzegovina) supported by the equivalent
4.2.2020. 18:35:21
 The Croatian Nation’s Struggle for Survival, 1991-1995

of an artillery battery and armored company.20 The Cro-

atian Army forces present, at any given time, in Bosnia
and Herzegovina were never concentrated in one area
or deployed all together tactically, but were, under the
command of the HVO, divided into smaller groups and
as such used to reinforce threatened or undermanned
sectors of a given defensive line. The largest unit that
was deployed on one line was an infantry battalion.
This pattern of deployment and the size of the units in
question are inconsistent with any offensive intention,
H
especially one that aims to destroy a country’s armed
forces and occupy its territory. Furthermore, the Croa-
tian Army formations in Bosnia and Herzegovina were
divided into smaller units and scattered the length and
breadth of the country, from Mostar to Uskoplje. The
role of these units was, first and foremost, to bolster
M
the HVO forces’ morale. At any given time the number
of Croatian Army soldiers in Bosnia and Herzegovina
was small and in this respect their value in the scheme
of things was symbolic, representing a token gesture
D
20 Judge Antonetti, Presiding Judge of the Trial Chamber
in the Prlić et al. case, referring to the number of HV so-
ldiers engaged in the conflict with the ARBIH, based on
Hrvatsko vijeće obrane. the transcript of the meeting between Franjo Tuđman,
Mate Granić, Gojko Šušak and Drago Krpina held on
Croatian Defense Council. January 29, 1994, at the Presidential Palace, at which
Tuđman stated that there were between 1,500 to 2,000
C
Croatian volunteers in Bosnia and Herzegovina, obser-
ved during the trial: “It appears that the number of vo-
lunteers was limited (2,000) and that the inviolability of
no je bila simbolična potpora HVO-u u obrani prevelike borders was recalled.” In his separate opinion the Judge
crte, koju je HVO 1993. s mukom održavao sprječavaju- wrote that Croatia had intervened in Bosnia and Herze-
ći da Armija Republike BiH u pohodu „oslobađanja“ ne govina mainly through volunteers and officers who had
been dispatched there, and as for direct intervention of
provede etničko čišćenje Hrvata iz BiH kao najmanjeg
D
the Croatian Army, the Judge wrote that it was very limi-
konstitutivnog naroda.1006 ted, if it ever existed at all. At the same time the Judge
Nekim je tumačima kontroverzan i kraj rata u Hr- expressed his regret about the selective approach to the
vatskoj – operacija Oluja, u kojoj vide još jedan dogo- presentation of documents in the trial: “I deeply regret
the fact that, in my view, the Prosecution had a very se-
vor Miloševića i Tuđmana. Obrazlaže se brzim slomom lective approach to its documents, retaining only tho-
SVK-a na okupiranom području. Iz perspektive čelnika se supporting its arguments and setting aside all those
R
ARBiH Rasima Delića, intenzitet napredovanja HV-a bio likely to compromise its point of view. I do not think
je nevjerojatno brz.1007 No, Delić je zanemario da su i na this is the most efficient practice to adopt with regard
to crimes falling under international humanitarian law.
teritoriju BiH gardijske brigade HV-a imale učinak kor- I find it absolutely necessary to say that when there are
pusa ARBiH, te da su uvjeti za brzo napredovanje u Oluji several opposing forces and three armies on the ground
prema Kninu ostvareni u dugotrajnoj napadajnoj kam- (VRS, HVO and ARBIH), a military incident is understood
panji, započetoj u studenom 1994., i uz znatne žrtve. only by way of a horizontal examination of the crimes
and not by selecting a few documents issued by only
one army which support the Prosecution's argument.”
ICTY: Separate and partially dissenting opinion of Pre-
1006 D. MARIJAN, „Expert opinion“, 281-282. siding Judge of the Trial Chamber Judge Jean-Clause
1007 R. DELIĆ, Armija RBiH, II, 190. Antonetti, of May 25, 2013, volume 6, 53, pp. 74-75.

433

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 Davor Marijan • Rat za opstojnost Hrvata, 1991. - 1995.

of the Croatian government’s assistance to the belea-

guered HVO units defending the line in 1993 and pre-
venting, against all odds, the Army of the Republic of
Bosnia and Herzegovina from conducting a compre-
hensive campaign of ethnic cleansing against the least
numerous and as such the most vulnerable constituent
nation of the country, the Croats.
Some people opt to view the end of the Croa-
tian War of Independence as a controversial histori-
cal event. In that they somehow see another devious
H
intrigue hatched by Milošević and Tuđman. This con-
spiracy theory draws its lifeblood from the fact that
the Croatian forces defeated the Army of the SVK in a
HVO, Crni vrh, prosinac 1993. (fotografiju darovao Zrinko Tokić). swift and decisive manner during Operation Storm, the
HVO, Crni vrh, December 1993 (Photograph donated by Zrinko Tokić). offensive in which the Croatian Army liberated most
of the occupied areas of the Republic of Croatia. The
M
commander of the Army of the Republic of Bosnia and
Herzegovina Rasim Delić stated that the intensity of
the Croatian Army’s advance was unbelievably swift.
But, Delić conveniently glossed over the fact that any
given Guards Brigade of the Croatian Army deployed
in Bosnia and Herzegovina, in terms of efficiency and
D
combat value, was the equivalent of any given Corps
of the Army of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina.
Delić also seemed to disregard the fact that the condi-
tions for a swift advance towards Knin were achieved
in a long offensive campaign launched in November,
1994, at the cost of considerable casualties.
C
HVO, Kupres, zima 1994. (fotografiju darovao Zrinko Tokić).
HVO, Kupres, winter 1994 (Photograph donated by Zrinko Tokić).
D
R
HVO, Kupres.

434

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 ZAKLJUČAK
VII
H
M
CONCLUSION
D
C
D
R

Domovinski rat 04-02-2020 Knjiga 1.indd 435 4.2.2020. 18:35:23

 Davor Marijan • Rat za opstojnost Hrvata, 1991. - 1995.

Hrvatske zastave i zapovjednici hrvatskih snaga u kraljevskim gradovima Kninu i Jajcu, oslobođenima u operacijama
„Oluja“ (5. kolovoza 1995.) i „Maestral“ (13. rujna 1995.).

Croatian flags and commanders of the Croatian forces in Knin and Jajce, seats of kings in medieval times, liberated in
Operation Storm (August 5, 1995) and Operation Maestral (September 13, 1995) respectively.
H
M
D
C
D
R
Kninska tvrđava, 6. kolovoza 1995. (autor fotografija: Alem
Hadžiegrić). Jajce, 13. - 14. rujna 1995. (arhiva 2. gbr HVO-a).

Knin fortress, August 6, 1995. (photographs by Alem Hadžiegrić). Jajce, September 13 - 14, 1995.

436

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 The Croatian Nation’s Struggle for Survival, 1991-1995
“Neki ljudi i pojedinci u Hrvatskoj, a osobito u svi-
jetu, koji nisu bili prijatelji Hrvatske znali su reći da rat
nije potreban, da smo mi krivi za njega. Govorio sam,
a mogu to i sada reći: Da, rat bi bio nepotreban da smo
se odrekli cilja stvaranja nezavisne i suverene hrvatske
države. Naš prijedlog je bio da taj cilj ostvarimo bez
rata, da riješimo jugoslavensku krizu pretvorbom fede-
racije u kojoj nitko nije bio sretan, a najmanje je to bio
hrvatski narod, da riješimo krizu stvaranjem konfedera-
cije suverenih država, u kojoj bi Hrvatska bila suverena
H
sa svojom vojskom, valutom i diplomatskom službom.
Nisu to prihvatili.”
Ovo su riječi iz govora hrvatskoga predsjednika Fra-
nje Tuđmana na Trgu bana Jelačića 24. svibnja 1992., po
povratku iz New Yorka, nakon što je Republika Hrvatska
primljena u članstvo UN-a.1008 Iz toga govora srpski tu-
M
mači rata uglavnom uzimaju prve dvije rečenice, spaja-
ju ih po svojoj potrebi i dokazuju da se rat dogodio jer
je to htjela Hrvatska.1009
Domovinski rat, kako u Hrvatskoj nazivaju svoj dio
„rata za jugoslavensko naslijeđe“ – što je varijanta na-
ziva koji koriste neki inozemni analitičari, a zapravo je
D
riječ o ratu za neovisnost Hrvatske i slobodu hrvatskog
naroda, bio je neizbježan. Odnos snaga u posttitovskoj
Jugoslaviji bio je takav da ništa drugo nije bilo mogu-
će. Srbija je neinstitucionalno srušila avnojsku SFRJ, a
potom je uz potporu Jugoslavenske narodne armije
političkim pritiskom pokušala i ostalim republikama
C
nametnuti svoj koncept uređenja Jugoslavije. Kada nije
uspjela, krenula je u rat protiv Republike Hrvatske. U
početnoj fazi rat su vodili Jugoslavenska narodna armi-
ja i značajan dio Srba iz Hrvatske uz potporu snaga TO-a
i dobrovoljaca iz Srbije, BiH i Crne Gore i usmjeravanje
D
iz Srbije. Bio je to rat za etnički čistu zemlju u čijoj su se
provedbi koristila sva sredstva.
Prvi dio rata, koji zapravo obuhvaća i pripreme Sr-
bije i JNA za rat, od svibnja 1990. do Sarajevskoga spo-
razuma 2. siječnja 1992., moguće je podijeliti u tri faze.
U prvoj, od sredine svibnja 1990. do početka ožujka
1991., Jugoslavenska narodna armija razoružala je Te-
1008 ICTY: Govor F. Tuđmana na Trgu bana Jelačića 24. 5.
1992.
1009 Mihajlo VUČINIĆ, “Vojni aspekt rata u BiH”, u: Početak
rata u Bosni i Hercegovini – uzroci i posledice, Udruženje
Srba iz BiH u Srbiji, Beograd, 2001., 256; Mirko BJELANO-
VIĆ, “O građanskom ratu u SFRJ – Hrvatskoj 1991–1995”,
u: Građanski rat u Hrvatskoj 1991–1995. Zbornik radova
br. IX, Udruženje Srba iz Hrvatske, Beograd, 2013., 36.
437
Domovinski rat 04-02-2020 Knjiga 1.indd 437
“Some people, some individuals in Croatia, and es-
pecially in the world, who were not friends of Croatia,
were fond of saying that the war was unnecessary and
that we are to blame for its outbreak. I said then, and I
can say now: yes, the war would have been unnecessary
had we given up on our desire to create an independent
and sovereign state of Croatia. We strove to achieve
our aim without war, we did try to solve the Yugoslav
crisis through transforming the federation in which no
constituent nation was content, least of all the Croats,
into a confederation of sovereign states in which Croatia
would have existed as a sovereign entity, with its army,
currency and diplomacy. They dismissed our efforts.”
Franjo Tuđman stated this during his speech on Ban
Jelačić Square on May 24, 1992, upon his return from
New York, after the Republic of Croatia had become a
member of the United Nations. Serbian interpreters of
history are fond of extracting the first two sentences
from the above statement and molding them into what-
ever their desired context of the moment is for the pur-
pose of proving that Croatia is responsible for the war.
Croatian historians, for some reason, insist on the
term “Homeland War” for Croatia’s part in what many
foreign analysts call the “Wars of the Yugoslav Succes-
sion”. Both terms are misnomers. In fact, the war in Cro-
atia was a war for Croatia’s independence and freedom
of the Croatian nation. And the war was inevitable. The
nature of and the situation in post-Tito Yugoslavia de-
termined its violent break-up. Serbia, in a move that ran
counter to both the letter and the spirit of the Yugoslav
constitution, brought down the SFRY and then, in a fol-
low-up move and with the backing of the JNA, put polit-
ical pressure on the other republics to acquiesce in Ser-
bia’s designs on Yugoslavia. When the plan failed, Serbia
launched armed aggression against the Republic of
Croatia. In the initial phase of the conflict the JNA and a
significant number of Croatian Serbs, supported by Ter-
ritorial Defense units and volunteers from Serbia, Bosnia
R
and Herzegovina and Montenegro, fought against the
nascent Croatian Army. The forces ranged against Cro-
atia were led directly from Belgrade. Serbia’s intention
was to ethnically cleanse the areas under Serb control in
Croatia of non-Serbs and used all means at its disposal
to achieve that aim.
The first phase of the war, which includes the JNA
and Serbia’s preparations for the conflict they were
about to provoke, lasted from May, 1990, until the
signing of the Sarajevo Agreement on January 2, 1992.
4.2.2020. 18:35:25
 Davor Marijan • Rat za opstojnost Hrvata, 1991. - 1995.
ritorijalnu obranu i provela novi strategijski razmještaj
snaga. Nakon srpske pobune spriječila je intervenciju
hrvatske policije i omogućila razvoj i učvršćivanje Srp-
ske autonomne oblasti Krajine. General Veljko Kadijević
definira da je glavni cilj Jugoslavenske narodne armije
u tom vremenu bila zaštita Srba u Hrvatskoj “od napada
hrvatskih oružanih formacija” i omogućivanje da “kon-
soliduju vojničko samoorganizovanje za odbranu”, a da
se istodobno pripremi “JNA za rat sa Hrvatskom kada ga
Hrvatska otpočne protiv JNA”.1010
H
U drugoj fazi, od početka ožujka do početka srpnja
1991., srpski su pobunjenici pokušali proširiti Srpsku
autonomnu oblast Krajinu na područja na kojima su
Srbi bili u većini ili ih je bilo u velikom broju. Na počet-
ku ove faze postrojbe Jugoslavenske narodne armije
bile su njihov zaštitnik, a na njezinu kraju i sudionik na
M
istom projektu. Incidenti i sukobi u Pakracu, na Plitvica-
ma, u Kijevu (Knin), Glini i istočnoj Slavoniji (ubojstvo 12
hrvatskih policajaca u Borovu Selu 2. svibnja 1991.) te
zaleđu Zadra (ubojstvo hrvatskog policajca u Polači, 2.
svibnja) sastavni su dio ove faze. U tim su okršajima pale
i prve žrtve na obje strane i provedena su prva etnička
D
čišćenja nesrpskoga stanovništva.
U prvim danima srpnja 1991. počela je treća faza
djelovanja Jugoslavenske narodne armije i pobunje-
nih Srba protiv Hrvatske. Postrojbe srpske Teritorijalne
obrane, kako su same sebe zvale, prešle su s prijetnji i
fizičkih zastrašivanja na mnogo učinkovitiju formulu,
C
zločin i etničko čišćenje. Ta formula otvorenoga zločina
pokazala se najučinkovitijom u postizanju osnovnoga
srpskog cilja, etnički očišćenog prostora od Hrvata i
drugoga nesrpskog stanovništva. Formula je odgovara-
la i Jugoslavenskoj narodnoj armiji, koja je najkasnije u
kolovozu postala njezin glavni izvršitelj. Nakon blokade
vojarni počela je strategijska ofenziva Jugoslavenske
narodne armije i Teritorijalne obrane na Hrvatsku čiji je
cilj bio zauzeti teritorij koji se držao srpskim i istodobno
izvući postrojbe iz garnizona izvan toga područja.
Operacija je brzo propala, pa je Jugoslavenska na-
rodna armija odustala od namjere da porazi Hrvatsku
vojsku i zadržala se na opciji otimanja dijela teritorija na
kojem je bila u borbenom dodiru s hrvatskim snagama.
Tada je smisao angažmana Jugoslavenske narodne ar-
mije bio očit. Pokriće da ratuje za deblokiranje vojarni
na primjeru Dubrovnika gubi svaki smisao, jer u njemu
1010 V. KADIJEVIĆ, Moje viđenje raspada, 127.
438
Domovinski rat 04-02-2020 Knjiga 1.indd 438
The first phase can be divided into three distinct peri-
ods. During the first period, from mid-May, 1990, until
the beginning of March, 1991, the JNA disarmed the
Croatian Territorial Defense and redeployed its forces.
When the Serb rebellion broke out, the JNA prevented
the Croatian police from intervening and solidified the
economic, political and military position of the auton-
omous region of Krajina. General Kadijević claims that
the main goal of the JNA during that time was to pro-
tect the Serbs in Croatia from “attacks by Croatian armed
formations”, enable the Serbs in Croatia to “consolidate
their military organization for defense”, and at the same
time prepare its forces “for war with Croatia when Croa-
tia starts moving against the JNA”.
The second period of the first phase lasted from the
beginning of March until the beginning of July, 1991.
The Serb rebels tried to territorially expand the auton-
omous region of Krajina to predominantly Serb areas of
Croatia and also to those areas where there lived a large
number of Serbs. At the beginning of this period the JNA
protected the rebel Serbs. Towards the end of the peri-
od the JNA was actively engaged in offensive operations
against the Croatian Army and acts of ethnic cleansing
against Croatian civilians. During this phase skirmishes
took place in Pakrac, Plitvice, Kijevo (Knin), Glina, eastern
Slavonia (murder of 12 Croatian police officers in Borovo
Selo on May 2, 1991) and in Zadar’s hinterland (murder
of a Croatian police officer, also on May 2). Both sides
suffered fatal casualties in these firefights and the Serbs
committed their first acts of ethnic cleansing.
The third period of the first phase of the conflict
began at the beginning of July, 1991. The rebel Serb
formations, calling themselves the Serbian Territori-
D
al Defense, launched an all-out campaign of ethnic
cleansing and genocide against non-Serbs. This for-
mula of naked criminality proved the most efficient in
regard to achieving the main objective – creation of a
Serb political entity thoroughly ethnically cleansed of
R
Croats and other non-Serbs. The formula suited the JNA
as well and it did not take long before JNA units also
began committing crimes against humanity and war
crimes. Most historians agree that after August, 1991,
JNA units became the main perpetrators of war crimes
and crimes against humanity but it is clear that the JNA
had jumped on the ethnic cleansing bandwagon long
before August. When the Croatian Army put the JNA
barracks in Croatia under blockade the JNA and Territo-
rial Defense launched a strategic offensive against Cro-
4.2.2020. 18:35:25
 The Croatian Nation’s Struggle for Survival, 1991-1995
nije bilo “ni blokiranih garnizona, ni srpskog življa koje
je trebalo štititi”, kako je primijetio lord Peter Carrin-
gton.1011 Prava priroda rata koji je Jugoslavenska na-
rodna armija vodila protiv Hrvatske ogoljena je do srži
u kampanji protiv Dubrovnika i Vukovara. Najkrupniji
zalogaj bio je Vukovar i Armiji su trebala gotovo puna
tri mjeseca da ga proguta. Svjesna svojega neuspjeha,
Armija je propagandom od Vukovara napravila mjesto
odlučne bitke s Hrvatskom vojskom nakon koje je Re-
publika Hrvatska prihvatila dolazak UNPROFOR-a. Ta-
H
kvo je stajalište prihvaćeno i u dijelu hrvatske javnosti,
pa je pogrešna i neodrživa tvrdnja da nije bilo Vukovara
1991., ne bi bilo ni hrvatske države, i danas razmjerno
česta. Ono se temelji na mišljenju da je pad Vukovara
posljedica odluka hrvatskoga vrhovništva i da je ono
imalo odlučujući utjecaj na sve što se događalo ne
M
samo s hrvatske strane, nego čak i na strani napadača.
U tom je razdoblju počela nastajati hrvatska oruža-
na sila. Iako je do kraja kolovoza 1991. uglavnom bila u
defenzivi, hrvatska je politika uspjela postići da vrijeme
bude faktor na njezinoj strani. Od sukoba u Sloveniji po-
čela su masovna dezertiranja, koja su osjetno umanji-
D
la borbenu spremnost Jugoslavenske narodne armije.
Ona su olakšala napade na vojarne i zarobljavanje oruž-
ja i opreme Jugoslavenske narodne armije ekvivalenta
ojačanog korpusa, što je nesumnjivo bio najveći uspjeh
hrvatskih snaga i najznačajniji događaj u Domovin-
skom ratu. Zarobljeno oružje omogućilo je Hrvatskoj
C
da zaustavi srbijansku agresiju i uz stalnu oskudicu u
opremi i napose streljivu nepokorena dočeka međuna-
rodno priznanje. Preduvjet priznanju država EZ-a bilo je
potpisivanje Sarajevskog primirja, 2. siječnja 1992., koje
je značilo i kraj prve etape rata.
D
Drugi dio rata razdoblje je od Sarajevskoga spora-
zuma do prosinca 1994. godine. To je vrijeme u kojem
su se smjenjivali sukobi niskog intenziteta (s hrvatske
strane često i kao posljedica samovolje pojedinih lokal-
nih zapovjednika) s razmjerno dugotrajnim intervalima
mira. Težište krize bivše Jugoslavije i rata preneseno je
u Bosnu i Hercegovinu. Uz pomoć Jugoslavenske na-
rodne armije, koja se transformirala u njihovu vojsku,
bosanskohercegovački Srbi brzim su i koordiniranim
pothvatima uspostavili premoć na tom dijelu ratišta.
Najveće i najbrže uspjehe postigli su na područjima s
većim brojem Muslimana i gdje gotovo nije bilo Hrvata,
1011 H. VEJNANS, U žrvnju, 99.
439
Domovinski rat 04-02-2020 Knjiga 1.indd 439
atia the aim of which was to capture the areas coveted
by Serbia and at the same time pull out the JNA garri-
sons stationed outside those areas.
The operation soon failed and the JNA gave up the
plan to defeat the Croatian Army in one swift campaign
and focused its efforts of snatching slivers of territory
in areas where its units where engaged in combat with
Croatian forces. At that point the role of the JNA in the
conflict became clear for all to see. The Serbs could no
longer maintain the fable that the JNA was exclusively
concerned with lifting the blockades of its garrisons in
Croatia. The attack on Dubrovnik revealed the crimi-
nality of the JNA’s intentions to the entire world. There
was “no JNA garrison in Dubrovnik, or Serb residents
of the city to protect”, as Lord Peter Carrington stated.
The depredations that the JNA visited on Vukovar also
gave the lie to the Serb propagandists’ claims that the
JNA was waging something akin to a just war. It took the
JNA more than three months to capture the city of Vu-
kovar. The original plan had called for a swift occupation
of Vukovar and rapid advance westwards and in that
sense the capture of Vukovar, after more than 80 days
of hard and cripplingly costly fighting both in terms of
manpower and equipment, was a pyrrhic victory for the
Serbs, at best. In strategic terms in was a signal defeat.
The Serbs propagandists went into full gear in an effort
to depict the failure of the offensive as a glorious and
decisive Serb victory over the Croatian Army. It could be
said that the propaganda campaign was fairly success-
ful. The Serb propagandists claimed that after the fall of
Vukovar in 1991 the Croatian Army had no choice but to
agree to the deployment of UNPROFOR in Croatia. A fair
few people in Croatia fell prey to that interpretation of
events and that led directly to the creation of yet anoth-
er conspiracy theory which insists that the Croatian gov-
ernment sold Vukovar down the drain for the purpose
of gaining sympathy from the international community
and that the Croatian government is therefore equally
R
responsible for the war crimes and crimes against hu-
manity committed by the JNA and Serb paramilitary for-
mations during and after the siege as the perpetrators
themselves. This conspiracy theory is complete non-
sense and there is plenty of evidence proving its falsity.
All of that evidence is in the public domain.
During this period Croatia started to develop its
armed forces in earnest. Until the end of August, 1991
the Croatian Army was mostly on the defensive. How-
ever, the Croatian governments’ political moves ensured
4.2.2020. 18:35:25
 Davor Marijan • Rat za opstojnost Hrvata, 1991. - 1995.
u istočnoj, središnjoj i zapadnoj Bosni. Pojedina područ-
ja preuzeta su gotovo bez borbe (Doboj, Donji Vakuf i
Stolac). Do kraja 1992. Vojska Republike Srpske postigla
je dominaciju na dijelu ratišta i stanje da uz jače napre-
zanje može održavati svoje teritorijalne stečevine. Na
područjima gdje su Hrvati bili većinsko stanovništvo
ili ih je bilo u većem broju srpski su uspjesi bili osjet-
no manji, a česte su bile višemjesečne kampanje, kao
u Bosanskoj Posavini i Jajcu. Najveći su hrvatski uspjesi
u tom razdoblju u stabiliziranju i održanju obrambene
H
crte na Livanjskom polju i u dolini Neretve, odnosno na
pograničnom području istočne Hercegovine. Najveći
neuspjeh „hrvatskoga oružja“ bila je Bosanska Posavi-
na, koja je izgubljena vojno. U tim je borbama Hrvatska
vojska pružila pomoć bosanskohercegovačkim Hrvati-
ma, a strategijska posljedica njihova djelovanja je i odr-
M
žanje Muslimana, odnosno od 1993./94. Bošnjaka. Do
vojnoga sporazuma između Hrvata i Muslimana nije
došlo jer ga muslimanski čelnik Alija Izetbegović nije
želio. Mjesecima je očekivao vojnu pomoć međunarod-
ne zajednice da bi brojnošću i građenim statusom žrtve
postupno nametnuo svoj koncept republike. No oče-
D
kivana pomoć nije došla, a međunarodna se zajednica
angažirala da mirovnom konferencijom podijeli Bosnu i
Hercegovinu na tri dijela.
Na hrvatskom dijelu ratišta, hrvatske oružane sna-
ge oslobodile su 1992. jug Hrvatske i spriječile snage
bosanskohercegovačkih Srba da preuzmu položaje
C
koje je do tada držala JNA, odnosno Vojska Jugoslavije.
Tijekom 1993. Hrvatska je vojska napravila dva zna-
čajnija pothvata. U zaleđu Zadra odbacila je srpske sna-
ge od grada i napravila važnu provjeru borbene spre-
mnosti, a operacijom u Medačkom džepu navukla je na
sebe zazor utjecajnog dijela međunarodne zajednice.
Veći dio 1993. i početak 1994. obilježio je musli-
mansko-hrvatski rat u BiH. Armija Republike Bosne i
Hercegovine počela ga je kada je bila spremna za nj i
nakon shvaćanja da u ratu protiv Vojske Republike Srp-
ske nema nikakvih izgleda. Na početak rata značajno je
utjecao i tijek međunarodne konferencije o Bosni i Her-
cegovini i planovi o unutarnjoj podjeli zemlje. Ne raču-
najući snažne sukobe u jesen 1992. u Novom Travniku i
Prozoru, te oružani sukob u Gornjem Vakufu/Uskoplju
i napad ARBiH na hrvatska naselja u Lašvanskoj dolini
u siječnju 1993., muslimansko-hrvatski rat je, u pravom
smislu te riječi, počeo u travnju 1993. napadom ARBiH
na Konjic i Jablanicu, a završio u ožujku 1994. potpisi-
vanjem Washingtonskoga sporazuma. Na području s
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Domovinski rat 04-02-2020 Knjiga 1.indd 440
that time would be on the Croatian Army’s side. The JNA
also suffered difficulties. Since the start of the war in Slo-
venia many men had deserted the JNA and this seem-
ingly never-ending wave of desertions significantly di-
minished the combat capabilities of the JNA. The JNA’s
problems with desertions made it that much easier for
the Croatian Army to attack the JNA barracks in Croatia
and capture significant amounts of weapons and equip-
ment – with what the Croatian Army captured the JNA
could have easily equipped a reinforced army corps. It
could be argued that this success of the Croatian Army
was the pivotal event of the entire war, one that made
possible the eventual Croatian victory. With the weap-
ons and equipment captured from the JNA barracks and
installations in Croatia the Croatian Army managed to
halt the Serb offensive and put paid to the JNA’s hopes
of a quick victory. It has to be said that even with all the
weapons and equipment captured the Croatian Army
still suffered from a chronic lack of ammunition and
equipment and was vastly inferior to the JNA in terms of
manpower and heavy weapons. Also, the Croatian Army
at that time, unlike the JNA, had no air force. Despite
these difficulties, the Croatian Army put up tenacious
resistance to the Serb invaders and remained unde-
feated when Croatia was internationally recognized. In
this regard it is important to note that the EC refused
to countenance recognizing Croatia until Croatia signed
the Sarajevo Agreement. On January 2, 1992. Croatia
duly signed the agreement and with that the first phase
of the war came to a close.
The second phase of the war lasted from the sign-
ing of the Sarajevo Agreement until December, 1994.
During this time, periods of low intensity combat (most
D
of those sparked by the Croatian side were the result of
local commanders’ obstinacy) were interspersed with
relatively long intervals of peace. The locus of the Yugo-
slav crisis and war shifted to Bosnia and Herzegovina. It
is important to mention at this point that the JNA had
R
been, by that time and for all intents and purposes, trans-
formed into the Army of the Republic of Bosnian Serbs.
The strategy adopted by the Bosnian Serbs, helped by
the JNA, was that of coordinated and swift attacks. That
approach bore fruit and the Serbs soon gained the up-
per hand. The Bosnian Serbs’ biggest and swiftest suc-
cesses occurred in areas with large Muslim populations
with hardly any Croat residents in eastern, central and
western Bosnia. Some areas were captured without a
fight, or only after defeating a token resistance mount-
4.2.2020. 18:35:25
 The Croatian Nation’s Struggle for Survival, 1991-1995
etnički miješanim stanovništvom Armija Republike Bo-
sne i Hercegovine iskoristila je brojčanu nadmoć i ovla-
dala područjem sjeverne Hercegovine, dijelom doline
Vrbasa i dijelom središnje Bosne. Statistički je imala veći
učinak od Hrvatskoga vijeća obrane, no vojnu pobjedu
nije odnijela. Hrvatsko vijeće obrane uspjelo se održati
uz pomoć manjih sastava Hrvatske vojske i u trenutku
završetka rata bilo je u povoljnom operativnom položa-
ju na većem dijelu ratišta.
Tijekom tog rata Vojska Republike Srpske poboljša-
H
la je položaj u istočnoj Bosni i oko Sarajeva. Po završet-
ku rata s Hrvatskim vijećem obrane Armija Republike
Bosne i Hercegovine krenula je u proljeće 1994. u nove
napade na područja pod nadzorom Vojske Republike
Srpske. S iznimkom Bihaća, učinak je bio gotovo zane-
mariv, uspjesi su bili taktičke prirode i svodili su se na
M
osvajanje poneke kote i sela. Veći uspjeh postignut je
u drugoj polovini listopada i početkom studenoga na
području Bihaća, nakon iznenadnog napada ARBiH i
dubokog prodora prema Bosanskom Petrovcu. Uspjeh
je bio kratkotrajan jer su Srbi združenim snagama vratili
izgubljeni teritorij i došli do ulaza u Bihać.
D
Te su borbe dovele do prve bihaćke krize, koja je
ujedno bila i početak trećega dijela rata, razdoblja na-
padnih operacija hrvatskih snaga i ARBiH koje su trajale
do kraja 1995. godine. U studenome 1994. Hrvatsko vi-
jeće obrane, u koordinaciji s ARBiH, zauzelo je Kupres.
Hrvatske snage (HV i HVO) pod zapovijedanjem gene-
C
rala Ante Gotovine, s ojačanjima su od kraja studenoga
1994. do lipnja 1995. na Livanjskom polju i planinskom
masivu Dinare potukle 2. krajiški korpus Vojske Repu-
blike Srpske, zauzele Glamoč i Bosansko Grahovo te
ostvarile povoljne uvjete za oslobađanje Knina. Sve do
D
kraja studenoga 1994. Vojska Republike Srpske uspi-
jevala je održati strategijsku ravnotežu, povremeno je
gubila teritorij, no preraspodjelom snaga i dovođenjem
pojačanja vraćala je izgubljeno. Ravnoteža je narušena
operacijom Zima-94 i ulaskom snaga Zbornoga područ-
ja Split na teritorij Bosne i Hercegovine, ili konkretno 4. i
7. gardijske brigade Hrvatske vojske. Od tada Vojska Re-
publike Srpske nije uspijevala vratiti izgubljeno područ-
je. To je stanje dobro koristila Armija Republike Bosne i
Hercegovine da bez većih borbi postigne prve značajne
pobjede nad Vojskom Republike Srpske.
Na teritoriju Hrvatske u svibnju 1995. operacijom
Bljesak zbrisan je 18. korpus Srpske vojske Krajine, a Olu-
jom je u prvoj polovini kolovoza 1995. najveći dio oku-
piranog teritorija vraćen u sastav matice zemlje. Nakon
441
Domovinski rat 04-02-2020 Knjiga 1.indd 441
ed by Muslim troops – Doboj, Donji Vakuf and Stolac. By
the end of 1992, the VRS was dominant in many areas
and able to defend its conquests. In the predominant-
ly Croatian areas and those with relatively large Croa-
tian populations the VRS was not nearly as successful.
Some campaigns in these areas lasted for months, like
in the Bosanska Posavina region and Jajce. The Croats
managed to stabilize and successfully defend the de-
fensive line in the Livno field and in the Neretva Valley
and in the border areas in eastern Herzegovina. These
were also the most important Croatian successes during
this time period. The largest Croatian military defeat oc-
curred in the Bosanska Posavina region. In the battles for
the Bosanska Posavina region the Croatian Army provid-
ed help to the HVO and one consequence of strategic
importance of that move was the survival of the Mus-
lim forces in the area (the term “Bosniaks” was officially
adopted in 1993/1994). The Croats and Muslims did not
ally against the Serbs because the Muslim leader Alija
Izetbegović did not want such an alliance. For months
he expected help from the international community
and played the victim card, trying to make most of the
fact that the Muslims formed a majority of the popula-
tion of Bosnia and Herzegovina. His ultimate goal was to
induce the international community to give the Muslims
preeminence in the Bosnian republic. His faith in the in-
ternational community was misplaced. The internation-
al community, contrary to Izetbegović’s expectations,
decided to partition Bosnia and Herzegovina into three
parts at a peace conference.
In the Croatian part of the theater the Croatian Army
liberated the south of the country in 1992 and prevent-
ed the Bosnian Serbs to deploy their forces to the posi-
tions that the JNA, that is Yugoslav Army, had held up to
that point.
During 1993 the Croatian Army achieved two im-
portant successes. In Zadar’s hinterland it pushed back
the Serb forces from the city and gained valuable expe-
R
rience and its performance in the Medak pocket earned
it the respect of influential elements of the international
community.
The better part of 1993 and the beginning of 1994
were marked by the Muslim-Croat conflict in Bosnia and
Herzegovina. The Army of the Republic of Bosnia and
Herzegovina started the war when it considered itself
ready for the move and after it had realized that it stood
no chance against the VRS. The course of the interna-
tional conference on Bosnia and Herzegovina and plans
4.2.2020. 18:35:25
 Davor Marijan • Rat za opstojnost Hrvata, 1991. - 1995.
H
M
D
C
Pokop poginulih hrvatskih branitelja, Pakrac, jesen 1992. (autor
fotografije: Toni Hnojčik).
Burial of killed Croatian soldiers, Pakrac, autumn 1992 (Photo-
graph by Toni Hnojčik).
Oluje slijedio je operacijski ciklus u Bosni i Hercegovini
u kojem je Hrvatska vojska zajedno s Hrvatskim vije-
ćem obrane i Armijom Bosne i Hercegovine uporabom
oružja uzela teritorij koji je prema mišljenju utjecajnih
krugova međunarodne zajednice pripadao Federaciji
Bosne i Hercegovine. U Hrvatskoj je pak preostali dio
okupiranog područja, pod utjecajima vojnih pobjeda
hrvatskih snaga, po završetku rata vraćen u sastav Re-
publike mirnom reintegracijom.
Domovinski je rat završio potpunom propašću
projekta stvaranja „velike Srbije“, odnosno ujedinje-
nja samoproglašenih srpskih država sa Srbijom, radi
ostvarenja cilja da „svi Srbi žive u jednoj državi“. Izazvao
442
Domovinski rat 04-02-2020 Knjiga 1.indd 442
on internal division of the country played a part in the
Muslims’ decision to attack the HVO. The fierce battles in
the fall of 1992 in Novi Travnik and Prozor and the con-
flict in Gornji Vakuf/Uskoplje and the ARBIH’s attack on
the Croatian villages in the Lašva Valley in January, 1993,
notwithstanding, the Muslim-Croat war, in the full sense
of the term, started in April, when the ARBIH attacked
Konjic and Jablanica and it ended in March 1994 with
the signing of the Washington Agreement.
In the areas with mixed Muslim-Croat populations
the Army of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina
took advantage of its numerical advantage and gained
control of northern Herzegovina, parts of the Vrbas Val-
ley and parts of central Bosnia. Statistically it was more
successful than the HVO but it could not achieve a deci-
sive victory. The HVO managed to hold on with the help
of small Croatian Army units and at the war’s end was
in a notably superior operational position in relation to
the Army of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina in
most areas.
During the Muslim-Croat conflict the VRS improved
its position in eastern Bosnia and around Sarajevo. In
spring, 1994, after the end of the Muslim-Croat war the
Army of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the
HVO, launched a number of attacks on positions of the
VRS. The HVO and the Army of the Republic of Bosnia
and Herzegovina made notable headway in the Bihać
area. In other areas the Croats and Muslims could not
achieve anything more than minor tactical victories,
gaining a few hills and the odd village. The HVO and the
Army of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina were
more successful in the second half of October and at the
beginning of November in the Bihać area after the Army
D
of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina mounted a
swift and determined attack towards Bosanski Petrovac,
penetrating deep into the Serbs’ rear. However, this suc-
cess proved short lasting because the Serbs concentrat-
ed its forces in the area and launched a counterattack
R
during which they recaptured the lost ground and even
reached the approaches to the city of Bihać.
These battles resulted in the first Bihać crisis. This
crisis marked the beginning of the third and final phase
of the war. During this phase the HVO and the Army of
the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina were on the
offensive until the end of 1995. In November, 1994,
the HVO, coordinating its actions with the Army of the
Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, captured Kupres.
From the end of November until June, 1995, the Croa-
4.2.2020. 18:35:26
 The Croatian Nation’s Struggle for Survival, 1991-1995
H
Spomenik žrtvama Domovinskog rata na Memorijalnom groblju
u Vukovaru; 938 bijelih križeva za žrtve napada JNA i srpskih
M
postrojbi koje su ekshumirane iz masovne grobnice na tom
mjestu (autor fotografije: Marko Perić).
The memorial monument dedicated to the fallen in the Croatian
War of Independence. The 938 white crosses represent 938 vic-
tims of attacks launched by the JNA and other Serb formations.
The victims were exhumed from a mass grave at the site where
the memorial stands today (Photograph by Marko Perić).
D
je protjerivanje stanovništva, ogromna materijalna ra-
zaranja i ljudske gubitke. U Bosni i Hercegovini Srbi su
C
imali više uspjeha. Iako su krajem 1995. bili na korak od
vojnoga poraza, međunarodna ih je zajednica nagradila
Republikom Srpskom na gotovo polovici teritorija Bo-
sne i Hercegovine.
Prema popisu HMDCDR-a, koji se i dalje provjera-
va i ažurira, u Domovinskom ratu u Hrvatskoj smrtno je
D
stradalo najmanje 21.500 osoba. Od toga broja, prema
podacima Uprave za zatočene i nestale Ministarstva hr-
vatskih branitelja, još nije poznata sudbina 1872 osoba:
1468 vode se kao nestali, a za 404 nije poznato mjesto
ukopa (spomenuti broj uključuje nestale osobe svih
narodnosti). Od spomenutoga broja, u napadima JNA
i ostalih srpskih snaga ili djelovanjem njihovih pripad-
nika, ubijeno je, poginulo ili nestalo oko 14.400 oso-
ba: 8400 osoba sa statusom hrvatskog branitelja i oko
6000 civila - Hrvata i građana ostalih narodnosti, iako
su prema podacima ratnoga ministra zdravstva Andri-
je Hebranga gotovo polovica smrtno stradalih bili ci-
vili. Ranjeno je 30.578 osoba, od čega 21.959 vojnika
i 7169 civila. Ostalih oko 7100 smrtno stradalih osoba
koje se nalaze na popisu HMDCDR-a, prema izvorima
443
Domovinski rat 04-02-2020 Knjiga 1.indd 443
tian forces (HV and HVO) under the command of Gen-
eral Ante Gotovina with reinforcements, defeated the
VRS II Krajina Corps on the Livno field and Dinara massif,
captured Glamoč and Bosansko Grahovo and created fa-
vorable conditions for an attack on Knin. Until the end of
November, 1994, the VRS was able to maintain strategic
parity – whenever the VRS lost ground it would regroup
its forces, counterattack and recapture the lost positions.
The stalemate was broken when the Croatian Army
launched Operation Zima-94 (Winter-94). The 4th and 7th
Guards Brigades of Military District Split advanced into
Bosnia and Herzegovina’s territory. From this point on
the VRS’s counterattacks were ineffective. The Army of
the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina reacted quickly
and, taking advantage of the newly created reality on
the ground, attacked weakened Serbs units and for the
first time scored significant victories over the VRS.
In Croatia the Croatian Army launched Operation
Flash in May, 1995, and annihilated XVIII Corps of the Ser-
bian Army of Krajina. In the first half of August, 1995, the
Croatian Army launched Operation Storm and liberated
most of the occupied territory of the Republic of Croa-
tia. After the successful completion of Operation Storm
the Croatian Army, together with the HVO and the Army
of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina mounted a
series of offensive operations in Bosnia and Herzegovi-
na and, defeating Serbian forces, occupied large swaths
of the country, including many areas that, according to
some notable figures from the international community,
belonged to the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina.
In Croatia, meanwhile, the recent decisive victories of
the Croatian Army convinced the Serb authorities in the
area that still remained under their control that discre-
tion was the better part of valor and meekly agreed to
be peacefully reintegrated in the legal and constitution-
al order of the Republic of Croatia.
The Croatian War of Independence ended with a
clear Croatian victory and total failure of the project of
R
creating a greater Serbian state and eradication of the
Serb statelets within the internationally recognized
borders of the Republic of Croatia and Bosnia and Her-
zegovina. It is worth pointing out that the raison d’être
of these statelets was their mutual belief in an eventual
union with Serbia. The Croatian victory in the war put
paid to such aspirations for good. The “Greater Serbia”
project caused loss of life and material damage on a
massive scale. In Bosnia and Herzegovina the Serbs were
more successful, courtesy of the international communi-
4.2.2020. 18:35:26
 Davor Marijan • Rat za opstojnost Hrvata, 1991. - 1995.
H
Stradanje Hrvata u BiH.
The plight of Croats in BiH.
M
D
Kakanj.
C
srpske strane, su pripadnici JNA i srpskih snaga (većim
dijelom) te građani srpske narodnosti na okupiranom
području Republike Hrvatske. No, ukupan broj smrtno
stradalih zasigurno je veći, s obzirom na to da nisu po-
znati podaci o svim poginulim pripadnicima JNA i osta-
lih oružanih formacija iz Srbije, Crne Gore i Bosne i Her-
cegovine, koje su sudjelovale u velikosrpskoj agresiji na
Hrvatsku (npr., u popisu HMDCDR-a, uz 3540 poginulih
pripadnika srpskih snaga, su i imena 555 poginulih pri-
padnika JNA, a izvor JNA od 20. svibnja 1992. govori o
1467 poginulih pripadnika JNA u RH, među kojima je
i 38 Hrvata). U Bosni i Hercegovini, prema nekim po-
dacima, smrtno je stradalo 7762 Hrvata, od čega 5610
vojnika i 2152 civila.1012
1012 Ubijeni i nestali Hrvati Bosne i Hercegovine 1991.–1995.,
Svjetlo riječi, poseban broj, Sarajevo, kolovoz 2008.; A. NA-
ZOR, Velikosrpska agresija na Hrvatsku 1990-ih, 368-370.
444
Domovinski rat 04-02-2020 Knjiga 1.indd 444
ty. At the end of 1995 the Serbs in Bosnia and Herzegov-
ina teetered on the brink of total military defeat. How-
ever, at the last moment the international community
intervened and rewarded them with the autonomous
entity of the Republika Srpska. To put the gift in per-
spective it is important to point out that the territory of
the Republika Srpska takes up almost half the territory
of Bosnia and Herzegovina.
According to the data available to the HMDCRD,
21,500 people were killed in the Republic of Croatia
during the Croatian War of Independence. Of that num-
ber, according to the data of the Directorate of Detained
and Missing Persons of the Ministry of Croatian Veter-
ans, the fate of 1,872 persons remains unclear to this
day: 1,468 of them are still listed as missing, and it is not
known where 404 were buried (all nationalities includ-
ed). Of the mentioned number, around 14,000 persons
were killed by the JNA and other Serb forces, or are listed
as missing: 8,400 of that number were Croatian soldiers
and 6,000 were civilians - Croats and other nationalities.
Andrija Hebrang, the minister of health during the war,
on the other hand, claims that almost half of those killed
were civilians. 30,578 persons were wounded during the
war, 21,959 of them soldiers and 7,169 civilians. The re-
maining 7,100 persons on the HMDCDR’s list, according
to the data provided by the Serbs, were mostly mem-
bers of the JNA and the Serb forces and civilians of Serb
nationality in the occupied territory of the Republic of
Croatia. To be sure, the total number of those killed is
greater, since we do not have data regarding the killed
members of the JNA and other armed formations from
Serbia, Montenegro and Bosnia and Herzegovina, who
participated in Serbian agression against Croatia (for
D
instance, on the HMDCDR’s list, other than 3,540 killed
members of the Serb forces, are 555 killed members of
the JNA. A source available to the JNA, dated May 20,
1992, mentions 1,467 members of the JNA who lost
their lives in the Republic of Croatia, 38 of whom were
R
Croats). In Bosnia and Herzegovina, according to some
sources, 7,762 Croats were killed – 5,610 soldiers and
2,152 civilians.
4.2.2020. 18:35:26
 The Croatian Nation’s Struggle for Survival, 1991-1995
IZVORI I LITERATURA
Hrvatski sabor, Zagreb
Opći spisi
Ministarstvo pravosuđa Republike Hrvatske (prije:
Vlada Republike Hrvatske), Zagreb
Pismohrana Ureda za suradnju s Međunarodnim sudom
pravde i međunarodnim kaznenim sudovima
H
Ministarstvo obrane Republike Hrvatske, Zagreb
Vojnosigurnosna agencija; Središnji vojni arhiv, ar-
hivski fondovi: Kabinet ministra obrane, Glavni stožer
Hrvatske vojske, Uprava za ustroj i mobilizaciju, Zapo-
M
vjedništvo Hrvatskog ratnog zrakoplovstva, Republički
sekretarijat za narodnu obranu SRH, Komanda 5. vojne
oblasti OS SFRJ, Zapovjedništvo Južnog vojišta HV, Za-
povjedništvo Operativne zone Osijek HV, Zapovjedniš-
tvo Operativne zone Zagreb HV, Zapovjedništvo Ope-
rativne zone Bjelovar HV, Zapovjedništvo Operativne
grupe “Vukovar” HV, Zapovjedništvo Operativne grupe
D
za Sisak i Baniju HV, Zapovjedništvo obrane grada Du-
brovnika, 4. gardijske brigade HV, 108. brigade HV, 121.
brigade HV, 123. brigade HV, 127. brigade HV, 142. bri-
gade HV i 125. domobranske pukovnije HV
C
Ministarstvo unutarnjih poslova Republike Hrvat-
ske, Zagreb
Pismohrana Odjela za terorizam i žrtve
Protuobavještajna agencija, Zagreb
D
Hrvatski državni arhiv, Zagreb
Arhivski fondovi: Ured Predsjednika Republike Hrvat-
ske, Hrvatski ured pri Promatračkoj misiji Europske za-
jednice i Komanda 5. vojne oblasti OS SFRJ
Hrvatski memorijalno-dokumentacijski centar Do-
movinskog rata, Zagreb
Arhivski fondovi: 9. korpus OS SFRJ, GŠ SV RSK i 7. kor-
pus SVK
Međunarodni kazneni sud za bivšu Jugoslaviju,
Den Haag
Sudski spisi Međunarodnog kaznenog suda za bivšu Ju-
goslaviju u Den Haagu (http://www.icty.org/cases)
445
Domovinski rat 04-02-2020 Knjiga 1.indd 445
SOURCES AND BIBLIOGRAPHY
Croatian Parliament, Zagreb
General records
Ministry of Justice of the Republic of Croatia (before:
Government of the Republic of Croatia), Zagreb
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Ministry of Defense of the Republic of Croatia, Zagreb
Military Security Agency; Central Military Archive, ar-
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the Croatian Army, Administration for Organization and
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Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Republic of Croatia,
Zagreb
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tia, Croatian Liaison Office to the European Community
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4.2.2020. 18:35:26
 Davor Marijan • Rat za opstojnost Hrvata, 1991. - 1995.
Objavljeni izvori
“Memorandum SANU”, Naše teme, 33 (1-2), Zagreb,
1989.
Otkaz mandata UNPROFOR-u: Treća obljetnica međuna-
rodnog priznanja Republike Hrvatske, MORH, Politička
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ABB – Ante Bruno Bušić
ABKO – atomsko-biološko-kemijska obrana ABBREVIATIONS
AP – autonomna pokrajina
ARBiH – Armija Republike Bosne i Hercegovine ABB – Ante Bruno Bušić
ASH – Arhiv Sabora Hrvatske ABKO – atomic-biological-chemical defense
C
ATG – antiteroristička grupa AP – Autonomous Province
ATJ – Antiteroristička jedinica APC – Armored Personnel Carrier
b/d – borbena dejstva (borbena djelovanja) ARBiH – Army of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegov-
b/g – borbena gotovost ina
b/s – borbena spremnost ARBIH – Army of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegov-
D
bbr – brdska brigada ina
BG – borbena grupa ASH – Archive of the Croatian Parliament
BiH – Bosna i Hercegovina ATG – anti-terrorist group
br. – broj ATJ –anti-terrorist unit
brHV – brigada Hrvatske vojske b/d – offensive action
brHVO – brigada Hrvatskoga vijeća obrane b/g – combat readiness
R
brTO – brigada Teritorijalne obrane b/s – combat readiness
brZNG – brigada Zbora narodne grade bbr – Mountain Brigade
bVP – bataljun Vojne policije BG – combat group
CO – Centar za obavještavanje BiH – Bosnia and Herzegovina
CSB – Centar službi bezbjednosti No. – number
dj. br. – djelovodni broj brHV – Croatian Army Brigade
DNERAP – dnevni raport brHVO – Croatian Defense Council brigade
DO – diverzantski odred brTO – Territorial Defense brigade
dp – domobranska pukovnija brZNG – Croatian Guards Corps brigade

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DT – državna tajna (stupanj tajnosti) bVP – Military Police battalion

ED – elektronsko djelovanje CO – Information Center
EZ – Europska zajednica CSB – Center for Security Services
gbr – gardijska brigada dj. br. – reference number
gbrHV – gardijska brigada Hrvatske vojske DNERAP – daily report
gbrHVO – gardijska brigada Hrvatskoga vijeća obrane DO – Sabotage Detachment
gdb – gardijska desantna bojna dp – Home Guard Regiment
Gmtbr – Gardijska motorizirana brigada DT – state secret
gmtbr – gardijska motorizirana brigada ED – electronic warfare
grb – granični bataljun EZ – EC – European Community
H
GrŠTO – Gradski štab Teritorijalne obrane gbr – Guards Brigade
GS HVO – Glavni stožer Hrvatskog vijeća obrane gbrHV – Croatian Army guards brigade
GSHV – Glavni stožer Hrvatske vojske gbrHVO – Croatian Defense Council guards brigade
GSHVO – Glavni stožer Hrvatskog vijeća obrane gdb – Guards Assault Battalion
GŠA – Glavni štab Armije Gmtbr – Guards Motorized Brigade
GŠ OS SFRJ – Generalštab Oružanih snaga Socijalističke gmtbr – Guards Motorized Brigade
M
Federativne Republike Jugoslavije grb – border battalion
GŠ SV – Glavni štab Srpske vojske (Krajine) GrŠTO – Territorial Defense City HQ
GŠ SV RSK – Glavni štab Srpske vojske Repubike Srpske GSHV –General Staff of the Croatian Army
Krajine GS HVO –Main Staff of the Croatian Defense Council
GŠ TO RSK – Glavni štab Teritorijalne obrane Republike GŠA – General Staff of the Army
Srpske Krajine GŠ OS SFRJ – General Staff of the Armed Forces of the
D
GŠ VJ – Generalštab Vojske Jugoslavije Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia
GŠ VJ – Glavni štab Vojske Jugoslavije GŠ SV – General Staff of the Serbian Army (Krajina)
GŠ VRS – Glavni štab Vojske Republike Srpske GŠ SV RSK – General Staff of the Serbian Army of the Re-
GŠ VSR BiH – Glavni štab Vojske Srpske Republike Bosne public of Serbian Krajina
i Hercegovine GŠ TO RSK – General Staff of the Territorial Defense of
GŠSVK – Glavni štab Srpske vojske Krajine the Republic of Serbian Krajina
C
GŠTO SAOK – Glavni štab Teritorijalne obrane Srpske GŠ VJ – General Staff of the Army of Yugoslavia
autonomne oblasti Krajine GŠ VRS – General Staff of the Army of the Republika
HB – Herceg-Bosna Srpska
HDA – Hrvatski državni arhiv GŠ VSR BiH – General Staff of the Army of the Serbian
HDZ – Hrvatska demokratska zajednica Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina
D
HGZ – Hrvatski gardijski zbor GŠSVK – General Staff of the Serbian Army of Krajina
HMDCDR – Hrvatski memorijalno-dokumentacijski GŠTO SAOK – General Staff of the Territorial Defense of
centar Domovinskog rata the Serbian Autonomous Region of Krajina
HOS – Hrvatske obrambene snage HB – Herzeg-Bosnia
HR HB – Hrvatska Republika Herceg-Bosna HDA – Croatian State Archive
R
HR-DAS – Hrvatski državni arhiv u Sisku HDZ – Croatian Democratic Union
HRM – Hrvatska ratna mornarica HGZ –Croatian Guards Corps
HRZ i PZO – Hrvatsko ratno zrakoplovstvo i protuzračna HMDCDR – Croatian Memorial Documentation Center
obrana of the Homeland War
HSP – Hrvatska stranka prava HOS – Croatian Defense Forces
HUPMEZ – Hrvatski ured pri Promatračkoj misiji Europ- HR HB – Croatian Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina
ske zajednice HR-DAS – Croatian State Archive in Sisak
HV – Hrvatska vojska HRM – Croatian Navy
HVO – Hrvatsko vijeće obrane HRZ i PZO – Croatian Air Force and Air Defense
HZ – Hrvatska zajednica HSP – Croatian Party of Rights

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HZ HB – Hrvatska zajednica Herceg-Bosna HUPMEZ – Croatian Liaison Office to the European Com-
IBK – Istočnobosanski korpus munity Monitoring Mission
ICTY – Međunarodni kazneni sud za bivšu Jugoslaviju HV – Croatian Army
(International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugosla- HVO – Croatian Defense Council
via) HZ – Croatian Community
IDS – izvidničko-diverzantska satnija HZ HB – Croatian Community of Herzeg-Bosnia
IKM – Izdvojeno komandno mjesto IBK – East Bosnia Corps
InMS – intendantska materijalna sredstva ICTY –International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yu-
int. – interno goslavia
IPD – Informativno psihološka djelatnost IDS – Recon-Sabotage Company
H
IZM – Izdvojeno zapovjedno mjesto IKM – Forward Command Post
IZPM – Izdvojeno zapovjedno mjesto InMS – equipment and materiel
IZpM – Izdvojeno zapovjedno mjesto int. – internal
JNA – Jugoslavenska narodna armija IPD – information and psychological warfare
JRM – Jugoslavenska ratna mornarica IZM – Forward Command Post
JV – Južno vojište IZPM – Forward Command Post
M
K – korpus IZpM – Forward Command Post
KESS – Konferencija o europskoj sigurnosti i suradnji JNA – Yugoslav People’s Army
KK – Krajiški korpus JRM – Yugoslav Navy
kl. – klasa JV – Southern Theater of War
KM – komandno mjesto K – Corps
KMO – Kabinet ministra obrane KK – Krajina Corps
D
KMORH – Kabinet ministra obrane Republike Hrvatske kl. – Class
knj. – knjiga KM – komandno mjesto Command Post
Ko KOV – korpus Kopnene vojske KMO – Office of the Minister of Defense
krd – krajiška divizija KMORH – Office of the Minister of Defense of the Repub-
KRV i PVO – Komanda Ratnog vazduhoplovstva i pro- lic of Croatia
tivvazdušne obrane knj. – book
C
KSJ – Korpus specijalnih jedinica Ko KOV – Ground Forces Corps
lbap – lovačko-bombarderski avijacijski puk krd – Krajina Division
lbr – laka brigada KRV i PVO – HQ, Air Force and Air Defense
lpbr – laka pješačka brigada KSJ – Special Units Corps
lpd – laka pješadijska divizija lbap – Fighter-Bomber Aviation Regiment
D
mabr – mješovita avijacijska brigada lbr –Light Brigade
map – mješoviti artiljerijski puk lpbr – Light Infantry Brigade
mbr – mehanizirana brigada lpd – Light Infantry Division
MiO – motrenje i obavještavanje mabr – Mixed Aviation Brigade
MKSJ – Međunarodni kazneni sud za bivšu Jugoslaviju map – Mixed Artillery Regiment
R
MORH – Ministarstvo obrane Republike Hrvatske mbr – Mechanized Brigade
mpoap – mješoviti protuoklopni artiljerijski puk MiO – surveillance and reporting
MPRH – Ministarstvo pravosuđa Republike Hrvatske ICTY – International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yu-
mtb – motorizirani bataljun goslavia
mtbr – motorizirana brigada mpoap – mixed anti-armor artillery regiment
MUP – Ministarstvo unutarnjih poslova MPRH – Ministry of Justice of the Republic of Croatia
n/o – napadajna operacija mtb – Motorized Battalion
NATO – Organizacija Sjevernoatlantskog pakta (North mtbr – Motorized Brigade
Atlantic Treaty Organization) MUP – Ministry of Internal Affairs
OB – organ bezbednosti n/o – offensive operaiton

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OC – operativni centar NATO – North Atlantic Treaty Organization

OdTO – odred Teritorijalne obrane OB – security organ
OG – operativna grupa OC – operational center
OGIP – Operativna grupa Istočna Posavina OdTO – Territorial Defense Squad
OGSB – Operativna grupa za Sisak i Baniju OG – Operational Group
OIO – Obavještavanje i osmatranje OGIP – Operational Group East Posavina
OJ – oklopne jedinice OGSB – Operational Group Sisak and Banija
ONO i DSZ – Općenarodna obrana i društvena samo- OIO – Reporting and Surveillance
zaštita OJ – armored units
ONP – operativno-nastavni poslovi ONO i DSZ – Total People’s Defense and Social Self-Pro-
H
OpŠTO – Općinski štab Teritorijalne obrane tection
OS – operativna skupina ONP – operational-educational activities
OS – Oružane snage OpŠTO – Municipal HQ of the Territorial Defense
OSISiB – obrambene snage istočne Slavonije i Baranje OS – operational troop
OTŽ – Odjel za terorizam i žrtve OS – Armed Forces
OZ – operativna zona OSCE – Organization for Security and Co-operation in
M
OZ JiH – Operativna zona Jugoistočna Hercegovina Europe
OZ S/ZH – Operativna zona Sjeverozapadna Hercegovina OSISiB – Armed Forces of Eastern Slavonia and Baranja
OZ SB – Operativna zona Srednja Bosna OTŽ – Department for Terrorism and Victims of Terrorism
OZSZH – Operativna zona Sjeverozapadna Hercegovina OZ – Operative Zone
p.p. – pravni poslovi OZ JiH – Operative Zone Southeast Herzegovina
partd – partizanska divizija OZ S/ZH – Operative Zone Northwest Herzegovina
D
pbr – pješačka brigada OZ SB – Operative Zone Central Bosnia
pd – pješačka divizija OZSZH – Operative Zone Northwest Herzegovina
PD – Politička djelatnost p.p. – legal affairs
pgmd – proleterska gardijska mehanizirana divizija partd – Partisan Division
PI – policijska ispostava pbr – Infantry Brigade
PJP – Posebna jedinica policije pd – Infantry Division
C
pmbr – proleterska mehanizirana brigada PD – political activity
PMEZ – Promatračka misija Europske zajednice pgmd – Proletarian Guards Mechanized Division
pmtbr – proleterska motorizirana brigada PI – police station
POA – Protuobavještajna agencija PJP – Special Police Unit
PoB – logistička (pozadinska) baza pmbr – Proletarian Mechanized Brigade
D
PoOb – pozadinsko obezbeđenje ECMM – European Community Monitoring Mission
Pov – povjerljivo pmtbr –Proletarian Motorized Brigade
pov. – povjerljivo POA – Counterintelligence Agency
PP – policijska postaja PoB – logistics base
ppd – proleterska pješačka divizija PoOb – read guard
R
PPN – Postrojba za posebne namjene Pov – confidential
PS – policijska stanica pov. – confidential
PSRH – Predsjedništvo Socijalističke Republike Hrvatske PP – police station
PU – Policijska uprava ppd – Proletarian Infantry Division
PU – Politička uprava PPN –Special Purpose Unit
PVL – profesionalna vojna lica PS – Police Station
RBiH – Republika Bosna i Hercegovina PSRH – Presidency of the Socialist Republic of Croatia
RH – Republika Hrvatska PU – Police Administration
RiK – rukovođenje i komandovanje PU – Political Administration
RJ – ratne jedinice PVL – professional military personnel

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 The Croatian Nation’s Struggle for Survival, 1991-1995
RRF – Riječna ratna flotila
RRF – Snage za brzo djelovanje (Rapid Reaction Force)
RS – Republika Srpska
RSK – Republika Srpska Krajina
RSNO SRH – Republički sekretarijat za narodnu obranu
Socijalističke Republike Hrvatske
RV i PVO – Ratno vazduhoplovstvo i protivvazdušna od-
brana
RZNG – rezerva Zbora narodne garde
S/ZH – Sjeverozapadna Hercegovina
H
SAD – Sjedinjene Američke Države
samb – samostalni bataljun
sambHV – samostalni bataljun Hrvatske vojske
SANU – Srpska akademija nauka i umetnosti
SAO – Srpska autonomna oblast
SAOK – Srpska autonomna oblast Krajina
M
SAP – Socijalistička Autonomna Pokrajina
SDA – Stranka demokratske akcije
SDB – Služba državne bezbjednosti
SDP – Socijaldemokratska partija Hrvatske
SDS – Srpska demokratska stranka
SFRJ – Socijalistička Federativna Republika Jugoslavija
D
SIS – Sigurnosno-informativna služba
SIV – Savezno izvršno vijeće
SJP MUP – Specijalne jedinice policije Ministarstva unu-
tarnjih poslova
SKH-SDP – Savez komunista Hrvatske – Stranka demo-
kratskih promjena
C
SKJ – Savez komunista Jugoslavije
SNO – Sekretarijat za narodnu obranu
SnSL – sanitetska služba
SNV – Srpsko nacionalno vijeće
SO – skupština općine
D
SP – Specijalna policija
Splbr – Srpska laka brigada
SR – Socijalistička Republika
SRBiH – Socijalistička Republika Bosna i Hercegovina
SRH – Socijalistička Republika Hrvatska
SRJ – Savezna Republika Jugoslavija
SSNO – Savezni sekretarijat za narodnu obranu
SSSR – Savez Sovjetskih Socijalističkih Republika
SSUP – Savezni sekretarijat za unutrašnje poslove
sŠTO – sektorski štab Teritorijalne obrane
str. pov. – strogo povjerljivo
SUP – Sekretarijat za unutarnje poslove
SUZUP – Služba za zaštitu ustavnog poretka
SVA MORH – Središnji vojni arhiv Ministarstva obrane
Republike Hrvatske
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RBiH –Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina
RH – Republic of Croatia
RiK – leadership and command
RJ – war units
RRF – river flotilla
RRF – Rapid Reaction Force
RS – Republika Srpska
RSK – Republic of Serbian Krajina
RSNO SRH – Republic Secretariat of National Defense of
the Socialist Republic of Croatia
RV i PVO – Air Force and Air Defense
RZNG – Croatian National Guard reserve
S/ZH –Northwest Herzegovina
SAD – United States of America
samb – Independent Battalion
sambHV – Independent Battalion of the Croatian Army
SANU – Serbian Academy of Sciences and Arts
SAO – Serbian Autonomous Region
SAOK – Serbian Autonomous Region of Krajina
SAP – Socialist Autonomous Province
SDA – Party of Democratic Action
SDB – State Security Administration
SDP – Social Democratic Party of Croatia
SDS – Serbian Democratic Party
SFRJ – Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia
SIS – Security Intelligence Service
SIV – Federal Executive Council
SJP MUP – Special Police Units of the Ministry of Internal
Affairs
SKH-SDP – League of Communists of Croatia – Party of
Democratic Reform
SKJ – League of Communists of Yugoslavia
SNO – Secretariat of National Defense
SnSL – ambulance service
SNV – Serbian National Council
SO – assembly of a municipality
SP – Special Police
Splbr – Serbian Light Brigade
R
SR – Socialist Republic
SRBiH – Socialist Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina
SRH – Socialist Republic of Croatia
SRJ – Federal Republic of Yugoslavia
SSNO – Federal Secretariat of National Defense
USSR – Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
SSUP – Federal Secretariat of Internal Affairs
sŠTO – Sector HQ of the Territorial Defense
str. pov. – strictly confidential
SUP – Secretariat of Internal Affairs
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 Davor Marijan • Rat za opstojnost Hrvata, 1991. - 1995.

SVK – Srpska vojska Krajine SUZUP – Agency for the Protection of the Constitutional
SVLR – samohodni višecijevni lanser raketa Order
SZUP – Služba za zaštitu ustavnog poretka SVA MORH – Central Military Archive of the Ministry of
ŠTO – štab Teritorijalne obrane Defense of the Republic of Croatia
ŠVK – Štab Vrhovne komande SVK – Serbian Army of Krajina
TG – taktička grupa SVLR – self-propelled multiple rocket launcher
tgr – telegram SZUP – Agency for the Protection of the Constitutional
TO – Teritorijalna obrana Order
TS – taktička skupina ŠTO – Territorial Defense HQ
tt – trigonometrijska točka ŠVK – Supreme Command HQ
H
UB SSNO – Uprava bezbednosti Saveznog sekretarijata TG – tactical group
za narodnu obranu tgr – telegram
UN – Ujedinjeni narodi TO – Territorial Defense
UNCRO – Operacija Ujedinjenih naroda za uspostavlja- TS – tactical team
nje povjerenja u Hrvatskoj (United Nations Confidence tt – hill
Restoration Operation in Croatia) UB SSNO – Security Administration of the Federal Secre-
M
UNPA – zaštićeno područje Ujedinjenih naroda (United tariat of National Defense
Nations Protected Area) UN – United Nations
UNPROFOR – Zaštitne snage Ujedinjenih naroda (Uni- UNCRO – United Nations Confidence Restoration Opera-
ted Nations Protection Forces) tion in Croatia
UNTAES – Prijelazna uprava Ujedinjenih naroda u istoč- UNPA – United Nations Protected Area
noj Slavoniji (United Nations Transitional Administration UNPROFOR – United Nations Protection Forces
D
in Eastern Slavonia) UNTAES – United Nations Transitional Administration in
UPRH – Ured predsjednika Republike Hrvatske Eastern Slavonia
ur. br. – urudžbeni broj UPRH – Office of the President of the Republic of Croatia
USMKSMP – Ured za suradnju s međunarodnim kazne- ur. br. – registry number
nim sudovima Ministarstva pravosuđa USMKSMP – Office for Cooperation with the Inter-
V i PP GŠVRS – vjerski i pravni poslovi Glavnog štaba VRS national Court of Justice of the Ministry of Justice
C
VJ – Vojska Jugoslavije V i PP GŠVRS – religious and legal affairs of the General
VLR – višecijevni lanser raketa Staff of the Army of the Republika Srpska
VO – vojna oblast VJ – Army of Yugoslavia
VOS – vojnoobavještajna služba MRL – multiple rocket launcher
VP – Vojna policija VO – Military District
D
VP – vojna pošta VOS – Military Intelligence Agency
VPO – Vojnopomorska oblast VP – Military Police
VPS – vojnopomorski sektor VP – military mail
VRH – Vlada Republike Hrvatske VPO – Military-Maritime District
VRS – Vojska Republike Srpske VPS – Military-Maritime Sector
R
VS UN – Vijeće sigurnosti Ujedinjenih naroda VRH –Government of the Republic of Croatia
VSA MORH – Vojnosigurnosna agencija Ministarstva VRS – Army of the Republika Srpska
obrane Republike Hrvatske VS UN – United Nations Security Council
VSZ – Vojni sud Zagreb VSA MORH – Military Security Agency of the Ministry of
z/o – zona odgovornosti Defense of the Republic of Croatia
Zap. – zapovjedništvo VSZ – Zagreb Military Court
ZHRM – Zapovjedništvo Hrvatske ratne mornarice z/o – area of responsibility
ZHRZ – Zapovjedništvo Hrvatskog ratnog zrakoplovstva Zap. – HQ
ZJB – Zapovjedništvo Južnog bojišta ZHRM – HQ, Croatian Navy
ZJD – Zapovjedništvo za južnu Dalmaciju ZHRZ – HQ, Croatian Air Force

464

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 The Croatian Nation’s Struggle for Survival, 1991-1995
ZJV – Zapovjedništvo Južnog vojišta
ZM – zapovjedno mjesto
ZMIN – zračno motrenje i navođenje
Zn ŠTO – Zonski štab Teritorijalne obrane
ZNG – Zbor narodne garde
ZOG – Zapovjedništvo Operativne grupe
ZOGIP – Zapovjedništvo Operativne grupe Istočna
Posavina
ZOGP – Zapovjedništvo Operativne grupe Posavina
ZOGV – Zapovjedništvo Operativne grupe Vukovar
H
ZOGVVŽ – Zapovjedništvo Operativne grupe Vukovar,
Vinkovci, Županja
ZOGZ – Zapovjedništvo Operativne grupe Zagreb
ZOZK – Zapovjedništvo Operativne zone Karlovac
ZOSISB – Zapovjedništvo obrambenih snaga za istočnu
Slavoniju i Baranju
M
ZOZS/ZH – Zapovjedništvo Operativne zone Sjeveroza-
padna Hercegovina
ZOZSB – Zapovjedništvo Operativne zone Srednja Bosna
ZOZB – Zapovjedništvo Operativne zone Bjelovar
ZOZK – Zapovjedništvo Operativne zone Karlovac
ZOZO – Zapovjedništvo Operativne zone Osijek
D
ZOZR – Zapovjedništvo Operativne zone Rijeka
ZOZS – Zapovjedništvo Operativne zone Split
ZOZZ – Zapovjedništvo Operativne zone Zagreb
ZP – zborno područje
ZPO – Zborno područje Osijek
ZPTG – Zborno područje Tomislavgrad
C
ZSB – Zapovjedništvo Slavonskog bojišta
ZSD – Zapovjedništvo Sektora Dubrovnik
ZSZ – Zapovjedništvo Sektora Zadar
ZZK – Zapovjedništvo Zagrebačkog korpusa
ZZNG – Zapovjedništvo Zbora narodne garde
D
ZZNGISB – Zapovjedništvo Zbora narodne garde istoč-
ne Slavonije i Baranje
ZZP – Zapovjedništvo Zbornog područja
ZZPB – Zapovjedništvo Zbornog područja Bjelovar
ZZPG – Zapovjedništvo Zbornog područja Gospić
ZZPK – Zapovjedništvo Zbornog područja Karlovac
ZZPO – Zapovjedništvo Zbornog područja Osijek
ZZPS – Zapovjedništvo Zbornog područja Split
ZZPZ – Zapovjedništvo Zbornog područja Zagreb
465
Domovinski rat 04-02-2020 Knjiga 1.indd 465
ZJB – HQ, Southern Theater of Operations
ZJD – HQ, Southern Dalmatia
ZJV – HQ, Southern Theater of War
ZM – Command Post
ZMIN – air surveillance and navigation
Zn ŠTO – Zone HQ of the Territorial Defense
ZNG – Croatian National Guard
ZOG – HQ, Operational Group
ZOGIP – HQ, Operational Group East Posavina
ZOGP – HQ, Operational Group Posavina
ZOGV – HQ, Operational Group Vukovar
ZOGVVŽ – HQ, Operational Group Vukovar, Vinkovci and
Županja
ZOGZ – HQ, Operational Group Zagreb
ZOSISB – HQ, Defense Forces for Eastern Slavonia and
Baranja
ZOZS/ZH – HQ, Operative Zone Northwest Herzegovina
ZOZSB – HQ, Operative Zone Central Bosnia
OZ – Operative Zone
ZOZB – HQ, Operative Zone Bjelovar
ZOZK – HQ, Operative Zone Karlovac
ZOZO – HQ, Operative Zone Osijek
ZOZR – HQ, Operative Zone Rijeka
ZOZS – HQ, Operative Zone Split
ZOZZ – HQ, Operative Zone Zagreb
ZP – Military District
ZPO – Military District Osijek
ZPTG – Military District Tomislavgrad
ZSB – HQ, Slavonia Theater of Operations
ZSD – HQ, Sector Dubrovnik
ZSZ – HQ, Sector Zadar
ZZK – ZQ, Zagreb Corps
ZZNG – HQ, Croatian National Guard
ZZNGISB – HQ, Croatian National Guard Eastern Slavonia
and Baranja
ZZP – HQ, Military District
ZZPB – HQ, Military District Bjelovar
ZZPG – HQ, Military District Gospić
R
ZZPK – HQ, Military District Karlovac
ZZPO – HQ, Military District Osijek
ZZPS – HQ, Military District Split
ZZPZ – HQ, Military District Zagreb
4.2.2020. 18:35:28
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M
D
C
D
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 PRILOZI
H
M
APPENDICES
D
C
D
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 Davor Marijan • Rat za opstojnost Hrvata, 1991. - 1995.

Večernji list, srijeda, 1. 2. 1995., Odgo-

vornost Kninske grupice – Z-4: nacrt je
II)
ALFfiEDO MATTACOTA
CORDEUA:

'Tuzan dan' tek osnova za pregovore i nije ponu-

"""""'""""'°"'°""""'
vel8po&lanlk pi Zenevskoj đen na osnovi “uzmi ili ostavi”
konfereneiji,kojljepijedva<:19-
setak dana umijenio Kaia Ei-
dea, izjwio j(l da j(l prel<juce<

Večernji list, Wednesday, February 1,

biovriotutan danzanjega.
J.Kao prvmatra¢ Europske
unljeprljedvijelpolgodlnebio
sam u Hrvatskoj. lJ Na!;lcama
samse~svelkomskupt-
nom starica odjewnih u emo,
1995., Knin Clique Responsible – Z-4: the
kojesubilejakotumeJersubl-
leprc,gnaneldalekood svoga draft plan is only a proposal and is not
presented on a take-it-or-leave-it basis.
doma Tad.asambioodlutloda
Je "'1jedno ulomi vn;eme i trud
da""barjednaodnjihvratiku-
Ci Nakon poslijepodneVll u Kni-
nu, ¢inl ml se da su Qrl(l dalJe
od svojih ku¢a nego stD su to Z-4: Nacrtje tekosnova za prago vora i nije ponmfen na osno ~i»uzmiili ostavi«

"'~"'""'"'~"'-·_""""
__ ~_-
_ __, KONFERENCIJA ZA NOVINARE CElVORICE VELEPOSLA NIKA SKUPINE Z-4

ODGOYORNOST KNINSKE GRUPICE I

H
2AGAE_B - Predstavr:i~i ~ob'!njenih Sr- • Jedn a strana primila je plan i prihvatlla ga kao bazu za prego-

~tfi:;~l~!{~; ~~~~~~~;e :'~~~r:ro!b~o°fe~

Hlderacije Leonid Kerescadfijanc i Fran- ska strana wjetl.Jje
~a:it =~n:o: :=~~ ~rv'!
1
ostanak napretk.om inirovnom procesu.
u I mi
:S~;:ii;i~ua~od~ii1a:i;J;;~1r~ ielimo takav napredak, kazao Je Galbraith
b;.~j Jugoslaviji Geert Ahrens ; Alfred_°: kumentc. On nije plod na~ ma§te . Qpt;
namjeru ovaj plan branitl iii nametatl Na·
Mattacota COrdella iz Kmna JIite r Vl"ati~ principi ptana ne mogu i?g ledati bltno
en plana fvnkcOO!lifa po princlpu >Uzmi i
neob,...l~na pas la._ . . . druktije no tto izgledaju sada<. kazao je
pogledajc. Bez plane nete bili ni mirr,og
>Marti¢1M,ke~ ' Babit mal , su s ".•· poslije povrall<a iz Knina veleposlanik
rjeoonJa«. kazoo je Kerestedfijanc l na•
me dol~o..11 Kmn, no Marti<! nam ,e Geeft Ahrens. veo da ;e vrijeme koJe su oni ulot~i u
rt:kaoda ie c,ielo ~l!)~kovodstvo odl\J· r, su principi terilo,ijalni integritet
plan n~hovo osobno Vl"ijeme. te da ne-
¢,lo da n~e nl pnmm plan. sve dok od Hrvalske ; njezin swerenltet nad cijelim
maju nikakv\J obvezu kojo Im je namet-
V1jeCa sigumostl na dob•)e plsmena tanlOrijem, drugo ;e status za Srbe na
nula njiho~a >Aada. ve<; samo preparuku
jamsivaotomadaUNPROFORostaleu onim terltori~ma na kojima su u 1991.
i podrtku
UN_PA zonama. Bude !I takvog lamstva. goclini biti u vOCinl trete ;e jedinstllenl
Velt!poslanik Sjedinjenih Dffava Peter
M
om Ce prlmltl plan Io n]emu pregovar~- gospoderski prostor bez lkakvlh unutra•
Galbraith naglasio je da llnjenice koje je
tic, kazao Je Gecrt Ahrens I dodao dam- lznio Geert Ahrens govore same z.a se-
!.niih granica, letvrto povratak svih prog-
su usp1e1a sva n~hov_a uv1e1avania de nanlka u njihove domove. Ahrens je ta--
be.>Jednastranaprim~ajeplan lprlhva-
Srtl l barem prn:ne_pap,r. Takoder, skupl- wa gakaobazuzapregovore, a drugaje
koder rel<ao da Je papir tek osnova z.a
~ _Z~ folJe!a IE! JIiter otlCI u Be?!l ra'!. pregovore i niie ponuden na osnovl
to odbl la. VrlO je ironi¢no to ~to strana
al( JU 1e Slobodan Mllo~v1C odb,o pn- koja Je odbila plBn lstodobno fe~ nasta-
>U2Jlli iii ostavi<. Dodoo ;e da ga Jou po-
miti. nedjeljak primio predsJednlk Tudman,
vak nazotnostj UNPROFOR-a. Hrvatska kojl ovc!jeflve Ina niihovim liderima Vre- je takode-r naglasio da bl odlaskom UN.
Neupltan hrvatski integ ritet ~~i~::~·=t~a~S~~tt: ~ : ~"o8mUV:~s~~f~r 1:11 ~~!ki~: ~~~:ogr~r~~;t·r! ~~s~ ~~~jen~:~ ~:r~1~~~~~ 1
JCNo ~to Cu sada reCI uee se buduC- ske, povrat.ok prognanika , samoupraw predak. Ona strana koja teM da UNf'RO. odbila proces pregovorac. kazao 1e ve1e- o prekidu vatre I prov~ba gospodar-
r.ostl naroda koj !ive u OVO/ regiji. Skup;. za srpsku manj nu FOfl ostane, ,stodobno odbija plane, ka- poslarnk Galbraith skog sporazuma. >ZahtJeV za ubrzanje
~~ko;! ~n.:;,a;~~~n;8Z~i~~r~e; 'Uzmi I pogledaj'
UNPA. O,aj plan zasniva se na rezoluci- Velepos~nlk Ruske Federacije LW-
~u~e~lb{a/!1a~:i.~ ~ / ~~~
strana, mogn blsmo reCI 'manja strana·,
MiloSevic I plan
Na p~anje sumnjaju Ji da Je odbljanJe
=~:i::r::. ~~ea~fti ~fn. :f-
puno nelogltanc. zakl)ueio je Galbraith I
Jama Vijeea Sigurnos~ 1H na dokumenti- nld Kerestedtijanc nije bio sklon drama- grupica izoliranih ljudi odbije neato na plana nared~ M i l ~ . Pete_r Galbra- dodao da ~obodan Milo!evic Ima ve_like
ma _medunarodnlh skupova koii su se !iZifan)u sl!uaclje ;er Je plan joo na sto~ ¢emu je rriecunarodna za]edn;ca dugo !th odgovorio ie_da su s,tme tm,en,c e da ~eze s tune posbte h se u prego110nma
~~ovi~ti!;'!'n~0r1C':iin~fo~~l~~ ~o~:ia:iv~~5a°g ;r~n:~eC:!':n~ ~:s: 02: ~ ~louc;i~,~~":~~r~i~ ~iioKrl;~~~~C:.i ~! l~~f:!~.~ neki napredak lli ne. - - M. Serie
D
Vjesnik, srijeda, 1. veljače 1995., RA-
UNUTARNJA POLIT.UC.A Srijeda, I. veljace 1995. ZOČARANI I ZABRINUTI – Veleposla-
nici Z-4 (Leonid Kerestedžijanc – Ru-
Veleposlanici Z-4 nakon neuspjelog puta u Knin ska Federacija, Peter Galbraith SAD,
Geert Ahrens i Alfredo Matacotta
Cordella – Međunarodna konferencija

Razocarani i zabrinuti
C
o bivšoj Jugoslaviji u Ženevi te fran-
cuski veleposlank Jean Jacques Gai-
llard) nakon neuspjelog puta u Knin;
»Cinjenica je da su u Kninu odbili
primiti plan, a Milosevic je odbio
primiti nas«, izjavio je Galbraith;
I “činjenica je da su u Kninu (srpsko
vodstvo) odbili primiti plan, a Miloše-
vić (predsjednik Srbije) je odbio primi-
veleposlanici rekli da o Milosevicu
umnogome ovisi hoce Ii biti napretka I ti nas”, izjavio je Galbraith.
D
ili nece
ZAGREB - Veleposlanici
skupine Z-4 Leonid Kerestedzi.-
ne samo kao promatrat. Ako
dobiju takva jamstva. oni ce Vjesnik, Wednesday, February 1, 1995.,
janc, Peter Galbraith. Geert
Ahrens, Alfredo Matacott.a Cor -
della i Jean Jacques Gaillard u
primiti Nacrt i dalje pregovara.-
ti Nismo ih uspjeli uvjeriti da
uzmu taj dokument U utorak
I Disappointed and Worried – Z-4 Ambas-
sadors (Leonid Kerestedžijanc – Rus-
utorak su u Unproforovoj z:rac. smo namjeravali otputovati u
noj bazi na Plesu, odrze.li konfe-
renciju za novinare nakon pov-
Beograd ka.ko bi se susreli s
ptedsjednikom MilDSevi6em, ali sian Federation, Peter Galbraith – USA,
ratka iz Knina, gdje su ta.mo.
Snjem vodstvu poku~li uruci.ti
on ni1e prist.ao da nas primic,
zavrSio je Ahrens uvodne na.po.. Geert Ahrens and Alfredo Matacotta
nacrt sporazuma o politil:kom
rjesenju za okupirana podrucja
mene.
Cordella – ICFYM and Jean Jacques
R
H~ai:,~~g ~~vodne je Ne treba joS dramatizirati Gaillard – France) after abortive mis-
na,pomene iznio velepos!anik
pri Medunarodnoj konferenciji
Ruski
Kerested±ijanc rekao je kako
velepos!anik Leonid
sion in Knin; ‘’it is a fact that in Knin the
Geert Ahrens: •Plan nije pro.smatra da •Situaciju ne treba
izvod nase fantazije nego se te-
dramatiziratic i dodao: ,Plan je Serbian leadership refused to accept
melji na rezolucijama Vijeca. si-
na stolu, nemamo ga namjeru
gurnosti, na zavrsnom doku- namet.ati ill braniti kao znan- the plan and that the Serb president,
mentu Londonske konferencije stveni rad. To je Nacrt na prtn.
i ostalim medunarodnim doku- cipu: 'uzmi i pogledaj'. Spremni Slobodan Milošević, refused to see us’’,
mentima smo o njemu razgovarati. Te-
Glavna nai:ela su: suverenitet melji se na medunarodnim do- Galbraith says.
Republike Hrvatske i njezin te- ~ument~a i ~)e~ici .~a
SU ~a- Skuplna Z-4 I francuskl veleposlanlk u zai::aranom krugu

468

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 The Croatian Nation’s Struggle for Survival, 1991-1995
Humanitarna kriza i ratna šteta u
Hrvatskoj u Domovinskom ratu
Agresija prosrpske JNA i srpskih snaga na Republiku
Hrvatsku 1991., a potom 1992. i na Bosnu i Hercegovinu,
izazvala je najveću prognaničko-izbjegličko-raseljeničku
i humanitarnu krizu u Europi nakon Drugog svjetskog
rata. Na stotine tisuća ljudi moralo je napustiti svoje
uglavnom razorene domove s neizvjesnim mogućnosti-
ma i vremenom povratka. Krajem 1991., u vrijeme kad je
H
Hrvatska bila izložena agresiji, Vlada RH osnovala je Ured
za prognanike i izbjeglice s ciljem organiziranja skrbi za
prognanike. Tada je u Hrvatskoj već bilo oko 536.000
prognanika, uglavnom Hrvata, protjeranih iz svojih do-
mova u napadima srpskih snaga. (…)
M
Tijekom 1992. Ured dodatno skrbi i o tisućama izbje-
glih Hrvata i Muslimana (Bošnjaka) iz Bosne i Hercego-
vine i Hrvata iz SRJ (odnosno Srbije, Vojvodine, Kosova
i Crne Gore). Prema izvješću Vlade RH iz 1998., „u 1992.
zabilježen je maksimum humanitarne krize u Hrvatskoj
s oko 800.000 prognanika i izbjeglica, što je bilo više od
15 % ukupnog stanovništva Hrvatske”.1013 U Hrvatskoj
D
je 1. prosinca 1992. bilo 663.493 prognanika i izbjegli-
ca (260.705 prognanika i 402.768 izbjeglica), a u broj od
oko 800.000 vjerojatno su bile uključene i osobe koje su
izbjegle u inozemstvo (1992. oko 136.000).
U proljeće 1995., uoči oslobodilačkih operacija hr-
C
vatskih snaga Bljesak i Oluja, u Hrvatskoj je bilo registrira-
no 210.592 prognanika (83.683 prognanika iz Hrvatskog
Podunavlja i 126.909 prognanika s okupiranih područja
koja će biti oslobođena u spomenutim operacijama) te
188.672 izbjeglice iz BiH i SRJ, što znači da je RH tada
skrbila za ukupno 399.264 prognanika i izbjeglice. Isto-
D
dobno ta je područja tijekom spomenutih operacija na-
pustila većina srpskog stanovništva koje je ondje živjelo
tijekom četverogodišnje okupacije (prema podacima iz
Izvješća Vlade RH iz 1998., njih oko 130.000).
Sredinom 1997. broj prognanika i izbjeglica u Hr-
vatskoj smanjio se na 225.000 osoba, a 1998. na 126.000
prognanika, povratnika i izbjeglica u sustavu skrbi hrvat-
ske države.
Izvješće Vlade RH iz 1998. navodi da je Republika
Hrvatska 1992. zbrinula najveći broj izbjeglica iz Bosne i
1013 „Izvješće Vlade Republike Hrvatske o dosadašnjem tije-
ku povratka i zbrinjavanju prognanika, izbjeglica i rase-
ljenih osoba”; https://narodne-novine.nn.hr/clanci/sluz-
beni/1998_07_92_1248.html.
469
Domovinski rat 04-02-2020 Knjiga 1.indd 469
Humanitarian Crisis and War Damage
in Croatia in the Croatian War of
Independence
The aggression of the pro-Serbian JNA and the Serb
forces against the Republic of Croatia in 1991, and then
in 1992 against Bosnia and Herzegovina, caused the big-
gest refugee and humanitarian crisis in Europe after the
Second World War. Hundreds of thousands of people
had to leave their mostly devastated homes with uncer-
tain possibilities and time of return. By the end of 1991,
when the entire Croatia was exposed to aggression, the
Government of the Republic of Croatia established the
Office for Displaced Persons and Refugees, with the aim
of organizing care for displaced persons. At that time,
there were already 536,000 displaced persons in Croatia,
mostly Croats, expelled from their homes in the attacks
of Serbian forces.
In 1992 the Office also cared for thousands of Croa-
tian and Muslim (Bosniak) refugees from Bosnia and Her-
zegovina and Croats from the FRY (i.e. Serbia, Vojvodina,
Kosovo and Montenegro). According to the 1998 report
by the Croatian Government, “in 1992 the humanitarian
crisis in Croatia reached its peak with about 800,000 dis-
placed persons and refugees, which was more than 15
% of the total population of Croatia”.21
On December 1, 1992, in Croatia there were 663,493
displaced persons and refugees in Croatia (260,705 dis-
placed persons and 402,768 refugees), so the number
of about 800,000 probably includes the persons who
fled abroad (it is estimated that outside Croatia, mostly
in West European countries, in 1992 there were about
136,000 refugees from Croatia).
In the spring of 1995, on the eve of Operations Flash
and Storm in Croatia there were 210,592 registered
displaced persons (83,683 displaced persons from the
Croatian Podunavlje region and 126,909 displaced per-
sons from the occupied territories about to be liberated
R
during the above mentioned operations) and 188,672
refugees from Bosnia and Herzegovina and the FRY,
which means that the Republic of Croatia at that point in
time provided care for a total of 399,264 displaced per-
sons and refugees. At the same time, during these op-
21 “Izvješće Vlade Republike Hrvatske o dosadašnjem tije-
ku povratka i zbrinjavanju prognanika, izbjeglica i rase-
ljenih osoba”; https://narodne-novine.nn.hr/clanci/sluz-
beni/1998_07_92_1248.html.
4.2.2020. 18:35:29
 Davor Marijan • Rat za opstojnost Hrvata, 1991. - 1995.
H
M
D
Prognanik - dijete, Novska, zapadna Slavonija, prosinac 1991. (au-
tor fotografije: Željko Gašparović).
Displaced person – a child, Novska, Western Slavonia, December,
C
1991 (Photograph by Željko Gašparović).
Hercegovine i SR Jugoslavije od svih zemalja primatelji-
ca. U ožujku 1992. broj izbjeglica iz BiH u Hrvatskoj izno-
sio je 16.579, u travnju ih je bilo već 193.415, u kolovozu
363.270, a u prosincu 1992. registriran je spomenuti broj
od 402.768 izbjeglica iz BiH, među kojima je bilo više od
200.000 Bošnjaka-muslimana. (…)
Prema drugom izvoru, nakon početka rata u Bosni
i Hercegovini u Hrvatskoj je bilo više od 600.000 izbje-
glica iz BiH: 425.000 Muslimana, 170.000 Hrvata i 5000
osoba drugih narodnosti.1014
Tijekom 1994., zbog terora srpskih vlasti, koje su
nastavile s „tihim etničkim čišćenjem“ područja pod srp-
skom kontrolom od nesrpskog pučanstva, u Hrvatsku je
1014 I. Rogić i sur., Progonstvo i povratak: psihosocijalne i ra-
zvojne odrednice progonstva i mogućnost povratka hrvat-
skih prognanika, Zagreb, 1995., 50-52.
470
Domovinski rat 04-02-2020 Knjiga 1.indd 470
Djetinjstvo u ratu, Prekopakra, zapadna Slavonija, 1992. (autor
fotografije: Toni Hnojčik).
Childhood in war, Prekopakra, Western Slavonia, 1992 (Photo-
graph by Toni Hnojčik).
erations the majority of the Serb population, who lived
there during the four-year occupation, left the areas in
D
question (according to data from the 1998 Government
Report, about 130,000 persons).
By mid-1997 the number of displaced persons and
refugees in the Croatian state care system had de-
creased to 225,000, and in 1998 to 126,000 displaced
R
persons, returnees and refugees.
The 1998 Government report states that the Republic
of Croatia in 1992 took care of the largest number of ref-
ugees from Bosnia and Herzegovina and SR Yugoslavia
from all recipient countries. In March 1992 the number of
refugees from Bosnia and Herzegovina in Croatia amount-
ed to 16,579, in April there were already 193,415 refugees,
in August 363,270, and in December 1992 there were the
mentioned 402,768 refugees from Bosnia and Herzegovi-
na, including more than 200,000 Muslim-Bosniaks.
4.2.2020. 18:35:29
 The Croatian Nation’s Struggle for Survival, 1991-1995
izbjeglo više od 30.000 Bošnjaka-muslimana i Hrvata iz
sjeverozapadnog dijela Bosne (Banja Luka, Prijedor, Kotor
Varoš...). Zadnja velika skupina izbjeglica u Hrvatsku stiže
u kolovozu 1995. preko mjesta Davor na Savi s područ-
ja Banje Luke, s kojeg je srpska vlast protjerala preostale
Bošnjake-muslimane i Hrvate neposredno nakon oslobo-
dilačke operacije hrvatskih snaga Oluja. U nepunih mje-
sec dana Hrvatska je primila 22.000 novih izbjeglica.
Prema popisu provedenom u lipnju 1994., u Hrvat-
skoj je bilo 48.760 djece prognanika iz Hrvatske i 62.683
H
djece izbjeglica iz BiH, ukupno 111.443 djece i mladeži
bez vlastitog doma, škole ili dječjeg vrtića, surovo pro-
gnane iz mirnog djetinjstva.
Žrtve rata su i djeca ostala bez roditelja. Bez jed-
nog ili oba roditelja poginula u ratu ostalo je 4327
djece, a registrirano je i 10 djece ranjene u ratu protiv
M
Hrvatske kojima je tijekom ranjavanja istom prilikom
poginula majka.
Prema podacima nadležnih ministarstava RH, u ratu
protiv Hrvatske, od obrazovnih ustanova razoreno je i
oštećeno: 131 dječji vrtić, 365 osnovnih škola te 89 sred-
njih škola i đačkih domova.
D
Od ustanova socijalne skrbi razoreno je i oštećeno:
- 8 dječjih domova (Dubrovnik, Karlovac, Lipik,
Petrinja, Osijek, Slavonski Brod, Vinkovci);
- 3 doma za resocijalizaciju mladeži (Karlovac,
Osijek, Zadar);
- 5 domova za rehabilitaciju hendikepirane djece
C
(Daruvar, Karlovac, Šibenik, Vrlika, Zadar).
Od zdravstvenih ustanova:
- razoreno je 15 bolnica i zdravstvenih ustanova
(Dvor, Glina, Gospić, Kostajnica, Lipik, Nova Gra-
diška, Novska, Osijek, Otočac, Pakrac, Petrinja,
D
Slunj, Topusko, Vinkovci, Vukovar);
- oštećeno je 15 zdravstvenih ustanova (Bjelovar,
Daruvar, Dubrovnik, Karlovac, Ogulin, Podrav-
ska Slatina, Sisak, Slavonski Brod, Požega, Šibe-
nik, Valpovo, Varaždin, Zadar, Županja, Klinika za
dječje bolesti Zagreb).
Tijekom 1991., srpske snage okupirale su gotovo
trećinu teritorija RH (oko 17.000 km2, od ukupno 56.538
km2 kopnene površine RH). (…) Početkom 1992. pod
srpskom okupacijom nalazila su se 1072 naselja u RH:
Hrvatsko Podunavlje 123, zapadna Slavonija 58, Banovi-
na 245, Kordun 227, Lika 179, Dalmacija 240.1015
1015 Dražen Živić, „Demografski okvir i gubici”, Stvaranje hr-
vatske države i Domovinski rat, Zagreb, 2006., 451.
471
Domovinski rat 04-02-2020 Knjiga 1.indd 471
According to another source, after the beginning of
war in Bosnia and Herzegovina, there were more than
600,000 refugees from Bosnia and Herzegovina in Cro-
atia: 425,000 Muslims, 170,000 Croats and 5,000 people
of other ethnicities.22
During 1994, the Serbian authorities continued
terrorizing the non-Serb population. This “silent eth-
nic cleansing” in Serb-controlled areas of the non-Serb
population forced more than 30,000 Bosnian Muslims
and Croats from the north-western part of Bosnia (Ban-
ja Luka, Prijedor, Kotor Varoš ...) to flee to Croatia. The
last large group of refugees from these areas arrived in
Croatia in August, 1995, via Davor on the Sava from the​​
Banja Luka area, from where the Serbian authorities ex-
pelled the remaining Bosniaks-Muslims and Croats right
after Operation Storm. In less than a month Croatia had
received 22,000 new refugees.
According to the June 1994 census, there were
48,760 displaced children from Croatia and 62,683 ref-
ugee children from Bosnia and Herzegovina, a total of
111,443 children and young people without a home, a
school or kindergarten to go to, children whose child-
hood had been cruelly ruined when they were forced to
flee their homes.
Many children lost their parents; according to data
available at the time, there were 4,327 children who lost
one or both parents killed in the war. 10 children were
wounded in the same incidents in which their mothers
were killed, in the war against Croatia.
The same report states that, according to the data
of the relevant Ministries of the Republic of Croatia, 131
kindergartens, 365 elementary schools and 89 high
schools and dormitories were destroyed and damaged
in the war against Croatia.
The buildings of the following social welfare institu-
tions were destroyed and damaged:
- 8 children’s homes (Dubrovnik, Karlovac, Lipik,
Petrinja, Osijek, Slavonski Brod, Vinkovci);
R
- 3 youth resocialization centers (Karlovac, Osijek,
Zadar);
- 5 homes for rehabilitation of handicapped chil-
dren (Daruvar, Karlovac, Šibenik, Vrlika, Zadar).
The following health care facilities and buildings
were destroyed and damaged:
22 Rogić, I. et al. Progonstvo i povratak: psihosocijalne i ra-
zvojne odrednice progonstva i mogućnost povratka hrvat-
skih prognanika, Zagreb, 1995, pp. 50-52.
4.2.2020. 18:35:29
 Davor Marijan • Rat za opstojnost Hrvata, 1991. - 1995.
H
Bolnica u Pakracu, jesen – zima 1991. (autor fotografije: Toni
Hnojčik).
Pakrac hospital, autumn-winter 1991 (Photograph by Toni
M
Hnojčik).
Na područjima Republike Hrvatske koja su u jesen
D
1991. okupirale JNA i srpsko-crnogorske snage, prema
popisu stanovništva iz 1991., od ukupno 549.083 sta-
novnika živjelo je 287.830 (52,4 %) Srba, što je malo
manje od polovice (49,5 %) od ukupnog broja (581.663)
Srba u RH; prema tome, na području RH nad kojim je
hrvatska vlast 1991. uspjela zadržati kontrolu živjelo
C
je ukupno 293.833 Srba ili polovica (50,5 %) svih Srba
(581.663) u RH 1991. godine.
Uz protjerano hrvatsko i drugo nesrpsko stanov-
ništvo, okupirano područje RH je nakon 1991. iz egzi-
stencijalnih, sigurnosnih i drugih razloga napustio i
znatan broj Srba (prema podacima iz srpskih izvora oko
100.000 Srba iselilo se do kraja 1992., a iseljavanje se na-
stavilo i u idućim godinama).
Prema podatku “Komesarijata za izbjeglice RSK” iz
srpnja 1994., u RSK su tada živjele 122.704 izbjegle i ra-
seljene osobe, a krajem 1994. u Saveznoj Republici Ju-
goslaviji (SRJ), dakle, ne računajući ostale države, živjelo
je oko 80.000 Srba iz RSK.1016 Zbog političkih i ekonom-
skih prilika u RSK iseljavanje stanovništva s tog područ-
ja nije se smanjilo ni u prvoj polovici 1995. godine.
Istodobno, procjenjuje se da je u razdoblju dolaska
snaga UN-a na području RSK ostalo oko 16.000 Hrvata,
1016 Nikica Barić, Srpska pobuna u Hrvatskoj 1990.-1995., Za-
greb, 2005., 172-173.
472
Domovinski rat 04-02-2020 Knjiga 1.indd 472
Vukovarska bolnica, rezultat srpske agresije, jesen 1991. (fo-
tografiju darovao: Damir Radnić).
Vukovar hospital; the result of Serb attacks, autumn 1991 (Pho-
tograph donated by Damir Radnić).
- 15 hospitals and health institutions were de-
stroyed (Dvor, Glina, Gospić, Kostajnica, Lipik,
Nova Gradiška, Novska, Osijek, Otočac, Pakrac,
Petrinja, Slunj, Topusko, Vinkovci, Vukovar);
- 15 health institutions were damaged (Bjelovar,
Daruvar, Dubrovnik, Karlovac, Ogulin, Podravs-
ka Slatina, Sisak, Slavonski Brod, Požega, Šibe-
nik, Valpovo, Varaždin, Zadar, Županja, Zagreb
Children’s Hospital).
During 1991, almost one third of the territory of the
Republic of Croatia was occupied by the Serbian forces
(approximately 17,000 km2, out of a total of 56,538 km2
D
of the land territory of ​​the Republic of Croatia). In the ar-
eas controlled by the Serbian forces, nearly all non-Serbs
were killed or expelled, and even a number of Serbs who
did not support the concept of Greater Serbia. Croatian
cultural and ecclesiastical heritage was plundered and
destroyed. At the beginning of 1992, there were 1,072
R
settlements in the Republic of Croatia under Serb oc-
cupation: 123 in the Croatian Podunavlje region, 58 in
Western Slavonia, 245 in Banovina , 227 in Kordun, 179
in Lika, 240 in Dalmatia.23
In the territory of the Republic Croatia (RC) which
was occupied in the autumn of 1991 by the JNA and Ser-
23 Živić, Dražen. „Demografski okvir i gubici”, Stvaranje hr-
vatske države i Domovinski rat, Zagreb, 2006, p. 451.
4.2.2020. 18:35:29
 The Croatian Nation’s Struggle for Survival, 1991-1995
H
M
D
Posljedica napada srpskih snaga, Pakrac, zapadna Slavonija, lje-
to 1992. (autor fotografije: Toni Hnojčik).
C
The results of a Serb attack, Pakrac, Western Slavonia, summer
1992 (Photograph by Toni Hnojčik).
D
no da je do kraja 1993. protjerano i pod različitim pritis-
cima i prijetnjama iselilo ili je ubijeno oko 8000 Hrvata
i pripadnika drugih nesrpskih nacionalnosti (od toga
broja, prema nekim procjenama, oko 1200 je ubijenih).
Prema tome, početkom 1994. u RSK, odnosno na oku-
piranom području RH, bilo je manje od 8000 Hrvata u
odnosu na 219.000 koliko ih je na tim područjima živje-
lo prije rata.1017 Do početka operacije Oluja taj se broj
još više smanjio.
Na području koje su okupirale i nadzirale srpske
snage srpski ekstremisti spalili su i srušili velik broj kuća
u vlasništvu Hrvata i gotovo sve objekte Katoličke cr-
1017 Isto, 396.
473
Domovinski rat 04-02-2020 Knjiga 1.indd 473
bian-Montenegrin forces, according to the 1991 census,
out of a total of 549,083 inhabitants there were 287,830
(52.4 %) Serbs, which is somewhat less than half (49.5
%) of the total number (581,663) of Serbs in Croatia;
therefore, in the territory of the Republic of Croatia un-
der government control in 1991, there lived a total of
293,833 Serbs or half (50.5 %) of all Serbs (581,663) in
the Republic of Croatia in 1991.
Along with the expelled Croats and other non-
Serbs, after 1991, a considerable number of Serbs also
left the occupied territory of the Republic of Croatia due
to existential, security and other reasons (according
to Serbian sources, about 100,000 Serbs had left by the
end of 1992, and the emigration trend continued in the
following years).
According to the data of the “Commission for Refu-
gees of the Republic of Srpska Krajina” from July 1994,
122,704 refugees and displaced persons lived in the
Republic of Serbian Krajina at that time. At the end of
1994 about 80,000 Serbs from the Republic of Serbian
Krajina lived in the Federal Republic Yugoslavia (FRY).24
Due to political and economic reasons in the Republic of
Serbian Krajina people continued to emigrate from the
statelet. The trend continued in the first half of 1995.
It is estimated that at the time of the arrival of the
UN forces in the Republic of Serbian Krajina about
16,000 Croats still lived there, but by the end of 1993
about 8,000 Croats and members of other non-Serb na-
tionalities had been expelled under different kinds of
duress or killed (out of that number, according to some
estimates, around 1,200 were killed). Therefore, at the
beginning in 1994, in the Republic of Serbian Krajina,
that is, in the occupied territory of Croatia, there were
fewer than 8,000 Croats compared to 219,000 living in
that area before the war.25 By the beginning of Opera-
tion Storm that number had decreased even more.
In the areas occupied and controlled by the Serb
forces, Serb extremists torched and demolished many
R
homes owned by Croats and almost all the Catholic
churches and religious buildings; Croatian national heri-
tage was also plundered and destroyed. During the war
in the Republic of Croatia the following property was
destroyed or damaged: 183,526 residential buildings,
that is, 217,009 housing units - apartments (depending
24 Barić, Nikica. Srpska pobuna u Hrvatskoj 1990.-1995. Za-
greb, 2005, pp.172-173.
25 Same, p.396.
4.2.2020. 18:35:30
 Davor Marijan • Rat za opstojnost Hrvata, 1991. - 1995.
H
M
kve, a hrvatska je kulturna baština opljačkana i razruše-
na. U ratnim razaranjima u Republici Hrvatskoj unište-
no je ili oštećeno, ovisno o popisu, 183.526 stambenih
zgrada, odnosno 217.009 stambenih jedinica - stanova
(najvećim dijelom u napadima srpskih snaga 1991.), oko
D
120 gospodarskih objekata i 2423 spomenika kulture
(od toga je 495 sakralnih objekata /uglavnom Katoličke
crkve/ na područjima koja su okupirali Srbi). Samo u pr-
voj godini rata stradalo je 590 naselja u 57 općina u Hr-
vatskoj, od kojih je 35 do temelja uništeno, a 34 su pre-
trpjela teška oštećenja (među njima su i veći gradovi).
C
Ukupna vrijednost izravne ratne štete u RH procijenjena
je krajem 1999. na 37,1 milijardu američkih dolara.1018
Prema novijim istraživanjima, ukupna ratna šteta u
RH od 1991. do 2004. iznosi oko 142 milijarde američ-
kih dolara: izravna ratna šteta 56,5, a neizravna oko 85,5
milijardi američkih dolara (1998. odnos valuta bio je 1
US dolar = 6,36 kn; štete su izražene u američkim dola-
rima, prema hrvatskim cijenama). Možda više od samih
brojki govori procjena da je Hrvatska do 2015. izgubila
od 7,5 do 9 svojih godišnjih bruto društvenih proizvoda
(prema BDP-u 2004.). Hrvatska će još dugo snositi tro-
šak propuštene ekonomske aktivnosti upravo zbog tih
izravnih šteta koje su nužno ostavile neizbrisiv trag.1019
1018 Vlada RH, Državna komisija za popis i procjenu ratne štete
– Ratna šteta RH, Završno izvješće, Zagreb, rujan 1999.
1019 Slobodan Praljak, Procjena ratnih šteta u Hrvatskoj, Za-
greb, prosinac 2006.; Domovinski rat – pregled političke i di-
plomatske povijesti, Ante Nazor – Tomislav Pušek, Nakladni
zavod Globus - HMDCDR, Zagreb, 2018., 278-280.
474
Domovinski rat 04-02-2020 Knjiga 1.indd 474
Zločin s potpisom: svetište i crkvu Gospe Voćinske, spomenik kul-
ture nulte kategorije, srpski vojnici razrušili su prilikom povlačen-
ja iz Voćina sredinom prosinca 1991. (autor fotografije: Zoran Fi-
lipović, snimljeno 31. prosinca 1991.).
The Church of the Pilgrimage to the Blessed Virgin Mary in Voćin,
a pilgrimage site and a zero-category monument, was destroyed
by retreating Serb soldiers in mid-December, 1991. (Photograph
by Zoran Filipović, December 31, 1991).
on the census; mainly during Serbian forces’ attacks in
1991), about 120 industrial buildings and 2,423 cultur-
al monuments (out of which 495 were religious, mainly
Catholic, buildings, in areas occupied by the Serbs). In
the first year of the war 590 settlements in 57 Croatian
municipalities were affected by the war – 35 were totally
destroyed, and 34 sustained major damage (including
larger towns). The total direct war damage in the Repub-
lic of Croatia was assessed at 37.1 billion US $ (Govern-
ment of the Republic of Croatia, State Commission for
the Census and Assessment of War Damage; War Dam-
age, final report, Zagreb, September 1999).
According to the latest studies, the overall war dam-
age in Croatia between 1991 and 2004 is assessed at 142
billion US dollars: direct war damage is assessed at 56.5
billion US dollars, and indirect war damage at around
D
85.5 billion US dollars (in 1998, 1 US dollar was 6.36 Cro-
atian Kuna; the damage report is expressed in US dollars,
but according to Croatian prices). Perhaps what is more
telling than the above stated numbers is the estimate
that by 2015 Croatia had lost 7.5 of its 9 GDPs (according
to the GDP for 2004). The war arrested Croatia’s econom-
R
ic development and the country will continue to live in
the shadow of the war for the foreseeable future.26
26 Slobodan Praljak, Procjena ratnih šteta u Hrvatskoj, Za-
greb, prosinac 2006.; Domovinski rat – pregled političke i di-
plomatske povijesti, Ante Nazor – Tomislav Pušek, Nakladni
zavod Globus - HMDCDR, Zagreb, 2018, pp. 278-280.
4.2.2020. 18:35:32
 The Croatian Nation’s Struggle for Survival, 1991-1995

Gornja fotografija: Nakon topničkog napada JNA i srpskih sna-

ga, u požaru 16./17. rujna 1991. izgorjela je Narodna knjižnica
i čitaonica u Vinkovcima. Požar je progutao cijelu zgradu i sav
knjižni fond (71.520 svezaka knjiga te brojne novine i časopise,
filmove i rukopise slavonskih književnika, kao i zavičajnu zbirku).
Na području cijele Hrvatske, u agresiji tijekom 1991. ukupno je
razoreno ili oštećeno 210 knjižnica. Osim vinkovačke, potpuno su
izgorjele, sa zgradom i čitavim knjižnim fondom, knjižnica Inter-
univerzitetskog centra za poslijediplomske studije u Dubrovniku
i knjižnica franjevačkog samostana sv. Antuna Padovanskog u
Hrvatskom Čuntiću.
Donja fotografija: Banski dvori, tada sjedište Predsjednika RH,
danas sjedište Vlade RH na povijesnom Gornjem gradu u Za-
H
grebu, 7. listopada 1991., neposredno nakon zračnog napada
kojim je JNA u službi velikosrpske politike pokušala ubiti preds-
jednika RH Franju Tuđmana te predsjednika Predsjedništva SFRJ
Stjepana Mesića i predsjednika Saveznog izvršnog vijeća SFRJ
Antu Markovića, koji su upravo tada imali sastanak.

Above: The National Library and Reading Room in Vinkovci gut-

ted by a fire on September 16/17, 1991, after a JNA artillery at-
M
tack. The fire destroyed the whole building and all the library
holdings (Library included 71,520 volumes and numerous news-
papers and magazines, films and manuscripts of Slavonian au-
thors and a local history collection). In Serb aggression against
Croatia during 1991, 210 libraries were totally destroyed or dam-
aged throughout Croatia. Particularly worthy of mention are
also the Library of the Inter-University Centre of Post-Graduate
Studies in Dubrovnik and the library of the Franciscan monastery
D
of St. Anthony of Padua in Hrvatski Čuntić which were also total-
ly destroyed.
Below: The Banski Dvori palace, then the Office of the President
of the Republic, today the seat of the Government of the Repub-
THIRTEEN CENTURIES OF CROATIAN CULTURE IN ASHES. lic of Croatia in Zagreb Upper Town, on October 7, 1991, immedi-
ately after JNA jets rocketed the building in an attempt to assas-
sinate the President of the Republic of Croatia Franjo Tuđman,
C
THE AGGRESSORS ARE SERBIA AND THE YUGO COMMUNIST ARMY.
•;_w_~-~~~~-!~<~~"'-~s-::AM\ ~-~~~~-~tu.~ o:.- ..- the President of the SFRY Presidency Stjepan Mesić and the
President of the SFRY Federal Executive Council Ante Marković.
The assassination attempt was in keeping with the Greater Ser-
bian policies. The aforementioned officials had adjourned their
meeting for lunch and left the room the jets targeted shortly
before the attack.
D
R

475

Domovinski rat 04-02-2020 Knjiga 1.indd 475 4.2.2020. 18:35:46

 Davor Marijan • Rat za opstojnost Hrvata, 1991. - 1995.
O uzrocima i posljedicama rata u BiH
Slom komunističkoga sustava u Europi otvorio je
prostor demokratizaciji i u Jugoslaviji, odnosno BiH. Na
prvim slobodnim, općim, demokratskim i višestranač-
kim izborima u povijesti BiH, koji su održani u stude-
nome 1990., vladajući komunisti doživjeli su težak po-
raz. Pobijedile su tri nacionalne stranke koje su osvojile
svih sedam mjesta u Predsjedništvu BiH i 84 % mjesta
u Skupštini. Rezultati izbora odražavali su strukturu
H
stanovništva. Nacionalni identiteti i nacionalne politi-
ke legitimirali su novu vlast. Za njezino funkcioniranje i
stabilnost bilo je nužno uvažavanje, priznanje identiteta
i legitimiteta interesa drugih, kao i spremnost na kom-
promis. Međutim, ubrzo se pokazalo da to nije lako. Srp-
ska demokratska stranka nije htjela ni čuti za BiH izvan
M
Jugoslavije, Hrvatska demokratska zajednica nipošto
nije htjela ostati u Jugoslaviji, a muslimanska Stranka
demokratske akcije propagirala je „građansku”, odnosno
centraliziranu i unitarnu BiH kao svoju „nacionalnu” dr-
žavu. Izbio je rat koji je odnio oko 100.000 života i razorio
ionako složeno društvo. U tome ratu, kao i tijekom cijele
D
povijesti, tri kolektiviteta, vjerske zajednice, etnokonfe-
sionalne skupine, naroda, nacije – vodile su svoje bitke
za svoje partikularne interese, sklapajući pritom privre-
mene međusobne saveze, ovisno o položaju i odnosu
snaga. Srbi su jedini vjerovali da uz pomoć JNA mogu
C
silom ostvariti svoje interese. To su i pokušali, pa su i
najodgovorniji za rat. Muslimanski politički vrh isticao je
da neće žrtvovati „suverenu BiH” za mir, odnosno da će
ratovati za BiH kao „građansku” državu. To je značilo da
BiH vide isključivo kao centraliziranu, a to znači njihovu
nacionalnu državu. Hrvati su podupirali BiH sve dok je
neovisna o Jugoslaviji. Jedini su prihvatili sve mirovne
sporazume i pristajali na sva ponuđena rješenja koja su
nudila mir. Do hrvatsko-muslimanskoga rata došlo je
najprije zbog muslimanskoga političkog cilja stvaranja
nacionalne države, a time i dovršetka procesa nacional-
noga konstituiranja. Hrvati su htjeli po svaku cijenu sa-
čuvati svoj identitet i politički subjektivitet.1020
Tijekom rata u BiH od 1991. do 1995. godine pogi-
nulo je oko 100.000 vojnika i civila svih nacionalnosti.
Prikupljeni su podaci za 33.070 bošnjačkih civila, 4075
srpskih i 2152 hrvatska civila. Oko 86 % ukupnih civilnih
1020 Odlomak je u cijelosti preuzet iz: Lučić, Od vila ilirskih do
Bijelog puta – stranputicama bosanske i hercegovačke po-
vijesti, Zagreb, prosinac 2018., 323.
476
Domovinski rat 04-02-2020 Knjiga 1.indd 476
On the Causes and Consequences of the
War in Bosnia and Herzegovina
The end of Communist rule in Europe ushered in
a period of democratization in the former Soviet bloc
countries, and by extension, in Yugoslavia and Bosnia
and Herzegovina. The first free, general, democratic,
and multiparty elections in the history of Bosnia and
Herzegovina were held in November, 1990. The ruling
Communist party lost the elections to three nation-
al parties who won seven seats in the Presidency of
Bosnia and Herzegovina and 84 % of the seats in the
Assembly. The results of the elections reflected the
ethnic/national make-up of the population. Nation-
al identities and national policies gave legitimacy to
the new government. The new government could
not hope to function properly or with any degree
of stability if each of the three constituent nations
was not prepared to compromise and recognize the
legitimacy of the interests and national identities of
the other two nations. However, no sooner had the
government been established, than it transpired that
the needed goodwill necessary for its viable function-
ing was sorely lacking. The Serbian Democratic Party
flatly rejected any option by which BiH would leave
Yugoslavia. The Croatian Democratic Union refused
to countenance any scenario by which BiH would re-
main in Yugoslavia. The Muslim Party of Democratic
Action propagated its commitment to a civil state,
that is, to a centralized and unitary Bosnia and Herze-
govina, in other words, a nation state. As a result, war
broke out, taking 100,000 lives and tearing asunder
D
the already fragile fabric of BiH society. During the
war, much like during their entire history, the three
constituent nations – collectivities, religious commu-
nities, ethnoconfessional groups, peoples, nations –
waged their battles, each for their own gains, enter-
ing into alliances with one another according to the
R
situation on the ground and the balance of power at
any given moment. The Serbs, unlike the other two
constituent nations, believed that, with the help of
the JNA, they could realize their objectives. Acting on
that belief, they decided to go for broke. In that sense,
they are more responsible for the outbreak of the war
in BiH than the other two peoples. The Muslim polit-
ical leadership made it clear that the Muslims would
not sacrifice a “sovereign Bosnia and Herzegovina” for
4.2.2020. 18:35:46
 The Croatian Nation’s Struggle for Survival, 1991-1995
žrtava u ratu ubile su srpske snage, a oko 30 % musli-
manskih civila stradalo je u Podrinju. U hrvatsko-mu-
slimanskome ratu ubijeno je 5 % ukupno stradalih
civila.1021 Ipak, iz više razloga, a posebno zbog vrlo agre-
sivne antihrvatske propagande koju su poduprli i pro-
jugoslavenski, odnosno anacionalni mediji u Hrvatskoj,
slika o hrvatskim žrtvama u BiH, posebno onima koje su
stradale od muslimanskih snaga, ostala je mutna i neja-
sna. Uz pobrojene civilne žrtve poginulo je i 5610 hrvat-
skih vojnika i policajaca u BiH. Dakle, Hrvati su, prema
H
popisu iz 2008., tijekom rata u BiH izgubili 7762 osobe
čiji je identitet utvrđen (a ranjeno ih je više od 20.000).
O srpskim zločinima u BiH svjetska i hrvatska
javnost su upoznate,1022 no zločini muslimanskih po-
strojbi ostali su nepoznati široj javnosti. Primjetno je
da javnom scenom, pa i u Hrvatskoj, dominira uvjere-
M
nje da su Bošnjaci jedina žrtva rata te da su u hrvat-
sko-muslimanskome ratu zločine činili jedino Hrvati.
Gradnju takve slike pomogle su i politički obojene
presude Haškoga tribunala.
Bošnjačko-muslimanske vojne i civilne vlasti tije-
kom muslimansko-hrvatskog sukoba uspostavile su
D
331 improvizirani zatočenički centar, logor ili zatvor, u
kojima su kraće ili duže vrijeme bila zatvorena 14.444
1021 Marko Attila Hoare, Što nam govore brojke bosan-
skih ratnih žrtava? V. https://cns.ba/wp-content/uplo-
C
ads/2014/03/sta_nam_govore_brojke_bosanskih_rat-
nih_zrtava.pdf (pristupljeno 17. listopada 2018.)
1022 U ožujku 1995. godine u New York Times je procurio iz-
vještaj ClA-e koji je zaključivao da su Srbi počinili 90 %
etničkoga čišćenja i vrlo jasno izložio da je srpsko vod-
stvo odigralo ključnu ulogu pri uništavanju i raseljavanju
D
nesrpskog stanovništva. Zaključci iz izvještaja CIA-e tre-
bali su, konačno, pokopati tvrdnje britanskih, francuskih
i američkih dužnosnika koji su sukob nazvali građanskim
ratom i tvrdili da krivicu podjednako trebaju snositi Srbi,
Hrvati i Muslimani (“Anatomija prijevare”, str. 48-49) (Da-
vorin Rudolf, Rat koji nismo htjeli, Nakladni zavod Globus,
Zagreb, 1999., 387-388). Sukladno tomu, iako neki izra-
žavaju sumnju glede brojeva, široko je prihvaćen opći
smisao zaključka koji sumira brojne izvještaje i tekstove:
“Organizacije koje su se bavile prikupljanjem činjenica,
kao UN, Ministarstvo vanjskih poslova SAD-a, CIA, Hel-
sinki Watch i druge, jednoglasno su zaključile da su Srbi
počinili 90 posto zločina u ovom balkanskom ratu i da su
izvršili 100 posto genocida sukladno definiciji genocida
koju je dao UN, naime organizirano, planirano i sustav-
no uništavanje naroda u cjelini ili djelomično, temeljem
etniciteta, religije ili drugog grupnog identiteta” (Ozren
Žunec, Goli život. Socijetalne dimenzije pobune Srba u Hr-
vatskoj I. i II., Demetra, Zagreb, 2007., 111, bilj. 181).
477
Domovinski rat 04-02-2020 Knjiga 1.indd 477
the sake of peace, meaning, they would fight for Bos-
nia and Herzegovina as a “civil state”. This meant that
the Muslims saw BiH only as a centralized state, that
is, their nation state. The Croats supported the con-
cept of a sovereign Bosnia and Herzegovina, meaning
a Bosnia and Herzegovina independent of Yugoslavia.
The Croats, unlike the Bosniak/Muslims and Serbs, ac-
cepted all peace plans proposed by the international
community. The Muslim-Croat conflict was a result of
the Muslim leadership’s plan to create a nation state.
The creation of such a state, according to the plan,
would complete the process of constituting the Mus-
lim nation in BiH. The Croats wanted to preserve their
identity and political subjectivity at all costs.27
During the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina, from
1991 to 1995, 100,000 soldiers and civilians of all
nationalities lost their lives. The collected data tells
us that 33,070 Bosnian civilians, 4,075 Serb civilians
and 2,152 Croatian civilians were killed. Around 86%
of the civilians were killed by the Serb forces, and
around 30% of the Muslim civilians were killed in the
Podrinje region. In the Muslim-Croat conflict 5% of
the civilians affected by the war were killed.28 How-
ever, due to, amongst other things, extremely aggres-
sive anti-Croatian propaganda backed up by pro-Yu-
goslav, anti-national media outlets in Croatia, the real
number of Croatian casualties in Bosnia and Herze-
govina, especially those who suffered at the hands of
the Muslim forces, is still unclear. In addition to the
known number of civilian casualties, a further 5,610
Croatian soldiers and policemen were killed in Bosnia
and Herzegovina. In that sense, according to the list
compiled in 2008, the Croats suffered 7,762 casualties
whose identity has been established (it is important
to note that 20,000 Croats were wounded).
The general public both in Croatia and the world is
familiar with the crimes committed by the Serb forces in
R
27 From: Lučić, 2018, p. 323.
28 Hoare, Marko Attila. “Što nam govore brojke bosan-
skih ratnih žrtava?” https://cns.ba/wp-content/uplo-
ads/2014/03/sta_nam_govore_brojke_bosanskih_rat-
nih_zrtava.pdf. Accessed 17 Oct 2018.
4.2.2020. 18:35:46
 Davor Marijan • Rat za opstojnost Hrvata, 1991. - 1995.
hrvatska logoraša ili zatvorenika, od čega su 10.346 bili
civili, a 4098 vojnici. Od toga su broja 632 hrvatska lo-
goraša i zatvorenika ubijena, a njih 50 okrutno je po-
gubljeno na ritualan način odsijecanjem glave, na isti
način na kakav će kasnije u ratu u Siriji muslimanski ek-
stremisti ubijati kršćane.1023
Prema istraživanjima Caritasa Biskupske konfe-
rencije Bosne i Hercegovine iz 1999. godine, koja se
oslanjaju na tadašnje podatke Ministarstva socijalne
politike, raseljenih osoba i izbjeglica Federacije BiH,
H
od ukupnoga broja Hrvata iz 1991. godine protjerano
je oko 312.000, što je točno 43,5 %. S područja koja su
tijekom rata bila pod nadzorom Bošnjaka-muslimana,
odnosno ARBiH, protjerano je oko 170.000 Hrvata, a iz
Republike Srpske oko 142.000.
Ukupno je na području BiH prognano oko 430.000
M
(31,7 %) Srba i 485.400 (25,8 %) Bošnjaka-muslimana.
Istodobno je s područja koje je bilo pod kontrolom Hr-
vata protjerano 112.000 ljudi, što od ukupnoga broja
prognanika iz cijele BiH iznosi 9,12 %. S područja pod
srpskom vlašću protjerano je 586.400 ljudi, što je čak
47,7 % od sveukupnoga broja prognanika, dok je iz kra-
D
jeva pod vlašću Bošnjaka protjerano 529.000 ljudi, što
iznosi 43,10 % od broja svih prognanika.
Među stradalnicima najveći je broj Bošnjaka. Zatim
slijede Srbi, a onda Hrvati. Međutim, kad se zbroje svi
koji su morali napustiti dom pa ih se izrazi u postotku u
odnosu na ukupan broj pripadnika vlastita naroda, opet
C
su najviše stradali Hrvati, jer bilo da su prognani bilo da
su raseljeni, stradalo je čak 61,24 % Hrvata u odnosu na
njihov ukupan broj iz 1991. godine. Istodobno, ako se ra-
čuna na isti način, stradalo je 44,24 % Srba, 47,36 % Mu-
slimana te 44,94 % pripadnika „ostalih” nacija, odnosno
nacionalnih manjina u BiH. Naime, prema popisu iz 1991.
udio Srba u nacionalnoj strukturi BiH iznosio je 31,1 %
(1.369.258); Muslimana je bilo 43,7 % (1.905.829), Hrvata
17,3 % (755.895), Jugoslavena 5,5 % i ostalih 2,4 %.1024
1023 Ivica Mlivončić, Muslimanski logori za Hrvate u Bosni i Her-
cegovini u vrijeme rata 1991.-1995., Naša ognjišta, Tomisla-
vgrad – Mostar, 2008., 249. Usp. Ivica Mlivončić, Zločin s
pečatom, vlastita naklada, Mostar, 2001., 281–284.; Josip
Kalaica, Razmijenjeni iz bugojanskog logora „Stadion” 19. 3.
1994. dvadeset godina poslije, Mostar, 2014.; Anđelko Kve-
sić, Od tvorca logora do radosti poricanja, Hrvatska udruga
logoraša Domovinskog rata u BiH, Busovača, 2017.
1024 Navedeni podaci preuzeti su iz: Lučić, 2018., 279-282; I.
Lučić navodi da je dio podataka dobiven od prof. dr. sc.
Tome Vukšića.
478
Domovinski rat 04-02-2020 Knjiga 1.indd 478
Bosnia and Herzegovina.29 On the other hand, the crimes
committed by the Muslim forces remain unknown to the
general public. It is obvious that the mentioned media out-
lets insist on portraying the Bosniaks as the only victims in
the war and on stating, both explicitly and implicitly, that
only the Croats committed war crimes during the Mus-
lim-Croat conflict. The biased observations served by the
mentioned media outlets reflect the prejudicial and polit-
ically motivated verdicts reached by the Hague Tribunal.
During the Muslim-Croat conflict the Bos-
niak-Muslim military and civilian authorities set up
331 improvised detention centers, detention camps
or prisons, in which 14,444 Croats were held as in-
mates and/or prisoners. Some were released after a
relatively short period of time, but some were held
imprisoned for long periods of time. Out of the above
stated number, 10,346 were civilians, and 4,098 were
soldiers. 632 Croatian inmates and/or prisoners were
killed, 50 of whom were brutally slaughtered – ritu-
ally decapitated in the same way Muslim extremists
would later kill Christians in the war in Syria.30
29 In March, 1995, The New York Timespublished a CIA report
which concluded that the Serbs had committed 90% of
the ethnic cleansings and argued that the Serbian lea-
dership had played a crucial role in the destruction and
dispersal of non-Serb populations. The conclusions from
the CIA report were supposed to finally negate the claims
by British, French and American government officials who
dubbed the conflict a civil war for which guilt should be
divided between Serbs, Croats and Muslims. (“Anatomija
prijevare”, pp. 48—49) (Rudolf, Davorin. Rat koji nismo htje-
li. Zagreb: Nakladni zavod Globus, 1999, pp. 387-388). By
extension, even though some people doubt the accuracy
of the numbers, the conclusion of the report, providing
D
a summary of numerous reports and texts, is widely ac-
cepted: “Organizations which collected facts, such as the
UN, the US Department of State, the CIA, Helsinki Watch
and others, unanimously concluded that the Serbs had
committed 90% of the war crimes in the Balkan war and
that they had committed 100% of the acts of genocide,
according to the definition of genocide by the UN – acts
R
committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a
national, ethnical, racial or religious group.” (Žunec, Ozren.
Goli život. Socijetalne dimenzije pobune Srba u Hrvatskoj. I. i
II. Zagreb: Demetra, 2007, p. 111, note 181).
30 Mlivončić, Ivica. Muslimanski logori za Hrvate u Bosni i
Hercegovini u vrijeme rata 1991.-1995. Tomislavgrad-Mo-
star: Naša ognjišta, 2008, p. 249. Compare: Mlivončić, Ivi-
ca. Zločin s pečatom. Mostar, 2001, pp.281-284; Kalaica,
Josip. Razmijenjeni iz bugojanskog logora „Stadion“ 19.3.
1994. dvadeset godina poslije. Mostar, 2014; Kvesić, Anđe-
lko. Od tvorca logora do radosti poricanja. Busovača: Hr-
vatska udruga logoraša Domovinskog rata u BiH, 2017.
4.2.2020. 18:35:46
 The Croatian Nation’s Struggle for Survival, 1991-1995
“Prema podacima Katoličke Crkve, u BiH je 1991.
živjelo 835.170 katolika, u većini Hrvata, a prema crkve-
nim podacima dobivenim tijekom božićnog blagoslova
obitelji od 31. prosinca 2010. na području BiH bilo je
samo 441.432 katolika, tj. 52,85 % u odnosu na 1991.,
što znači da je nestalo 393.738 katolika ili 47,15 %. Broj
katolika Hrvata danas u BiH manji je nego što je bio pri-
je sto godina (1913.: 458.999).
Broj katolika, uglavnom Hrvata, prije rata 1991.
na području današnjeg entiteta Federacije BiH bio je
H
659.400, a 31. prosinca 2010. na istom području bilo je
429.508 katolika, što znači da je u odnosu na 1991. ne-
stalo 229.892 katolika ili 34,86 %.
Od 152.856 katolika, uglavnom Hrvata, koliko je
1991. živjelo na području BiH koje je pripalo entitetu
Republici Srpskoj, 31. prosinca 2010. ostala su 11.924
M
katolika.
Na području BiH tijekom rata od 1991. do 1995.
potpuno je uništeno 125 katoličkih crkava, teško je
oštećeno njih 107, a 121 katolička crkva lakše je ošte-
ćena, tj. ukupno je stradalo, što potpuno, što u većem
ili manjem stupnju, 1000 katoličkih crkvenih objekata
D
(od toga broja 294 objekta su stradala u naletima Ar-
mije RBiH, a 706 objekata bili su na meti Vojske Re-
publike Srpske): katoličkih crkava 353, kapelica 220,
župnih kuća i ostalih župnih zgrada 233, samostana
30 i grobalja 164. Uništene su i dvije velike biblioteke:
Franjevačke teologije u Sarajevu i Biskupskog ordina-
C
rijata u Mostaru.
I dok se i ovom prilikom sjećamo žrtava i gubitaka
Katoličke Crkve, ali i strepimo za njezinu budućnost,
ne gubimo iz vida stradanje i gubitke drugih. Naprotiv,
ponavljamo što smo u zajedničkoj poslanici napisali
D
1996.: ‘Sve one, koji su se od sinova Katoličke Crkve na
bilo koji način osjetili nepravdom pogođeni, molimo
za oproštenje ... mi opraštamo svima koji su nam nani-
jeli nepravdu i zlo...’”1025
Od travnja 1993. ARBiH je zbog brojčane nadmoći
svojih snaga zauzela više od 5000 km2 područja na ko-
1025 Stanje katoličkih župa na području Bosne i Hercegovine
između 1991. i 2011. godine, glavni urednik Franjo Marić,
Biskupska konferencija BiH, Sarajevo, prosinac 2011.,
17, 43-44; Raspeta Crkva u Bosni i Hercegovini: uništa-
vanje katoličkih sakralnih objekata u Bosni i Hercegovini
(1991.-1996.), glavni urednik Ilija Živković, Biskupska
konferencija Bosne i Hercegovine, Hrvatska matica ise-
ljenika Bosne i Hercegovine, Hrvatski informativni cen-
tar, Banja Luka, Mostar, Sarajevo, Zagreb 1997., 357.
479
Domovinski rat 04-02-2020 Knjiga 1.indd 479
According to the research carried out by the Caritas
organization of the Bishops’ Conference of Bosnia and
Herzegovina in 1999, which drew heavily on the data
available at that time provided by the Ministry of Social
Policy, Displaced Persons and Refugees of the Federa-
tion of Bosnia and Herzegovina, 312,000 Croats (43.5%
of the total Croat population in BiH) were expelled in
1991. Around 170,000 Croats were expelled from the
territory that was, during the war, under Bosniak-Muslim
control (ARBIH). 140,000 Croats were expelled from the
Republika Srpska.
A total of 430,000 (31.7 %) Serbs and 485,400 (25.8
%) Bosniaks/Muslims were expelled from Bosnia and
Herzegovina. At the same time, 112,000 persons were
expelledfrom areas that were under Croatian control,
amounting to 9.12 % of the total number of the refugees
from Bosnia and Herzegovina. From areas under Serb
control 586,400 persons were expelled, amounting to
47.7 % of the total number of refugees, and from areas
under Bosniak control 529,000 persons were expelled,
amounting to 43.1 % of the total number of refugees.
The number of Bosniaks affected by the war is
higher than the number of Serbs and the number of
Croats equally affected. However, when expressed in
percentages, the numbers tell a different story. 61.24
% of the total number of Croats in 1991 were affected
by the war. 44.24 % of the Serbs were affected by the
war. 47.36 % of the Muslims were affected by the war.
44.94 % of members of “other” nationalities, or ethnic
minorities, were affected by the war. In the context of
this particular paragraph, the term “affected” is used
for expelled and displaced persons. The percentages,
therefore, show that the Croats were affected by the
war in Bosnia and Herzegovina more than the Serbs
and Bosniaks/Muslims.
It is important to mention that according to the 1991
census, the percentage of Serbs in the national make-up
of Bosnia and Herzegovina was 31.1% (1,369,258); the
R
percentage of Muslims was 43.7 % (1,905,829), the per-
centage of Croats was 17.3 % (755.895), the percentage
of Yugoslavs was 5.5 %, and the percentage of other na-
tionalities was 2.4 %.31
“According to the data provided by the Catholic
Church, 835,170 Catholics, most of whom were Cro-
ats, lived in Bosnia and Herzegovina in 1991. By way of
31 Data obtained from: Lučić, 2018, pp. 279-282. Some data
were provided by Prof. Tomo Vukšić, Ph.D.
4.2.2020. 18:35:46
 Davor Marijan • Rat za opstojnost Hrvata, 1991. - 1995.
jem su Hrvati do tada bili u većini, tako da se do kraja
godine područje koje su u BiH kontrolirale hrvatske sna-
ge svelo na tek oko 10 % teritorija BiH, što je bilo manje
od predratnog udjela Hrvata u stanovništvu BiH (17 %) i
postotka teritorija (16 %) koji su hrvatske snage kontro-
lirale krajem 1992. godine. Do postizanja Daytonskog
sporazuma u studenom 1995., nakon oslobodilačkih
operacija, pod kontrolom hrvatskih snaga bilo je 25-26
% teritorija BiH1026 (otprilike isti postotak teritorija koji
je Vance-Owenov plan unutarnje podjele BiH predvidio
H
kao hrvatske provincije).
Prema podacima Katoličke crkve u BiH:
• prije Daytonskog sporazuma 1995. bosanski
Srbi kontrolirali su oko 46 % BiH (oko 23.687
km2), bosanskohercegovački Hrvati 25 % (oko
12.937 km2) i bosanski Bošnjaci-muslimani 28 %
M
(oko 14.506 km2). Tijekom rata 1993. i 1994. Srbi
su vojno kotrolirali i do 65 - 70 % teritorija BiH;
• oko 41 % (oko 10.720 km2) područja Federacije
BiH bilo je pod nadzorom Hrvata, a oko 53 %
(oko 13.960 km2) istoga područja bilo je pod
nadzorom Bošnjaka (ostatak, oko 1430 km2, bio
D
je pod kontrolom Srba);
• u teritorijalnim zamjenama, ako se uzme u obzir
vojna kontrola teritorija, bosansko-hercegovač-
ki Hrvati dali su najviše (4 % BiH teritorija), vraća-
jući Srbima 9 % današnje Republike Srpske;
• maleno povećanje Posavske županije (Odžak i
C
dijelovi domaljevačke općine) nisu promijenili
činjenicu da su nakon Daytonskog sporazuma
bosanskohercegovački Hrvati kontrolirali samo
21 % BiH (10.640 km), u usporedbi s više od 25
% prije Daytona, kao i da je Posavina, gdje su
Hrvati značajan udio stanovništva, većim dije-
lom ostala izvan hrvatskog nadzora;
• bosanski Srbi dobili su natrag velik dio planin-
skog teritorija koji su prije nadzirali, i to 4 %
teritorija BiH od Hrvata i malene dijelove od
Bošnjaka (planina Ozren), ali su bili prisiljeni
prepustiti Sarajevo (uz iznimku prigradskih na-
selja južno od grada) i neke bitne točke na isto-
ku Bosne i Hercegovine;
• sve u svemu, srpski postotak narastao je do 49
% (48 % ako se isključi Brčko Distrikt, 24.526
km) s nešto više od 46 % prije Daytona;
1026 Podaci iz rukopisa dr. sc. Marka Tokića.
480
Domovinski rat 04-02-2020 Knjiga 1.indd 480
comparison, the data collected by the Catholic Church
during the Christmas period in 2010 – by December 31
–through the blessing of families at Christmas, showed
that there were only 441,432 Catholics living in Bosnia
and Herzegovina at that time, or 52.85 % compared to
1991. This means that in 2010 there were 393,738 fewer
Catholics (47.15 %) in Bosnia and Herzegovina than in
1991. The number of Croatian Catholics in Bosnia and
Herzegovina today is lower than a hundred years ago
(1913: 458,999).
The number of Catholics, most of whom were Cro-
ats, living before the war in the territory of what is today
the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, was 659,400.
On December 31, 2010, there were 429,508 Catholics liv-
ing in the same area. This means that there were 229,892
fewer Catholics (34.86%) in 2010 than in1991.
152,856 Catholics, mostly Croats, lived in 1991 in the
portion of BiH territory that is nowthe Republika Srpska.
Only 11,924 Catholics were living in that area on Decem-
ber 31, 2010.
During the war, from 1991 to 1995, in Bosnia and
Herzegovina, 125 Catholic churches were completely
destroyed, 107 churches were severely damaged, and
121 churches were lightly damaged. In total, 1,000 fa-
cilities belonging to the Catholic Church were damaged
(out of that number, 294 facilities were damaged by
the ARBIH, and 706 facilities by the VRS): 353 Catholic
churches, 220 chapels, 233 parish buildings, 30 monas-
teries, and 164 cemeteries. Two sizeable libraries were
also destroyed: the library at the Franciscan Theology
College in Sarajevo and the library at the Bishop’s Ordi-
nariate in Mostar.
And while we take this opportunity to remember
D
the victims and losses suffered by the Catholic Church
and to express fear for its future, we cannot forget the
suffering and the losses of others. We repeat what we
said in our epistle in 1996: ‘All of those, who have in any
way, shape or form, suffered at the hands of the sons of
R
the Catholic Church, we ask for forgiveness… We forgive
everyone who has transgressed against us …’”32
Since April, 1993, due to its numerical strength, the
ARBIH had captured more than 5,000 km2of territory
with majority Croatian populations. By the end of the
32 Stanje katoličkih župa na području Bosne i Hercegovine iz-
među 1991. i 2011. godine, 17,pp. 43-44; Raspeta Crkva u
Bosni i Hercegovini – Uništavanje katoličkih sakralnih obje-
kata u Bosni i Hercegovini (1991.-1995.), p. 357.
4.2.2020. 18:35:46
 The Croatian Nation’s Struggle for Survival, 1991-1995
H
U spomen na hrvatske civile i zarobljene pripadnike HVO-a koje
je ARBiH ubila u Trusini, 16. travnja 1993.
M
In memory of Croatian civilians and HVO POWs murdered by the
ARBiH in Trusina, April 16, 1993.
• bosanski Bošnjaci - muslimani dobili su najvi-
D
še – mirovni sporazum dao im je gotovo cijelo
Sarajevo, kao i neke bitne položaje u istočnoj
Bosni i Hercegovini (npr. goraždanski koridor),
dok su napustili tek nekoliko položaja na plani-
ni Ozren i u zapadnoj Bosni;
C
• njihov postotak povećao se s 28 % prije Dayto-
na do 30 % te su uvelike poboljšali kvalitetu do-
bivene zemlje.1027
Nakon Domovinskog rata, ubijeno je još najmanje
16 Hrvata povratnika ili službenih osoba, uglavnom na
području Federacije BiH s kojih su muslimanske snage
D
protjerale Hrvate tijekom rata, a jedna Hrvatica nestala
je na području Republike Srpske.
1027 Stanje katoličkih župa na području Bosne i Hercegovine
između 1991. i 2011. godine, 60-61.
481
Domovinski rat 04-02-2020 Knjiga 1.indd 481
year, only 10 % of the territory of BiH was under Croatian
control. To put this piece of information into its proper
context, it is worth mentioning that the percentage of
the Croats living in BiH was, before the war, 17 % of the
Bosnian population and that the percentage of BiH terri-
tory under Croatian control at the end of 1992 was 16 %.
In November, 1995, when the Dayton Agreement was
signed and after the Croats had successfully completed
their operations for the liberation of territory, the Croats
controlled 25-26 % of BiH territory33 (approximately the
same percentage of BiH territory that the Vance-Owen
plan for the internal division of BiH envisaged as the Cro-
atian provinces).
According to the data provided by the Catholic
Church in Bosnia and Herzegovina:
- prior to the Dayton Agreement in 1995, the
Bosnian Serbs controlled ca 46 % of Bosnia
and Herzegovina’s territory (ca 23,687 km), the
Bosnian-Herzegovinian Croats controlled 25%
of BiH territory (ca 12,937 km) and the Bos-
niaks/Muslims controlled 28 % of BiH territory
(ca 14,506 km). During the war, from 1993 and
1994, the Serbs militarily controlled up to 65-70
% of BiH territory;
- around 41% (ca 10,720 km) of the territory of
the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina was
under Croatian control, around 53% (ca 13,960
km) of the same territory was under Bosniak
control (the remaining 1,430 km was under Serb
control);
- in territorial swaps (military control of territory),
the Croats of Bosnia and Herzegovina gave the
largest portion of territory (4 % of BiH territory),
thus returning to the Serbs 9 % of the territory
of what is today the Republika Srpska;
- a slight expansion of the territory of the Posav-
ina County (Odžak and parts of the Domaljevci
Municipality) did not change the fact that after
R
the Dayton Agreement the Croats of Bosnia and
Herzegovina controlled only 21% of BiH terri-
tory (10,640 km), compared to more than 25 %
before the Dayton Agreement, and that Posav-
ina, where the Croats comprised a significant
percentage of the population, was, for the most
part, not under Croatian control;
33 Data from the manuscript by Marko Tokić, Ph.D.
4.2.2020. 18:37:03
 Davor Marijan • Rat za opstojnost Hrvata, 1991. - 1995.
H
Ahmići, džamija srušena u napadu HVO-a, 16. travnja 1993. godine.
Mosque destroyed during a HVO attack, Ahmići, April 16, 1993.
M
D
Pećine kraj Novog Travnika, pripadnici ARBiH teško su oštetili ka-
C
toličku crkvu i zapalili župnu kuću, druga polovica 1993. (Šematizam
Vrhbosanske nadbiskupije za 2015. godinu, Sarajevo, 2015., 353).
ARBiH soldiers heavily damaged the local Catholic church in Pećine
near Novi Travnik and burned the rectory, second half of 1993.
Vidovice, Bosanska Posavina, srpske snage (VRS) razorile su
župnu crkvu u drugoj polovini 1992. (Šematizam Vrhbosanske
nadbiskupije za 2015. godinu, Sarajevo, 2015., 744).
Serb forces (VRS soldiers) destroyed the local Catholic church in
Vidovice, Bosanska Posavina, second half of 1992.
482
Domovinski rat 04-02-2020 Knjiga 1.indd 482
- the Bosnian Serbs got back a large portion of
the mountainous areas of BiH, which was previ-
ously under their control; the Croats returned to
the Serbs 4 % of BiH territory and the Bosniaks
returned small portions of territory (Mount Oz-
ren). However, the Serbs were forced to give
up on Sarajevo (with the exception of suburbs
south of Sarajevo), and some important areas in
the east of BiH;
- on the whole, the percentage of BiH territo-
ry under Serb control increased from slightly
over 46 % to 49 % (or 48 %, not counting the
Brčko District, 24,526 km) after the Dayton
Agreement;
- the Bosniaks/Muslims gained the largest por-
tion of territory – the peace agreement gave
them almost the entire area of Sarajevo, as well
as some important locations on Mount Ozren
and in west Bosnia;
- the percentage of BiH territory under Bosniak
control increased from 28 % to 30% after the
Dayton Agreement. Geographically, and gen-
erally speaking, the territory the Bosniaks ac-
quired after the Dayton Agreement is better in
terms of quality and potential than the territory
that they lost.34
After the Croatian War of Independence, a minimum
of 16 Croatians returnees or officials were killed, mostly
in the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina from where
the Muslim forces expelled the Croats during the war.
One Croatian woman living in the Republika Srpska is
listed as missing.
D
R
34 Stanje katoličkih župa na području Bosne i Hercegovine iz-
među 1991. i 2011. godine. Sarajevo, 2011. pp. 60-61.
4.2.2020. 18:37:04
 The Croatian Nation’s Struggle for Survival, 1991-1995
Davor Marijan: Rat Hrvata i Muslimana u
Bosni i Hercegovini od 1992. do 1994.
(dijelovi intervjua)
Uzrok rata u BiH ne može se gledati izvan projek-
ta svi Srbi u jednoj državi. Rat u BiH je samo nastavak
rata u Hrvatskoj koji je privremeno okončan u siječnju
1992. godine. U složenom ratu kakav je bio u BiH (srp-
ska agresija na BiH, a potom i muslimansko-hrvatski
H
građanski rat i međumuslimanski rat), problem je kada
se nude pojednostavljena tumačenja, a to se često radi.
Srpski ciljevi, postavljeni radi stvaranja srpske države u
BiH, kao dijelu „velike Srbije“, predstavljeni su u jednom
nevjerojatnom dokumentu koji se zove Odluka Narod-
ne skupštine Republike srpskog naroda u BiH o stra-
M
teškim ciljevima srpskog naroda u BiH koja je usvojena
12. svibnja 1992. u Domu JNA u Banja Luci i za koje ima
sasvim dovoljno naznaka da su se počeli ranije provo-
diti. Kod Bošnjaka je cilj bio sukladan stajalištu politi-
ke o građanskoj državi, a to je cijela BiH pod njihovim
nadzorom. Kod Hrvata se nastojalo obraniti teritorij na
D
kojem su bili većinski. Uz to se kao idealno rješenje sa-
njalo o obuhvaćanju većine hrvatskog naroda u jednoj
državi kao što je to bilo u granicama Banovine Hrvatske
iz 1939. godine, a realno se, sukladno ustavnoj činjenici
da u BiH postoje tri konstitutivna naroda, tražila unutar-
C
nja podjela BiH na tri entiteta, kako bi Hrvati u BiH imali
svoju političku i teritorijalnu autonomiju.
Glede sukobljenih strana u BiH, činjenica je da se
navodno savezna JNA transformirala u tri srpske vojske.
JNA je zlouporabljena za projekt „svi Srbi u jednoj drža-
vi“, iako su sve republike i narodi pola stoljeća izdvajali
D
ogroman novac za nju. Pa evo i jedan fascinantan poda-
tak: Hrvatska je 1987. za JNA u miru izdvojila više novca
nego 1991. za ZNG u ratu. Na kraju se pokazalo da je
JNA pala na prvom ozbiljnom ispitu i da je zanemarila
poruku koju je često ponavljala, a ona glasi: narod koji
se bori za svoju slobodu ne može se pobijediti. U BiH to
Hrvati mogu reći, a i Bošnjaci, premda su u prvim mje-
secima otvorenog rata dobro kasnili u obrani od napa-
da JNA i ostalih srpskih formacija.
HVO i VRS su bile hrvatska i srpska vojska, a ARBiH
muslimanska, od 1994. bošnjačka, to je jedino nespor-
no. Srbi su preuzeli JNA i dio TO-a, Hrvati su se organi-
zirali gotovo od nule nakon što su srpskom agresijom
na Hrvatsku i oni ugroženi, a Muslimani su posljednji
završili s ustrojem vojske jer je bošnjačko-muslimanski
483
Domovinski rat 04-02-2020 Knjiga 1.indd 483
Davor Marijan: Excerpts from an
Interview about the Muslim-Croat
Conflict in Bosnia and Herzegovina
1992-1994
The origins and causes of the war in BiH are in-
timately connected to the “all Serbs in one country”
project. The war in BiH was a continuation of the war
in Croatia. The war in Croatia, it is worth pointing out,
was temporarily suspended in 1992. The war in BiH was
a complex affair – Serb aggression, the Muslim-Croat
conflict, the Inter-Muslim conflict, etc. – and often pro-
posed generalizations of the events in BiH purporting
to represent the conclusions of comprehensive anal-
yses and offering shortcuts to understanding the war
are something I, as a conscientious historian, resent on
a professional level. The Serbs’ goals were formulated,
for the purpose of creating a Serb state within BiH, in
a fascinating document called The Decision of the Na-
tional Assembly of the Republic of the Serbian People
in BiH. The Decision was accepted on May 12, 1992, in
the JNA Center in Banja Luka. Again, the strategic ob-
jectives of the Bosnian Serbs were clearly laid out in the
text of the Decision. That said, there are strong indica-
tions that the Serbs had started implementing measures
for the realization of the goals set forth in the Decision
even before the Decision was officially passed in Banja
Luka. The Bosniaks calibrated their policies according to
their goal which was to establish a civil state. Simply put,
they wanted to lord over the whole country. The Croats
wanted to defend their areas. Most Croats believed that,
in an ideal world, there should exist a Croatian state, the
borders of which would roughly correspond to the bor-
ders of the Banate of Croatia in 1939. At the same time,
and I cannot emphasize this point enough, the Croats
realized that the dream had no basis in reality. They were
realistic enough then, as they still are today, to respect
the fact that there are three constituent nations in BiH.
R
Therefore, the Croats proposed an internal division of
BiH into three entities so that they could have political
and territorial autonomy.
As far as the issue of the belligerent parties in BiH
goes, it is a fact that the JNA transformed/divided it-
self into three Serbian armies. The JNA was used as the
main instrument of realizing the “all Serbs in one coun-
try” project. Ironically, the tax payers of all republics
and nationalities of Yugoslavia had been paying vast
amounts of money for the JNA’s upkeep. One factoid
4.2.2020. 18:37:04
 Davor Marijan • Rat za opstojnost Hrvata, 1991. - 1995.
vođa u BiH Alija Izetbegović pokušavao napraviti neka-
kav aranžman s JNA, pri čemu je u potpunosti ignorirao
hrvatske interese. To je propalo jer Srbi nisu bili za takvu
opciju. Ogroman broj žrtava upravo je posljedica tog
političkog sljepila i pokušaja kompromisa, koji se počeo
odvijati s tzv. historijskim sporazumom bošnjačko-mu-
slimanskog vodstva sa Srbima na račun Hrvata u ljeto
1991. godine. Zato je za bošnjačku politiku najlakše sve
relativizirati na način „oni su se (Srbi i Hrvati) dogovorili
na naš račun i sve što se zbilo posljedica je tog dogovo-
H
ra“. Svatko se sa svakim dogovarao uoči i tijekom rata.
Uvijek je razgovor, odnosno njegovi pokušaji bolji od
samog rata i primjene sile. To je zadnja linija na kojoj
prestaje ono racionalno, jer kada se potegne oružje raz-
govori su završeni.
Bošnjačko-muslimansko vodstvo optužuje Hrvat-
M
sku da je bila involvirana u rat u BiH protiv Armije RBiH
zbog činjenice da su malobrojne snage iz Hrvatske,
sastavljene uglavnom od dragovoljaca koji su podri-
jetlom bili iz BiH, intervenirale u ratu između HVO-a i
Armije RBiH u dijelu BiH. Te su snage pomogle brojčano
slabijem HVO-u obraniti dugu crtu obrane u iznimno
D
nepovoljnim okolnostima za hrvatski narod u BiH. Tu
optužbu mogu razumjeti, no samo u kontekstu istovjet-
nog odnosa na koje bošnjačko-muslimansko vodstvo
izbjegava odgovor, što s dragovoljcima muslimanima iz
Srbije sa Sandžaka, ili vjerskim ratnicima mudžahedini-
ma koji su se u BiH borili u sastavu Armije RBiH? Tokove
C
novca iz muslimanskog svijeta da i ne spominjemo. U
takvom kontekstu definiciju agresorstva pojedinih stra-
na u muslimansko-hrvatskom sukobu nije lako utvrditi,
ako je uopće smislena. Primjerice, slučaj Vareša, gradića
s većinskim hrvatskim stanovništvom na pravcu izme-
đu Sarajeva i Tuzle. Je li njega u studenom 1993. ARBiH
oslobodila ili zauzela, je li to bio čin oslobađanja ili agre-
sije? Ako se koristi pojam agresije tada je primjerenije
da se razmatra od slučaja do slučaja. Ne treba zaboraviti
da su Hrvati i Srbi u ogromnoj većini bili za entitetsko
organiziranje, što znači da su bili većina na razini BiH i
da je već tu jako teško primjenjivati formule agresije i
oslobodilaštva. Bošnjačko-muslimanska strana očito ne
vidi ništa sporno da je 1993. - 1994. manjina „oslobađa-
la“ teritorij od većine.
Uzrok hrvatsko-muslimanskog građanskog rata u
BiH su suprotstavljene politike. Hrvati su smatrali da
trebaju dobiti dio teritorija za svoj entitet, a Bošnjaci
(muslimani) su imali koncept centralizirane, unitarne,
odnosno svoje nacionalne države koja je trebala nastati
484
Domovinski rat 04-02-2020 Knjiga 1.indd 484
is actually very descriptive of what I’m saying here: in
1987 Croatia spent more money on the JNA than it did
in 1991, during the war, on the ZNG. And in the end
what happened? The JNA performed miserably during
the war. Maybe that should not surprise us because
the JNA acted in opposition to its own ethos accord-
ing to which a people fighting for its freedom cannot
be defeated. The Bosnian Croats fought for their free-
dom against the JNA in BiH. So did the Bosniaks, even
though during the first few months of the war their
contribution to the defense against the JNA and other
Serb formations was negligible.
The HVO and the VRS were the Croat army and the
Serb army respectively and the ARBIH was the Muslim
army, Bosniak army from 1994. That much is clear. Not
much else about the war in BiH is clear though. The
Serbs took the JNA and a part of the TO, the Croats,
founding themselves under threat when Croatia was
attacked by the JNA and other Serb formations, set up
their defensive force from scratch. The Muslims were the
last to establish their armed force because the Bosniak/
Muslim leader Alija Izetbegović had been trying to reach
some kind of accommodation with the JNA, completely
ignoring the Croats and their interests. His efforts, how-
ever, did not bear fruit because the Serbs were bent on
going for broke. The staggering number of casualties in
the war in BiH came as a direct result of Izetbegović’s
ineptness as a politician. He actually chose to negotiate
with the Serbs from a position of weakness! He wasn’t
forced into that self-defeating gambit. Of course, un-
der such circumstances, any compromise between the
Muslims and the Serbs, by its very nature and definition,
was bound to be anti-Croatian. The Muslim-Serb nego-
D
tiations for a while looked promising in summer 1994
when the idea of the “historic Serb-Muslim agreement”
was floated. It is actually funny how the Muslims justi-
fy their actions by referring to a mythical Croat-Serb
agreement, often saying things like: “Well, the Serbs
R
and Croats made their deal, didn’t they? So, everything
we did we did as a result of that. Who can blame us?”
The argument is silly. All sides engaged in talks prior to
and during the war – jostling for position, trying to pre-
vent war or further bloodshed, buying time, whatever.
All that notwithstanding, it is always better to negoti-
ate – but negotiate for the purpose of preventing war,
not fostering conflict, than to use force. Warfare, in that
sense, can be, and really should be seen as corruption
of politics.
4.2.2020. 18:37:04
 The Croatian Nation’s Struggle for Survival, 1991-1995
H
M
HVO, Bosanska Posavina (fotografija: arhiv HVO-a Bosanska
Posavina).
D
kao prividno „građanska“ država u kojoj bi nebošnjačko
(nemuslimansko) stanovništvo bilo majorizirano. Rat je
C
bio neminovan. Počeo je kada je ARBiH velikim dijelom
preko teritorija Hrvatske i područja koje je nadzirao
HVO nabavila dostatnu količinu oružja i streljiva i kada
je agresivnije nastupila prema HVO-u u središnjoj Bosni
i sjevernoj Hercegovini. Tu je rat i počeo, u travnju 1993.,
D
nakon što je već u listopadu 1992. i siječnju 1993. doš-
lo do ozbiljnih hrvatsko-muslimanskih sukoba na tom
području (Novi Travnik, Rama, Gornji Vakuf/Uskoplje
i Lašvanska dolina). U HVO-u su tek 14. travnja 1993.,
kada ih je ARBiH napala u Konjicu, prihvatili da se ne
radi o povremenim incidentima, već o otvorenom ratu.
Do tada su iz Zagreba dolazili nalozi da se smire i prego-
varaju s Muslimanima.
HVO je bio izrazito obrambena organizacija, za razli-
ku od ARBiH. ARBiH je 1993. imala više uspjeha u nacio-
nalno miješanim područjima gdje je čimbenik izrazite
većine odnio prevagu u njihovu korist. U sukobima s ja-
sno definiranom crtom i bez višestruke nadmoći ARBiH
nije postizala uspjehe vrijedne spomena. To se najbolje
vidi u slučajevima Lašvanske doline i doline Lepenice. O
485
Domovinski rat 04-02-2020 Knjiga 1.indd 485
The Bosniak/Muslim leadership accuses Croatia of
being involved in the war in BiH against the ARBIH. The
basis of that accusation lies in the fact that meager for-
mations from Croatia, composed mostly of volunteers
born in BiH, were sent to BiH to help the HVO defend
against the ARBIH during the Muslim-Croat conflict.
These soldiers from Croatia were stretched thin along
the long HVO defensive line at a time when the odds
were stacked against the HVO, when it seemed probable
that the vastly superior ARBIH would overrun the HVO.
Still, I can understand and even appreciate the accusa-
tion. Fair enough. But, the Bosniak/Muslim leadership is
conspicuously silent about the issue of the Muslim vol-
unteers from the Sandžak area in Serbia and the Mujahi-
deen who fought in the ranks of the ARBIH. And they’re
also conspicuously silent on the issue of financial trans-
actions originating in the Muslim world and ending up
in BiH. So, when the whole picture is considered, deter-
mining who the aggressor in the Muslim-Croat conflict
was becomes very hard, maybe even an exercise in futil-
ity. Take, for example Vareš, a small predominately Cro-
at town situated between Sarajevo and Tuzla. Was the
town, in November, 1993, occupied or liberated by the
ARBIH? Was the ARBIH’s move into the town an act of
liberation of aggression? It is dangerous to generalize
though, especially when using the term “aggression”.
We should not forget that most Croats and Serbs were
in favor of internally dividing BiH into entities. The Serbs
and Croats combined outnumbered the Muslims in BiH.
That means that a significant majority of the popula-
tion in BiH wanted to see the country internally divided
among the three constituent nations. That fact alone
tells us that we should use the terms “liberation” and
“aggression” with extreme caution. The Muslims claim
that the ARBIH acted with the aim of liberating territory
during 1993-1994. If that is the case then the minority
was liberating territory at the expense of the majority.
The Muslims are obviously oblivious to the inherent lu-
R
dicrousness of their claim.
The underlying cause of the Muslim-Croat civil war
in BiH is the fact that the expectations and aspirations of
the Croats were diametrically opposed to those of the
Muslims. The Croats believed that they were entitled to
their own entity while the Muslims insisted on a central-
ized, unitary, national state. The Muslims’ strategy was
to clamor for the establishment of a civil state under the
guise of which they could then set up a Muslim state in
which the non-Muslims would be marginalized. In such
4.2.2020. 18:37:05
 Davor Marijan • Rat za opstojnost Hrvata, 1991. - 1995.
Žepču da ne govorimo. Uz to ne treba zaboraviti da je
ARBiH imala odriješene ruke za rat, za razliku od HVO-a
na kojeg je u nekoliko presudnih slučajeva nepovoljno
utjecala politika i interes Republike Hrvatske.
Muslimansko vodstvo u BiH u tom ratu nije posti-
glo ni izbliza koliko je željelo, a HVO se uz velike gubitke
održao u središnjoj Bosni. General Rasim Delić je u ve-
ljači 1994. sažeo bit i učinak rata prema zamisli tadaš-
njeg muslimanskog vodstva u BiH konstatacijom da je
„HVO eliminisan sa područja Jablanice, Konjica, Fojnice,
H
Kaknja, Zenice, Travnika i Bugojna. Znači, kompletna
jedna pokrajina po Vens-Ovenovom planu sa centralom
u Travniku”. Delićeva samohvala ogoljuje do srži pobu-
de i svrhu rata koji je Armija RBiH povela protiv HVO-a.
Armija RBiH ratovala je za teritorij koji je najvećim dije-
lom i etnički očistila. Pobijedila je u etnički miješanim
M
područjima, na kojima je prije izbijanja otvorenog su-
koba demografska slika drastično promijenjena u korist
muslimana, prilivom muslimana prognanih s područja
koja su osvojile srpske snage. Muslimani su ratovali za
teritorij koji nisu bili u stanju uzeti Srbima zbog njihove
tehničko-taktičke premoći. S HVO-om su bili izmiješani i
D
iskoristili su pogodan trenutak da na račun te prednosti
protjeraju Hrvate.
Ustaljeno mišljenje o muslimansko-hrvatskom sa-
vezništvu pokazatelj je koliko se slabo poznaje sam rat,
a i prilike u BiH. Svako malo od raznih kavanskih tumača
proziva se Hrvatska zato što nije očuvala savezništvo.
C
No savezništva uopće nije bilo do srpnja 1995., posto-
jala je suradnja na pojedinim područjima 1992. kada su
Hrvati i Muslimani bili ugroženi od Srba. U toj suradnji
daleko su bolje prošli Muslimani jer su im Hrvati dali vri-
jeme da se organiziraju i ustroje vojsku. Kada pojedini
Bošnjaci danas pričaju o nekakvom čudu bosanskog
otpora, svjesno ili ne, ignoriraju da je ono, doslovno,
nastalo na krvi hrvatskih vojnika u proljeće 1992. godi-
ne. Nema slučaja da su Hrvati bez borbe prepustili neko
područje na kojem su bili većina ili ih je bilo u značajni-
jemu broju. S druge strane, najveći dio teritorija Srbi su
zauzeli u travnju i svibnju gdje su Muslimani bili većina,
često bez borbe ili s malim zalaganjem. Hrvatima se Do-
nji Vakuf, Doboj ili Bijeljina nisu mogli dogoditi.
Hrvati su na vrijeme prepoznali opasnost i organizi-
rali se, i zahvaljujući toj okolnosti BiH je u travnju i svib-
nju 1992. opstala. Ona danas postoji u prvom redu zbog
uloge Hrvata, tj. HV-a i HVO-a. Postoje tri strategijske
točke na kojima je BiH u travnju 1992. opstala. Prva je
u sklopu obrane Livna i Šuice, nakon što je pao Kupres,
486
Domovinski rat 04-02-2020 Knjiga 1.indd 486
circumstances war was inevitable. The ARBIH depend-
ed on Croatia and the HVO in the sense that shipments
of armaments and equipment sent to the ARBIH went
through Croatian and HVO controlled territory. When
the ARBIH figured that it was sufficiently armed it as-
sumed a belligerent attitude towards the HVO in central
Bosnia. And the Muslim-Croat civil war started in central
Bosnia and northern Herzegovina, in April, 1993. It has
to be said that there had been clashes between the HVO
and the ARBIH in October, 1992, and January, 1993 (Novi
Travnik, Rama, Gornji Vakuf/Uskoplje and Lašva Valley).
On April 14, 1993, when the ARBIH attacked the HVO in
Konjic, the HVO realized that the attack did not consti-
tute another sporadic incident but a full-scale war. The
Croatian government, it has to be said, up to that point,
had urged the HVO to try to negotiate with the Muslims
and do its utmost to avoid conflict.
The HVO was a defensive armed force, unlike the
ARBIH. In 1993 the ARBIH was successful in mixed ar-
eas where, at the moment of ARBIH attack, Muslims
outnumbered the Croats. In the battles where there
existed a clearly defined front line the ARBIH was not
successful unless it enjoyed overwhelming superiority
in numbers and equipment over the defenders. The
battles in the Lašva Valley and Lepenica Valley best ex-
emplify that. Žepče is another excellent example. We
should not forget that the ARBIH was given free rein
to mount offensives against the HVO, while the HVO
was constrained, on a number of critical occasions, by
the Croatian government’s interests and policies. The
Muslims failed to achieve most of their objectives in the
Muslim-Croat civil war. The HVO managed, at the cost
of a high number of casualties, to survive in central Bos-
D
nia. In February, 1994, General Rasim Delić summarized
the essence and effects of what the Muslim leadership
wanted to achieve with starting the Muslim-Croat con-
flict by saying that “the HVO has been eliminated in the
Jablanica, Konjic, Fojnica, Kakanj, Travnik and Bugojno
R
areas. That means one whole Croat province according
to the Vance-Owen plan, with Travnik as its adminis-
trative center.” Delić’s self congratulatory statement re-
veals the very essence and purpose of the war the AR-
BIH launched against the HVO. The ARBIH waged a war
of conquest. The ARBIH ethnically cleansed the areas it
conquered. The ARBIH was victorious in the ethnically
mixed territories where the demographic picture had
been drastically altered in the Muslims’ favor due to a
large influx of Muslim refugees from areas conquered
4.2.2020. 18:37:05
 The Croatian Nation’s Struggle for Survival, 1991-1995
H
Predsjednik F. Tuđman i hrvatska delegacija u franjevačkoj bol-
M
nici „Fra dr. Mato Nikolić“ u Novoj Bili tijekom posjeta Hrvati-
ma u Lašvanskoj dolini, 14. lipnja 1994. (autor fotografije: Ante
Čakić; fotografije darovao: Slobodan Lang).
President Franjo Tuđman and the Croatian delegation in the
“Fra Dr Mato Nikolić” Franciscan hospital at Nova Bila during
their visit to the Croats in the Lašva valley, June 14, 1994 (Photo-
graph by Ante Čakić; photographs donated by Slobodan Lang).
D
gdje je spriječen prodor u dubinu i zadržana osnova za
kasniji slom Republike Srpske Krajine u Hrvatskoj. Dru-
ga je točka na prijevoju Stolovi kada je spriječen prodor
C
i izlazak na rijeku Neretvu u njezinoj punoj dužini i gdje
je glavni posao napravila Hrvatska vojska, a treća točka
su Kolibe Gornje kod Bosanskog Broda gdje je zaustav-
ljen pokušaj srpskih snaga da iziđu na Savu, što će im
uspjeti tek sedam mjeseci poslije. Na te tri točke osigu-
D
ran je opstanak BiH, ali se to uporno ignorira u Sarajevu,
gdje uopće nema interesa da se Hrvati razmatraju izme-
đu navodnog dogovora u Karađorđevu i Grazu.
Nema nikakve dvojbe da je muslimansko-hrvatski
rat u BiH izazvala muslimanska strana. Alija Izetbegović
glavni je krivac za rat Hrvata i Muslimana. Ima veliku
odgovornost i oko izbijanja otvorenog rata u BiH 1992.
jer je u proljeće te godine odbacio Cutileirov plan, vje-
rojatno uz odlučujući utjecaj američkog veleposlanika
Warrena Zimmermanna. Uz to, što ne treba zaboraviti,
već je u predizbornoj kampanji u rujnu 1990. elaborirao
da alternativa za „ideal građanske republike” ne postoji.
Ili „građanska republika” ili „građanski rat”. Sličnu izjavu
dao je sredinom rujna 1990. na predizbornom skupu
SDA-a u Velikoj Kladuši. Početkom 1991. u Skupštini
487
Domovinski rat 04-02-2020 Knjiga 1.indd 487
by the Serbs. The ARBIH attacked the Croats with the
intention of conquering territory so as to recoup for the
territory the Muslims had lost to the technically and tac-
tically superior Serb forces. In most areas there was no
delineating line between the ARBIH and the HVO forces.
The ARBIH planned to catch the HVO on the wrong foot.
The plan worked. The ARBIH’s objective was to defeat
the HVO in a series of surprise attacks and then expel
the Croats from the conquered areas.
The general public thinks that the HVO and ARBIH
were allied against the Serbs. No such alliance existed.
This only goes to show how little is known about the
war and conditions in BiH. Every now and again some
armchair general accuses Croatia of not doing enough
to preserve the alliance. But no alliance existed until
July, 1995. There were instances of cooperation in cer-
tain areas in 1992 where both the Croats and Muslims
were under attack by the Serbs. That cooperation bene-
fited the Muslims more than it did the Croats. Essentially
the Croats, by resisting the Serbs, bought time for the
Muslims to form their armed forces. When Muslims to-
day glorify, without much justification, their resistance
to the Serbs, they forget, consciously or otherwise, that
the ARBIH was created on the blood of Croatian soldiers
shed in spring, 1992. The Croats defended tenaciously
the predominately Croat areas and mixed areas with a
significant number of Croats. Never did the Croats allow
the Serbs to capture anything without a fight. On the
other hand, most of the predominately Muslim areas the
Serbs captured, in April and May, 1992, without a fight
or after encountering only token resistance. The Serbs
inflicted embarrassing humiliations on the Muslims in
Bjelina, Donji Vakuf and Doboj. The Croats, on the other
hand, died hard.
The Croats recognized the danger posed by the
Serbs on time and organized themselves. BiH survived
the Serb onslaught in April and May 1992 because the
Croats, not the Muslims, fought and died resisting the
R
Serbs. BiH owes its existence today to the Croats, that
is, the Croatian Army and the HVO. The survival of BiH
depended on three strategic resistance points in April,
1992. The first of these points existed as part of the de-
fense of Livno and Šujice, after the fall of Kupres, where
the Serbs were prevented from advancing into the rear.
The line on which the Serbs were checked there would
later serve as the launch pad for the offensive moves
that brought about the downfall of the Republic of Ser-
bian Krajina in Croatia. The second resistance point was
4.2.2020. 18:37:05
 Davor Marijan • Rat za opstojnost Hrvata, 1991. - 1995.
SR BiH je izjavio da bi zbog suverene Bosne „žrtvovao
mir”, ali da ne bi zbog mira u Bosni „žrtvovao suverenu
Bosnu”. Prema tome, raščlamba rata ne može se raditi
na analizi samo jedne strane. U Hrvatskoj se na desetak
predsjedničkih transkripata „analizirala“ samo hrvatska
politika. Ključ za razumijevanje hrvatsko-muslimanskog
rata je prvenstveno politika Alije Izetbegovića. Do sada
su o njemu, uz par kritičkih osvrta, uglavnom pisani pa-
negirici. Nije sporno to što ga Bošnjaci slave, sporno je
što ga u okruženju također smatraju čovjekom mira, su-
H
života, tolerancije – što u stvarnosti nije bio.
Alija Izetbegović je bio islamist koji je u izbornu trku
ušao s pedigreom robijaša za islam i Islamskom deklara-
cijom koja se konstantno relativizira tvrdnjom da je na-
pisana 20 godina ranije. No objavljena je 1990. u izbor-
noj godini i smatram da su u pravu oni koji u njoj vide
M
politički program. Izetbegović je bio osoba predmoder-
nog shvaćanja, odnosno aktualnog islamističkog shva-
ćanja zajednice po kriteriju vjere. On nije prihvaćao da
je BiH zemlja tri ravnopravna naroda. Koncept građan-
ske države za koju se zalagao imao je svrhu majorizacije
manjina, a ne izgradnju države u zapadnjačkom smislu.
D
Djelovao je po načelu da cilj opravdava sredstvo, što je
uključivalo i laž. Uostalom, osobno je 2000. u jednom
intervjuu priznao da je za njega laž nužan taktički potez
na putu do strategijskog cilja.
Uloga Hrvatske i predsjednika Franje Tuđmana u ratu
u BiH, pa tako i u ratu Muslimana i Hrvata u BiH komplek-
C
sna je, a često se razmatra izvan konteksta. Godine 1991.
BiH je s velikim dijelom teritorija i nekoliko desetaka tisu-
ća vojnika u JNA i Teritorijalnoj obrani sudjelovala u ratu
protiv Hrvatske. Hrvatska je 1992. vraćala svoj okupirani
teritorij kroz dio BiH. Posebice je bio značajan operacijski
ciklus iz Livanjskog polja 1994. - 1995. koji je doveo do
sloma paradržave pobunjenih Srba u Hrvatskoj. U tom se
procesu zbio i rat Hrvata i Muslimana. I tu su paradoksi, iz
Hrvatske i preko njezinog teritorija naoružavane su obje
strane. Slučaj 17. krajiške brigade ARBiH najupečatljivije
ilustrira taj paradoks. Ona je nastala od dvije postrojbe
koje su naoružane i opremljene u Hrvatskoj, pri čemu je
značajnu ulogu imao dio najviše rangiranih generala HV-
a. Dio vojnika u toj brigadi bili su i pripadnici HV-a. To je
bila možda i najbolja brigada ARBiH i ključna u protjeri-
vanju Hrvata iz Travnika u lipnju 1993. godine. Hrvatska
je sukladno tome bila involvirana, no na način na koji
prosječan Hrvat iz BiH teško da može biti zadovoljan.
Nekako sam stekao dojam da je Hrvatskoj stavljen
krimen da je kriva za raspad Jugoslavije. Ne smatram da
488
Domovinski rat 04-02-2020 Knjiga 1.indd 488
the Stolovi pass. There the Serbs were prevented from
reaching the Neretva River along its entire length. The
Croatian Army did most of the fighting there. The third
resistance point was at Gornje Kolibe near Bosanski
Brod, where the Serbs were prevented from reaching
the Sava River. The Serbs would reach the river but only
seven months later. The successes against the Serb forc-
es at these three locations ensured the survival of BiH.
This fact has been consistently ignored in Sarajevo. The
focus as regards the role of the Croats in the war is on
mythical deals made in Karađorđevo and Graz.
It is an indisputable fact that the Muslims caused and
provoked the Muslim-Croatian conflict in BiH. Alija Izet-
begović is the main culprit in that regard. He is also large-
ly responsible for the break-out of the war in BiH in 1992
because in spring, 1992, he had rejected the Cutileiro
Plan, probably heeding the American Ambassador Wal-
ter Zimmerman’s advice. It has to be remembered that
Izetbegović, during the election campaign in Septem-
ber,1990, adamantly stated that there was no alternative
to the ideal of civil state. Civil state or civil war, he said.
He made a similar statement in mid-September, 1990, at
a SDA rally in Velika Kladuša. At the beginning of 1991 in
the Assembly of SR BiH he stated that he was willing to
sacrifice peace for Bosnia’s sovereignty but that he was
not willing to sacrifice Bosnia’s sovereignty for peace. So,
one cannot analyze the war in BiH by focusing solely on
one side. In Croatia, dozens of presidential transcripts
prove, the focus has been on Croatia’s policies. The key
to understanding the Muslim-Croat conflict is, first and
foremost, Alija Izetbegović’s policies. Precious few people
have dared to critically comment on Alija Izetbegović and
his policies. On the other hand, many panegyrics have
D
been written about him. I’ve got no problem with the fact
that the Muslims revere him. I do have a problem though
when they portray him as a man of peace, a champion of
tolerance and coexistence. He was not any of that.
Alija Izetbegović was an Islamist whose election plat-
R
form revolved around two motifs: his image as a Mus-
lim martyr on account of his time spent behind bars in
Yugoslavia for anti-communist activities and his book
Islamska deklaracija (The Islamic Declaration). The im-
portance of that book is being constantly played down
by the argument that it had been written 20 years before
the elections. But, it was published in 1990, the election
year. I think that those who perceive the book as a politi-
cal manifesto are right. Izetbegović’s intellectual make-up
was that of a pre-modern person. He subscribed to the
4.2.2020. 18:37:05
 The Croatian Nation’s Struggle for Survival, 1991-1995
jest, jer su glavni krivci Slobodan Milošević i Veljko Kadije-
vić, odnosno Srbija i JNA. Hrvatskoj se iz međunarodnih
krugova koji su stvarali obje Jugoslavije to ipak zamjera.
Dodajte i intelektualne snage na Zapadu gdje dominira
neka čudna liberalna ljevica koja je „proizvela“ tone lite-
rature o ratu, a koja je znanstveno pretežno bezvrijedna.
No poslužila je svrsi da se dobije željena slika. Spominjem
„stručnjake“ poput primjerice Johna B. Allcocka koji je bio
i ekspert na Haškom sudu i koji je priredio članak o radu
Međunarodnog kaznenog tribunala u Haagu u sklopu
H
inicijative međunarodne skupine znanstvenika. On, bez
imalo znanstvene nelagode, tvrdi da su razgovori Tuđma-
na i Miloševića u „Karađorđevu o podjeli Bosne i Herce-
govine i kasniji pregovori u Grazu” dobro „dokumentira-
ni i više se ne smatraju spornim”. To je u biti poziv da se
prošlost ne propitkuje, to nije znanost, to je stopostotna
M
politička angažiranost. Haški sud je samo nastavak takve
politike „pravnim sredstvima“.
Kada se sve uzme, najveći dobitnik rata u BiH su Srbi.
Oni imaju svoj entitet. Na drugom mjestu su Muslimani,
odnosno Bošnjaci. Hrvati su tu najgore prošli, jer im se i
ono malo što su imali postupno uzelo nakon Daytona,
D
najvećim dijelom zbog samovolje visokih predstavnika za
BiH. U ovakvoj današnjoj BiH Hrvati imaju najmanje razlo-
ga biti zadovoljni.
C
D
Mostar, 1992, most cara Franje Josipa (Titov most).
Mostar, 1992: Emperor’s Franz Joseph’s Bridge (Tito’s Bridge).
489
Domovinski rat 04-02-2020 Knjiga 1.indd 489
Muslim concept of community based on religion. He did
not accept that BiH is a country of three equal peoples.
The concept of a civil state he ostensibly championed was
a ruse the purpose behind which was to marginalize the
minorities. He definitely did not want to build a civil state
in the western sense of the term. He acted on the princi-
ple that the end justified the means. So he lied. In 2000 he
admitted in an interview, that for him lying was a tactical
move conducive to achieving a strategic goal.
The role of President Tuđman and Croatia in the war in
BiH, including the Muslim-Croat conflict is a complex one.
The problem is that it is often analyzed outside its proper
context. In 1991 BiH participated, with a large portion of
its territory and a few tens of thousand soldiers serving
in the JNA and TO, in the attack on Croatia. In 1992 Croa-
tia launched operations to liberate some of its occupied
territory and some Croatian Army formations moved into
BiH as part of said operations. In 1994-1995 the Croatian
Army operated on the Livno field. The operations the Cro-
atian Army conducted there led directly to the downfall
of the rebel Serbs’ statelet in Croatia. The Muslim Croat
conflict started in 1993. The war in BiH, including the Mus-
lim-Croat conflict was fraught with paradoxes. Both sides
in the Muslim-Croat conflict received shipments of arms
and equipment from and through Croatia. The case of
the 17th Krajina Brigade of the ARBIH illustrates the point
aptly. The brigade was formed out of two units that had
been armed and equipped in Croatia. A number of highly
placed generals of the Croatian Army played important
roles in the process. Some soldiers serving in the 17th Kra-
jina Brigade were members of the Croatian Army. The 17th
Krajina Brigade was arguably the best ARBIH formation.
It certainly played the key role in the expulsion of Croats
from Travnik in June, 1993. Croatia was therefore involved
in the conflict, but in this case in a way most Bosnian Cro-
ats would not condone.
It is my impression that Croatia always gets blamed for
the break-up of Yugoslavia. I do not agree. The main cul-
R
prits are Slobodan Milošević and Veljko Kadijević, that is,
Serbia and the JNA. But, Croatia is blamed for Yugoslavia’s
demise by the very international factors that helped cre-
ate both Yugoslavias. These accusations are propped up
by many intellectuals of the liberal-leftist persuasion who
have “produced” tons of texts about the war the scholarly
value of which is nil. But, these text, books, articles, what-
ever, have served their purpose. A certain picture detri-
mental to Croatia has been manufactured. In this context
I have to mention the “expert” John B. Allcock who served
4.2.2020. 18:37:06
 Davor Marijan • Rat za opstojnost Hrvata, 1991. - 1995.

in the capacity of an expert at the Hague Tribunal and

who wrote an article about the work of the  Internation-
al Criminal Tribunal in The Hague as part of an initiative
launched by an international group of scholars. Allcock
brazenly claims, without citing any valid sources for his
assertion, that the talks between Tuđman and Milošević
in “Karađorđevo and later in Graz about dividing BiH”
are “well documented and proven”. In essence, Allcock’s
claim is an injunction against conscientious scholarship.
His article has nothing to do with scholarship as such, it is
H
a political tract. The Hague Tribunal is, for all intents and
purposes, continuation of politics by legal means.
All things considered, the Serbs gained plenty from
the war. The Muslims gained a lot, albeit far less than they
wanted to. The Croats gained bugger all. The Serbs have
their entity. The little the Croats had to begin with was
M
gradually taken away from them after the signing of the
Dayton Agreement thanks, for the most part, to the arbi-
Mostar, 1992.: Kujundžiluk, pojas izravnog dodira sa Starim mo- trariness of the High Representatives for BiH. The Croats
stom (lijeva obala Neretve). have the least reason to be satisfied with today’s BiH.
Mostar, 1992: Kujundžiluk (Goldsmiths’ Quarter), the belt of
cirect contact with the Old Bridge (the left bank of the Neretva).
D
V. KladuSa

Cazin
B. Novi Prijedor Derventa
LaktaSi GradaCac
Pnjavor
C
BihaC Banja
B. Krupa
Luka Celinac Doboj Bjeljina
S. Most Srebren ik Ugljevik
TeSanj Grai'.:an ica Lopare
K. Varos
B. Petrovac TesliC Mag laj Zvornik
Lukavac Kalesija
S. Vakuf Tuzla
KljuC MrkonjiC
Drva r .ZepCe ZavidoviCi
SekoviCi
Jajce Travni k Zen ica Kladanj
D
N. Travn ik Vlasenica
Vares Olovo MiliCi
D.Vakuf Vitez
8. Grahovo GlamoC $ipovo Busovata Kakanj Han P.
Bugojno Kiseljak Visoko
Sokolac
Livno Kupres
G.Vakuf
KreSevo Pale
Prozor Sarajevo
GoraZde
Trnovo
Tomislavgrad Konjic
R
Jablanica

PosuSje Mostar
Kalinovik

Grude
Siroki B.

LjubuSki Citluk Nevesinje

Stolac
Tumac znakova Berk.
Capljina

D Federacija Bosne i Hercegovine Neum

Ljubinje
BileCa

0 Republika Srpska Ravno

D Distrikt Brcko Daytonski sporazum, 21. studenoga 1995.

The Dayton Agreement, November 21, 1995.

490

Domovinski rat 04-02-2020 Knjiga 1.indd 490 4.2.2020. 18:37:06

 II. DIO
PART II

Ante Nazor
H
NEKE ČINJENICE O ZLOČINIMA
M
NAD HRVATIMA U BIH I IZVORI
O MUSLIMANSKO-HRVATSKOM
SUKOBU U DIJELU BIH
D
C
AN OVERVIEW OF POLITICAL
D
AND MILITARY EVENTS IN THE
CROATIAN WAR OF INDEPENDENCE,
WITH SPECIAL EMPHASIS ON THE
R
MUSLIM-CROAT CONFLICT IN
BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA)

Domovinski rat 04-02-2020 Knjiga 1.indd 491 4.2.2020. 18:37:06

 Ante Nazor • II DIO

Šejh Enver Šaban, vjerski vođa Odreda El Mudžahid; Alija

Izetbegović, predsjednik Predsjedništva RBiH; Abu Maali
(Abu-al-Ma’ali), zapovjednik Odreda El Mudžahid; Vozuća
kod Zavidovića, rujan 1995. (Esad Hećimović, Garibi – mu-
džahedini u BiH 1992.-1999., Zenica, 2006., 275).

Sheik Enver Shaban, the religious leader of the El-Mu-

jahid Detachment; Alija Izetbegović, the President of
the Presidency of RBiH; Abu-al-Ma’ali, the commander
of the El-Mujahid Detachment; Vozuća near Zavidovići,
September 1995 (Esad Hećimović, Garibi – Mujahideen in
BiH 1992-1999, Zenica, 2006, p. 275).
H
M
Abu Maali, zapovjednik Odreda El Mudžahid; general
Rasim Delić, čelnik ARBiH i general Sakib Mahmuljin,
zapovjednik 3. korpusa ARBiH, Zenica, krajem 1995.
D
(Zločin bez kazne - Bikoši 8. lipnja 1993., Travnik, lipanj
2019., 78-79); general Rasim Delić je 13. kolovoza 1993.
naredio osnivanje Odreda El Mudžahid, u sastavu 3.
korpusa ARBiH.

Abu-al-Ma’ali, the commander of the El-Mujahid Detach-

ment; General Rasim Delić, leader of the ARBiH and Gen-
C
eral Sakib Mahmuljin, the commander III Corps ARBiH,
Zenica, end of 1995 (Crime without Punishment – Bikoši,
June 8 1993), Travnik, June 2019, pp. 78-79); On August
13, 1993 the El-Mujahid Detachment was formed on the
orders of General Rasim Delić. The El-Mujahid Detach-
ment operated as part of III Corps of the ARBiH.
D
R

492

Domovinski rat 04-02-2020 Knjiga 1.indd 492 4.2.2020. 18:37:06

 Ante Nazor • PART II
S obzirom na to da u hrvatskoj historiografiji već
postoje knjige koje znanstveno prikazuju uzrok, tijek i
posljedice velikosrpske agresije na Republiku Hrvatsku
u 1990-im,1028 znatnim dijelom zahvaljujući i radovima
autora prvoga dijela ove knjige Davora Marijana,1029 u
ovom dijelu knjige upozorit će se samo na neke od činje-
nica o ratu u Bosni i Hercegovini. Iako se one uglavnom
spominju i u Marijanovom dijelu knjige, zbog namet-
nutih kontroverzija i percepcije javnosti o nekim doga-
đajima, potrebno je izdvojiti ih i potkrijepiti dodatnim
H
izvorima, kako bi zaključci o njima bili što cjelovitiji i
znanstveno utemeljeni.
Zbog veličine gradiva koje treba obraditi u pregledu
Domovinskog rata, autor u prvom dijelu knjige prilikom
opisa događaja uglavnom nije mogao ići u detalje, niti
je mogao navesti sve događaje, no nastojao je zadržati
M
uravnotežen pristup događajima za cijelo vrijeme rata i
na cijelom području Hrvatske i Bosne i Hercegovine, čiji
teritorij, bez obzira na to što je riječ o dvije međunarod-
no priznate države, kad se govori o Domovinskom ratu
predstavlja jedinstveno ratište. Događaji u RH i BiH ne
mogu se razumjeti ako se prikazuju odvojeno, jer su dio
D
jedinstvenog procesa pokušaja stvaranja „Velike Srbije“
na dijelu teritorija RH i BiH.
S obzirom na takav pristup i koncepciju knjige, koja
je usmjerena na prikaz političkih i vojnih događaja, u
njenom sadržaju nije bilo mjesta za ostale aspekte Do-
movinskog rata. Primjerice za humanitarno djelovanje,
C
simbolički izraženo u velikom humanitarnom konvoju
„Bijeli put za Novu Bilu i Bosnu Srebrenu“, koji je na Me-
đunarodni dan ljudskih prava, 10. prosinca 1993., u 12
D
1028 Barić, N. (2005.): Srpska pobuna u Hrvatskoj 1990.-1995.,
Golden marketing, Tehnička knjiga, Zagreb, 614; Radelić,
Z., Marijan, D., Barić, N., Bing, A., Živić, D. (2006.): Stvara-
nje hrvatske države i Domovinski rat, Školska knjiga, Hr-
vatski institut za povijest, Zagreb, 575; Žunec, O. (2007.):
Goli život – socijetalne dimenzije pobune Srba u Hrvatskoj,
I-II, Demetra, Zagreb, 978; Domovinski rat – pregled po-
litičke i diplomatske povijesti, Nakladni zavod Globus –
HMDCDR, Zagreb, 2018., 328.
1029 Oluja, HMDCDR, Zagreb, 2007., 445; Slom Titove armije:
JNA i raspad Jugoslavije 1987.-1992., Golden marketing
– Tehnička knjiga, Hrvatski institut za povijest, Zagreb,
2008., 518; Obrana i pad Vukovara, Hrvatski institut za
povijest, Zagreb, 2013., 464; Domovinski rat, Despot In-
finutus – Hrvatski institut za povijest, Zagreb, 2016., 456;
Hrvatska 1989.-1992.: rađanje države, Hrvatski institut za
povijest, Zagreb, 2017., 657; Rat Hrvata i Muslimana u
Bosni i Hercegovini od 1992. do 1994., Hrvatski institut za
povijest, Zagreb, 2018., 476.
493
Domovinski rat 04-02-2020 Knjiga 1.indd 493
Given the fact that there exists, in the Croatian lan-
guage, a substantial body of scholarly work, including not
an insignificant number of books, relating to the causes,
dynamic and consequences of Serbia’s aggression against
the Republic of Croatia in the 1990s, this part of the book
deals with certain facts regarding the war in Bosnia and
Herzegovina. It is important to stress that a fair share of
the mentioned scholarly output has been produced by
the author of the first part of this book, Davor Marijan. The
facts in question are analyzed and given due attention in
the first part of the book. However, the sheer number of
artificially created controversies imposed, for strictly po-
litical purposes, on these facts and the consequent influ-
ence the perpetuation of these controversies has had on
the popular perception of both the Croatian War of Inde-
pendence and the War in Bosnia and Herzegovina, war-
rant a somewhat deeper analysis, bolstered by additional
sources regarding both the facts and the events that un-
derlie them. The goal is to reach valid and comprehensive
conclusions grounded in conscientious scholarship.
The vastness of the subject of the Croatian War of Inde-
pendence and the massive amount of materials pertaining
to it prohibited the author from mentioning all the events
and analyzing all the aspects of the war in the first part of
the book. However, his narrative is balanced and compre-
hensive – a feat worthy of praise especially given the fact
that the narrative deals with the entire period of the war
in Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina. It has to be not-
ed that, Croatia and BiH, independent sovereign countries
both, formed a single theater of war. The events in Croatia
and BiH cannot be understood and/or put in any meaning-
ful context if they are viewed and analyzed independently
of each other. The Croatian War of Independence and the
War in Bosnia and Herzegovina were caused by Serbia’s at-
tempt to create a Greater Serbian state by occupying por-
tions of Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina. In that sense,
the War in Bosnia and Herzegovina could be viewed as part
of the Croatian War of Independence.
R
The very concept of the book – an overview of po-
litical and military events – precluded the author from
giving too much attention to various other aspects of the
Croatian War of Independence.
The issue of humanitarian efforts, for example, un-
dertaken by many organizations and individuals, is not
represented in the book. For that reason, it is essential
to mention here the great humanitarian convoy “White
Road for Nova Bila and Silver Bosnia”. On December 10,
1993, on Human Rights Day, at 1200 hours the convoy
4.2.2020. 18:37:06
 Ante Nazor • II DIO
sati krenuo sa Zapadnog kolodvora u Zagrebu prema
središnjoj Bosni i Lašvanskoj dolini, gdje je stigao 20.
prosinca u 15,30 sati.1030 Hrvatski humanitarci Slobodan
Lang, Herman Vukušić, Branko Čulo, Ante Damjanović,
Ivan Bagarić, fra Velimir Valjan, fra Iko Skoko, fra Ferdo
Vlašić i brojni drugi liječnici, vozači, medicinsko osoblje,
franjevci i novinari (ukupno 167 osoba) donijeli su spas
za oko 70.000 Hrvata u Lašvanskoj dolini, među njima
i oko 12.000 djece te oko 28.000 prognanika, kojima je
zbog opsade višestruko nadmoćnijih snaga ARBiH (1., 3.,
H
6. i 7. korpus) prijetila glad i izumiranje.
Jedina veza Lašvanske doline s vanjskim svijetom
tada je bio humanitarni helikopter HVO-a. Uz posebne
procedure, nadzor i dopuštenja UN-a, letio je bez obzira
na vremenske uvjete, pri čemu je bio često napadan s
položaja ARBiH. Teške ranjenike iz improvizirane ratne
M
bolnice HVO-a “Dr. fra Mato Nikolić” u franjevačkoj crkvi
Svetog Duha u Novoj Bili, prevozilo se helikopterom u
Split. Smještena gotovo na samoj crti bojišnice, crkva –
bolnica je deset mjeseci radila u potpunom okruženju
snaga ARBiH, s čijih je položaja granatirana. O ranjenici-
ma i bolesnima skrbilo se 147 zaposlenih u bolnici/crkvi i
D
velik broj volontera. Svakoga mjeseca javljalo se oko 250
dragovoljnih davatelja krvi za ranjenike, a hrana je pri-
kupljana od stanovništva, kao i sve druge potrepštine,
od vode do goriva. U Novoj Bili liječeno je gotovo 12.000
pacijenata, izvršeno je oko 4000 operacijskih zahvata,
od čega oko 1000 teških u općoj anesteziji. Ranjenici,
C
kojih bi u pojedinim danima pristiglo i oko 60, smještani
su u crkvene klupe, koje su poslužile kao improvizirani
bolnički ležajevi. Među ubijenima i ranjenima bila su i
djeca. U samo 12 ratnih dana u lipnju 1993. musliman-
ska vojska ubila je 10 i ranila 59 djece, a do kraja listo-
pada 1993. stradalo je 142 djece – 26 ih je poginulo u
topničkim napadima, a 33 su ubili snajperisti ARBiH.1031
1030 O tome govore monografije Bijeli put: Pobjeda dobra u
ratu (koju je 2014. objavio dr. Slobodan Lang, jedan od
inicijatora i organizatora konvoja, u koautorstvu s Bran-
kom Čulom) te Svjetlost i nada (autora Zvonimira Čilića,
fra Zorana Livančića, Srećka Stipovića i Željka Kocaja,
koja je objavljena 2010. u nakladi viteške podružnice
HKD-a Napredak), Hrvatska bolnica dr. fra Mato Nikolić,
Nova Bila – Travnik (Nova Bila, 2018), kao i knjiga Ive Lu-
čića Od vila ilirskih do Bijelog puta – stranputicama bosan-
ske i hercegovačke povijesti.
1031 Ivo Lučić, Od vila ilirskih do Bijelog puta – stranputicama
bosanske i hercegovačke povijesti, Hrvatska liječnička
komora – Hrvatski institut za povijest, Zagreb, prosinac
2018., 10, 301, 304, 309.
494
Domovinski rat 04-02-2020 Knjiga 1.indd 494
left Zagreb for central Bosnia and the Lašva Valley. The
convoy reached its destination on December 20 at 1530
hours. The Croatian humanitarians Slobodan Lang, Her-
man Vukušić, Branko Čulo, Ante Damjanović, Ivan Bagarić,
friar Velimir Valjan, friar Iko Skoko, friar Ferdo Vlašić and
many others – doctors, drivers, medical staff, Franciscan
friars and journalists (167 persons in total) brought salva-
tion for about 70,000 Croats in the Lašva Valley, includ-
ing 12,000 children and 28,000 refugees who were under
siege from the vastly superior Muslim forces (I, III, VI and
VII Corps) and on the brink of famine.
At that time the Lašva Valley’s only link with the out-
side world was an HVO humanitarian helicopter. The UN
imposed strict limitations on the usage of the helicop-
ter – special permissions for every take-off were needed
with ubiquitous red tape encumbering every step of the
process of obtaining one, every flight had to be closely
monitored by the UN, etc. That meant that the flyers had
to contend, more often than not, with adverse weather
conditions and ARBIH anti-aircraft fire. The helicopter was
used, among other things, to transport heavily wounded
soldiers and civilians from the improvised HVO hospital
“Dr. Fra Mato Nikolić” – located in the Church of the Holy
Spirit in Nova Bila – to Split. For ten months the hospi-
tal was completely encircled by ARBIH forces and often
shelled. The patients were in the care of 147 employees
of the hospital and a large number of volunteers. Every
month about 250 blood donors came forth. Food and ev-
ery other necessity for the patients were provided by the
local populace. The patients, at any given time, included
a large number of wounded people. Almost 12,000 pa-
tients were treated in the Nova Bila hospital and about
4,000 surgical procedures were performed, around 1,000
D
of which were complex, involving total anesthesia. On
some days the number of wounded people admitted
to the hospital was around sixty. They were placed on
church benches which were used as improvised beds.
Many children were also among the wounded and killed.
R
During a 12-day period in June, 1993, the Muslim army
killed 10 and wounded 59 children. By the end of Octo-
ber, 1993, 142 children had become casualties of war – 26
of them killed in artillery attacks and 33 by ARBIH snipers.
The White Road humanitarian convoy, on its return
from Nova Bila, was attacked by ARBIH troops on Decem-
ber 22-23, 1993, near Gornji Vakuf/Uskoplje. The Muslim
soldiers killed one truck driver – Ante Vlaić (born 1934) –
wounded a number of people and appropriated about 20
trucks. It has to be pointed out that UNPROFOR and the
4.2.2020. 18:37:06
 Ante Nazor • PART II
H
M
D
Improvizirana franjevačka bolnica (crkva) „Fra dr. Mato Nikolić“
u Novoj Bili (BiH); župni uredi crkve Sv. Duha prilagođeni su za
potrebe bolnice za oko 70.000 Hrvata opkoljenih u Lašvanskoj
dolini (autor fotografija: Srećko Stipović).
C
Improvised “Fra Dr Mato Nikolić” Franciscan hospital (church), in
Nova Bila (BiH); the parish premises of the Church of the Holy
Spirit were adapted for hospital needs so as to receive about
70,000 Croats who were encircled by enemy forces in the Lašva
Valley (photohraphs by Srećko Stipović)
D
Prilikom povratka iz Nove Bile, iako je njegov pro-
laz dogovoren na najvišim državnim razinama Hrvat-
ske i BiH te s UNPROFOR-om, humanitarni konvoj Bijeli
put pripadnici ARBiH napali su 22./23. prosinca 1993.
kod Gornjeg Vakufa/Uskoplja i ubili jednog od vozača
kamiona, Antu Vlaića (1934. - 1993.), nekoliko osoba
su ranili i oteli 20-ak kamiona. Sve to na teritoriju pod
nadzorom snaga UN-a! I unatoč tome što je dio pomo-
ći iz Hrvatske tada upućen Muslimanima u Zenici i u
viteška naselja Kruščice i Mahale, te u Maglaj. Istog su
jutra, kad je konvoj izlazio iz Lašvanske doline, 22. pro-
sinca 1993., snage ARBiH počinile zločin nad 64 Hrvata
u Križančevu Selu, nedaleko od Viteza. Konvoj Bijeli put
495
Domovinski rat 04-02-2020 Knjiga 1.indd 495
BiH government guaranteed to the Croatian government
the convoy’s safe passage. Also worth noting is the fact
that the attack on the convoy took place in an area un-
der UNPROFOR’s control. Finally, the ARBIH attacked the
convoy in complete disregard of the fact that a portion of
the relief transported by the convoy had been sent to the
Muslims in Zenica, the villages of Krušica and Mahala in
the Vitez area and Maglaj. On December 22, 1993, the day
when the convoy departed from the Lašva Valley, ARBIH
troops massacred 64 Croats in Križaničevo Selo near Vitez.
It can be argued that the White Road for Nova Bila and
Silver Bosnia convoy is one of the finest episodes of the
Croatian War of Independence. It unequivocally showed
to the world that the unity between the Croats in Croatia
and those in Bosnia was unshakable.
Despite being vastly outnumbered and outgunned,
the HVO forces in the Lašva Valley managed to repulse
all attacks launched by the ARBIH. The help that the con-
voy brought to the Lašva Valley facilitated, in no small
measure, this exceptional feat of arms. Had the ARBIH
been victorious in the Lašva Valley, the Muslims would
have ethnically cleansed central Bosnia of Croats. The
determination and resolve of the Croats to defend their
homes is exemplified by the battles for the strategically
important positions on Hrašće Hill above the Lašva Valley.
Hrašće Hill, popularly known as Pješčara, was defended
by 300 HVO troops belonging to Military District Vitez.
The ARBIH tried doggedly to capture the HVO positions
on Hrašće Hill for over a year, sending about 3,000 regular
soldiers, elite units and Mujahideen into attack during the
course of that period. 69 HVO soldiers were killed in ac-
tion defending Hrašće Hill and more than a hundred were
wounded. On June 12, 1993, alone, 22 Croatian soldiers
were killed but the attacks were defeated. Hrašće Hill is
just one example among many of the Croats’ steadfast-
ness in defending their homes, villages, towns and cities
during the Croatian War of Independence and the war in
Bosnia and Herzegovina.
R
A number of books in the Croatian language about
the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina could and should
serve, on account of the primary sources used and infor-
mation presented, as worthy companions to this book.
One such book is Uzroci Rata. Bosna i Herzegovina 1980-
1992 (Zagreb, 2013), authored by Ivo Lučić. He gives a
broad account of the causes of the war in BiH. Jadran-
ko Prlić’s book Prilozi za povijest Hrvatske Republike Her-
zeg-Bosne (I-III, Mostar, Zagreb,2017) reveals the complex-
ity of the political and economic situation in Bosnia and
4.2.2020. 18:37:08
 Ante Nazor • II DIO
za Novu Bilu i Bosnu Srebrenu jedna je od najsvjetlijih
epizoda u Domovinskom ratu, koja je pokazala zajed-
ništvo Hrvata u BiH i Hrvatskoj.
Zahvaljujući pristigloj pomoći i HVO-u, koji je us-
pio izdržati napade višestruko brojnijih snaga ARBiH,
Hrvati su opstali u Lašvanskoj dolini i središnjoj Bo-
sni. O odnosu snaga u sukobu između ARBiH i HVO-a
u središnjoj Bosni i ustrajnosti hrvatskih branitelja u
obrani svojih domova, možda najbolje svjedoče borbe
za strateški iznimno važnu kotu Hrašće iznad Lašvan-
H
ske doline. Za obranu te kote, u narodu poznatije kao
Pješčara, Zborno područje HVO-a Vitez na raspolaga-
nju je imalo malo više od 300 bojovnika, a ARBiH je
u gotovo godinu dana pokušaja njenog osvajanja u
napadima angažirala oko 3000 vojnika, te elitne snage
i mudžahedine. U obrani Pješčare poginulo je 69 pri-
M
padnika ZP-a HVO-a Vitez, a ranjeno ih je više od sto-
tinu. U samo jednom danu, 12. lipnja 1993., poginula
su 22 hrvatska branitelja, no Pješčara je obranjena.1032
Mnoštvo je takvih primjera ustrajnosti Hrvata u
obrani svojih naselja u Domovinskom ratu u Hrvatskoj
i Bosni i Hercegovini.
D
U hrvatskoj historiografiji o ratu u Bosni i Herce-
govini nekoliko je knjiga koje svojim podacima i izvo-
rima mogu nadopuniti sadržaj ove knjige. Jedna od
njih je knjiga Ivice Lučića Uzroci rata. Bosna i Hercego-
vina od 1980. do 1992. godine (Zagreb, 2013.), koja go-
vori opširnije o uzrocima rata u BiH. Knjiga Jadranka
C
Prlića Prilozi za povijest Hrvatske Republike Herceg Bo-
sne (I-III, Mostar-Zagreb, 2017.), uz prikaz slojevitosti
političke i ekonomske slike BiH uoči rata 1992., govo-
ri o razlozima uspostave najprije Hrvatske zajednice
Herceg-Bosne, a potom i Hrvatske Republike Her-
ceg-Bosne te o načinu njihova djelovanja i integracije
u institucije Federacije i BiH nakon Daytonskog spo-
razuma, kao i o međunarodnim okolnostima i nizu
potpuno zapostavljenih i neobrađivanih, a iznimno
važnih podtema iz sfere financijsko-ekonomskog i
pravnog sustava HR-HB.
Detaljnu analizu pravne naravi, odnosno legalno-
sti uspostave Hrvatske zajednice Herceg-Bosne napi-
sao je Mato Arlović: Hrvatska zajednica Herceg–Bosna
1032 Iz kolumne Glorije Lujanović za Dnevnik.ba, objavljene
20. prosinca 2017. godine; preuzeto s: http://fenix-ma-
gazin.de/bijeli-put-najsvijetlija-epizoda-domovin-
skog-rata-u-bih-kojom-su-spaseni-hrvati-sredisnje-bo-
sne/; pristup ostvaren 24. ožujka 2019.
496
Domovinski rat 04-02-2020 Knjiga 1.indd 496
Herzegovina immediately prior to the outbreak of war in
1992, explains the reasons behind the establishment of
the Croatian Community of Herzeg-Bosnia (HZ HB) and
later the establishment of the Croatian Republic of Her-
zeg-Bosnia (HR HB), describes how these political entities
functioned and how they were integrated into the BiH
Federation’s institutions after the Dayton Agreement, and
analyzes international factors and a wide plethora of oth-
er financial-economic-legal aspects relating to the HZ HB
that are often glossed over or ignored but no less import-
ant for that.
A detailed analysis of various legal aspects, centering
on the issue of legality of the establishment of HZ HB can
be found in Mato Arlović’s book Hrvatska Zajednica Her-
ceg Bosna i pre(ustroj) Bosna i Herzegovina (Zagreb, 2017).
Based on a number of sources Arlović concludes that
the establishment of the Croatian Community of Her-
zeg-Bosnia was a legal way of joining municipalities and
fully in accordance with the Constitution of the Socialist
Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Arlović convincing-
ly argues that the HZ HB was formed for the purpose of
defending the Croats and all citizens of BiH from aggres-
sion launched by the JNA and Serb forces. The HZ HB was
a temporary expedient and its founders considered BiH
their country and respected the authority of the central
government and were ready to continue doing so as
long as BiH remained in existence. All available evidence
points to the fact that the HZ HB was created as a commu-
nity of municipalities whose main purpose was to coordi-
nate activities with the aim of offering effective resistance
to the aggressor. Another purpose behind the creation of
the HZ HB was to secure the legal and other conditions
for proper functioning of civil institutions until the cen-
D
tral government became able again to fulfill its role in the
entire territory of BiH. The HZ HB established its authority
in the areas under its control because there was no other
choice available – the central government’s institutions at
that time did not function in that part of the country and
R
the municipalities that formed the HZ HB were effectively
left to wither on the vine by the central government. It
has to be noted that the HZ HB’s institutions functioned
as institutions belonging to BiH and were not, in any way,
shape or form conceptualized as organs of a break-away
region. No evidence exists that could even remotely sug-
gest that the HZ HB harbored aspirations to become an
independent state or to join with the Republic of Croatia.
Arlović proves that the Croatian government never col-
luded with the Bosnian Croat leadership to divide BiH.
4.2.2020. 18:37:08
 Ante Nazor • PART II
i (pre)ustroj Bosne i Hercegovine (Zagreb, 2017.). Na
temelju izvora zaključio je da je Hrvatska zajednica
Herceg-Bosna (HZ HB) bila Ustavom Socijalističke Re-
publike BiH dopuštena, dakle legalan oblik organizi-
ranja i zajedničkog djelovanja općina. Osnovana je
radi obrane hrvatskog naroda i svih građana BiH od
velikosrpske politike i agresije koju su prema njima
pokrenule bivša JNA i srpske snage. HZ HB bila je pri-
vremeni oblik organiziranja općina i, prema vlastitom
priznanju, smatrala je BiH svojom državom, a njezinu
H
državnu vlast svojom središnjom vlasti sve dok posto-
ji BiH. Provedeno istraživanje dokazuje da je HZ HB
nastala kao zajednica općina u kojoj su se ponajprije
koordinirali odnosi i aktivnosti radi pružanja otpora
agresoru. Zatim radi stvaranja pravnih i drugih po-
trebnih pretpostavki za funkcioniranje civilnih institu-
M
cija dok središnja vlast ne bude sposobna za ponovno
ostvarivanje svojih dužnosti, prava i odgovornosti na
cijelom teritoriju Bosne i Hercegovine. U uvjetima od-
sječenosti i nemogućnosti obavljanja vlasti od strane
središnjih državnih tijela, HZ HB ostvarivala je privre-
menu vlast na području koje je pokrivala i kontrolirala,
D
ali kao dijelu teritorija Bosne i Hercegovine. Činjeni-
ca je da ne postoje pravovaljani dokumenti ustavne
i pravne snage iz kojih bi se moglo zaključiti da je
Hrvatska zajednica Herceg-Bosna htjela biti i bila sa-
mostalna suverena država, koja se odvaja od Bosne i
Hercegovine i pripaja Hrvatskoj. Cjelokupna analiza
C
izložena u Arlovićevoj knjizi pokazuje da je optužba
Republike Hrvatske da se putem svojeg vodstva udru-
žila s vodstvom Hrvata iz BiH u zajednički (udruženi)
zločinački pothvat radi podjele BiH, odvajanjem di-
jela njezina teritorija na kojem žive Hrvati i njegova
D
pripojenja Hrvatskoj radi stvaranja „Velike Hrvatske“,
potpuno neutemeljena. Za potvrdu takve njezine po-
litike ne postoje pravni akti i realne političke radnje i
aktivnosti za njezino provođenje. Zapravo je u realnim
odnosima egzistirala sasvim oprečna politika, politika
suradnje i pomoći BiH radi njezine obrane i međuna-
rodnog priznanja u granicama bivše Socijalističke Re-
publike Bosne i Hercegovine. In conclusio može se reći
da Republika Hrvatska ne samo što nije sudjelovala u
podjeli BiH, već je ona svojim utjecajem na Hrvate u
BiH, pomoći u obrani, naoružanju i opremanju njezine
vojske te pružanju humanitarne pomoći civilima i voj-
nicima pomogla njezinu osamostaljenju i međunarod-
nom priznanju. Osim toga, svojom kooperativnošću s
međunarodnom zajednicom, posebice sa SAD-om,
497
Domovinski rat 04-02-2020 Knjiga 1.indd 497
There was never a plan, let alone an attempt made either
by the Croatian government or Bosnian Croat leadership
to join the predominately Croatian areas of BiH with Cro-
atia. Arlović, therefore, clearly shows that the accusation
that the Croatian government and the Bosnian Croat
leadership embarked upon a joint criminal enterprise for
the purpose of carving out a portion of BiH’s territory is
complete nonsense.
The policies of the HZ HB were never geared towards
creating a Greater Croatia35 but towards cooperation with
and providing help to BiH with the ultimate goal of en-
suring BiH’s survival in the face of Serb aggression and
also securing BiH’s international recognition as an inde-
pendent state whose borders matched the boundaries of
the former Socialist Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina
within former Yugoslavia. It is beyond doubt that the Re-
public of Croatia did not try to divide BiH but helped – by
inducing Bosnian Croats to moderation, by providing lo-
gistical support to the ARBIH, by sending armaments and
equipment to the ARBIH, by sending humanitarian aid to
Muslim civilians and soldiers – BiH to become an interna-
tionally recognized, independent and sovereign country.
Furthermore, the Republic of Croatia, with its co-opera-
tive attitude toward the international community, espe-
cially in relation to the USA, made not only the creation
but also continued existence of BiH as an independent,
sovereign and internationally recognized country possi-
ble, negating, to a large degree, all the problems BiH cur-
rently faces which threaten to tear it asunder.
There was only one cause for the political crisis the
SFRY was plunged into and for the subsequent violent
break-up of the country, including, amongst other con-
flicts, the war in Croatia and the war in Bosnia and Herze-
govina. That cause was the Greater Serbian policy Serbia
embarked upon, at the instigation of a part of Serbia’s po-
litical elites, in mid-1980s. The aim of the Greater Serbian
policy was to have “all Serbs living in one country”. The
aim and the inflammatory rhetoric underlying it proved
to be a heady brew to many Serbs. A significant number of
R
Serbs in Croatia, in the summer of 1990, embraced armed
rebellion as a means of expressing their right to “self de-
termination”. These rebels, from the summer of 1991, sup-
ported the JNA’s aggression against Croatia and the JNA’s
occupation of almost one third of Croatia’s territory. Serb
35 There exists not a single legal act that would suggest
that the leadership of the HZ HB was bent upon creating
a Greater Croatian state. Moreover, no political action
was ever taken toward that aim.
4.2.2020. 18:37:08
 Ante Nazor • II DIO
Hrvatska je pridonijela njezinu osamostaljenju, na-
stanku i opstanku sve do današnjih dana kao samo-
stalne, suverene, međunarodno priznate države, bez
obzira na sve teškoće i probleme kojima je ona izlože-
na i opterećena.1033
Krizu i raspad SFRJ te rat u Hrvatskoj i Bosni i
Hercegovini uzrokovala je srbijanska („velikosrpska”)
politika, odnosno pokušaj ostvarenja projekta „svi
Srbi u jednoj državi”, koji je dio srbijanske političke
elite pokrenuo sredinom 1980-ih. Znatan broj Srba u
H
Hrvatskoj prihvatio je u ljeto 1990. oružanu pobunu
kao način rješavanja pitanja svoga „samoodređenja“,
a potom je od ljeta 1991. podržao JNA u agresiji na
Hrvatsku i okupaciji gotovo trećine njezina teritorija.
Počinivši pritom brojne zločine nad Hrvatima i ostalim
nesrbima, ali i nad vlastitim sunarodnjacima, srpski ek-
M
stremisti zakotrljali su spiralu zla, koju je u svakom ratu
teško kontrolirati (u Hrvatskoj je pronađeno najmanje
150 masovnih grobnica i više od 1300 pojedinačnih
grobnica žrtava zločina srpskih snaga, a ubijeno je ili
se vode kao nestali oko 14.400 - 15.000 civila Hrvata
i hrvatskih branitelja). To je izravno utjecalo kako na
D
unutarnje, tako i na sveukupne hrvatsko-srpske odno-
se, prouzročivši, u znatno manjim razmjerima, nepri-
hvatljivo djelovanje određenih skupina ili pojedinaca
i na hrvatskoj strani, prema pojedinim građanima srp-
ske narodnosti i njihovoj imovini. No, i u okolnostima
ratnoga stanja, gotovo sve značajnije odluke Sabora i
C
Vlade RH bile su popraćene posebnim aktima ili pove-
ljama o pravima Srba i ostalih nacionalnih manjina, što
svjedoči o spremnosti hrvatskog vodstva da Srbima i
ostalim nacionalnim manjinama u Hrvatskoj osigura
potrebna građanska i nacionalna prava. Zapravo, hr-
vatsko vodstvo nije imalo problema niti s jednom od
20-ak nacionalnih manjina u Hrvatskoj, osim s dijelom
jedne – srpske nacionalne manjine.
Srpske snage su 1991. Hrvatsku napadale i s teri-
torija Bosne i Hercegovine, a to se nastavilo sve do kra-
ja rata. Rat u Bosni i Hercegovini, koji se rasplamsao u
proljeće 1992., nastavak je rata u Hrvatskoj, odnosno
druga etapa otvorene velikosrpske oružane agresije.
Rat u BiH, pa tako i sukob između ARBiH i HVO-a na
dijelu teritorija BiH (središnja Bosna i Hercegovina), te
znatno smanjen broj Hrvata u BiH, posljedice su takve
velikosrpske politike i agresije. Uostalom, Hrvati su prvi
1033 Arlović, Mato, Hrvatska zajednica Herceg-Bosna i (pre)
ustroj Bosne i Hercegovine, Zagreb, 2017., 207-217.
498
Domovinski rat 04-02-2020 Knjiga 1.indd 498
extremists committed numerous war crimes and crimes
against humanity against Croats and other non-Serbs in
Croatia. Worth pointing out is the fact that Serb extremists
also committed crimes against those Serbs who showed
reluctance to subscribe to the ideology of Greater Serbia.
More than 150 mass graves and more than 1,300 individ-
ual graves have been discovered in Croatia. At this point
in time there are still 14,400-15,000 Croat civilians and sol-
diers listed as killed or still missing.
These depredations of Serb extremists perpetrated
on Croatian soil affected the relations between the Croats
and Croatian Serbs in Croatia as well as the relations be-
tween Serbia and Croatia and unleashed a spiral of hatred
with all its concomitant evils. Some Croatian groups and
individuals retaliated by treating individual Croatian Serbs
and their property in an unacceptable and regrettable
manner. It cannot be emphasized enough that the scope
of the retaliation cannot even begin to match the scope
of the preceding depredations. However, throughout the
war, all important decisions reached by the Croatian Par-
liament and the Croatian government were accompanied
by special acts or charters granting and guaranteeing
rights to the Serbs and other ethnic minorities. This testi-
fies to the Croatian government’s commitment to secure
all civil and national rights to the Croatian Serbs and other
ethnic minorities in Croatia. That said, it has to be pointed
out that out of about 20 ethnic minority groups in Croatia
only a part of the Serb ethnic minority decided that there
was something wrong with the Croatian government and
the Republic of Croatia as such.
In 1991, Serb forces started attacking Croatia from
Bosnia and Herzegovina also. The practice continued until
the end of the war. The war in Bosnia and Herzegovina,
D
which erupted in the spring of 1992 was a continuation
of the war in Croatia; the second phase of Serbia’s war of
aggression. In that sense, the war in BiH and also the Mus-
lim-Croat conflict in BiH were caused directly by Serbia’s
attempt to create a Greater Serbian state. The Serb forces
R
in BiH targeted Croats first. The Serb forces burned to the
ground the Croatian village of Ravno and the surrounding
Croatian hamlets at the beginning of October, 1991, and
killed the Croats from those villages. Then, in 1992, Serb
forces committed numerous crimes against Croats and
Muslims. Here we mention just a few crimes among many
committed by Serbs against Croats in BiH: at Kupres (April
6 – 10 1992); in the Donja Vrela villages – Bosanski Brod
Municipality (March – May 1992); Vidovice and Kopanica –
Orašje Municipality (May 1 1992); in the village of Crkvine
4.2.2020. 18:37:08
 Ante Nazor • PART II
postali žrtve napada srpskih snaga u BiH, koje su po-
četkom listopada 1991. zapalile selo Ravno i okolne hr-
vatske zaseoke u istočnoj Hercegovini, te ubile Hrvate
iz tih sela. Potom su 1992. počinili brojne zločine nad
Hrvatima i Muslimanima. Ovdje će se spomenuti samo
neki od zločina nad Hrvatima: na Kupresu (od 6. do 10.
travnja 1992.), u selima Donja Vrela - općina Bosanski
Brod (ožujak - svibanj 1992.), Vidovice i Kopanica - op-
ćina Orašje (1. svibnja 1992.), u selu Crkvine - općina
Bosanski Šamac (7. svibnja 1992.), u selima Krepšić,
H
Gorice, Laništa, Markovića Polje, Vukšići i Ulice - općina
Brčko (8. svibnja 1992.), na Galici u općini Travnik (15.
svibnja 1992.), u naselju Uborak - Vrapčići u općini Mo-
star (13. - 15. lipnja 1992.), u selu Briševo - općina Prije-
dor (24./25. srpnja 1992.), u selima općine Odžak (kolo-
voz 1992.) i na drugim mjestima. U općini Banja Luka,
M
gdje nije bilo izravnih sukoba između HVO-a i VRS-a,
srpska vojska ubila je 114 Hrvata civila, a u gradu Sara-
jevu je tijekom rata, većinom od granatiranja s položaja
srpskih snaga, ubijeno 482 hrvatskih civila.
Ogromne žrtve u sukobu sa srpskim snagama pre-
trpjele su hrvatske snage u Bosanskoj Posavini (prema
D
izvoru s kraja 1995.: 2306 poginulih, 109 nestalih i 6571
ranjeni vojnik, a u srpskim napadima ubijeno je i oko
2300 civila, uglavnom Hrvata i Muslimana).1034 Bosanska
Posavina je velikosrpskim ideolozima bila od strateške
važnosti zbog osiguravanja koridora između okupira-
nih područja RH i Srbije. Zbog toga su na tom području
C
koncentrirane znatne srpske snage, s ciljem eliminira-
nja HVO-a, odnosno protjerivanja Hrvata i Muslimana
s toga područja i izbijanja na rijeku Savu na cijelom
području Bosanske Posavine. Primoran na odsudnu
obranu, odnosno obranu iz nužde, s ograničenim ma-
D
terijalno-tehničkim i ljudskim resursima u odnosu na
nadmoćnije srpske snage, HVO je radi opstanka Hrvata
u Bosanskoj Posavini koristio sve raspoloživo stanovniš-
tvo („sve raspoložive snage i sve strukture na terenu – i
civilne i vojne“).1035 Tako su, uz vojnike u postrojbama,
u utvrđivanju prve crte angažirani i „svi sposobni civili,
rezervni sastav policije i civilna zaštita“.1036
1034 Stanje u Posavini. RH – Ministarstvo obrane, Glavni sto-
žer HV, Zapovjedništvo ZP Osijek, klasa: 81/95-02/01; ur.
br: 1076-09-95-30, Osijek, 28. 11. 1995.
1035 Republika Bosna i Hercegovina, HVO, Operativna grupa
„Bosanska Posavina“, broj 01-270/92, 2. 12. 1992., Zapo-
vijed za utvrđivanje teritorija.
1036 Zapovijed za utvrđivanje, broj 527/92, Orašje, 22. 7. 1992.
499
Domovinski rat 04-02-2020 Knjiga 1.indd 499
– Bosanski Šamac Municipality (May 7 1992); in the villag-
es of Krepšić, Gorice, Laništa, Markovića Polje, Vukšići and
Ulice – Brčko Municipality (May 8 1992), in Galica in the
Travnik Municipality (May 15 1992), in the village of Ubor-
ak-Vrapčići in the Mostar Municipality (June 13 – 15 1992);
in the village of Briševo – Prijedor Municipality (July 24 –
25). In the Banja Luka Municipality, where no direct clashes
between the HVO and VRS took place, Serb soldiers killed
114 Croatian civilians. In Sarajevo, during the Croatian War
of Independence, 482 Croatian civilians were killed, most
of them in Serb artillery attacks on the city.
The Croatian forces in the Bosanska Posavina region
suffered appalling casualties in fighting against the Ser-
bian forces. According to a source from the end of 1995:
2,306 killed, 109 missing and 6,571 wounded soldiers. Ac-
cording to the same source, about 2,300 civilians, mostly
Croats and Muslims, lost their lives during Serb attacks.
The region was of immense strategic importance to the
ideologues supporting the idea of Greater Serbia because
it formed a corridor between the Serb occupied areas of
the Republic of Croatia and Serbia. The Serbs concen-
trated strong forces in the region with the aim of elim-
inating the HVO forces, expelling the Croat and Muslim
population and reaching the Sava River along the entire
boundary of the region. The HVO forces were vastly out-
numbered and outgunned and the commanders were
aware of the Serbs’ plans to ethnically cleanse the region
of Croats and Muslims. The HVO commanders knew they
were fighting for the survival of the Croats in the Bosanska
Posavina region. For that reason the HVO had no option
but to involve civilians in its implementation of defensive
measures against the aggressor (“all available forces and
all structures in the field – civilian and military”). “All able
bodied civilians, police reserve and civil defense” partici-
pated, alongside soldiers, in fortifying the front line.
The completion of Operation Storm marked the end
of the war in Croatia. The war in BiH was brought to an
end with the Dayton Agreement, after a string of Croa-
R
tian forces’ successes in south-west Bosnia from July to
mid-October, 1995 (Operation Summer 95, Operation
Maestral, Operation Southern Move). However, the es-
tablishment of the Republika Srpska as a separate entity
comprising 49% of BiH’s territory meant that the Serb mil-
itary conquests during the Serbs’ war of aggression were
given political recognition. Therefore, the verdict of the
Dayton Agreement can, by no stretch of the imagination,
be perceived as a just peace. The Serb political entity en-
compasses areas from which almost all non-Serbs were
4.2.2020. 18:37:08
 Ante Nazor • II DIO
Operacijom Oluja završen je rat u Hrvatskoj. U BiH
rat je zaustavljen Daytonskim sporazumom, nakon po-
bjedonosnih operacija hrvatskih snaga u jugozapad-
noj Bosni od srpnja do sredine listopada 1995. (Ljeto
‘95, Maestral i Južni potez). No, uspostavom Republike
Srpske kao posebnoga entiteta na 49 % teritorija BiH
zapravo su „priznati” rezultati srpske agresije, pa se
može reći da nije postignut pravedan mir. Srpskom
entitetu u BiH pripala su područja s kojih je protjerano
gotovo sve nesrpsko stanovništvo (veći dio Bosanske
H
Posavine, itd.), čak i područje na kojem su srpske sna-
ge počinile genocid (Srebrenica).
Drugi entitet u BiH (Federacija BiH) Daytonskim
sporazumom zamišljen je kao federacija Bošnjaka-mu-
slimana i Hrvata (konfederacija između spomenute Fe-
deracije BiH i Republike Hrvatske, predviđena Washin-
M
gtonskim sporazumom iz ožujka 1994. i “oživotvorena”
Splitskom deklaracijom iz srpnja 1995. nije ostvarena
i više se ne spominje). No, hrvatsko-bošnjačke (musli-
manske) odnose u Federaciji BiH opterećuje razdoblje
međusobnoga oružanog sukoba između HVO-a i Ar-
mije RBiH, koji je, uz povremena primirja, trajao od li-
D
stopada 1992., odnosno kao neprekidno ratno stanje
od travnja 1993. do ožujka 1994. godine. Hrvati su ga
doživjeli kao pokušaj Bošnjaka (muslimana) da ih pro-
tjeraju s područja na kojima su stoljećima živjeli i na
taj način nadoknade gubitak teritorija koji su osvoji-
le srpske snage, te kao izdaju naroda koji su zbrinuli i
C
kojem su pomogli obraniti se od velikosrpske agresije
(za vrijeme hrvatsko-muslimanskih sukoba u BiH, Hr-
vatska je pružila utočište velikom broju muslimanskih
izbjeglica iz BiH, pomagala je u naoružavanju Armije
RBiH, itd.). Bošnjaci (muslimani) su ga doživjeli kao
izdaju ratnoga saveznika te pokušaj stvaranja “Velike
Hrvatske”, odnosno priključenja Hrvatskoj dijela terito-
rija Bosne i Hercegovine.
Hrvatski narod, iako trenutno najmalobrojniji u
BiH, kao autohton i konstitutivan narod ima pravo
tražiti ravnopravnost s ostala dva konstitutivna naro-
da u BiH i pravednije unutarnje uređenje te države od
onog koje je sada na snazi (konstitutivnost Hrvata u
BiH je zapisana u Daytonskom sporazumu i Ustavu BiH
te potvrđena višekratnim odlukama Ustavnog suda
u BiH). Problemi u funkcioniranju Federacije BiH (či-
njenica da su Bošnjaci–muslimani već u tri mandata
izabrali hrvatskog člana Predsjedništva BiH, pitanje hr-
vatskog jezika i hrvatske televizije te drugi problemi) i
nastojanje političkog vodstva većinskoga bošnjačkog
500
Domovinski rat 04-02-2020 Knjiga 1.indd 500
expelled (most of Bosanska Posavina and other regions)
and also the area in which Serb forces committed geno-
cide (Srebrenica).
The other entity in BiH created by the Dayton Agree-
ment – the BiH Federation – was originally conceptualized
as a federation of the Bosniak/Muslim and Croats (the con-
federation between the BiH Federation and the Republic of
Croatia, envisaged by the Washington Agreement signed
in March, 1994, and “put into effect” by the Split Declara-
tion issued in July, 1995, was never realized and nobody
deigns to mention it any more). However, the Croat-Bos-
niak/Muslim relations in the BiH Federation are burdened
by the legacy of the Muslim-Croat conflict in which the
HVO fought against the ARBIH. The conflict lasted, with
brief intermissions brought on by cease-fires, from Oc-
tober, 1992 – as an uninterrupted state of war from April,
1993 – until March 1994. The Croats perceived the conflict
as the Bosniaks’ attempt to expel the Croats from areas
where they had lived for centuries in a bid to compensate
for the territories the ARBIH had lost to the Serbs. Also, the
Croats felt betrayed by the Bosniaks/Muslims because the
Bosniaks would not have been able to withstand the initial
Serb onslaught without the Croats’ help (even during the
Muslim-Croat conflict in BiH the Republic of Croatia took
in a large number of Muslim refugees from BiH, sent weap-
ons to the ARBIH etc). The Bosniaks/Muslims, on the other
hand, perceived the conflict as an attempt on the part of
the Croats to create a Greater Croatia at their expense – the
Muslims believed that the Croats’ ultimate goal was to join
a portion of BiH’s territory with Croatia.
It is undisputable that the Croatian people in BiH,
though less numerous than the Serbs and Bosniaks, as
a constituent nation, has the right to seek equality with
D
the other two constituent nations in BiH, complain about
the inherently unjust internal political structure of the
country and demand that it be restructured (the constitu-
tionality of the Croats in BiH is guaranteed by the Dayton
Agreement and the Constitution of BiH and confirmed by
R
a number of decisions passed by the Constitutional Court
of BiH). The problems relating to less-than-viable func-
tioning of the BiH Federation (the fact that for three man-
dates in a row the Muslims have had two members of the
Presidency while the Croats have not been represented,
issues relating to the Croatian language and Croatian TV,
etc.) the fact that the political leadership of the Bosniaks/
Muslims endeavors to marginalize the Croats in the BiH
Federation and the fact that the leaders of the Republika
Srpska behave as if their entity is an independent state
4.2.2020. 18:37:08
 Ante Nazor • PART II
(muslimanskog) stanovništva da osigura prevlast nad
Hrvatima u tom entitetu, te činjenica da se srpsko vod-
stvo u BiH ponaša kao da je Republika Srpska samo-
stalna država, razlog su za propitivanje pravednosti
i održivosti Daytonskog sporazuma i traženja novih
političkih rješenja, kako bi sva tri konstitutivna naroda
u BiH zaista bila ravnopravna i zadovoljna. U tom kon-
tekstu znakovito je mišljenje Europskoga parlamenta
iz siječnja 2014., da bošnjački centralizam (odnosno
unitarizam) i srpski separatizam ugrožavaju BiH, te
H
da je upravo federalizam ključ za europski put BiH. U
skladu s time, Miroslav Tuđman je primijetio: „Ako se i
2014. u Europskom parlamentu zagovara federalizam
kao političko i demokratsko rješenje za BiH, onda se ni
hrvatsku službenu politiku, kako onu u RH tako i u BiH,
ne može optužiti za stvaranje ‘Velike Hrvatske’ zato
M
što je u 1990-im javno zagovarala federalno uređenje
Bosne i Hercegovine. Osim toga, svi su međunarodni
planovi i prijedlozi (od Cutileirova, Vance-Owenova,
Owen-Stoltenbergova) nudili ustavna rješenja za BiH
na federalnim ili konfederalnim osnovama. Upravo
zato je hrvatska službena politika prva, a često i je-
D
dina, prihvaćala te planove međunarodne zajednice.
Hrvatski dužnosnici i generali, prihvaćanjem i proved-
bom planova međunarodne zajednice, znali su da je-
dino tako mogu osigurati nacionalne interese Hrvata
u BiH.”1037
Glede pitanja podjele Bosne i Hercegovine, i po-
C
vjesničar Ivo Lučić zaključuje da je „ona dijeljena od
samog nastanka. U novijem vremenu ‘dijeljena’ je od
Vanceove komisije i Badinterove komisije, Cutileirova,
Vance-Owenova i Owen-Stoltenbergova plana pa do
Washingtonskog sporazuma. Bosna i Hercegovina po-
D
dijeljena je u Daytonu, i to na Republiku Srpsku i Fede-
raciju BiH“.1038
Primjerice, pod pokroviteljstvom Europske zajed-
nice, u Lisabonu je 18. ožujka 1992. iznesen prijedlog
o uređenju BiH (Cutileirov plan kantonizacije BiH ili Li-
sabonski sporazum), prema kojemu su Muslimanima
trebale pripasti 52 općine (44 % teritorija), Srbima 32
(44 % teritorija), a Hrvatima 20 općina (12 % teritori-
ja). Hrvatima bi pripale općine Neum, Čapljina, Čitluk,
1037 Miroslav Tuđman, „Haške optužnice Tuđmanovoj Hr-
vatskoj i 'baršunasta obnova' komunističke prošlosti“,
Oslobađajuće presude haškog Suda Tuđmanovoj Hrvat-
skoj, UHIP, Zagreb, 2014., 96.
1038 Lučić, 2013., 469.
501
Domovinski rat 04-02-2020 Knjiga 1.indd 501
are all valid reasons for questioning the moral validity
and political sustainability of the Dayton Agreement and
also for striving to find new political solutions with the
aim of ensuring that all three constituent nations in BiH
are equal and content with both BiH as their country and
their place in it. In this context it is important to mention
the European Parliament’s statement issued in January,
2014, in which it is claimed that Bosniak centralism (uni-
tarism) and Serb separatism threaten BiH’s survival and
that federalism is the way for the country to go on its path
to the EU. Miroslav Tuđman has observed: “If, in 2014, the
European parliament advocates federalism as the politi-
cal and democratic solution for BiH’s problems, then the
Republic of Croatia’s policies, pursued in relation to Croa-
tia and in relation to BiH during the 1990s and later, can-
not be characterized as conducive to creating a Greater
Croatia. Let’s not forget that Croatia publically upheld a
federally system of government for BiH. Besides, all plans
put forth by the international community (Cutileiro Plan,
Vance-Owen Plan, Owen-Stoltenberg Plan) proposed
constitutional solutions for BiH on a confederate or feder-
ate basis. The Republic of Croatia, time and again, was the
first, and often the only party, that accepted these plans.
Croatian officials and generals, by accepting and imple-
menting the international community’s plans, were con-
sciously promoting the interests of the Bosnian Croats.”
The historian Ivo Lučić, analyzing the often voiced
opinion that Serbia and Croatia strove to divide BiH, con-
cludes in his book Uzroci rata. Bosna i Hercegovina od 1980
do 1992 godine (The Origins of the War. Bosnia and Herze-
govina 1980-1992): “Ever since BiH was created there have
been forces at work trying to divide it. In recent times
BiH was ‘being divided’ by the Vance Commission and by
the Badinter Commission, by the Cutileiro Plan, by the
Vance-Owen Plan, by the Owen-Stoltenberg Plan and by
the Washington Agreement. Finally, BiH was divided by
the Dayton Agreement into the Republika Srpska and the
BiH Federation.”
R
For example, the EC, on March 18, 1992, in Lisbon,
presented a proposal (Cutileiro Plan or Lisbon Agree-
ment) according to which the Muslims would get 52 mu-
nicipalities (44% of BiH’s territory), the Serbs would get
32 municipalities (44% of BiH’s territory) and the Croats
would get 20 municipalities (12% of BiH’s territory). The
plan gave the following municipalities to the Croats:
Neum, Čapljina, Čitluk, Ljubuški, Grude, Široki Brijeg (Lišti-
ca), Posušje, Prozor, Tomislavgrad, Livno, Kreševo, Kiseljak,
Busovača, Vitez, Travnik, Vareš, Orašje, Bosanski Šamac,
4.2.2020. 18:37:08
 Ante Nazor • II DIO

Ljubuški, Grude, Široki Brijeg (Lištica), Posušje, Prozor, Odžak and Bosanski Brod. The Bosnian Croats, despite
Tomislavgrad, Livno, Kreševo, Kiseljak, Busovača, Vitez, the fact that the acceptance of the plan meant that 59%
Travnik, Vareš, Orašje, Bosanski Šamac, Odžak i Bo- of the Bosnian Croats would live in non-Croat municipal-
sanski Brod. Premda je prema tom planu 59 % Hrvata ities, signed the agreement. However, the plan was never
trebalo živjeti u “nehrvatskim kantonima”, Hrvati u BiH put into effect because the Muslims, at the end of March,
potpisali su sporazum, no on nije proveden, jer ga je 1993, rejected it.
krajem ožujka 1993. odbila muslimanska strana. At the beginning of January, 1993, the Vance-Owen
U Ženevi je početkom siječnja 1993. Vance-Owe- Plan was presented in Geneva. The plan called for an in-
novim mirovnim planom predložena unutarnja po- ternal division of BiH into nine provinces (cantons) with
djela Bosne i Hercegovine na devet (9) provincija Sarajevo as a special area (tenth province). The provinc-
H
(kantona) uz posebno područje Sarajeva (kao deseta es would not be international legal personalities. The
provincija), koje ne bi bile međunarodni pravni subjek- administrative centers of the Croatian provinces – the
ti. Središta hrvatskih provincija (posavska, mostarska i Posavina Province, Mostar Province and Travnik-Livno
travničko-livanjska) predviđena su u Odžaku, Mostaru Province – would be Odžak, Mostar and Travnik respec-
i Travniku, a u njima bi živjelo 513.433 (68,27 %) Hr- tively. According to the plan, 513,435 (68.27%) of the
vata iz BiH. Hrvatske provincije obuhvatile bi 25,4 % total Bosnian Croat population in BiH would live in the
M
teritorija BiH; 3 srpske provincije obuhvatile bi 42,3 three Croatian provinces. The Croatian provinces would
%, 3 muslimanske provincije 28,8 %, a sarajevsko po- encompass 25.4% of BiH’s territory; the three Serb prov-
dručje obuhvatilo bi 3,5 % teritorija BiH. Plan su pot- inces would encompass 42.3% of BiH’s territory and the
pisali predstavnici hrvatske i muslimanske strane (u 3 Muslim provinces would encompass 3.5% of BiH’s ter-
New Yorku 25. veljače, u Ženevi 25. ožujka), a Srbi su ritory. The plan was signed by Croat and Muslim repre-
ga odbili bez posljedica (3. travnja). Sudbina plana za- sentatives (in New York on February 25 and in Geneva
D
pečaćena je nepostojanjem mehanizama (i političke on March 25) but the Serbs rejected it (April 3) without
volje), koji bi natjerali Srbe da vrate 20 % okupiranog suffering any consequences. There existed no legal or
teritorija BiH te izbijanjem sukoba između ARBiH (Boš- any other mechanism (or political will) by which the
njaka-muslimana) i HVO-a (Hrvata). Serbs could be compelled to return the 20% of the ter-
Nacionalna struktura stanovništva u predviđenim ritory they occupied through military aggression. This
hrvatskim provincijama: indolent attitude on the part of the international com-
C
munity, coupled with the outbreak of the Muslim-Croat
Provincije Posavska Mostarska Travničko-livanjska conflict, was the final nail in the plan’s coffin.
National structure of the population in the envisaged
Hrvati 142.384 193.016 178.033
(56,0 %) (54,3 %) (45,8 %)
Croatian provinces:
D
Srbi 41.025 39.695 45.498 Provinces Posavina Mostar Travnik-Livno
(16,2 %) (11,1 %) (11,7 %)
Croats 142,384 193,016 178,033
Muslimani 47.260 102.035 145.424 (56.0 %) (54.3 %) (45.8 %)
(18,6 %) (28,7 %) (37,4 %)
Serbs 41,025 39,695 45,498
Ostali 23.465 20.877 19.602 (16.2 %) (11.1 %) (11.7 %)
R
(9,2 %) (5,9 %) (5,1 %) Muslims 47,260 102,035 145,424
(18.6 %) (28.7 %) (37.4 %)
Posavska provincija (2103 km2) obuhvatila bi općine Other 23,465 20,877 19,602
Bosanski Brod, Odžak, Bosanski Šamac, Orašje, Derven- (9.2 %) (5.9 %) (5.1 %)
ta, Modriča i Gradačac;
Travničko-livanjska (5735 km2) općine Jajce, Trav- The Posavina province (2,103 km2) would have
nik, Novi Travnik, Vitez, Busovača, Fojnica, Gornji Va- encompassed the municipalities of Bosanski Brod,
kuf/Uskoplje, Bugojno, Donji Vakuf, Kupres, Livno i Odžak, Bosanski Šamac, Orašje, Derventa, Modriča
Tomislavgrad; and Gradačac;

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 Ante Nazor • PART II

H
Provincije
1. Bihac
2. Banja Luka
3. Posavska
(Bos. Brod)
4. Bijeljina
M
5. Tuzla
6. Nevesinje
7. Sarajevo
8. Mostar
9. Zenica
10. Travnicko-livanjska (Travnik)

Tumac znakova
D
(i) Naselja
• Naselja hrvatskih provincija
1111 Hrvatske provincije
1111 Bosnjacke provincije
1111 Srpske provincije
C
C=:J Distrikt Sarajevo
~ Granice Daytonskog sporazuma

Zemljovid Vance-Owenova plana unutarnje podjele BiH na 9 pro-
vincija i posebno područje Sarajeva (autor Tzowu - Vlastito djelo,
CC BY-SA 4.0, https://commons.wikimedia.org/w/index.php?cu-
rid=50443206; prilagodio Marin Sabolović).
D
Mostarska (6135 km2) općine Prozor, Konjic, Jablani-
ca, Mostar, Posušje, Grude, Ljubuški, Široki Brijeg, Čitluk,
Stolac i Neum.
Owen-Stoltenbergov mirovni plan za BiH, predstav-
ljen 20. kolovoza 1993., po etničkom principu predviđao
je labavu tročlanu Uniju republika BiH (tri  autonomne
republike), u kojoj bi Srbi zadržali najveći dio okupira-
nog teritorija (49,1 %); Muslimanima bi pripalo 33,3 %, a
Hrvatima 17,6 % teritorija. Hrvati su ga prihvatili, Bošnja-
ci-muslimani su ga prihvatili uz uvjet vraćanja teritorija,
a Srbi su ga u veljači 1994. odbili.
Map showing the internal division of BiH into 9 provinces and the
district of Sarajevo as proposed by the Vance-Owen plan (by Tzowu
– Own work, CC BY-SA 4.0, https://commons.wikimedia.org/w/in-
dex.php?curid=50443206; map formatted by Marin Sabolović).
The Travnik-Livno province (5,735 km2) would
have encompassed the municipalities of Jajce,
R
Travnik, Novi Travnik, Vitez, Busovača, Fojnica, Gornji
Vakuf/Uskoplje, Bugojno, Donji Vakuf, Kupres, Livno
and Tomislavgrad;
The Mostar province (6,135 km2) would have en-
compassed the municipalities of Prozor, Konjic, Jablan-
ica, Mostar, Posušje, Grude, Ljubuški, Široki Brijeg, Čitluk,
Stolac and Neum.
The Owen-Stoltenberg peace plan for BiH, present-
ed on August 20, 1993, called for a loose three-member

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 Ante Nazor • II DIO
Prema tome, nijedan od spomenutih prijedloga u
konačnici nije prihvaćen. Jedini koji su prihvatili sve
prijedloge bili su Hrvati, druga dva naroda u BiH, Srbi i
Bošnjaci-muslimani, ili su ih odmah odbili ili su ih prvo
prihvatili pa potom odustali.
„Podjelom u Daytonu ozakonjeno je etničko čišće-
nje. Jedan narod (Srbi) privilegiran je, a jedan (Hrvati)
obespravljen je neravnopravnim ustavnim položa-
jem i ‘ravnopravnom’ raspodjelom krivice. Podjela je
nepoštena i prema Bošnjacima, jer im onemogućava
H
povratak u Republiku Srpsku, a u Federaciji BiH ih su-
protstavlja Hrvatima. Dakle, Bosna i Hercegovina nije
podijeljena u Karađorđevu, već u Daytonu. Uvažen je
jedino argument sile, a cijela priča o Karađorđevu kori-
sti se za amnestiju najodgovornijih ne samo za podjelu
Bosne i Hercegovine, nego i za sve što se toj zemlji pro-
M
teklih godina dogodilo.”1039
O tome je Miroslav Tuđman zapisao: “Logika je poli-
tičke filozofije unitarnog ustavnog uređenja Bosne i Her-
cegovine silila muslimansko vodstvo da zbog političkih
razloga i geostrateških interesa zarate s Hrvatima u sre-
dišnjoj Bosni. Po svemu sudeći, takvu su im opciju suge-
D
rirali i neki međunarodni čimbenici. Prema svjedočenju
Muhameda Filipovića, lord Owen je sugerirao bošnjač-
kom vodstvu, tijekom privatne večere u Ženevi 26. srp-
nja 1993., da pristanu na ponuđeni Owen-Stoltenber-
gov plan o uniji triju republika, tako da svoje teritorijalne
pretenzije ‘namire na račun Hrvata’. M. Filipović tvrdi da
C
je Owen izjavio ‘da znade da mi ne možemo biti zado-
voljni s onim što su dobili Srbi, u teritorijalnom smislu,
ali da se stvar može ispraviti na taj način da se musliman-
ska strana namiri na račun Hrvata. Ako mi pristanemo na
ono što treba da dobiju Srbi, tada će oni okrenuti leđa
Hrvatima i mi se možemo namiriti na njihov račun’.1040
Ne sporeći se oko odgovornosti za pojedine provo-
kacije, ekstremizme ili razna nedjela, kako na hrvatskoj
tako i na muslimanskoj strani, što je sve samo po sebi
moglo biti dostatno za iracionalni početak musliman-
sko-hrvatskog sukoba, činjenica je da su Muslimani
imali dostatnih razloga za planiranje tog sukoba.”1041
Bošnjačko političko i vojno vodstvo nikada iskreno
nije pristalo na (kon)federalni ustroj BiH, te je inten-
1039 Lučić, 2013., 469-471.
1040 Muhamed Filipović, Bio sam Alijin diplomata I – II, Delta,
Bihać, 2000., 301.
1041 M. Tuđman, 2014., 76.
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Domovinski rat 04-02-2020 Knjiga 1.indd 504
union of BiH republics (three autonomous republics)
based on the ethnic principle. The Serbs would keep most
of the occupied territory (49.1%), the Muslims would get
33.3 % of BiH’s territory and the Croats would have to set-
tle for 17.6% of BiH’s territory. The Croats accepted the
plan, the Bosniaks/Muslims accepted it on the condition
that the territory they had lost be returned to them and
the Serbs, in February, rejected it.
As we have seen, every proposed solution proved to
be a dead-end. The only constituent nation that accepted
each and every proposal were the Croats. The other two
constituent nations, the Serbs and the Bosniaks/Muslims,
either rejected the plans outright or rejected them after a
period of procrastination.
The Dayton Agreement effectively confirmed the
results of ethnic cleansing. It lavished privileges on one
constituent nation (the Serbs) and left another constitu-
ent nation (the Croats) marginalized, politically underrep-
resented and vilified by the international community’s
insistence that all three constituent nations are equally
responsible for the war. The verdict of the Dayton Agree-
ment was also unfair to the Bosniaks. They have no say
in what happens in the Republika Srpska and in the BiH
Federation they are politically pitted against the Croats.
Therefore, BiH was not divided in Karađorđevo between
Milošević and Tuđman, as some commentators are fond of
alleging, but in Dayton. Nothing but brute force was given
currency by the Dayton Agreement and the Karađorđevo
fable serves to deflect focus from the real villains of the
story – those truly responsible for the division of BiH and
for all the evils, pain, death and suffering that preceded
that final abominable act of division.
Miroslav Tuđman wrote: “The logic of the political phi-
D
losophy of the unitary constitutional system in BiH forced
the Muslim leadership to start a war with the Croats in cen-
tral Bosnia for political reasons and geo-strategic interests.
There are indications that certain factions in the interna-
tional community urged the Muslim leadership to attack
R
the Croats. According to the testimony of Muhamed Fi-
lipović, Lord Owen told the Muslim leadership, during a
private dinner party in Geneva on July 26, 1993, to accept
the Owen-Stoltenberg Plan so that they could satisfy their
territorial pretentions at the expense of the Croats. Mu-
hamed Filipović claims: ‘Owen said to the Muslim leader-
ship that he knew that the Muslims could not be happy
with what the Serbs had been given but that the Muslims
could recoup what they had lost to the Serbs by attacking
the Croats and if the Muslims agreed to the plan then the
4.2.2020. 18:37:09
 Ante Nazor • PART II
zivno nastojalo vojnim operacijama osigurati što veći
teritorij za muslimanski entitet. U takvim okolnostima
supredsjedatelj MKBJ lord Owen u svojim memoarima
priznaje da je bio spreman na podjelu Bosne i Herce-
govine i formiranje samostalne muslimanske države:
“Moja druga opcija ... bila je ponovo otvoriti pitanje
nacionalnih granica u bivšoj Jugoslaviji, prešutno pri-
znajući da je priznanje Bosne bilo pogrešno. Trebali
smo potvrditi granice Slovenije i Makedonije i onda se
nagoditi s Bosnom, Hrvatskom i Srbijom... Opciju pre-
H
krajanja granica nazvao sam ‘rješenjem kojem se nitko
ne usudi izgovoriti ime’.”1042
Neosporno je da su supredsjedatelji sredinom
1993. zastupali stajalište da “Muslimanima treba biti
osiguran pristup na more, a moguće je da im se dade
i Mostar” (Pismo predsjednika Hrvatske zajednice Her-
M
ceg-Bosne Mate Bobana supredsjedatelju MKBJ lordu
Davidu Owenu, 22. lipnja 1993.). T. Stoltenberg i D.
Owen ne samo da zagovaraju kako bi muslimanska
republika trebala imati izlaz na more, nego i izlaz na
Savu kod Brčkog, pa traže od predsjednika Tuđmana
da Hrvatska ustupi dio svojeg “močvarnog” teritori-
D
ja “sjeverno od Save” – u zamjenu za zemlju u zaleđu
Dubrovnika – kako bi se Srbima osigurao koridor koji
bi povezao srpske teritorije u BiH (Pismo supredsje-
datelja MKBJ Thorvalda Stoltenberga i Davida Owena
predsjedniku RH dr. Franji Tuđmanu, 25. lipnja 1993.).
Predsjednik Tuđman je odbio prijedloge supredsjeda-
C
telja MKBJ (Pismo predsjednika RH dr. Franje Tuđmana
supredsjedateljima MKBJ lordu Davidu Owenu i Thor-
valdu Stoltenbergu, 26. lipnja 1993.).
Bošnjačka je politika izlaz na Savu i izlaz na more
definirala kao svoje strateške ciljeve. Pristanak supred-
D
sjedatelja MKBJ da modificiraju mirovne planove kako
bi se izašlo u susret bošnjačkim zahtjevima – od Save,
središnje Bosne do Mostara i mora (bošnjačkim zahtje-
vima izlazi se u susret u Owen-Stoltenbergovu mirov-
nom planu) – davao je prešutni “legitimitet” vojnim
operacijama Armije RBiH kako bi vojno osigurali svoje
ciljeve u područjima u kojima je hrvatsko stanovniš-
tvo bilo u većini. Muslimani su pak u javnosti nastojali
osigurati pokriće svojim vojnim ciljevima tako što su
stvarali incidente za koje su optuživali Hrvate. O takvoj
politici provokacija i lažnih optužbi izvješćuju i obavje-
štajni izvori (“Muslimani i ostaci vladinih snaga bit će u
1042 David Owen, Balkanska odiseja, Hrvatska sveučilišna na-
klada i Hrvatski institut za povijest, Zagreb, 1998., 220.
505
Domovinski rat 04-02-2020 Knjiga 1.indd 505
international community would sell the Croats down the
drain and the Muslims could attack the Croats without any
interference from the international community’”.
Many provocations, incidents, displays of extremism,
various crimes committed by both Croats and Muslims
preceded the outbreak of the Muslim-Croat conflict. Any
one of these misdeeds could have sparked the conflict
and endeavoring to find sufficient evidence in this maze
of transgressions, infringements and offenses for the pur-
pose of putting the blame for the conflict on one side or
the other is an exercise in futility. However, it is an indis-
putable fact that the Muslims stood to gain a lot from
attacking the Croats whereas the Croats had no reason
whatsoever to provoke a conflict with the Muslims.
The Bosniak political and military leadership never
genuinely agreed to a (con)federative system of gover-
nance and constantly labored to secure as much territory
as possible for the Muslim entity in BiH by military action.
Lord Owen, in his memoirs admits that he, acting in the
capacity of co-chairman of the International Conference
on the former Yugoslavia, was prepared to divide BiH and
agree to the formation of an independent Muslim state:
“My other option (…) was to reopen the question of na-
tional borders in the former Yugoslavia, implicitly admit-
ting that recognition of Bosnia was a mistake. We should
confirm the boundaries of Slovenia and Macedonia, and
then do a deal between Bosnia, Croatia and Serbia. I
called the redrawing borders option ‘the solution which
dare not speak its name’.”
It is beyond dispute that the co-chairmen, in the mid-
dle of 1993, subscribed to the idea that “the Muslims have
to be given access to the sea, and it’s even possible to
give them Mostar” (President of the HZ HB Mate Boban’s
letter to the co-chairman of the International Conference
on the former Yugoslavia, Lord David Owen, of June 22,
1993). Not only do T. Stoltenberg and D. Owen insist that
the Muslim republic should have access to the sea, but
they also insist that the Muslims should have access to
R
the Sava River at Brčko and they demand that Tuđman
accord to the Serbs a portion of Croatia’s ‘swamp’ territo-
ry to the north of Sava” – in exchange for some territory
in Dubrovnik’s hinterland – in order to provide the Serbs
with a corridor connecting the Serb areas in BiH (the let-
ter of the co-chairmen of the International Conference on
the former Yugoslavia, Thorvald Stoltenberg and David
Owen, to the president of the Republic of Croatia, Fran-
jo Tuđman, of June 25, 1993). President Tuđman rejected
the co-chairmen’s proposals (Franjo Tuđman’s letter to the
4.2.2020. 18:37:09
 Ante Nazor • II DIO
iskušenju da potaknu krvave incidente za koje bi mo-
gli biti okrivljeni Srbi ili Hrvati“).1043
S obzirom na pokušaj bošnjačko-muslimanske po-
litike da nametne percepciju o hrvatskoj odgovornosti
za rat u BiH i pokušaj podjele te države, koji je ojačan
osuđujućom drugostupanjskom presudom šestorici
Hrvata u predmetu „Prlić i ostali“ za događaje u BiH,1044
potrebno je jasno upozoriti da podaci iz te presude
koji sugeriraju udruženi (zajednički) hrvatski zloči-
nački pothvat potpuno ignoriraju povijesne činjenice,
H
te da stoga „svi koji žele znati, znaju da je ona ruglo
od presude i od primjene međunarodnog kaznenog
prava“.1045 Pritom nitko objektivan i ozbiljan ne negira
da su i pripadnici hrvatskih snaga počinili zločine nad
pripadnicima drugih naroda, što je sramotno i što je
za osudu. No, pravda se ne može postići nepravednim
M
presudama ljudima koji zločin nisu počinili, niti su ga
planirali ili zapovjedili, samo zato da bi se zadovoljila
politička odluka da treba kazniti i nekoga od „visokih
dužnosnika“ s hrvatske strane. Hrvatska zajednica Her-
ceg Bosna osnovana je, u skladu s odredbama Ustava
BiH i iz nužde, kad je postalo očito (nakon što su srpske
D
snage početkom listopada 1991. spalile etnički hrvat-
sko naselje Ravno u istočnoj Hercegovini) da vlast u
Sarajevu nije mogla zaštititi hrvatski narod od veli-
kosrpske agresije. Hrvatska Republika Herceg Bosna
osnovana je u skladu s planovima međunarodne za-
C
1043 National Intelligence Estimate. Prospects for Bosnia. NIE
93-22, May 1993; Izvor: www.foia.cia.gov/sites/default/
files/ document.../1993-05-01.pdf; M. Tuđman, 2014.,
88-90.
1044 U Haagu je, 29. studenoga 2017., na znakovit datum iz
jugoslavenske povijesti (29. studenog 1943. u Jajcu je
utemeljena druga Jugoslavija – kasnija SFRJ), kao za-
dnja u mandatu privremeno uspostavljenog Međuna-
rodnog kaznenog suda za područje bivše Jugoslavije,
pročitana drugostupanjska presuda šestorici Hrvata za
događaje u Bosni i Hercegovini u razdoblju od siječnja
1993. do travnja 1994.: Jadranku Prliću, Bruni Stojiću,
Valentinu Ćoriću, Slobodanu Praljku, Milivoju Petkoviću
i Berislavu Pušiću. Tom je presudom spomenutoj šesto-
rici hrvatskih dužnosnika zapravo u najvećem dijelu
potvrđena prvostupanjska presuda iz 2013. godine, u
kojoj su optuženi na ukupno 111 godina zatvora. No
samo izricanje presude, a može se reći i cjelokupni rad
takvoga suda, obilježio je čin hrvatskog generala Slo-
bodana Praljka, koji je, popivši otrov, s prijezirom odbio
odluku sudaca da je ratni zločinac i život pod takvom,
nepravedno mu nametnutom stigmom.
1045 Višnja Starešina, Slobodna Dalmacija, subota, 2. 12.
2017., 16.
506
Domovinski rat 04-02-2020 Knjiga 1.indd 506
co-chairmen of the International Conference on the for-
mer Yugoslavia, Lord David Owen and Thorvald Stolten-
berg, of June 26, 1993).
The Bosniak leadership defined their aspirations to
gain access to the sea and access to the Sava River as
strategic objectives. The decision of the co-chairmen of
the International Conference on the former Yugoslavia
to modify the peace plans for the sole purpose of ac-
commodating the Bosniaks – giving them access to the
sea, access to the Sava River and giving them Mostar
(the Owen-Stoltenberg Peace Plan was tailored so as to
satisfy the Bosniaks’ demands) – gave a tacit “legitimacy”
to the ARBIH’s military moves against the Croats in the
predominately Croat areas of BiH. The ARBIH needed a
pretext for attacking the Croats and gain public support
for the planned aggression. The Muslims provoked many
incidents with the Croats and duly blamed the Croats in a
veritable campaign of provocations and false accusations.
Intelligence sources confirm this (“The Muslims and the
remnants of the government forces will be tempted to
provoke serious incidents, involving loss of life, and blame
them on either the Serbs or Croats”).
Ever since the end of the war the Bosniak/Muslim
leadership has been striving very hard to cast the Croats
as the main instigators of the war in BiH and to fabricate
evidence suggesting that the Croats were bent upon di-
viding BiH. Unfortunately, the ICTY, in its final judgment in
the Jadranko Prlić et al. case, found the six accused Croats
guilty36. The verdict lends weight and validity to the Bos-
niak/Muslim leadership’s policy of fabricating history. It
has to be noted that the official explanation of the verdict,
which hints that the Croats were involved in a joint crim-
inal enterprise, completely ignores historic facts. There is
D
36 In The Hague, on November 29, 2017, the second instan-
ce verdict was read out to the six Croat defendants regar-
ding events in Bosnia and Herzegovina between January,
1993, and April, 1994: Jadranko Prlić, Bruno Stojić, Valen-
tin Ćorić, Slobodan Praljak, Milivoj Petković and Berislav
R
Pušić. The verdict, for all intents and purposes, confirmed
the first instance verdict of 2013 by which the defendants
were sentenced to a total of 111 years’ imprisonment.
Slobodan Praljak’s desperate act of suicide by poison in
the court room passed a condemning judgment on the
proceedings of the court and displayed his rejection of
the verdict and his refusal to live disgraced by the unjusti-
fied stigma of being a war criminal. Two interesting facts
are connected to the trial. First, on November 29, 1943,
74 years to the day before the reading of the verdict the
Second Yugoslavia – later named the SFRY – was founded
in Jajce. Second, the verdict in the Prlić et al. case was the
last act in the checkered history of the ICTY.
4.2.2020. 18:37:09
 Ante Nazor • PART II
jednice o unutarnjoj podjeli BiH, nakon što je započeo
muslimansko-hrvatski sukob u BiH.
Jednako tako, i HVO je 8. travnja 1992. utemeljen
iz nužde. U okolnostima kada je vlast u Sarajevu javno
priznala da „nije u mogućnosti zaštiti ni samu sebe“ od
unutarnje i vanjske (srpske) agresije, samoorganiziranje
Hrvata radi obrane bila je nužna reakcija. Naime, snage
Srba iz Hrvatske, tzv. martićevci, već su iz Knina upada-
le u BiH, primjerice na područje sela Uništa u svibnju
1991., gdje su maltretirali hrvatsko stanovništvo, te u
H
Bosansko Grahovo i Drvar, gdje su postrojavanjem u
lipnju 1991. demonstrirali namjeru brisanja granice iz-
među “SAO Krajine” i “Bosanske krajine” i iznudili iskrenu
reakciju Alije Izetbegovića 9. i 10. lipnja u medijima, da
BiH “u ovom trenutku nije u stanju izaći na kraj sa sve že-
šćom unutarnjom i vanjskom agresijom”, odnosno da se
M
BiH “ne može oduprijeti agresiji” i da “nije u mogućnosti
zaštititi samu sebe”: “Izloženi smo unutrašnjoj agresiji
kao što je to u Bileći i Trebinju, a s druge strane dolazi
nam agresija izvana. Mi se za takvo nešto nismo spre-
mali. U Bosni i Hercegovini spremali smo se za demo-
kratsku političku borbu, a nikako za oružanu borbu.“1046
D
Činjenica da su Hrvati u BiH opstali uglavnom on-
dje gdje se uspio održati i HVO, koji je utemeljen 8. trav-
nja 1992. radi obrane od velikosrpske agresije u trenu-
cima “nemoći legalne vlasti RBiH, a posebno raspadom
njenog obrambenog sustava”, te da je HVO zaslužan što
srpske snage 1992. nisu zauzele još veći dio BiH, najbo-
C
lje govori o njegovim zaslugama za opstojnost Hrvata u
BiH, ali i u obrani cjelovitosti BiH. S obzirom na to da je
prostor RH i BiH u Domovinskom ratu bio jedinstveno
ratište, ne smije se zanemariti ni uloga HVO-a u obrani
Republike Hrvatske, te doprinos postrojbi HVO-a u ope-
D
racijama hrvatskih snaga kojima je oslobođen okupira-
ni teritorij RH.
Istoga dana kad je formiran HVO, Predsjedništvo SR
BiH je usvojilo Uredbu o rasformiranju Republičkog šta-
ba TO-a i uspostavi Štaba Teritorijalne obrane Republike
Bosne i Hercegovine, što znači da je izvršena promjena
samo na vrhu piramide i to samo u personalnom pogle-
du. Teritorijalna obrana je nastavila biti glavna formalna
oružana snaga BiH, što je imalo negativan učinak na
stanovništvo, pogotovo hrvatsko, imajući u vidu da je
Teritorijalna obrana prethodno bila podređena JNA, da
je upravo JNA 1990. razoružala TO u Hrvatskoj i 1991.
1046 Kronologija rata 1989.-1998., Hrvatska i Bosna i Hercegovi-
na, Hrvatski informativni centar, Zagreb, 1998., 57, 65-67.
507
Domovinski rat 04-02-2020 Knjiga 1.indd 507
no doubt that “all those who wish to know the truth ac-
tually already know that the verdict is a travesty of justice
and makes a total mockery of International Criminal Law”
To be sure, members of the Croatian forces did com-
mit crimes against members of other nationalities and the
perpetrators should be put on trial, pronounced guilty
and punished. But, justice cannot be served by finding
innocent people guilty, people who did not commit or
plan or order the crimes they are accused of. Justice must
never conform to political expediency. And, in relation to
the Prlić et al. case, it was nothing but political expediency
which called for putting a number of “high ranking” Croa-
tian officials on trial on trumped-up charges and finding
them guilty. In the absence of guilty Croats innocent ones
were the next best thing.
The HZ HB was formed in accordance with the provi-
sions of the Constitution of BiH and out of necessity when
it became obvious (after Serb troops, at the beginning of
October, 1991, had burnt to the ground the predominate-
ly Croatian village of Ravno in eastern Herzegovina) that
the government in Sarajevo was not able to protect the
Bosnian Croats from Serb aggression. Moreover, the HZ
HB was formed in accordance with the international com-
munity’s plans regarding internal division of BiH after the
start of the Muslim-Croat conflict.
The HVO, by the same token, was also formed out of
necessity, on April 8, 1992, when the government in Sara-
jevo publically admitted that “it was in no shape to protect
itself” from internal (Serb) and external (Serb) aggression.
The Bosnian Croats had no other choice but to take steps
to protect themselves. Serb forces from Croatia belonging
to the Martić Militia had already made a number of for-
ays from Knin into BiH. For example, Martić Militia troops
raided the area around the village of Unište in May, 1991,
maltreating and brutalizing the Croat population. In June,
1991, Martić Militia troops raided Bosansko Grahovo and
Drvar, where they demonstrated their intention to erase
the boundary between the SAO Krajina and Bosanska
R
Krajina. The raid provoked Alija Izetbegović into hasti-
ly stating that BiH “at this moment in time, is not able to
resist aggression” and that “it is in no shape to protect it-
self”; “we are exposed to internal aggression, for example
in Bileća and Trebinje but also we have to contend with
external aggression. We are not prepared for these chal-
lenges. We have been preparing for a democratic, politi-
cal struggle and not for war.” The BiH media outlets aired
these statements on June 9 and 10.
It is a fact that the Croats remained in most of the ar-
4.2.2020. 18:37:09
 Ante Nazor • II DIO
na području BiH gdje su Hrvati i Muslimani bili većinsko
stanovništvo, te da su snage TO-a iz Bosne i Hercegovi-
ne sudjelovale u agresiji na Republiku Hrvatsku. Pred-
sjedništvo je istoga dana (8. travnja) proglasilo stanje
neposredne ratne opasnosti i proširilo je Predsjedniš-
tvo SR BiH za tri mjesta, sa zapovjednikom TO-a, ali ne
i HVO-a. Hrvatski predstavnici su odbijali prihvatiti da
na sjednicama Predsjedništva sjedi, kao ravnopravni
član, zapovjednik TO-a BiH, a da nema zapovjednika
HVO-a. Formiranje TO-a na sjednici Predsjedništva BiH
H
od 8. travnja izazvalo je konfuziju među Hrvatima, jer je
novi TO formiran, a stari je okupirao BiH i prije toga su-
djelovao u napadu na Republiku Hrvatsku, te jer se na
sjednici Predsjedništva koja je, s prekidima, trajala od
4. do 8. travnja 1992., tražila i pomoć „JNA u rješavanju
situacije u Republici“. Iste JNA koja je do tada okupirala
M
gotovo trećinu Republike Hrvatske te počinila zločine
nad Hrvatima i razorila brojna hrvatska naselja. No, ne
samo zbog toga, već i zbog činjenice da su odlukom
Alije Izetbegovića, 27. svibnja 1992., od 44 imenovana
zapovjednika TO-a, njih 43 bili Muslimani (jedan je bio
Srbin), a niti jedan Hrvat, Hrvati su smatrali da je toga 8.
D
travnja u Sarajevu formirana Teritorijalna obrana samo
za Muslimane. HVO je predložio formiranje zajedničkog
zapovjedništva, ali muslimansko vodstvo u početku pri-
jedlog nije prihvaćalo.
U reakciji HVO-a na odluku Predsjedništva i Vlade
Republike Bosne i Hercegovine o objedinjavanju svih
C
naoružanih snaga na teritoriju Republike Bosne i Her-
cegovine, od 9. travnja 1992., između ostaloga je nave-
deno: „HVO je u načelu suglasan sa ovom odlukom, ali
inzistira na poštivanju međunarodnih i unutarnjih okol-
nosti glede njezine realizacije... Na unutarnjem planu
HVO je oblik samoorganizacije hrvatskog i musliman-
skog pučanstva na teritoriji Hrvatske zajednice općina
Herceg-Bosne... HVO je organiziran kao jedini mogući
odgovor na teror, pokolje, protjerivanje (preko 130.000
ljudi), spaljena i uništena sela... Štitio je cjelokupno sta-
novništvo HZ HB bez obzira na nacionalnu i vjersku
pripadnost, o čemu svjedoči i činjenica da s tog pod-
ručja nitko nije iseljavao pod prinudom. Cjelokupnom
svojom aktivnošću HVO dokazuje da je za samostalnu i
suverenu BiH, suverenu državu suverenih naroda.
Na konferenciji u Bruxellesu dogovoreno je da su-
vereni narodi BiH imaju svoje Vlade i vlastite obrambe-
ne snage... Iz svega ovoga slijedi da su formacije HVO
legitimni oblik teritorijalne obrane Hrvatske zajednice
općina Herceg-Bosne, te jedino takve formacije pod
508
Domovinski rat 04-02-2020 Knjiga 1.indd 508
eas where the HVO was able to hold the attackers at bay.
It is also a fact that the Serbs would have occupied much
more of BiH’s territory than they did had it not been for
the HVO. These two facts speak volumes about the HVO’s
role in protecting the Croats in BiH and securing their
continued survival in the country and in protecting the
integrity and sovereignty of BiH. Given the fact that BiH
and the Republic of Croatia formed a single theater of war
the contribution of the HVO to the HV’s successful offen-
sives for the liberation of the occupied territory of Croatia
can only be described as considerable. It is worth pointing
out again that the HVO was formed in April, 1992, for the
purpose of defending against Serb aggression when “the
legal authority in RBiH was impotent and when the defen-
sive system of RBiH was in complete disarray”.
On the same day when the HVO was formed, the Pres-
idency of SR BiH passed the Decree on Disbanding the Re-
public HQ of the TO and Forming the HQ of the TO of the
RBiH. In practical terms the Decree meant little – it amount-
ed to a few personnel changes at the top of the pyramid.
The TO continued to function as the main armed force of
BiH. That had a negative effect on the population, espe-
cially the Croats because the TO had been subordinated to
the JNA. The JNA had, in 1990, disarmed the TO in Croa-
tia and in 1991 the JNA also disarmed the TO units in the
predominately Croat and Muslim areas in BiH. TO BiH units
had participated in the JNA’s aggression against the Re-
public of Croatia. The Presidency, also on April 8, declared a
state of emergency and added three more members to the
Presidency, including the commander of the TO but not
the commander of the HVO. The Bosnian Croats were tak-
en aback by the formation of the new TO. The meeting of
the Presidency at which the new TO was brought into ex-
D
istence lasted from April 4 to April 8, 1992. During the ses-
sion the members of the Presidency requested help from
“the JNA in solving the situation in the republic”. It is im-
portant to stress that the same JNA the Presidency sought
help from had occupied almost one third of the Republic
R
of Croatia’s territory, committed numerous crimes against
Croats and destroyed many Croatian towns and villages.
The formation of the new TO was a slap in the face to the
Bosnian Croats. On May 27, 1992, Alija Izetbegović added
insult to injury when he appointed 44 TO commanders –
43 Muslims and one Serb. The Croats rightly concluded
that the raison d’être of the new TOs that was formed in Sa-
rajevo on April 8 was to protect the Muslims only. The HVO
proposed that a joint Muslim/Croat command be formed
but the Muslims rejected the proposal.
4.2.2020. 18:37:09
 Ante Nazor • PART II
zapovjedništvom Glavnog stožera HVO-a, mogu ući u
sustav obrambenih snaga suverene Bosne i Hercego-
vine. Na tim načelima predlažemo daljnje dogovore na
konsolidaciji i organizaciji obrane zajedničke nam drža-
ve Bosne i Hercegovine.“
HVO nije prihvatio kompromitirani naziv Teritorijal-
na obrana, no njegove odluke ne pokazuju nepriznava-
nje nadležnosti tijela BiH. Hrvatsko vijeće obrane je već
10. travnja 1992. poslalo prijedlog Predsjedništvu BiH za
uspostavu zajedničkog zapovjedništva za obranu BiH,
H
ali Izetbegović nikada to pitanje nije stavio na dnevni
red sjednice Predsjedništva. Prije nego što je formiran
HVO, Boban je predložio muslimanskom vodstvu u Sa-
rajevu formiranje Hrvatsko-muslimanskog vijeća obra-
ne, ili Muslimansko-hrvatskog vijeća obrane, ali ono
nije reagiralo. Muslimanskom vodstvu u Sarajevu bila je
M
prihvatljiva samo opcija po kojoj bi se HVO bezuvjetno
podredio Štabu TO-a u Sarajevu.
Zapovjednik Teritorijalne obrane BiH Hasan Efen-
dić poslao je 14. travnja 1992. godine planove obrane
u 73 općine s isto toliko zapovjednika, bez konzul-
tacija s ministrom obrane Hrvatom Jerkom Dokom,
D
ostavljajući dakle više od 30 općina da se brinu same
za sebe. Ta se brojka podudarila s brojkom od 73 op-
ćine nazočne na konstitutivnoj skupštini muslimanske
SDA 1990. godine, što navodi na zaključak da je već od
ranije postojalo opredjeljenje da se brane samo opći-
ne s muslimanskim stanovništvom, a ne cijela Bosna i
C
Hercegovina. Naravno, taj je broj isti broju općina koje
su dale lojalnost novom Štabu TO-a, formiranom 8.
travnja 1992. u Sarajevu.
Na svojoj sjednici održanoj u Širokom Brijegu 4.
lipnja 1992., Predsjedništvo HDZ-a BiH je, uz odavanje
D
priznanja HVO-u na otporu srpskoj agresiji, odlučilo: „…
predložit će Predsjedništvu i Vladi BiH da se dosadašnji
naziv Teritorijalna obrana BiH zamijeni nekim drugim,
što bi bolje odgovaralo. Predložen je, primjerice, naziv
‘Republičko vijeće obrane’. No, predsjedništvo Republi-
ke BiH je 23. lipnja 1993. odabralo drugačiji naziv: ‘Mi-
jenja se naziv ‘Teritorijalna odbrana Republike Bosne i
Hercegovine’, u naziv ‘Armija Republike Bosne i Herce-
govine’ i organizuju se oružane snage Republike Bosne
i Hercegovine.’“1047
Odluka zapovjednika HVO-a od 6. svibnja 1992.,
o organizaciji jedinstvene obrane na području općine
1047 Prlić, knjiga I, 311-316.
509
Domovinski rat 04-02-2020 Knjiga 1.indd 509
On April 9 the Presidency and the government of
RBiH reached the decision to unify all armed forces in
RBiH’s territory. The HVO, reacting to the decision, issued
a written statement: “The HVO, in principle, agrees with
the decision but insists that international and internal
factors be taken into account in relation to implementing
the decision… In the context of BiH the HVO is a form of
self-organization of the Croatian and Muslim population
in the HZ HB… The HVO was organized as the only pos-
sible reaction to Serb depredations: massacres, mass ex-
pulsions (more than 130,000 have been expelled thus far),
burned and destroyed villages… The HVO protected the
entire population of the HZ HB irrespective of national or
religious affiliation. The fact that not a single person has
been expelled from the HZ HB testifies to that. The HVO
has proved, time and again, that it supports a sovereign
and independent BiH, a sovereign state of sovereign peo-
ples… At the conference in Brussels it was agreed that the
sovereign peoples of BiH should have their own govern-
ments and their own defense forces… All of this means
that the HVO formations are a legitimate form of territorial
defense of the HZ HB and, as such and under the com-
mand of the Main HQ of the HVO, can be part of the de-
fense forces of the sovereign Bosnia and Herzegovina. On
these principles we propose further discussions regard-
ing the consolidation and organization of the defense of
our country, Bosnia and Herzegovina.”
The HVO did not accept to be tagged with the com-
promised designation TO. However, the HVO’s decisions
and actions show that the HVO recognized and accept-
ed the authority of BiH’s institutions. The HVO, already on
April 10, 1992, proposed to the Presidency of BIH that a
joint command for the defense of the country be formed
but Izetbegović never saw it proper to put the proposal on
the agenda of a Presidency meeting, effectively rejecting
it. Even before the HVO was formed, Mate Boban suggest-
ed to the Muslim leadership in Sarajevo that a Croat-Mus-
lim or Muslim-Croat defense council be formed but the
R
Muslim leadership ignored the overture. The only option
acceptable to the Muslim leadership was the HVO’s un-
conditional subordination to TO HQ in Sarajevo.
The commander of TO BiH, Hasan Efendić, sent, on
April 14, 1992, the defense plans to 73 municipalities
(to 73 commanders of the defense of the municipally in
question) without consulting the minister of defense,
Jerko Doko, a Croat. 30 municipalities did not receive
the plans and were effectively abandoned, left to fend
for themselves. Revealingly enough, at the constitutive
4.2.2020. 18:37:09
 Ante Nazor • II DIO
Jablanica, koja uključuje „TO, HVO, Zelene beretke, ne
prejudicirajući buduća politička rješenja“, pokazuje da
je hrvatsko vodstvo smatralo HVO dijelom zajedničkih
oružanih snaga Bosne i Hercegovine, jednakopravnim
s ostalim obrambenim komponentama poput Zelenih
beretki, Patriotske lige ili TO-a. Uostalom, ni Predsjed-
ništvo BiH u početku, osim Samostalnog bataljuna,
nije formiralo jedinice i brigade u Hercegovini, jer je u
potpunosti prihvaćalo ulogu HVO formacija na tom po-
dručju. Kao i u Posavini, gdje je HVO djelovao u masov-
H
nijem obliku. Legalnost HVO-a potvrđuju i odluke mu-
slimanskih predstavnika u Mostaru, Maglaju, Gornjem
Vakufu…, kojima je obrana tih područja prepuštena
HVO-u. Prema tome, odluka o formiranju HVO-a bila je
priznata kao legalna, što implicite potvrđuje i Odluka
Predsjedništva RBiH od 20. lipnja 1992., o proglašenju
M
ratnog stanja, kojom se priznaju sve oružane formacije
koje brane Republiku.
Jedan od Tuđmanovih argumenata na reakciju Vi-
jeća sigurnosti koje HVO naziva paravojnim jedinica-
ma, 11. svibnja 1993., bio je da se „u sporazumu koji su
potpisali Izetbegović i Boban izričito govori da su obje
D
formacije - i ARBiH i HVO - podjednako legalne i regular-
ne“. Naime, HVO je Sporazumom o prijateljstvu i surad-
nji, 21. srpnja 1992., prepoznat kao dio oružanih snaga
RBiH, s dogovorenom ulogom u zajedničkom zapovije-
danju, ali muslimanska strana to nije pretočila u propise
i praksu, kako se obvezala tim Sporazumom. Nije ispo-
C
štovan ni sporazum koji su zapovjednici obiju vojski
(ARBiH i HVO-a), načelnik Štaba Vrhovne komande OS
RBiH Sefer Halilović i načelnik Glavnog stožera HVO-a
Milivoj Petković, potpisali 20. travnja 1993. u Zenici, uz
nazočnost „zapovjednika snaga UN-a za BiH“ generala
Philippea Morillona i „šefa regionalnog centra“ ECMM-a
Jeana Pierrea Thebaulta (točka 1.): „BiH armija i HVO su
legalne vojne snage Republike Bosne i Hercegovine sa
istim tretmanom“. Kao oružana snaga RBiH, HVO se spo-
minje i u Sporazumu između Alije Izetbegovića i Mate
Bobana, potpisanom u prvom satu 25. travnja 1993. u
Zagrebu, uz svjedočenje Franje Tuđmana.
HVO se od samog formiranja smatrao integralnom
komponentom oružanih snaga BiH, zajedno s Armijom
RBiH, i kao takav je bio prepoznat, a brojni dokumen-
ti pokazuju da je HVO bio konstitutivni dio oružanih
snaga Bosne i Hercegovine. U jeku muslimansko-hr-
vatskog sukoba, sredinom 1993., Ured predsjednika HZ
HB priopćio je: „HVO je muslimanski kao i hrvatski, 16
% vojnika HVO-a su Muslimani.“ Zapravo, HVO je bila
510
Domovinski rat 04-02-2020 Knjiga 1.indd 510
session of the Muslim SDA party in 1990 the 73 munici-
palities mentioned above were discussed in the context
of defending the country. The logical conclusion is that
the Muslims, from the outset, wanted to defend only the
Muslim municipalities and not the whole country. The 73
municipalities, not surprisingly, pledged allegiance to the
new TO HQ formed on April 8, 1992, in Sarajevo.
The Presidency of the HDZ BiH party, at a meeting
held in Široki Brijeg on June 4, 1992, praised the HVO for
its determined resistance to Serb aggression and decided:
“…to suggest to the Presidency and the government of
BiH to rename the TO BiH because the designation is not
suitable. The designation Republic Defense Council has
been proposed.” But, the Presidency of RBiH, on June 23,
1993, decided otherwise: “The TO BiH is re-designated as
the Army of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina and
the Armed Forces of the Republic of Bosnia and Herze-
govina are formed.”
On May 6, 1992, the commander of the HVO decided
to form a unified defense in the Jablanica municipality, in-
cluding “TO, the HVO, the Green Berets without prejudic-
ing future political developments.” The decision unequiv-
ocally shows that the Croatian leadership considered the
HVO as an integral part of the Armed Forces of Bosnia and
Herzegovina, equal in rights to the other defense compo-
nents, like the Green Berets, the Patriotic League or TO.
Besides, the Presidency of the BiH, at first, did not form,
apart from the Independent Battalion, units and brigades
in Herzegovina because it accepted the HVO’s defensive
role in the area. It is worth pointing out that in Posavina
the HVO had even more men under arms than in Herze-
govina. The legality of the HVO as a whole is confirmed
by the decisions of the Muslim representatives in Mostar,
D
Maglaj, Gornji Vakuf and other places to let the HVO de-
fend the areas in question. Therefore, the decision to form
the HVO was recognizsed as fully legal. The Decision of
the Presidency of the RBiH of June 20, 1992, on Declaring
a State of Emergency and recognizing as legal all forma-
R
tions defending the Republic tacitly confirmed the legal-
ity of the HVO.
On May 11, 1993, Tuđman made a statement relating
to the UN Security Council’s branding the HVO a para-
military unit. He argued that “in the agreement signed
by Izetbegović and Boban it is explicitly stated that both
formations – the ARBIH and the HVO are equally legal and
regular.” President Tuđman referred to the Agreement on
Friendship and Cooperation between Bosnia and Herze-
govina and Croatia of July 21, 1992, by which the HVO was
4.2.2020. 18:37:09
 Ante Nazor • PART II
jedina istinska multietnička vojna formacija u ratu u
Bosni i Hercegovini, prvenstveno Hrvata i Muslimana,
kao i ostalih koji su se željeli pridružiti. O tome govori
podatak da je HVO u 1992. godini imao 30 % Muslima-
na u svojim redovima. Dobru suradnju s Muslimanima
istaknuo je 17. svibnja 1992. i predsjednik HZ HB Mate
Boban: „U postrojbama Hrvatskog vijeća obrane, koje
se jedino suprotstavilo agresiji na Herceg-Bosnu, od
početka sudjeluju i branitelji iz redova muslimanskog
naroda. Deset je bojni sastavljeno od Muslimana, koje
H
su pod zapovjedništvom Hrvatskog vijeća obrane, u
Mostaru, Čapljini, Stocu, Livnu, Konjicu, Jablanici, Tomi-
slavgradu, Bosanskom Brodu, Derventi, Orašju, Odžaku,
Modriči, Bosanskom Šamcu. U zajedničkoj borbi nikad
nije bilo problema.“
Multietničnost HVO-a priznao je i glavni „sigurnjak“
M
ARBiH Fikret Muslimović u tekstu objavljenom 7. veljače
1993.: „U Armiji RBiH još uvijek se na važnijim funkcija-
ma u štabovima nalaze Hrvati, ali ih nema kao vojnika
u jedinicama. Međutim, kada je u pitanju HVO, stanje
je obrnuto jer u nekim postrojbama ima čak i do 70 %
Bošnjaka…“ (Fikret Muslimović, „Odbrana Republike“,
D
Ljiljan, Sarajevo-Ljubljana, 1995., 117).
Prekretnica se dogodila 30. lipnja 1993., nakon što
su, u skladu s planom vodstva ARBiH, muslimani pripad-
nici HVO-a u Hercegovini okrenuli oružje protiv Hrvata.
No, bez obzira na muslimansko-hrvatski sukob u
dijelu BiH, puna ravnopravnost i legalnost HVO-a pri-
C
znata je svim aktima – od uspostave Federacije do re-
levantnih zakonskih propisa koji reguliraju obranu.1048
Zakon o obrani Federacije Bosne i Hercegovine priznaje
potpuno ista prava vojnicima obje komponente Vojske
Federacije (HVO i ARBiH): „Vojska Federacije, nastala iz
D
Armije RBiH i Hrvatskog vijeća obrane, sastoji se od dvi-
je komponente do razine zdruga.“1049 Potpuno identič-
na prava za pripadnike HVO-a i ARBiH definirana su i u
Zakonu o pravima branitelja i članova njihovih obitelji:
“Braniteljem, u smislu ovoga Zakona, smatra se pripad-
nik Armije Republike Bosne i Hercegovine, Hrvatskog
vijeća obrane i policije nadležnog tijela unutarnjih po-
slova (u daljnjem tekstu: Oružane snage) koji je sudjelo-
vao u obrani Bosne i Hercegovine (početak agresije na
općinu Ravno) od 18. rujna 1991. do 23. prosinca 1996.
godine, odnosno do prestanka izravne ratne opasnosti
1048 Prlić, knjiga I, 315-325.
1049 Službene novine Federacije BiH, broj 34/04, 26. 6. 2004.,
članak 34.
511
Domovinski rat 04-02-2020 Knjiga 1.indd 511
recognized as an integral part of the armed forces of the
ARBIH and by which a joint HVO-ARBIH command was
to be established. However, the Muslims never honored
the agreement. Another agreement the Muslims failed to
honor was the one signed by Chief of the General Staff
of the Army of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina
Sefer Halilović and Chief of the HVO Main Staff Milivoj
Petković, on April 20, 1993, in Zenica. The Commander of
United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) in Bosnia
and Herzegovina General Philippe Morillon and Director
of the ECMM Regional Center Jean Pierre Thebault were
present at the signing of the agreement. Article 1 of the
agreement reads as follows: “The ARBIH and the HVO are
legal armed forces of BiH and enjoy equal treatment.” The
HVO is also referred to as an armed force of the RBiH in
the text of the agreement between Alija Izetbegović and
Mate Boban, signed shortly after midnight on April 25,
1993, in Zagreb. President Tuđman was present in the ca-
pacity of witness at the signing of the agreement.
From its inception the HVO considered itself as an in-
tegral part of the armed forces of BiH, equal in every way
to the ARBIH, and was legally recognized as such. Many
documents exist that prove that the HVO was a constit-
uent part of the armed forces of BiH. At the height of the
Muslim-Croat conflict, in the middle of 1993, the Office of
the President of the HZ HB issued the following statement:
“The HVO is just as much a Muslim force as it is Croatian.
16% of its soldiers are Muslims.” In fact, the HVO was the
only truly multi-ethnic military formation in the war in BiH,
composed primarily of Croats and Muslims but also of in-
dividuals of other ethnicities who chose to join it. In 1992,
30% of the HVO’s soldiers were Muslims. On May 17, 1992,
the President of HZ HB Mate Boban pointed out: “The HVO
is the only military formation that resisted the Serbs’ attack
on Herzeg-Bosnia. From day one Muslims have been fight-
ing in the HVO’s ranks. Ten battalions, consisting of Muslim
soldiers, are under the command of the HVO, in Mostar,
Čapljina, Stolac, Livno, Konjic, Jablanica, Tomislavgrad,
R
Bosanski Brod, Derventa, Orašje, Odžak, Modrići, Bosanski
Šamac. There has never been a problem between Muslims
and Croats during our joint struggle against the Serbs.”
The multi-ethnic character of the HVO was also recog-
nized by the ARBIH’s main intelligence officer Fikret Mus-
limović in a text published on February 7, 1993: “There are
still Croats in more important position in various ARBIH
HQs but there are no Croat soldiers in the ARBIH units. But,
the situation in the HVO is different. There, 70% of the sol-
diers in some units are Muslim…” (Muslimović 117).
4.2.2020. 18:37:09
 Ante Nazor • II DIO
i koji je demobiliziran rješenjem nadležnoga vojnog ti-
jela.”1050 Također, prema Zakonu o odbrani Bosne i Her-
cegovine, Oružane snage Republike Bosne i Hercegovi-
ne imaju tri prepoznatljive sastavnice – „tri pješadijska
puka koji su organizacije odgovorne za vojno naslijeđe
i identitet jedinica i naroda iz kojih potiču“,1051 tako da
pripadnici HVO-a i danas sudjeluju na obilježavanjima
ratnih događaja u BiH, kao pripadnici hrvatske kom-
ponente u sastavu Oružanih snaga BiH. Uostalom, i te-
meljem Zakona o posebnim pravima dobitnika ratnih
H
priznanja i odličja i članova njihovih obitelji (Službene
novine Federacije BiH, broj: 70/05) ista materijalna i ne-
materijalna prava ostvaruju pripadnici HVO-a kojima
je ratno odlikovanje dodijelio predsjednik Republike
Hrvatske Franjo Tuđman i pripadnici ARBiH kojima je
ratno odlikovanje dodijelio predsjednik Predsjedništva
M
RBiH Alija Izetbegović.
Prema tome, HVO je, i njegov civilni i njegov vojni
dio, od svoga osnivanja bio legalan i legitiman. Uporište
za svoje djelovanje imao je u zakonima Bosne i Herce-
govine, njegovi politički i vojni predstavnici sudjelova-
li su u svim pregovorima i sporazumima o BiH koji su
D
vođeni uz inicijativu i pokroviteljstvo međunarodne za-
jednice, a kao predstavnici hrvatskog naroda potpisnici
su i Washingtonskog i Daytonskog sporazuma.
Zahvaljujući Hrvatima, BiH je na referendumu ste-
kla pravne uvjete za priznanje, a Hrvati i Hrvatska naj-
zaslužniji su što se BiH uspjela obraniti od velikosrpske
C
agresije. Taj hrvatski obrambeni, a potom i oslobodilač-
ki pothvat ne spominje se u presudi Haškog suda hr-
vatskim dužnosnicima u predmetu Prlić i ostali, a ističe
samo razdoblje od siječnja 1993. do travnja 1994., koje
nije moguće razumjeti bez spoznaje o događajima iz
prethodnog razdoblja.
Višegodišnja medijska kampanja o zločinima Hr-
vata u BiH i odgovornosti hrvatskoga vodstva za „po-
grešnu“ politiku prema BiH razlog je što i danas u dijelu
hrvatske i svjetske javnosti postoji snažna percepcija o
negativnoj ulozi Hrvatske i Hrvata u ratu u BiH. Namet-
nuta je bezobraznim i bezobzirnim interpretacijama
izvora te neodgovornim iznošenjem zaključaka na te-
melju selektivnog prikaza pojedinih izvora, u čemu su
sudjelovali i najviši dužnosnici Republike Hrvatske. Dra-
stičan primjer toga je proglašavanje tadašnje hrvatske
1050 Službene novine Federacije BiH, broj 33/04, 19. 6. 2004.,
članak 2.
1051 Službeni glasnik BiH, broj 88/05, 5. 10. 2005., član 2/2.
512
Domovinski rat 04-02-2020 Knjiga 1.indd 512
The event marking the turning point occurred on
June 30, 1993, when, in accordance with the ARBIH lead-
ership’s plan, Muslim soldiers serving in the HVO units in
Herzegovina turned on the Croats.
Regardless of the Muslim-Croat conflict, which, it
has to be said, took place only in certain areas of BiH, it is
important to understand that the HVO’s full legality and
equality with the ARBIH was recognized and confirmed
by all the pertinent legal acts – from the establishment
of the Federation to the passing of the relevant legal pro-
visions regulating defense matters. The Law on Defense
of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina afforded the
same and equal rights to the soldiers serving in the ARBIH
and the soldiers serving in the HVO: “The Army of the Fed-
eration, created out of the ARBIH and the HVO, consists
of two components up to the brigade level.” The Law on
the Rights of War Veterans also guarantees the same and
equal rights to the members of the HVO and the ARBIH: “A
war veteran, within the context of this law, is a member of
the ARBIH, the HVO or the police force under the auspices
of the appropriate organ of the Ministry of Internal Affairs
(hereinafter referred to as the Armed Forces) who par-
ticipated in the defense of Bosnia and Herzegovina (the
attack on the Ravno Municipality marks the start of the
aggression) from September 18, 1991, until December 23,
1996, that is, until the end of the state of war, and who
was demobilized by a decision made by the appropriate
military organ.” According to the Law on Defense of the
Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Armed Forces
of BiH have three recognizable components: “Three infan-
try regiments which are also the organizations responsi-
ble for preserving the military legacy and identity of the
units and peoples they originate from.” HVO members, to
D
this day, participate, as members of the Croatian compo-
nent, in ceremonies commemorating events from the war
in BiH.37 According to the Law on special Rights of Win-
ners of War Acknowledgement and Medals and Members
of Their Families (Official Gazette of the FBiH, No. 70/05),
R
members of the HVO and the ARBIH who were awarded
military awards by Croatian President Franjo Tuđman and
President of the Presidency of the RBiH Alija Izetbegov-
ić respectively have the right to the same material and
non-material benefits.
Therefore, the HVO, its military component as well as
the civilian one, was legitimate, lawful and legal from its
37 Službeni glasnik BiH, broj 88/05, 5. 10. 2005., član 2/2.
4.2.2020. 18:37:09
 Ante Nazor • PART II
politike prema BiH zločinačkom i optuživanje Hrvatske
da je agresor na BiH, iako za takvu tvrdnju nema upori-
šta u cjelovito prikazanim izvorima. Uostalom, isti krug
ljudi je svojedobno i Oluju proglasio zločinačkom. Isto-
dobno, razmjeri neznanja u Hrvatskoj i svijetu o strada-
nju Hrvata u BiH, posebice o stradanju Hrvata središ-
nje Bosne u napadima Armije RBiH, zaprepašćujući su.
Stoga se, umjesto teze „da je drugostupanjska presuda
šestorici Hrvata konačan epilog pogrešne hrvatske, od-
nosno Tuđmanove – HDZ-ove politike u BiH“, kako to
H
komentiraju neki političari, nameće zaključak da je ona
epilog jednog dužeg razdoblja specijalnog rata protiv
Hrvatske i Hrvata u BiH tijekom kojega su u medijski
prostor ubačene brojne laži, dezinformacije i poluistine,
a prešućeno je mnogo toga.
Svaki zločin treba osuditi, a njegove počinitelje ka-
M
zniti – neovisno o njihovoj nacionalnoj i vjerskoj pripad-
nosti, te izraziti sućut prema svim nevinim žrtvama u
ratu u RH i BiH, no činjenica je da su zločini nad Hrvatima
u BiH uglavnom medijski prešućeni ili umanjivani, iako
su bili brojniji i rasprostranjeniji od onih za koje se optu-
žuju Hrvati. Istina je da su zločini koje su počinili pripad-
D
nici hrvatskih postrojbi nad muslimanima u Ahmićima
(16. travnja 1993.) i Stupnom Dolu (23. listopada 1993.),
te zatvaranje i protjerivanje Bošnjaka-muslimana na
pojedinim područjima BiH pod nadzorom hrvatskih
snaga, privukli veliku pozornost politike, medija i me-
đunarodnog suda u Haagu, za razliku od zločina koje su
C
počinili pripadnici Armije RBiH nad Hrvatima: u Busova-
či (Gusti Grab, 26. siječnja 1993.) i okolici, Zenici i selima
Dusina (26. siječnja 1993.), Šušanj i drugim naseljima u
toj općini, u Konjicu i selima Orlište (25. ožujka), Bušćak
(14. travnja 1993.), Trusina (16. travnja, istoga dana kad
D
je počinjen i zločin u Ahmićima) i drugim naseljima u toj
općini, Doljanima (općina Jablanica), Gornjem Vakufu/
Uskoplju, Bugojnu i okolnim naseljima (Gračanica, Vuči-
polje...), Zavidovićima, Kiseljaku (Žepče), Kiseljaku kraj
Sarajeva, Varešu i okolici (selo Kopijari – 21. listopada
1993., dva dana prije zločina u Stupnom Dolu), Kaknju
i okolici, Vitezu i okolnim naseljima (Križančevo Selo,
Buhine Kuće, Brdo – Zabilje, Bobaši...), Novom Travni-
ku i okolnim naseljima (Rastovci, Zenepići...), Travniku
i okolnim naseljima (Maljine/Bikoši, Čukle, Dolac...), Uz-
dolu, Hudutskom, Jurićima i drugim naseljima (općina
Prozor), Gračanici, Fojnici i okolnim naseljima (Polje Šći-
tovo, Ostružnica...), u Mostaru, čak i u Grabovici, dubo-
ko iza linije bojišta, na teritoriju pod kontrolom Armije
RBiH (općina Mostar), i drugim naseljima.
513
Domovinski rat 04-02-2020 Knjiga 1.indd 513
very inception. Its existence was grounded in BiH’s laws,
its military and civilian representatives participated in all
negotiations and agreements regarding BiH initiated and
concluded at the instigation of the international commu-
nity and were, as the representatives of the Croatian peo-
ple cosignatories of the Washington Agreement and the
Dayton Agreement.
Thanks to the Bosnian Croats, BiH, with the results
of the referendum on independence, secured the legal
conditions for international recognition. Furthermore,
the Bosnian Croats and the Republic of Croatia played the
pivotal role in the defense of the country against the Serb
aggression. Therefore, the Croats first enabled BiH to be
internationally recognized, then saved it from the Serbs’
attack and finally played the main role in the liberation of
the occupied territories. None of the above is mentioned
in the text explaining the verdict in the Prlić et al. case. In-
stead, the text focuses on the period from January, 1993,
to April, 1994. The very drift of the explanation defeats
the veracity of its argument. The abovementioned period
cannot be put into any meaningful or logical context, or
understood without reference to the events that preced-
ed it and caused it.
A fair few people in Croatia and the world perceive
the role the Republic of Croatia and Bosnian Croats played
during the war in BiH as negative. This is not surprising in
light of the fact that many media outlets, both in Croa-
tia and abroad, have been waging a campaign, for years,
aimed at depicting the Republic of Croatia’s policies to-
wards BiH during the war as “wrong” and at shifting the
focus from historical facts to crimes, real, imagined and
fabricated, committed by Croats in BiH. This media on-
slaught against the Bosnian Croats and the Republic of
Croatia is characterized by flippant, superficial and down-
right fallacious interpretations of history in general and
the events that led to and took place during the war in
BiH in particular and by misleading conclusions reached
on the basis of selective and injudicious scrutiny of both
R
primary and questionable sources. Unfortunately, a num-
ber of the highest ranking Croatian officials partook, for
their own narrow and venal gains, in the rush to twist the
historical facts. The dynamic of the thrust to vilify Croatia
and Bosnian Croats has been fairly successful and reaped
a number of results detrimental to Croatia, some of them
quite drastic. For example, the Republic of Croatia’s poli-
cies toward BiH during the war have been condemned as
criminal and Croatia has been accused of having waged
an aggressive war against BiH. The condemnation and
4.2.2020. 18:37:09
 Ante Nazor • II DIO
H
Grobovi petero, od osmero djece, koja su ubijena u Vitezu 10.
lipnja 1993., od granate ispaljene s položaja muslimanske Armije
M
RBiH (autor fotografije: Srećko Stipović).
The graves of five, out of eight, children killed in Vitez on June
10, 1993, by a shell fired from positions held by the ARBiH.
D
Prema podacima iz izvora “najmanje sedam puta
više civila Hrvata i zarobljenih pripadnika HVO-a ubili
su ‘neki’ pripadnici ARBiH, nego što su ‘neki’ pripadnici
HVO-a ubili civila Muslimana – Bošnjaka i zarobljenih
C
pripadnika ARBiH”, a isti omjer navodi se i kod među-
sobnog protjerivanja.
Prešućeno je i u hrvatskoj i svjetskoj javnosti malo
je poznato čak i ubojstvo osmero hrvatske djece u Vi-
tezu, među koje je 10. lipnja 1993., oko 20.45 sati, pala
mina kalibra 120 mm ispaljena iz smjera položaja Armi-
je RBiH na prostor zaštićen od snajpera, na kojem su se
redovito igrala djeca, hrvatska i muslimansko-bošnjač-
ka. Toga dana nije bilo nijednog muslimansko-bošnjač-
kog djeteta. Odmah je smrtno stradalo petero djece,
a troje je umrlo u bolnici u Novoj Bili: Milan Garić (rođ.
1981.), Sanja Garić (1975.), Dragan Ramljak (1978.),
Velimir Grebenar (1981.), Augustina Grebenar (1984.),
Boris Antičević (1983.), Draženko Čečura (1978.) i Sanja
Križanović (1978.). Videosnimke toga ubojstva, koje je
snimila lokalna TV Vitez, ni jedna inozemna TV kuća nije
htjela objaviti!1052
1052 Srećko Stipović, Terorizam bez kazne – stradanje Hrvata
Lašvanske doline, 1992. - 2014., Vitez, listopad 2014.
514
Domovinski rat 04-02-2020 Knjiga 1.indd 514
the accusation have no basis in historic facts whatsoever,
or, for that matter, in primary sources. It is interesting to
note that the same people who have been vilifying Croa-
tia’s role in the war in BiH are the same people who, when
the verdict of the issue hung in the balance directly as a
result of the media campaign against Croatia, claimed
that Operation Storm had been a criminal undertaking. It
has to be pointed out that an alarming number of Cro-
ats are not aware of the scope and degree of the Bosnian
Croats’ suffering, especially those in central Bosnia, at the
hands of the ARBIH. By the same token, most people out-
side Croatia, even those who know quite a bit about the
war in BiH, are blissfully ignorant of the fact that the AR-
BIH committed numerous crimes against humanity and
war crimes against Bosnian Croats. The above refutes the
claim voiced by some politicians that the outcome of the
Prlić et al. case is the final chapter in Tuđman’s, and by ex-
tension, the HDZ’s folly as regards Croatia’s policies in BiH
and reveals that the verdict is in fact the culmination of
a prolonged period of a special war against Croatia and
the Bosnian Croats, during which many media outlets
published and broadcast numerous lies, half-truths and
pieces of disinformation and ignored pertinent facts and
pieces of evidence.
Every crime needs to be condemned and the perpe-
trators put on trial and punished – irrespective of their
national or religious affiliation. Sympathy should be ex-
tended to all innocent victims of war crimes and crimes
against humanity committed during the war in Croatia
and the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina. But, the crimes
committed against Croats in BiH have been, for the most
part, ignored or trivialized by the media. It is a fact that
the Muslims committed more crimes against humanity
D
and war crimes than the Croats during the war in BiH.
Also, the scope of the crimes committed by the Muslims
exceeded that of those committed by the Croats. Howev-
er, the crimes committed by members of Croatian units
against Muslims in Ahmići (April 16, 1993) and Stupni Do
R
(October 23, 1993) and imprisonment and forced expul-
sion of Muslims/Bosniaks by Croats in some areas of BiH
under Croat control have drawn a lot of attention from the
media, politicians and the Hague Tribunal. On the other
hand, the crimes committed by members of the ARBIH
against Croats in Busovača (Gusti Grab, January 26, 1993)
and the surrounding area, in Zenica and the villages of
Dusina (January 26, 1993), Šušanj and other locales in the
municipality, in Konjic and the villages of Orlište (March
25) Bušćak (April 14, 1993), Trusina (April 16, the same day
4.2.2020. 18:37:09
 Ante Nazor • PART II
U hrvatskoj javnosti poznata je sudbina Kate Šoljić
(rođ. 1923.), majke kojoj su srpske snage u Vukovaru
i okolici 1991. ubile četiri sina: Niku (rođ. 1942.), Miju
(1945.), Ivu (1948.) i Matu (1952.) te zeta Ivana Vukoje-
vića (1953.), a koja je sličnu tragediju već doživjela po
završetku Drugoga svjetskog rata, kad su joj komunisti
ubili četiri brata: Ivu, Martina, Ivana i Petra. No, u hrvat-
skim i svjetskim medijima prešućena je sudbina Hrvatice
Anice Jurić iz Kovača u središnjoj Bosni, kojoj su pripad-
nici Armije RBiH 13. lipnja 1993. naočigled ubili supruga
H
Juru (rođ. 1941.) i tri sina: Stjepana (1968.), Ljubomira
(1972.) i Dragana (1973.). Kao i sudbina Sarafine Lauš,
travničke Hrvatice iz sela Ćukle, kojoj su pripadnici Ar-
mije RBiH, također u lipnju 1993., ubili supruga Ivu (rođ.
1939.) i tri sina: Miroslava (1970.), Fabijana (1961.) i Dra-
guna (1959.). Kao i sudbina obitelji Ilije Solde, kojemu
M
su pripadnici Armije RBiH u istom danu, 28. 7. 1993., u
Doljanima ubili tri sina: Peru (1967.), Ivana (1969.) i Juru
(1970.). Kao i sudbina Ane Ivandić, kojoj su srpski vojnici
24. srpnja 1992. u Briševu kod Prijedora ubili tri sina: Peju
(rođ. 1954.), Stipu (1959.) i Milana (1963.), a istoga dana
ubijena je i njezina snaha Lucija, tako da je četvero djece
D
u istom danu ostalo bez oba roditelja – Lucije i Peje.1053
Nasuprot tome, u nastojanju da se Hrvatska prikaže
kao agresor na BiH, ide se u takvu krajnost da se, primje-
rice, prilikom navođenja “logističkog osiguranja HVO-a”
kao “dokaza” o “agresiji Hrvatske na BiH” ističe čak i poda-
tak da su “ranjeni pripadnici HVO-a liječeni u bolnicama
C
u Hrvatskoj”.1054 Dakako, prešućuje se činjenica da su u
Hrvatskoj postojali i logistički centri Armije RBiH, te da
se u bolnicama u Hrvatskoj (u Splitu, Zagrebu, Slavon-
skom Brodu, Karlovcu, Vinkovcima, Metkoviću i ostalim
bolnicama) istodobno liječilo više od 10.000 ranjenih
D
pripadnika Armije RBiH i civila – Muslimana iz BiH (u taj
broj nisu uračunati liječeni bolesnici). Prema podacima
ratnoga ravnatelja KBC-a Split, prof. dr. sc. Mihovila Bio-
čića, kada se rat proširio na BiH – „u skladu sa savješću
i hrvatskom politikom 1990-ih“, KBC Split je pružio me-
dicinsku i svekoliku humanitarnu pomoć susjednoj BiH.
Na području BiH hrvatsko zdravstvo opskrbljivalo je 65
mjesta (od Tomislavgrada i Livna, Viteza, do Sarajeva,
Brčkog, Žepča, Zenice, Bijeljine, Tuzle, Živinica itd.), u
ljudstvu, lijekovima, opremi, sanitetskom materijalu, hi-
1053 Franjo Piplović i Ivo Atlija, Briševački mučenici, Banja
Luka, 2017., 372-374.
1054 Smail Čekić, Agresija na Republiku Bosnu i Hercegovinu
(planiranje, pripreme, izvođenje), knj. 2, Sarajevo, 2004.
515
Domovinski rat 04-02-2020 Knjiga 1.indd 515
when the crime in Ahmići was committed) and other plac-
es in the municipality, Doljani (Jablanica Municipality),
Gornji Vakuf/Uskoplje, Bugojno and surrounding villag-
es (Gračanica, Vučipolje…), Zavidovići, Kiseljak (Žepče),
Kiseljak near Sarajevo, Vareš and its environs (the village
of Kopijari – October 21, 1993 – two days before the
crime in Stupni Do), Kakanj and its environs, Vitez and the
surrounding villages (Križančevo Selo, Buhine Kuće, Br-
do-Zabilje, Bobaši), Novi Travnik and the surrounding vil-
lages (Rastovci, Zenepići…), Travnik and the surrounding
villages (Maljine/Bikoši, Čukle, Dolac…) Uzdol, Hudutsko,
Jurići and other settlements and villages (Prozor Munic-
ipality), Gračanica, Fojnica and the surrounding villages
(Polje Šćitovo, Ostružnica…), in Mosor and even in Grabo-
vica deep in the Muslims’ rear and other locales went, for
the most part, completely unnoticed by the world public
and the world media.
According to verifiable sources “‘certain’ members of
the ARBIH murdered at least seven times more Croat ci-
vilians and HVO POWs than ‘certain’ members of the HVO
murdered Muslim/Bosniak civilians and ARBIH POWs.” Ac-
cording to the same sources, the same 7:1 ratio applies
also to forced expulsions. Both the Croatian and the world
media ignored the murder of eight Croat children in Vi-
tez. On June 10, 1993, around 2045 hours, a 120-mm shell
was fired from the direction of ARBIH positions at an area
protected against sniper fire where Croat and Muslim
children regularly played. On that day, however, not a sin-
gle Muslim/Bosniak kid was among the children playing
there. Five children were immediately killed by the ex-
plosion and the other three died of their wounds in the
Nova Bila hospital – Milan Garić (born 1981), Sanja Garić
(born 1975), Dragan Ramljak (born 1978), Velimir Grebe-
nar (born 1981), Augustina Grebenar (born 1984), Boris
Antičević (born 1983), Draženko Čečura (born 1978) and
Sanja Križanović (born 1978). The video footage of that
ghastly and heinous crime, filmed by the local TV Vitez
network, no foreign TV network wanted to air.
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The Croatian public is aware of the fate of Kata Šol-
jić (born 1923). In Vukovar and its environs Serb soldiers
murdered her four sons – Niko (born 1942), Mijo (born
1945, Ivo (born 1948) and Mate (born 1952) – and her
son-in-law – Ivan Vukojević (born 1953). She had already
suffered a similar tragedy at the end of WWII, when Com-
munists murdered her four brothers – Ivo, Martin, Ivan
and Petar. The Croatian and the world media ignored the
fate of Anica Jurić, a Croat woman from Kovač in central
Bosnia. ARBIH soldiers, on June 13, 1993, murdered her
4.2.2020. 18:37:09
 Ante Nazor • II DIO
gijenskim potrepštinama, hrani itd. Sva pomoć pružana
je bez obzira na nacionalni ili vjerski sastav stanovništva.
Oko 25 % sanitetskog materijala i lijekova (bez obzira
na to jesu li kupljeni ili donirani), KBC Split je darovao
u BiH. Primjerice, oko 17.500 doza krvi prikupljeno je sa
splitskog područja za liječenje vojnih i civilnih osoba iz
BiH u splitskoj bolnici, a za ratne bolnice na terenu u BiH
(Rama, Tomislavgrad, Livno, Mostar, Nova Bila i Kiseljak,
gdje je KBC Split formirao i transfuzijske laboratorije) od
1993. do sredine 1996. ukupno su još izdane najmanje
H
6764 doze krvi (dokumentacija se još sređuje).
Liječenje i skrb koje je KBC Split obavljao za držav-
ljane BiH u splitskoj bolnici i na području BiH, bili su
dragovoljni i u cijelosti besplatni, na teret siromašnog
proračuna razorene, djelomično okupirane i same vrlo
potrebite hrvatske države. KBC Split je državna bolnica i
M
to je bila tadašnja hrvatska državna politika.
Splitska bolnica je od 1991. do 1996. liječila ukupno
261.435 bolesnika i ranjenika, od toga 31.086 ranjenika i
bolesnika iz BiH (11,89 %). U toj brojci je bilo oko 30 – 40
% muslimana (svi podaci još nisu obrađeni). Od toga je
bilo 4200 teško bolesne i dijelom ranjene djece (76). U
D
splitskom rodilištu rodila su se 4493 djeteta čiji su rodi-
telji došli iz BiH (imali su izbjeglički status), a od te djece
975 je trebalo neonatološko liječenje i pojačanu skrb.
Tome treba pridodati (po protokolu) 15.754 većinom ra-
njenika i neznatni broj bolesnika u osam ratnih bolnica
u BiH, koje je organizirao KBC Split. Iz 27 mjesta BiH, KBC
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Split je organizirao smještaj u inozemstvu, u 15 država
za 302 teška ranjenika i bolesnika (većinom Muslimana),
često uz pratnju vlastitog medicinskog osoblja. Vrlo je
zanimljiva činjenica da su u BiH na pojedinim mjestima
na ukrcaj u helikopter za prijevoz u splitsku bolnicu ra-
njeni vojnici HVO-a čekali ranjene vojnike ARBiH, a još je
važnije napomenuti da su generali i drugi časnici HVO-a
vrlo često, pa i tijekom sukoba, nazivali Upravu splitske
bolnice da osigura smještaj i neprijateljskim vojnicima
ARBiH i njihovim obiteljima. Zar bi itko mogao doći do
Splita, a da to nisu odobrile i čak organizirale hrvatske
vojne i civilne vlasti u BiH?!
Svekolika briga o velikom broju izbjeglica iz BiH
koje je Hrvatska primila i o njima skrbila smještajem u
svojim najboljim hotelima, koji su ostali devastirani, po-
seban je problem s više gledišta (medicinski, socijalni,
humanitarni ...). Primjerice, samo u rujnu 1993. na širem
području Splita (Kaštela, Solina, Trogira i Splita) bilo je
smješteno oko 180.000 izbjeglica (zajedno s prognani-
cima oko 300.000), o kojima je skrbila splitska bolnica,
516
Domovinski rat 04-02-2020 Knjiga 1.indd 516
husband Jure (born 1941) and three sons – Stjepan (born
1968), Ljubomir (born 1972) and Dragan (born 1973) right
in front of her. The Croatian general public is not aware of
the fate of Sarafina Lauš, a Croat woman from the village
of Čukle in the Travnik Municipality. ARBIH soldiers, also in
June, 1993, murdered her husband Ivo (born 1939) and
her three sons – Miroslav (born 1971), Fabijan (born 1961),
and Dragun (born 1959). On July 28, 1993, ARBiH soldiers
murdered three sons of Ilija Soldo in Doljani: Pero (born
1967), Ivan (born 1969), and Jure (born 1970). Another
tragedy not known by the Croatian public is that suffered
by Ana Ivandić. Serb soldiers, on July 24, 1992, in Briševo
near Prijedor, murdered her three sons – Pejo (born 1954),
Stipe (born 1959) and Milan (born 1963). On the same day
her daughter-in-law Lucija was also murdered. Lucija and
Pejo left four kids behind.
Those bent on vilifying Croatia’s role in the war in
BiH are not averse to stretching the limits of credulity in
their quest to depict Croatia as the aggressor in the war
in BiH. For example, when referring to “the logistics sup-
port for the HVO” as “evidence” of “Croatia’s aggression
against BiH”, they point out that “wounded HVO members
received medical care in Croatia”. Of course, those same
people ignore the fact that ARBIH logistics bases existed
in the Republic of Croatia and also the fact that wounded
ARBIH soldiers and Muslim civilians from BiH were treat-
ed in hospitals in Croatia – Split, Zagreb, Slavonski Brod,
Karlovac, Vinkovci, Metković and in other hospitals in oth-
er cities in Croatia (the number does not include Muslim
patients suffering from various illness and afflictions).
According to the then director of the KBC Split hospital,
Prof. Mihovil Biočić, Ph.D., when the war spread to BiH –
“in keeping with the dictates of conscience and Croatian
D
official polices in the 1990s” the KBC Split provided med-
ical and humanitarian help to BiH. The Croatian Health
Services supplied 65 towns in BiH (from Tomislavgrad and
Livno, Vitez, to Sarajevo, Brčko, Žepče, Zenica, Bjeljina, Tu-
zla, Živnica etc.) with personnel, medicines, equipment,
R
medical supplies, food etc). All this help was sent to those
in need, irrespective of their nationality or religious affil-
iation. Around 25% of all available medical supplies and
medicines (bought and donated) the KBC Split gave to
BiH. For example, about 17,500 units of blood were col-
lected in the Split area for the soldiers and civilians from
BiH who were treated in the Split hospital. The KBC Split,
from 1993 to mid-1996, sent at least 6,764 units of blood
(documentation is still not complete) to hospitals in BiH –
Rama, Tomislavgrad, Livno, Mostar, Nova Bila and Kiseljak
4.2.2020. 18:37:09
 Ante Nazor • PART II
ali i čitava zajednica. Ovaj golemi posao KBC ne bi mo-
gao obaviti bez pomoći dobrih ljudi iz Hrvatske i svijeta.
Uz humanitarne organizacije, pomagali su „mali“ ljudi
i oni iz kraljevskih kuća, tako da je primljeno oko 5000
donacija (većinom vrlo dobrih, iako je bilo i nekorisnih)
u lijekovima, potrošnom sanitetskom materijalu i medi-
cinskoj opremi, hrani, higijenskim potrepštinama itd. Za
svu pomoć susjednoj državi BiH, najviše zahvala i prizna-
nja KBC Split dobio je od vojnih i civilnih predstavnika
muslimanskog naroda, pa i od samog predsjednika BiH
H
Alije Izetbegovića. Također treba spomenuti da je KBC
Split pružio znatnu pomoć i pri evakuaciji židovskih obi-
telji iz Sarajeva i Mostara. Nikad nikome nije uskratio po-
moć, niti neprijatelju! Ovu istinu pred svjetskom javnosti
je svjedočilo više od 90 državnih i privatnih TV postaja i
novinskih kuća iz svijeta, koji su posjetili KBC Split. Tije-
M
kom 1990-ih hrvatski liječnici i ostalo zdravstveno oso-
blje, u skladu s Hipokratovom zakletvom i hrvatskom
državnom politikom, liječili su sve potrebite i sve građa-
ne BiH, bez obzira na nacionalnost, vojnu pripadnost i
vjeroispovijest.1055
Činjenica je da, nakon oružanog sukoba u Gornjem
D
Vakufu, kronologija međusobnih zločina pripadnika
ARBiH i HVO-a tijekom 1993. na području BiH započinje
26. siječnja 1993. zločinom pripadnika ARBiH nad Hrva-
tima u selima Dusina (općina Zenica) i Gusti Grab (opći-
na Busovača) u središnjoj Bosni. Pripadnici ARBiH poči-
nili su zločin nad Hrvatima u Orlištu (25. ožujka 1993.) i
C
Bušćaku (14. travnja 1993.), prije tragičnog događaja u
selu Ahmići. Za američkoga vojnog povjesničara Char-
lesa R. Shradera „nema dvojbe” da su Ahmići u trenutku
“neočekivanoga napada HVO-a bili legitiman vojni cilj,
kako zbog svojeg položaja, tako i zbog vjerojatnosti da
D
se snage ARBiH koriste selom kao svojim polazištem”.
Neosporno je da su 16. travnja 1993. Ahmiće branile “lo-
kalne muslimanske snage Teritorijalne obrane i dijelovi
ARBiH koji su se pripremali za napad preko ceste Travnik
– Kaonik”. U zaključku o akciji HVO-a na Ahmiće, Shra-
der zaključuje: “S isključivo vojnog motrišta, neočekivani
napad HVO-a na Ahmiće bio je vrlo uspješan. Planirani
muslimanski napad preko ceste Travnik – Busovača kod
Ahmića u potpunosti je onemogućen i nije mogao biti
obnovljen. Međutim, uništavanja u selu bila su užasava-
1055 Podaci iz rukopisa ratnog ravnatelja KBC-a Split dr. sc.
Mihovila Biočića, Kaštel Sućurac, 15. travnja 2019.
517
Domovinski rat 04-02-2020 Knjiga 1.indd 517
– where the KBC Split set up transfusion laboratories.
The medical treatment and other medical services the
KBC Split provided to BiH citizens in the hospital itself and
in BiH were free of charge and conducted on a voluntary
basis, meaning that the Republic of Croatia footed the bill
out of its, at that time, meager budget. It has to be kept in
mind that at the time Croatia was devastated by the war
and that a sizable portion of its territory was under Serb
occupation. The KBC Split is a state hospital and the help
it provided to BiH during the war formed an integral part
of the Republic of Croatia’s policy towards BiH.
261,435 sick and wounded people were treated in the
Split hospital from 1991 to 1996. 31,086 of those were sick
and wounded people from BiH (11.89%). About 30-40%
of the patients from BiH were Muslims (not all available
data have been processed yet). Out of the 31,086 sick and
wounded people from BiH 4,200 were children suffering
from serious illnesses or wounded. 4,493 children, whose
parents had fled BiH (and been granted refugee status in
the Republic of Croatia), were born in the Split hospital.
975 of these children required neonatal care. An addition-
al 15,754 people, mostly wounded and a small number
of sick, were treated in the 8 hospitals set up by the KBC
Split in BiH. The KBC Split secured accommodation in 15
foreign countries for 302 seriously wounded and/or sick
patients, most of them Muslims from 27 BiH towns and
villages. For the most part, these patients were accompa-
nied by medical staff from Croatia. It is important to point
out that it often happened that wounded HVO soldiers
had to wait to be put aboard helicopters and transported
to the Split hospital because the helicopters were ordered
to wait for wounded ARBIH soldiers. It is also worth men-
tioning that HVO generals and other officers very often,
even during the Muslim-Croat conflict, called the Split
hospital administration department to secure accommo-
dation for family members of the wounded ARBIH soldiers
treated in the hospital. No wounded Muslim soldier or ci-
vilian could have reached Split without both the approval
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of and transport secured by the Croat military and civilian
authorities in BiH.
The Republic of Croatia took in a huge number of ref-
ugees from BiH. The refugees were accommodated in lux-
ury hotels, many of them located on the Croatian coast.
The Croatian taxpayers footed that bill too and eventually
paid for renovating many a facility left devastated by the
then disposed and dislocated occupants from BiH. Croa-
tia, in the midst of waging a war for its own survival, had to
grapple with a refugee crisis of daunting proportions. The
4.2.2020. 18:37:09
 Ante Nazor • II DIO
juća, a civilne žrtve strašne”.1056 To što su, uz pripadnike
ARBiH ubijene u borbi, ubijeni i civili u selu, zločin je za
koji nema opravdanja, kao što nema opravdanja ni za
navedene zločine nad Hrvatima, uglavnom prešućene
u svjetskim medijima, pa čak i u medijima u Hrvatskoj.
Za zločin koji su neki pripadnici HVO-a počinili nad
Bošnjacima-muslimanima u Ahmićima hrvatska javnost
treba znati i upoznata je, no postavlja se pitanje zašto se
vrlo malo zna o zločinima pripadnika Armije RBiH nad
Hrvatima u BiH, čak i kad je riječ o zločinima u kojima je
H
istoga dana ubijen veći broj civila i zarobljenih vojnika
HVO-a, a njihova imovina zapaljena i razrušena. Primje-
ćujući da “prešućivanje zločina nad Hrvatima u BiH ide
u prilog tezi da su za rat u BiH podjednako krivi i Srbi i
Hrvati”, Carol Hodge je u svojoj knjizi napisala:
Za samo nekoliko sati, vijest o pokolju u Ahmićima iza-
M
zvala je pozornost javnosti širom svijeta i imala je golem
utjecaj na sliku rata u BiH u javnosti, i to upravo u trenutku
kada su Sjedinjene Američke Države razmišljale o provođe-
nju zračnih udara na srpske položaje i prijetile ukidanjem
embarga na oružje. (...) Događaji od 15. i 16. travnja 1993.,
uključujući i otmicu hrvatskoga generala (brigadira, Živka,
D
op. ur.) Totića, ubojstvo četvorice njegovih tjelesnih čuvara
usred dana u Zenici (počinitelji pripadnici Armije RBiH,
op. ur.), kao i napadi na Vitez, Ahmiće, Šantiće i još neka
sela, politički i vojno bili su posve neobjašnjivi i lokalnom
pučanstvu i stranim promatračima. Neki su držali da je su-
kob potaknut izvana. (...) U zbrci nastaloj 16. travnja, kada
C
su uzduž Lašvanske doline iznenada izbili sukobi, i to dok
su se mnogi trudili što je moguće više umanjiti i otkloniti
posljedice otmice generala Totića u Zenici od prethodnog
dana, možda je djelomice i razumljivo što su stvarni raz-
mjeri zvjerstava počinjenih u Ahmićima izmakli kontroli
zapovjednika BritBata (Britanskog bataljuna UN-a) i nje-
govim visokim časnicima. (...) U očima svjetske javnosti
otkriće pokolja u Ahmićima gotovo je preko noći promi-
jenilo sliku o ratu u Bosni i Hercegovini. Pozornost i zani-
manje medija diljem svijeta za taj događaj kao da su tre-
bali potvrditi tezu o tome kako su u tome ratu Srbi i Hrvati
podjednako krivi, a taj je dojam još više pojačavala javna
reakcija pukovnika Stewarta, kojom je osudio ‘krvavi HVO’.
U uobičajenim okolnostima takva se ocjena mogla držati
kršenjem postupovnih pravila UN-a o nepristranosti, ali u
ovoj prigodi Stewarta se predstavilo kao vrlo sposobna i
1056 Charles R. Shrader, Muslimansko-hrvatski građanski rat u
srednjoj Bosni, Golden marketing – Tehnička knjiga, Za-
greb, 2004., 146-152.
518
Domovinski rat 04-02-2020 Knjiga 1.indd 518
refugee issue presented a number of acute problems for
the Croatian government – problems of medical, social,
humanitarian nature. For example, in September, 1993,
alone there were around 180,000 refugees (300,000, to-
gether with the displaced persons) accommodated in
the Split area (Kaštel, Solin, Trogir and Split). They were
in the care of the KBC Split hospital and the community
at large. The KBC Split hospital would not have been able
to accomplish this gargantuan task without the help of
Croatian citizens and people of good will from across the
world. Humanitarian organizations stepped up, ordinary
people stepped up, members of royal families stepped
up… About 5,000 donations were received (most of
them containing items and stuffs sorely needed; a small
portion, on the other hand, contained useless trinkets) –
medicines, medical supplies, medical equipment, food,
hygienic products etc. The KBC Split received numerous
acknowledgements and recognitions for its help to BiH
from high ranking ARBIH officers and high ranking Mus-
lim government officials, including the president of BiH,
Alija Izetbegović. It is worth pointing out that the KBC
Split helped with the evacuation of Jewish families from
Sarajevo and Mostar. The KBC Split never refused help to
anyone, including enemy combatants and more than 90
state-run and private TV stations and newspapers from
around the world, whose reporters visited the hospital,
published articles or aired reports acknowledging that
truth. During the 1990s Croatian doctors and other medi-
cal staff, following both the letter and the spirit of Hippo-
cratic Oath and honoring the official Croatian policies to-
wards BiH, treated all those BiH citizens in need of medical
help or attention irrespective of the patients’ nationality,
religion or military affiliation.
D
It is a fact that, after the chalshes in Gornji Vakuf, the
chronology of crimes committed by members of the HVO
and members of the ARBIH during 1993 in BiH starts on
January 26, 1993, with a crime committed by ARBIH sol-
diers against Croats in the village of Dusina (Zenica Mu-
R
nicipality) and the village of Gusti Grab (Busovača Munici-
pality) in central Bosnia. ARBIH soldiers committed a crime
against Croats in Orlište (March 25, 1993) and Bušćak
(April 14, 1993), before the tragic incident in the village of
Ahmići. The American military historian Charles R. Shrad-
er convincingly argues that the village of Ahmići “was un-
doubtedly a legitimate military target for an HVO spoiling
attack at the time by virtue of both its location and its
probable use as an ARBIH staging area”. It is beyond dis-
pute that on April 16, 1993, Ahmići was defended by “by
4.2.2020. 18:37:10
 Ante Nazor • PART II
visoko profesionalna vojnika u kojega je, zbog razumljivih
razloga, na trenutak srce zavladalo umom.1057
Radi boljeg razumijevanja i cjelovitijeg prikaza do-
gađaja, treba podsjetiti da je u tijeku srpskih napada na
Jajce, na kontrolnoj točki ARBiH u Ahmićima, na važnoj
prometnici Vitez – Busovača, 20. listopada 1992. zaustav-
ljena postrojba HVO-a s oko 150 vojnika iz središnje Bo-
sne i nije mogla doći u pomoć Jajcu. Isto tako, postrojba
HVO-a nacionalno mješovitoga sastava koja je 28. listo-
pada krenula iz Gruda u pomoć braniteljima Jajca bila je
H
putem zaustavljana, opstruirana i nije uspjela na vrijeme
stići do Jajca, grada koji su srpske snage okupirale do 30.
listopada. Časnici HVO-a optužili su muslimansku stranu
za pad Jajca jer su se postrojbe ARBiH u večernjim sati-
ma 26. listopada 1992. po zapovijedi povukle s položaja.
Prema informacijama kojima su raspolagale institucije
M
HVO-a, zapovijed za povlačenje preko jednoga od za-
povjednika ARBiH u središnjoj Bosni, Džemala Merdana,
došla je izravno od Sefera Halilovića. Poslije su, prema
ustaljenome obrascu, muslimanski mediji optužili HVO
za povlačenje i pad Jajca. Taj i drugi primjeri, posebice
pokušaji opravdanja ili negiranja počinjenih zločina,
D
pokazuju da su laži, poluistine i prešućivanja bili temelj
političke i ratne propagande ARBiH i dijela vodećih boš-
njačko-muslimanskih političara.1058
Također, radi razumijevanja konteksta događaja,
treba podsjetiti da je ujutro 16. travnja 1993., istovre-
meno s događajima u Ahmićima i Trusini na području
C
Konjica, počeo napad ARBiH na Busovaču u središnjoj
Bosni, koji je busovačka brigada HVO-a odbila uz velike
gubitke. Idućega dana, istovremeno s događajima u So-
vićima i Doljanima, muslimanske su snage napale Kuber,
da bi osvojile dio prometnice Kaonik – Vitez i okružile
D
Busovaču.1059
Sve navedeno govori u prilog zaključku da su u hr-
vatskom medijskom prostoru, kad je riječ o BiH, svjesno
prevladavale informacije o žrtvama jednog naroda, kako
1057 Carole Hodge, Velika Britanija i Balkan od 1991. do danas,
Detecta, Zagreb, 2007., 136-137. 139, 144-145.
1058 Ivo Lučić, Od vila ilirskih do Bijelog puta – stranputicama
bosanske i hercegovačke povijesti, Hrvatska liječnička
komora – Hrvatski institut za povijest, Zagreb, prosinac
2018., 243.
1059 IZM OZ SB, Izvješće br. 01-4-302/93 od 17. 4. 1993.; IZM
OZ SB, Zapovijed br. 01-4-319/93 od 17. 4. 1993.; IZM OZ
SB, Izvješće br. 03-4-334/93 od 18. 4. 1993.; Brigada HVO
“Nikola Šubić Zrinski”, Izvješće br. 827/93 od 27. 4. 1993.;
Shrader, Muslimansko-hrvatski građanski rat, 168-170.
519
Domovinski rat 04-02-2020 Knjiga 1.indd 519
local Muslim Territorial Defense forces as well as by ARBIH
elements staging for the attack across the Travnik-Kaonik
road”. In his conclusion regarding the HVO attack on Ah-
mići, Shrader writes “From a purely military point of view,
the HVO spoiling attack at Ahmići was very successful. The
planned Muslim attack across the Travnik – Busovača road
in the Ahmići area was completely disrupted and could
not be resumed. However, the destruction in the village
was horrific, and civilian casualties were appalling.
HVO soldiers killed, in the attack on Ahmići, a num-
ber of ARBIH soldiers. They also murdered a number of
civilians in the village. The murder of these civilians is an
inexcusable crime. By the same token, also inexcusable
are the numerous crimes committed by ARBIH soldiers
against Croats. Unfortunately, those crimes committed by
Muslims against Croats most media outlets in Croatia and
abroad for some reason find convenient to ignore.
The Croatian public is well informed about the crime
in Ahmići. But, why is the Croatian public not so well in-
formed about the crimes committed by ARBIH troops
against Croats, including those committed on the same
day as the crime in Ahmići in which a large number of
Croatian civilians and HVO POWs were murdered and
their property destroyed and burned? Carole Hodge,
observing that ignoring crimes against Croats in Bosnia
and Herzegovina serves to validate the claim the Serbs
and Croats are equally responsible for the war in Croatia,
writes in her book:
“Within hours of its discovery, the massacre received
world-wide publicity, impacting significantly on public
perception of the Bosnian war at a time when the Unit-
ed States was contemplating air strikes against Serb po-
sitions and threatening to lift the arms embargo. (...) The
events of 15-16 April, including the kidnapping of the
Croat general Živko Totić and the murder of his four body-
guards in broad daylight in Zenica (the perpetrators were
ARBIH troops, author’s note), and the attacks on Vitez, Ah-
mići, Šantići and other villages, made no sense politically
R
or militarily to many inhabitants, or to foreign observers.
Some believed they had been instigated from outside. (...)
In the confusion of 16 April where hostilities erupted sud-
denly along the Lašva valley, amidst efforts to minimise
the backlash from the Totić kidnapping in Zenica the pre-
vious day, it was perhaps partly understandable that the
degree of atrocity at Ahmići should escape the immediate
notice of the BritBat commander and his senior officers.
(…) The discovery of the Ahmići massacre changed the
international perception of the Bosnian war almost over-
4.2.2020. 18:37:10
 Ante Nazor • II DIO
bi se politika vodstva drugog naroda – Hrvata, mogla
prikazati kao zločinačka. Naglašavam, da ovo govorim
kao osoba koja smatra da je velikosrpska politika glav-
ni uzrok stradanja stanovništva u Hrvatskoj i BiH, te kao
osoba koja je vjerovala u mogućnost zajedničkog hrvat-
sko-muslimanskog otpora zajedničkom agresoru u BiH.
Nakon svega, samo iskreno suočavanje vodstva svakog
konstitutivnog naroda u BiH sa zločinima koje su poči-
nili pripadnici postrojbi vlastitih oružanih snaga može
osigurati mirnu budućnost u BiH, čiji stanovnici trebaju
H
živjeti jedni uz druge.
Percepcija da su Hrvati izazvali i započeli sukobe s
Armijom RBiH, koju je bošnjačko-muslimanska strana
uspjela u medijima nametnuti, zanemaruje činjenicu da
su sukobi između Bošnjaka-muslimana i Hrvata po pra-
vilu započinjali u mjestima gdje su Bošnjaci-muslimani
M
(odnosno Armija RBiH) bili nadmoćniji, te da su se iz sre-
dišnje Bosne preko Konjica proširili u Hercegovinu, a ne
obrnuto! Posebno se Hrvatima želi nametnuti odgovor-
nost za sukob u Mostaru u svibnju 1993., koji je do tada
već bio znatno razoren u napadima JNA i srpskih snaga
u proljeće i ljeto 1992. godine.1060 Tako se i u prvostu-
D
panjskoj presudi Haškog suda u predmetu „Prlić i ostali“
navodi da „već od travnja 1992. Hrvati u Mostaru dovo-
de muslimane u podređeni položaj“. No, taj je navod
u suprotnosti s činjenicom da su tada Hrvati i Bošnja-
ci-muslimani u Mostaru zajednički planirali obranu od
napada agresorskih snaga (prosrpska JNA i srpske po-
C
strojbe), da je upravo krajem travnja (29. travnja 1992.)
Krizni štab općine Mostar donio „Odluku“ prema kojoj
HVO preuzima obranu Mostara, zajedno s pripadnicima
MUP-a – centar Mostar, te da je HVO tu odluku uspješno
proveo tako što su najvećim dijelom upravo postrojbe
HVO-a u lipnju 1992. porazile srpskog agresora i oslo-
1060 O tome svjedoče fotografije razorenoga Mostara u napa-
dima topništva JNA, uz napomenu da se činjenice o tome
mogu pronaći i u „vrijednoj, istinitoj i lijepoj knjizi Mostar
'92 - urbicid grupe autora hrvatske i muslimansko-boš-
njačke narodnosti“, objavljenoj već 1992. (dakle, prije mu-
slimansko-hrvatskog sukoba), u čijem je uvodu istaknuto:
„Grad od 130.000 stanovnika, s prepoznatljivom arhitek-
turom (…) u ratu od travnja do lipnja (1992.) razoren je
do neprepoznatljivosti i onima koji su to vrijeme proveli u
podrumima. Urbicid – značenje kojega se može svesti na
potpuno uništenje Mostara, ostavio je pustinju od materi-
jala iz kojih je bio građen …“ (Mostar '92 – urbicid, Mostar,
1992., 7); vidi u: Slobodan Praljak, URBICID koji su počinile
postrojbe JA pod vodstvom Momčila Perišića nad Mostarom
u ljeto 1992., Zagreb, svibanj 2007.
520
Domovinski rat 04-02-2020 Knjiga 1.indd 520
night. The world-wide publicity generated by its exposure
seemed to confirm the thesis of an equivalence of guilt
between Serbs and Croats, and was further compounded
by (Colonel) Stewart’s public reaction, in condemning the
‘bloody HVO’. Normally, this may have been considered a
violation of the UN impartiality rules, but on this occasion,
Stewart was portrayed as a highly-proficient commander
whose heart had momentarily ruled his head, in extenu-
ating circumstances.”
It has to be pointed out that, during the Serb attacks
on Jajce, ARBIH soldiers stopped an HVO 150-men-strong
formation from central Bosnia on its way to Jajce at the
checkpoint in Ahmići on the strategically important Vitez
– Busovača road on October 20, 1992. The ARBIH soldiers
thus prevented the HVO troops from reinforcing the be-
leaguered defenders of Jajce. Another HVO formation,
consisting of Croat and Muslim soldiers, sent from Grude
to Jajce, was impeded on its march by ARBIH troops. As a
result, the HVO soldiers did not reach Jajce. The city fell on
October 30. HVO officers held the ARBIH responsible for
the fall of Jajce because the ARBIH troops that had held
a potion of the Jajce defensive line had abandoned, as
per their orders, abandoned their positions on October
26, 1992. According to the HVO the order to abandon
the positions was given to the troops by one of the AR-
BIH commanders in central Bosnia but came directly from
Sefer Halilović. Some time later the Muslim media, true to
form, accused the HVO of retreating from Jajce and being
responsible for the city’s fall. There are many more similar
examples. These incidents are all worthy of mention be-
cause they reveal the essence of sometimes seemingly
incredulous developments in the war in BiH. They also
prove that the Muslims tried to deny or justify their crimes
D
and that their lies, half-truths and lies by omission were
the foundation stone of the ARBIH and a number of Mus-
lim/Bosniak high ranking government officials’ propagan-
da campaign against the Croats.
To put the crime in Ahmići in its proper context, with-
R
out trying to justify it in any way, shape or form, it has to
be noted that on the morning of April 16, 1993, as the in-
cident in Ahmići and the one in Trusina were taking place,
the ARBIH attacked the HVO in Busovača in central Bosnia.
The Busovača Brigade repulsed the attack at the cost of
a high number of casualties. On the following day, at the
same time as the events in Sovići and Doljani were unfold-
ing, the Muslims attacked Kuber. Their aim was to capture a
stretch of the Kaonik – Vitez road. As the attack progressed
the Muslim forces placed Busovača in encirclement.
4.2.2020. 18:37:10
 Ante Nazor • PART II
bodile Mostar (operacija „Čagalj“, odnosno „Lipanjske
zore“). Spomenutom „Odlukom“, koju je potpisalo devet
članova Kriznog štaba općine Mostar, od toga četiri Boš-
njaka-muslimana, „takozvana Jugoslavenska narodna
armija i druge paravojne formacije koje djeluju skupa s
njom proglašavaju se kao neprijateljske i okupatorske
formacije na području općine Mostar“ (čl. I.), a „zaštita i
odbrana grada Mostara od formacija iz člana I. povjerava
se Hrvatskom vijeću obrane – Općinskom stožeru Mo-
star, te pripadnicima Ministarstva unutrašnjih poslova –
H
centar Mostar“ (čl. II.). U „Odluci“ se, uz ostalo, navodi da
„Hrvatsko vijeće obrane čine pripadnici muslimanskog
i hrvatskog naroda i narodnosti koji priznaju legalne
organe vlasti Republike Bosne i Hercegovine i kojima
iskažu svoju lojalnost“ (čl. III.), da će „nacionalni sastav
komandnog kadra Hrvatskog vijeća obrane odgovarati
M
nacionalnom sastavu aktivnih vojnika“ (čl. IV.), te da „sva
dokumenta za kretanje ljudi i roba izdaje HVO – Općin-
ski stožer Mostar“ (čl. VII.). Prema tome, u najtežim tre-
nucima za obranu Mostara, na samom početku srpske
agresije na Mostar i BiH, glavnu odgovornost i najveći
teret u sprječavanju JNA i srpskih snaga da okupiraju
D
cijeli Mostar, kao i u pripremama za oslobađanje opći-
ne Mostar, preuzeo je HVO, uz suglasnost muslimanskih
predstavnika.
To nije bio izolirani primjer, jer je i Krizni štab opći-
ne Maglaj, u kojoj su Muslimani imali relativnu većinu, 2.
lipnja 1992. obranu općine „povjerio HVO-u općine Žep-
C
če, Zavidovići, Maglaj i Teslić, sa sjedištem u Žepču“. U
odluci o tome navedeno je da će obrambene formacije
„obavezno nositi oznake HVO-a, kao i oznake Republike
Bosne i Hercegovine“, a da se „HVO obvezuje da forma-
ciji u Maglaju osigura potrebna materijalno-tehnička
D
sredstva kao i opskrbu hranom i lijekovima“, uz napome-
nu da ta odluka „ne prejudicira nikakvo političko rješe-
nje“.1061 I zaključci sastanka muslimanskih predstavnika
11. srpnja 1992. u Gornjem Vakufu, potvrđuju da je HVO
bio legalna formacija u zajedničkoj borbi.1062
Jednako tako, i 108. brigada HVO-a Brčko, koja je u
teškim uvjetima branila 30-ak hrvatskih sela, s oko 20.000
stanovnika, zaslužna je što srpske snage u proljeće 1992.
nisu ovladale cijelom općinom Brčko. U početku je bila
sastavljena od Hrvata i Bošnjaka-muslimana, da bi se
njenom reorganizacijom početkom 1993. podijelila „na
1061 Krizni štab Općine Maglaj broj 01-98-1/92 od 2. 6. 1992.;
MKSJ, predmet Prlić i ostali IT-04-74 – dokaz 1D01924.
1062 Prlić, knjiga I, 317.
521
Domovinski rat 04-02-2020 Knjiga 1.indd 521
The inevitable conclusion is that the Croatian media
space has been awash with reports about the plight and
suffering of one people so that the policies of another na-
tion – the Croats – could be branded as criminal. I have to
point out that I am stating my case as a person who makes
the inference that the ideology of Greater Serbia is the root
cause of all evil perpetrated in Croatia and BiH, and also as
a person who firmly believed that a viable joint Croat-Mus-
lim alliance could be formed for the purpose of resisting
the Serb aggressor in BiH. Having said that, it is both my
belief and opinion that the leaders of each constituent
nation in BiH have to genuinely confront the crimes that
members of their respective armed forces committed
during the war. There is no doubt in my mind that unless
the leaders of the three constituent nations express regret
for the horrific acts done in the name of their respective
nations and religions through acts of contrition and offers
of atonement, there will never be a lasting peace in BiH.
Let us not forget that the Serbs, the Croats and the Bos-
niaks have no choice but to live side by side in BIH.
The prevailing perception, incepted by the Muslims’
success in imposing their version of events on most me-
dia outlets in BiH, Croatia and the rest of the world, that
the Croats caused and initiated the Muslim-Croat con-
flict is simply not accordant with the facts. The clashes
between Croats and Muslims almost always started in
locales where the ARBIH enjoyed distinct advantage in
men and materiel over the Croats. The Muslims spread,
from central Bosnia and through Konjic, to Herzegovina
– the Croats did not spread into Muslim areas of BiH. The
Croats did not start the conflict in Mostar, as Muslim pro-
pagandists would have the world to believe. By the time
the conflict in Mostar started, in May, 1993, the city was al-
ready devastated as a result of the JNA and Serbs’ attacks
in spring and summer 1992.38
38 There are photographs of the devastation the city of
Mostar sustained in JNA artillery attacks. Facts regarding
the devastation can be found in the ''important, truthful
R
and historically accurate Mostar '92 - urbicid, by a group
of authors of Croatian and Muslim-Bosniak nationality'',
published in 1992 (before the Muslim-Croat conflict). In
the introducudtion it is stated: ''A city with a populati-
on of 130.000, with a recognizable style of architecture
(…) was devasted beyond recognition in the fighting
between April and June 1992 even to those who shel-
tered in their basements during that period. Urbicid – in
the case of Mostar meaning that the city was completely
reduced to rubble…'' (Mostar '92 – urbicid, Mostar, 1992.,
p.7) see: Praljak, Slobodan. URBICID koji su počinile po-
strojbe JA pod vodstvom Momčila Perišića nad Mostarom
u ljeto 1992. Zagreb, May 2007.
4.2.2020. 18:37:10
 Ante Nazor • II DIO
108. pješačku brigadu HVO Brčko i 215. motorizovanu
brigadu Armije RBiH“. Tijekom rata pojačana je Hrvatima
s područja Hrvatske zajednice Soli i hrvatskih naselja s
područja Živinica, kao i hrvatskim vojnicima iz 115. bri-
gade HVO-a Zrinski s područja Tuzle, koja je ukinuta zbog
ultimativne odluke muslimanskog dijela Predsjedništva
BiH u Sarajevu. Crte obrane na području Donje Dubravi-
ce, Vranovače i Boderišta cijelo vrijeme rata uspješno su
odolijevale snažnim napadima srpskih snaga, zahvaljuju-
ći i pomoći topništva HVO-a s područja Orašja, a kasnije i
H
pomoći susjednih snaga ARBiH u najtežim trenucima. O
intezitetu borbi u hrvatskoj općini Ravne-Brčko, domo-
ljublju i brojnim hrvatskim žrtvama u obrani toga pod-
ručja i cijele Bosanske Posavine svjedoči i sudbina četiri
majke iz četiri hrvatska sela (Boće, Zovik, Štrepci i Peškiri),
koje su u napadima srpskih snaga izgubile svaka po dva
M
sina, pripadnika HVO-a: Jela Marčetić sinove Augustina
i Ivana, Pera Mikanović sinove Matu i Slavka, Kata Zeče-
vić sinove Mirka i Antu, Manda Zečević sinove Ivu-Čupu i
Stjepana-Pepu. Kao i sudbine mnogih drugih majki i obi-
telji… Izvješćujući 1995. s bojišta kod Boderišta, koje je
postalo simbol obrane hrvatskih prostora u općini Brčko,
D
novinar Martin Bell, poznati izvjestitelj s bojišta u Hrvat-
skoj 1991., zaključio je: „Nigdje osim u Vukovaru nije palo
ovoliko granata. Boderište – Mali Vukovar.“1063
Dakako, Bošnjaci-muslimani bili su u sastavu i dru-
gih brigada HVO-a iz Bosanske Posavine.
U priopćenju građanima, jedan od muslimanskih
C
članova Kriznog štaba općine Mostar i njen potpisnik
dr. Ismet Hadžiosmanović, obrazložio je „Odluku“ od 29.
travnja 1992., kojom je obrana grada povjerena HVO-u:
Ova „Odluka“ je odraz trenutne političke i prije svega
vojne situacije u gradu Mostaru. Mi se moramo suočiti sa
istinom da smo napadnuti, da napadač čini sve da uništi
ovaj grad, da uništi naše zajedništvo, da učini od grada
avetinjski grad. I u takvim okolnostima bilo je neminovno
donijeti takvu Odluku. Sa političkog aspekta ona je u kon-
tinuitetu svih donesenih odluka ovih dana od strane Pred-
sjedništva i Vlade BiH i ona je u pravnom smislu osnovna
potpora koja se koristi upravo iz tih dokumenata. Prema
tome, nema nikakvih političkih manipulacija i zloupotre-
ba Odluke u bilo kakvom drugom smislu, već predstavlja
na određen način kontinuitet stvaranja istinski nove prav-
1063 Druga bojna Gromovi – 108. pješačka brigada HVO Brčko,
HNV Brčko distrikt BiH – Udruga obitelji poginulih i ne-
stalih hrvatskih branitelja Ravne-Brčko, Brčko, 2011., 14,
111, 140, 170.
522
Domovinski rat 04-02-2020 Knjiga 1.indd 522
The first instance verdict in the Prlić et al. case verified
the efforts of the Muslim propaganda machine. In the text
explaining the verdict it is stated that “beginning in April
1992, in the Municipality of Mostar, the Croats embarked
upon a policy aimed at placing Muslims living in the mu-
nicipality at a disadvantage”. It needs to be said that the
claim is in stark contradiction with the unassailable fact
that the Croats and Muslim/Bosniak in Mostar had been
jointly preparing to defend against attacks by the aggres-
sor (JNA and Serb formations). Also, the explanation of
the verdict ignores a number of other pertinent facts. For
example, at the end of April (April 29, 1992) the Crisis Staff
of the Mostar Municipality passed the Decision according
to which the defense of Mostar fell within the sphere of
responsibility of the HVO and the MUP – Mostar center.
The HVO successfully defended Mostar and decisively de-
feated the Serb forces in June, 1992, and liberated the city
(Operation Čagalj, also known as June Dawns). The Deci-
sion was signed by nine members of the Crisis Staff of the
Mostar Municipality, four of them Bosniak/Muslims. In the
Decision it was stated that “the so-called Yugoslav Peo-
ple’s Army (JNA) and other paramilitary formations acting
in unison with the JNA are hereby declared enemy and
occupying formations in the Mostar Municipality’” (Article
1) and that ‘”the responsibility for the protection and de-
fense of the city of Mostar from the formations named in
Article 1 is given to the HVO – Municipal HQ Mostar and
the members of MUP – Mostar center” (Article 2). Further-
more, in the Decision it was explicitly stated that “the HVO
consists of members of the Muslim nation and the Croat
nation and members of other ethnicities who recognize
the legal organs of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegov-
ina and who are loyal to said organs” (Article 3) and that
D
“the national composition of the command cadres of the
HVO will mirror the national composition of the active
contingent” (Article 4) and that “all documents relating to
movement of people and goods are issued by the HVO
– Municipal HQ Mostar” (Article 7). Therefore, at the crit-
R
ical moment for Mostar, at the beginning of the Serb ag-
gression against Mostar and BiH the main burden of de-
fending Mostar and BiH, preventing the Serb forces from
occupying the whole city and of preparing to liberate the
Mostar Municipality, fell on the HVO, with the Muslim rep-
resentatives’ consent.
What happened in Mostar was not an isolated occur-
rence. The Crisis Staff of the Maglaj Municipality, where
Muslims formed a relative majority, on June 2, 1992,
“entrusted the defense of the municipalities of Žepče,
4.2.2020. 18:37:10
 Ante Nazor • PART II
ne države, novih političkih odnosa i novog života na ovim
prostorima. Što se tiče vojnog aspekta ona ima svoje ute-
meljenje u jednoj neminovnoj činjenici da je hrvatski narod
bio svjestan da će jednoga dana morati da dođe do ovoga
do čega se došlo. Muslimani i većina građana Mostara nisu
uopšte imali predodžbu da će ova sudbina zadesiti naš
grad. To je istina, ona je bolna, ona je teška, ona razara
dušu svakog čestitog našeg građanina i razlog je toga što
su mnogi Mostarci upravo bježeći od suočenja sa istinom
napustili ovaj grad. U njemu su istinski ostali oni koji žele,
H
koji hoće i mogu da ga brane. To su branioci Mostara kojeg
predstavljaju čestiti sinovi i očevi hrvatskog i muslimanskog
i ostalih naroda kojima je u duši stalo do ovoga grada. (…)
Mi (muslimani, op. ur.) tek sada počinjemo stvarati
svoje oružane snage. Strana koja je najagresivnija, koja je
proglašena u krajnjoj liniji političkim i vojnim agresorom, tj.
M
SDS (Srpska demokratska stranka, op. ur.), ona po svaku
cijenu želi zadržati postojeći dio JNA i dio svojih oružanih
formacija koje se podvode pod pojmom TO (Teritorijalna
obrana, op. ur.). Upravo, pošto su i jedna i druga vojna for-
macija na ovim prostorima učinile zločinačka djela, učinili
sve da ovaj grad sravne sa zemljom, sam taj pojam je sa
D
pravom kod određenih ljudi stvorio nedoumice, jedno ne-
povjerenje, nešto što podsjeća na zločin. (…)
Mislim da je ovo (spomenuta „Odluka“, op. ur.) pro-
izvod upravo stanja u kom se Mostar našao. To je grad
koji je sa strateškog i vojnog aspekta u najtežoj, najgoroj
vojnoj poziciji. On je dnevno izložen velikim razaranjima,
C
posebno artiljerijskim i nas je, htjeli ne htjeli, nužda na-
tjerala na ovakav postupak. On je proizvod napada agre-
sora na ovaj grad. Prema tome, mi smo to htjeli i morali i
da smo to bogdo i ranije uradili vjerovatno bi tada daleko
bolje stajali i sa odbranom, manje bi imali i žrtava i mate-
D
rijalnih razaranja i znali bi na koncu konca protiv koga se
borimo, ko je okupator i ko je došao ovdje da razori ovaj
grad. Uostalom, to ima u dokumentima, a historija će reći
u svemu tome svoju sudbinu.1064
Spomenuto priopćenje istaknutog muslimanskog
predstavnika u tijelima vlasti u Mostaru, koji će na Izetbe-
govićev zahtjev 25. studenoga 1992. biti smijenjen s
dužnosti predsjednika Regionalnog odbora SDA-a,1065
potvrđuje zaključak da su srpsku agresiju na BiH musli-
mani dočekali nepripremljeni, a da su Hrvati prvi pružili
1064 Iz „Saopštenja građanima Mostara člana Kriznog štaba
SO Mostar dr. Ismeta Hadžiosmanovića“, vrijeme emiti-
ranja: 29. 4. 1992., 18 sati.
1065 Lučić, 2018., 268.
523
Domovinski rat 04-02-2020 Knjiga 1.indd 523
Zavidovići, Maglaj and Teslić to the HVO in Žepče”. In the
decision stipulating the above it was also stated that the
defensive formations “shall wear HVO insignia and insig-
nia of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina” and that
“the HVO accepts the obligation to secure all necessary
matériel and equipment as well as food and medicines
to the forces in Maglaj”. The statement is qualified by
noting that “the decision is not prejudicial in relation to
any future political solution”. The conclusions reached at
a meeting between the Muslim representatives held on
July 11, 1992, in Gornji Vakuf confirm that the HVO was a
legal and legitimate formation in a joint defense against
the JNA and Serbs.
Also, the performance of the 108th HVO Brčko Brigade
while defending, in difficult conditions, about 30 Croatian
villages with around 20,000 residents, is the main reason
why the Serb forces did not manage to occupy the entire
area of the Brčko Municipality. Initially the 108th Brigade
consisted of Croats and Bosniak/Muslims. At the begin-
ning of 1993 the Brigade was “divided into the 108th HVO
Infantry Brčko Brigade and the 215th Motorized ARBIH
Brigade”. During the war the 108th Brigade was reinforced
with Croats from the Croatian Community (HZ) of Soli and
Croatian settlements in the Živinica area and Croatian sol-
diers from the 115th HVO Zrinski Brigade from Tuzla, which
was disbanded following the extortionate decision of the
Muslim members of the BiH Presidency in Sarajevo. The
defensive lines in Donja Dubravica, Vranovača and Bod-
erište throughout the war held in the face of determined
Serb attacks. The defenders often relied on HVO artillery
support and help from neighboring ARBIH units during
the most critical moments. The HVO artillery pieces pro-
viding support for the defenders were deployed in the
Orašje area. The fates of four mothers from four Croatian
villages (Buće, Zovik, Štrepci and Peškiri ) testify to the
horrific intensity of the fighting in the predominately Cro-
at Municipality of Ravne Brčko and also to the patriotism
and determination of the Croat defenders of that area
R
and the entire Bosanska Posavina and to their willingness
to sacrifice their lives in the defense of their homes. Each
mother lost two sons, members of the HVO, killed in bat-
tle against the Serbs: Jela Marčetić lost her two sons Au-
gustin and Ivan; Pera Mikanović lost her two sons Mato
and Slavko; Kata Zečević lost her two sons Mirko and
Ante; Manda Zečević lost her two sons Ivo “Čupa” and St-
jepan “Pero”. Many other Croatian families suffered similar
tragedies… Reporting in 1995 from the battlefield near
Boderište, a town that has become a symbol of the Croa-
4.2.2020. 18:37:10
 Ante Nazor • II DIO
značajniji otpor na područjima BiH na kojima su živjeli
u većem broju, pa tako i napadu JNA i srpskih snaga na
Mostar. Priopćenje je također važno i zato što potvrđuje
činjenicu da je Mostar u najvećoj mjeri razorilo topniš-
tvo JNA, što će muslimansko vodstvo kasnije pokušati
u jednakoj mjeri pripisati HVO-u. I na kraju, Odluka da
se obrana Mostara povjeri HVO-u, kao odraz trenutnog
stanja i potrebe obrane protiv zajedničkog agresora, na-
meće pitanje zašto na isti način, koji se na primjeru Mo-
stara pokazao kao učinkovit, muslimansko vodstvo nije
H
kasnije prihvatilo i prijedlog ministra obrane BiH Bože
Rajića od 16. siječnja 1993., o podčinjavanju postrojbi
HVO-a Glavnom stožeru Armije RBiH ondje gdje su pre-
težno muslimanske snage, odnosno postrojbi Armije
RBiH Glavnom stožeru HVO-a ondje gdje je pretežito
HVO, radi bolje koordinacije, neophodne za uspješnije
M
zajedničko djelovanje protiv srpskih snaga.
Početak muslimansko-hrvatskog sukoba u Mostaru
ne može se promatrati odvojeno od pokretanja ofenzive
Armije RBiH na Konjic i Jablanicu 14. travnja 1993., koja
je HVO u Mostaru primorala na reakciju radi sprečavanja
širenja sukoba na Mostar i ostale općine u dolini Nere-
D
tve. Istovremeno s napadajnim djelovanjem ARBiH pro-
tiv HVO-a na području Konjica, zapovjednik 4. korpusa
ARBiH Arif Pašalić je 17. travnja 1993. naredio nastavak
„odbrambenih“ borbenih djelovanja (riječ „odbrambe-
nih“ je rukom dopisana u dokument preko druge riječi,
op. ur.) i zaposjedanje dominantnih objekata u gradu
C
Mostaru.1066 Izvanredno izvješće Vojno obavještajne
službe Glavnog stožera HVO-a, sastavljeno istoga dana,
govori o dramatičnim trenucima za hrvatski narod na
području sjeverozapadne Hercegovine i središnje Bosne
(Jablanice, Konjica, Viteza, Busovače, Zenice i Vareša)
zbog „velike ofenzive muslimanskih snaga“ na HVO i Hr-
vate, započete prije tri dana, u kojoj je, zajedno s ARBiH,
sudjelovalo i oko „1600 mudžahedina“, čineći zločine
nad Hrvatima i uništavajući njihovu imovinu. U zaključ-
ku izvješća navedeno je: „Imajući u vidu sve naprijed
navedeno muslimani su prekinuli dosadašnju suradnju i
krenuli u otvoreni rat protiv HVO – hrvatskog naroda. Za
ostvarivanje svog cilja, protjerivanje hrvatskog naroda,
napustili su sve položaje prema ‘vojsci Republike Srpske’
/angažiranje postrojbi s planine Igman, angažiranje bri-
gade ARBiH iz Hrasnice/. Dok traju srpski napadi na Sre-
brenicu, ARBiH s područja središnje Bosne nijednu svoju
1066 Naređenje komandanta 4. korpusa ARBiH Arifa Pašalića
od 17. 4. 1993., djelov. broj: 01-3191/93.
524
Domovinski rat 04-02-2020 Knjiga 1.indd 524
tian defense against aggression in the Brčko Municipality,
Martin Bell, a renowned war correspondent who had cov-
ered the war in Croatia in 1991, concluded: “Nowhere else
except in Vukovar have this many shells been dropped.
Boderište – Little Vukovar.”
Of course, Bosniaks/Muslims also fought in the ranks
of other HVO brigades in Bosanska Posavina.
In a communiqué to the residents of Mostar Dr. Ismet
Hadžiosmanović, one of the Muslim members of the Crisis
Staff Mostar and a co-signatory of the Decision of April 29,
1992, by which the defense of the city was entrusted to
the HVO, explained the decision thusly:
The decision reflects the current political, and more im-
portantly, military situation in the city. We have to face the
fact that we are under attack and that the aggressor is doing
his utmost to destroy this city, to ruin our unity and to leave
nothing but desolation in his wake. In such circumstances we
had no option but to reach this Decision. From the political
perspective the Decision is consistent with all the decisions
made by the Presidency and the BiH government over the
course of the last few days and in the strictly legal sense,
the Decision is an instrument which derives its validity and
substance from the aforementioned documents issued pre-
viously. Therefore, no political manipulation or ill intent un-
derlies the Decision. Moreover, this Decision represents, in a
certain sense, the continuity of the process of the creation of
a truly new state based on the concept of the rule of law, new
political relationships and a new way of life in these lands.
As far as the military aspect, the Decision is grounded in the
inevitable fact that the Croatian nation was aware that one
day this misfortunate situation would occur. The Muslims,
and most residents of Mostar, had no inkling whatsoever
that this calamity would befall our city. But, this is the reality.
D
It is a harsh reality, a painful reality, a destructive reality, a
soul-demolishing reality that has forced many Mostar resi-
dents to flee rather than to face it. Those who have stayed are
those who truly want and are able to defend the city. They
are the defenders of Mostar, they are the sons and fathers of
R
the Croatian and Muslim and other nations who care deeply
about this city (…)
We (the Muslims) only now have begun to form our
armed forces. The side that is the most aggressive, the side
that has been, after all, declared the political and military
aggressor, the (the Serbian Democratic Party) wants to keep
the existing contingent of the JNA and its armed formations
functioning under the designation “Territorial Defense” (TO).
Both the JNA and Serb formations have committed crimes
against humanity and war crimes in these lands and done
4.2.2020. 18:37:10
 Ante Nazor • PART II
postrojbu nije uputila za deblokadu iste, već je sve svoje
potencijale upotrijebila za uništenje hrvatskog naroda
na slobodnim prostorima.“1067
Ciljeve ARBiH u sukobu s HVO-om, koji je ujutro 19.
travnja 1993. započeo u središtu Mostara, otkrivaju za-
povijedi Komande 41. mtbr ARBiH od 19. i 20. travnja
1993., u kojima se navode zadaće za zaposjedanje polo-
žaja za obranu i prelazak u napad na značajne objekte u
Mostaru (zauzimanje brda Hum i vojarne Sjeverni logor,
kao i zgrade MUP-a i PS-a Mostar, prostorija „Elektro-Her-
H
cegovine“ i objekata „Žitoprometa“), te za pripremu za
djelovanje po ciljevima na desnoj obali Neretve.1068
U Dnevnom obavještajnom izvješću HVO-a, datira-
nom 19. travnja 1993., navodi se da je u „rajonu Mostara“
zabilježena „samo jedna incidentna situacija, izazvana
od strane ARBiH, u kojoj je ranjeno nekoliko pripadni-
M
ka HVO-a“, no ističe se da je „opće stanje napeto“, da
su „tenzije podignute u prvom redu zbog propagande
muslimanskih medija na kojima se često oglašavaju
zapovjednici muslimanskih postrojbi čiji istupi imaju
negativan trend“ te da je „sinoć oko 21.00 sat svim pri-
padnicima ARBiH data puna borbena gotovost“. Stoga je
D
ocijenjeno „da su sukobi vrlo lako mogući, bez posebnih
povoda za njihovu eskalaciju“, jer je u cilju vrha ARBiH
„da rat proširi na ove dijelove HZ H-B“. U istom izvješću
zaključeno je da žestina udara „na cijeloj teritoriji HZ HB
pokazuje da je muslimanska ofenziva dobro planirana,
sinhronizirana i vođena s najvišeg vrha“, no da će „kao
C
i do sada muslimanska strana to negirati, a radnje koje
poduzima prikazivati kao incidente ili djelo pojedinač-
nih ekstremista i grupa koje su se otrgnule kontroli“, te
da je „osnovna namjera agresora postupno preuzimanje
vojne i civilne vlasti nad mjestima u središnjoj Bosni i po-
D
tiskivanje Hrvata s tih prostora“.1069
Povremenih sukoba bilo je 20. travnja, a 21. travnja
je dogovoreno povlačenje vojske u vojarne i uklanjanje
postavljenih zaklona za borbu, te crta razgraničenja,1070
1067 Glavni stožer HVO, Vojno obavještajna služba, str. pov.
br. 03-365/93, Mostar, 19. travnja 1993., Dnevno obavje-
štajno izvješće br. 235/93.
1068 Komanda 41. mot. br. ARBiH, Zapovijest za odbranu dj.
br. 470 od 19. 4. 1993.; Komanda 41. mot. br. ARBiH, Na-
ređenje dj. br. 470-2/93 od 20. 4. 1993.
1069 Glavni stožer HVO, VOS (vojno obavještajna služba), str.
pov. br. 03-359/93, Mostar, 17. travnja 1993., Izvanredno
izvješće.
1070 Priopćenje za javnost od 20. 4. 1993. i 21. 4. 1993., Petar
Zelenika i Arif Pašalić, ICTY 3D00676 i 3D00016.
525
Domovinski rat 04-02-2020 Knjiga 1.indd 525
their utmost to reduce this city to rubble. For this reason the
term “TO” has, for some people, become synonymous with
the word “crime” (…)
I am of the opinion that this Decision is the result of the
situation Mostar is in. Militarily, and therefore strategically,
the city is in a precarious position. The city of Mostar is sys-
tematically being destroyed, mostly by artillery fire. We were
forced to reach this Decision. Again, this Decision is the result
of the aggressor’s attack on the city of Mostar. We should
have acted sooner. Had we done so, we would now be bet-
ter able to defend ourselves, we would not have suffered so
many casualties and sustained so much material damage.
We should have known who the aggressor was, we should
have known who was bent on destroying this city. Had that
been the case, we would have fought the invader. Now we
know. Everything is documented and history will judge us all.
It is worth pointing out that the Dr. Ismet Hadžios-
manović was sacked, at Izetbegović’s request, on Novem-
ber 25, 1992, from the position of President of the SDA’s
Regional Committee. It is clear that his explanation con-
firms that the Muslims were not able to resist the Serbs’
attack and that only the Croats, at that time, offered effec-
tive resistance to the Serbs and the JNA in predominately
Croatian areas of BiH, including the city of Mostar. The ex-
planation also confirms that the Serbs shelled Mostar and
practically destroyed the city. The point is worth stressing
because the Muslims would later claim that the damage
inflicted by Serb (JNA) artillery was actually inflicted by
the HVO.
Finally the decision to entrust the defense of Mostar
to the HVO, as a reflection of the circumstances calling
for a joint resistance to the aggressor, raises the question:
why did the Muslim leadership later not accept, especially
in light of the fact that the HVO had successfully defend-
ed Mostar, the proposition the minister of defense of
BiH, Bože Rajić, made on January 16, 1993, about subor-
dinating the HVO units to the General Staff of the ARBIH
in the areas where Muslim forces were predominant and
R
subordinating ARBIH units to the HVO Main Staff in those
areas where most of the deployed units belonged to the
HVO? Had the proposition been accepted by the Muslims,
the HVO and ARBIH would have been able to closely co-
ordinate their actions and achieve many more successes
against the Serb forces than they actually did.
The break-out of the Muslim-Croat conflict in Mostar
cannot be viewed independently of the ARBIH’s offensive
on Konjic and Jablanica launched on April 14, 1993. That
move by the ARBIH forced the HVO in Mostar to react so
4.2.2020. 18:37:10
 Ante Nazor • II DIO
da bi se 23. travnja stanje smirilo. No, stanje se sustav-
no pogoršavalo jer je uglavnom bilo odraz nepoštiva-
nja sporazuma ARBiH u Konjicu, tako da je sukob bio
izvjestan. Pripreme ARBiH za napad na HVO i namjeru
muslimanskog zapovjedništva da u tom napadu isko-
risti i muslimane u sastavu HVO-a, potvrđuje i „Izvještaj
o stanju i događanjima u 42. bbr“ zapovjednika 4. kor-
pusa ARBiH Arifa Pašalića, od 2. svibnja 1993. godine. U
njemu je navedeno izvješće komandanta 42. bbr i izvje-
šće sa sastanka u brigadi održanog 17. travnja 1993., iz
H
čijih je sadržaja razvidno postojanje plana „zauzimanja
grada Stolca sa našim ljudima (muslimanima, op. ur.) u
HVO-u“, odnosno da je već bilo „izvršeno uvezivanje sa
našim ljudima u HVO-u“ i da su minobacači ARBiH „već
bili postavljeni za djelovanje protiv HVO-a“ i „ciljeve na
desnoj obali Neretve“:
M
U Naredbi koja je izdata k-dantima bataljona i
užem dijelu k-de 42. bbr na sastanku održanom dana
17. 04. 1993. u 22,00 usmeno je od strane k-danta 42.
bbr rečeno sljedeće:
- ne otpočinjati dejstva bez naredbe;
- izvršeno je uvezivanje sa našim ljudima u HVO-u;
D
- manjim snagama posjednuti su:
• most u Žitomislićima,
• dvije dominantne kote koje dominiraju Bunom,
• položaji prema Domanovićima,
• položaji prema s. Stanojevići,
• kontroliše se Hodbina;
C
- glavnina snaga je u pripravnosti i odmara se sa
zadatkom da:
• zatvori most na Žitomislićima,
• zauzimanje punkta i mosta na Buni sa dijelom
snaga iz Blagaja,
• zauzimanje Domanovića;
- ljudstvo (muslimani, op. ur.) iz HVO Čapljina ima
zadatak da zauzme s. Tasovčiće i most u Čapljini
s ciljem da ne dozvoli dovođenje snaga iz pravca
Metkovića;
- sela su maximalno obezbijeđena i uvezana
kurirskom vezom,
- zauzimanje grada Stolac sa našim ljudima u HVO-u,
- zauzimanje punktova i s. Prenj, Nakovanj i Aladinići,
- kontrola mosta na r. Bregava u s. Prenj i sprečavanje
uvođenja snaga HVO iz pravca Kruševo – Prenj i
Svitava – Prenj,
- zatvoriti put prema s. Drinovac i s. Kruševo,
- MB 60 i 82 postavljeni za dejstvo protiv HVO,
- lanseru dati ciljevi i na desnoj obali Neretve (po
526
Domovinski rat 04-02-2020 Knjiga 1.indd 526
as to prevent the conflict from spreading to Mostar and
other municipalities in the Neretva Valley. When the AR-
BIH attacked the HVO in the Konjic area, the commander
of IV Corps of ARBIH Arif Pašalić, on April 17, 1993, ordered
the continuation of “defensive” actions (the word defensive
was handwritten into the existing document over anoth-
er word) and capture the dominant locations in the city of
Mostar. In the Extraordinary Report of the military intelli-
gence staff attached to the HVO Main Staff, composed on
the same day, the situation was characterized as dramat-
ic for the Croatian nation in northwest Herzegovina and
central Bosnia (Jablanica, Konjic, Vitez, Busovača, Zenica
and Vareš) due to “a great offensive of the Muslim forces”
against the HVO and Croats, launched three days before,
in which “1,600 Mujahedeen” fought alongside the ARBIH
troops, committing crimes against Croats and destroying
their property. The report concludes: “Keeping in mind
everything stated above, the Muslims have dissolved the
partnership with us and started an all-out war against the
HVO – the Croatian nation. In order to achieve their prima-
ry objective – the expulsion of the Croats – the Muslims
abandoned their positions on the defensive lines oppo-
site the VRS and deployed against us their forces from the
Igman mountain and the ARBIH Hrasnica Brigade. As the
Serb attacks on Srebrenica are in progress, the ARBIH has
sent no unit from central Bosnia to the Srebrenica front,
using instead all of its available forces to destroy the Cro-
ats in the unoccupied areas.”
The orders issued by the 41st Motorized Brigade HQ
on April 19 and 20, 1993, reveal the objectives of the AR-
BIH’s attack in the Mostar city center on April 19, 1993. The
orders instructed the ARBIH forces to set up defensive po-
sitions and also to attack and capture important positions
D
in Mostar (Hum Hill, Sjeverni Logor barracks, MUP build-
ing, Police station, Elektro-Herzegovina building and Žito-
promet) and prepare to fire on targets on the right bank
of the Neretva.
In the daily military intelligence report of the HVO
R
dated April 19, 1993, it is stated that “in the Mostar area”
the ARBIH “provoked only one incident in which a few
HVO members were wounded” but also that “the general
situation is tense” and that “tensions have been raised as
a direct result of the Muslim media outlets’ habit of letting
commanders of Muslim units promote Muslim propagan-
da on air” and that “last night, around 2100 hours all ARBIH
soldiers were put on highest level of combat readiness.” It
is further stated in the report that “it is probable that clash-
es will occur without any direct cause for their escalation”
4.2.2020. 18:37:10
 Ante Nazor • PART II
položajima HVO-a, op. ur.),
- PO sredstva su u pripravnosti.1071
O tome svjedoče i „potrebni zadaci“ koje je 8. svib-
nja 1993. izdala Komanda 4. korpusa ARBiH.1072
Prve velike gradske borbe između ARBiH i HVO-a u
Mostaru, koje su počele ujutro 9. svibnja, a završile 12.
svibnja 1993.,1073 HVO drži posljedicom priprema ARBiH
za napad1074 i nastavkom napadnih operacija ARBiH na
području Konjica, Klisa i Jablanice.1075 Zbog napada AR-
BiH manji dijelovi profesionalnih sastava koje je imao
H
HVO toga dana, 9. svibnja, hitno su pozvani u Mostar,1076
što navodi na zaključak da HVO nije planirao napad,
nego je reagirao. U borbama u okolici grada ARBiH je
10. svibnja zauzela Grabovicu, mjesto u kojem će 8./9.
rujna 1993., kada na tom području nije bilo borbenih
djelovanja jer se nalazilo u pozadini crte razdvajanja,
M
pripadnici ARBiH ubiti 32 civila Hrvata, među kojima i
jedno četverogodišnje dijete.
Potom je, zahvaljujući iznenađenju, odnosno izda-
ji muslimana pripadnika HVO-a, što je bilo u skladu sa
spomenutim planom Arifa Pašalića od 2. svibnja 1993.
o ostanku muslimana u postrojbama HVO-a do znaka
D
za napad na HVO, ARBiH nakon ponoći 29./30. lipnja
zauzela vojarnu HVO-a Tihomir Mišić i Bijelo polje te
još neka područja Mostara i okolice.1077 Nužna i vojnič-
ki jedina logična reakcija vodstva HVO-a na izdaju di-
jela muslimana pripadnika HVO-a, radi zaštite vlastitih
snaga i hrvatskih civila od narednih ofenzivnih djelo-
C
1071 Komanda 4. korpusa, Armija Republike BiH, Izvještaj str.
pov. br. 01-3573/93 od 2. 5. 1993.
1072 Komanda 4. korpusa, Armija Republike BiH, Izvještaj str.
D
pov. br. 02-3763/93 od 8. 5. 1993.
1073 Istoga dana, u ranim jutarnjim satima, pripadnici ARBIH
otimaju don Ivu Vukšića iz prostorija samostana i odvo-
de ga u istočni Mostar. Nakon pregovora, posredstvom
SPABAT-a on je vraćen u zapadni Mostar (Izvješće župni-
ka don Ive Vukšića, 15. svibnja 1993., ICTY Prlić i ostali,
3D00177).
1074 Komanda 41. mot. br ARBiH, Zapovijest za odbranu dj.
br. 470 od 19. 4. 1993., ICTY, Prlić i ostali, dokaz 3D00014;
naredba od 20. 4. 1993., broj 470-1/93, ICTY, Prlić i ostali,
dokaz 2D00094 i 2D00095.
1075 GSHVO, VOS, str. pov. br. 03-412/93, za dan 9. i 10. 5.
1993.
1076 Operativna zona JIH, Mljenko Lasić, ICTY Prlić i osta-
li, 3D01001; 3D01006; 3D01007; 3D01008; 3D01009;
3D01010; 3D01011; 3D01013; 3D01016; 3D01023.
1077 ICTY Prlić i ostali, 3D00165.
527
Domovinski rat 04-02-2020 Knjiga 1.indd 527
because the aim of the ARBIH leadership “is to spread the
conflict to these areas of the HZ HB”. The report ends with
the conclusion that the ferocity on the onslaught “in the
entire territory of the HZ HB shows that the Muslim offen-
sive has been carefully and meticulously prepared and it is
commanded from the very top” and that “the Muslim side,
as it has been doing all along, will deny everything and
will present the ARBIH moves as isolated incidents or ac-
tions taken by extremists and renegade groups” and that
“the basic intention of the aggressor is to gradually seize
military and civil power in the towns in central Bosnia and
expel the Croats from these areas”.
Sporadic clashes occurred on April 20. On April 21
the HVO and ARBIH agreed to confine their respective
troops to the barracks, remove all erected obstacles and
barricades and establish a separation line. On April 23
the situation was relatively calm. But, then it started to
steadily deteriorate again, mostly because the ARBIH
forces in Konjic did not honor the agreement. A conflict,
at that point, was inevitable. The Report on Conditions
and Developments in the 42nd Mountain Brigade by the
commander of IV Corps of the ARBIH Arif Pašalić of May
2,1993 confirms that the ARBIH was preparing to attack
the HVO and that the Muslim command intended to use
the Muslims serving in the ranks of the HVO in the attack.
Arif Pašalić, in his reports, refers to a report made by the
commander of the 42nd Mountain Brigade and a report
from a meeting held at the Brigade HQ on April 17, 1993.
The contents of both these reports reveal the existence
of the plan to “use our men (Muslims) in the HVO to cap-
ture Stolac”. Furthermore, the report says that “we have
already established communication with our men in the
HVO” and that ARBIH mortars “are already in position and
ready to fire on HVO troops” and on “targets on the right
bank of the Neretva”.
In Order, issued to the battalion commanders and
narrow part of the 42 b.br., at the meeting held on 17 April
1993 at 2200 hours, the commander of the 42b.br. orally
R
stated the following:
- do not act without an Order
- connection with our men in the HVO has been done
- with minor forces occupied are:
- bridge in Žitomislići
- two dominant points that dominate Buna
- positions towards Domanovići
- positions towards village Stanojevići
- Hodbina is under control
- the most of forces is in stand-by, resting from the task:
4.2.2020. 18:37:10
 Ante Nazor • II DIO
vanja ARBiH, bila je privođenje i izoliranje većeg broja
muslimanskih vojnih obveznika na području na kojem
je HVO držao vlast, uključujući i postrojbe HVO-a u či-
jem su sastavu bili muslimani. Izvori HVO-a od 1. srpnja
1993. pokazuju da su zapovijedi „o privođenju vojnih
obveznika muslimanske nacionalnosti, primjerice u vo-
jarnu Dretelj i u pritvor u Gabelu, rezultat pogoršanja
sigurnosne situacije zbog događaja u Mostaru“.1078
Presudna za slamanje HVO-a i zauzimanje znatnog
dijela BiH na kojem žive Hrvati, trebala je biti napadajna
H
operacija „Neretva“, koju je muslimanska ARBiH pokre-
nula 12. rujna 1993. protiv HVO-a i hrvatskog naroda
na prostoru od Gornjega Vakufa preko Prozora do Mo-
stara, s ciljem ovladavanja tim teritorijem i stvaranjem
pretpostavki za zauzimanje Mostara, doline Neretve i
izlaska na more.1079 Na mostarskom dijelu bojišta poče-
M
la je 14. rujna. Istoga dana, na drugom smjeru opera-
cije „Neretva“, ARBiH je 14. rujna napala selo Uzdol na
ramskoj bojišnici, s ciljem zauzimanja Prozora/Rame, i
počinila zločin, ubivši 41 Hrvata - 12 zarobljenih pripad-
nika HVO-a i 29 civila Hrvata, među kojima su bila i dje-
ca. Omjer snaga – 1:7 u korist ARBiH, ukazuje na jačinu
D
ofenzive i napore koje je HVO uložio da se održi i odbije
napade. O svemu tome govori Davor Marijan u prvom
dijelu ove knjige.
Radi pokušaja sprječavanja srpskih snaga da osvoje
pojedine gradove u BiH i spašavanja muslimanskog sta-
novništva na tom području, međunarodna zajednica ih
C
je proglašavala „zaštićenim zonama“. Na području Sre-
brenice i Žepe, koje su sredinom travnja 1993. bile u go-
tovo bezizlaznom položaju zbog napada Drinskog kor-
pusa VRS-a, UNPROFOR je preuzeo odgovornost nakon
Sporazuma o demilitarizaciji toga područja, koji je AR-
BiH potpisala s Vojskom Republike Srpske (VRS) 8. svib-
nja 1993. godine. Prekid sukoba na tom dijelu ratišta,
ARBiH mogla je iskoristiti za obračun s HVO-om u sre-
dišnjoj Bosni, što je već sljedećega dana, 9. svibnja, kad
su započele borbe između ARBiH i HVO-a u Mostaru,
nagovijestio načelnik Glavnog štaba Armije Republike
BiH Sefer Halilović u zapovjedništvu 3. korpusa ARBiH:
„… Treći korpus mora pojačati napadna i informativna
dejstva na Travnik i Lašvansku dolinu, Busovaču, Vitez,
Novi Travnik. Treći korpus će dobiti pojačanje kad UN
1078 Zapovjedništvo III. satnije III. bojne VP HVO Čapljina,
Dnevno izvješće, djelatni broj: 02-4/3-06/4-12-207/93,
od 1. 7. 1993.
1079 Lučić, 2018., 296.
528
Domovinski rat 04-02-2020 Knjiga 1.indd 528
- to close the bridge in Žitomislići
- to take the point and the bridge on Buna with
one part of Blagaj forces
- to take Domanovići
- Men (Muslims, editor’s note) From HVO Čapljina has
got the task to take Tasovčići and the bridge in Čapljina
with aim not to allow the forces gathering from
direction Metković
- villages are maximally safe and connected through the
courier connection
- taking the town Stolac with our men in the HVO
- taking points and the villages Prenj, Nakovanj and
Aladinići
- bridge control on route Bregava in the village Prenj and
prevention of introducting HVO forces from direction
Kruševo-Prenj and Svitava-Prenj
- to close the route towards villages Drinovac and
Kruševo
- Mortars 60 and 82 are set to act against HVO
- given targets at the right bank of Novertva to the
launcher
- PO materials are in stand-by (unofficial translation
from The Hague)
The “necessary tasks”, issued by IV Corps HQ confirm
the contents of the above document.
The first serous battles between the ARBIH and the
HVO in Mostar started on the morning of May 9 and fin-
ished on May 12, 1993.39 The HVO perceived those battles
as the logical consequence of the ARBIH’s preparations
for attacks and further offensive actions in the Konjic, Klis
and Jablanica areas. When the ARBIH attacked the HVO in
Mostar on May 9 elements of HVO professional units were
sent to Mostar. That suggests that the HVO did not plan to
D
attack the ARBIH. The HVO merely reacted to the ARBIH’s
moves. On May 10 the ARBIH captured Grabovica, on the
outskirts of Mostar, where, on September 8-9 ARBIH sol-
diers would kill 32 Croatian civilians, including a four-year-
old child. It is worth pointing out that when the massacre
R
was perpetrated Grabovica was deep in the ARBIH’s rear.
After midnight on the night of June 29-30 the ARBIH,
using the Muslim traitors in the HVO ranks, as per Arif
Pašalić’s plan of May 2 1993, which ordered the Muslims
39 On the same day, in the early morning hours, ARBIH so-
ldiers abducted don Ivo Vukšić from the monastery and
took him to East Mostar. After negotiations, Vukšić was
returned to West Mostar (Report by parish priest Don Ivo
Vukšić, of May 15, 1993, ICTY: Prlić et al., 3D00177).
4.2.2020. 18:37:10
 Ante Nazor • PART II
odredi demilitarisovane zone u Istočnoj Bosni, tada
će biti trenutak konačnoga obračuna sa ustašama na
ovom terenu i put u Hrvatsku ili pod crnu zemlju…“.1080
Kad je 4. lipnja 1993. Vijeće sigurnosti UN-a konač-
no izglasalo Rezoluciju 836 o šest “zaštićenih zona” u
BiH (Bihać, Goražde, Sarajevo, Tuzla, Srebrenica i Žepa)
i odobrilo novu operaciju UN-a u BiH da bi se te zone i
zaštitile,1081 ARBiH mogla je pokrenuti nove napadajne
operacije u središnjoj Bosni, s pojačanjima dovedenim
iz drugih područja BiH. Zbog toga je hrvatski pred-
H
sjednik Franjo Tuđman prigovorio Aliji Izetbegoviću na
susretu u Zagrebu, 11. lipnja 1993.: „Gospodine Izetbe-
goviću, 7500 vojnika muslimanskih je prebačeno bilo
u vrijeme dok je tamo bila tragedija Srebrenice, pre-
bačeno na područje Busovače i tamo su hrvatska sela
čišćena. Od 145 tisuća izbjeglica iz istočne Bosne, iz
M
središnje Bosne, oko 95 do 100 tisuća je Muslimana (na-
seljeno, op. ur.), od Mostara pa dalje i tada ste započeli,
da li po vašoj naredbi, ali postoje pripremljene naredbe,
pismene naredbe da treba očistiti sve (od Hrvata, op.
ur.) – Jablanicu, Konjic, Mostar itd. Prema tome, zašto je
započelo to u tim provincijama 8 i 10 koje su bile pred-
D
viđene (Vance-Owenovim planom, op. ur.) s većinskom
hrvatskom vlašću?”1082
S obzirom na podatke u izvorima, koji javnosti nisu
cjelovito prikazani, a koje je selektivno koristilo i haško
Tužiteljstvo, činjenica je da bi većina odluka, odnosno
objašnjenja odluka Žalbenoga vijeća kojima se oprav-
C
dava teza o „udruženom (zajedničkom) zločinačkom
pothvatu“ pala u svakoj ozbiljnijoj znanstvenoj raspra-
vi. Stoga je teza da je udruživanje Hrvata u Hrvatsku
zajednicu / Republiku Herceg Bosnu zločinačke naravi,
kao i pomoć koju je pritom pružilo hrvatsko vodstvo, či-
D
njenično neprihvatljiva, a za Hrvate i uvredljiva. Budući
da ovdje nema dovoljno prostora za cjelovitu i detaljnu
raščlambu, samo ću se osvrnuti na neke navode iz pri-
općenja Tužiteljstva nakon proglašenja drugostupanj-
ske presude. Primjerice, da je “Žalbeno vijeće potvrdilo
1080 OZ SB-VOS, Načelnik VOS Ivica Zeko, 9. 5. 1993., Obra-
na, vojna tajna, strogo pov., File: B-446-2-16.pdf. /ICTY,
predmet IT-04-74 (Prlić i ostali) dokaz 3D02873./; M.
TUĐMAN, Druga strana Rubikona - politička strategija
Alije Izetbegovića, Hrvatska sveučilišna naklada, Zagreb,
2017., 192-193.
1081 Marija Sentić, Kronologija Republike Hrvatske 1990.-
1998., Hrvatski institut za povijest – Školska knjiga, Za-
greb, 2015., 552.
1082 M. TUĐMAN, 2017., 341.
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Domovinski rat 04-02-2020 Knjiga 1.indd 529
in the HVO to continue serving in the HVO until the ARBIH
attacked the Croats, the ARBIH captured the HVO Tihomir
Mišić barracks, Bijelo Polje and a few other locales in Mo-
star and its environs. The only logical, and by the same to-
ken, necessary reaction of the HVO to the actions of the
Muslim traitors in its ranks was to arrest and isolate a large
number of Muslim conscripts in the area controlled by the
HVO and those serving in HVO units. The HVO, knowing
that the ARBIH would launch more offensive actions, took
this step to protect its soldiers and Croatian civilians. HVO
sources, dated July 1, 1993, show that the orders to “con-
fine the Muslim conscripts to, among other places, the
Dretelj barracks and Gabela  jail, come as a direct result of
the worsening of the security situation in relation to the
events in Mostar.”
The ARBIH launched Operation Neretva-93 against
the HVO and the Croatian people on September 12 ,1993.
The aims of the offensive were to occupy the predomi-
nately Croat area stretching from Gornji Vakuf via Prozor
to Mostar, decisively defeat the HVO forces, create condi-
tions for the capture of the city of Mostar and the Neretva
Valley and create conditions for securing access to the
Adriatic Sea. Fighting on the Mostar front commenced
on September 14. On the same day, the ARBIH attacked
the village of Uzdol on the Rama front with the aim of
capturing Prozor/Rama. During the attack ARBIH soldiers
committed a crime, murdering 41 Croats – 12 HVO POWs
and 29 civilians, including children. The ARBIH enjoyed
a 7:1 numerical advantage over the HVO during the of-
fensive. Despite this, the HVO offered spirited resistance
and repulsed many attacks. Davor Marijan describes these
events in detail in the first part of this book.
In a bid to prevent Serb forces from capturing a num-
ber of towns in BiH and protect the Muslim population
in the area in question, the international community de-
clared these areas safe zones. Srebrenica and Žepa, under
attack from Drina Corps of VRS, were in a hopeless situa-
tion in mid-April, 1993. Then UNPROFOR moved in follow-
R
ing the demilitarization agreement of the area which the
ARBIH had signed with the VRS on May 8, 1993. The ces-
sation of hostilities in the Žepa –Srebrenica area freed up
the ARBIH troops deployed there for deployment against
the HVO in central Bosnia. The chief of the General Staff of
the ARBIH Sefer Halilović announced the troop transfer at
III Corps HQ on May 9, when the ARBIH attacked the HVO
in Mostar: “…III Corps must intensify its offensive actions
against Travnik, the Lašva Valley, Busovača, Vitez, Novi
Travnik. III Corps will be reinforced when the UN declared
4.2.2020. 18:37:10
 Ante Nazor • II DIO
zaključke Raspravnog vijeća da su ključni članovi tadaš-
njeg čelništva Hrvatske, uključujući predsjednika Franju
Tuđmana, ministra obrane Gojka Šuška i Janka Bobet-
ka, visokog generala Hrvatske vojske, dijelili zločinački
cilj da etnički očiste bosanske muslimane i doprinijeli
ostvarivanju tog cilja”. Ta netočna teza temelji se na
necjelovito prikazanim izvorima, posebice na selektiv-
no prikazanim transkriptima razgovora iz Ureda pred-
sjednika. U zaključcima o tadašnjoj „pogrešnoj“ politi-
ci hrvatskoga vodstva prema BiH, vidljivo je da haško
H
Tužiteljstvo i dio sudaca, kao i dio političara i povjesni-
čara u Hrvatskoj, koje ne zanima cjelovit sadržaj izvora,
niti su pročitali barem neke od njih (npr. transkripte iz
Ureda predsjednika RH), potpuno zanemaruje sadržaj
razgovora između hrvatskog predsjednika Tuđmana i
predsjednika bošnjačko-muslimanskog dijela Predsjed-
M
ništva BiH Alije Izetbegovića, u kojima je on zastupao
ultimativan i isključiv stav da će BiH „biti građanska dr-
žava ili će biti građanski rat“!1083 O tome govore brojni
izvori, primjerice, objavljeni u knjizi Miroslava Tuđmana,
Druga strana Rubikona – politička strategija Alije Izetbe-
govića (Zagreb, 2017.).
D
Fokusirajući se uglavnom na predsjednika Tuđma-
na i traženje krivnje Hrvatske, mnogi su „zaboravili“ da
se korijeni Izetbegovićeve doktrine i njegove političke
filozofije nalaze u njegovoj Islamskoj deklaraciji, pisanoj
već 1970. u Sarajevu, a objavljenoj u 200.000 besplatnih
primjeraka 1990., uoči slobodnih i demokratskih izbora
C
u BiH. U skladu sa sadržajem spomenute Deklaracije, u
kojoj se navodi i da „islamski pokret treba i može prići
preuzimanju vlasti čim je moralno i brojno toliko snažan
da može ne samo srušiti postojeću neislamsku, nego
i izgraditi novu islamsku vlast“, za njega su nacionalni
interesi nelegitimni u višenacionalnoj Bosni i Hercego-
vini, te se zbog toga uporno zalagao za jednu, unitarnu
Bosnu i Hercegovinu, bez tri konstitutivna naroda i bilo
kakvih entiteta na nacionalnoj osnovi.1084
Također, o tome kako su rješenje hrvatskoga pita-
nja u BiH vidjeli pojedini bošnjačko-muslimanski duž-
nosnici, svjedoči govor dr. Safeta Ćibe, nametnutoga
predsjednika Ratnoga predsjedništva općine Konjic, na
Radio Konjicu, 12. travnja 1993., uoči početka napada
ARBiH na Hrvate na tom području, u kojem je ustvrdio
da „u BiH živi samo jedan narod – to su Bosanci, i to Bo-
1083 Lučić, 2018., 260.
1084 Slobodan Praljak, Priručnik, Zagreb, ožujak 2017., 70.
530
Domovinski rat 04-02-2020 Knjiga 1.indd 530
demilitarized zones in eastern Bosnia. When that happens
the moment we’ll settle accounts with the fascists once
and for all in this area. Those Croats reluctant to leave for
Croatia we’ll put six feet under…”
When, on June 4, 1993, the UN Security Council fi-
nally passed Resolution 836, establishing 6 safe zones in
BiH (Bihać, Goražde, Sarajevo, Tuzla, Srebrenica, and Žepa)
and sanctioned a new UN operation in BiH protecting the
zones, the ARBIH was able to mount new offensive opera-
tions in central Bosnia using reinforcements brought from
other areas of the country. President Tuđman put Alija
Izetbegović on the spot during their meeting in Zagreb
on June 11, 1993: “Mr. Izetbegović, 7,500 Muslim soldiers
were transferred from the Srebrenica area while the trag-
edy there was taking place, to the Busovača area where
Croatian villages were ethnically cleansed. Out of 145,000
refugees from eastern Bosnia, central Bosnia, about 95-
100,000 are Muslims settled in the Mostar area and oth-
er areas. And then it started, maybe on your orders and
make no mistake, there exist written, prepared orders
that the whole area is to be cleansed of Croats – Jablanica,
Konjic, Mostar, etc. So, why did everything start in these
provinces, 8 and 10, which (according to the Vance-Owen
plan) were to have majority Croatian local governments?”
The data contained in the primary sources regard-
ing the war in BiH, which have not been presented to the
public in their entirety and were selectively used by the
prosecutors in The Hague, would have, had they been
analyzed conscientiously, decisively refuted all the expla-
nations of the Appeals Chamber supporting the verdict,
which are grounded in the idea that the Bosnian Croats
engaged in a criminal enterprise. Therefore, the theory
that the establishment of the HZ HB and the help provid-
D
ed by the Croatian government constitute a criminal un-
dertaking is not supported by facts and is deeply insult-
ing to the Croats. The format of this book precludes me
from analyzing in detail every point from the explanation
of the second instance verdict, but I deem it important to
R
mention a few points and comment on them here. For ex-
ample, “the Appeals Chamber upheld the Trial Chamber’s
findings that key members of Croatia’s then-leadership,
including President Franjo Tuđman, Defence Minister
Gojko Šušak, and Janko Bobetko, a senior General in the
Croatian Army, shared the criminal purpose to ethnical-
ly cleanse Bosnian Muslims and contributed to realizing
that goal”. This theory is factually incorrect and based on
selective interpretations of the sources, especially those
regarding the transcripts from the meetings held in the
4.2.2020. 18:37:10
 Ante Nazor • PART II
sanci islamske, katoličke i pravoslavne vjeroispovijesti”,
negirajući tako postojanje Hrvata u BiH: “Mene je na ovu
funkciju postavio lično gospodin Alija Izetbegović, koji
se trenutno nalazi u Americi. Sve što radim, radim po
nalogu našega predsjednika. Dužan sam ispraviti naše
propuste i da bude sve dobro. Mnogi me pitaju o Hrva-
tima u BiH, a ja odgovaram da su Hrvati u Hrvatskoj, a u
BiH su Bošnjaci – katolici. Oni nisu ekstremi HVO-a, a mi
nećemo voditi nikakve pregovore s ekstremima HVO-a,
njih ćemo poraziti. Nećemo voditi pregovore ni s ek-
H
stremistima HDZ-a.” Smjenjivanje njegova prethodnika,
predsjednika općine Konjic prim. dr. Rusmira Hadžihu-
sejnovića, pokazuje da se politika institucionalizacije
ARBiH temeljila i na praksi eliminiranja Muslimana koji
su bili za suradnju s HVO-om, te navodi na zaključak da
je takva politika “već u svojem ishodištu planirala mu-
M
slimansko-hrvatski sukob”. Da „nema hrvatskog naroda
u BiH” ustvrdio je početkom 1994. godine i prvi zapo-
vjednik Četvrtoga korpusa ARBiH Arif Pašalić „poučivši”
javnost kako u BiH žive „katolici Bosanci”, „Bosanci Boš-
njaci-muslimani” i „Bosanci pravoslavci”.1085
Neuvjerljiva su i sramotna opravdanja za počinjene
D
zločine nad Hrvatima u izvješćima zapovjednika Armije
RBiH, no ona također pokazuju razinu propagande di-
jela bošnjačke politike i daju odgovor na pitanje kakva
je bila alternativa Tuđmanovoj politici u BiH. Primjerice,
u “Informaciji Ministarstvu inostranih poslova”, 23. listo-
pada 1993., “komandant Štaba Vrhovne komande OS R
C
BiH” general Rasim Delić je o pokolju 30-ak Hrvata civila
(među ubijenima je i jedno četverogodišnje dijete) u
Grabovici kod Mostara 8./9. rujna 1993. zapisao: “Prema
raspoloživim podacima iz ovog sela je pružen oružani
otpor, a borbe su se vodile tokom cijele noći. Narednog
D
dana došli smo do saznanja da je tom prilikom stradalo
11 civila hrvatske nacionalnosti, a 18 je organizovano,
u cilju njihove zaštite, evakuirano za Jablanicu. Zbog
veće koncentracije jedinica u tom oružanom sukobu,
nemamo preciznijih podataka o načinu stradanja lica.”
Za pokolj u Uzdolu 14. rujna 1993., u kojem je ubijeno
29 civila (od toga troje djece) i 12 pripadnika HVO-a
napisao je da su uz “bojovnike HVO-a stradali i civili sa
naoružanjem koje su bojovnici uključili u sukob” te da je
“toliki broj poginulih bio uslovljen i dejstvom artiljerije
HVO-a”. U drugom izvješću muslimanskih snaga o napa-
du na Uzdol navedeno je da su “bojovnici HVO-a ispred
1085 „Nema hrvatskog naroda u BiH”, Danas, 22. 2. 1994.,
9–10; Lučić, 2018., 259-260, 268; M. Tuđman, 2017., 142.
531
Domovinski rat 04-02-2020 Knjiga 1.indd 531
Office of the President. From the conclusions relating to
the “wrong” policy of the Croatian leadership towards BiH,
it is clear that the prosecutors and some judges, as well
some politicians and historians in Croatia, who are not
interested in the picture that the sources in their entirety
present and who have not even read some of the sourc-
es (for example, the transcripts from the meetings held
in the Office of the President), completely ignored what
was said during the meeting between the President of the
Republic of Croatia, Franjo Tuđman, and the President of
the Bosniak/Muslim part of the BiH Presidency, Alija Izet-
begović, when Alija Izetbegović assumed a belligerent
attitude, stating that “BiH will be a civil state or there will
be civil war”. Many sources confirm this and most of them
are cited in Miroslav Tuđman’s book Druga strana Rubiko-
na – politička strategija Alije Izetbegovića (The Other Side
of the Rubicon – the Political Strategy of Alija Izetbegović)
(Zagreb, 2017).
Many people, focusing mostly on President Tuđman
and on trying to find fault with Croatia, have glossed over
the fact that the roots of Izetbegović’s doctrine and his
political philosophy lie in his book Islamska Deklaracija
(Islamic Declaration) written in Sarajevo in 1974 and pub-
lished in 1990. 200,000 copies of the book were printed
and distributed to all and sundry – free of charge – be-
fore the free and democratic elections in BiH. In the book
Izetbegović espouses his belief that national interests are
illegitimate in a multi-ethnic BiH. He was always, it has to
be noted, staunchly in favor of a unitary BiH, a BiH with-
out the three constituent nations and without any entities
based on a national basis. In Islamska Deklaracija Izetbe-
gović states that “the Islamic Movement should and can
seize power as soon as it acquires enough moral clout and
sufficient numerical strength to not only topple the exist-
ing non-Muslim government but also to set up a new, Is-
lamic government”.
The speech given by Dr. Safet Ćibo, the president of
the Presidency of the Konjic Municipality, on radio Konjic
R
on April 12, 1993, prior to the ARBIH’s attack on the Croats
in the area testifies to how some Bosniak/Muslim officers
envisaged the solution to the Croat problem. Ćibo, ap-
pointed by decree, averred that “there is only one nation
in BiH – and that nation is Bosnians, that is Bosnians of Is-
lamic, Catholic and Christian Orthodox faith”, thus negat-
ing the existence of Croats in BiH. He also stated: “I have
been appointed to this function by Mr. Alija Izetbegović
himself. He is currently in America. Everything I do I do ac-
cording to the decrees of our president. I am responsible
4.2.2020. 18:37:10
 Ante Nazor • II DIO
H
Pečati hrvatskih snaga u BiH, natpis na njima: Republika Bosna i
Hercegovina / Hrvatska zajednica Herceg Bosna / Općina Prozor
/ Hrvatsko vijeće obrane.
The seals of the Croatian forces in Bosnia and Herzegovina with
the following inscriptions: Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina /
Croatian Community of Herzeg-Bosnia / Municipality of Prozor /
Croatian Defense Council.
M
sebe isturili žene s naoružanjem”, pa da su tako strada-
le… (“Izvještaj komande SB-a ‘Prozor’”, 20. 9. 1993.).
Istina je da u selu Grabovica, koje je bilo pod kontro-
D
lom Armije RBiH i udaljeno od crte bojišta, nije bilo nika-
kvoga sukoba, te da branitelji Uzdola nisu tjerali civile i
žene u sukob s napadačima iz Armije RBiH, da su mnogi
od civila, uključujući i djecu, ubijeni iz blizine, te da je ar-
tiljerija HVO-a tukla samo školu na kraju sela, iz koje su
branitelji HVO-a pružali otpor, opkoljeni pripadnicima
C
Armije RBiH. Također, u izvješću generala Rasima Delića
za Hrvate koje su pripadnici ARBiH strijeljali na području
sela Maljine/Bikoši, navodi se da su poginuli u sukobu, a
da su potom mrtvi prikupljeni na jedno mjesto. Na Haš-
kom sudu general Delić osuđen je na 5 godina (!) zatvora.
Brojni su primjeri takve alternative Tuđmanovoj, odnosno
hrvatskoj politici u BiH i „vjerodostojnosti“ Haškog suda...
Jednako tako, haško Tužiteljstvo je u priopćenju ista-
knulo da je zajednički cilj sudionika „udruženog (zajed-
ničkog) zločinačkog pothvata“ bio „preuzimanje kontrole
nad teritorijem u Bosni i Hercegovini“, kako bi se „omo-
gućilo ujedinjenje hrvatskog naroda u Hrvatskoj i Bosni
i Hercegovini“, te da je zbog toga, između ostaloga, u
navedenim općinama „prisilno raseljena desetina hiljada
bosanskih Muslimana“, od siječnja 1993. do travnja 1994.
godine. No, takvoj tezi suprotstavlja se pitanje kako je
Žalbeno vijeće moglo zanemariti činjenicu da su upravo
Hrvati pristali na sve prijedloge unutarnje podjele BiH
i da su potpisali Washingtonski i Daytonski sporazum,
što izravno negira spomenutu tvrdnju Tužiteljstva. I sam
532
Domovinski rat 04-02-2020 Knjiga 1.indd 532
for making right our mistakes and making sure that every-
thing turns out OK. Many people ask me about the Croats
in BiH and I tell them that the Croats are in Croatia and
that in BiH there are Bosnian Catholics. They are not HVO
extremists. We will not engage in dialogue with HVO ex-
tremists, we will defeat them. We will not talk to the HDZ
extremists either.” The sacking of Dr. Safet Ćibo’s prede-
cessor, the president of the Konjic Municipality Dr. Rusmir
Hadžihusejnović, shows that the policy of institutionaliz-
ing the ARBIH was based on the practice of eliminating
those Muslims who were in favor of cooperating with the
HVO and makes one conclude that the policy was “from
its inception, grounded in the concept of instigating a
Muslim-Croat conflict.” The commander of IV Corps Arif
Pašalić, at the beginning of 1994, also claimed that “there
are no Croats in BiH”, educating the public that in BiH “live
Catholic Bosnians, Bosnians – Bosniaks/Muslims and Bos-
nians Orthodox Christians.”
The justifications put forward for the crimes commit-
ted against the Croats in the reports of the commander of
the ARBIH are ludicrous and dishonorable but they also
reveal the degrading level of Bosniak/Muslim propagan-
da and show what the Muslim alternative to Tuđman’s
policies in BiH was. For example, in the Information for the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of October 23, 1993, the com-
mander of the Supreme Command HQ of the SR BIH Gen-
eral Rasim Delić wrote the following about the massacre
of about 30 Croatian civilians (including a four-year-old
child) in Grabovica near Mostar on September 8-9, 1993:
“According to the available information, resistance was
offered from the village and the fighting lasted all night.
The following day we found out that 11 civilians of Croat
ethnicity had become casualties in the fighting. We evac-
D
uated 18 Croats for their own safety to Jablanica. Due to
a large number of troops engaged in the battle we have
no way of ascertaining the manner of death of the said
persons.” On September 14, 1993, Muslim soldiers mur-
dered 29 civilians (including three children) and 12 HVO
R
soldiers in the village of Uzdol. Rasim Delić wrote that
“HVO combatants were killed and also armed civilians
whom the combatants involved in the fighting” and that
“the large number of casualties was caused by HVO artil-
lery”. In another ARBIH report about the attack on Uzdol
it was claimed that “HVO combatants used women, all of
them armed, as a human shield” and they got hurt… (HQ
SB Prozor report of September 20, 1993)
There is no denying that when the massacre in
Grabovica took place there was no fighting in the village,
4.2.2020. 18:37:11
 Ante Nazor • PART II
pogled na memorandume i pečate Hrvatske zajednice,
a kasnije i Hrvatske Republike Herceg-Bosne, na kojima
se gotovo uvijek na početku nalazi naziv države – „Bo-
sna i Hercegovina“, a potom naziv Zajednice/Republike
Herceg-Bosne, govori o ciljevima hrvatskoga vodstva.
Činjenica da naziva države Bosne i Hercegovine nema
na memorandumima i pečatima Republike Srpske, jasno
pokazuje što je bio cilj srpske politike u BiH i potvrđuje
da se Republika Srpska i Hrvatska zajednica/Republika
Herceg-Bosna ne mogu poistovjetiti, niti po okolnostima
H
njihova nastanka, niti po političkim ciljevima!
Osnivanje hrvatskih zajednica u BiH, prvo Hrvatske
zajednice Bosanske Posavine (HZ BP), 12. studenoga
1991., a potom i drugih (u Hercegovini, središnjoj Bosni,
Usori, Soli i drugim manjim područjima na kojima su
Hrvati bili u većini ili su činili znatan udio stanovništva),
M
uvjetovano je dramatičnim razdobljem brutalne srpske
agresije na Republiku Hrvatsku i prijetnjom srpske agre-
sije na BiH te potrebom cjelovitijeg organiziranja obra-
ne vlastitih povijesnih prostora i interesa cjelokupnog
hrvatskoga naroda, kao i teritorijalne cjelovitosti BiH. S
obzirom na činjenicu da je Hrvatska u tom razdoblju su-
D
stavno razarana i s teritorija BiH, a da tamošnja vlast nije
reagirala na odgovarajući način, pod parolom „ovo nije
naš rat“, te s obzirom na prethodno iskustvo pokušaja
postizanja srpsko-muslimanskog „historijskog sporazu-
ma“ u srpnju 1991., takva je reakcija bila prirodni slijed
postupaka Hrvata koji su odgovorno razmišljali o sud-
C
bini svoga naroda, ne dovodeći u pitanje suverenitet i
cjelovitost Bosne i Hercegovine. Upravo onako kako je
navedeno u zaključcima Regionalnog odbora Hrvatske
demokratske zajednice Bosanske Posavine, 12. stude-
noga 1991. u Bosanskom Brodu: Hrvatska zajednica
D
Bosanska Posavina osnovana je zbog „složenog i teškog
političkog stanja te neposredne ratne opasnosti i agresi-
je na hrvatski narod“, a radi „objedinjavanja političkih ak-
tivnosti na obrani suvereniteta i integriteta Bosne i Her-
cegovine i jačanja hrvatskog korpusa“, uz otvorenost da
„zajednici mogu pristupiti i pripadnici svih drugih naro-
da i političkih asocijacija koje se u svojim programskim
opredjeljenima zalažu za suverenitet Bosne i Hercego-
vine, demokraciju, mir i poštovanje povijesnih, etničkih,
kulturnih prava i legalnih metoda“.1086
1086 Ivo Lučić, Od vila ilirskih do Bijelog puta – stranputicama
bosanske i hercegovačke povijesti, Hrvatska liječnička
komora – Hrvatski institut za povijest, Zagreb, prosinac
2018., 209-212.
533
Domovinski rat 04-02-2020 Knjiga 1.indd 533
and that the village was firmly under the ARBIH control
and located far from the front line. Also, the claim that the
HVO defenders of Uzdol used women and civilians as a
human shield is ludicrous. What is true, however, is that
many of the killed civilians, including children, in Uzdol
were dispatched from point-blank range and that HVO
artillery fired only on the school building located on the
edge of the village when the HVO positions there were
being overrun by ARBIH troops. Rasim Delić’s unscrupu-
lousness is also evident in what he wrote about the Croats
who had been summarily shot by ARBIH soldiers in the
village of Maljine/Bikoši. According to Delić, the executed
Croats were killed in combat and then their bodies were
brought to the same place. The Hague Tribunal sentenced
Rasim Delić to five years imprisonment (!). There are many
similar examples of this alternative to Tuđman’s, or the Re-
public of Croatia’s, policy towards BiH and the “integrity”
of the Hague Tribunal…
Also, the prosecutors in The Hague claimed in their
statement that the common goal of the participants in
“the joint criminal enterprise” was to “to seize control over
claimed territory in Bosnia and Herzegovina” in order to
“facilitate a unification of Croatian people in Croatia and
Bosnia and Herzegovina” and that, on account of that,
amongst other things, in said municipalities “tens of thou-
sands of Bosnian Muslims were forcibly displaced” from
January, 1993, to April, 1994. This claim begs the ques-
tion: How could the Appeals Chamber ignore the fact that
the Croats had been the only ones who had accepted all
proposals about internal division of BiH put forward by
the international community and that the Croats had
duly signed the Washington Agreement and the Dayton
Agreement? In light of the Croats’ compliance with every-
thing the international community proposed the falsity of
the prosecutors’ claim is revealed for all to see. Just one
cursory glance at memos and seals issued by the HZ and
later the HZ HB shows what the goals and intentions of
the leadership of the Bosnian Croats were – at the top of
R
all these documents and stamps is the name Bosnia and
Herzegovina followed by the name HZ or HZ HB. On the
other hand, the name Bosnia and Herzegovina does not
feature in the memorandums and seals of the Republika
Srpska. It is therefore evident what outcome the Serbs’
policies in BiH were aimed at and that the Republika Srps-
ka and the HZ HB were not two sides of the same coin.
The conditions in which the HZ HB was formed were
completely different from those surrounding the estab-
lishment of the Republika Srpska and the political goals
4.2.2020. 18:37:11
 Ante Nazor • II DIO
Jednako tako, i sadržaj Odluke o osnivanju Hrvatske
zajednice Herceg-Bosne (HZ HB), koju su legalno izabra-
ni predstavnici hrvatskog naroda donijeli na sjednici u
Grudama 18. studenoga 1991., na dan srpske okupacije
i pokolja hrvatskog stanovništva u Vukovaru i Škabrnji,
jasno pokazuje opredijeljenost Hrvata za državnu neo-
visnost BiH i potvrđuje da cilj njenog osnivanja nije bio
izdvajanje iz BiH: „Zajednica će štovati demokratski iza-
branu vlast Republike Bosne i Hercegovine dok opstoji
državna neovisnost Bosne i Hercegovine u odnosu na
H
bivšu ili svaku buduću Jugoslaviju (članak 5. Temeljnih
odredaba).“ 1087 Hrvatskoj zajednici Herceg-Bosni s vre-
menom će pristupiti ostale hrvatske zajednice i udru-
žiti se u Hrvatsku Republiku Herceg-Bosnu, pokazujući
zajedništvo većeg dijela Hrvata u BiH, a prvu odluku
– osnivanje Hrvatskog vijeća obrane (HVO), 8. travnja
M
1992., HZ HB će donijeti tek nakon eskalacije rata u BiH,
odnosno početka otvorene srpske agresije na BiH.1088
Suprotni tome bili su ciljevi bosanskohercegovačkih
Srba, očigledno dogovoreni sa srbijanskim vodstvom u
Beogradu, izraženi u šest strategijskih točaka koje je pri-
hvatila Narodna skupština Srba iz BiH 12. svibnja 1992.
D
godine: spajanje srpskih država s obje strane rijeke Dri-
ne i povezivanje sa „srpskim“, zapravo okupiranim po-
dručjima u Republici Hrvatskoj, razgraničenje Srba u BiH
od Muslimana i Hrvata te izlaz Republike Srpske na more
i uspostavljanje srpske granice na Uni i Neretvi.
Spomenute odluke srpske skupštine u BiH, kao i na-
C
stavak hrvatsko-srpskog rata u BiH (upravo su hrvatske
snage u BiH onemogućile srpski plan „izlaska na more i
uspostave granice na Neretvi“), potvrđuju koliko su be-
smislene tvrdnje da je hrvatsko vodstvo iz BiH šest dana
ranije, 6. svibnja 1992., u Grazu (Austrija) postiglo dogo-
vor s vodstvom bosanskohercegovačkih Srba o razgra-
ničenju teritorija na račun Muslimana u BiH. Susret čelni-
ka Hrvata i Srba iz BiH u Grazu, Mate Bobana i Radovana
Karadžića, bio je tek jedan od brojnih (neuspješnih) raz-
govora i pregovora, na zahtjev međunarodne zajednice,
radi pokušaja mirnog rješenja sukoba u BiH i treba ga
promatrati u kontekstu ratnih prilika i nadmoći srpskih
snaga i JNA nad hrvatskim snagama.1089 Uostalom, obje
1087 Odluka o uspostavi Hrvatske zajednice Herceg-Bosne
od 18. studenoga 1991., izmijenjena je i dopunjena 3.
srpnja 1992. na sjednici Predsjedništva HZ HB. Preuzeto
iz rukopisa dr. sc. Marka Tokića.
1088 Lučić, 2018., 211.
1089 Iz rukopisa dr. sc. Marka Tokića.
534
Domovinski rat 04-02-2020 Knjiga 1.indd 534
of the HZ HB were mutually exclusive to those pursued by
the Bosnian Serbs!
The circumstances leading to the establishment of
Croatian Communities in BiH, first in Bosanska Posavina
(the Croatian Community of Bosanska Posavina (HZ BP,
on November 12, 1991) and later in Herzegovina, cen-
tral Bosnia, Usora, Soli and other smaller predominantly
Croat areas and those where Croats formed a significant
percentage of the population, were determined by the
brutality of Serb aggression against Croatia and the im-
minent threat of Serb aggression against Bosnia and
Herzegovina and the consequent need to take defensive
measures for protecting Croat areas in BiH, protecting the
interests of the Croatian nation as a whole and, last but
not least, protecting the territorial integrity of BiH. Given
the fact that Croatia, during that time period, was being
systematically devastated and attacked from BiH territo-
ry and given the fact that the BiH government refused
to take appropriate actions, justifying its indolence with
statements such as “this is not our war” and also given the
fact that the Muslims and Serbs tried to reach “a historic
Serb-Muslim agreement” in July, 1991, the only respon-
sible course of action on the part of the Bosnian Croats
was to take defensive measures. It has to be emphasized
yet again that these defensive measures did not compro-
mise the sovereignty and territorial integrity of BiH. In
the conclusions reached by the Regional Committee of
the Croatian Democratic Union of Bosanska Posavina on
November 12, 1991, in Bosanski Brod it is stated that the
HZ BP was formed because of “the difficult and complex
political situation and imminent danger of war and ag-
gression against the Croatian people” and for the purpose
of “unifying political activities relating to defending the
D
sovereignty and integrity of Bosnia and Herzegovina and
solidifying the Croatian national body”. It is further stated
that “members of all other nations and political associa-
tions, which are devoted to the sovereignty of Bosnia and
Herzegovina, democracy, peace and honoring the histori-
R
cal, ethnic, cultural rights and legal methods, are welcome
to join the HZ BP”.
Equally, the contents of the Decision on the Forming
of the HZ HB, which was passed by legally elected repre-
sentatives of the Croatian nation at a meeting on Novem-
ber 18, 1991 in Grude, the day of the fall of Vukovar when
the Serbs massacred a large number of Croatian civilians
there and in Škabrnja, constitute yet another proof that
the Croats were for an independent BiH and that the es-
tablishment of the HZ HB was not, in any way, shape or
4.2.2020. 18:37:11
 Ante Nazor • PART II
strane su u priopćenju za javnost nakon razgovora za-
tražile hitan nastavak Konferencije Europske zajednice
o BiH (čl. 5 priopćenja), što je podrazumijevalo i sudje-
lovanje muslimanske strane u pregovorima.1090
Istodobno, ignoriraju se podaci koji govore da je
bošnjačko-muslimansko vodstvo sudjelovalo u raz-
govorima o podjeli BiH. Primjerice, zapis načelnika
Štaba Vrhovne komande ARBiH Sefera Halilovića, da
je predsjednik Predsjedništva BiH Alija Izetbegović
od studenoga 1992. kombinirao s podjelom BiH,1091
H
da su suradnici bosanskohercegovačkog predsjedni-
ka Izetbegovića i izaslanici srbijanskog predsjednika
Miloševića imali bliske odnose tijekom 1992. - 1993.,
uključujući i razgovore o suradnji, o razmjenama teri-
torija, odnosno podjeli BiH.1092
Zanemaruje se i pokušaj sklapanja „historijskog
M
sporazuma“, odnosno dogovora između Srba i Musli-
mana, koji su muslimanski predstavnici, uz suglasnost
Alije Izetbegovića, ali bez znanja i sudjelovanja Hrvata u
njima, pokrenuli u srpnju 1991., kako bi se sačuvala cje-
lovitost BiH i izbjegao rat, te BiH ostala u „krnjoj Jugosla-
viji“. Srbi bi zauzvrat odustali od kantonizacije, odnosno
D
regionalizacije BiH. Ipak, Alija Izetbegović i SDA odustali
su od „historijskog sporazuma“, no muslimansko-srpski
pokušaj dogovora narušio je odnose i izazvao nepovje-
renje između Muslimana i Hrvata,1093 odnosno gublje-
nje povjerenja u središnje republičke institucije među
Hrvatima u Bosni i Hercegovini.
C
Prema tome, upravo u razdoblju započete otvore-
ne velikosrpske agresije na Hrvatsku, koju su provodi-
le Srbija, Crna Gora i JNA te srpske postrojbe iz BiH,
uz suradnju s dijelom Srba iz Hrvatske, vodstvo Mu-
slimana (Bošnjaka) u BiH tajno pregovara sa srpskim
D
vodstvom o uvjetima ostanka BiH u Jugoslaviji i nje-
zinoj unutarnjoj organizaciji, bez znanja hrvatskoga
vodstva i Hrvata kao trećeg konstitutivnog naroda u
BiH. Osim toga, tijekom 1991. održan je niz sastanaka,
1090 Miroslav Tuđman, Bosna i Hercegovina u raljama zapad-
ne demokracije – Korespondencija predsjednika Repu-
blike Hrvatske dr. Franje Tuđmana i dokumenti o Bosni i
Hercegovini 1990. - 1995. (256 originalnih dokumenata),
Zagreb, 2013., 122.
1091 Sefer Halilović, Lukava strategija, Maršal, Sarajevo,
1997., 18-20.
1092 Halilović, 1997., 10; Zapisnik sa sjednice Vrhovnog sa-
vjeta obrane SR Jugoslavije, kolovoz 1994.; Slobodna
Bosna, 5. 5. 2011., 29.
1093 Lučić, 2018., 196.
535
Domovinski rat 04-02-2020 Knjiga 1.indd 535
form, a bid to break away from BiH: “The Community shall
uphold the democratically elected government of Bosnia
and Herzegovina as long as the independence of Bosnia
and Herzegovina in relation to the former or any future
Yugoslavia exists (Article 5 of the Basic Provisions).40 Other
Croatian Communities would eventually join the HZ HB
and form the Croatian Republic of Herzeg-Bosnia, show-
ing that most of the Croats in BiH stood united. It is in-
teresting to note that the HZ HB passed its first decision
– the formation of the Croatian Defense Council (HVO) on
April 8, 1992 – only after the war in BiH had escalated, that
is, after the Serbs had launched their all-out aggression
against BiH.
The goals of the Bosnian Serbs, diametrically opposite
to those of the Croats, were in all probability conceived in
conclave with the Serbian leadership in Belgrade. These
goals were articulated as six strategic objectives accepted
by the National Assembly of the Bosnian Serbs on May 12,
1992: connecting the Serb states on both sides of the Dri-
na River and annex the Serb (in reality militarily occupied)
areas of the Republic of Croatia, separating the Serbs in
BiH from the Croats and Muslims and securing access
to the sea for the Republika Srpska and establishing the
western boundary of what in effect was supposed to be
Greater Serbia on the Una and Neretva Rivers.
The mentioned objectives of the National Assem-
bly of the Bosnian Serbs and the continuation of the
Serb-Croat war in BiH (it was the Croat forces that foiled
the Serb plan to “secure access to the sea” and establish
a boundary on the Neretva River) expose the inherent
farcicality of the claims professing that the Bosnian Croat
leadership, on May 6, 1992, in Graz (Austria) reached an
agreement with the Bosnian Serb leadership about delin-
eating BiH territory at the Muslims’ expense. This meeting
in Graz between Mate Boban and Radovan Karadžić, the
leaders of the Bosnian Croats and Bosnian Serbs respec-
tively, was just one among many unsuccessful meetings
and talks instigated by the international community in its
R
efforts to find a peaceful solution to the conflict in BiH.
For that reason, the Graz meeting should not be analyzed
outside the context of the existing circumstances on the
battlefield at that time and the overwhelming superiority
40 The Decision on Forming the Croatian Community of
Herzeg-Bosnia of November 18, 1991, was amended
and expanded on July 3, 1992, at the session of the Pre-
sidency of the HZ HB. From the manuscript by Marko
Tokić, Ph.D.
4.2.2020. 18:37:11
 Ante Nazor • II DIO
na različitim razinama, između Muslimana i Srba, bez
nazočnosti Hrvata.1094
O srpsko-muslimanskim razgovorima, među ostali-
ma, govori knjiga istaknutoga srpskog političara iz BiH i
ratnog potpredsjednika Republike Srpske, Nikole Koljevi-
ća - Stvaranje Republike Srpske 1993. - 1995., knjiga 1-2 (Be-
ograd, 2008.). Među izvorima i literaturom koja svjedoči
o srpsko-bošnjačkim (muslimanskim) pokušajima dogo-
vora (jedan od takvih sastanaka dogodio se u Beogradu
nakon prekida muslimansko-hrvatskog sukoba u BiH),
H
posebno je zanimljiva knjiga uglednog bošnjačko-musli-
manskog dužnosnika i jednog od vodećih muslimanskih
političara i diplomata za vrijeme rata u BiH, akademika
Muhameda Filipovića - Bio sam Alijin diplomata I-II. Kao
sudionik spomenutoga pokušaja postizanja „historijskog
sporazuma“ sa Srbima, u toj je knjizi zapisao: “Mi smo
M
smatrali da se pregovori moraju obaviti, prije svega, izme-
đu Srba i Muslimana. Naime, najveći problemi i najteže
moguće posljedice nastale bi po BiH ako bi došlo do težih
poremećaja odnosa između Bošnjaka (muslimana) i Srba.
Moralo je svakome biti jasno da sudbinu BiH određuju
prije svega odnosi dva njena najbrojnijih naroda.“1095
D
Za razumijevanje okolnosti spomenutih srpsko-mu-
slimanskih pregovora u BiH i spomenutoga Filipovićeva
citata treba reći da to nije bio izdvojen slučaj niti samo-
stalan čin jednog od muslimanskih intelektualaca, nego
postupak koji je bio u skladu s razmišljanjem tadašnjeg
muslimanskog vodstva, izraženim u intervjuu Alije
C
Izetbegovića za novine Borba, 9. veljače 1991.: “Mi ovdje
poštujemo srpski narod, živimo u slozi kao i sa hrvat-
skim, ali sudbinu Bosne više određuju srpsko-musliman-
ski, nego srpsko-hrvatski odnosi, i to jednostavno stoga
jer su Srbi ovdje brojniji od Hrvata.”1096 Na temelju takvih
i sličnih izjava muslimanskog vodstva u BiH i postupaka
u skladu s tim, autori knjige Smrt Jugoslavije zaključili su:
“Izetbegović je pokušao u Bosni igrati istu igru koju je
Milošević imao na umu za Jugoslaviju”.1097
1094 Jadranko Prlić, Prilozi za povijest Hrvatske Republike Her-
ceg Bosne, I-III, Hrvatski dokumentacijski centar Domo-
vinskog rata u BiH – Hrvatski memorijalno-dokumenta-
cijski centar Domovinskog rata, Mostar-Zagreb, 2017.,
knjiga I, 204.
1095 Muhamed Filipović, Bio sam Alijin diplomata, I-II, Bihać,
2000., 88-89.
1096 Ćosić, 2007., 40.
1097 Laura SILBER i Allen LITTLE, Smrt Jugoslavije, Oto-
kar Keršovani, Opatija, 1996., 207.
536
Domovinski rat 04-02-2020 Knjiga 1.indd 536
of the JNA and Serbs over the Croat forces. Besides, both
sides, right after the talks in Graz ended, requested, in a
press release, an urgent continuance of the EC’s Peace
Conference (Article 5 of the release) at which Muslim del-
egates were among the participants.
It is important to point out that the information reveal-
ing that the Bosniak/Muslim leadership was not averse to
taking part in talks about dividing BiH have been, for the
most part, ignored. For example, ignored is Sefer Hali-
lović’s report in which he wrote that the President of the
Presidency of BiH Alija Izetbegović had been, from No-
vember, 1992, considering the option of dividing BiH, that
Izetbegović’s delegates and those of Serbian President
Slobodan Milošević met regularly during 1992-1993 and
engaged in talks about, amongst other things, close coop-
eration, exchanges of territory and dividing BiH.
Also ignored is the attempt to reach “the historic
Serb-Muslim agreement”. This attempt was instigated
by Muslim representatives, with Izetbegović’s blessing in
July, 1991, with the aim of preserving the integrity of BiH,
avoiding war and keeping BiH in “rump Yugoslavia”. The
Croats were not informed of the move, let alone invited
to participate in meetings and discussions. The Serbs, un-
der the envisaged terms of “the historic agreement”, were
supposed to give up on the cantonization concept, that is,
the regionalization of BiH. In the event, however, Alija Izet-
begović and the SDA abandoned the effort. These Muslim
overtures to the Serbs and subsequent Serb-Muslim dis-
cussions and talks sowed the seeds of mistrust between
the Croats and Muslims and shattered the Croats’ confi-
dence in the central institutions of the republic.
The above shows that when Serbia, Montenegro, the
JNA, Serbian formations from BiH and a part of the Croa-
D
tian Serbs launched their joint aggression against Croatia,
the Muslim/Bosniak leadership was engaged in secret ne-
gotiations with the Serb leadership about the conditions
relating to BiH’s continued existence within Yugoslavia
and BiH’s internal system of governance. Also, during
R
1991, a string of meetings, on various levels, between
Muslims and Serb representatives, took place. Croat rep-
resentatives were not invited.
The renowned Serb politician from BiH, Nikola Kolje-
vić, who was the vice president of the Republika Srpska
during the war, analyzes in detail the Muslim-Serb talks
and negotiations in his book Stvaranje Republike Srpske
1993-1995, knjiga 1-2 (Belgrade 2008) (The Creation of the
Republika Srpska, Volume 1-2). Another book that testifies
to the Serb-Muslim negotiations and meetings (one meet-
4.2.2020. 18:37:11
 Ante Nazor • PART II
Za razumijevanje ukupne Izetbegovićeve politike
i odnosa prema hrvatskoj politici i borbi za nacionalnu
slobodu i državnu suverenost važno je i svjedočenje
američkog veleposlanika Warrena Zimmermanna o nje-
govu lobiranju protiv međunarodnoga priznanja Hrvat-
ske. Zimmermann je napisao kako mu je potkraj listopa-
da 1991., nakon što je JNA otvoreno napala Hrvatsku i
razorila Ravno te druga hrvatska sela u jugoistočnoj Her-
cegovini, „bosanski predsjednik rekao da Zapad ne smije
priznati Hrvatsku”. Pritom je izrazio želju za dobrim od-
H
nosima s JNA, za koju je čak rekao da je u BiH „dobrodoš-
la”.1098 Naravno, podatke iz memoarskoga gradiva treba
uzeti s rezervom, pa tako i spomenutu Zimmermannovu
izjavu, no na kontekst njegove izjave upućuje i „Dnevna
informacija“, koju je 26. studenoga 1991. napisala „Ko-
manda TG-2“ (JNA): „Prilikom posete Beču Alija Izetbe-
M
gović je dao interesantnu izjavu: ‘Da ni jedna od šest
jugoslovenskih republika nema izgleda kao samostalna
država’. Govor Izetbegovića o budućnosti Jugoslavije
austrijski novinari komentarišu kao zaokret u političkim
istupanjima nekih republičkih lidera, što može uticati i
na neke evropske faktore u zauzimanju stavova.“1099
D
Reakciju Hrvata nakon što se saznalo za musli-
mansko-srpske razgovore pokazuju sadržaji Zapisnika
i Priopćenja s VIII. sjednice Predsjedništva HDZ-a BiH
održane 31. srpnja 1991. u Sarajevu, “u povodu aktual-
ne sigurnosno-političke situacije u zemlji”. U Zapisniku
se u točki “2b” navodi da “hrvatski narod ne smije ostati
C
skrštenih ruku, da će Hrvati cijeloga svijeta braniti slo-
bodu hrvatskoga naroda i da se zato podržava izjava
predsjednika HDZ-a BiH Stjepana Kljuića da ćemo ako
zatreba braniti Hrvatsku, a isto tako ćemo dići ustanak
ukoliko se postigne tzv. ‘istorijski dogovor’ između Srba
D
i Muslimana na štetu Hrvata u Bosni i Hercegovini”.1100
U Priopćenju je, u točki “a”, navedeno: “Hrvatska de-
mokratska zajednica Bosne i Hercegovine zalaže se od
svoga početka za samostalnu, suverenu i nedjeljivu BiH
u njenim sadašnjim granicama u šesteročlanoj konfede-
rativnoj jugoslavenskoj zajednici. Ne prihvaćamo nika-
kvo nasilno prekrajanje bosanskohercegovačkih granica
niti nasilno pripajanje Bosne i Hercegovine u neku kr-
nju Jugo-federaciju. Hrvati Bosne i Hercegovine hoće i
1098 Warren ZIMMERMANN, Izvori jedne katastrofe, Globus –
Znanje, Zagreb, 1997., 204.; Lučić, 2018., 203.
1099 Komanda TG-2, pov. br. 37/5-1, 26. 11. 1991.
1100 Zdenko Ćosić, Rat je počeo prije, Matica hrvatska, Ogra-
nak Široki Brijeg, 2007., 43.
537
Domovinski rat 04-02-2020 Knjiga 1.indd 537
ing took place in Belgrade following the end of the Mus-
lim-Croat conflict in BiH) is Muhamed Filipović’s Bio sam
Alijin diplomata I-II (I was Alija’s Diplomatist I-II). Muhamed
Filipović is an academic and was one of the leading Bos-
niak/Muslim officials and diplomats during the war and
his book makes for compelling reading. As a participant in
the mentioned attempt to reach “the historic Serb-Mus-
lim agreement”, Filipović writes: “We held the opinion that
talks must be conducted, first and foremost, between the
Serbs and Muslims. Because, insurmountable problems
and the direst of consequences for BiH would, we thought
at the time, ensue if there was a serious disturbance be-
tween the Bosniaks and Serbs. We had to make everyone
understand that the fate of BiH was determined, more so
than any other factor, by the relations between the two of
the country’s most numerous nations.”
To fully comprehend the circumstances underlying
the mentioned Serb-Muslim negotiations in BiH and Fili-
pović’s statement quoted above it is essential to keep in
mind that all the moves and statements made by Muslim
officials were not isolated acts of individuals or renegade
groups but integral parts of a strategy wholly in keeping
with the thinking of the Muslim leadership. That thinking
was judiciously expressed by Alija Izetbegović in an inter-
view he gave to the Borba newspaper on February 9, 1991:
“We respect the Serbian nation, we live in harmony with
the Serbian nation as well as with the Croatian nation. But,
the fate of Bosnia and Herzegovina is determined more
by the Serb-Muslim relations than by the Serb-Croat rela-
tions for the simple reason that there are more Serbs than
Croats in BiH.” Based on this and similar statements made
and subsequent actions taken by the Muslim leadership
in BiH, the authors of the book The Death of Yugoslavia
concluded: “Izetbegovic was attempting to play the same
game in Bosnia that Milosevic had in mind for Yugoslavia.”
Izetbegović was against the international recognition
of Croatia and that stance shaped his attitude towards
Croatia’s policies and Croatia’s struggle for freedom and
R
independence. The American ambassador Warren Zim-
merman claims that Izetbegović, towards the end of Oc-
tober, 1991, after the JNA had launched its attack against
Croatia and destroyed Ravno and other Croatian villages
in eastern Herzegovina, told him that he wished to be on
good terms with the JNA and that the JNA was welcome
in BiH. To be sure, it would be prudent to take Zimmer-
man’s statement with a grain of salt. Having said that, it is
important to mention that the gist of Zimmerman’s asser-
tion is supported by the daily report issued on November
4.2.2020. 18:37:11
 Ante Nazor • II DIO
mogu obraniti teritorije na kojima žive. Bosna i Herce-
govina jest stoljetna domovina i nas Hrvata i nitko nam
tu domovinu neće uzimati bez naše suglasnosti. Prego-
vori pojedinaca o sklapanju tzv. Historijskog sporazuma
između Srba i Muslimana predstavljaju za nas Hrvate
uvlačenje Bosne i Hercegovine u veliki ratni sukob. Mir-
nu Bosnu i Hercegovinu mogu očuvati samo svi njezini
narodi zajedno, ali taj se mir ne može očuvati nikako na
temelju dogovora dvaju naroda iza leđa trećeg, hrvat-
skoga naroda. (...)”1101
H
Unatoč navedenim saznanjima, hrvatski politički
predstavnici ostali su dosljedni svojoj javno iznesenoj
politici, izjasnivši se za suverenost i neovisnost BiH. Hr-
vati su samo tražili jamstvo svojih prava, odnosno neki
oblik autonomije, što im je vođa Bošnjaka-muslimana
Alija Izetbegović obećao uoči referenduma, na pregovo-
M
rima vođenim u Lisabonu, gdje je 22. veljače 1992. posti-
gnut sporazum predstavnika triju konstitutivnih naroda
(Muslimana, Srba i Hrvata) o unutarnjoj podjeli BiH na
tri jedinice (entiteta), prema prijedlogu portugalskog
diplomata Joséa Cutileira. Spomenuti, tzv. Lisabonski
sporazum, službeno će biti predstavljen sredinom ožuj-
D
ka 1992. godine.
Referendum o neovisnosti BiH održan je 29. velja-
če i 1. ožujka 1992. godine. Malo manje od dvije treći-
ne (62,68 %) stanovnika SR BiH, uglavnom Muslimana i
Hrvata, izjasnilo se za samostalnost države (od 63,7 %
bosanskohercegovačkih birača koji su izašli na referen-
C
dum, 99,4 % izjasnilo se za „suverenu i nezavisnu Repu-
bliku BiH, državu građana i naroda: Muslimana, Srba i
Hrvata i drugih naroda koji u njoj žive“). Najveći odaziv
zabilježen je u općini Široki Brijeg, s apsolutnom hrvat-
skom većinom, gdje je 96 % građana izašlo na referen-
dum, a gotovo su svi glasovali za suverenitet BiH. Odaziv
veći od 90 % građana koji su se pozitivno izjasnili o suve-
renosti BiH zabilježen je i u drugim općinama u kojima
su Hrvati i(li) Muslimani apsolutna većina: Posušje, Lju-
buški, Grude, Čitluk, Cazin, Velika Kladuša, Prozor, Stari
grad Sarajevo i Gornji Vakuf. Prema nekim podacima, od
cjelokupnog muslimanskog glasačkog tijela (38 % u BiH)
68 % je glasalo za suverenu i neovisnu bosanskoherce-
govačku državu, a od hrvatskog (23 % glasačkog tijela u
BiH) 96 posto.
No, nakon referenduma Izetbegović obećanje nije
ispunio. Sudionik pregovora u Lisabonu i autor predlo-
1101 Ćosić, 2007., 44.
538
Domovinski rat 04-02-2020 Knjiga 1.indd 538
26, 1991, by TG2 HQ (JNA): “During his visit to Vienna Alija
Izetbegović gave an interesting statement; ‘none of the
six Yugoslav republics can function as an independent
state’. Izetbegović’s speech about the future of Yugoslavia
some Austrian commentators perceive as a change in atti-
tude of some republic leaders which may have an impact
on some European factors as regards forming opinions.”
The Croats’ reaction upon finding out about the
Serb-Muslim negotiations can be ascertained from the
Transcript and Statement from the 8th Session of the Pres-
idency of the HDZ BiH held on July 31, 1991, in Sarajevo
and “prompted by the current security-political situation
in the country”. In Article 2b of the Transcript it is stated
that “the Croatian people can ill-afford to remain idle and
Croats from all over the world will defend the freedom of
the Croatian nation and therefore, we support the Pres-
ident of the HDZ BiH Stjepan Kljuić’s statement that, if
need be, we will defend Croatia and also stage an uprising
if ‘the historic Serb-Muslim agreement’ is reached at the
expense of the Croats in Bosnia and Herzegovina.”
In Article A of the Statement it is stated: “The HDZ
BiH has been, from its very inception, supporting an inde-
pendent, sovereign and indivisible BiH within its current
boundaries in a six member confederative Yugoslav com-
munity. We do not accept any alteration of the boundar-
ies brought about by violent means nor do we accept any
scenario by which BiH is forced to join a rump Yugo-feder-
ation. The Croats of Bosnia and Herzegovina can, and will,
defend their territory. Bosnia and Herzegovina has been
our homeland for centuries and nobody is allowed to deny
our homeland to us. The talks conducted by certain indi-
viduals about reaching the so-called historic Serb-Muslim
agreement are conducive, it is clear to us Croats, to plung-
D
ing Bosnia and Herzegovina into a full-scale war. Peace
in Bosnia and Herzegovina can be preserved only if all
three constituent nations strive to preserve it together.
Peace cannot be preserved if two constituent nations are
engaged in secret talks, or any talks from which the third
R
constituent nation – the Croats – is excluded (…).”
Despite having learned about the secret Serb-Muslim
negotiations, the Croat political leadership stayed true
to its previously declared policy of supporting the sover-
eignty and independence of BiH. The Croats only wanted
to be guaranteed their rights, that is, some form of auton-
omy, which the Bosniak/Muslim leader Alija Izetbegović
had promised them before the referendum and again
during the talks in Lisbon, where, on February 22, 1992,
an agreement between the three constituent nations (the
4.2.2020. 18:37:11
 Ante Nazor • PART II
ženoga plana, José Cutileiro, izjavio je da je odbijanje
njegova plana iz ožujka 1992. odvelo BiH u rat. Prema
njegovim riječima, Izetbegović je prihvatio plan da bi
udovoljio Europljanima, a zatim ga je odbacio da bi za-
dovoljio Amerikance koji su ga ohrabrivali da to učini.
Izetbegovićeva retorika, odustajanje od Lisabonskoga
sporazuma i kasniji razvoj događaja upućuju na zaklju-
čak da je muslimansko vodstvo već tada počelo pripre-
me za rat i s Hrvatima ako ne pristanu na njihove poli-
tičke zahtjeve.1102
H
Primjedbe da su Srbi i Hrvati u BiH međusobno
surađivali (gospodarski i vojno), zanemaruju činjenicu
da je ta suradnja bila iznimka, a ne pravilo, odnosno
da je bila uvjetovana trenutnim stanjem na terenu i to
samo na lokalnoj razini, na pojedinim područjima, u
okolnostima napada višestruko brojnijih snaga ARBiH
M
na Hrvate, koji su radi opstanka i spašavanja golih ži-
vota pomoć morali potražiti (i platiti!) od srpskih snaga.
Uostalom, povremenu međusobnu suradnju imala su i
vodstva bošnjačko-muslimanskog i srpskoga naroda u
BiH, što se prešućuje. Primjerice, u rujnu 1993. u Zeni-
ci je održan susret bošnjačko-muslimanskog i srpskog
D
vodstva „s ciljem uspostavljanja ekonomskih odnosa i
saradnje između regija Zenica i Banja Luka“.1103 Istodob-
no, u Mostaru su Muslimani i Srbi, odnosno ARBiH i VRS
surađivali u napadu na HVO, tako što je VRS davao arti-
ljerijsku podršku ARBiH.1104 Suradnju je, među ostalima,
C
1102 „Žoze Kutiljero: Izetbegović je odbio mir”, Oslobođenje,
19. 7. 2005., 27; Lučić, 2018., 215-219.
1103 „Sedmično referisanje – 13. 09. - 20. 09. 1993., Uprave
bezbednosti Štaba vrhovne komande OS“, Sarajevo, 19.
9. 1993.
D
1104 Jedan od zapovjednika u 4. korpusu ARBiH, Esad Šejta-
nić, zapisao je: Prisustvovao sam na jednom od sastana-
ka na liniji dodira sa srpskim snagama u selu Busak, gdje
su Safet Oručević, Fatima Leho i Šefkija Džiho definisali
uslove pod kojim će srpska strana pomoći naša borbena
dejstva. Srpska strana je pristala da 1 haubicu 122 mm sa
kompletnom posadom i 200 projektila za istu rasporedi
na naše položaje u rejonu planine Rošci, odakle je u toku
izvođenja borbenih dejstava pružala artiljerijsku podršku
shodno naređenju komandanta 4. korpusa. (…) Kao znak
pažnje za dosadašnju saradnju, Safet Oručević je koman-
dantu nevesinjske brigade (VRS-a, op. ur.) Novici Gušiću
poklonio skoro novo auto Golf-JX. (…) Borbena dejstva su
otpočela u ranim jutarnjim satima 20. septembra 1993. i
krenula su planiranom dinamikom (…) Jedinice u grad-
skoj jezgri imale su početne uspjehe na pravcu prema na-
selju Balinovac, a uz strahovitu srpsku artiljerijsku podršku
uspjeh je bio izgledan. (…) Esad Šejtanić, Hercegovci na
ognjenim vratima Bosne, Sarajevo, juna 2005., 181-183.
539
Domovinski rat 04-02-2020 Knjiga 1.indd 539
Serbs, the Muslims and the Croats) about internal division
of BiH into three units (entities) was reached. The solution
agreed to by the three constituent nations, it is important
to note, was proposed by the Portuguese diplomat José
Cutileiro. This agreement, known as the Lisbon Agree-
ment, would be officially presented in mid-March, 1992.
The referendum on BiH independence was held be-
tween February 29 and March 1, 1992. Almost two thirds
(62.68 %) of the SR BiH population (Muslims and Croats
for the most part) voted for independence (99.4 % of
those who voted in the referendum opted for “a sovereign
and independent republic of BiH, a state of citizens and
peoples: Muslims, Serbs, Croats and others who live in
it)”. The highest voter turnout was in the Široki Brijeg Mu-
nicipality (the absolute majority of the population in the
municipality was Croatian) where 96% of the registered
voters declared for the sovereignty of BiH. More than 90 %
of the registered voters turned out in the other predomi-
nately Croat municipalities and also in the predominately
Muslim municipalities: Posušje, Ljubuški, Grude, Čitluk,
Cazin, Velika Kladuša, Prozor, Stari Grad Sarajevo, Gornji
Vakuf. According to some sources, out of the entire Mus-
lim electorate (38% in BiH) 68% voted for a sovereign and
independent Bosnian-Herzegovinian state. On the other
hand, 96% of the Croat voters (23% of the electorate in
BiH) voted for a sovereign and independent BiH.
After the referendum Alija Izetbegović reneged on his
promise to the Croats and, on March 28, withdrew his sig-
nature from the Lisbon Agreement. José Cutileiro stated
that Izetbegović, by refusing to honor the Lisbon Agree-
ment, plunged BiH into war. According to Cutileiro, Izet-
begović initially accepted the agreement to please the EU
and then withdrew his signature to please the Americans
who had been goading him to reject the agreement. Izet-
begović’s rhetoric, his rejection of the Lisbon Agreement
and the subsequent developments strongly suggest
that the Muslim leadership started preparing, as early as
March, 1992, for the possibility that the Croats might not
R
accede to their political demands. That eventuality, for
the Muslim leadership, obviously meant a conflict with
the Croats.
Supporters of the Muslim cause in BiH are fond of
pointing out that the Serbs and Croats cooperated, eco-
nomically and militarily, in BiH. It is essential to point out,
however, that every instance of cooperation between the
Serbs and Croats was an exception rather than the rule
and it was invariably of a local nature. Every such instance
happened when overwhelmingly superior ARBIH forces
4.2.2020. 18:37:11
 Ante Nazor • II DIO
dogovorio istaknuti muslimanski političar, kasnije i gra-
donačelnik Mostara, Safet Oručević, koji je na početku
srpske agresije na BiH pristupio HVO-u i 8. svibnja 1992.
potpisao svečanu prisegu da će „vjerno i časno izvršavati
dužnosti koje se od njega, pripadnika Hrvatskog vijeća
obrane, zahtijevaju i da će se savjesno i odgovorno po-
koravati službenim naredbama i zapovijedima“, da će i
„uz žrtvu vlastitoga života braniti Hrvatsku zajednicu
Herceg-Bosnu, njezinu teritorijalnu cjelovitost i sve nje-
zine građane“, te da je „svjestan i upozoren da će u slu-
H
čaju postupanja protivnog ovoj prisezi snositi zakonske
posljedice“.1105 S vremenom je, optužujući HVO, zabora-
vio i svoju prisegu i suradnju s VRS-om.
Također, dok se govori o prisilno raseljenim musli-
manima, prešućuje se podatak da su u istom razdoblju
pripadnici ARBiH i mudžahedini s područja središnje Bo-
M
sne, koje se prema planu međunarodne zajednice (Van-
ce-Owenov plan predstavljen početkom 1993.) trebalo
naći u hrvatskoj provinciji, protjerali više desetaka tisuća
Hrvata. Zar to nije „zločinački pothvat“, zar nije očigled-
na namjera ARBiH da područje od središnje Bosne sve
do Mostara osvoji i etnički očisti od Hrvata, o čemu svje-
D
doče izvori o sastancima i planovima zapovjedništva
ARBiH, te provedba i ciljevi operacije Neretva ‘93?
Primjerice, stenogram sa savjetovanja vojnog vrha
ARBiH u Zenici 21. i 22. kolovoza 1993., koji je “okupio
... veći dio Štaba Vrhovne komande, ljude na najodgo-
vornijim dužnostima u ARBiH i pet od šest komandanata
C
korpusa”, pokazuje da su, opredijelivši se za ratnu opci-
ju, bez povjerenja u međunarodne pregovore, pa čak i
bez povjerenja u legalne predstavnike Republike BiH,
zapovjednici ARBiH odredili ciljeve vojnih operacija na
području pod nadzorom Hrvata: “Glavne tri ključne tač-
ke su Kiseljak, Prozor i Žepče, što život znače za državu
BiH i za Armiju. Ali, njima prethodi da se odrade pravac
od Fojnice i onda Vitez. (...)” (Rifat Bilajac, transkript sa-
vjetovanja u Zenici).
Načelnik Glavnog stožera Armije Republike BiH
bio je puno precizniji u obrazlaganju svojeg viđenja
vojnih ciljeva: “Ostaje nam pitanje kako i na koji način
doći do plijena, kako i na koji način velike kapacitete
staviti u funkciju namjenske industrije. Kako uzeti Vi-
tez. I kako uzeti Žunovnicu. Jer to su dva strategijska
objekta za našu Armiju. Sa Vitezom se zaokružuje si-
stem vojne industrije u našoj državi. Onda je komplet-
1105 Hrvatsko vijeće obrane – Općinski stožer Mostar, sveča-
na prisega, 8. svibnja 1992.
540
Domovinski rat 04-02-2020 Knjiga 1.indd 540
attacked HVO forces. In these cases, HVO troops and Cro-
at civilians, in order to save their lives, had no choice but
to seek assistance from the Serbs. It is worth stressing that
the Serbs always exacted a steep price for their assistance
to beleaguered HVO troops and civilians. Besides, co-op-
eration between the Serb leadership and the Bosniak/
Muslim leadership was a regular feature of the war in BiH
but the fact is often conveniently ignored. For example,
in September, 1993, a meeting between the Muslim/Bos-
niak leadership and Serb leadership was held in Zenica for
the purpose of “establishing economic relations and co-
operation between the Zenica region and the Banja Luka
region”. At the same time in Mostar the VRS provided ar-
tillery support to the ARBIH during its attack on Mostar.41
The cooperation between the ARBIH and the VRS was es-
tablished thanks to the efforts of, amongst other individ-
uals, the prominent Muslim politician and later Mayor of
Mostar, Safet Oručević. When the Serbs launched their at-
tack on BiH, Oručević joined the HVO and, on May 8,1992,
signed the HVO oath, swearing that he would “faithfully
and honorably perform the duty expected of him as a
member of the HVO”, “conscientiously follow official or-
ders”, “if need be, lay down his life in defense of the HZ
HB, of its territorial integrity and of its citizens” and that
“he has been warned and is aware that breaking the oath
means that he will be prosecuted”. Oručević would later
accuse the HVO of crimes, forgetting his oath and also for-
getting his cooperation with the VRS…
A lot of ink has been shed on the issue of forcibly ex-
pelled Muslims in BiH. On the other hand, precious little
ink has been used to describe the plight of tens of thou-
D
41 One of the commanders of the ARBIH IV Corps, Esad Šej-
tanić, wrote: I was present at one of the meetings held on
the front line with Serb forces in the village of Busak, where
Safet Oručević, Fatima Leho and Šefkija Džiho defined the
conditions under which the Serbs would support our offen-
sive moves. The Serbs agreed to send one 122-mm howitzer,
200 projectiles and the howitzer crew to our positions in the
R
area of Mount Rošci, from where the howitzer provided ar-
tillery support during the attack, according to the orders of
the commander of IV Corps. (…) As a token of appreciation
for the VRS help, Safet Oručević gave to the commander of
the Nevesinje Brigade (of the VRS, editor's note) Novica Gušić
a Golf-IX, in mint condition. (…) The attack commenced in
the early hours of September 20, 1993, and went according
to plan (…) The units deployed in the city center advanced
in the direction of the Balinovac neighborhood and scored
early successes. The Serbs provided tremendous artillery
support and on account of that, success seemed inevitable.
(…) Šejtanić, Esad. Hercegovci na ognjenim vratima Bosne.
Sarajevo, June 2005, pp. 181-183.
4.2.2020. 18:37:11
 Ante Nazor • PART II
na. Onda imamo kompletan lanac u našim rukama. U
Žunovnici dolazimo do onog što je superhitno. Onog
što je gotovo, što odmah može da se upotrijebi. Re-
promaterijal, trotil je tamo. Ima baruta. Ima municije i
oružja. A, sa Vitezom zaokružujemo kompletan sistem
namjenske proizvodnje. Kada bi sada bilo pitanje:
kuća ti gori, da li gasiti kuću ili uzeti Vitez? Ja bih se
odlučio prije za Vitez. Sa Vitezom zaokružujemo na-
mjensku proizvodnju.”
Ni jedan od zapovjednika ARBiH nije na savjeto-
H
vanju u Zenici predložio ofenzivna djelovanja prema
srpskom agresoru. Prioritetni ciljevi bili su im hrvatske
enklave u središnjoj Bosni i komunikacijski pravac do-
linom Neretve prema Mostaru. Eliminiranjem Hrvata iz
središnje Bosne ARBiH postiže dvostruki cilj:
a) stavlja pod kontrolu vojno-industrijske komplekse
M
neophodne za vođenje rata,
b) etničkim čišćenjem Hrvata iz središnje Bosne cijela
jedna provincija po Vance-Owenovom planu (pred-
viđena kao hrvatska), mora pripasti Muslimanima,
pa time njihov teritorij postaje ne samo veći, nego
nacionalno i strateški kompaktniji.
D
Da je cilj djelomično ispunjen svjedoči i prija-
vak zapovjednika ARBiH generala Rasima Delića Aliji
Izetbegoviću u veljači 1994.: „HVO /je/ eliminisan sa
područja Jablanice, Konjica, Fojnice, Kaknja, Zenice,
Travnika i Bugojna. Znači, kompletna jedna pokrajina
po Vens-Ovenovom planu sa centralom u Travniku.“1106
C
Naravno, eliminacija HVO-a značila je i eliminaciju Hr-
vata s toga područja, uz brojne zločine pripadnika AR-
BiH nad Hrvatima.
Spomenute izjave zapovjednika ARBiH objašnja-
vaju zašto je bošnjačko-muslimansko vodstvo u BiH
D
odbilo hrvatske prijedloge o vojnoj suradnji (do srpnja
1995.), posebice zašto nije prihvatilo odluku o među-
sobnom podčinjavanju postrojbi u provincijama pred-
viđenima Vance-Owenovim mirovnim planom o unu-
tarnjoj podjeli Bosne i Hercegovine na devet provincija
(kantona), uz posebno područje Sarajeva (kao desetom
provincijom), koji je predstavljen u Ženevi početkom si-
ječnja 1993. godine. Naime, nakon predstavljanja Van-
ce-Owenova mirovnog plana ministar obrane Republi-
1106 Rasim Delić, Armija ključ mira, Sarajevo: Vojna bibliote-
ka, 1994., 19; citirano prema: Davor Marijan, „Vještački
nalaz: o ratnim vezama Hrvatske i Bosne i Hercegovine
(1991. - 1995.)“, Časopis za suvremenu povijest, 36, Za-
greb, 2004., 227.
541
Domovinski rat 04-02-2020 Knjiga 1.indd 541
sands of Croats ARBIH soldiers and Mujahideen forcibly
expelled from central Bosnia, a region that, according to
the international community’s plan (Vance-Owen Plan
presented at the beginning of 1993) was supposed to be
within the boundaries of the Croatian province in BiH. Isn’t
the expulsion of tens of thousands of Croats by ARBIH sol-
diers and Mujahedeen a “criminal enterprise”? Isn’t it pain-
fully obvious that the ARBIH’s intention was to occupy the
area stretching from central Bosnia as far as Mostar and
ethnically cleanse it of Croats? There are numerous docu-
ments, transcripts from meetings and plans of the ARBIH
and also the aims and the course of Operation Neretva-93
that prove the Muslim leadership was bent on territorial
aggrandizement and ethnic cleansing.
For example, the transcript from the meeting of the
military leadership of the ARBIH in Zenica on August 21
and 22, 1993, present at which were almost all personnel
of the Supreme Command HQ, highest ranking ARBIH of-
ficers and five out of six corps commanders reveals that
the commanders of the ARBIH did not put much stake in
negotiations with the international community, did not
show much confidence in the legal representatives of BiH
and were determined to go to war against the Croats. At
the meeting the ARBIH officers set out the goals of their
military operations in the Croatian areas of the country:
“Three objectives are of paramount importance for us;
Kiseljak Prozor and Žepče. These three locations mean ev-
erything. But, in order to capture them, first we have to
control the Fojnica – Vitez line (…)” Rifat Bilajac, transcript
of the meeting in Zenica).
The chief of the General Staff of the ARBIH was much
more precise in explaining his view regarding the main
objectives: “Now we have to figure out how to get our
hands on the loot we’re after and how to utilize this po-
tential in respect of a given facility’s purpose. We have to
figure out how to capture Vitez. And Žunovnica. These
two towns are objectives of strategic importance for the
ARBIH. With Vitez in our hands we’ll have a full military-in-
R
dustrial system in our state. With Vitez our military indus-
try will be complete. Then, we’ll have the entire chain of
armaments factories in our hands. In Žunovnica we’ll get
what we need right now. There’s a lot of stuff there we
can use right away. Raw materials are there, TNT is there.
There’s gunpowder. There’s ammo and weapons. Again,
with Vitez we are self- sufficient in terms of weapons pro-
duction. Now, if you ask me: your house is on fire, what do
you do; put the flame out or take Vitez? It’s a no-brainer, I’d
go for Vitez. With Vitez we are self sufficient.”
4.2.2020. 18:37:11
 Ante Nazor • II DIO
ke BiH Božo Rajić izdao je 16. siječnja 1993. u Sarajevu
sljedeću zapovijed:
“1. Sve postrojbe HVO-a koje se trenutno nalaze u pro-
storima provincija broj 1, 5 i 9, koje su Ženevskim
dogovorom proglašene muslimanskim provincija-
ma, podčinjavaju se Glavnom stožeru Armije RBiH.
2. Sve postrojbe Armije RBiH, koje se trenutno nalaze
na prostorima provincija broj 3, 8 i 10, koje su Že-
nevskim dogovorima proglašene hrvatskima, po-
dčinjavaju se Glavnom stožeru HVO-a.”
H
Predsjedništvo RBiH je 19. siječnja 1993., u obra-
zloženju odluke o poništavanju spomenute zapovije-
di ministra obrane Vlade RBiH Bože Rajića o realizaciji
uzajamnog podčinjavanja postrojbi ARBiH i HVO-a, kao
razlog te poništavajuće odluke cinično navelo da “mini-
star obrane RBiH nije potpisao svečanu izjavu - zakletvu,
M
te pravno nije imao ovlaštenje za izdavanje zapovijedi”
(Odluka Predsjedništva BiH o zapovijedi ministra obra-
ne Bože Rajića od 16. 1. 1993., Sarajevo, 19. 1. 1993.).
Upravo reakcija bošnjačke strane na Rajićevu Za-
povijed pokazuje dvoličnost tadašnje bošnjačko-mu-
slimanske politike, jer izvori upućuju na zaključak da
D
je u Zagrebu prije 15. siječnja 1993. postignut dogo-
vor s bošnjačko-muslimanskim vodstvom o podči-
njavanju postrojbi, koje ono potom nije ispoštovalo.
Naime, razgovor ministra obrane RH Gojka Šuška i Ali-
je Izetbegovića na sastanku održanom u Zagrebu 15.
siječnja 1993., pokazuje da je Izetbegović prije dono-
C
šenja Rajićeve zapovijedi bio upoznat s činjenicom da
njen smisao nije napuštanje pojedinih područja jedne
od vojski (ARBiH i HVO), nego podčinjavanje postroj-
bi na pojedinim područjima radi bolje učinkovitosti u
borbi protiv zajedničkog neprijatelja, te da se o sadr-
žaju Rajićeve zapovijedi već ranije razgovaralo i da je o
tome postignut dogovor:
Ja bih samo još jedanput postavio čisto praktično pi-
tanje, koje sam mislio da smo se davno razumjeli. Ja sam
sa Vama gospodine predsjedniče Izetbegoviću razgova-
rao ovdje u Zagrebu, i to smo razgovarali i pred supred-
sjedateljima u Ženevi. I zbog efikasnosti rata, a ionako
smo u nepovoljnom položaju, da ondje gdje su pretežno
muslimanske snage, a to se podijelilo sada i po tim provin-
cijama, bude zapovjedništvo Armije RBiH, a ondje gdje su
pretežno HVO snage da bude zapovjedništvo HVO. Ja ne
mogu shvatiti što je sada sporno u tome, da zbog zajed-
ničkog interesa se obranimo od zajedničkog neprijatelja.
Nije li to dio koji smo postigli. Ja sam sa Vama sjedio u sobi,
u hotelu ovdje, u Esplanadi, kada smo se to dogovorili kao
542
Domovinski rat 04-02-2020 Knjiga 1.indd 542
No ARBIH officer present at the meeting in Zenica
counseled offensive actions against the Serb aggressor.
The officers’ priorities were the Croat enclaves in central
Bosnia and the lines of communication leading along the
Neretva Valley towards Mostar. By eliminating the Croats
in central Bosnia the ARBIH wanted to: gain control of the
military-industrial facilities necessary for the war effort
and secure one whole province (a Croat province accord-
ing to the Vance-Owen plan) for the Muslims and in turn
make the Muslim territory in BiH not only larger but also
more nationally and strategically compact.
The ARBIH partly achieved its overall objective. The
commander of the ARBIH, General Rasim
Delić, sent a report, in February, 1994, to Alija Izetbe-
gović, in which he wrote: “The HVO has been eliminated
in the Jablanica, Konjic, Fojnica, Kakanj, Travnik and Bugo-
jno areas. That means one whole Croat province accord-
ing to the Vance-Owen plan, with Travnik as its adminis-
trative centre.” Of course, the elimination of the HVO by
the ARBIH also meant the elimination of the Croats from
the mentioned areas. And the elimination of the Croats
also meant committing numerous war crimes and crimes
against humanity.
The above quoted statements made by the ARBIH
commanders explain why the Bosniak/Muslim leadership
in BiH refused the Croats’ proposals for military coopera-
tion (in July, 1995, the Muslims, when they were on the
brink of total defeat in their conflict with the Serbs begged
the Croats to agree to a military cooperation agreement
and the Croats accepted) and why the Muslims refused the
proposal about mutual unit subordination in relation to
the provinces as envisaged by the Vance-Owen plan. The
plan, it is worth repeating, was presented in Geneva at the
D
beginning of January, 1993, and called for internally div-
ing BiH into nine provinces with Sarajevo as a special area
(tenth province). After the Vance-Owen plan had been
presented the minister of defense of RBiH Božo Rajić, on
January 16, 1993, in Sarajevo, issued the following order:
R
1. All HVO units currently stationed in the provinces 1,
5 and 9, which were, by the Geneva Agreement de-
clared as Muslim provinces are hereby subordinated
to the General Staff of the ARBIH.
2. All ARBIH units, currently stationed in the provinces 3,
8 and 10, which were, by the Geneva Agreement de-
clared as Croatian provinces are hereby subordinated
to the Main Staff of the HVO
The Presidency of RBiH, however, cancelled the order
on January 19, 1993, explaining the move by cynically
4.2.2020. 18:37:11
 Ante Nazor • PART II
ljudi, da na tome poradite. (…) Pa, sami Vi sebe ubijate,
onda Srbi više ne trebaju ratovati s vama. Hvala lijepa.1107
Prije toga, Mate Boban je na prijedlog Alije Izetbe-
govića da se osnuje nekakav „komitet“ (odnosno arbi-
tražna komisija, op. ur.) koji će arbitrirati u razgovorima
između Muslimana i Hrvata u BiH, odgovorio da su
Hrvati u BiH za dogovor i da smatra da se Muslimani i
Hrvati mogu sami međusobno dogovoriti, bez posre-
dovanja sa strane, a da „arbitra i komitete treba uteme-
ljiti između Muslimana i Srba, te Hrvata i Srba, a nikako
H
između Muslimana i Hrvata“.1108
Izlaganje predsjednika Franje Tuđmana na spome-
nutom sastanku potvrđuje njegovo zalaganje za cjelovi-
tu BiH te hrvatsko-muslimanski razgovor i dogovor u BiH:
Ja bih samo htio podsjetiti da sam zamolio i predstav-
nika Muslimana gospodina Izetbegovića i predstavnika
M
Hrvata gospodina Bobana i druge da usuglase svoje na-
pore na svim područjima naspram agresiji. A isto tako htio
bih podsjetiti i to da su u Zagreb dolazili predstavnici iz či-
tave Bosne i Hercegovine u tri navrata, nakon što se formi-
rala ta posebna srpska republika, predstavnici Hrvata su
dolazili. Nakon što se formirala ta posebna srpska republi-
D
ka i nakon što su, kako su oni govorili, bili suočeni sa pla-
nom da se iz Bosne i Hercegovine stvori islamska država
pod parolom građanske države. I ti Hrvati, stotinjak njih iz
svih krajeva Bosne i Hercegovine gdje žive Hrvati, predla-
gali su da sa svoje strane tu zajednicu Herceg-Bosnu goto-
vo proglase sastavnim dijelom Hrvatske. Mi u Zagrebu i ja
C
osobno bio sam taj koji su kazali da ne čine to i preporučio
da idu na referendum, da u okviru samostalne Bosne i Her-
cegovine ostvare suradnju s Muslimanima. Međutim, traju
takve nesuglasice. Primjer, ima jedan Musliman, još ratnik
iz Drugog svjetskog rata, koji se istakao u obrani Dubrov-
D
nika, koji je stekao i čin generala u Hrvatskoj vojsci (vjero-
jatno Nijaz Batlak, zvani i Mate Šarlija – Daidža, op. ur.) i
koji se borio na fronti, kasnije u redovima HVO-a, Stolca i
Nevesinja, koji je kazao, mene zove telefonom, i bio je ra-
njen u Zagrebu, i kaže – što ti to, predsjedniče, dogovaraš
1107 ICTY: Zapisnik s razgovora predsjednika RH dr.
Franje Tuđmana sa supredsjedateljima Ženevske
konferencije za bivšu Jugoslaviju lordom Davi-
dom Owenom (EZ) i Cyrusom Vanceom (UN) te
Alijom Izetbegovićem, predsjednikom Bosne i
Hercegovine, i Matom Bobanom, predsjednikom
Hrvatske zajednice Herceg-Bosne, i suradnicima,
Zagreb, 15. siječnja 1993., str. 51/01322293; M. TU-
ĐMAN, 2017., 138.
1108 ICTY: isto, str. 44/01322286.
543
Domovinski rat 04-02-2020 Knjiga 1.indd 543
claiming that “the minister of defense of RBiH had not
signed the solemn oath and therefore had no authority to
issue the order”. (The Decision of the Presidency of RBiH
on the order issued by Minister of Defense Božo Rajić of
January 16, 1993, Sarajevo, January 19, 1993).
The reaction of the Presidency to Rajić’s order reveals
the duplicity of the Bosniak/Muslim leadership’s policies.
According to a number of sources, on January 15, 1993,
at a meeting in Zagreb the Muslim leadership agreed to
the unit subordination scheme. As we have seen, the Bos-
niak/Muslim leadership then, in the most of duplicitous of
manners, reneged on the agreement. The transcript from
the discussion between the minister of defense of the
Republic of Croatia Gojko Šušak with Alija Izetbegović in
Zagreb on January 15 shows that Izetbegović knew well
in advance that Rajić would issue the unit subordination
order and was aware that the purpose of the order was to
make both the HVO and ARBIH more efficient in resisting
the common enemy and not to make one or the other
army vacate their positions in certain areas. The transcript
also reveals that talks had already been held about Rajić’s
order and that an agreement about it had been reached:
I just want to bring up a practical issue, one that I
thought we had agreed on. Mr. President Izetbegović, I talk-
ed to you, here in Zagreb and we also talked in the presence
of the co-chairmen in Geneva. So, in order to make our forces
more efficient, and we both know that the situation on the
ground at the moment is dire, it makes sense to subordinate
the HVO forces to the ARBIH in those areas where the ARBIH
is numerically stronger than the HVO and to subordinate the
ARBIH forces to the HVO in the areas where the HVO is stron-
ger. And the areas have now officially been designated with
the division of the country into provinces. I do not see what
the problem all of a sudden is. What is wrong with making
both our forces more efficient in combating our common
enemy? And we have already agreed on the unit subordina-
tion move. Remember, I sat here with you, in a room in this
very hotel, the Esplanade, and we agreed on this issue, like
R
normal people (…). And now, you’re shooting yourself in the
foot here. You’re defeating yourself and saving the Serbs the
effort. Nice going.
Before that meeting, Mate Boban, responding to Ali-
ja Izetbegović’s proposal to set up some kind of a com-
mission or arbitration committee that would act as an
honest broker in talks between the Muslims and Croats,
said that the Croats were willing to reach an agreement
and opined that the Croats and Muslims could make a
deal on their own, without interference from committees
4.2.2020. 18:37:11
 Ante Nazor • II DIO
sa Izetbegovićem kada mene Muslimani tamo napadaju i
ugrožavaju mi život.
Ja sam rekao, pa ti si Musliman, dogovorite se tamo.
Prema tome, problemi su duboki i treba ih riješiti, ali
trebaju ih riješiti predstavnici Muslimana i Hrvata u BiH.
(…) Ja ponovo apeliram ovdje pred gospodom, izvolite
sjesti i dogovorite se tako da bude zadovoljan i hrvatski
narod tamo. Jer mislim da Hrvati u cjelini ne ugrožavaju
Muslimane, a sa svojom obranom vjerojatno su spasili Bo-
snu da ne potpadne u prve dane (rata) pod veliku Srbiju
H
ili Jugoslaviju, kad, kao što je i gospodin Izetbegović sam
izjavio, u početku Muslimani nisu bili spremni na rat sa ju-
gosrpskom armijom, i kada je težište borbe (i) obrane bilo
na hrvatskom narodu. (…)
Gospodine Vance, lord Owen, gospodine Ahtisaari,
Gospodo, zaključujemo znači ovaj naš sastanak.
M
Hvala vam što ste još došli i uložili sa svoje strane na-
pore da se približe gledišta muslimanskih i hrvatskih
predstavnika iz Bosne da bi to poslužilo i omogućilo pri-
siljavanje da tako kažem, dopustite mi da tako kažem,
jer vi morate biti objektivni u odnosu na sve tri sučeljene
strane. Ali ipak jedinstveno gledište muslimanskih i hr-
D
vatskih predstavnika iz Bosne olakšalo bi traženje mira.
Ja apeliram ponovo da oni to učine, ali izjavljujem i pred
vama i pred njima, Hrvatska će još odlučnije staviti do
znanja da nije spremna ni u kom pogledu potpomaga-
ti nastavljanje rata. Jer to je suprotno bitnim interesima
Republike Hrvatske i hrvatskoga naroda.
C
Prema tome, molim da se usmjerimo na traženje mira,
a nikakvog mira ni u jednom ratu, ni u jednom sukobu, pa
čak i bez rata, nema bez nekakvih kompromisa. To nam
mora biti jasno. I nemojmo se zavaravati s verbalnim po-
drškama svijeta. Taj svijet nam je davao verbalnu podrš-
ku, a ja imam razrušen i Vukovar i Drniš i Dubrovnik sam
imao i pitanje je kada ćemo se osloboditi srpske okupacije
i s mirovnim snagama. Prema tome, treba voditi računa
da i čitavu Bosnu i Hercegovinu ne zadesi, već ju je i sada
zadesila zla nesreća, a može još veća ako bi se rat nasta-
vio. Hvala vam.1109
Izvori također potvrđuju da su se predsjednik Fra-
njo Tuđman i ministar obrane RH Gojko Šušak, poštujući
realnost, odnosno politički okvir koji je postavila među-
narodna zajednica, u siječnju 1993. zalagali za razgovo-
re i dogovor Muslimana, Srba i Hrvata o sudjelovanju
predstavnika sva tri naroda u vladajućim tijelima i za-
1109 ICTY: isto, str. 45-47/01322287-01322289;
54-55/01322296-01322297
544
Domovinski rat 04-02-2020 Knjiga 1.indd 544
or commissions and that “committees and commissions
were necessary only when it comes to talks between the
Muslims and Serbs and the Croats and Serbs”.
President Tuđman expressed his position at the men-
tioned meeting confirming his commitment to a sover-
eign Bosnia and Herzegovina and his support for cordial
relations between the Muslims and Croats in BiH:
I just want to point out that I have asked the representa-
tive of the Muslims, Mr. Izetbegović and the representative of
the Croats, Mr. Mate Boban and others to coordinate their ac-
tions in all areas as regards resisting the aggression. I would
also like to remind you that representatives from all areas of
Bosnia and Herzegovina came to Zagreb on three different
occasions, after the establishment of that separate Serb re-
public. Croat representatives came. They said that they were
threatened by the plan to turn Bosnia and Herzegovina into
an Islamic state under the guise of a civil state. And those
Croats, about a hundred of them from all Croatian areas of
Bosnia and Herzegovina wanted to declare their community,
Herzeg-Bosnia, an integral part of Croatia. We told them, I
personally told them, not to do that and I recommended that
they should set up a referendum, to establish cooperation
with the Muslims within the scope of an independent Bos-
nia and Herzegovina. But, these issues are not going away.
For example, there’s this Muslim42, who fought in WWII and
who distinguished himself fighting against the Serbs during
the siege of Dubrovnik and who attained the rank of general
in the Croatian Army, and who fought on the front line as a
member of the HVO Stolac and Nevesinje. So, he calls me on
the phone, he’s in Zagreb, wounded, and he says, “Why are
you trying to make a deal with Izetbegović when I’m being
attacked by the Muslims in Bosnia, trying to kill me.” So I said
to him, “You’re a Muslim, sort it out amongst yourselves down
D
there.” You see, these problems run deep and they have to be
solved but they have to be solved by Muslim and Croat repre-
sentatives in BiH (…) I ask you gentlemen again to sit down
and find a solution satisfactory to the Croats in Bosnia and
Herzegovina. In my opinion, generally speaking, the Croats
R
are not a threat to the Muslims. And the Croats, by mounting
a defense against the Serbs probably saved Bosnia and Her-
zegovina from becoming, during the first days of the war, a
part of Greater Serbia or Yugoslavia. Mr. Izetbegović himself
has said that the Muslims, when the Serbs attacked Bosnia
and Herzegovina, were not ready to fight the JNA and that
the Croats did most of the fighting and defending (…)
42 Probably Nijaz Batlak, also known as Mate “Daidža” Šarli-
ja (author’s note).
4.2.2020. 18:37:11
 Ante Nazor • PART II
jedničkoj vladi, „nemajući iluzija da će to postati realna
vlada u današnjim uvjetima“, ali barem da se „obustavi
rat i da se onda omogući političko rješenje“. 1110
Političko rješenje pokušalo se naći i na sastanku
predsjednika Tuđmana i supredsjedatelja Konferencije
o bivšoj Jugoslaviji Cyrusa Vancea i lorda Davida Owena
s hrvatskim predstavnicima iz BiH, održanom u Zagrebu
20. siječnja 1993. godine. Na sastanku je Mate Boban,
pozivajući se na dokument koji je muslimanska Stranka
demokratske akcije iz Hercegovine poslala 5. siječnja
H
1993. Izetbegoviću na pregovore u Ženevi, upozorio
predsjednika Tuđmana da oni (muslimansko vodstvo,
op. ur.) ne prihvaćaju podjelu BiH na provincije, kako su
predložili predstavnici međunarodne zajednice, a Tuđ-
man prihvatio. Ako bi ipak „bili pritjerani uza zid da bi
morali prihvatiti neke provincije, onda traže provinciju
M
srednja Hercegovina u dolini Neretve“, u kojoj bi bio
„Neum, Stolac, Mostar, Jablanica, Konjic i Čapljina“,1111
dakle područje koje će ARBiH pokušati osvojiti u svojoj
napadajnoj operaciji Neretva ‘93., u rujnu 1993. godine.
Također je rekao da su već tijekom prethodnog raz-
govora u Zagrebu imali dokument koji svjedoči o pri-
D
premama ARBiH u siječnju 1993. za „napad na hrvatsko
pučanstvo i hrvatske vojne postrojbe, HVO postrojbe
u Gornjem Vakufu“, u kojem „oni sami tvrde da HVO ne
uzvraća vatrom“, dodajući da HVO nije uzvratio vatrom
sve dok nisu izvršili masakr nad Hrvatima i „ubili 16, a
ranili preko 60 Hrvata“, te da su spaljene mnoge hrvat-
C
ske kuće prije nego što je HVO uopće uzvratio vatru“.
Također, Boban spominje da je ARBiH napustila dva ki-
lometra crte prema srpskim snagama na liniji Kupres –
Bugojno i krenula u napad na hrvatska sela i hrvatske
postrojbe, te da Izetbegović nije izdao zapovijed ARBiH
D
da ne napada HVO, nego je „na jedan veoma, veoma po-
dao način optužio Hrvatsku vojsku da je došla u Bosnu i
1110 ICTY: Zapisnik s razgovora predsjednika RH dr. Franje
Tuđmana sa supredsjedateljima Konferencije o bivšoj
Jugoslaviji gosp. Cyrusom Vanceom i lordom Davi-
dom Owenom te s hrvatskim predstavnicima iz Bosne
i Hercegovine, održanog u Predsjedničkim dvorima u
Zagrebu, u srijedu 20. siječnja 1993., broj dokumenata:
01322327-01322328.
1111 ICTY: Zapisnik s razgovora predsjednika RH dr. Franje
Tuđmana sa supredsjedateljima Konferencije o bivšoj
Jugoslaviji gosp. Cyrusom Vanceom i lordom Davi-
dom Owenom te s hrvatskim predstavnicima iz Bosne
i Hercegovine, održanog u Predsjedničkim dvorima u
Zagrebu, u srijedu 20. siječnja 1993., broj dokumenta:
01322310.
545
Domovinski rat 04-02-2020 Knjiga 1.indd 545
Mr. Vance, Lord Owen, Mr. Ahtisaari,
Gentlemen, let us conclude this meeting. Thank you for
coming and making an effort to reconcile the respective po-
sitions of the Muslim and Croat representatives from Bosnia
and thus making the representatives more amenable to out-
side pressures calling for a settlement. Don’t get me wrong
here, I’m saying this fully aware that you have to be objective
in relation to all three opposing sides. Having said that, if the
Muslims and Croat representatives presented a united front,
the quest for peace would become that much easier. I call on
them again, right here, right now, to present a united front.
Croatia, for its part, will show, with more determination than
before, that it is willing to take no action that could facilitate
the war’s continuation. This war runs counter to the main
interests of the Republic of Croatia and the Croatian people.
Therefore, let us please focus on trying to reach a peace-
ful solution and keep in mind that there is no peace without
compromise. That has to be clear. Now, the world has been
paying lip service to Croatia but in and of itself lip service
doesn’t mean a thing. So let’s not pretend that it does. Lip
service is fine and good but it didn’t prevent the Serbs from
destroying Vukovar, Drniš and Dubrovnik. And what about
the elephant in the room nobody cares to mention – the
peacekeepers. Is their presence conducive to the liberation of
Croatia? That said, the situation in Bosnia is dire and we can
do something to prevent it from spiraling completely out of
control. Make no mistake, if the war continues, that’s exactly
what will happen. Thank you.
Sources also confirm that President Tuđman and Min-
ister of Defense of the Republic of Croatia Gojko Šušak
were realistic and honored the political framework im-
posed by the international community. The same sources
reveal that in January, 1993, Tuđman and Šušak strove to
induce the Muslims, Serbs and Croats to engage in tripar-
tite talks and reach an accommodation by which a future
BiH government and governing bodies would consist of
representatives of all three constituent nations. Tuđman
and Šušak “harbored no illusions that such a government
R
could be formed in the prevailing circumstances” and
their immediate aim was to “stop the war so that a politi-
cal solution could be found”.
The quest for a political solution continued at a meet-
ing between President Tuđman, the Co-Chairmen of the
International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia Cyrus
Vance and Lord David Owen and Bosnian Croat represen-
tatives held in Zagreb on January 20, 1993. During the
meeting, Mate Boban, referring to a document the Mus-
lim SDA party had sent, on January 5, 1993, to Izetbegov-
4.2.2020. 18:37:11
 Ante Nazor • II DIO
Hercegovinu i to da je došla u Vakuf, što je notorna laž“,
o čemu mogu posvjedočiti snage UNPROFOR-a i europ-
ski promatrači. Ističe da su Hrvati inicirali pregovore o
miru, da su na sastanku na kojem je dogovoren mir bili
uključeni „i svećenik i islamski muftija, ali da su hrvatska
sela i hrvatske postrojbe napadnute istovremeno kad je
sastanak završen“.1112
Tuđman je izjavio da je „u posljednja dva mjeseca
već dobio nekoliko izvještaja da su neki muslimanski
prvaci i u Bosni i u Hrvatskoj i u Njemačkoj dali izjave
H
– za Srbe nismo bili spremni, a za Hrvate ćemo biti spre-
mni“, ali da „nije vjerovao da će se to izroditi u ovakve
sukobe do kakvih je došlo“ (u siječnju u Gornjem Vaku-
fu/Uskoplju, op. ur.).1113
Podatke iz spomenutih transkripata potvrđuje i
pismo koje je zbog napada ARBiH na HVO i Hrvate u
M
Gornjem Vakufu/Uskoplju i Lašvanskoj dolini predstoj-
nik Odjela obrane HVO-a Bruno Stojić uputio načelniku
Glavnog štaba ARBiH Seferu Haliloviću, upozorivši ga
na neprihvatljivo ponašanje muslimanskih političkih i
vojnih čelnika koji javno zagovaraju mir i „bezuvjetno
poštivanje prekida neprijateljstava”, a istodobno vrše
D
pregrupiranja i manevre postrojba: „Od Vas, kao načel-
nika Glavnog štaba Armije RBiH, s razlogom očekujem
da na razini svoje odgovornosti spriječite djelovanje po-
strojbi Armije RBiH prema postrojbama HVO-a i hrvat-
skom narodu. Vi, kao i ja, dužni ste pred savješću, pred
poviješću, i pred muslimanskim i hrvatskim narodom
C
zaustaviti tekuće i buduće sukobe, jer oni neposredno
koriste (srpskim, op. ur.) agresorima i mogu nas odvesti
u potpuni poraz, jednako Armiju RBiH, kao i HVO.” Stojić
je upozorio Halilovića i na neprihvatljive izjave niza za-
povjedništava ARBiH koja Izetbegoviću „poručuju da i u
slučaju kad on potpiše Ženevski sporazum, Armija RBiH
to neće prihvatiti”. Prigovorio mu je i zbog grube, neci-
1112 ICTY: Zapisnik s razgovora predsjednika RH dr. Franje
Tuđmana sa supredsjedateljima Konferencije o bivšoj
Jugoslaviji gosp. Cyrusom Vanceom i lordom Davi-
dom Owenom te s hrvatskim predstavnicima iz Bosne
i Hercegovine, održanog u Predsjedničkim dvorima u
Zagrebu, u srijedu 20. siječnja 1993., broj dokumenata:
01322311-01322312, 01322314-01322315.
1113 ICTY: Zapisnik s razgovora predsjednika RH dr. Franje
Tuđmana sa supredsjedateljima Konferencije o bivšoj
Jugoslaviji gosp. Cyrusom Vanceom i lordom Davi-
dom Owenom te s hrvatskim predstavnicima iz Bosne
i Hercegovine, održanog u Predsjedničkim dvorima u
Zagrebu, u srijedu 20. siječnja 1993., broj dokumenta:
01322313.
546
Domovinski rat 04-02-2020 Knjiga 1.indd 546
ić, who was in Geneva participating in peace talks, warned
President Tuđman that the Muslim leadership was against
the international community’s recommendation for di-
viding BiH into provinces. Tuđman, it has to be pointed
out, had accepted the recommendation. Boban contin-
ued by saying that “if the Muslims were somehow forced
to accept the concept of dividing BiH into provinces then
they would demand the province of central Herzegovina
in the Neretva Valley”. It is important to note that the cit-
ies of Neum, Stolac, Mostar, Jablanica, Konjic, and Čapljina
are located in the Neretva Valley. It was exactly these cities
that the ARBIH would attempt to capture during its Oper-
ation Neretva-93 in September, 1993.
Boban also stated that the Bosnian Croat representa-
tives had been in possession, during the previous meet-
ing in Zagreb, of documents proving that the ARBIH had
been preparing, in January, 1993, “to attack the Croatian
population and the HVO units in Gornji Vakuf” and that
“according to the Muslims themselves the HVO did not re-
turn fire when attacked”, adding that the HVO only started
returning fire after ARBIH soldiers had “massacred 16 and
wounded over 60 Croats” and that “many Croatian hous-
es had been set on fire by ARBIH soldiers before the HVO
started returning fire”.
Continuing with his enumeration of the Muslims’
transgression against the Croats, Boban pointed out
that the ARBIH had abandoned their positions on the
two-kilometer Kupres-Bugojno line opposite the Serbs
and launched an attack on Croatian villages and Croatian
units, emphasizing the fact that Izetbegović had not or-
dered the ARBIH not to attack the HVO but “instead, in a
vile and underhanded manner accused the Croatian Army
of having sent its formations to Bosnia and Herzegovina
D
and being present in Vakuf, which is a vicious lie”. Back-
ing up his characterization of Izetbegović’s statement
Boban simply pointed out that UNPROFOR and European
observers could confirm everything he had said. In con-
clusion Boban described the meeting at which both sides
R
had agreed on peace, saying: “A Catholic priest was there
and also a mufti but the moment the meeting ended the
Muslims attacked the Croatian villages and Croatian units.”
Tuđman stated that he “received, during the last two
days, a number of reports that certain Muslim officials in
Bosnia and Herzegovina, in Croatia and in Germany had
said, ‘We were not ready for the Serbs but we’ll be ready
for the Croats,’ pointing out that he did not “believe that
the situation would escalate into this ferocious conflict”
(Gornji Vakuf/Uskoplje, editor’s note).
4.2.2020. 18:37:11
 Ante Nazor • PART II
vilizirane i izazivačke propagande koja se protiv HVO-a
i Hrvata u BiH vodi preko javnih medija pod musliman-
skom kontrolom. Istaknuo je i problem prijetnji koje „s
pozicija pretpostavljene sile” hrvatskim dužnosnicima i
institucijama upućuju neki zapovjednici ARBiH, pa čak i
Arif Pašalić. Stojićevo obraćanje Haliloviću, kao i sve slič-
ne inicijative nisu dale rezultate. Armija RBiH nastavila
je s ofenzivnim akcijama.1114
Ignoriranje Stojićeva pisma očekivano je, jer je
upravo Sefer Halilović bio jedan od zapovjednika ARBiH
H
koji su smatrali da ih potpisivanje Ženevskog sporazu-
ma ne obvezuje, pa je sljedećeg dana, 27. siječnja 1993.,
u španjolskome El Paisu objavljen njegov intervju u ko-
jemu je upozorio: „Nikakvi pregovori, pa ni ženevski, ne
mogu uništiti ideju o Bosni, kao unitarnoj i suverenoj
državi. Mogu oni u Ženevi potpisati što hoće! Ako bi se
M
preko tih pregovora došlo do učvršćivanja ideje o uni-
tarnoj Bosni, mi ćemo to pozdraviti. U suprotnom slu-
čaju realizirat ćemo je na bojnom polju. Ako Europa ne
promijeni stav, poduzet ćemo mjere i izazvati teroristič-
ke akcije na njezinom teritoriju. Mnogi europski gradovi
gorjet će u plamenu.”1115
D
O napadima ARBiH u središnjoj Bosni, Stojić je 27.
siječnja 1993. obavijestio ministra obrane Republike Hr-
vatske Gojka Šuška i zaključio: „Odnosi s Muslimanima i
Armijom BiH na prostorima HZ H-B, osobito u srednjoj
Bosni, već duže vremena postaju sve složeniji s tenden-
cijom otvorenih oružanih sukoba. Izvješća koja prima-
C
mo i druga saznanja upućuju na organizirani oblik na-
srtaja na postrojbe HVO-a i hrvatski narod, uz znanje i
odobrenje najvišeg političkog i vojnog vrha musliman-
skog naroda u BiH. Opća je ocjena da se to sve čini s ci-
ljem izazivanja kaosa, opstruiranja ženevskih dogovora
D
i planske borbe za prostor.”1116
S obzirom na to da se o uzroku bošnjačko (musli-
mansko) – hrvatskog sukoba i o odgovornosti za njegov
nastavak sukobljene strane međusobno optužuju, ra-
zložno je postaviti pitanje zašto se muslimansko vodstvo
nije opredijelilo za pravu vojnu suradnju, tj. za združene
hrvatsko-muslimanske vojne operacije prema zajednič-
kom agresoru, sve do Splitskog sporazuma 22. srpnja
1995. godine? Pogotovo zato što je hrvatska politika in-
1114 RBiH, HZ H-B HVO, Odjel obrane, broj: 03-391/93., Mo-
star, 26. siječnja 1993.; Lučić, 2018., 251.
1115 Lučić, 2018., 253-254.
1116 RBiH, HZH-B, HVO, Odjel obrane, broj: 03-394/93., Mo-
star, 27. siječnja 1993.; Lučić, 2018., 254.
547
Domovinski rat 04-02-2020 Knjiga 1.indd 547
The information contained in the mentioned tran-
scripts is confirmed, amongst other things, by the letter
the Head of the HVO Defense Department Bruno Stojić
sent to the Chief of the General Staff of the ARBIH Sefer
Halilović following the ARBIH’s attack on the HVO and Cro-
at civilians in Gornji Vakuf/Uskoplje and the Lašva Valley.
In the letter Stojić warned Halilović that the behavior of
the Muslims political and military leaders was unaccept-
able, elaborating that the Muslim leadership had been
publically proclaiming their commitment to peace and
calling for “unconditional cessation of hostilities” while
the ARBIH had been preparing to attack the HVO. Stojić
wrote: “You hold the position of the Chief of the Gener-
al Staff of the ARBIH. Therefore, commensurate with the
level of responsibility you hold, I expect of you to prevent
further offensive moves of the ARBIH against the HVO and
the Croatian people. You, as well as I, will have to answer
to our consciences and will be judged by history and by
the Muslims people and the Croatian people. For that rea-
son, you have to stop this conflict and prevent any future
conflict from breaking out. Fighting between the Muslims
and Croats only serves the Serb aggressor and can only
lead both the HVO and ARBIH into total defeat.” Mincing
words not at all Stojić pointed out that statements issued
by various ARBIH HQs for the benefit of Izetbegović’s at-
tention to the effect that the ARBIH would not accept
the Geneva Agreement even should Izetbegović sign it
were completely improper, offensive and objectionable.
Concluding his scathing missive Stojić put Halilović on
the spot regarding the crass, uncivilized and belligerent
propaganda campaign against the HVO and the Bosnian
Croats waged through state-run/Muslim media outlets
and also regarding threats issued, in a highhanded man-
ner, by certain ARBIH commanders, including Arif Pašalić,
to Croat officials and institutions.
Stojić’s letter to Halilović, and a whole plethora of sim-
ilar initiatives, bore no fruit. The ARBIH continued attack-
ing the HVO and the Croat civilians.
R
It should not surprise us that Stojić’s letter was ig-
nored because Sefer Halilović was one of those ARBIH
commanders who held the view that the signing of the
Geneva Agreement had nothing to do with the ARBIH.
On January 27, 1993, the Spanish daily newspaper El Pais
published an interview with Sefer Halilović in which he
said: ‘”No negotiations, not even those in Geneva, can de-
stroy the idea of Bosnia as a unitary and sovereign state.
Those people in Geneva can sign what they will! If these
negotiations serve to support the idea of a unitary Bosnia,
4.2.2020. 18:37:11
 Ante Nazor • II DIO
zistirala da se HVO i ARBiH urede kao dvije komponen-
te jedne vojske i formiraju zajedničko zapovjedništvo, o
čemu svjedoče razgovori ili sporazumi, primjerice “od 21.
srpnja 1992. (Sporazum o prijateljstvu i suradnji između
RH i BiH, Zagreb), 21. rujna 1992. (Dodatak prethodnom
sporazumu, New York), 25. travnja 1993. (Zajednička izja-
va Alije Izetbegovića i Mate Bobana o formiranju zajed-
ničkog zapovjedništva ARBiH i HVO-a, u nazočnosti pred-
sjednika Franje Tuđmana i predstavnika međunarodne
zajednice, Zagreb) i drugi sporazumi”.1117
H
Oružani sukob između Bošnjaka-muslimana i Hr-
vata u BiH nije moguće objektivno i cjelovito prikazati,
ako se ne razumije što je rat, odnosno ako se zanemaru-
ju vojni i sociološki aspekti rata. U skladu s time, američ-
ki vojni povjesničar Charles R. Shrader zaključio je:
- da su “ključne činjenice o muslimansko-hrvatskom
M
sukobu na tom području temeljito iskrivljene zbog
raznih ideologijskih, političkih i društvenih i osob-
nih interesa”;
- da su rijetki koji su pisali ili govorili o tom sukobu,
posebice novinari, “bili dovoljno osposobljeni ili
spremni činjenično stanje analizirati i o njemu toč-
D
no izvještavati”;
- da “svatko tko zna išta o vojnim pitanjima (i o do-
kazima) nikad ne bi zaključio da su Hrvati započeli
sukob u središnjoj Bosni“;
- da je “ICTY pogrešno presudio da je postojao veliki
plan etničkog čišćenja tog područja od Muslimana”,
C
jer je “zapravo bilo sasvim obratno”.1118
Uostalom, omjer snaga ARBiH i HVO-a u središnjoj
Bosni bio je znatno u korist ARBiH – od 6:1 do 9:1, po-
sebice nakon što se na području Travnika, Bugojna, Ze-
nice i u Lašvanskoj dolini do kraja 1992. našlo najmanje
70.000 Bošnjaka – muslimana protjeranih s teritorija
pod kontrolom srpskih snaga, koje je trebalo zbrinuti i
osigurati im krov nad glavom.1119
Shrader drži da je vrlo rano, “već u jesen 1992.,
muslimansko vodstvo u Sarajevu donijelo strategijsku
1117 M. Tuđman, „Haške optužnice Tuđmanovoj Hrvatskoj i
baršunasta obnova komunističke prošlosti“, Oslobađa-
juće presude Haškog suda Tuđmanovoj Hrvatskoj, UHIP,
Zagreb, 2014., 73-75.
1118 Shrader, Muslimansko-hrvatski građanski rat u srednjoj
Bosni, 9.
1119 Slobodan Praljak, Pomoć RH muslimansko-bošnjačkom
narodu i Armiji BiH tijekom 1991. - 1995., Zagreb, lipanj
2007., 5.
548
Domovinski rat 04-02-2020 Knjiga 1.indd 548
we will support the negotiations. Otherwise, we’ll realize
the idea of Bosnia on the field of battle. If Europe does
not change its attitude we will take measures and mount
terrorist attacks against targets on European soil. We’ll set
many European cities ablaze.”
Also on January 27, 1993, Stojić informed the min-
ister of defense of the Republic of Croatia, Gojko Šušak,
about the ARBIH’s attacks in central Bosnia, stating: “The
relations with the Muslims and the ARBIH in the HZ HB, es-
pecially in central Bosnia, have been, for quite some time,
becoming progressively more complex and conducive to
open armed conflict. The reports we have received and
information gleaned from other sources suggest that we
are dealing with organized attacks on the HVO and Croa-
tian people which are explicitly and implicitly supported
by the military and political leadership of the Muslims in
BiH. It is our conclusion that the Muslims’ objective is to
create a state of chaos on the ground, obstruct the nego-
tiations in Geneva and systematically conquer territory.”
Generally speaking, the Muslims hold the Croats re-
sponsible for the Muslim-Croat conflict while the Croats
accuse the Muslims of causing and starting it. At face value
this looks like a classic “your word against mine” situation.
However, on closer inspection it becomes obvious that this
is not an imbroglio caused by incompatible viewpoints. As
we have seen, the Muslim leadership refused to cooperate
militarily with the HVO against the common foe until the
signing of the Split Agreement on July 22, 1995. We have
also seen that the Croats insisted that a joint HVO-ARBIH
command be formed. Many agreements testify to that.
For example, the agreement of July 21, 1992 (Agreement
on Friendship and Cooperation between the republic of
Croatia and BiH, Zagreb), the agreement of September 21,
D
1992 (Appendix to the previous agreement, New York), the
agreement of April 25, 1993 (Joint statement by Alija Izet-
begović and Mate Boban on forming a joint ARBIH-HVO
command made in the presence of President Franjo
Tuđman and representatives of the international commu-
R
nity, Zagreb) and other agreements.
The Muslim-Croat conflict in BiH cannot be compre-
hensively analyzed without being aware of the nature
of war, that is, if the military and sociological aspects of
war are ignored. The American military historian Charles
R. Shrader concluded, in his comprehensive analysis of
the Muslim-Croat conflict that the “the salient facts of the
Muslim-Croat conflict in central Bosnia have been distort-
ed thoroughly by the ideological, political, social and per-
sonal agendas of various government leaders, journalists
4.2.2020. 18:37:11
 Ante Nazor • PART II
odluku o pokretanju rata protiv Hrvata, zato što su oni
bili slabiji od Srba”, a pritom se poziva na izjave prvog
načelnika Glavnog stožera Armije RBiH generala Sefera
Halilovića i njegovu knjigu Lukava strategija (Sarajevo,
1997.). U prilog tome govori i podatak da je zapovjednik
ARBiH Sefer Halilović već krajem prosinca 1992. u Sara-
jevu, u sjedištu Prvog korpusa u Ulici Danijela Ozme, na
sastanku zapovjednika ARBiH održao govor, na kraju
kojega je uzviknuo: „Naš barjak će se viti u Pločama!“1120
Dakle, izvori jasno pokazuju da je Armija RBiH imala
H
planove za napad na Hrvate i HVO prije siječnja 1993.,
odnosno razdoblja u kojem je, prema tvrdnji Haškoga
suda, počela provedba hrvatskoga „udruženog (zajed-
ničkog) zločinačkog pothvata“!
U tom kontekstu treba spomenuti da tvrdnja iz pri-
općenja haškoga Tužiteljstva, da su dijelovi Hrvatske
M
vojske „direktno sudjelovali u sukobu u Bosni i Herce-
govini“ prešućuje činjenicu da oni nisu angažirani u BiH
radi promjene granica i pripajanja dijela teritorija Hr-
vatskoj, kao srpske snage u RH, nego radi obrane hrvat-
skih područja i autonomne jedinice unutar BiH, prvo od
agresije srpskih snaga na BiH, a tek potom, s malobroj-
D
nim snagama, uglavnom dragovoljcima podrijetlom iz
BiH, od napada brojčano nadmoćnijih snaga ARBiH, čiji
je cilj bio izlazak na more te eliminacija Hrvata iz sre-
dišnje Bosne i područja uz Neretvu. S obzirom na to da
u razdoblju koje haško Tužiteljstvo uzima kao sporno
(siječanj 1993. - travanj 1994.) broj angažiranih drago-
C
voljaca i snaga iz HV-a u BiH (uglavnom podrijetlom iz
BiH) u sukobu s bošnjačko-muslimanskim postrojba-
ma, koje su popunjavali i mudžahedini pridošli iz raznih
islamskih država, nikada nije bio veći od 1400, maksi-
malno 1800 ljudi, i laicima je jasno da te snage nisu bile
D
dovoljne ni za kvalitetnu obranu, a kamoli za agresiju
na drugu državu, za što su potrebne cjelovite brigade
i znatno veće snage. Tim više što ni te malobrojne sna-
ge nikada nisu bile koncentrirane na jednom taktičkom
pravcu ili mjestu, već su, pod zapovijedanjem HVO-a,
dijeljene na manje skupine (nikada nisu dosegle punu
razinu popunjenosti jedne bojne), u svrhu “krpljenja”
prevelike crte obrane. Svaka ozbiljna vojna raščlamba
zaključit će da se s takvim snagama ne ide u agresiju i
secesiju druge države, a pogotovo ih se ne koristi raz-
dijeljene na manje skupine i razbacane na širokom po-
dručju od Mostara do Uskoplja. Jasno je da je njihova
1120 Slavko Zelić, HVO u obrani Sarajeva 1992. - 1993., Zagreb
- Mostar, 2014., 47.
549
Domovinski rat 04-02-2020 Knjiga 1.indd 549
(…) few of whom were properly equipped or inclined to
analyze and report the facts of the matter accurately”, that
anyone who knows anything about military matters (and
evidence) could never conclude that the Croats started
the conflict in central Bosnia and that the ICTY made a
mistake by concluding that there existed a grand plan for
ethnically cleansing the area of Muslims because the truth
was exactly the opposite.
Besides, the ARBIH was overwhelmingly superior both
in numbers and equipment to the HVO in central Bosnia.
In terms on numbers the ARBIH enjoyed a 6:1 to 9:1 ad-
vantage. This stark numerical superiority stemmed, in large
measure, from the fact that by the end of 1992 at least
70,000 Muslim refugees had fled from the Serb occupied
areas to the Travnik, Bugojno and Zenica areas in the Lašva
Valley. It is important to reiterate that the Croats took in the
refugees and secured food and accommodation for them.
Shrader writes that very early in the game, in fall 1992,
the Muslim leadership in Sarajevo decided to launch a
war against the Croats simply because the Croats were
weaker than the Serbs, backing up the assertion with
what Halilović wrote in his book Lukava Strategija (The
Shrewd Strategy) (Sarajevo 1997). Shrader’s claim is also
borne out by what Sefer Halilović said in his speech, at the
end of December, 1992, in Sarajevo, held at I Corps HQ lo-
cated in Danijel Ozma Street, during a meeting of ARBIH
commanders there. Concluding his expose, it is interest-
ing to point out, Halilović exclaimed: “Our banner will be
raised in Ploče.” It is obvious that the sources closely reveal
the fact that the ARBIH planned to attack the HVO and
the Croats before January, 1993, that is, before the period
during which, according to the Hague Tribunal the Croats
embarked on their “joint criminal enterprise”.
In this context it is important to point out that the
claim by the Tribunal Prosecutors that elements of the
Croatian Army directly participated in the conflict in Bos-
nia and Herzegovina is erroneous in the sense that it ig-
nores the fact that those elements of the Croatian Army
R
were not deployed in BiH for the purpose of altering the
boundaries and annexing a part of BiH to Croatia (unlike
Serbia’s forces in Croatia) but for the purpose of defend-
ing the Croatian area and autonomous unit within BiH,
first from Serb aggression against BiH and then, with a
meager contingent consisting mainly of individuals born
in BiH, from attacks launched by vastly superior ARBIH
forces whose objective was the elimination of Croats
from central Bosnia and the Neretva Valley and securing
access to the sea for the Muslims. The Tribunal Prosecu-
4.2.2020. 18:37:12
 Ante Nazor • II DIO
uloga u prvom redu bila psihološka i da, s obzirom na
broj pristiglih dragovoljaca iz HV-a, stvarno predstavlja
simboličnu potporu u obrani tako dugačke crte obrane
koju je HVO 1993. s mukom pokušavao održati pred na-
letima jednonacionalne muslimanske ARBiH, u čijem su
sastavu bili muslimani iz susjednih država i mudžahedini
iz islamskih država.1121
Uz navedeno, važno je podsjetiti da u spomenutom
razdoblju bojišta u Hrvatskoj nisu mirovala, da su krajem
siječnja 1993. HV i policija u zaleđu Zadra i na sinjskom
H
području proveli operaciju Gusar (Maslenica) i akciju
oslobađanja HE Peruča, da su nakon toga gotovo cijelu
godinu trajale žestoke borbe u zadarskom zaleđu, te da
je u rujnu 1993. provedena akcija oslobađanja Medač-
koga džepa nedaleko od Gospića, što znači da Hrvatska,
zbog stanja na svojem dijelu ratišta i borbi sa srpskim
M
snagama, tada nije mogla angažirati veće snage u BiH.
Istodobno, brojnost islamskih ratnika – mudžahe-
dina pristiglih u BiH radi širenja muslimanskog radika-
lizma i „svetog rata“, procjenjuje se na nekoliko stotina
(740) do nekoliko tisuća, vjerojatno ne manje od 2000.
U sastavu 3. korpusa ARBiH na području središnje Bosne
D
djelovala je i jedinica „El mudžahid“, sastavljena od radi-
kalnih islamista pristiglih iz muslimanskih država – od
Alžira, Egipta, Jemena, Saudijske Arabije, Afganistana i
drugih država. S obzirom na to da su se uz mudžahedi-
ne iz islamskih država u ARBiH borili i brojni dragovoljci
iz Republike Srbije, uglavnom iz Raške oblasti, odnosno
C
Sandžaka, nedvojbeno je da je broj stranih dragovoljaca
u postrojbama ARBiH bio veći od broja dragovoljaca iz
Republike Hrvatske u postrojbama HVO-a.1122
U skladu s navedenim, na neke od apsurdnih tvrd-
nji Tužiteljstva na kojima se temelje presude šestori-
ci Hrvata u predmetu “Prlić i ostali” argumentirano je
upozorila politička komentatorica i poznavatelj proble-
matike suđenja na Međunarodnom kaznenom sudu za
bivšu Jugoslaviju u Haagu Višnja Starešina, povezujući
terorističke napade u Londonu 2017. s događajima u
BiH u 1990-im, koji su na spomenutom sudu u Haagu
prilikom donošenja prvostupanjske presude šestorici
Hrvata prešućeni. Podaci koje iznosi otkrivaju zaprepa-
šćujuće razmjere ignoriranja i bijega od činjenica, kako
bi se pravda podredila političkim ciljevima, na štetu
1121 Davor Marijan, “Vještački nalaz: o ratnim vezama Hrvat-
ske i Bosne i Hercegovine, 1991. - 1995.”, Časopis za suvre-
menu povijest 1/36, Zagreb, 2004, 241-242.
1122 Lučić, 2018., 278-279.
550
Domovinski rat 04-02-2020 Knjiga 1.indd 550
tors condemns Croatia and the Croats on the basis of (al-
leged) events that took place between January, 1993, and
April,1994. During that period the number of engaged
volunteers and other Croatian Army troops (born in BiH,
for the most part) in combat with Muslim/Bosniak forces
(which were reinforced by Mujahideen from a number of
Islamic countries) never exceeded 1,400-1,800. The num-
ber was simply not sufficient to organize a viable defense
along the whole length of the front line against the vastly
superior ARBIH let alone mount a strategic offensive with
the aim of inflicting a crushing defeat on the ARBIH so that
Croatia could annex a part of BiH territory. Also, the troops
from Croatia were never concentrated in one location.
Divided into small groups (always smaller than a battal-
ion-size formation), placed under HVO command and sent
to threatened sectors of the front line they did not, by any
stretch of the imagination, constitute an attacking force.
The HVO was not strong enough to successfully defend
the entire length of the front line. In these circumstanc-
es, attempting to mount an offensive would have been
suicidal. Equally, the elements of the Croatian Army were
scattered in a wide area from Mostar as far as Uskoplje.
Their primary role was to bolster the morale of the HVO
troops. Their deployment in BiH represented an act of
symbolic support of the Republic of Croatia for the belea-
guered HVO soldiers desperately trying, in 1993, to fend of
the onslaughts of the all-Muslim ARBIH army in the ranks
of which fought Muslims from neighboring countries and
Mujahideen from Islamic and Muslim countries.
It is important to stress that during the period in ques-
tion the situation on various fronts in Croatia was not quiet.
At the end of January, 1993, the Croatian Army and police
conducted Operation Maslenica in Zadar’s hinterland and
D
in the Sinj area. At the end of January the Croatian Army
liberated the Peruća hydroelectric power plant. For almost
a year after the completion of Operation Maslenica fight-
ing raged unabated in Zadar’s hinterland. In September,
1993, the Croatian Army liberated the Medak pocket near
R
Gospić. It is therefore clear that the Croatian Army had its
hands full in Croatia and was in no position to send a sig-
nificant number of troops to BiH, even had it wanted to.
On the other hand, estimates of the number of the
Islamic warriors – Mujahideen imported into BiH for the
purpose of spreading Muslim radicalism and “Holy War”
range from 740 to a few thousand43. The El-Mudžahid unit,
43 According to the available sources, probably no less
than 2,000 Mujahideen fought in the ranks of the ARBIH.
4.2.2020. 18:37:12
 Ante Nazor • PART II
Hrvata u BiH koji su bili žrtve džihadizma u BiH, ali i na
političku štetu za Hrvatsku:
Haag, London, Bruxelles i BiH bili su prošle srijede tako
simbolično povezani džihadizmom i posljedicama njegove
zapadnjačke banalizacije. Bruxelles se sjećao prve obljet-
nice velikoga džihadističkog napada na glavni grad ujedi-
njene Europe, koji je otkrio ne samo sve sigurnosne slabosti
europske prijestolnice, već i sve slabosti europske politike
guranja glave u pijesak. Istoga dana u Velikoj Britaniji, dr-
žavi koja je upravo na krilima europske politike otvorenih
H
vrata i nesnalaženja u migrantskoj krizi, referendumski od-
lučila napustiti EU, džihadistički se napad dogodio doslov-
ce na vratima Parlamenta. (...)
Pred Međunarodnim kaznenim sudom za bivšu Jugo-
slaviju tog se dana vodila žalbena rasprava u predmetu
protiv političkog i vojnog vodstva Herceg-Bosne, prvo-
M
stupanjski osuđenih za sudjelovanje u udruženom zloči-
načkom pothvatu progona Bošnjaka/Muslimana u BiH.
Gotovo istodobno kada je Khalid Massud započeo svoj
ubilački pothvat pred Westminsterskom palačom, odvjet-
nica generala Praljka, Nika Pinter, ukazivala je Žalbenom
vijeću kako je prvostupanjsko vijeće ozbiljno oštetilo istinu,
D
osuđenike i pravdu kada je odbilo prihvatiti kao dokaze sve
izjave svjedoka koje su se odnosile na djelovanje mudža-
hedina u muslimansko-hrvatskom ratu u BiH, ocjenjujući
ih – nerelevantnima.
Među tim „nerelevantnim“ izjavama je i svjedočenje
jednog od zapovjednika odreda El Mudžahid Alija Hama-
C
da koji je kao svojevrsni svjedok-pokajnik na suđenju zapo-
vjednicima Armije RBiH Hadžihasanoviću i Kuburi, podrob-
no ispričao svoj ratni put u BiH i ciljeve svoje borbe. Ukratko:
podrijetlom je iz Bahraina, prošao je džihadističku obuku u
vojnim logorima Osame bin Ladena u Afganistanu, već u
D
ljeto 1992. je poslan u BiH u misiju širenja Al-Qa’idine mre-
že i radikalizacije domaćega muslimanskog stanovništva,
kroz vjersku obuku i kroz ratne operacije. Ratovao je u sre-
dišnjoj Bosni, ponajviše na širem području Travnika, potan-
ko je opisao napade na hrvatska sela u okolici Travnika i
Zenice, kako bi ih očistili od Hrvata, osvajanje katoličke cr-
kve i samostana u Gučoj Gori, koju su nakon skrnavljenja
mudžahedini minirali i namjeravali srušiti. Opisao je uve-
zanost odreda El Mudžahid u Armiju RBiH i veze njihovih
zapovjednika s bošnjačkim političkim vodstvom, uključu-
jući i Aliju Izetbegovića. (...)
Raspravno sudsko vijeće je sve to ocijenilo nerelevan-
tnim, uključujući i obredna ubojstva, prihvativši potpuno
tezu tužitelja da su Hrvati sami sebe etnički čistili. Ili još
preciznije, da je hrvatsko vojno i političko vodstvo samo
551
Domovinski rat 04-02-2020 Knjiga 1.indd 551
composed of radical Muslims from Muslim and Islamic
states – Algiers, Egypt, Yemen, Saudi Arabia, Afghanistan,
etc. – operated in central Bosnia under the command
of III Corps. Given the fact that many Muslim volunteers
from Serbia (most of them from the Rajška area/Sandžak)
fought alongside the Mujahideen, it is clear that the num-
ber of foreign volunteers in the ARBIH was significantly
higher than that of the volunteers from the Republic of
Croatia fighting in the ranks of the HVO.
In the context of the above, Višnja Starešina, a polit-
ical commentator who followed closely the proceedings
of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugo-
slavia in the Hague, reacted to some of the more absurd
claims of the prosecutors in the Prlić et al. case by writ-
ing an article in which she convincingly tracks a connec-
tion between the terrorist attacks in London in 2017 and
events in BiH in the 1990s. Two things need to be empha-
sized in relation to Višnja Starešina’s reaction; first, the final
judgment in the Prlić et al. case was based, in large mea-
sure, on the claims she irrefutably uncovers in her article
as absurd and second, the information she reveals in the
article was available to the judges but they chose to dis-
regard and/or ignore it. Her article makes for breathtaking
reading; she exposes the staggering level of deliberate
and continuous disregard for pertinent facts the prosecu-
tors and the judges displayed during the proceedings in
the Prlić et al. case and proves that this miscarriage of jus-
tice was administered pointedly for the purpose of sub-
orning the Tribunal into serving venal political agendas
at the material and psychological expense of the Bosnian
Croats who were the victims of Jihadism in BiH, and at the
political expense of the Republic of Croatia:
Last Wednesday The Hague, London, Brussels and BiH
were symbolically connected to Jihadism and the conse-
quences of its ubiquitous disparagement of Western values.
Brussels marked the 1st anniversary of a large Jihadist terrorist
attack on the capital of united Europe, an attack that lay bare
not only all the security flaws in the European administrative
R
center but also the inherently corrupt penchant of many Euro-
pean politicians to bury their hands in the sand. On the same
day in Great Britain, a country that responded to the political
shambles on the continent precipitated by the open door pol-
icy and the inept reaction to the refugee crisis, by deciding to
leg it out of the Union, Jihadists mounted a terrorist attack
right on the Parliament’s doorstep. As the Jihadists spread
terror in the financial heart of Europe the judges of the Ap-
peals Chamber of the International Criminal Tribunal for the
former Yugoslavia were hearing arguments in a case against
4.2.2020. 18:37:12
 Ante Nazor • II DIO
H
M
Razmjena zarobljenih mudžahedina, Busovača – Kaonik, BiH, 17.
svibnja 1993. (autor fotografije: Srećko Stipović).
Exchange of Mujahideen prisoners, Busovača – Kaonik, Bosnia
and Herzegovina, May 17, 1993 (Photograph by Srećko Stipović)
D
proizvodilo strah kako bi nagnali Hrvate da napuste svoja
sela u središnjoj Bosni, dok su mudžahedini, njih oko 4000,
bili tek puki marketing. Pred jednim Khalidom Massudom,
u moćnom, mirnom i policijski-obavještajno pokrivenom
C
Londonu, britanska je premijerka iz sigurnosnih razloga
hitno evakuirana iz Westminsterske palače na sigurnu po-
ziciju. Prema zaključcima prvostupanjskog vijeća Haškog
suda, strah Hrvata iz BiH pred nekoliko tisuća takvih bora-
ca pred vlastitim dvorištima, bio je irelevantna izmišljoti-
na. Tu tezu o izmišljenom hrvatskom strahu od islamskih
boraca u BiH za haško Tužiteljstvo su pripremili i elaborila-
li upravo visoki časnici britanske vojske, koji su djelovali u
BiH u sklopu misije UNPROFOR-a u središnjoj Bosni, upra-
vo na prostoru na kojem su u to doba osnovani prvi vojni
logori za obuku džihada na europskom tlu. Bili su to isti
oni časnici koji su se svojim oklopnim vozilima svakod-
nevno mimoilazili s mudžahedinima u Travniku, Zenici,
Bugojnu, u selima gdje su osnivani džihadistički kampovi,
koji su s njima organizirali razmjene zarobljenika ... Posto-
je televizijske snimke na kojima se vidi da je tadašnji za-
povjednik Britanskog bataljuna general Alaister Duncan
osobno rukovodio evakuacijom hrvatskih civila iz Guče
Gore, koji su se pred mudžahedinskim napadom sklonili u
crkvu, da je čak zbog nadiranja mudžahedina prema crkvi
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Domovinski rat 04-02-2020 Knjiga 1.indd 552
the political and military leadership of Herzeg-Bosnia ac-
cused of taking part in a joint criminal enterprise to persecute
Muslims/Bosniaks in BiH. As Khalid Masood embarked on his
killing spree in front of the Westminster Palace, General Pral-
jak’s lawyer, Nika Pinter, pointed out to the judges that those
who had reached the first instance verdict had committed a
serious transgression against the ideal of truth, the persons
of the accused and the concept of justice when they refused
to accept into evidence the witness statements pertaining to
the activities of the Mujahideen in the Muslim-Croat conflict
in BiH, characterizing the statements as irrelevant.
Among these irrelevant statements is the testimony of
one of the commanders of the El Mudžahid Detachment,
Alija Hamad, who, as some kind of a “pentito” told the story
of his soldiering in BiH, warts and all, during the trial of the
ARBIH commanders Hadžihasanović and Kubura. In short:
Hamad was born in Bahrain, did his Jihadist training in train-
ing camps run by Osama bin Laden in Afghanistan, was sent
to BiH in summer 1992 tasked with spreading the Al-Qaeda
network and radicalizing the native Muslim population by
means of religious instruction and warfare. He saw combat in
central Bosnia, mostly in the wider Travnik area.
During his testimony he described in detail the attacks on
the Croatian villages around Travnik and Zenica; how the at-
tackers ethnically cleansed the villages of Croats; how the Mu-
jahideen desecrated the Catholic Church and monastery in
Guča Gora and then mined the buildings with the obvious in-
tention of blowing them up. He detailed the process of placing
the El Mudžahid detachment under the ARBIH command and
the dynamic of communications between the detachment’s
commanders and the Bosniak political leadership, including
Alija Izetbegović (…)
All of that the judges dismissed as irrelevant, including
ritual murders of Croats. What the judges, on the other hand,
D
did not dismiss was the prosecutors’ claim that somehow the
Croats had performed an astonishing feat of self-debasement
by ethnically cleansing central Bosnia of themselves. The
prosecutors soberly told the judges that the Croatian politi-
cal and military leadership had been deliberately spreading
fear among the Croats so as to induce them to flee. Equally
R
soberly the prosecutors averred that the 4,000 Mujahideen
in Bosnia were nothing more than a figment of the Bosnian
Croats leaders’ imagination. Khalid Masood, one man, one
terrorist on a rampage, sent the British prime minister scur-
rying in fear out of the Westminster palace. A lone troubled
Muslim on the Jihadists’ idea of a joyride instilled fear into the
hearts of everyone working in the security and intelligence
apparatus of the mighty United Kingdom and sent shivers
of dread up and down the spine of pretty much everyone in
the country. But, according to the judges at The Hague, the
4.2.2020. 18:37:12
 Ante Nazor • PART II
zapovjedio da britanski transporteri zapucaju na njih. U
Haagu je svjedočio kako nikada nije vidio mudžahedine,
da su glasine o njima bile tek moćno propagandno sred-
stvo Armije RBiH, kojim se ubijao duh protivnika.
U vrijeme svjedočenja u Haagu, u kojima su negira-
li postojanje i ulogu mudžahedina u ratu u BiH, većina
zapovjednika i obavještajnih časnika iz Britanskog ba-
taljuna UNPROFOR-a iz BiH, već su bili istaknuti eksperti
međunarodne antiterorističke koalicije. Nitko se u Hr-
vatskoj s institucionalne ili ekspertne razine nije upuštao
H
u analizu i razobličavanje njihovih supstancijalno lažnih
svjedočenja na kojima se uvelike temelje i optužnice i pr-
vostupanjska presuda za svehrvatski zločinački pothvat
hrvatskom političkom i vojnom vodstvu Herceg-Bosne,
baš kao i presuda za progon Dariju Kordiću. A nikoga
izvan Hrvatske to se nije osobito ticalo, niti osobito za-
M
nimalo. (...)1123
S obzirom na navedeno, ne negirajući činjenicu da
su u bošnjačko (muslimansko) – hrvatskom sukobu u
BiH pripadnici obje strane nažalost počinili zločine koji
opterećuju današnje hrvatsko-bošnjačke (musliman-
ske) odnose, treba jasno upozoriti da svaka znanstveno
D
utemeljena raščlamba uloge Hrvata i Hrvatske, odno-
sno hrvatskog predsjednika Franje Tuđmana, u ratu u
Bosni i Hercegovini ne može zaobići kronologiju doga-
đaja i ključne činjenice:
• da je hrvatska politika od 1990. (primjerice, hrvat-
sko-slovenski prijedlog o Savezu jugoslavenskih
C
republika, od 12. listopada 1990.) dosljedno bila za
poštovanje republičkih granica i za cjelovitu BiH, o
čemu svjedoče brojni izvori;
• da je glasovanje Hrvata na referendumu za neovi-
snost Bosne i Hercegovine (29. veljače i 1. ožujka
D
1123 Višnja Starešina, „Džihadistička veza Londona, Haaga i
Travnika“, Slobodna Dalmacija, 25. 3. 2017., 14; Koliko je
netočna tvrdnja Haškog tužiteljstva u predmetu Prlić i
ostali da je hrvatsko vodstvo izmislilo mudžahedine po-
kazuje i intervju bivšeg generala Islamske revolucionar-
ne garde Saeeda Ghasemia (postavljen 14. travnja 2019.
na iransku web-stranicu apparat.com), u kojem je rekao:
“Otišli smo u Bosnu kao članovi međunarodnog Crvenog
polumjeseca, a tamo smo obučavali mudžahedine… Isti-
na je da su se u Bosni – u srcu Europe – dogodile stvari
koje je omogućila naša prisutnost tamo… Došla je Al-Qa-
eda… U jednom određenom periodu bili smo u Bosni
zajedno s članovima Al-Qaedae. Oni su kopirali naš stil,
od vrpca za kosu do zastava… Dali su imena svojim jedi-
nicama… Tamo se dogodilo nešto novo – osnivanje mu-
slimanskih džihadskih jedinica. Ovo što se dogodilo prije
pet ili šest godina u Siriji, dogodilo se već prije u Bosni.’’
553
Domovinski rat 04-02-2020 Knjiga 1.indd 553
fear 4,000 bloodthirsty Mujahideen bent on torture and mur-
der instilled into the hearts of the Croats of central Bosnia is
nothing but an irrelevant nonsense. This unfounded-and-ar-
tificially-induced-fear theory is actually the brainchild of a
number of high-ranking British Army officers who took part in
UNPROFOR’s mission in central Bosnia, in precisely the same
area where the first Jihadist training camps in Europe were set
up. The same high-ranking officers, driving in their armored
vehicles, bypassed Mujahideen on a daily basis in Travnik,
Zenica, Bugojno, in villages where Jihadist camps were lo-
cated… These same officers organized prisoner exchanges
with the Mujahideen… There is TV footage showing the then
commander of the British Battalion, Alastair Duncan, being in
charge of evacuating the Croat civilians from Guča Gora who
had sought shelter in the church there. Alastair Duncan, when
the Mujahideen started advancing towards the church gave
the order to his troops in the armored vehicles to fire on the at-
tackers if they came too close. In The Hague, however, Alastair
Duncan claimed that he had never seen Mujahideen and that
the stories about them were nothing more than a propagan-
da tool used by the ARBIH to spread fear among the Croats.
Interestingly enough, at the time of giving their testi-
monies in The Hague the British officers were recognized as
intelligence experts of the international anti-terrorist coa-
lition. Nobody from Croatia deigned it proper to challenge
the British officers’ claims either on an institutional or expert
level. The prosecutors based their case, in large measure, on
the British officers’ testimonies suffused, as they were, with lies
and falsities. The judges pronounced the defendants guilty
and condemned the military and political leadership of the
Bosnian Croats. These same lies and falsities were used to
prosecute and find guilty Dario Kordić. And nobody outside
Croatia cared enough to check the facts. (…)44
44 Višnja Starešina, „Džihadistička veza Londona, Haaga i
Travnika“, Slobodna Dalmacija, 25. 3. 2017., 14; In relation
to the prosecutors claim that the Mujahideen in Bosnia
were a figment of the Bosnian Croats leaders’ imagination
it is worth mentioning that, On April 14, 2019, an interview
with former IRGC General Saeed Ghasemi was uploaded
R
to the Iranian media website apparat.com. In the inter-
view Ghasemi said:’’We went (to Bosnia) as Red Crescent
members to provide military training to the Mujahideen
forces…The truth is that in Bosnia – in the heart of Euro-
pe – things happened that our presence and that in our
footsteps... Al-Qaeda came... There was a time when we
were in Bosnia and Herzegovina together with Al-Qaeda
members. They copied our style, from the headband and
the flags... They named their regiments such-and-such...
Something new happened there – the establishment of
Muslim jihadi units. What happened in the last five or six
years in Syria happened before in Bosnia''.
4.2.2020. 18:37:12
 Ante Nazor • II DIO
1992.), koje je podržao hrvatski predsjednik F. Tuđ-
man, bilo presudno za uspjeh tog referenduma;
• da je Hrvatska priznala Bosnu i Hercegovinu kao ne-
ovisnu državu 7. travnja 1992., dakle odmah nakon
što su to učinile zemlje Europske zajednice, a isti dan
kad i Sjedinjene Američke Države, što Srbija do kraja
rata nije učinila;
• da su hrvatske snage, kao i ARBiH, sudjelovale u
obrani i oslobađanju BiH od srpskih snaga: 1992.
spriječile su srpske postrojbe da zauzmu strateški
H
iznimno značajne točke u BiH (Mostar i dolinu Ne-
retve, Bosansku Posavinu, područja Livna, Tomisla-
vgrada, Rame) i okupiraju još veći dio te zemlje, a
1995. oslobodile su velika područja (više od 5000
km2) u zapadnoj i jugozapadnoj Bosni; pritom su
operacijom Oluja hrvatske snage omogućile de-
M
blokadu Bihaća, koji se više od 1200 dana nalazio
u okruženju srpskih postrojbi, i tako spasile živote
tisućama tamošnjih Bošnjaka-muslimana;
• da su snage HV-a u BiH uglavnom bile angažirane
protiv srpskih snaga, dijelom i na temelju sporazu-
ma između hrvatskog i bošnjačko-muslimanskog
D
vodstva, radi sprječavanja srpskih napada iz BiH na
Hrvatsku i zaštite Hrvata u BiH od srpske agresije, a
tek potom, u malom broju, uglavnom s dragovoljci-
ma podrijetlom iz BiH i pod zapovijedanjem HVO-a,
radi pomoći hrvatskim snagama u BiH u obrani od
napada ARBiH, u čijem sastavu su bili i muslimani
C
s područja drugih bivših jugoslavenskih republika
i islamski ratnici (mudžahedini) iz raznih dijelova
svijeta, čiji broj nije bio manji od broja spomenutih
dragovoljaca iz HV-a;
• da analiza snage i brojnosti dragovoljaca iz Hrvatske
koji su pod zapovijedanjem HVO-a sudjelovali u su-
kobu s ARBiH, pokazuje da je njihova zadaća primar-
no bila obrambena (omogućiti opstanak hrvatskoga
naroda na prostoru na kojem je živio), odnosno da
su snage koje su oni činili mogle poslužiti samo za
“krpanje linije sukoba”, nikako ne i za agresiju (broj
pripadnika HV-a u sukobu s Armijom BiH nikad nije
prešao snagu formacijske lake brigade JNA: 1400
- 1800, a najčešće se radilo o 500 - 600 pripadnika
iz HV-a, uglavnom dragovoljaca podrijetlom iz BiH,
koji nikada nisu bili koncentrirani na jednom taktič-
kom pravcu ili mjestu, nego su pod zapovijedanjem
HVO-a dijeljeni na manje skupine radi „krpanja“ pre-
velike crte obrane);
• da su u razdoblju najžešćeg sukoba ARBiH i HVO-a
554
Domovinski rat 04-02-2020 Knjiga 1.indd 554
Members of both sides in the Muslim-Croat conflict
in BiH committed crimes. This sad fact has been an al-
batross around the neck of the Bosniak/Muslim-Croat
relations ever since the conflict ended. Having said that,
it is important to bear in mind that any conscientious
scholarly analysis of the role the Croats, Croatia and Cro-
atian President Tuđman played in the conflict has to be
grounded in the chronology of the conflict and key facts
pertaining to it.
- Croatia was committed, from 1990, that is, from the
very beginning, to respecting the republic bound-
aries and territorial integrity of BiH. Many sources
confirm that (for example, the Croatian-Slovenian
Proposal for a Union of Yugoslav Republics of Octo-
Had the Bosnian Croats not voted in the referendum
on Bosnia and Herzegovina’s independence (Febru-
ary 29 – March 1, 1992) the country would have never
achieved independence. The Croatian President Fran-
jo Tuđman supported the referendum.
- Croatia recognized Bosnia and Herzegovina’s inde-
pendence on April 7, 1992, right after the EU member
states had done so. The USA recognized Bosnia and
Herzegovina’s independence on the same day Croa-
tia did. On the other hand, Serbia did not recognize
Bosnia and Herzegovina’s independence until the
end of the war.
- Croatian forces, as well as the ARBIH, participated in
the defense and liberation of BiH from Serb forces. In
1992 Croatian forces prevented the Serbs from cap-
turing strategically important objectives (Mostar, the
Neretva Valley, Bosanska Posavina, the Livno area,
Tomislavgrad, Rama). The Serbs would have captured
a lot more of the country’s territory had they not
D
been checked in the aforementioned areas. In 1995
Croatian forces liberated large areas (more than 5,000
square kilometers) in western and southwestern Bos-
nia. Operation Storm created the conditions for lifting
the siege of Bihać, which had been in a complete Serb
R
encirclement for 1,000 days. The Croatian Army thus
saved Bihać and the lives of thousands of Muslims/
Bosniaks in the Bihać area.
- The bulk of the Croatian Army forces in BiH was de-
ployed against Serb forces, in accordance with the
Croat-Muslim agreement, for the purpose of prevent-
ing Serb attacks from Bosnia and Herzegovina on the
Republic of Croatia and protecting the Bosnian Croats
from Serb aggression. Only a small percentage of the
Croatian Army troops, most of whom were volunteers
4.2.2020. 18:37:12
 Ante Nazor • PART II
1993. Hrvatska vojska i policija vodile borbe protiv
srpskih snaga za okupirana područja Hrvatske u
zaleđu Zadra, Sinja i Gospića (operacija Maslenica i
oslobađanje HE Peruča te protuudar srpskih snaga
u zadarskom zaleđu, kao i akcija Medački džep), tako
da značajnije snage iz Hrvatske (brojem i kvalite-
tom) tada nisu ni mogle biti angažirane u BiH radi
pomoći HVO-u u obrani od napada višestruko broj-
nijih snaga ARBiH;
• da je hrvatsko vodstvo prihvatilo sve prijedloge
H
međunarodne zajednice o rješenju sukoba i unutar-
njem uređenju Bosne i Hercegovine;
• da su Hrvatska zajednica Herceg-Bosna (18. stude-
noga 1991.) i njezina upravna i vojna organizacija
HVO (8. travnja 1992.) nastale kao reakcija na ne-
posredne događaje u Republici Hrvatskoj (srpska
M
okupacija i pokolj Hrvata u Vukovaru i Škabrnji), te
na odluke Srba u BiH, u razdoblju neizvjesnosti i ne-
mogućnosti bosanskohercegovačke vlasti da zaštiti
Hrvate od prijeteće srpske agresije;
• da je Hrvatska Republika Herceg-Bosna proglašena
(28. kolovoza 1993.) u skladu s tadašnjim planovima
D
međunarodne zajednice o unutarnjoj podjeli BiH
na tri entiteta (Cutileirov plan kantonizacije BiH ili
Lisabonski sporazum, 18. ožujka 1992.; Vance-Owe-
nov plan unutarnje podjele BiH na devet provincija
i područje Sarajeva, 4. siječnja 1993.), a posebice u
skladu s netom predloženim (20. kolovoza 1993.)
C
Owen-Stoltenbergovim mirovnim planom za BiH o
uniji triju republika, nakon što je ARBiH napala HVO;
• da je Hrvatska pomagala u naoružavanju i obuci pri-
padnika ARBiH;
• da je uslijed ratnoga stanja u Bosni i Hercegovini
D
Hrvatska zbrinjavala izbjeglice i prognanike iz te
države bez obzira na njihovu nacionalnu i vjersku
pripadnost: od početka rata do sredine listopada
1994., dakle čak i tijekom sukoba između ARBiH i
HVO-a, Ured Vlade Republike Hrvatske za progna-
nike i izbjeglice pomogao je u zbrinjavanju više od
600.000 izbjeglica i prognanika iz Bosne i Hercegovi-
ne (oko 425.000 Bošnjaka-muslimana, oko 170.000
Hrvata i oko 5000 ostalih); istodobno, uz pripadnike
HVO-a, u bolnicama u Hrvatskoj liječeni su ranjeni
pripadnici ARBiH i civili – Bošnjaci-muslimani iz Bo-
sne i Hercegovine.
Ne može se izostaviti ni činjenica da je teritorij Bo-
sne i Hercegovine bio osnovica za srpsku agresiju na
Hrvatsku 1991., te da je s istoga teritorija Hrvatska bila
555
Domovinski rat 04-02-2020 Knjiga 1.indd 555
born in Bosnia and Herzegovina, under the command
of the HVO, were deployed to defend against ARBIH
and Mujahideen attacks. The number of Muslims from
other republics of the former Yugoslavia and Mujahi-
deen from various parts of the world who served in
the ranks of the ARBIH was not smaller than that of
the mentioned Croat volunteers fighting under the
HVO command.
- The number and activities of Croatian Army troops
that participated, under the HVO command, in the
Muslim-Croat conflict show that their role was pri-
marily defensive (at stake was the very survival of the
Croats in predominately Croatian areas). The number
of Croatian Army volunteers was too small for any of-
fensive adventures. They were sent, in small groups,
to critical areas of the front line to help the belea-
guered HVO troops (the number of Croatian Army
troops in the Muslim-Croat conflict never exceeded
1,400-1,800 – roughly the equivalent of a JNA light
brigade. Most of the time, though, there were only
500-600 Croatian Army soldiers deployed in BiH. Most
of them were volunteers born in Bosnia and Herze-
govina. They were never concentrated in one place
but were scattered all along the length of the front
line to strengthen the threatened sectors. All Croatian
Army troops in the Muslim-Croat conflict were under
the command of the HVO.
- When the intensity of the fighting in the Muslim-Cro-
at conflict was at its peak, in 1993, the bulk of the
Croatian Army and police were engaged in combat
against Serb forces in Croatia – in Zadar’s hinterland,
the Sinj and Gospić areas (Operation Maslenica, the
liberation of the Peruća hydroelectric power plant,
Serb counterattack in Zadar’s hinterland, fighting for
the Medak pocket). Therefore, the Croatian Army was
in no position to send a large number of men, or even
a small number of professional soldiers, to Bosnia and
Herzegovina to help the HVO against the vastly supe-
R
rior ARBIH.
- The Croatian leadership accepted all recommenda-
tions of the international community about ending
the war and about internal system of governance
in BiH.
- The Croatian Community of Herzeg-Bosnia (HZ HB)
(created November 18, 1991) and its military and
administrative organization, the HVO (created April
8, 1992), were established as a direct reaction to the
events in the Republic of Croatia (Serb occupation
4.2.2020. 18:37:12
 Ante Nazor • II DIO
izravno ugrožena i nakon 1991. godine. Činjenica je i
da je tijekom rata u Bosni i Hercegovini došlo do suko-
ba između ARBiH i HVO-a, koji je Srbima u BiH olakšao
obranu do tada osvojenih teritorija i osvajanje novih
područja, a koji su srbijanska i bošnjačko-muslimanska
politika iskoristile da odgovornost za rat u BiH prebace
i na hrvatsko vodstvo.
Zapravo, za ocjenu karaktera i razumijevanje uzro-
ka sukoba između ARBiH i HVO-a može poslužiti završ-
na izjava generala Slobodana Praljka na suđenju u Haa-
H
gu, 21. veljače 2011.:
Nikada u povijesti ratovanja jedan narod (Hrvati) nije
tako i toliko pomogao drugi narod (Bošnjake-Muslimane),
i onda kada su potonji okrenuli svoju vojsku, Armiju RBiH,
protiv Hrvata, HVO-a u BiH. Nikada u povijesti ratovanja
zapovjednik jedne vojske (HVO-a) nije propuštao konvoje
M
oružja (i ostaloga) drugoj vojsci (Armiji RBiH) i onda kada
je ta vojska (Armija RBiH) to oružje i ostalo koristila za na-
pade na one koji su joj to propustili.1124
No, prije svega, treba uzeti u obzir uzrok rata, od-
nosno odgovornost srbijanskog vodstva i zapovjed-
nog vrha JNA za početak rata u Hrvatskoj i Bosni i Her-
D
cegovini. Rat u Bosni i Hercegovini nastavak je rata u
Hrvatskoj, odnosno druga etapa otvorene velikosrpske
oružane agresije, započete napadom na Hrvatsku u lje-
to 1991. radi ostvarenja cilja da “svi Srbi žive u jednoj
državi”. Rat u BiH, pa tako i sukob između ARBiH i HVO-a
na dijelu teritorija BiH (središnja Bosna i Hercegovina),
C
te znatno smanjen broj Hrvata u BiH posljedice su takve
velikosrpske politike i agresije.
Nažalost, te su činjenice zanemarene u presudi u
predmetu „Prlić i ostali“, o čemu je, kao i o radu MKSJ-a
u Haagu, kritički govorio Robin Harris, povjesničar, pisac
i publicist, te bivši savjetnik britanske premijerke Mar-
garet Thatcher. Između ostaloga, naglasio je:
Međunarodni kazneni sud je skup neuspjeh. Napravio
je samo minimum koji se od njega očekivao – no sporo,
nestručno, radeći uz nepoštene kompromise, pod snažnim
političkim utjecajem, slijedeći nemoralan program izjed-
načavanja krivice među uključenim strankama. (...) Pre-
sude tribunala, čak i ako su ponekad vrijedne zbog nekih
drugih razloga, nisu ustvari postignute putem procesa ili
prema standardima, što bi bilo prihvatljivo u svakoj razvi-
jenoj državi – pogotovo u Velikoj Britaniji, koja je tako sr-
dačno podržala zaključke Međunarodnog suda. Klasičan
1124 Završna riječ generala Slobodana Praljka u Haagu, 21. ve-
ljače 2011. (http://www.slobodanpraljak.com/.
556
Domovinski rat 04-02-2020 Knjiga 1.indd 556
and massacres of Croats in Vukovar and Škabrnja) and
to the decisions made by the Bosnian Serbs during a
period of uncertainty when the BiH authorities were
unable to protect the Bosnian Croats from imminent
Serb aggression.
- The Croatian Republic of Herzeg-Bosnia was declared
(August 28, 1993) in accordance with the plans of the
international community about internal division of
BiH into three entities (the Cutileiro Plan, also known
as the Lisbon Agreement on cantonization of BiH,
March 18, 1992); the Vance-Owen Plan on internal
division of BiH into nine provinces and Sarajevo area,
January 4, 1993) and especially in accordance with
the most recent (August 20, 1993) Owen-Stoltenberg
Peace Plan for BiH on a union of three republics, pro-
posed after the ARBIH had attacked the HVO.
- The Republic of Croatia helped train ARBIH members
and sent weapons to the ARBIH.
- The Republic of Croatia took in refugees from Bos-
nia and Herzegovina irrespective of their nationality
or religion. From the beginning of the war until the
middle of October, 1994, including the period of the
duration of the Muslim-Croat conflict the Govern-
ment’s Office for Displaced Persons and Refugees
helped accommodate more than 600,000 refugees
and displaced persons from Bosnia and Herzegovina
(425,000 Bosniak/Muslims, 170,000 Croats and 5,000
members of other ethnicities and nationalities). Also,
wounded ARBIH soldiers and Bosniak/Muslims from
Bosnia and Herzegovina were treated, alongside HVO
wounded soldiers, in hospitals in Croatia.
It has to be kept in mind, when analyzing any given
aspect of the war in BiH, including the Muslim-Croat con-
D
flict, that BiH territory was used by the JNA and Serb for-
mations as an avenue of attack on Croatia in their initial
onslaught in 1991. After that the Serbs continued using
BiH territory to mount attacks on Croatia. Croatia, it has
to be said, was under constant threat of attack from BiH
R
territory until the end of the war. The conflict between the
ARBIH and the HVO in BiH made it easier for the Serbs to
consolidate their control over the conquered areas and
conquer more territory. The conflict also made it easier for
the Muslim and Serb propagandists to blame the Croat
leadership for the war in BiH.
The statement made by General Praljak on February
21, 2011, in The Hague during his trial encapsulates the
character of the Muslim-Croat conflict and explains its or-
igin and causes:
4.2.2020. 18:37:12
 Ante Nazor • PART II
primjer je stvaranje pojma udruženi (ili „zajednički“, op.
ur.) zločinački pothvat, koji se u svom najširem – i najteže
obranjivom – obliku, upotrijebio da bi se postigla osuđuju-
ća presuda u nedavnom slučaju protiv hrvatske šestorke iz
Bosne i Hercegovine. Bila je to nepravedna presuda. Mož-
da je prihvaćena – baš kao što se sutrašnje vrijeme može
prihvatiti – no ne treba se poštovati, kao ni institucija koja
ju je donijela. (...)
Nakon što sam pročitao odličnu knjigu Charlesa R.
Shradera, „Muslimansko-hrvatski građanski rat u srednjoj
H
Bosni“ (eng. The Muslim-Croat Civil War in Central Bosnia),
te nakon što sam intervjuirao mnoge bosanske izbjeglice –
Muslimane i Hrvate 1993. godine, držao sam da situaciju
poznajem prilično dobro. Međutim, nisam do sada shva-
ćao sve vojne razloge za muslimansku vojnu kampanju u
sjevernoj Hercegovini. Niti sam shvatio, unatoč tome što
M
sam svojedobno čuo različite neosnovane optužbe, ek-
stremno i opsežno divljaštvo mudžahedina – koje je uvela,
angažirala i kontrolirala Armija Republike Bosne i Herce-
govine u svojoj kampanji kako bi prognala Hrvate. Boš-
njačka obavještajna služba, AID, nastojala je zataškati tu
vezu. No njihov uspjeh u tome povlači druga važna pita-
D
nja – o profesionalnosti rada istražnog tima 9 Tužiteljstva
Haaškog suda, o upletenosti drugih službi – uključujući
britansku – u ublažavanje informacija o mudžahedinskim
zvjerstvima te o potpunom propustu Hrvatske tada i sada
da javno obznani progon Hrvata.
Nasuprot tomu, Tužiteljstvo se snažno obrušilo na
C
(jednako stvarne) zločine koje su počinile hrvatske snage u
vojnoj kampanji u Lašvanskoj dolini, osobito u Ahmićima.
Slučajevi koji se tiču tih operacija prvo su upotrijebljeni
kako bi se dokazao stupanj odgovornosti zapovjedništva
neutemeljen u stvarnosti, koji je rezultirao kaznom od 45
D
godina zatvora (koja se kasnije drastično smanjila) protiv
generala HVO-a Tihomira Blaškića. Oni su zatim, u presudi
protiv Darija Kordića, poslužili za tvrdnju o postojanju po-
litički definiranog plana etničkog čišćenja ne-Hrvata. To je
bio temelj optužnice protiv „Prlića i ostalih“, koja je uključi-
vala predsjednika Tuđmana i hrvatsku državu. (...)1125
Jedna od najupućenijih osoba u zbivanja u Hrvat-
skoj i Bosni i Hercegovini u spomenutom razdoblju, pu-
kovnik Richard Herrick (časnik SAD-a s više od 20 godi-
1125 Iz govora Robina Harrisa na predstavljanju knjige Viš-
nje Starešine Hrvati pod KOS-ovim krilom: Završni račun
Haaškoga suda, 11. prosinca 2017. na Hrvatskom kato-
ličkom sveučilištu u Zagrebu; preuzeto s portala Narod.
hr, 13. prosinca 2017.
557
Domovinski rat 04-02-2020 Knjiga 1.indd 557
Never in the history of war has one people (the Croats)
provided so much help to another people (the Bosnian Mus-
lims) even when the latter turned their army, the BH Army,
against the Croats, the HVO, in Bosnia-Herzegovina.
Never in the history of war has the commander of one
army (the HVO) let convoys with armaments and other
equipment pass through to another army (the BH Army)
even when that army (the BH Army) used those armaments
and all the rest to attack those who let them receive it.
The root cause of the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina
lies in the fact that the Serbian leadership, pursing the ide-
ology of Greater Serbia, decided to use the JNA and other
Serb formations to attack Croatia and BiH. The war in BiH
was a continuation of the war in Croatia, that is, the sec-
ond phase of open Serb aggression launched in summer
1991 against Croatia for the purpose of realizing the con-
cept of “all Serbs in one country”. The war in BiH, includ-
ing the Muslim-Croat conflict in BiH (central Bosnia and
Herzegovina) was caused by the ideology of Greater Ser-
bia and consequent Serb armed aggression against both
Croatia and BiH. One part of the legacy of the ideology of
Greater Serbia and the war waged in the pursuance of it is
the fact that fewer Croats live in BiH today than they did in
1991, on the eve of the war.
Unfortunately all the above facts were ignored in the
Prlić et al. case. Robin Harris, historian, author, journalist
and former advisor to Margaret Thatcher, commenting on
the ineptness of the Hague Tribunal, said:
The ICTY has been an expensive failure. It has done
the bare minimum that was expected of it – but slowly,
incompetently, working through dishonest compromis-
es, heavily politically influenced, following an immoral
programme of equalizing guilt between the constituent
parties. (…)
The judgements of the Tribunal, even if sometimes
merited on other grounds, were not in fact reached by
processes, or according to standards, which would have
been acceptable in any developed country – let alone in
R
Britain, which so heartily endorsed the ICTY conclusions.
A classic example is the creation of the concept of the
Joint Criminal Enterprise, which in its most extended - and
least defensible - form, was used to achieve a guilty ver-
dict in the recent case against the Croat Six from Bosnia
and Hercegovina. That was an unjust judgement. It may
be accepted – just as the weather tomorrow may be ac-
cepted – but it does not need to be respected, and neither
does the institution which delivered it. (…)
Having read Charles R. Shrader’s excellent book, The
4.2.2020. 18:37:12
 Ante Nazor • II DIO
na iskustva na poslovima vojne analitike u inozemstvu,
vojni ataše u američkome veleposlanstvu u Beogradu od
1991. do kolovoza 1992., a potom na istoj dužnosti u Hr-
vatskoj sve do 1995.), smatra da je „postojao vojno oprav-
dan razlog za ulazak HV-a u dijelove BiH u funkciji obrane
vlastitog teritorija“, no da bi to pitanje trebalo posebno
analizirati, jer je „teško o tomu govoriti bez uključivanja
mnoštva podataka koji se odnose na određeni period i/ili
lokacije“. O mogućem broju pripadnika HV-a u BiH rekao
je: „Nije točno da smo mi (SAD) imali drukčije procjene
H
o događajima u BiH u odnosu na međunarodne orga-
nizacije koje su bile prisutne ondje. No imali smo dosta
različitih procjena kada se radi o pojedinim konkretnim
kategorijama. Npr. međunarodne su snage cijenile da je
nazočnost HV snaga u BiH značajno veća od naših pro-
cjena. Isto je bilo i s kvalitetom i kvantitetom logističke
M
potpore HV-a HVO-u. Mi (SAD) smo smatrali da je broj
trupa HV-a u BiH značajno manji od broja koji su navodile
međunarodne organizacije. Npr. UNPROFOR bi zabilježio
nazočnost cijele HV jedinice u BiH na temelju uočavanja
skupine pripadnika te jedinice. U nekim prilikama bilo je
jasno da je takva određena jedinica stvarno u RH, a samo
D
par ljudi iz te jedinice (vod ili slično) bio je u BiH.“
Istaknuvši kako nikada nije ništa negativno čuo o ge-
neralu Slobodanu Praljku od međunarodnih promatrača,
ili ljudi druge etničke pripadnosti te da mu Praljak nikada
nije odbio neko njegovo traženje, glede počinjenih zlo-
čina i kršenja međunarodnoga prava, puk. Herrick pri-
C
mijetio je: „Znao sam za više incidenata u kojima su vrlo
vjerojatno bili počinjeni ratni zločini nad civilima ili pri-
padnicima ARBiH od strane pripadnika HVO-a. No ne mi-
slim, i nismo imali takve informacije, da bi to bila politika
HVO-a, odnosno da bi zločini bili zapovjeđeni ‘odozgo’.“
Govoreći o uzroku sukoba između Armije RBiH i
HVO-a zaključio je: „Kasno 1992. javljaju se napetosti
između te dvije skupine. Događaju se incidenti – zna-
čajniji ili manje značajni. No ne mislim da je tu postojao
neki plan sve do kraja 1992. i rane 1993. kada je postalo
jasno da je vizija Alije Izetbegovića bila stvaranje musli-
manske države. Negdje u proljeće 1993. jasno je da su
dotadašnji saveznici postali zaraćene strane. Naravno,
postoje i drugi opći čimbenici koji su utjecali na nasta-
nak toga sukoba.“1126
1126 Iz razgovora s pukovnikom Richardom Herrickom 20.
lipnja 2005. u Washingtonu, SAD; preuzeto iz članka
Jure Kapetanovića, objavljenog 21. prosinca 2017. na
portalu Narod.hr.
558
Domovinski rat 04-02-2020 Knjiga 1.indd 558
Muslim-Croat Civil War in Central Bosnia, and having in-
terviewed many Bosnian Muslim and Croat refugees in
1993, I thought that I knew the situation pretty well. But I
did not, until now, grasp the full military rationale for the
Muslim military campaign in Northern Hercegovina. Nor,
despite at the time hearing various unsubstantiated alle-
gations, did I grasp the extreme and extensive savagery
of the mujahedeen – who were imported, deployed and
controlled by the Army of BiH in its campaign to expel
Croats. The Bosniak intelligence service, the AID, sought
to conceal that connection. But their success in doing so
raises other large questions - about the seriousness of the
work of the Tribunal Prosecutor’s investigative team 9;
about the involvement of other agencies – including the
British - in downplaying the mujahedeen atrocities; and
about the total failure of Croatia, then and since, to publi-
cise the persecution of Croats.
By contrast the (equally real) crimes committed by
Croat forces in the military campaign in the Lašva Valley,
notably at Ahmići, were vigorously pursued by the Prose-
cution. The cases relating to these operations were used
first to assert a degree of command responsibility unwar-
ranted by realities, resulting in the 45 year sentence (later
sharply reduced) against the HVO general Tihomir Blaškić.
They then served to allege, in the judgement against
Dario Kordić, the existence of a politically-determined
plan of ethnic cleansing of non-Croats. This was the foun-
dation of the indictment against “Prlić and others”, which
involved President Tuđman and the Croatian state.
In 2005 Jure Kapetanović interviewed Colonel Richard
Herrick, the former military attaché to the Federal Repub-
lic of Yugoslavia (1991-1992) and later to the Republic of
Croatia (until 1995). Colonel Richard Herrick is a renowned
D
military analyst with over 20 years of experience and was,
on account of his official role, one of the insiders in the
events in Bosnia and Herzegovina and Croatia during the
war. In the interview he expressed his opinion that “the
Croatian Army entered BiH territory out of military neces-
R
sity and for the purpose of defending its own territory”.
He qualified the statement by saying that the issue should
be carefully analyzed because “it is hard to pass judgment
without taking into account many pieces of information
relating to specific time periods and/or locations”. Talking
about the issue of the presence of the Croatian Army sol-
diers in BiH he said: “It is not true that we (the USA) had a
different picture of the events in BiH than the internation-
al organizations present on the ground. But, our estimates
concerning certain categories were different than theirs.
4.2.2020. 18:37:12
 Ante Nazor • PART II
Michael G. Karnavas, odvjetnik osuđenoga gene-
rala Jadranka Prlića, istaknuo je kako je „sigurno to da
ove presude neće donijeti pomirenje, jednako kao što
neće predstavljati povijesne istine o tome što se dogo-
dilo u BiH tijekom sukoba između Muslimana i Hrvata“
te zaključio:
Duboko poštujem suce Žalbenog vijeća koje je doni-
jelo presudu. Također prihvaćam, kao što svi moramo, da
je njihova presuda konačna. Međutim, ne mogu mirne sa-
vjesti poštivati mnoge od nalaza i zaključaka u žalbenom
H
postupku do kojih su došli ti cijenjeni sudci. Moja kritika
nije napad na MKSJ kao instituciju; ona je optužba načina
na koji je Raspravno vijeće provodilo postupke u predmetu
„Prlić i ostali“, što je rezultiralo donošenjem pogrešne pre-
sude, koju nažalost Žalbeno vijeće nije ispravilo. I dok kao
odvjetnik MKSJ-a imam „pozitivnu obvezu zaštititi ugled
M
Suda“, bilo bi kukavički s moje strane i uvreda sjećanju na
generala Praljka da se pretvaram da je postupak bio pravi-
čan, da nije bilo pristranosti sudaca tijekom suđenja, te da
u prvostupanjskoj i drugostupanjskoj presudi nije bilo po-
grešaka. Oštre su to riječi koje se mogu smatrati napadom
na ugled i ostavštinu MKSJ-a, ali po riječima Voltairea: „Ži-
D
vima dugujemo poštovanje, a mrtvima samo istinu.“1127
O tome zašto je došlo do sukoba ARBiH i HVO-a mi-
šljenja se razlikuju. Cjelovito pregledani izvori nedvoj-
beno pokazuju da je cilj hrvatske politike prema Bosni
i Hercegovini bio pokušaj zaštite hrvatskoga naroda, ne
dovodeći u pitanje njene međunarodno priznate grani-
C
ce, te da se ona vodila u okvirima - političkim i teritorijal-
nim - koje je zadala međunarodna zajednica.
Na kraju, politika tadašnjega hrvatskog vodstva pre-
ma BiH, odnosno prema drugim narodima u BiH, bez
koje Bosna i Hercegovina ne bi opstala kao država, može
D
se prikazati kroz govor ratnog ministra obrane Gojka
Šuška Hrvatima iz Bosne i Hercegovine na skupu u Livnu
nakon početka rata u BiH:
Vi niste pomogli ni hrvatskom narodu u Herceg-Bosni,
ni hrvatskoj Republici koja je matica svih Hrvata, ako Mu-
sliman u Livnu i Srbin u Mostaru ne bude imao ista prava
kao i Hrvat, jer to je samo garancija da će Hrvat u Saraje-
vu i Hrvat u Banja Luci i Hrvat u Zenici imati svoja prava. I
ako oni prema nama učine zločin onda dokažimo da nas
ni vjera, ni civilizacijska tekovina nije uputila na to i neće
dozvoliti da im uzvraćamo istom mjerom.
To je bila politika hrvatskog vodstva prema BiH.
1127 http://michaelgkarnavas.net/blog/2017/12/05/pra-
ljaks-defiance/.
559
Domovinski rat 04-02-2020 Knjiga 1.indd 559
For example, the international organizations’ estimates re-
garding the number of Croatian Army troops in BiH were
a lot higher than our estimates. The same applied to the
estimates regarding the quality and quantity of the logis-
tics support provided by the Croatian Army to the HVO.
UNPROFOR would note the presence of a whole unit in
BiH based on a sighting of a small group of soldiers be-
longing to that unit. In some cases the unit in question
was stationed in Croatia and only those few soldiers (pla-
toon or similar size group) were present in BiH.”
Pointing out that the he had never heard anything
negative about General Praljak from international observ-
ers nor from any non-Croat in BiH and that General Praljak
had always been forthcoming regarding his requests in
relation to investigating war crimes and violations of In-
ternational Law, Colonel Herrick observed: “I was aware of
a number of incidents during which HVO soldiers proba-
bly committed war crimes against civilians and ARBIH sol-
diers. But, I have no reason to believe, I mean, we certainly
did not possess any information that would even remote-
ly suggest that committing war crimes was consistent
with the HVO’s conduct or that committing war crimes
was ever ordered from ‘on high’.”
Speaking about the cause of the conflict between
the ARBIH and the HVO, Herrick concluded: “In late 1992
the relations between the HVO and the ARBIH became
strained. Incidents occurred – serious and not so serious
ones. However, I don’t think that there was a method to
that madness, not until late 1992, early 1993 anyway,
when it became clear that Alija Izetbegović’s aim was to
create a Muslim state. Sometime in the spring of 1993 it
became clear that the erstwhile allies had become ene-
mies. Of course, other facts also contributed to the break-
out of the conflict.”
Michael G. Karnavas, the lawyer of General Prlić, point-
ed out that “what is for sure is that these Judgments will
not foster reconciliation any more than it can be claimed
that they represent the historical truths of what happened
R
in BiH during the Muslim-Croat conflict’’ and concluded:
I have profound respect for the Judges of the Appeals
Chamber who rendered the Judgment. I also accept, as all
must, that their Judgment is final. However, in good con-
science, I cannot respect most of the findings and conclu-
sions in the Appeal Judgment made by these esteemed Judg-
es. My critique is not an attack on the ICTY as an institution; it
is an indictment on the way the Trial Chamber conducted the
proceedings in Prlić et al., resulting in a miscarriage of justice,
which, regrettably, the Appeals Chamber failed to cure. And
4.2.2020. 18:37:12

HRVATSKI POLITICKI
[i_rcdsjednik Tudman urucio odliCja lzetbegoviCU i SaCirbeju
H
SAVEZ HRVATA IBOSNJAKA
SLAMA SRPSKU AGRESIJU
M
D
Vjesnik, srijeda, 9. 8. 1995.: „Savez Hrvata i Bošnjaka slama srp-
sku agresiju – predsjednik Tuđman (utorak 8. 8. 1995.) uručio
odličja Izetbegoviću i Šaćirbeju“; prilikom spomenutog odliko-
vanja političkih predstavnika muslimana u RBiH Alije Izetbe-
govića (politički vođa Bošnjaka-muslimana u BiH i predsjednik
Predsjedništva BiH) i Muhameda Šaćirbeja (tada ministar van-
jskih poslova BiH), predsjednik Tuđman je rekao: „Washington-
ski sporazum i prijateljska suradnja između dvaju naroda te BiH
i Republike Hrvatske od životnog su interesa ne samo za bošn-
jačko-muslimanski i hrvatski narod, nego i za slamanje agresije s
kojom smo suočeni.“
Vjesnik, Wednesday, August 9, 1995: “The Alliance Between
Croats and Bosniaks Defeats Serb Aggression – President
Tuđman (Tuesday August 8, 1995) Awards Medals to Izetbe-
gović and Šaćirbej”; during the ceremony at which the political
representatives of the Bosnian-Herzegovinian Muslims, Alija
Izetbegović (political leader of the BiH Muslims and President
of the Presidency of BiH) and Muhamed Šaćirbej (then Minister
of Foreign Affairs of BiH) at which they were awarded medals,
President Tuđman stated: “The Washington Agreement and
friendly relations between the two peoples and between BiH
and the Republic of Croatia are of crucial importance not only
for the Bosniak-Muslim people and Croatia people but also for
defeating Serb aggression we are faced with.”
Domovinski rat 04-02-2020 Knjiga 1.indd 560
Ante Nazor • II DIO
while it is claimed that counsel at the ICTY have “a positive
obligation to protect the reputation of the Tribunal”, it would
be cowardly of me and an affront to General Praljak’s mem-
ory to pretend the proceedings were fair, that there was no
predisposition shown by the Judges during the trial or that
the Trial and Appeal Judgments are not flawed. Some may
DIETPHARM try to twist these words as an assault on the ICTY’s reputation
BRIGA@)
!!J.h_
ZAVA$E
lO~A'/LJE
and legacy, but in the words of Voltaire, “To the living we owe
DNEVN I K respect, but to the dead we owe only the truth.”
_ Opinions as to why the Muslim-Croat conflict broke
out differ. The sources irrefutably show that the Republic
of Croatia’s policy towards Bosnia and Herzegovina was
one of trying to protect the Croatian people without
bringing into question the internationally recognized
borders of BiH. The sources also show that the Republic of
Croatia’s decisions and actions were taken strictly within
the political and territorial framework set by the interna-
tional community.
Finally, the policies of the Croatian leadership to-
wards Bosnia and Herzegovina and towards other nations
in BiH, policies without which BiH would not have sur-
vived as an independent country, can best be surmised
from the speech the Croatian minister of defense, Gojko
Šušak, gave to the Bosnian Croats at a rally in Livno after
the start of the war in BiH:
IO0 DEM =....._N
362,5000
You cannot help the Croatian people in Herzeg-Bosnia,
,,...,..,., N ..,_,,,., kn
or the Republic of Croatia, which is the mother country of all
Croats, by denying the rights of a Muslim in Livno or a Serb
C
in Mostar. Respecting the rights of the Serbs and Muslims is
the only guarantee that the rights of a Croat in Sarajevo, of a
Croat in Banja Luka and of a Croat in Zenica will be respect-
ed. And if they commit a crime against us then let us prove to
them that our faith and our civilized values prevent us from
D
responding in kind.
That was the policy of the Croatian leadership to-
wards Bosnia and Herzegovina.
R
560
4.2.2020. 18:37:13
 Ante Nazor • PART II
IZ RECENZIJE
Zapažanja o knjizi i činjenicama u knjizi
Tijekom dvadeset godina rada na prikupljanju i
analizi dokumenata u pet predmeta pred Međunarod-
nim kaznenim sudom za bivšu Jugoslaviju (MKSJ, ICTY)
u kojima sam bila u timovima obrana optuženih pripad-
nika HVO-a, stekla sam nemalo znanje o činjenicama i
dokumentima koji na činjenice ukazuju, što je, vjeru-
H
jem, bila referenca za poziv na suradnju u prikupljanju
relevantne dokumentacije za ovu knjigu.
Uvod u knjigu daje nam odgovor zašto je bilo po-
trebno napisati ovu knjigu: „zbog nametnutih kontro-
verzija i percepcije javnosti o nekim događajima, po-
M
trebno je izdvojiti ih i potkrijepiti dodatnim izvorima,
kako bi zaključci o njima bili što cjelovitiji i znanstveno
utemeljeni“.
O oružanom sukobu u Bosni i Hercegovini između
ARBiH i HVO-a napisano je nekoliko znanstvenih stu-
dija, knjiga, analiza, tako da primarna tema ove knjige
D
nije nastanak i trajanje sukoba. No, bilo je nužno zločine
staviti u politički i vojni kontekst ukazivanjem na činje-
nice koje taj kontekst utvrđuju. Događaji se ne mogu
promatrati izolirano, već u svojoj ukupnosti, i ni jednog
se trenutka ne smije zaboraviti da se sve odvija u kon-
tekstu najmanje dva rata istovremeno.
C
U prvom dijelu knjige - Rat za opstojnost Hrvata,
1991. - 1995. (pregled političkih i vojnih događaja u Domo-
vinskom ratu, s posebnim osvrtom na muslimansko-hr-
vatski sukob u BiH) dr. sc. Davor Marijan daje prikaz ra-
zvoja muslimansko-hrvatskog sukoba, koji je nužan da
D
bi se razumio sam sukob i prikazalo kako su na područ-
ju Bosne i Hercegovine vođeni oružani sukobi, nakon
agresije JNA, između HVO-a/ARBiH i JNA/VRS-a, između
HVO-a i ARBiH te između ARBiH i ARBiH (Bihać).
U drugom djelu knjige - Neke činjenice o zločinima
nad Hrvatima u BiH i izvori o muslimansko-hrvatskom su-
kobu u dijelu BiH, dr. sc. Ante Nazor ukazuje na činjenice
nužne za razumijevanje, mnogima u suštini nepoznate,
okolnosti izbijanja i tijeka muslimansko-hrvatskog su-
koba. U tom je dijelu, radi istine, bilo važno naglasiti da
je „u travnju 1993. Armija Republike BiH napala HVO
Konjic, što je pratio i napad na civile i njihovo protje-
rivanje, te da se sukob proširio u dolinu Lašve, gdje su
postrojbe HVO-a 16. travnja počinile zločin u Ahmići-
ma, a ARBiH istoga dana u Trusini, te u Bušćaku i Orlištu
561
Domovinski rat 04-02-2020 Knjiga 1.indd 561
EXCERPT FROM A REVIEW
Thoughts about the book and the facts
presented in the book
Through 20 years of work on collecting, collating
and analyzing documents pertaining to a total of five
cases tried by the ICTY in which I participated in the ca-
pacity of a member of the defense teams of the accused
HVO members, I gained not an insubstantial amount of
knowledge about the facts the documents in question
relate and point to. My expertise in that particular re-
gard was, presumably, behind the request to participate
in collecting relevant documentation for this book.
The book’s raison d’être is summed up by Ante
Nazor: “The sheer number of artificially created contro-
versies imposed, for strictly political purposes, on these
facts and the consequent influence the perpetuation of
these controversies has had on the popular perception
of both the Croatian War of Independence and the War
in Bosnia and Herzegovina, warrant a somewhat deeper
analysis, bolstered by additional sources regarding both
the facts and the events that underlie them. The goal is
to reach valid and comprehensive conclusions ground-
ed in conscientious scholarship.”
Many articles, scholarly works, books, and analyses
have been written about the armed conflict between
the HVO and the ARBIH in Bosnia and Herzegovina. One
theme which comprises the thread of the narrative is
the beginning and duration of the conflict. Another is
the issue of war crimes and crimes against humanity.
The themes are inextricably intertwined with one pro-
viding context to the other. The events around which
the narrative revolves cannot be viewed or analyzed in
isolation because every single one is an integral part of
the whole. The facts explaining the factors forming the
context within which the war crimes and crimes against
humanity were committed are presented with clarity
R
and the underlying cases are cogently explained. That
said, the authors do not allow the reader’s attention to
stray outside the contextual framework of the narrative.
That narrative, it has to be pointed out, is inevitably de-
termined by the fact that at least two wars were in prog-
ress simultaneously when the events described were
taking place.
In the first part of the book The Croatian Nation’s
Struggle for Survival, 1991-1995: An Overview of Political
4.2.2020. 18:37:13
 Ante Nazor • II DIO
prije toga“. Zahvaljujući medijskoj prezentaciji zločina
u Ahmićima koju su tjedan dana poslije napravili pred-
stavnici britanske bojne UNPROFOR-a, Ahmići su gotovo
preko noći promijenili sliku o ratu u BiH i utjecali na stor-
niranje američkoga prijedloga o ukidanju embarga na
uvoz oružja i zračnim udarima po položajima VRS-a.1128
Svojom Rezolucijom broj 827, usvojenom 25. svib-
nja 1993., Vijeće sigurnosti osnovalo je MKSJ i donijelo
njegov Statut. Na sjednici Vijeća sigurnosti UN-a, odr-
žanoj 25. svibnja 1993. povodom donošenja odluke
H
o osnivanju Tribunala, Sir David Hannay, predstavnik
Ujedinjenog Kraljevstva, izričito je naglasio da je esen-
cijalno pri osnivanju Tribunala da suci, tužitelji i osoblje
budu značajno profilirani, s iskustvom u kaznenoprav-
noj proceduri.1129 Madeleine Albright, kao predstavnica
SAD-a, između ostalog podsjetila je na svoju izjavu danu
M
na prethodnim sjednicama: „This will be no victors’ tribu-
nal. The only victor that will prevail in this endeavour is
the truth“ (S/PV.3175, p. 11).
No, dominacija istine nije ostvarena.
Nakon Ahmića sasvim su se ignorirali zločini i etnič-
ko čišćenje koje je prije i poslije počinila ARBiH protiv
D
Hrvata (zločini ARBiH nad civilima Hrvatima počinjeni
su u naseljima: Dusina, Busovača, Travnik, Križančevo
Selo, Buhine Kuće, Uzdol, Stipića livade, Grabovica, Bu-
gojno, Kakanj, Vareš, Travnik, Miletići, Maljine, Trusina,
Bušćak, Orlište…). Hrvatsko vijeće obrane doista je od
travnja 1993. reagiralo na etničko čišćenje Konjica, a po-
C
sebice su jake reakcije bile zbog napada ARBiH na HVO
u Mostaru 30. lipnja 1993. i izdaju muslimana pripadnika
HVO-a, nakon čega su slijedila masovna uhićenja musli-
mana vojnih obveznika na području općina Stolac, Ča-
pljina, Mostar i Neum.1130
Svijet je upoznat sa zločinom u Ahmićima, Stu-
pnom dolu, MKSJ je vodio postupke i donio presude
optuženim Hrvatima za navedene zločine. No, MKSJ
nije donio presudu odgovornima za zločine nad civi-
lima Hrvatima i zarobljenim pripadnicima HVO-a u
Grabovici, Uzdolu, Jablanici (Stipića livade), Konjicu
(Orlište, Bušćak, Trusina, Klis), Vitezu, Dusini, Travniku,
1128 C. HODGE, Velika Britanija i Balkan od 1991. do danas,
139-147.
1129 Provisional verbatim record of the three thousand two
hundred and seventeenth meeting Held at Headquar-
ters, New York, on Tuesday, 25 May 1993, at 9 p.m.
1130 ICTY: Zapovjedništvo III. satnije III. bojne VP HVO Čaplji-
na, Izvješće dj. br. 02-4/3-06/4-12-208/93 od 1. 7. 1993.
562
Domovinski rat 04-02-2020 Knjiga 1.indd 562
and Military Events in the Croatian War of Independence,
with Special Emphasis on the Muslim-Croat Conflict in
Bosnia and Herzegovina Davor Marijan explains the ori-
gins and causes of the Muslim-Croat conflict and traces,
in detail, its progress without glossing over the origins,
causes and progress of the other armed conflicts in Bos-
nia and Herzegovina that erupted in the wake of the
JNA’s aggression against Bosnia and Herzegovina (HVO/
ARBIH vs JNA/VRS and ARBIH vs ARBIH (Bihać).
In the second part of the book, Facts Regarding War
Crimes and Crimes against Humanity Committed against
Croats in Bosnia and Herzegovina and Sources Regarding
the Muslim-Croat Conflict in a Part of Bosnia and Herze-
govina Ante Nazor points to the crucial facts necessary
for understanding the circumstances surrounding the
break-out and progress of the Muslim-Croat conflict.
For the purpose of clarifying a number of issues, Ante
Nazor writes: “In April, 1993, the Army of the Republic
of Bosnia and Herzegovina attacked the HVO Konjic,
also targeting and expelling Croat civilians. The conflict
spread to the Lašva Valley where HVO troops, on April
16, committed a crime in Ahmići. On the same day the
Army of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina com-
mitted a similar crime in Trusina, and on the day before
also in Bušćak and Orlište.” Thanks to the media presen-
tation of the crime in Ahmići, made by representatives
of the British UNPROFOR Battalion, world public opin-
ion changed its position regarding the war. The Amer-
icans withdrew their recommendation for lifting the
arms embargo and also the recommendation calling
for air strikes against the VRS.45
By Resolution 827, adopted on May 25 1993, the Se-
curity Council established the ICYT.
D
At the 3217th meeting of the Security Council, held
on May 25 the UK’s representative, Sir David Hannay
stated that: It is of the greatest importance for the effec-
tive functioning of the Tribunal that the judges, prose-
cutor and staff are persons with considerable practical
R
experience in the field of criminal prosecution.46 The
Tribunal has very specific purposes, to try persons for
serious criminal offences, and it is essential that all in-
volved are experts in the field. Madeleine Albright, the
45 Hodge, Carole. “Velika Britanija i Balkan od 1991. do da-
nas.” Pp. 139-147.
46 Provisional verbatim record of the three thousand two
hundred and seventeenth meeting held at Headquar-
ters, New York, on Tuesday, 25 May 1993, at 9 p.m.
4.2.2020. 18:37:13
 Ante Nazor • PART II
Križančevu Selu, Buhinim Kućama, Bugojnu, Varešu,
Kaknju, Busovači i drugim mjestima koja su u knjizi na-
vedena, a žrtve imenovane.
Jednako tako, bilo je važno ukazati u knjizi da „mu-
džahedini nisu mit“, jer su u trećem dijelu knjige nave-
dene žrtve zločina počinjenih i od mudžahedina. To je
tzv. reverzibilno etničko čišćenje u okviru kojega je boš-
njačko-muslimanska politika, koristeći medije, pokuša-
la uvjeriti javnost da mudžahedina nema u središnjoj
Bosni, nego da HVO propagandom o mudžahedinima
H
plaši Hrvate kako bi ih prisilili da napuste to područje.
Slučajeve nasilja i nezakonitih postupaka postrojbi AR-
BiH predsjednik Alija Izetbegović nije negirao, no ustvr-
dio je da „te slučajeve osuđujemo i progonimo”,1131 što je
bilo licemjerno, budući da je ARBiH nastavila protjerivati
Hrvate, kao što je licemjerno tvrditi da je hrvatska pro-
M
paganda izmislila mudžahedine, koji su počinili najgore
zločine nad Hrvatima u središnjoj Bosni. U vrijeme pisa-
nja toga pisma ARBiH je etnički očistila područje općine
Travnik i dio općine Novi Travnik. Doista, ARBiH je poslije
sankcionirala ubojstvo dvojice franjevačkih svećenika u
Fojnici, no to je bila gotovo sva njezina reakcija.
D
U knjizi su dokumentirano prikazani zločini u kojima
su žrtve Hrvati civili i zarobljeni pripadnici HVO-a. Žrtve
zločina na kraju svih agresija, oružanih sukoba, bez ob-
zira na njihovu nacionalnu pripadnost, ostaju zauvijek,
imenom i prezimenom. Namjera knjige nije negirati žr-
tve zločina nad pripadnicima druge strane u sukobu.
C
Već od samog početka Domovinskog rata, a pogo-
tovo oružanog sukoba između HVO-a i ARBIH u Bosni i
Hercegovini, medijske i političke slike o Hrvatima i po-
strojbama HVO-a bile su iskrivljene, a zločini i njihove
žrtve, Hrvati, prešućivani. Tako je postojala percepcija da
D
HVO provodi propagandu o muslimanskim zločinima,
jer izvještaji raznih „službenih“ promatrača i novinara
objavljeni u medijima nisu prikazivali pravo stanje i stra-
danje Hrvata. I Bakir Izetbegović, kao član Predsjedniš-
tva BiH, u nekoliko je navrata uporno naglašavao da su
zločinački postupci ARBIH bili tek incidenti.1132
U analizi i prikazu muslimansko-hrvatskoga sukoba
1131 ICTY: Alija Izetbegović, predsjednik Predsjedništva RBiH
od 28. 6. 1993. za dr. Franju Tuđmana, predsjednika RH.
1132 https://www.hercegovina.info/vijesti/vijesti/bih/izetbe-
govic-zlocine-armije-bih-nazvao-incidentima, https://
www.jabuka.tv/covic-odgovorio-izetbegovicu-ne-mo-
ze-biti-negdje-incident-a-negdje-zlocin/ https://www.
index.hr/vijesti/clanak/izetbegovic-pravimo-haubi-
ce-vbr-i-dronove/1039069.aspx
563
Domovinski rat 04-02-2020 Knjiga 1.indd 563
US representative, reminded those present of her state-
ment given during a previous meeting: “This will be no
victors’ tribunal. The only victor that will prevail in this
endeavor is the truth.”
But, the truth has not prevailed.
After the crime in Ahmići the crimes and acts of eth-
nic cleansing committed, before and after the crime in
Ahmići, by the ARBIH were ignored (the ARBIH commit-
ted crimes against Croats in Dusina, Busovača, Travnik,
Križančevo Selo, Buhine Kuće, Uzdol, Stipića Livade,
Grabovica, Bugojno, Kakanj, Vareš, Travnik, Miletići, Mal-
jine, Trusina, Bušćak, Orlište…). The HVO began reacting,
in April, 1993, to the ethnic cleansing of Konjic by the
ARBIH. On June 30, 1993 the ARBIH attacked the HVO
formations in Mostar and Muslim soldiers serving in the
HVO switched their allegiance to the ARBIH. The HVO re-
acted severely and arrested a large number of Muslim
conscripts in the municipalities of Stolac, Čapljina, Mo-
star and Neum.47
The world public knew about the crimes committed
in Ahmići and Stupni Do. The ICTY accused a number of
Croats for the crimes, tried them and found them guilty.
But, the ICTY did not find guilty those responsible for the
crimes against Croatian civilians and HVO POWs commit-
ted in Grabovica, Uzdol, Jablanica (Stipića Livade), Kon-
jicu (Orlište, Bušćak, Trusina, Klis), Vitez, Dusina, Travnik,
Križančevo Selo, Buhine Kuće, Bugojno, Vareš, Kakanj,
Busovača and other locales mentioned in the book. The
names of the victims are also listed in the book.
Ante Nazor emphasizes the fact that the Mujahe-
deen were not a myth. In the third part of the book he
writes about crimes committed by Mujahedeen against
civilians and POWs, noting that the Muslim leadership
used the media to try to convince the public that Muja-
hedeen were not present in central Bosnia and that their
presence there was a fabrication concocted by the HVO
to scare Croats into leaving the area. Izetbegović did not
deny that the ARBIH was committing war crimes and
R
crimes against humanity and stated that “we condemn
and prosecute such acts”48. The statement was hypocrit-
ical in the extreme, just as was the claim that the HVO
had made up the presence of Mujahideen in central
47 ICTY: HQ 3rd Company, 3rd Battalion of the MP HVO Ča-
pljina, Report No. 02-4/3-06/4-12-208/93 of July 1, 1993.
48 ICTY: Alija Izetbegović, President of the Presidency of
the RBiH, of June 2, 1993, for Dr. Franjo Tuđman, Presi-
dent of the Republic of Croatia.
4.2.2020. 18:37:13
 Ante Nazor • II DIO
svaka strana ima niz argumenata i obrazloženja o doga-
đajima koji njoj idu u prilog. Ova knjiga nema namjeru
„pogleda iz hrvatskog kuta“, nego se opis događaja i po-
pis žrtava na hrvatskoj strani zasnivaju na dokumentira-
nim činjenicama.
Svakako je značajno i informativno opažanje Ro-
bina Harrisa, povjesničara, pisca i publicista, te bivšeg
savjetnika britanske premijerke Margaret Thatcher, koji
je u knjizi citiran, a ovdje ukazujem samo na jedan dio
njegova govora:
H
Nakon što sam pročitao odličnu knjigu Charlesa R.
Shradera, „Muslimansko-hrvatski građanski rat u sred-
njoj Bosni“ (eng. The Muslim-Croat Civil War in Central
Bosnia), te nakon što sam intervjuirao mnoge bosanske
izbjeglice – Muslimane i Hrvate 1993. godine, držao sam
da situaciju poznajem prilično dobro. Međutim, nisam
M
do sada shvaćao sve vojne razloge za muslimansku voj-
nu kampanju u sjevernoj Hercegovini. Niti sam shvatio,
unatoč tome što sam svojedobno čuo različite neosno-
vane optužbe, ekstremno i opsežno divljaštvo mudža-
hedina – koje je uvela, angažirala i kontrolirala Armija
Republike Bosne i Hercegovine u svojoj kampanji kako
D
bi prognala Hrvate. Bošnjačka obavještajna služba, AID,
nastojala je zataškati tu vezu. No njihov uspjeh u tome
povlači druga važna pitanja – o profesionalnosti rada
istražnog tima 9 Tužiteljstva Haaškog suda, o upleteno-
sti drugih službi – uključujući britansku – u ublažavanje
informacija o mudžahedinskim zvjerstvima te o potpu-
C
nom propustu Hrvatske tada i sada da javno obznani
progon Hrvata.
Završit ću s citatom Voltairea, preuzetim s bloga od-
vjetnika Michaela G. Karnavasa:
Živima dugujemo poštovanje, a mrtvima samo istinu.1133
Nika Pinter
1133 http://michaelgkarnavas.net/blog/2017/12/05/pra-
ljaks-defiance/.
564
Domovinski rat 04-02-2020 Knjiga 1.indd 564
Bosnia. When Izetbegović made his statement the AR-
BIH had ethnically cleansed the Travnik municipality and
parts of the Novi Travnik municipality. It is important to
mention that the Mujahideen committed especially
heinous atrocities against Croats in central Bosnia. The
ARBIH did eventually try the case of the murder of two
Franciscan friars in Fojnica, but that was the sum total of
what the ARBIH did in terms of prosecuting war crimi-
nals in its ranks.
The crimes against Croatian civilians and HVO POWs
are documented in the book. The names of the victims
of all aggressions, armed conflicts, regardless of their na-
tionality, cannot be extinguished. Their presence in our
memory, in books and in the collective consciousness of
humankind is eternal. The purpose of this book is not to
deny the victims of war crimes of the other side.
Most media outlets, when the Croatian War of Inde-
pendence broke out, presented a skewed picture about
the Croats. The trend continued and the smearing cam-
paign in the media and various political circles against
the Croats reached its height during the Muslim-Croat
conflict in BiH. The HVO was vilified and crimes against
Croatian civilians and HVO POWs ignored. It was widely
believed that HVO propaganda was grossly exaggerat-
ing crimes committed by the ARBIH because the reports
submitted by various “official” observers and journalists
and subsequently published and/or aired in the media
did not reflect the reality of the situation and omitted
the crimes against Croats. Bakir Izetbegović, in the ca-
pacity of member of BiH presidency, duplicitously stat-
ed, on a number of occasions, that transgressions of AR-
BIH members were isolated incidents.49
Generally speaking, most Muslims and most Croats
D
subscribe to those arguments and points of view that
exonerate their soldiers and policies and vilify the oth-
er side. This book avoids the trap of “viewing the events
from the Croatian bird’s eye view”. Everything stated,
described, explained and analyzed in the book rests on
R
documented facts.
In that respect I deem it apt to quote a portion of
a speech given by Robin Harris, a historian, writer and
49 https://www.hercegovina.info/vijesti/vijesti/bih/izetbe-
govic-zlocine-armije-bih-nazvao-incidentima, https://
www.jabuka.tv/covic-odgovorio-izetbegovicu-ne-mo-
ze-biti-negdje-incident-a-negdje-zlocin/ https://www.
index.hr/vijesti/clanak/izetbegovic-pravimo-haubi-
ce-vbr-i-dronove/1039069.aspx
4.2.2020. 18:37:13
 Ante Nazor • PART II

publicist and Margaret Thatcher’s former advisor:

Having read Charles R. Shrader’s excellent book, The
Muslim-Croat Civil War in Central Bosnia, and having in-
terviewed many Bosnian Muslim and Croat refugees in
1993, I thought that I knew the situation pretty well. But I
did not, until now, grasp the full military rationale for the
Muslim military campaign in Northern Hercegovina. Nor,
despite at the time hearing various unsubstantiated alle-
gations, did I grasp the extreme and extensive savagery of
the mujahedeen – who were imported, deployed and con-
H
trolled by the Army of BiH in its campaign to expel Croats.
The Bosniak intelligence service, the AID, sought to conceal
that connection. But their success in doing so raises oth-
er large questions - about the seriousness of the work of
the Tribunal Prosecutor’s investigative team 9; about the
involvement of other agencies – including the British - in
M
downplaying the mujahedeen atrocities; and about the
total failure of Croatia, then and since, to publicize the per-
secution of Croats.
I will conclude with a quote by Voltaire, also used by
Michael G. Karnavas on his website:
“To the living we owe respect, but to the dead we
D
owe only the truth.”50

Slobodan Praljak (Čapljina, BiH, 2. 1. 1945. – Haag, Nizozemska, Nika Pinter

29. 11. 2017.).

Slobodan Praljak (Čapljina, BiH, 2. 1. 1945 – Haag, Netherlands,

C
29. 11. 2017).

Michael G. Karnavas:
I dok kao odvjetnik MKSJ-a imam „pozitivnu obvezu zaštititi ugled
Suda“, bilo bi kukavički s moje strane i uvreda sjećanju na generala
Praljka da se pretvaram da je postupak bio pravičan, da nije bilo
pristranosti sudaca tijekom suđenja, te da u prvostupanjskoj i dru-
D
gostupanjskoj presudi nije bilo pogrešaka.

And while it is claimed that counsel at the ICTY have “a positive

obligation to protect the reputation of the Tribunal”, it would be
cowardly of me and an affront to General Praljak’s memory to pre-
tend the proceedings were fair, that there was no predisposition
shown by the Judges during the trial or that the Trial and Appeal
Judgments are not flawed.
R
50 http://michaelgkarnavas.net/blog/2017/12/05/pra-
ljaks-defiance/

565

Domovinski rat 04-02-2020 Knjiga 1.indd 565 4.2.2020. 18:37:13


IZVORI
REPUBLIKA BOSNA I HERCE'GOVJNA
SKUPSTINA OPCINE MOSTAR
Krizni stab opcine
Broj: 427/92
Datum: 29.04.1992. godine
H
Na temelju Naredbe
Republickog staba za civilnu zastitu,
kao i zakljucka Predsjednistva
Republike Bosne i Hercegovine
donesenih 04.04.1992.· godine i
10.4.1992. godine i Odluke a pro-
glasenju neposredne ratne opsanos-
ti na podrucju opc':ine Mostar broj
M
1/92 od 09.04.1992. godine, kao f Od-
luke a povlacenju jedinica JNA sa
teritorije Republike Bosne i Her-
cegovine, koju je donijelo Predsjed-
nistvo Republike BiH ad 27.04.1992.
:,dine, Krizni stab opcine Mostar,
i-1olazecj od cinjenice da .se opcina
Mostar nala:zi u stanju djelimicne
okupacije ad strane jedinica tako- ·
D
zvane Jugoslavenske narodne armije
i paravojnih formacija koje u
sadejstvu sa njom vrse orufana
~ejstva po civilnim objektima, istov-
remeno pljackajuci privredne sub-
jekte i porodicne kuce I odvodeci u
zarobljenistvo stanovnike •oile
opcine, kao i cinjenicu da tako:zvana
JNA i druge pa:raliojne formacije koje
dejstvuju skupa s njom ne priznaju
legitimne i legalne organe vlasti
Republike Bosne i Hercegovine niti
opcine Mostar donosi sljedecu.
ODLUKU
Takozvana Jugoslavenska
narodna armija i druge paravojne for-
macije koje djeluju skupa s njom
proglasavaju se kao neprijateljske i
· okupaiorske formacije na podrucju
,ppcine Mostar.
~-~
II
Zastita i odbrana grada Mos-
tara od formacija iz clan a 1. povjerava
se Hrvatskom vijecu obrane -
Opctinskom stoieru Mostar, te pripa-
dnicima Ministarstva unutra~njih pos-
lova - centar Mostar.
Ill
Hrvatsko vijece obrane· cine
pripadnici muslimanskog i hrvatskog
naroda, te pripadnika drugih naroda
i narodnosti koji priznaju legalne or-
Domovinski rat 04-02-2020 Knjiga 1.indd 566
Ante Nazor • II DIO
03270532
ODLUKA
gane vlasti Republike Bosne i Her- starstvom unutrasnjih poslova i
cegovine i kojima iskazu svoju lojal- drugim legalnim organima Republike
nosl. Bosne i Hercegovine kada to oko-
Muslimani mogu formirati lnosti nalazu.
sopstvene orufane formacije koje se Na zajednick im sjednicama
stavljaju pod jedinstvenu komandu Kriznqg staba Skupstine opcine Mos-
HVO Opcinski stoier Mostar. tar i Hrvatskog vijeca obrane, Opc':i-
nskog stoi.era Mostar rjesavati ce se
IV
problematika od zajednickog· inte-
Nacionalni sastav ko- resa.
mancinog kadra Hrvatskog vijece Sva dokumenta za kretanje
obrane ce odgovarati nacionalnom ljudi i roba i:zdaje Hrvatsko vijece
sastavu aktivnih "'.Ojnika. obrane - Opcinski stozer Mostar.
Kod formiranja ·novih obram-
benih snaga komandni kadar ce biti VIII
.::astup4e·n na paritetnom principu. Krizni stab opcine Mosrar se
Ova odredba v?,ii za snage koje se obavewje da u najkracem roku lo•
formiraju poslije 1. maja 1992. rmira privrerneni lzilrsni odbor koji ce
godine. . obezbjediti funkcionisanje organa
uprave Skupstine opcine Mostar._
V
IX
Zadatak Hrvatskog vijeca
obrane - Opciriskog stoi.era Mostar je Po prestanku ratnih dejstava
oslobaclanje cjelokupnog prostora odnosno oslobodenja opcine Mostar
opcine. Hrvatsko vijece obrane - i· stvaranja uvjeta za normalno
C
Opcinski stozer Mostar · c"e radi funkcionisanje legalnih organa vlasti
izvrsenja zadataka ii. predhodnog regulisat ce sya ostala pitanja i
stava koordinirati sa -ostalim obram- politil:kjl rjesenja u pogledu korh-
benim snagama susjednih opcina. petertcije, rjesenja koja budu
' Hrvatsko vijece obrane - donesena u legalnim organima
Opcinski stoier Mostar duzno je Republike Bosne i Hercegovine ~
izvrsiti ustrojstvo i organizaciju svojih
oiufanih snaga koje ·ce garantirati
D
graClanima mir, slobodu i sigumost.
Ovu funkciju obavlja vojna
policija.
VI
Rad i ostvarenja funkcije
pravosuCla iz domena Ratnog prava
Hrvatsko vijece obrane - Opcinski
R
stozer Mostar duino je osnovati i
ustrojiti, te organizirati rad vojnog
,
tuiilastva i vojnog suda za podrucje
opcine Mostar.
Nacionalni sastav u ovim in-
stitucijama c':e odgovarati nacional-
nom sastavu aktivnih vojnika.
VII
Radi .obrane opcine Mostar
Hrvatsko vijece obr.ane - Opcinski
stoier Mostar duzno je koordinirati sa
opcinskim kriznim stabom, Mini-
566
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 Ante Nazor • PART II

SOURCES
REPUBLIC OF BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA
Assembly of the Municipality of Mostar Municipal Crisis Headquarters
No: 427/92
Date: 29 Apr 92
DECISION
Pursuant to the Order of the Republic Headquarters of Civil Defense and the Resolution of the Presidency of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegov-
ina passed on 4 Apr 92 and 10 Apr 92 and the Decision on Proclaiming the Immediate Threat of War in the Territory of the Municipality of Mostar
No: 1/92 of 9 Apr 92, and the Decision on the Withdrawal of the JNA Units from the Territory of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina passed
by the Presidency of the Republic of BiH on 27 Apr 92, the Crisis Headquarters of the Municipality of Mostar, proceeding from the fact that the
Municipality of Mostar is under partial occupation by units of the so-called Yugoslav People’s Army and the paramilitary formations which are
cooperating with it in armed action against the civilian facilities and are, at the same time, looting commercial establishments and family homes
and taking prisoner the inhabitants of this Municipality, as well as the fact that the so-called JNA and other paramilitary formations cooperating
H
in action with it do not recognize the legitimate and legal authorities of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina or of the Municipality of Mostar,
passes the following

DECISION

I
The so-called Yugoslav People’s Army and other paramilitary formations which are cooperating with it in action are proclaimed to be the enemy
M
and occupation formations in the territory of the Municipality of Mostar.
II
The Croat Defense Council - Municipal Headquarters Mostar and members of the Ministry of Interior - Mostar Center shall be entrusted with the
protection and defense of the city of Mostar against the formations described in Article 1.

III
The Croat Defense Council shall consist of the members of Muslim and Croat peoples and the members of other peoples and minorities who rec-
ognize the legal authorities of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina and profess allegiance to them.
D
The Muslims may form their own armed formations which shall be placed under the unitary command of the HVO Municipal Headquarters Mostar.
IV
The ethnic structure of the command personnel of the Croat Defense Council shall match the ethnic structure of soldiers on active duty.
When forming new defense forces, the command personnel shall be represented on the parity principle. This provision shall apply to forces formed
after 1 May 92.
V
The task of the Croat Defense Council - Municipal Headquarters Mostar shall be the liberation of the entire territory of the municipality. In order to
C
carry out the foregoing task, the Croat Defense Council - Municipal Headquarters Mostar shall coordinate with other defense forces from neigh-
boring municipalities.
The Croat Defense Council - Municipal Headquarters Mostar shall form and organize its armed forces which shall guarantee peace, freedom and
security to the citizens.
The military police shall perform this function.
VI
In order to perform the judicial function in the domain of the Laws of War, the Croat Defense Council - Municipal Headquarters Mostar shall es-
D
tablish and form, and organize the work of the Military Prosecutor’s Office and the Military Court for the territory of the Municipality of Mostar.
The ethnic structure in these institutions shall reflect the ethnic structure of soldiers on active duty.
VII
When the circumstances so warrant, the Croat Defense Council - Municipal Headquarters Mostar shall coordinate with the Municipal Crisis Head-
quarters, the Ministry of Interior and other legal authorities of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina in order to defend the Municipality of
Mostar.
The questions of common interest shall be resolved at joint sessions of the Crisis Headquarters of the Assembly of the Municipality of Mostar and
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the Croat Defense Council, Municipal Headquarters Mostar.
All documents for movement of people and goods shall be issued by the Croat Defense Council - Municipal Headquarters Mostar.
VIII
The Crisis Headquarters of the Municipality of Mostar shall establish as soon as possible the temporary Executive Council which will ensure the
functioning of the government bodies of the Assembly of the Municipality of Mostar.
IX
All other questions and political decisions regarding the competency of the decisions passed by legal authorities of the Republic of Bosnia and
Herzegovina shall be regulated after cessation of hostilities i.e. liberation of the Municipality of Mostar and creation of conditions for normal func-
tioning of legal authorities.

MEMBERS OF THE CRISIS HEADQUARTERS (signature):

Milivoj Gagro, Ismet Hadziosmanovic, Zijad Demirovic, Borislav Puljic, Josip Skutor, Mehmed Bahmen, Ilija Filipovic, Fikret Bajric, Jole Musa

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 Ante Nazor • II DIO

Sporazum o prijateljstvu i suradnji između RBiH i RH, Zagreb, 21. srpnja 1992.

Predsjednik Predsjedništva Republike Bosne i Hercegovine Alija Izetbegović i predsjednik Republike Hrvatske
dr. Franjo Tuđman zaključili su, nakon razgovora delegacija Republike Bosne i Hercegovine i Republike Hrvatske
koji su održani 21. srpnja 1992. u Zagrebu, sljedeći

SPORAZUM O PRIJATELJSTVU I SURADNJI IZMEĐU

REPUBLIKE BOSNE I HERCEGOVINE I REPUBLIKE HRVATSKE

Predsjednik Predsjedništva Republike Bosne i Hercegovine i predsjednik Republike Hrvatske,

Polazeći od zajedničkih interesa njihovih zemalja u zaštiti njihove nezavisnosti i teritorijalne cjelovitosti;
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Ozbiljno zabrinuti zbog nastavka agresije ostataka Jugoslavenske narodne armije bivše SFRJ i srpskih i crnogorskih vojnih
regularnih i neregularnih snaga na njihova područja;
Prihvaćajući rezolucije Vijeća sigurnosti Ujedinjenih naroda br. 752 (1992.) od 15. srpnja 1992., br. 757 (1992.) od 30. svib-
nja 1992., br. 758 (1992.) od 8. lipnja 1992., br. 760 (1992.) od 18. lipnja 1992., br. 761 (1992.) od 29. lipnja 1992., br. 762
(1992.) od 30. lipnja 1992. i br. 764 (1992.) od 13. srpnja 1992.;
Prihvaćajući mišljenja koja je do današnjeg dana donijela Arbitražna komisija Konferencije o Jugoslaviji, napose ona o
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prestanku postojanja dosadašnje Socijalističke Federativne Republike Jugoslavije, o potrebi prestanka njezinog članstva
u međunarodnim organizacijama i o načelima na kojima treba riješiti pitanja sukcesije;
Svjesni potrebe da sporazumno riješe pitanja koja su od životne važnosti za njihovu međusobnu suradnju i zajedničko
suprotstavljanje agresiji;
Dogovorili su se o slijedećem:
1. Predsjednik Predsjedništva Republike Bosne i Hercegovine i predsjednik Republike Hrvatske suglasili su se da će
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buduće državno uređenje Bosne i Hercegovine polaziti od načela pune jednakopravnosti triju konstitutivnih naroda:
Muslimana, Hrvata i Srba. Ustavno-političko uređenje zemlje temeljit će se na konstitutivnim jedinicama, pri osniva-
nju kojih će se voditi računa o nacionalnim, povijesnim, kulturnim, gospodarskim, prometnim i drugim elementima.
2. Republika Bosna i Hercegovina i Republika Hrvatska će surađivati i međusobno se sporazumijevati, polazeći od pošti-
vanja svojih posebnih interesa i svjesni povezanosti interesa njihovih zemalja, o pitanjima gospodarske i financijske
suradnje, industrijske i energetske suradnje, korištenja vode i zaštite ljudske okoline, suradnje u obnovi života na
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njihovim područjima, rješavanja imovinskih pitanja fizičkih i pravnih osoba jedne države u drugoj državi, usklađenja
društvenih djelatnosti u njihovim državama, napose na polju rada i socijalne politike, zdravstva, obrazovanja, kulture
i fizičke kulture, znanstvene i tehničke suradnje, kulturno-prosvjetne suradnje, informiranja, i o pitanjima religije.
3. Državna delegacija Republike Bosne i Hercegovine izražava zahvalnost Republici Hrvatskoj na prihvatu i zbrinjavanju
izbjeglica iz Republike Bosne i Hercegovine iznad njenih mogućnosti.
Republika Bosna i Hercegovina i Republika Hrvatska, suočene s gorućim problemom masovnih progona posebno
D
muslimanskog i hrvatskog pučanstva Bosne i Hercegovine, surađivat će na zbrinjavanju izbjeglica u Republici Hr-
vatskoj i drugim zemljama, skupljanju humanitarne i financijske pomoći, izgradnji izbjegličkih centara u sigurnim
zonama u Bosni i Hercegovini, te na povratku izbjeglica iz Republike Hrvatske u Republiku Bosnu i Hercegovinu. U tu
svrhu potpisat će se poseban protokol o suradnji.
4. Republika Bosna i Hercegovina i Republika Hrvatska surađivat će također, polazeći od zajedničkih i posebnih intere-
sa, na području unutrašnjih poslova i pravosuđa.
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5. Predsjednik Predsjedništva Republike Bosne i Hercegovine i predsjednik Republike Hrvatske sporazumjeli su se da
će se, u nastavku dosadašnje suradnje, oni redovno sastajati najmanje dva puta godišnje, a njihove vlade i pojedina
ministarstva održavati periodične međusobne sastanke na kojima će razmatrati postignute rezultate i eventualna
neriješena pitanja i sva ta pitanja nastojati rješavati što je prije moguće, u mjeri u kojoj to ulazi u djelokrug njihova
odlučivanja, odnosno upućivati svoje prijedloge za rješenje takvih pitanja drugim nadležnim tijelima državne uprave.
6. Oružani dio Hrvatskog vijeća obrane sastavni je dio jedinstvenih oružanih snaga Republike Bosne i Hercegovine. Hr-
vatsko vijeće obrane će imati svoje predstavnike u zajedničkom zapovjedništvu oružanih snaga Bosne i Hercegovine.
Privremena civilna vlast, nastala u ratnim uvjetima u okviru Hrvatskog vijeća obrane, uskladit će se što prije s ustav-
nopravnim poretkom Republike Bosne i Hercegovine, o čemu će se odmah povesti razgovori u duhu načela iz točke
1. ovog Sporazuma.

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 Ante Nazor • PART II

The Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Republic of Croatia: Agreement on Friendship and
Cooperation, Zagreb, 21 July 1992

Agreement on Friendship and Cooperation between the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Republic of Croatia

The President of the Presidency of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the President of the Republic of Croatia,
Proceeding from the common interests of their countries in the protection of their independence and territorial integrity;
Seriously concerned about the continued aggression of the remnants of the Yugoslav People’s Army of the former SFRY
/Socialist Federative Republic of Yugoslavia/, and of the Serbian and Montenegrin regular and irregular military forces
against their territories;
Accepting United Nations Security Council resolutions no. 752 (1992) of 15 July /as written/ 1992, no. 757 (1992) of 30
H
May 1992, no. 758 (1992) of 8 June 1992, no. 760 (1992) of 18 June 1992, no. 761 (1992) of 29 June 1992, no. 762 (1992) of
30 June 1992 and no. 764 (1992) of 13 July 1992;
Accepting the views adopted to date by the Arbitration Commission of the Conference on Yugoslavia, particularly that
concerning the cessation of the existence of the Socialist Federative Republic of Yugoslavia, the need for termination of its
membership of international organisations, and the principles on the basis of which the succession issues should be resolved;
Aware of the need to solve by negotiation the issues which are of vital importance to their mutual cooperation and joint
M
resistance against aggression;
Have agreed on the following:
1. The President of the Presidency of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the President of the Republic of
Croatia have agreed that the future constitutional organisation of Bosnia and Herzegovina will proceed from the
principle of full equality of the three constituent nations: Muslims, Croats and Serbs. The constitutional and political
organisation of the country will be based on constituent units, in the establishment of which national, historical,
cultural, economic, transport and other elements will be taken into account.
D
2. The Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Republic of Croatia will cooperate and agree between themselves
on the basis of respect for each other’s special interests, and aware of the interrelatedness of the interests of their
countries, on issues of economic and financial cooperation, industrial and energy cooperation, water management
and environmental protection, cooperation in the restoration of life on their territories, the resolving of the property
issues of physical and legal entities of one state in the other, the harmonisation of social activities in their states,
particularly in the areas of labour and social welfare, health, education, science, culture and physical education,
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scientific and technical cooperation, cultural and educational cooperation, information and religious matters.
3. The state delegation of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina has expressed gratitude to the Republic of Croatia
for the reception of and care for the refugees from the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina above and beyond its
capacities. The Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Republic of Croatia, faced with the burning issue of mass
expulsions, particularly of the Muslim and Croat populations of Bosnia and Herzegovina, will cooperate in providing
care for the refugees in the Republic of Croatia and other countries, in collecting humanitarian and financial aid, in
D
constructing refugee centres in secure areas of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and in the return of refugees from the Republic
of Croatia to the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina. /illegible/ a separate protocol on cooperation will be signed.
4. The Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Republic of Croatia will also cooperate, proceeding from their
common and individual interests, in the areas of internal affairs and the judicial system.
5. The President of the Presidency of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the President of the Republic of
Croatia have agreed that, in continuance of their cooperation, they will meet regularly at least twice a year, while
R
their governments and individual ministries will hold periodic meetings at which they will discuss results achieved
and possible outstanding issues, and will endeavour to solve all these issues as soon as possible insofar as those
matters fall within their jurisdictions, that is, will forward their proposals for the resolution of those issues to the other
responsible state-administrative bodies.
6. The armed component of the Croatian Defence Council is a constituent part of the united armed forces of the Republic
of Bosnia and Herzegovina. The Croatian Defence Council will have its representatives in the joint command of the
armed forces of Bosnia and Herzegovina. The provisional civilian authority, established under wartime conditions
within the Croatian Defence Council, will adjust itself as soon as possible to the constitutional order of the Republic of
Bosnia and Herzegovina, concerning which talks will begin immediately in the spirit of the principles set out in point
1 of this Agreement.

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7. Republika Bosna i Hercegovina i Republika Hrvatska uzajamno će omogućiti svojim državljanima stjecanje dvojnog
državljanstva.
8. Predsjednik Predsjedništva Republike Bosne i Hercegovine i predsjednik Republike Hrvatske, polazeći od činjenice da
se nastavlja agresija srpskih i crnogorskih vojnih snaga na Republiku Bosnu i Hercegovinu, ali velikim dijelom i na Re-
publiku Hrvatsku, s graničnih područja Republike Bosne i Hercegovine, pozivaju međunarodnu zajednicu, posebno
Organizaciju Ujedinjenih naroda, Europsku zajednicu i Sjedinjene Američke Države, da poduzmu stvarne i djelotvor-
ne mjere za energično zaustavljanje agresije na njihove države, za sprečavanje daljnjih ljudskih žrtava, proganjanja i
iseljavanja njihovih građana i uništavanja materijalnih dobara.
U tom cilju obje će države nastaviti dosadašnju uspješnu suradnju i stalnu koordinaciju svojih obrambenih djelatno-
sti u graničnim zonama između njih.
Svjesni činjenice da, ako se hitno ne zaustavi agresija na njih, objema državama prijete daljnja razaranja i uništavanja
H
njihovog državnog bića i cjelovitosti, one će, u slučaju da napori međunarodne zajednice ostanu bezuspješni, raz-
motriti i poduzeti sve potrebne oblike šire suradnje na vojnom polju i usklađćenje vojnih operacija radi definitivnog
odbijanja opasnosti koja im prijeti.
9. Predsjednik Predsjedništva Republike Bosne i Hercegovine i predsjednik Republike Hrvatske složili su se da se odmah
potpiše sporazum o uspostavljanju diplomatskih odnosa između dviju država na razini ambasada.
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10. Vlade dviju država organizirat će, u najkraćem roku, prema potrebi, svoje sastanke i sastanke ministarstava svojih
država radi zaključenja sporazuma iz njihove nadležnosti prema ovom Sporazumu.

U Zagrebu, 21. srpnja 1992.

PREDSJEDNIK PREDSJEDNIK PREDSJEDNIŠTVA

REPUBLIKE HRVATSKE REPUBLIKE BOSNE I HERCEGOVINE
D
dr. Franjo Tuđman [v.r.] Alija Izetbegović [v.r.]

Dodatak sporazumu o prijateljstvu i suradnji između RBiH i RH, New York, 23. rujna 1992.

Predsjednik Predsjedništva Republike Bosne i Hercegovine Alija Izetbegović i Predsjednik Republike Hrvatske dr. Franjo
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Tuđman, polazeći od Sporazuma o prijateljstvu i suradnji između Republike Bosne i Hercegovine i Republike Hrvatske
od 21. srpnja, a nakon razgovora delegacija Republike Bosne i Hercegovine i Republike Hrvatske koji su održani 21. rujna
1992. godine u New Yorku tijekom 47. zasjedanja Generalne skupštine Ujedinjenih naroda,
Svjesni važnosti zajedničkih interesa njihovih zemalja u zaštiti njihove neovisnosti, suverenosti i teritorijalne cjelovitosti,
ozbiljno zabrinuti zbog nastavka agresije ostatka Jugoslavenske narodne armije bivše SFRJ i srpskih i crnogorskih vojnih
regularnih i neregularnih snaga na Republiku Bosnu i Hercegovinu, te vodeći računa da ostaci tzv. JNA bivše Jugoslavije
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još drže pod okupacijom teritorij Republike Hrvatske južno od Dubrovnika, da srpske snage napadaju teritorij Republike
Hrvatske s teritorija Republike Bosne i Hercegovine, te da dio srpskih iregularnih odreda u Hrvatskoj, prerušenih u lokalnu
miliciju, pruža otpor UNPROFOR-u u provedbi mirovnog plana Cyrusa Vancea;
Polazeći od temeljnih načela članka 51 Povelje Ujedinjenih Naroda koji jamči legitimno pravo suverenih država na samoobranu;
Pozdravljajući mirovnu akciju i humanitarne napore Ujedinjenih Naroda;
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Pozdravljajući Rezoluciju 777 Vijeća sigurnosti Ujedinjenih Naroda i Rezoluciju 47/1 Generalne skupštine Ujedinjenih Na-
roda o delegitimizaciji Socijalističke Federativne Republike Jugoslavije;
Spremni i dalje provoditi zaključke Londonske konferencije i odnosne rezolucije Vijeća Sigurnosti Ujedinjenih Naroda, te
aktivno promicati Ženevske mirovne procese:
suglasili su se da potpišu:
DODATAK SPORAZUMU
O PRIJATELJSTVU I SURADNJI IZMEĐU REPUBLIKE BOSNE I HERCEGOVINE I REPUBLIKE HRVATSKE

1. Dosadašnji diplomatski, politički i humanitarni napori međunarodne zajednice nisu zaustavili agresiju na Re-
publiku Bosnu i Hercegovinu i Republiku Hrvatsku, suverene članice Ujedinjenih Naroda, niti su bitno ublažili

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7. The Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Republic of Croatia will mutually enable their citizens to acquire
dual citizenship.
8. The President of the Presidency of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the President of the Republic of
Croatia, in view of the continued aggression of the Serbian and Montenegrin military forces against the Republic
of Bosnia and Herzegovina, but also to a large extent against the Republic of Croatia, from the border areas of the
Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, call upon the international community, particularly the Organisation of the
United Nations, the European Community and the United States of America, to take real and effective measures
energetically to halt the aggression against their states and prevent further loss of life, persecutions and expulsions
of their citizens, and destruction of property. To this end, both states will continue their successful cooperation and
the constant coordination of their defence activities in the border zones between them. Aware of the fact that, unless
the aggression against them is urgently halted, both states are threatened with further devastation and destruction
H
of their statehood and territorial integrity, they will, in the eventuality that the efforts of the international community
remain unsuccessful, consider and take all necessary forms of broader cooperation in the military sphere and in the
coordination of military operations in order definitively to repel the danger threatening them.
9. The President of the Presidency of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the President of the Republic of
Croatia have agreed that an agreement on the establishment of diplomatic relations between the two states will be
M
signed immediately at embassy level.
10. The governments of the two states will organise, as speedily as possible, and as and when necessary, their meetings
and meetings of the ministries of their states for the purposes of concluding agreements under their jurisdictions as
provided for in this Agreement.

Zagreb, 21 July 1992

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PRESIDENT OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE PRESIDENCY
REPUBLIC OF CROATIA OF THE REPUBLIC OF BOSNIA AND HERCEGOVINA
Dr. Franjo Tuđman Alija Izetbegović

Annex to the agreement on friendship and cooperation between the Republic of

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Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Republic of Croatia, 23 September 1992

The President of the Presidency of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina Alija IZETBEGOVIĆ, and the President of the
Republic of Croatia, Dr Franjo TUĐMAN,
proceeding from the Agreement on Friendship and Cooperation between the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina and
the Republic of Croatia of 21 July, and following talks between the delegations of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina
D
and the Republic of Croatia which were held on 21 September 1992 in New York during the 47th session of the General
Assembly of the United Nations,
Mindful of the importance of the mutual interests of their countries in the protection of their independence, sovereignty,
and territorial integrity, seriously concerned about the continuation of aggression by the remainder of the Yugoslav
People’s Army of the former SFRJ /Socialist Federative Republic of Yugoslavia/ and Serbian and Montenegrin military
regular and irregular forces in the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and considering that the remainder of the so-
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called JNA /Yugoslav People’s Army/ of the former Yugoslavia is still occupying territory of the Republic of Croatia to the
south of Dubrovnik, that Serbian forces are attacking territory of the Republic of Croatia from the territory of the Republic
of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and that a part of the Serbian irregular detachments in Croatia, disguised as local police, are
offering resistance to UNPROFOR which is implementing the peace plan of Cyrus VANCE;
Proceeding from the basic principles of Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations which guarantees the legitimate
right to self defence of sovereign states;
Welcoming the peace operation and humanitarian efforts of the United Nations;
Welcoming Resolution 777 of the Security Council of the United Nations and Resolution 47/1 of the General Assembly of
the United Nations on the cessation of membership of the Socialist Federative Republic of Yugoslavia.
Prepared to continue to implement the conclusions of the London Conference and the relevant Resolutions of the

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stradanja civilnog pučanstva. Stoga Republika Bosna i Hercegovina i Republika Hrvatska zahtijevaju energičnu
akciju međunarodne zajednice u zaštiti od strane agresije, u skladu sa odredbama Sedmog poglavlja Povelje
Ujedinjenih Naroda.
2. Iznova se ističe potreba jačanja napora na iznalaženju političkog rješenja za prestanak rata i provedbu načela o
ustrojstvu Republike Bosne i Hercegovine kao ravnopravne i cjelovite zajednice triju konstitutivnih naroda.
3. U skladu s pravom na samoobranu i zajedničku obranu od agresije, osnovat će se zajednički Odbor radi usklađi-
vanja obrambenih napora, sve dok agresija u potpunosti ne prestane.
4. Republike Bosna i Hercegovina i Republika Hrvatska zajednički će zatražiti ukidanje embarga na izvoz oružja u
Republiku Bosnu i Hercegovinu i Republiku Hrvatsku, propisan Rezolucijom 713 Vijeća Sigurnosti Ujedinjenih
Naroda.
5. Ustrajno će se i dosljedno, u skladu sa običajnim i kodificiranim međunarodnim pravom, promicati politika zaštite
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ljudskih prava, progoniti i kažnjavati ratni zločinci, poglavito počinitelji zločina genocida.

U New Yorku, 23. rujna 1992.

PREDSJEDNIK PREDSJEDNIK PREDSJEDNIŠTVA

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REPUBLIKE HRVATSKE REPUBLIKE BOSNE I HERCEGOVINE
dr. Franjo Tuđman [v.r.] Alija Izetbegović [v.r.]

Sporazum između ARBiH i HVO, Zenica, 20. travnja 1993.

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ŠVK ŠTAB VRHOVNE KOMANDE OS R BIH
Broj 02/1954-321
26. 02. 1994. godine
(prijemni štambilj)
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U Zenici, 20. 04. 1993.

SPORAZUM

Tokom zajedničkog sastanka, održanog u Zenici, kome su zajednički predsjedavali general Morillon, komandant UN
snaga u BiH i gospodin Thebault, na čelu Posmatračke misije Evropske zajednice, predstavnici na najvišem nivou su
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se saglasili:
1) BiH Armija i HVO su legalne vojne snage Republike Bosne i Hercegovine sa istim tretmanom.
2) Svi komandanti na svim nivoima moraju poštovati i odmah uspostaviti potpuni prekid vatre na cijelom teritoriju Re-
publike. Bez obzira na razloge, nije prihvatljivo nepoštivanje prekida vatre. Oba načelnika su odmah izdala naredbe
za potpuno poštivanje navedenog.
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3) Formiran je zajednički Operativni centar Vitez, na nivou Trećeg korpusa Armije BiH i HVO Operativne zone Srednja
Bosna kao početak uspostavljanja zajedničke komande koja će biti konačno formirana narednih dana. Na samom
početku, zajednički operativni centar će voditi oba zamjenika komandanata, a članovi će biti predstavnici brigada
obje strane. Centar će privremeno biti lociran u sadašnjem sjedištu zajedničke komisije Busovača, u Vitezu, čime
će se obezbjediti tijesna saradnja. UNPROFOR će obezbijediti svaku neophodnu pomoć, posebno u mjerama bez-
bjednosti.
Istovremeno će na nivou komandanata brigada biti formirane lokalne zajedničke komisije kako bi se obezbijedila
potpuna i neposredna saradnja.
Zajednički operativni centar će biti formiran u srijedu, 21. 04. 1993. i odmah će početi sa radom na cijelom području.
centar je ovlašten da izdaje zajedničke naredbe koje se odmah moraju primijeniti na terenu.

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Security Council of the United Nations, and to actively promote the Geneva peace processes:
have agreed to sign this:
ANNEX TO THE AGREEMENT
ON FRIENDSHIP AND COOPERATION BETWEEN THE REPUBLIC OF BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA
AND THE REPUBLIC OF CROATIA

1. The diplomatic, political and humanitarian efforts of the international community have so far failed to stop the
aggression against the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Republic of Croatia, sovereign members of the
UN. Neither did they alleviate the sufferings of the civilian population to any great extent. Hence the Republic of
Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Republic of Croatia demand of the international community to take vigorous action
to protect it from the aggression, in keeping with the provisions of Chapter VII of the UN Charter.
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2. Once more we underline the need to increase efforts in order find a political solution to end the war and to further
the principle of Bosnia and Herzegovina as an equal and integral community of three constituent peoples.
3. In keeping with the right to self-defence and to joint defence from aggression, a joint Committee will be set up in
order to harmonize defence efforts, until the aggression stops completely.
4. The Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Republic of Croatia will jointly seek the lifting of the embargo on the
import of arms into the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Republic of Croatia, prescribed by Resolution
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713 of the Security Council of the United Nations.
5. We will consistently and faithfully promote the policy of protection for human rights, seek out and punish war
criminals, in particular the perpetrators of genocide, in keeping with customary and codified international law.

In New York, 23 September 1992

PRESIDENT OF THE CHAIRMAN OF THE PRESIDENCY

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REPUBLIC OF CROATIA OF THE REPUBLIC OF BOSNIA AND HERCEGOVINA
Dr. Franjo Tuđman Alija Izetbegović

Agreement between BiH Army and HVO, Zenica, 20 April 1993

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/hand-written/
ŠVK /Supreme Command Staff/
Supreme Command Staff of RBiH Armed Forces
No: 02/1594-321
26. 02. 1994.
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/stamp/

Zenica 20. 04. 1993.

AGREEMENT
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During a joint meeting held in Zenica, chaired by General MORILLON, Commander of UN forces in BiH, and Mr THEBAULT,
Head of European Monitoring Mission, representatives from the highest instances agreed on the following:
1) BiH Army and Croatian Defence Council /HVO/ are legal military forces of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina,
and are treated equally.
2) Commanders from all instances must respect and immediately enforce absolute cease-fire on the entire territory of
the Republic. Cease-fire violations are unacceptable, regardless of the reasons. Both Commanders have immediately
issued orders to fully respect the aforementioned.
3) A Joint Operative Communication Centre was established in Vitez at the level of the 3rd Corps of BiH Army and HVO
Central Bosnia Operative Zone, as a starting point for the forming of a Joint Command, which will be finally established
in the oncoming days. At the beginning, the Joint Operative Centre will be run by both Deputy Commanders, while

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4) Načelnici će se sastajati svake sedmice kako bi se osigurala tijesna i stalna saradnja po svim pitanjima. Ovi sastanci će
se organizovati naizmjenično u Mostaru i Zenici. sljedeći sastanak će biti održan u Mostaru.
5) Svakodnevno će se sačinjavati informacije o urađenom na svim nivoima.
Svaki dan će se napraviti jedan zajednički izvještaj na nivou komandanta korpusa i zapovjednika operativne zone
kako bi se o navedenom odmah informisala oba načelnika.

Načalnik štaba VK OS R BiH Načelnik GS HVO

Sefer Halilović Milivoj Petković

Komandant snaga UN za BiH Šef Reg. centra ECMM

general Philippe Morillon Jean-Pierre Thebault
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Zajednička izjava Alije Izetbegovića i Mate Bobana, Zagreb, 25. travnja 1993.
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Gospodin ALIJA IZETBEGOVIĆ i gospodin MATE BOBAN, na sastanku koji su u Zagrebu sazvali 24. travnja 1993. godine
supredsjedatelj Međunarodne konferencije o bivšoj Jugoslaviji Lord David Owen i Predsjednik Republike Hrvatske dr.
Franjo Tuđman, u nazočnosti veleposlanika Petera Halla, veleposlanika Herberta Okuna, veleposlanika Petera Ahrensa,
brigadira Johna Wilsona, brigadira Messevya-Whitinga, g. Fredericka Eckharda, g. d. Ludlowa, g. Bradea, dr. Jure Radića,
g. Vladimira Šeksa, g. Gojka Šuška, dr.·Zdenka Škrabala, generala zbora Janka Bobetka, veleposlanika Zdravka Sančevića,
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dr. Željka Matića, g. Ivana Jarnjaka, dr. Branimira Jakšića, brigadira Mile Ćuka, g. Ejupa Ganića, generala Sefera Halilovića,
veleposlanice Bisere Turković, veleposlanika Muhameda Šaćirbegovića, g. Kasima Trnke i general-bojnika Milivoja Petko-
vića, donijeli su nakon sastanka slijedeću
Zajedničku izjavu
1. U skladu sa Sporazumom između gospodina Alije Izetbegovića, g. Harisa Silajdžića, g. Mate Bobana i g. Mile Akmadži-
ća, zaključenim u New Yorku dana 03. ožujka 1993. g., započet će radom u najkraćem vremenu koordinacijsko tijelo
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od šestorice članova i to gospoda: Alija Izetbegović, Ejup Ganić i Fikret Abdić, te Mate Boban, Mile Akmadžić i Franjo
Boras.
Koordinacijsko tijelo ce raditi na provedbi Plana Vance-Owen koliko god je to moguće s obzirom na karakter odreda-
ba i sadašnje okolnosti.
2. U svezi s obnavljanjem sukoba dviju vojski (Armije BiH i HVO) u središnjoj Bosni i u nekim drugim dijelovima
Republike Bosne i Hercegovine koji su doveli do velikog broja ljudskih žrtava i do ozbiljnih kršenja međunarodnog
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humanitarnog prava, što sve prijeti dalekosežnim političkim posljedicama, potpisnici ove Zajedničke izjave naređuju
svim vojnim postrojbama Armije BIH i HVO da odmah prekinu vatru i sva neprijateljstva na svim mjestima gdje se te
vojne postrojbe nalaze u međusobnom dodiru.
3. Supotpisnici ove Zajedničke izjave pozivaju sve zapovjednike i postrojbe Armije BiH i HVO na bezuvjetno poštiva-
nje svih do sada postignutih sporazuma između predstavnika hrvatskog i muslimanskog naroda u Republici Bosni
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i Hercegovini. Napose pozivaju vojne postrojbe Armije BiH i HVO da bez odlaganja započnu izvršavanje odredaba
Sporazuma o tome da su Armija BiH i HVO jednake legalne postrojbe i o ustanovljenju zajedničkog zapovjedništva
tih snaga sastavljenog od predstavnika oba stožera (Dodatak 1).
4. Potpisnici Zajedničke izjave ponovno potvrđuju da su sukobi snaga HVO i Armije BiH u Republici Bosni i Hercegovini
suprotni politici koju vode predstavnici ta dva naroda i da bi daljnje nastavljanje sukoba stavilo u ozbiljnu opasnost
ostvarenje njihovih političkih ciljeva: neovisnost, samostalnost i teritorijalni integritet Republike Bosne i Hercegovine
u okviru Vance-Owen plana što su supotpisnici prihvatili i potpisali, kao i uspjeh u borbi protiv agresora koji želi raz-
bijanje ta države, okupaciju njezinog teritorija i priključenje okupiranih teritorija „Velikoj Srbiji“.
5. Potpisnici Zajedničke izjave najoštrije osuđuju svako kršenje pravila međunarodnog humanitarnog prava, bez ob-
zira na to tko ih je učinio, a prema dosadašnjim podacima obje strane snose odgovornost, i obvezuju sa da će hitno

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representatives of Brigades from both sides will be the members. The Centre will be temporarily located in the present
seat of the Busovača Joint Commission in Vitez, which will ensure close collaboration.
UNPROFOR will provide all necessary help, especially in terms of security measures.
Meanwhile local Joint Commissions will be established on the level of Brigade Commanders in order to ensure full
and direct cooperation.
The Joint Operative Centre will be established on Wednesday, 21. 04. 1993, and will immediately start with its work in
the entire area. The Centre is authorized for issuing joint orders, which must be immediately implemented in the field.
4) Chiefs will attend weekly meetings in order to ensure close and permanent cooperation regarding all issues. These
meetings will be held alternately in Mostar and Zenica. Next meeting will take place in Mostar.
5) Reports on accomplished tasks at all levels will be made daily.
One joint report will be issued daily at the level of the Corps Commander and Operative Zone Commander in order
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to inform both Chiefs immediately.

Chief of Supreme Command Staff of R BiH Armed Forces Chief of HVO Main Staff
Sefer HALILOVIĆ Milivoj Petković

Commander of UN Forces for BiH Head of European Monitoring Mission Regional Centre
M
General Philippe MORRILON Jean-Pierre THEBAULT

/hand written marginalia/

AMB. TAFO
THEBAULT
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Joint Statement by Alija Izetbegović and Mate Boban, Zagreb, 25 April 1993

Mr. ALIJA IZETBEGOVIĆ and Mr. MATE BOBAN, at the meeting convoked in Zagreb on April 24, 1993, by the Co-chairman
of the International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia Lord David Owen and the President of the Republic of
Croatia Dr. Franjo Tuđman, in the presence of Ambassador Peter Hall, Ambasador Herbert Okun, Ambassador Peter
Ahrens, Brigadir John Wilson, Brigadir Messervy-Whithing, Mr. Frederic Eckhard, Mr. Ludlow, Mr. Brade, Dr. Jure Radić,
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Mr. Vladimir Šeks, Mr. Gojko Šušak. Dr. Zdenko Škrabalo, General Janko Bobetko, Ambassador Zdravko Sančević, Dr.
Željko Matić, Mr. Ivan Jarnjak, Dr. Branimir Jakšić, Brigadir Mile Ćuk, Mr. Ejup Ganić, General Sefer Halilović, Ambassador
Biserka Turković, Ambassador Muhamed Šaćirbegović, Mr. Kasim Trnsko and Major-General Milivoj Petković, have
issued after the meeting the following
Joint Statement
1. In accordance with the Agreement between Mr. Alija Izetbegović, Mr. Haris Silajdžić, Mr. Mate Boban and Mr.
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Mile Akmadžić, concluded on March 3, 1993 in New York, the six members of the coordination body i.e. Mr. Alija
Izetbegović, Mr. Ejup Ganić and Mr. Fikret Abdić, and Mr. Mate Boban, Mr. Mile Akmadžić and Mr. Franjo Boras, will
start working within the shortest possible time.
The coordination body will work on the implementation of the Vance-Owen Plant to the extent possible,
considering the character of the provision and present circumstances.
2. In connection with the renewal of the conflicts between the two armies (the Army of Bosnia and Herzegovina and
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the Croatian Defence Council) in central Bosnia and some parts of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, which
have caused many casualties and serious violations of the international humanitarian law, thus posing the threat
of far-reaching political consequences, the signatories of this Joint Statement hereby order all military units of
the Army of Bosnia and Herzegovina and of the Croatian Defence Council (HVO) to immediately cease fire and all
hostilities in all areas where such military units are in contact.
3. The signatories of this Join Statement urge all commanders and units of the Army of Bosnia and Herzegovina and
of the Croatian Defence Council (HVO) to unconditionally respect all the thus far concluded agreements between
the representatives of the Croatian and Muslim peoples in the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina. In particular,
they urge military units of the Army of Bosnia and Herzegovina and of the Croatian Defence Council to immediately
start implementing the Agreement on the legality of both the Army of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the HVO, and on

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provesti zajedničke i pojedinačne istrage o svakom pojedinom slučaju kršenja, te bez odgađanja pokrenuti pitanje
odgovornosti osoba za sukobe i počinitelje zločina prema civilnom pučanstvu.
Potpisnici su također suglasni da utvrđenje činjenica izvrši posebna nezavisna međunarodna komisija.
6. Potpisnici sa svoje strane pozivaju da se obustavi međusobno optuživanja koje vodi do medijskog rata.

Mate Boban [v.r.] Alija Izetbegović [v.r.]

Uz svjedočenje:
dr. Franjo Tuđman [v.r.]

Zagreb, 25. travnja 1993. u 00:45 sati

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DODATAK 1
USTROJSTVO ZAPOVJEDNIŠTVA ARMIJE BIH I HVO
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1. Armija BiH i HVO će zadržati svoje zasebne identitete i ustrojstvo zapovjedništva. Njihova djelovanja će uključivati sve
vidove osoblja, logistike, vodstva. obuke, morala i identiteta.
2. Oni će formirati Zajedničku komandu koja će biti odgovorna za kontrolu operacija vojnih oblasti.
3. Zajednička komanda će se sastojati od dva vrhovna zapovjednika, generala Halilovića i generala Petkovića, koji će se
redovito sastajati najmanje jedanput tjedno. Oni će osnovati stalni zajednički glavni stožer koji će biti smješten u Travniku
i sastojat će se najmanje tri visoka časnika imenovana od svakog vrhovnog zapovjednika. Ovi časnici će raditi zajedno na
trajnoj osnovi na planiranju i kontroliranju operacija svih postrojbi Armije BiH i HVO.
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4. Dva vrhovna zapovjednika će formirati vojne okruge pod zajedničkim stožerom čija će područja djelovanja biti poveza-
na sa zahtjevima zajedničkih operacija a ne s privremenim provincijskim granicama. Njihova područja se neće preklapati.
Svaki vojni okrug će imati zapovjednika i zamjenika kojeg će postaviti zajednička komanda. U svakom slučaju jedan će
biti izabran iz Armije BiH a drugi iz HVO.
5. Svaki vojni okrug imat će operacijsku kontrolu nad svim postrojbama Armije BiH i HVO u svojim područjima.
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Alija Izetbegović [v.r.] Mate Boban [v.r.]

General Sefer Halilović [v.r.] General-bojnik Milivoj Petković [v.r.]

Zagreb, 25. travnja 1993. u 00:45 sati

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Pismo Sefera Halilovića Aliji Izetbegoviću o operaciji „Neretva 93“, Sarajevo 1. svibnja 1995.

Gospodine Predsjedniče,
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U trinaestoj svesci „Vojne biblioteke“ koja sadrži AUTORIZOVANE intervjue, govore i izlaganja R. Delića od marta 1994.
godine, do marta 1995., godine, objavljen je i intervju koji je dat zagrebačkom Globusu pod nazivom „Zajedno smo jači“.
Razgovor je vođen 06. marta 1994. godine u Sarajevu, a vodio ga je novinar Željko Garmaz. Nažalost, meni je tek postao
sada dostupan kad je objavljen autorizovan u navedenoj svesci „Vojne biblioteke“. Da mi je bio dostupan kad je objavljen,
do sada bi mnoge stvari vjerovatno uspješnije razjasnili. No, u Allaha nikad nije kasno - kaže naš narod, pa pođimo redom.
Na pitanje novinara: Jeste li našli krivce za zločine nad Hrvatima u Uzdolu, Doljanima, Trusini ..., R. Delić odgovara:
„Kada je riječ o onome što se zamjera ARBiH, poput ubojstva fratara u Fojnici, mogu samo reći da su krivci uhvaćeni i
očekuju suđenje. Što se tiče Uzdola krivci nisu još definisani. Nažalost, Uzdol je proizvod nekih tadašnjih odnosa unutar
Armije RBiH. Na tim prostorima su bile neke jedinice koje smo poslije rasformirali ili smo se s njima morali poslije sukobiti.
Znamo samo da su za te slučajeve krivci iz jedinica sa teritorije Sarajeva, koje u to vrijeme jednostavno nisu bile u sistemu

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the establishment of a joint command of both forces made up of representatives of both headquarters (Annex 1).
4. The signatories of the Joint Statement reaffirm that the conflicts between units of the HVO and of the Army of Bosnia
and Herzegovina in the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina are contrary to the policy of the representatives of the
two peoples, and that the continuation of such conflicts would seriously jeopardize the achievement of their political
goals, i.e. the independence and territorial integrity of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina within the framework
of the Vance-Owen Plan accepted and signed by the signatories of this Statement, and success in the fight against the
aggressor who wants to break the state apart, occupy its territory and annex the occupied territories to “Greater Serbia”.
5. The signatories of the Joint Statement condemn most severely all violations of the rules of international humanitarian
law regardless of their perpetrators, both sides having been responsible according to data available so far, and
undertake to urgently initiate joint and individual inquest concerning each instance of violation of such rights and
immediately examine personal responsibility for the conflicts and crimes perpetrated against the civilian population.
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The signatories also agree that the fact be established by a special independent international commission.
6. The signatories urge the cessation of mutual accusations leading to a media war.

(The Croatian version shall apply)

Mate Boban Alija Izetbegović

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/signature/ /signature/
Witnessed by:
Dr. Franjo Tuđman
/signature/

April 25, 1993, 00.45 h

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Annex 1
COMMAND STRUCTURES FOR THE BiH ARMY AND THE HVO

1. The BiH Army and the HVO will retain their separate identities and command structures. Their function will include all
aspects of personnel, logistics, administration, training, morale and identity.
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2. They will form a Joint Command which will be responsible for the operational control of military districts.
3. The Joint Command will consist of the two Commanders in Chief, General Halilović and General Petković, who will
meet on a regular basis, at least weekly. They will form a permanent joint headquarters to be located at Travnik and
consisting of at least 3 high caliber officers nominated by each Commander in Chief. These officers will work together on
a continuous basis to plan and control the operations of all BiH Army and HVO units.
4. The two Commanders in Chief will form military districts, under the joint headquarters, whose areas will be related
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to the operational requirement for joint operations and not to provisional provincial boundaries. Their areas will not
overlap. Each military district will exercise operational control over all BiH Army and HVO unit in its area.

Halilović’s letter to the President Alija Izetbegović about Operation „Neretva 93“, Sarajevo 1 May 1995
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SEFER HALILOVIĆ, Sarajevo, Ašikovac 6

To the President, Mr. Alija Izetbegović and members of the Presidency

The response to the interview by R. Delić We Are Stronger Together”, given to the Zagreb magazine Globus and published
in the 13th volume of the “Military Library” entitled “Bosnia is Here”, in March 1995 by the Press Centre of the Army of the
RBH in Sarajevo.
Mr. President,
An interview from the Zagreb magazine Globus was published in the 13th volume of the “Military Library” which
includes AUTHORISED interviews, speeches and addresses by R. DELIĆ from March 1994 until March 1995. The interview

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rukovođenja i komandovanja. To su one jedinice s kojima smo se mi na kraju krajeva morali sukobiti ovdje u Sarajevu i
vojnički razriještiti problem. Njih poslije 15. marta očekuje suđenje za kriminal, nevojničko ponašanje, brojna ubojstva i
vjerovatno se među njima nalaze i krivci za Uzdol. Nažalost, znate da je te jedinice vodio moj načelnik štaba, Sefer Hali-
lović, koji je također smijenjen sa dužnosti, tako da, tim više tada nisam mogao odmah reagirati i odmah izvršiti istragu.“
Pošto je ovdje na vrlo grub način povrijeđena istina dužan sam vas upoznati sa pravim stanjem stvari, a zaključke ću
naravno prepustiti Vama.
1.) Na savjetovanju u Zenici održanom 21. i 22. 08. 1993. godine, na kome su bili prisutni: Komandant Glavnog štaba,
načelnik Gš, načelnici svih uprava, komandanti svih korpusa (osim 5. K) i ministar UP (unutarnjih poslova, op. a.) Bakir
Alispahić, Komandant Glavnog štaba je nakon dvodnevne diskusije izdao, pored ostalih, i slijedeće zadatke:
- Prozor (Makljen, Vilića Guvno) rješava 3. K (korpus) u sadejstvu sa 6. K;
- zauzimanje s. Vrdi radi deblokade D. i G. Drežnice i deblokade puta Jablanica - Mostar, planira 6. Korpus, izvodi
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Izviđačko-diverzantska brigada „Zulfikar“ i Drežnički bataljon, sadejstvuje 45. b.br. i jedinice 4. K koje se nalaze na
prostoru Bijelog polja.
Na kraju svih zadataka izričito naređuje: Sve ove zadatke završiti za 10 dana. O svemu ovome postoji uredna doku-
mentacija u OC rukovođenja i komandovanja, a cio tok savjetovanja je sniman video kamerom i audio sredstvima i
znam pouzdano da taj materijal ima u OC 3. K i kod snimatelja po imenu Mirza.
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Po povratku u Sarajevo i analize u OC rukovođenja i komandovanja ŠVK dolazi sa procjenom do zaključka da ope-
rativno-taktički raspored snaga HVO, snaga kojima mi raspolažemo uz minimalno ojačanje sa jedinicama iz Sarajeva
sve zajedno jačine do jednog bataljona, manevarsko zemljište i kanalisani pravci dejstva omogućuju planiranje jedne
obimnije operacije koja bi obuhvatala prostor od Bugojna do Mostara s veoma izvjesnim rezultatima. R. Delić prihva-
ta taj prijedlog i svojim naređenjem broj: 02/1047-1 od 30. 08. 1993. godine, određuje tim sastava:
- Vođa tima: načelnik GŠ OS Sefer Halilović, a za članove tima Suljević Zićro, Bilajac Rifat, Karić Vehbija, Najetović Dže-
mal, Hasanspahić Edin i Džanković Namik.
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Navedeni tim izrađuje potrebnu dokumentaciju za operaciju pod nazivom „NERETVA – 93“, R. Delić svojim potpisom
i pečatom odobrava i odmah izlazimo na teren radi realizacije iste. Prethodno su uređena sva potrebna dokumenta:
Plan operacije, Direktiva za izvođenje operacije, upućena priprema naređenja K-tima 3., 4. i 6. Korpusa, naređeno K-di
1. K da uputi jedinice iz Sarajeva, a prethodno je sa K-tom 1. K dogovoreno na njegov prijedlog da će to biti po jedna
ojačana četa iz 9. br., 10. b.br. i Samostalnog bataljona. Dio tima /Bilajac, Suljević i Karić/ izlazi 01. 09. 1993. godine
da zajedno sa Džanković Namikom i Hasanspahićem izvrši pripreme za smještaj jedinica u rajon Jablanice s obzirom
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da je planom izvođenja operacije bilo predviđeno njihovo angažovanje na pravcu: s. Vrdi – Lištica, a ja izlazim 02. 09.
1993. godine i odlazim u Jablanicu gdje se i organizuje istaknuto komandno mjesto ŠVK, i gdje sa kompletnim timom
radim na daljnjoj pripremi za izvođenje plana i odobrenje operacije „NERETVA – 93“. Vrše se izviđanja, izrađuju se pla-
novi boja za svaki pravac, prikuplja se MTS (materijalno-tehnička sredstva, op. a.) i municija i drugi poslovi predviđeni
planom operacije.
2.) 04. 09. 1993. godine R. Delić u pratnji Sulejmana Vranja i Alije Lončarića u prijepodnevnim časovima dolazi u Jablani-
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cu. U Donjoj Jablanici u komandi Izviđačko-diverzantske brigade „Zulfikar“ u prisutnosti svih članova tima, K-ta 6. K,
K-ta 45. b.br. i K-ta ID brigade „Zulfikar“ upoznajem R. Delića sa svim detaljima operacije, pravcima napada, sastavu
i jačini snaga HVO na njima, našim mogućnostima i tražim da mi se za izvođenje operacije stavi na raspolaganje:
Helikopter koji treba da bazira na heliodromu u D. Jablanici, tražim da mi K-t 3. K pošalje 4 minobacača 120 mm, a
K-t 2. i 3. K iz Sarajeva uputi nekoliko hiljada ručnih bombi i tromblona i da se još dva artiljerijska oruđa sa Igmana
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prebace u Jablanicu. Pored ovog tražim da se sva ubojna sredstva iz tvornice „Igman“ iz Konjica stave na raspolaganje
(municija 7.62, 7. 9, 12.7 mm, ručne bombe, trombloni i nešto malo mina za minobacače 60, 82 i 120 mm iz Čelebića).
Popodne odlazimo zajedno u Buturović polje radi sagledavanja stanja, priprema za predstojeću operaciju u 45. b.br. i
nakon toga ponovo zajedno odlazimo u Konjic u K-du 6. K gdje se upoznajemo sa stepenom pripreme K-de i jedinica
6. K za izvođenje predstojeće operacije. Nakon toga zajedno odlazimo na spavanje u vojnu bazu u Konjicu i 05. 09.
se rastajemo. R. Delić sa svojom ekipom odlazi za Zenicu, a ja ostajem u Hercegovini radi daljeg rada na pripremi za
izvođenje operacije „Neretva – 93“.
Tokom boravka 04. 05. cio dan i gotovo cijelu noć 4/5. 09., a 05. 09. cijelo vrijeme smo razgovarali o predstojećoj ope-
raciji i tad je R. Delić ponovo upoznat i na terenu o detaljima operacije, a i o tome koja jedinica ima zadatak na kom
pravcu. Ovdje samo ukratko:

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was entitled “We Are Stronger Together”. It was given to the journalist Željko GARMAZ on 6 March 1994 in Sarajevo.
Unfortunately, I have only now gained access to it as it was officially made available in the aforementioned volume of the
“Military Library”. If I had had access to it when it was first published, many matters would have been cleared up much
sooner. However, it is never too late for Allah, as we say, so let us proceed from the beginning. To the journalist’s question:
“Have you found the perpetrators of crimes against Croats in the villages of Uzdol, Doljani, Trusina…” R. DELIĆ said:
“As far as the criticisms of the Army of the Republic of BH are concerned, like the murder of a friar in Fojnica, I could only say
that the perpetrators have been caught and are awaiting trial. As far as Uzdol is concerned, the perpetrators have not yet been
identified. Unfortunately, Uzdol was caused by certain problems which then existed in the BH Army. There were some units
there that we later disbanded or we had to fight. We only know that perpetrators belonging to units from Sarajevo are to blame
for this. At the time, those units were simply not part of the command and control system. We had to fight them in the end,
here in Sarajevo, and take care of the problem in a military manner. They will be tried after 15 March for crimes, dishonorable
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military conduct and multiple murders. The perpetrators from Uzdol are probably among them.
Unfortunately you know that the units were led by my Chief-of-Staff, Sefer HALILOVIĆ who was also removed from his post so
that I could not react immediately and conduct an investigation.”
Because the truth suffered here in the most heinous manner, I have a duty to tell you about what really happened and I
will naturally allow you to draw your own conclusions.
1. At consultations held in Zenica on 21 and 22 August 1993 attended by the Commander of the Main Staff, Chief of
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Staff, the Chiefs of all Departments, the Commanders of all Corps (except the 5th Corps) and the Minister of the
Interior, Bakir ALISPAHIĆ, after two days of discussion, the Commander of the Main Staff assigned, among others, the
following tasks:
- Prozor (Makljen,Vilića Guvno), will be covered by the 3rd Corps reinforced by the 6th Corps;
- Capture of Vrdi village in order to lift the blockade of D. and G. Drežnica as well as of the road between Jablanica
and Mostar, to be planned by the GK /supreme Command/, to be carried out by the reconnaissance and sabotage
brigade, Zulifikar and Drežnica Battalion, reinforced by the 45th Mountain Brigade and the units of the 4th Corps
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deployed in the Bijelo Polje area.
At the end of the list he explicitly ordered: “All the tasks should be carried out within 10 days. There is a complete
documentation about all this in the OC/operations centre/ for Administration and Command, and I know for a fact
that all the consultations were recorded on video and audio tape and these recordings are in the OC of the 3rd Corps
and with a cameraman whose name is Mirza.
Following the return to Sarajevo an analysis was made in the OC for Administration and Command of the ŠVK /Staff of
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the Supreme Command/ which led us to a conclusion that the operational/tactical deployment of the HVO forces, the
strength of our forces reinforced with just one battalion from Sarajevo, the configuration of the field and the channeled
lines of attack allow us to plan a comprehensive operation in the area between Bugojno and Mostar with certain results.
R. Delić accepted the proposal and appointed the following team in order 02/1047-1, dated 30 August 1993:
- Team leader, Sefer HALILOVIĆ, members: Zićro SULJEVIĆ, Rifat BILAJAC, Vehbija KARIĆ, Džemal NAJETOVĆ, Edin
HASANSPAHIĆ and Namik DŽANKOVIĆ.
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The above named team prepared the documentation for the operation called NERETVA - 93; R. Delić endorsed it with
his signature and stamp and we immediately went to the field in order to carry it out. We prepared all the necessary
documents beforehand: a plan of the operation, directives concerning the implementation of the operation and
preliminary orders sent to the commanders of the 3rd, 4th and 6th Corps. The Command of the 1st Corps was ordered
to send units from Sarajevo (we previously agreed to accept his proposal to send one platoon from the 9th Mountain
Brigade and one from the 10th Mountain Brigade and one from the autonomous battalion). Some members of the
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team, i.e. BILAJAC, SULJEVIĆ and KARIĆ left Sarajevo on 1 September 1993 together with Namik DŽANKOVIĆ and
with HASANSPAHIĆ to prepare the accommodation for the units in the area of Jablanica since the plan envisaged
that the units should attack on the line between Vrdi and Lištica. I left Sarajevo on 2 September 1993 in order to go
to Jablanica where a forward command post of the SVK was being established and where I worked with the entire
team on the further implementation of the approved Operation NERETVA - 93. Reconnaissance was carried out, a
plan of every line of attack was devised, supplies and ammunition were collected and all other work relevant for the
operation was done.
2. In the morning of 4 September 1993, R. DELIĆ accompanied by Sulejman VRANJ and Alija LONCARIĆ came to
Jablanica. In Donja Jablanica, in the base of the Reconnaissance and Sabotage Brigade Zulifikar I briefed R. Delić on
all the details of the operation, lines of attack, strength and composition of the HVO forces along those lines and our

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- 45. b.br. na pravcu Šćipe - Gornja Blace - Prozor;

- 317. b.br, sa l/45 b.br. i bataljon Sutjeska napada g/s na pravcu s. Voljevac - Crni vrh – Makljen, a pomoćnim snagama
(Samostalni prozorski bataljon) pravcem: s. Here - s. Uzdol - s. Lug;
- 45. b.br. (-1) sa dostignutih položaja aktivnim dejstvom veže snage HVO za sebe i na taj način sadejstvuje;
- 317. i 44. b.br. napada g/s pravcem Rajan (tt 1023) – s. Porlani s p/s; s. Divlja Grabovica - Pločno (tt 2226);
- ID br. „Zulfikar“ sa Drežničkim bataljonom i jedinicama iz Sarajeva (po jedna četa iz 9. i 10. b.br i Samostalnog ba-
taljona) napada g/s: s. Kutac - s. Golubić - s. Vratnica i s. Jasenjani - s. Mandići - Umac, a p/s pravcem Dotačne - Lozina
- Pločno.
U bližem zadatku ovladati s. Vrdi – Gradina – Veliki Jelinik, a u sledećem izbiti na liniju: s. Goranci - s. Đubrani itd.
3.) 05. 09. 1993. godine pišem potrebna naređenja o angažovanju jedinica i naročito o prikupljanju MTS i municije koju
je odobrio Delić i o svemu ovom postoji sva potrebna dokumentacija i naravno veliki broj na svu sreću živih svjedoka
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i više je nego jasno da R. Delić ne pravi slučajno „grešku“ jer mu je dobro poznato da je na pravcu s. Here - s. Uzdol bio
angažovan Samostalni prozorski bataljon, a ne jedinice iz Sarajeva.
4.) 06. 09. 1993. godine u Jablanicu je došao B. Alispahić sa 50 policajaca iz odreda „Lasta“ i na sastanku kojim rukovodi
R. Bilajac (ja se u to vrijeme sve do 09. 09. 1993. godine) nalazim na prostoru Konjica, Buturović polja, Dobrog Polja,
Voljevaca radi pripreme na glavnom pravcu napada), a kome su još prisutni Z. Suljević, V. Krić, Safet Idrizović, Enes
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Kovačević i Safet Hindić, kaže: „Imate zeleno svijetlo od Predsjednika za navedenu operaciju radi pomoći Mostaru i ja
vam stavljam na raspolaganje odred ‘Lasta’ jačine 50 boraca.“
Svi prisutni su se tome obradovali i odmah ih planiraju upotrijebiti na pravcu napada prema Pločnom i Risovcu. U
toku noći bez objašnjenja i obavještavanja napušta Jablanicu, odlazi za Mostar i vodi sa sobom i cio odred „Lasta“, što
izaziva kod svih razočarenje i negodovanje.
5.) Isti dan, 06. 09. stižu jedinice iz Sarajeva i pošto su dobili zadatak već ranije da ih smjeste, R. Bilajac sa dijelom ekipe to
i radi po slijedećem: ojačanu četu iz 10. b.br. smještaju u školu u Jablanici; ojačanu četu iz 9. b.br. smještaju na izlazu
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iz s. Grabovica južnije prema Mostaru u nekoliko napuštenih kuća, a ojačanu četu iz Samostalnog bataljona smješta-
ju na ulazu u s. Grabovica, kod stare željezničke stanice u 10-ak napuštenih kuća. Obje jedinice su na desnoj obali
Neretve, a jedinica Igmanski vukovi je već ranije bila smještena na lijevoj obali Neretve u barakama upravne zgrade
HE Grabovica. Dio ekipe ŠVK sa R. Bilajcem na čelu obilazi borce, vrše pripreme boraca i razgovor sa narodom uz za-
htjev borcima da budu korektni prema domaćinima i molbu domaćinima da budu tolerantni prema borcima. Prema
kazivanju članova Ekipe, atmosfera prilikom smještaja i boravka je bila korektna i nije bilo nikakvih znakova za bilo
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kakav incident. Ovdje treba napomenuti da je veliki dio izbjeglica iz Hercegovine bio smješten na teritoriji opštine
Jablanica, približno oko 10.000, ali i selu Grabovci, po izvještaju Ekipe samo nekoliko starijih ljudi.
6.) 7/8. 09. 1993. godine, po izvještaju dijela Ekipe na čelu sa R. Bilajcem, događa se incident sa tragičnim posljedicama
u s. Grabovica o kojem Ekipa saznaje 08. 09. 1993. godine, oko 10 časova, od Džanković Namika, inače operativca u
upravi bezbjednosti ARBiH i člana Ekipe. Po njegovom izvještaju on je za to doznao u SJB Jablanica i istovremeno ih
upoznaje da organi SJB Jablanica rade na rasvjetljavanju tog tragičnog događaja. Ekipa ŠVK naređuje Namiku Džan-
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koviću da se uključi u rad ekipe MUP-a na pronalaženju krivca.
7.) 09. 09. 1993. godine u popodnevnim časovima u Jablanici po dolasku iz Konjica i Dobrog Polja saznajem od istog
o svemu i odmah mu naređujem: Da izvjesti odmah Upravu bezbjednosti i R. Delića, da traži pomoć iz UB, da se on
lično sa organima bezbjednosti 44. b.br. (Jablaničke) uključi u rad ekipe MUP-a, da odmah zatraži da dođe načelnik
bezbjednosti 6. K pošto se taj tragični incident dogodio u zoni odgovornosti 6. K. Tad me on izvještava da je najveći
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dio tih zadataka već sam uradio i na osnovu nadležnosti koju ima kao organ bezbjednosti i da će ih sve realizovati u
najkraćem roku. K-tima naređujem nastavak priprema za operaciju, a organi bezbjednosti rade svoj posao na prona-
laženju krivca.
8.) 10. 09. sa cijelom Ekipom ujutro rano odlazim na Dobro Polje i na sastanku na kom je prisutna cijela ekipa (bez Džan-
kovića) - K-t 6. K, K-t OG „Zapad“, K-ti brigada, vršimo posljednje pripreme za izvođenje operacije. Naveče u Konjicu u
Vojnoj bazi održava se sastanak kom su prisutni: B. Alispahić, R. Mahmutčehajić, Dr. S. Ćibo, V. Karić, razgovaramo o
nastavku operacije (zapravo priprema za operaciju, op. a.). B. Alispahić se zalaže da se operacija obustavi. Jednogla-
san zaključak svih je da se operacija nastavi. R. Delić odobrava takvu moju odluku.
9.) 12. 09. Početak operacije: na g/p (glavnom pravcu, op. a.) napada sve jedinice kreću na svim pravcima po dobijenim
zadacima, osim Samostalnog prozorskog bataljona koji nalazi izgovor da nije dobio naftu, i 13. 09. nakon preduzetih

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potentials. All the team members were present at the briefing: the Commander of GK, commander of the 45th Brigade
and commander of the Zulifikar Brigade. For the purpose of the operation I requested to be assigned: a helicopter
which ought to be based at the heliport in D. Jablanica. I asked the 3rd Corps commander to send me four 120 mm
mortars and the commanders of the second and third Corps to send me the necessary ammunition for the mortars.
I also asked the commander of the 1st Corps in Sarajevo to send me several thousand hand grenades and grenade
launchers and to transfer two additional pieces of artillery from Igman to Jablanica. Apart from the above listed, I
also requested munitions from the Igman factory in Konjic (ammunition 7.62, 7.9, 12.7, hand grenades and a few
mines for 60, 72 and 120 mm mortars). In the afternoon, we went together to Buturović Polje for an inspection and
preparation of the 45th Mountain Brigade for the operation. Later on, we went to Konjic, to the 6th Corps Command
where we were briefed on the extent to which the command and the units of the 6th Corps were ready for combat.
After that we went to the military base in Konjic to spend a night there and we parted on 5 September. R. DELIĆ and
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his team went to Zenica and I stayed in Herzegovina to continue preparations for the Neretva 93 Operation. During
our stay, i.e. all day on 4 September and almost all the night between 4 and 5 September, we discussed the future
operation and we then again informed R. DELIĆ in the field of all the details of the operation and of which unit would
cover which line of attack. I will give just a summary here: 45th Mountain Brigade on the Šćipe-Gornja Blace-Prozor
line; 317th Mountain Brigade with 1/45 Mountain Brigade and Sutjeska Battalion on the main line of attack Voljevac
village-Crni Vrh - Makljen reinforced by the autonomous Prozor Battalion on the Here - Uzdol - Lug villages auxiliary
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line of attack; the 45th Mountain Brigade (-1) engaged in combat with the HVO forces from the taken positions thus
assisting the 317th and 45th Mountain Brigade on the main line of attack Rajan (tt 1023) - Porlani village with the
auxiliary line of attack Divlja Grabovica - Pločno (tt 2226); the Reconnaissance and Sabotage Brigade, Zulifikar with
the Drežnica Battalion and forces from Sarajevo (one platoon from the 9th, one from the 10th Mountain Brigade
and one from the autonomous attacked on the main line of attack Kutac - Golubić - Vratnica villages and Vratnica-
Jašenjani - Mandići - Umac villages with the auxiliary line of attack Dotačne-Lozina-Pločno.
The first objective was to take control of Vrdi-Gradina Veliki Jelenik and the second was to penetrate the line Goranci
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- Dubrani villages, etc.
3. On 5 September 1993, I wrote the necessary orders relevant to the engagement of the units and especially to the
collection of supplies and ammunition which was approved by R. DELIĆ. The relevant documentation about all this
exists and, of course, luckily there are many witnesses. It is more than obvious that R. DELIĆ did not make a “mistake”
by chance because he knows very well that the autonomous Prozor Battalion was engaged on the Here - Uzdol
villages line and not the forces from Sarajevo.
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4. On 6 September 1993 B. ALISPAHIĆ came with 50 policemen from the Laste /swallows/ Detachment. At the meeting
chaired by R. BILAJAC (at that time I was in Konjic, Buturović Polje, Dobro Polje and Voljevac where I stayed until
9 September in order to prepare the main line of attack) which was also attended by Z. SULJEVIĆ, V. KRIĆ /Karić/,
Safet IDRIZOVIĆ, Enes KOVAČEVIĆ and Safet HINDIĆ, ALISPAHIĆ said: “the President gives you the green light for
the operation because Mostar needs help and I put at your disposal the Laste Detachment whose strength is 50
soldiers”. All those present were happy to hear that and planned to use them on the line of attack Pločno - Risovac.
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During the night, without any explanation and without having informed anyone, he left Jablanica and to everyone’s
disappointment and displeasure he took the Laste with him.
5. On the same day, i.e. 6 September, units from Sarajevo arrived and since R. BILAJAC and a part of the team had
already received orders to assist them with the accommodation they did this according to the following plan: a
reinforced company of the 10th Mountain Brigade was put up in the school in Jablanica; a reinforced platoon from
the 9th Mountain Brigade was put up at several abandoned houses at the southern exit of Grabovica, in the direction
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of Mostar and a reinforced platoon of the autonomous detachment was put up at about 10 abandoned houses near
the old railway station. Both units were on the right bank of the Neretva while the Igman wolves had already earlier
been deployed at the left bank of Neretva in the barracks of the Administration building of Grabovica hydro-electric
power-plant. A part of the ŠVK team headed by R. BILAJAC made a tour of units in order to prepare soldiers and talk to
people, asking the soldiers to be helpful to their hosts and asking the hosts to be tolerant with the soldiers. It should
be noted that there was a large number of refugees from Herzegovina resettled in the Jablanica municipality, about
10,000 approximately but also in Grabovci /Grabovica/ village where according to the report by the team there were
only a couple of elderly people.
6. On 7 and 8 September 1993, according to a report from a team headed by R. BILAJAC, an incident with tragic
consequences took place in the village of Grabovica. Our team found out about it on 8 September 1993, at around 1000

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mjera sve jedinice kreću na zadatak, a Prozorski bataljon ulazi u s. Uzdol iz koga oko 11 sati biva potisnut zbog jakog
protivnapada snaga HVO. Tek nakon nekoliko dana saznajemo da je Samostalni prozorski bataljon u s. Uzdol počinio
neke nedozvoljene radnje. Zbog činjenica da nije 12. 09. na vrijeme krenuo na izvršenje zadatka naredio sam da sa
komandantom S. p. (Samostalnog prozorskog) bataljona 12., 13. i 14. 09. boravi Z. Suljević (ime Z. Suljević dopisano je
rukom, op. a.), a R. Bilajac i V. Karić na KM (komandnom mjestu) Voljevac sa K-tom 317. b.br. Ja sam 13. 09. do popodne
pratio tok borbenih dejstava na području Jablanica, a predveče došao na KM 317. b.br. U s. Voljevci sam primio izvje-
štaj o toku b/a na tom pravcu i o toku b/d na pravcu OG „Zapad“ koja je veoma uspješno izvodila b/d ka Vilića Guvnu.
10.) Ukupni rezultati operacija su impresivni. Po izvještaju UNPROFOR-a BiH Armija je napredovala i oslobodila preko 450
km2. Rezultati operacije bili bi još bolji, naročito u drugoj etapi da nije bilo vidljive i nevidljive opstrukcije iz Sarajeva,
no o tome drugi put.
11.) Dana 20. 09. 1993. godine i u izvještaju koji sam dostavio sa prijedlozima mjera koji su ocjenjeni kao veoma radikalni,
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a koji su dostavljeni Predsjedništvu R BiH, K-tu ŠVK, ministru U.P., Ministarstvu odbrane i Izvršnom odboru SDA pod
tačkom 3. stoji: „Komandanta Prozorskog bataljona pozvati na odgovornost, a nakon toga uputiti OG „Istok“ na novu
dužnost, jer je isti (Buza Enver) rodom iz Visokog i prosto nam je bilo neshvatljivo otkud on tamo. Međutim, i pored
mog prijedloga za njegove smjenjivanje i pozivanje na odgovornost isti ostaje na dužnosti da bi kasnije bio činovan
sa činom majora i vraćen u Visoko (ne znam na koju dužnost). Zar je ovdje bilo kakav komentar potreban.
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12.) U svom ukupnom radu i djelovanju od početka u okviru PL (Patriotske lige), a kasnije TO i ARBiH, ne skrivajući ni
jednoga trenutka svoju nacionalnu i vjersku pripadnost, zalagao sam se za „Bosanski“ karakterArmije, naročito svuda
i na svakom mjestu upozoravao, a i po potrebi energično se suprostavljao svakom obliku ispoljavanja revanšizma,
bilo verbalnog, bilo praktičnog. U toku priprema pa čak i u susretu sa izbjeglicama od kojih je bilo veoma radikalnih
zahtjeva, na svakom mjestu sam govorio: Da Armija koja se sveti nad nedužnima i nemoćnima neće nikad moći
računati na pobjedu, da je karakter naše Armije po ciljevima za koje se borimo - cjelovita i demokratska BiH, (da se
njene pripadnike) mora vidjeti i doživljavati ih kao zaštitnike, a ne osvetnike. Novinar Oslobođenja Ševko Hodžić je
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na nekoliko mjesta prilikom susreta sa izbjeglicama i sa borcima Armije BiH to i sam na audio traci zabilježio i o tome
pisao u Oslobođenju. O svemu ovome pored ovog zapisa postoji još veliki broj svjedoka. Pripisivati meni ono što je
protivno mom uvjerenju, mojem praktičnom djelovanju je tendenciozno i sračunato na diskreditaciju moje ličnosti
i to od onih koji su do 15. aprila ili 15. maja vršili pripremu za agresiju, a i učestvovali u agresiji na svoju državu i svoj
narod. Meni je jasno što im JA smetam, nije mi jasno što to i Vama nije jasno, gospodine Predsjedniče.
Sve unaprijed navedene činjenice bile su poznate R. Deliću i ako se iz naprijed iznijetog, a o čemu postoji sva potreb-
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na dokumentacija, nedvosmisleno jasno (vidi):
Da operacija „Neretva – 93“ nije bila nikakva privatna operacija „nego operacija koja je planirana u GŠ“ i koju je R. Delić
odobrio svojim potpisom i pečatom;
Da je na pravcu s. Here - Uzdol napad izvodio samo Samostalni prozorski bataljon i da sam odmah predlagao njegovu
(zapovjednikovu) odgovornost i njegovo smjenjivanje, a njemu je R. Delić dao čin majora i amnestirao ga odgovor-
nosti pripisujući meni krivicu bez ikakvog osnova;
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Da su na prostoru s. Grabovica bile smještene dvije jedinice iz Sarajeva pa je više nego očigledno da je izabran metod
šutnje o odgovornosti pravih počinilaca nečasnih dijela da bi se indirektno odgovornost pripisala meni i na taj način
stvorili u javnom mjenju utisak odgovornosti, a u dijelu Hrvatskog naroda prikazati me kao ratnog zločinca - bez
ikakvog razloga i osnova. Nadležni organi, siguran sam, poimenično znaju ko je za šta odgovoran, ali „Nevidljivoj
ruci“ odgovara da se krivci ne otkriju jer je to način da me drže u stanju u kakvom jesam „Na raspolaganju“. Metodom
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zamjene teza zamagljuje se istina i skrivaju pravi krivci.
Gospodine Predsjedniče,
Ja lično ne tražim ništa, ni čin, ni položaj, ni funkciju. Hoću samo ono što je moje, a to je čist obraz i ništa više. Molim Vas,
da Vašim neospornim autoritetom utičete da se izjava data na navedenim mjestima adekvatno demantuje i ujedno Vas
molim da utičete da se pravi krivci pronađu i adekvatno kazne zarad istine, naše borbe, obraza našeg naroda i naravno
radi Vas. Ovo Vam sve pišem jer znam Vaše plemenite stavove kada je u pitanju, Istina, Pravda i Sloboda.

Sarajevo, 01.05. 1995. godine

Sefer Halilović

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hours, from Namik DŽANKOVIĆ, otherwise known as an operative in the Security Service of the BH Army and a member
of the team. According to his report, he learned about it from the Jablanica SJB /Public Security Station/ and at the same
time, he told them that the policemen of Jablanica SJB were working in order to shed some light on the tragic incident.
The ŠVK team ordered Namik DŽANKOVIĆ to get involved in the work of the MUP team to look for the perpetrator.
7. In the afternoon of 9 September 1993, I learned this from him in Jablanica after returning from Konjic and Dobro
Polje, and ordered him immediately to inform the UB /Security Department/ and R. DELIĆ; to ask for help from the
UB; become personally involved in the MUP team work, together with members of the 44th Jablanica Mountain
Brigade; and to ask for the head of security of the 6th Corps to come because the tragic incident took place in its zone
of responsibility but I also did this on the basis of their authority as a security body so that they would carry them all
out as soon as possible. I ordered the commanders to continue with the preparations for the action while the security
bodies were working on finding the perpetrators.
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8. On 10 September, I went with the whole team to Dobro Polje, where there was a meeting attended by the whole team
except for DŽANKOVIĆ. The Commander of the 6th Corps, the Commander of the OG /Operations Group/ “Zapad”
(West), and the Commanders of the brigades. We made the final preparations for the operation. A meeting was held
in the evening, in the military base in Konjic and it was attended by: B. ALISPAHIĆ, R. MAHMUTČEHAJIĆ, Dr S. ČIBO
and V. KARIĆ. We talked about the continuation of the operation. B. ALISPAHIĆ was in favor of ending the operation.
The unanimous decision of the others was to resume the operation. R. DELIĆ approved of my decision.
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9. On 12 September, the operation began: on the main line of the attack, all units set off in all directions according to
the instructions they had been given, except for the Independent Prozor Battalion which used the excuse of not
having received fuel. On 13 September, after completing preparations, all of the units went to carry out their tasks
while the Prozor Battalion entered the village of Uzdol from where it was repulsed at around 1100 hours by a strong
HVO counterattack. It was only several days later that we found out that the Independent Prozor Battalion committed
some unlawful acts in the village of Uzdol. Because they did not set off at the same time to complete their tasks as
everyone else on 12 September, I ordered Z. SULJEVIĆ to remain with the Commander of the Independent Prozor
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Battalion on 12, 13 and 14 September, while R. BILAJAC and V. KARIĆ were to remain at the KM /Command Post/
Voljevac with the commander of the 317th Mountain Brigade. On 13 September, I followed the course of the combat
in the Jablanica region until the afternoon, and in the evening, I arrived at the KM of the 317th Mountain Brigade. In
the village of Voljevci I received a report about the combat activity in the area and about the combat assignments in
the area of OG “Zapad” which had been very successfully carried out in the direction of Vilić Guvno.
10. All the results of the operations were impressive. According to the UNPROFOR report, the BH Army made progress
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and liberated more than 450 sq. km. The results of the operation could have been even better if there had been no
visible and hidden obstacles from Sarajevo, but that is another story.
11. On 20 September 1993, I submitted in a report certain proposals for measures that were considered radical, and this was
submitted to the Presidency of the RBH, to the Commander of ŠVK, the Minister of the Interior, the Defence Ministry and
the Executive Board of the SDA /Party of Democratic Action/. Under item 3, I have suggested that: “The commander of
the Prozor Battalion must be called to account and then sent to the OG Istok /East/ to carry out new duties” because the
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very same Enver BUZA is originally from Visoko and it was hard to understand why he was there at all.
However, despite my insistence that he should be replaced and called to account he remained in his post, was later
given the rank of major and returned to Visoko (I do not know to which post). Is any further comment needed?
12. From the beginning, throughout my whole career and activities, initially in the PL /Patriotic League/ and later in the
TO /Territorial Defence/ and the BH Army, I never hid my national and religious identity. I campaigned for the Army
to have a Bosnian character and everywhere I warned against any form of reprisal either verbal or physical. During
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preparations, even in meetings with refugees, from whom there were sometimes truly radical demands, I always said
that the army that took revenge against the innocent and the helpless could never be victorious, that the character
of the army was defined by the objectives that we were fighting for - a unified and democratic BH. People had to see
the Army as protectors not as avengers. Ascribing to me something that goes against my convictions and my actions
has been deliberately calculated to discredit me.
R. DELIĆ knew all of the above-mentioned facts which are contained in the relevant files. The following is clear:
- That Operation “Neretva - 93” was not a “private operation” but an operation planned by the Main Staff, approved by
R. DELIĆ with his signature and seal;
- That in the area from the village of Here to the village of Uzdol the attack was carried by the Independent Prozor
Battalion only, I immediately proposed that the commander be called to account and replaced while R. DELIĆ
promoted him and exonerated him and put the blame on me for no reason at all;

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Deklaracija o oživotvorenju Sporazuma iz Washingtona, zajedničkoj obrani RBiH i RH od srpske agresije

i postizanju političkog rješenja sukladno naporima međunarodne zajednice, Split, 22. srpnja 1995.

22-JUL-1995 23:32 FROM TO 001427594 P.02/05.

Izaslanstvo Republike Hrvatske predvođeno Predsjednikom Republike Hrvatske dr. Franjom Tuđmanom, izaslanstvo Re-
publike Bosne i Hercegovine i Federacije Bosne i Hercegovine predvođeno Predsjednikom Predsjedništva Republike Bo-
sne i Hercegovine Alijom Izetbegovićem i Predsjednikom Federacije Bosne i Hercegovine Krešimirom Zubakom, nakon
razgovora u Splitu, dana 22. srpnja 1995. godine usvojili su

DEKLARACIJU
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o oživotvorenju Sporazuma iz Washingtona, zajedničkoj obrani od
srpske agresije i postizanju političkog rješenja sukladno
naporima međunarodne zajednice
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Potvrđujući čvrsto opredjeljenje i političku volju za jačanje suradnje i savezništva hrvatskog i bošnjačkog naroda u sud-
bonosnim trenucima za opstojnost dvaju naroda suočenih s pojačavanjem nasilja na okupiranim područjima u Hrvatskoj
i Bosni i Hercegovini, s neizvjesnošću mirovnog procesa i s nedjelotvornošću međunarodne zajednice;
Utvrđujući da su zaposjedanje i napadi na “zaštićene zone” UN u Bosni i Hercegovini i zajedničke vojne operacije bosan-
skih i hrvatskih Srba protiv “zaštićene zone” UN u Bihaću, oružane provokacije u drugim područjima Hrvatske i Bosne
i Hercegovine, te odbijanje svakog mirovnog plana sa strane bosanskih i hrvatskih Srba, dio jedinstvene i zajedničke
strategije nastavka agresije i pokušaja zadržavanja okupiranih područja Hrvatske i Bosne i Hercegovine u cilju stvaranja
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“Velike Srbije”, pod vodstvom i uz punu odgovornost političkog i vojnog vrha “SRJ” (Srbije i Crne Gore);
Utvrđujući da nastavak agresije i nasilnih pokušaja zadržavanja okupiranih područja u Bosni i Hercegovini i Hrvatskoj, te
nedostatni rezultati mirovnog procesa, nalažu vodstvima Hrvatske i Bosne i Hercegovine da temeljito i cjelovito razmotre
stanje u regiji sa stanovišta očuvanja nacionalne opstojnosti hrvatskog i bošnjačkog naroda i teritorijalne cjelovitosti
Republike Hrvatske i Republike Bosne i Hercegovine;
Iskazujući neopozivu potporu provedbi Sporazuma iz Washingtona o uspostavi Federacije, te o njenom konfederalnom
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povezivanju s Republikom Hrvatskom;
Uvjereni da je takva snažna, međunarodno afirmirana, teritorijalno održiva, gospodarski razvijena i demokratski uređena
Federacija nezamjenjiv državno-politički okvir, povijesni interes i najsigurniji oblik zaštite i ostvarivanja jednakopravnih
nacionalnih, političkih i drugih interesa hrvatskog i bošnjačkog naroda;
Uvjereni također da se na osnovi ostvarenja takve Federacije hrvatskog i bošnjačkog naroda može uz pomoć međuna-
rodne zajednice postići rješenje krize i postaviti temelj novog uravnoteženog regionalnog poretka kao jamstva mira,
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stabilnosti, sigurnosti i razvoja;
Pozivajući hrvatske Srbe da preispitaju aktualnu militantnu politiku i prihvate mirnu reintegraciju u ustavni poredak Re-
publike Hrvatske, a bosanske Srbe da prihvate plan Kontaktne skupine;
Pozivajući “SRJ” (Srbiju i Cmu Goru) da odustane od agresije radi stvaranja “Velike Srbije”, prestane pružati vojnu pomoć
ekstremistima u Kninu i na Palama i pristupi međusobnom priznanju u međunarodno priznatim granicama Republike
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Hrvatske i Republike Bosne i Hercegovine;
Potvrđujući spremnost na djelatni doprinos naporima za hitno oživljavanje mirovnog procesa na temelju prihvaćanja Pla-
na Kontaktne skupine u Bosni i Hercegovini, te mirne reintegracije privremeno okupiranih teritorija Republike Hrvatske;
Ističući posebno da će svako produženje postojeće neučinkovitosti UNPROFOR-a u Bosni i Hercegovini, te neprimjenji-
vanje mandata UNCRO u Hrvatskoj voditi odluci o otkazivanju produžetka mandata u Hrvatskoj i Bosni i Hercegovini;
Podržavajući odluku o upućivanju Snaga za brzo djelovanje i zajednički utvrđujući da sva pitanja njihova dolaska, man-
data i raspoređivanja trebaju biti uređena posebnim sporazumom sukladnim suverenitetu i teritorijalnoj cjelovitosti Re-
publike Hrvatske i Republike Bosne i Hercegovine;
Ističući zajednički stav da odluka o ukidanju embarga na oružje treba istodobno biti primijenjena na Bosnu i Hercegovinu
i na Hrvatsku;

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- That in the area of the village of Grabovica there were two units from Sarajevo so it was obvious that the method of
shifting responsibility had been chosen to conceal the real culprits in order to put the responsibility on to me and
influence public opinion in such a way as to create the impression of my responsibility, as well as to denounce me as
a war criminal to some Croats - without any reason or basis for it. I am sure that the authorities knew exactly who was
responsible, but the “invisible hand” did not want the culprits to be discovered because it was a way of keeping me -
“available”. By switching the blame, the truth was covered up while the real culprits remained hidden.
Mr President,
Personally, I am not asking for anything, not for a rank, nor a position nor a post. I only want what is mine by right and that
is to clear my name and nothing else. I ask you to use your unquestioned authority to ensure that the statement made in
the aforementioned places be adequately refuted and I am also asking you to ensure that the real culprits are found and
are properly punished in the name of truth, our struggle, and our people’s name and for your own sake. I am writing all
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this to you because I am familiar with your noble beliefs when truth, justice and freedom are in question.

Sarajevo, 1 May 1995

Sefer HALILOVIĆ
/signed/
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Declaration on the implementation of the Washington Agreement, joint defense against Serb
aggression and reaching a political solution congruent with the efforts of the international
community, Split, 22 July 1995

The delegation of the Republic of Croatia, led by the President of Croatia dr. Franjo Tuđman, the delegation of the Republic
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of Bosnia-Herzegovina led by the President of the Presidency or the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina Alija Izetbegović and
by the President of the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina Krešimir Zubak, after their talks in Split on July 22nd, adopted a

DECLARATION

on the implementation of the Washington Agreement, joint defense against Serb

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aggression and reaching a political solution congruent with
the efforts of the international community

Confirming their strong commitment and political will to strengthen the cooperation and alliance of the Croatian and
Bosniac nations in these fateful moments for the survival of both nations, faced with the increasing violence in the
occupied territories of Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina, with the uncertainty of the peace process and the inefficacy
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of the international community;
Having established that the occupying of and the attacks on the UN “safe areas” in Bosnia- Herzegovina and the joint
operations by the Bosnian and Croatian Serbs against the UN “safe area” in Bihać, the armed provocations in other areas of
Croatia and Bosnia and Bosnia- Herzegovina, as well as the refusal of all peace plans by the Bosnian and Croatian Serbs, are
part of a unified and joint strategy of continuing aggression and attempt to maintain occupation of territories in Croatia
and Bosnia-Herzegovina with the aim to create a “Great Serbia”, under the leadership and with the full responsibility of
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the political and army leadership of the “FRY” (Serbia and Montenegro);
Having established that the continued aggression and violent attempts to keep control of the occupied territories in Bosnia-
Herzegovina and Croatia, as well as the inadequate results of the peace process, command the leaders of Croatia and Bosnia-
Herzegovina to fully examine the situation in the region from the stand-point of safeguarding the national survival of the
Croatian and Bosniac people and the territorial integrity of the Republic of Croatia and the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina;
Expressing their irrevocable support to the implementation of the Washington Agreement on the establishment of the
Federation, as well as its confederal linking to the Republic of Croatia;
Convinced that such a strong, internationally established, territorially viable, economically developed and democratically
organized Federation is an irreplaceable governmental and political framework, the historical interest and the safest form
of security and realization of equal national, political and other interests of the Croatian and Bosniac nations;

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Uvjereni da “SRJ” (Srbija i Cma Gora) snosi posebnu odgovornost za nastavak krize i smatrajući da je potrebno održati i
osnažiti režim sankcija Vijeća sigurnosti UN;
Odbijajući zamisli o obnavljanju ili uspostavi bilo kakve nove “jugoslavenske” državne zajednice, smatrajući ih upored-
nom i rezervnom varijantom velikosrpske hegemonije, te podupirući normalizaciju u regiji na osnovi suverenosti, neovi-
snosti i cjelovitosti;
Potvrđujući interes za hitnom provedbom navedenih načela Deklaracije, dogovoreno je:
1. Proširenje i jačanje obrambene suradnje na temelju Sporazuma o prijateljstvu i suradnji između Republike Hrvatske
i Republike Bosne i Hercegovine od 21. srpnja 1992. godine.
U tom pogledu Republika i Federacija Bosne i Hercegovine uputile su Republici Hrvatskoj poziv da pruži hitnu vojnu
i drugu pomoć u obrani od agresije, posebice u području Bihaća, što je Republika Hrvatska prihvatila.
Dogovoren je nastavak suradnje i stalna koordinacija obrambenih djelatnosti između Hrvatske i Bosne i Hercegovine.
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Dogovorena je i suradnja Glavnog stožera Hrvatske vojske sa Združenim stožerom ARBH i HVO radi koordinacije
obrambenih djelovanja u oblasti zapovijedanja, logistike, vojno-industrijske proizvodnje, komunikacijskih sustava,
informacijsko-analitičkih potreba i drugim oblastima.
2. Osnivanje političko-pravne stručne skupine sa zadaćom da hitno analizira i predloži rješenja za integriranje funkcija
vlasti Republike i Federacije BiH;
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3. Upućivanje poziva za sastanak skupine 22 zemlje članice “Prijatelja Federacije” na visokoj razini radi hitnih donacija i
pomoći u suočavanju s humanitarnom i izbjegličkom katastrofom i razmatranja trajne zajedničke strategije obnove i
razvoja;
4. Održavanje redovnih i stalnih političkih konzultacija radi ostvarivanja načela i dogovora ove Deklaracije, te priprema-
nja pravnih, političkih i drugih osnova za uspostavu konfederalnih veza s Republikom Hrvatskom;

Dr. Franjo Tuđman [v.r.] Alija Izetbegović [v.r.]

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Predsjednik Republike Hrvatske Predsjednik Predsjedništva
Republike BiH

Krešimir Zubak [v.r.]

Predsjednik Federacije BiH
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Haris Silajdžić [v.r.]
Predsjednik Vlade BiH
D
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Convinced also that on the basis of the realization of such a Federation of the Croatian and Bosniac nations and with the
assistance of the international community, a solution to the crisis can be reached and the ground laid for a new, balanced
regional order as a guarantee of peace, stability, security and development;
Calling on the Croatian Serbs to reexamine their current militant policy and to accept the peaceful reintegration in the
constitutional order of the Republic of Croatia, and the Bosnian Serbs to accept the Contact Group plan;
Calling on the “FRY” (Serbia and Montenegro) to give up aggression with the aim of creating a “Great Serbia”, to stop giving
military assistance to the extremists in Knin and in Pale and to agree to the mutual recognition of the Republic of Croatia
and the Republic of Bosnia- Herzegovina within their internationally recognized borders;
Confirming their readiness to actively contribute to the efforts towards an urgent revival of the peace process on the basis
of acceptance of the Contact Group Plan in Bosnia-Herzegovina as well as the peaceful reintegration of the temporarily
occupied territories of the Republic of Croatia;
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Underlying in particular that any prolongation of the existing ineffectiveness of UNPROFOR in Bosnia-Herzegovina as
well as the non-application of the UNCRO mandate in Croatia will lead to the decision to call off the prolongation of their
mandate in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina;
Supporting the decision to send Rapid Reaction Forces and jointly establishing that all questions concerning their arrival,
mandate and deployment must be organized by way of a special agreement in accordance with the sovereignty and
territorial integrity of the Republic of Croatia and the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina;
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Underlying the common viewpoint that any decision on lifting of arms embargo must be applied simultaneously to
Bosnia-Herzegovina and to Croatia;
Convinced that the “FRY” (Serbia and Montenegro) carries a special responsibility for the continuation of the crisis and
judging that it is necessary to maintain and reinforce the United Nations Security Council sanctions system;
Refusing ideas about renewing or creating any kind of new “Yugoslav” state community, considering them to be parallel
and spare variations of Great-Serbian hegemony, and supporting normalization in the region on the basis of sovereignty
independence and integrity;
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Confirming their interest in the urgent implementation of the aforementioned principles of the Declaration, agreement
has been reached on:
1. Widening and strengthening of the defense cooperation on the basis of the Agreement on friendship and cooperation
between the Republic of Croatia and the Republic of Bosnia- Herzegovina of July 21st 1992.
In this respect, the Republic and the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina have called upon the Republic of Croatia to
extend urgent military and other assistance in the defense against aggression, especially in the area of Bihac, which
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the Republic of Croatia has accepted.
Agreement has also been reached on the continuation of cooperation and constant coordination of defense activities
between Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina.
Agreement has been reached as well as on the cooperation between the main headquarters of the Croatian Army
and the joint headquarters of the Army of Bosnia-Herzegovina and the Croatian Defense Council for the sake of
coordination of defense activities in the areas of command, logistics, military-industrial production, communication
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systems, information and analytical needs and other areas.
2. Creation of a political-legal expert group with the duty to urgently analyze and submit proposals for the integration
of the functions of the Republic and Federation of Bosnia- Herzegovina authorities.
3. Addressing an invitation for a meeting of the group of 22 member states of the “Friends of the Federation” on the
highest level, in view of urgent donations and assistance in the face of the humanitarian and refuge catastrophe and
to examine long-term joint reconstruction and development strategies.
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4. Maintaining regular and constant political consultations aiming at the realization of the principles and agreements of
this Declaration, as well as the preparation of legal, political and other foundations for the establishment of confederal
ties with the Republic of Croatia.

Dr. Franjo Tuđman Alija Izetbegović

President of the Republic of Croatia President of the Presidency of the Republic of Bosnia- Herzegovina

Krešimir Zubak Haris Silajdžić

President of the Federation Prime Minister of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina
of Bosnia-Herzegovina

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 Ante Nazor • II DIO

VELIKA AKCIJA HRVATSKIH SNAGA PRIVODI SE TRIJUMFALNOME ZAVRSETKU

OIUJA POMllA (ITNIKI!

Hrvatske su snage oslobodile Korenicu, Petri•
nju, Obrovac, Slunj, Plaski, Vrhovine, Cetin•
grad, Otric, Bruvno, Plitvice, Plitvicka jezera,
Novi Licki Osik, Medak ...
H
M
D
C
WASHINGTON ODJECI OPERACIJE OLUJA M
UH~!~~J:i~,R~g,s~~tAM~~~TAR M~•,,,;;;6
I\IIA. V~ta !U lnterv~ncija _HV•~ ~~!~:?.
D
I OllONAC AMilKi spaslla 81~~~
•nt Pftdlildnlka Cllntona, Hrvatska postaJa
R
. . . . . _ u rJtilllJu balkanske krlza, pa
tomedl u

Naslovnica Slobodne Dalmacije, ponedjeljak, 7. kolovoza 1995.; istaknuti naslovi: Predsjednik Tuđman: “TEHNIKA SE MOŽE KUPITI, ALI
OVAKVI VOJNICI NE”; Odjeci operacije Oluja: Hrvatska – vojna sila i oslonac Amerike (prema ocjeni predsjednika Clintona, Hrvatska postaje
glavnim čimbenikom u rješenju balkanske krize, pa i osloncem SAD u tome dijelu svijeta); Muhamed Šaćirbegović, ministar vanjskih poslova
BiH: Intervencija HV-a spasila Bihać.

Slobodna Dalmacija, front page, Monday, August 7, 1995; headlines: President Tuđman:
“MONEY CAN BUY ARMAMENTS AND EQUIPMENT BUT THESE GALLANT AND VALIANT SOLDIERS NO MONEY IN THE WORLD CAN BUY”;
Reactions to Operation Storm: Croatia – a Military Force to be Reckoned With and a Factor USA Can Rely On (according to President Clinton
Croatia has become the main player in resolving the Balkan crisis and as such is America’s trump card in this part of the world); Muhamed
Šaćirbegović, Foreign Affairs Minister of BiH: Croatian Army’s intervention saved Bihać.

588

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 Ante Nazor • PART II

l~t,1:
JAJCE, DRVAR
I SIPOVO U HRVATSKIM
RUKAMA

pecat
ANALIZA SLOBODA U
Kako se zivi u
Kninu 40 dana KRALJEVSKOM
GRADU
H
nakon
oslobodenja Pisu: MARIO MARus1c ; IVAN SABrc

VJESNIK
M
HRVATSKI POL I T I CK I D N EVNI K
W-•.a LVI. Broj 17218 Zagreb, p e tak, 15. IX. 1995. Cijena 3,5 k1
D
Naslovnica Vjesnika, petak, 15. rujna 1995.: SLOBODA U KRALJEVSKOM GRADU – Jajce, Drvar i Šipovo u hrvatskim rukama.
Vjesnik, front page, Friday, September 15, 1995: FREEDOM IN THE SEAT OF MEDIEVAL KINGS – Jajce, Drvar and Šipovo in Croatian hands.
C
D
Neupitan hrvatski trag – dokaz čvrstoga hr-
R
vatskog korijenja: romanički zvonik sv. Luke u
Jajcu (iz reportaže o oslobođenom Jajcu, pod
naslovom „Sloboda u hrvatskome kraljev-
skom gradu“, Vjesnik, petak, 15. rujna 1995.,
str.  16, 33).

Indisputably Croatian – proof of strong
Croatian origins: Romanesque tower of the
Church of Saint Luke in Jajce (from an article
about the liberation of the city of Jajce, enti-
tled Freedom in the seat of Croatian Medieval
Kings, Vjesnik, Friday, September 15, 1995,
page 16, 33).
Dio naslovnice Večernjeg lista, četvrtak, 14. rujna 1995.: OSLOBOĐENI
JAJCE, DRVAR I ŠIPOVO – veliki uspjesi hrvatskih snaga na kupreškom,
glamočkom i drvarskom bojištu.
A part of the front page, Večernji list, Thursday, September 14, 1995:
JAJCE, DRVAR AND ŠIPOVO LIBERATED – signal successes of the Cro-
atian forces on the Kupres, Glamoč and Drvar fronts.

589

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 Zemljovidi • Maps

Ethnic . . in the F~o~r~m~e:_

Map D Compos1t1011 r ~Yugoslavia,
'.!e::::.:__ _ _
1991
Narodnosni sastav SFRJ, 1991.
Ethnic Composition in the former
Yugoslavia, 1991.
H
M
In percent Others 3.9\
arians 1.9\
Mon~un~~rins2~.5\ \ ,.-Serbs 36 -3
Yugoslavs" s. 4--..
Macedonians 5.9 -

Albanians 7.7../

,aJ
Slovenes . _/ "-croats 19.7
MuslimsS.9
D
a Yugoslavs are /hos_e
in the
fi!i;ons
are who
198''=:'.''":'_'.'.:.'._:_
._'.
dispersed
_____
lhe~~e:;:~~i:i~~
/is red aero

MADfARSKA
Nogvkoniz

1/
C
Pees
D
R
ONE OPERACIJE
ZAMISAO NAPA RODNE ARMIJE
SLAVENSKE NA
JUGO RUJAN - LI STOPAD 1991 .

Plan napadne operacije JNA, rujan – listopad 1991.

JNA Strategic Offensive Plan, September - October 1991.

590

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 Zemljovidi • Maps

H
M
D
C
D
R
Operacija Bljesak, svibanj 1995.
Operation Flash, May 1995.

591

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 Zemljovidi • Maps

SLOVENIA

~ZAGREB
✓
C R O A T A

s
H
M
D
BOSNIA
AND
HERZEGOVINA
C
D
~ ------ 142Homo ~ f&Hom1 De1. g ~1

•sibenik
'•sibenik"f f A

.,, .
R
/
SPLIT

Operacija Oluja, kolovoz 1995.

Operation Storm, August 1995.

592

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 Zemljovidi • Maps

CA...OATIA

~1
,t'::l
H
I
M
C R 0 • T I A
D
Zapadna Bosna, rujan – listopad 1995. (operacije Maestral i Južni potez).
C
Western Bosnia, September – October 1995 (Operations Maestral and Južni potez).

C r oat i a
D
·-.
R
~
VRS-c ontrollod area
HV/HVO-controlled are.!
D AR8 1H •cont rollc::I am a
..) <ii?,,..- , ,; BiH, 20. listopada 1995.
- -. ~Ot,' '~•
Bosnia and Herzegovina, October 20, 1995.

593

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 Zemljovidi • Maps

Serbia
H
M
ADRIATIC SEA

The Municipalities ,,_,

of Bosnia and Herzegovina, 199,U
-··~---"

50 100
Map 2 - -==- -== Km
D
Općine BiH, 1991.
The Municipalities of Bosnia and Herzegovina, 1991.

A
C
Serbia
D
Legend
D BoundaryofCroaiianCominuoities

- ~r~::c1t~1!i:;;~:a~;,~~:l~~)
R
~ ~::ci~~~~;7i~~s~{:!a~~)
c=J ~~~ii~~~}:i;i;:!:1!~~~~:cSln)
lIIIIIlIIIl ~~~;i~;~~J:i1:i;~e:s~~:~';O%)
- ~~i~:~j:::;,(;~~1:; t~:~,~~k) Montenegro

~ ~:i~~:::;.\~~~1~:1~;\ Ethnic Composition ,

of Bosnia and Herzegovina, J9QJ '
i:-· --
50 100
Map 9 Km

Narodnosni sastav BiH.

Ethnic Composition of BiH.

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 Zemljovidi • Maps

Serbia
H
Legend
[ I ] Krajina
[I] Northern Bos nia
CT] Somberija
~ Romanija-BiraC
M
[I] Hercegovina
c:::J Boundary of Croatian Communities
"A,publishedinOlfocialGazcucoftheBo,.nianSerbPoop lc Montenegro
inBosniaand Herzegovina,No.lJanuary 1992."

Bosnian Serb
ADRIA TIC S£A Autonomous Areas (SAO)

50 100
Map 7 Km
D
Srpske autonomne oblasti u BiH (SAO), 1991.
Bosnian Serb Autonomous Areas (SAO), 1991.

A
C
Serbia
D
Legend
[I] South-East Herzegovina Operational Zo ne
R
~ North-West Herzegovina Operational Zone
CI] Central Bosnia Operational Zone

~ Posavina Operational Zone

Montenegro
Source: Exhibit No. 00416 - Order Fonning Zones of Operations.
Municipalities shown as stated in the order with the add ition
of Vares and th ose of the Posavina OZ.
Armed Forces of Herceg-Bosna -;
ADRIATIC SEA
Operational Zones __ /
50 100
August 199;
/!
Map 13 Km

Operativne zone HVO-a.

Armed Forces of Herzeg Bosna Operational Zones, August 1992.

595

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 Zemljovidi • Maps

Serbia
H
Legend
c:J Boundary of Croatian Comm unities

CJ ~r~:!c1~~~\~~i~; ~i::a~:r~~:~\~~%)
1
M
Montenegro

Based on 199 1 Census

Municipalities
ADRIATIC SEA with a Relative or Absolute
Croat Majority
50 100
Map 8 Km
D
Općine sa apsolutnom ili relativnom većinom Hrvata.
Municipalities with a Relative or Absolute Croat Majority.

A
C
Serbia
D
R
ADRIA TIC S/,'A
Montenegro

The Croatian Communities- .

.
of Herceg-Bosna
and Bosanska Posavina" 199-Ji
50 100
Map 3 Km

Hrvatska zajednica Herceg-Bosna i Bosanska Posavina, 1991.

The Croatian Communities of Herceg-Bosna and Bosanska Posavina, 1991.

596

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 Zemljovidi • Maps

Serbia
H
M
Montenegro

The Banovina,1939 " . ..

and Croatian Communities, 199,U

50 100
Map 6 Km
D
Banovina Hrvatska, 1939., i Hrvatske zajednice, 1991.
The Banovina, 1939 and Croatian Communities, 1991.

A
C
Serbia
D
R
Montenegro

The Banovina, 1939'··

(showing BiH Municipaliti~.s.)

Banovina Hrvatska, 1939. (prikaz općina u BiH koje je obuhvatila).

The Banovina 1939 (showing BiH municipalities).

597

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 Zemljovidi • Maps

Serbia
H
Legend
~ MuslimAreas

Serb A reas
M
Croat Areas

[=:r=J Mixed (Sarajevo)

Montenegro
ADRIATIC SEA

The Vance-Owen Peace Plan

2 January 1993
50 100
Map 11 Km
D
Vance-Owenov mirovni plan, siječanj 1993.
The Vance-Owen Peace Plan, January 1993.

Zemljovid Vance-Owenova mirovnog plana, verzija UN-a iz

C
VANCE - OWENOV PLAN
siječnja 1993. / Promijenjeni zemljovid Vance-Owenova mirov- ZA BiH (4. sijecnja 1993.)
nog plana, 25. ožujka 1993.
U odnosu na prijedlog iz siječnja 1993., općine Vareš, Visoko,
Breza i dio općine Kakanj su u ožujku 1993. „zbog duboke i pos-
tojane naklonosti Hrvata prema Varešu zbog biskupije, prem-
ještene iz provincije 9 s muslimanskom većinom u provinciju 7
(Sarajevo), u kojoj je bio potreban konsenzus o svim odlukama“,
D
a istodobno je „bosanskim muslimanima omogućen pristup
rijeci Savi“ (prema izjavi veleposlanika Herberta Okuna, po-
moćnika supredsjedatelja Međunarodne konferencije o bivšoj
Jugoslaviji Cyrusa Vancea – IT-04-74: 16790-16791; Miroslav
Tuđman, Haški krivolov, Zagreb, 2019., 304-305).

Vance-Owen peace plan, UN version, January, 1993/ Altered

map of Vance-Owen peace plan, March 25, 1993
R
In March 1993 the Vance-Owen plan of January, 1993, was al-
tered. The municipalities of Vareš, Visoko and Breza, and parts
of the Kakanj Municipality, up to that point under the jurisdic- TUMAC
tion of predominantly Muslim Province 7 (Sarajevo) , were, due
to the Croats’ deep attachment to Vareš on account of the dio-
D HRVAT I
(p rovincije 3,8, 10)
MUSL IMANI
cese, placed under the jurisdiction of Province 9 where consen- (p rovincije 1,5,9)
sus regarding all decisions was required and at the same time
the Bosnian Muslims were given access to the Sava River (ac- D SRBI
(provin cije 2,4,6)

cording to the statement made by Herbert Okun, co-chairman

of the International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia - IT-
D SARAJEVO
distrikt(7)

04-74: 16790-16791; Miroslav Tuđman, Haški krivolov, Zagreb, Promijenjeni Vance-Owenov mirovni plan, ožujak 1993.
2019, pp.304-305).
Altered Map of Vance-Owen Peace Plan, March 1993.

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 Zemljovidi • Maps

N Cutileirov mirovni plan, ožujak 1992.

A The Cutileiro Peace Plan, March 1992.

SerbJa
H
Legend

L_J Mus lim Areas

- SerbArt"as

Croat Areas

Montenogro
M
The Culileiro Plan
March 1992
Map 10

N
-
0 50 100
Km

Owen-Stoltenbergov mirovni plan,

A kolovoz 1993.

The Owen-Stoltenberg Peace Plan,

August 1993.
D
C
Legend
~ MuslirnA reas

- ScrbAreas

c= CroatAreas

~ SpecialStatus Zone-,
Montenegro

Zepa-GoraZdelinkroad
D
The Owen-Stoltenberg Plan
August 1993
so 100
Map 12 Km

Zemljovid prema Owen-Stoltenbergovom mirovnom planu, kolovoz 1993.

Manji teritorij predviđen za hrvatsku provinciju, u odnosu na Vance-Owenov plan, odraz je tadašnjeg stanja na terenu, koje se promijenilo od
R
siječnja 1993., jer je Armija RBiH ofenzivnim djelovanjem zauzela dio središnje Bosne pod kontrolom HVO-a i protjerala Hrvate sa zauzeto-
ga područja. Da je Armija RBiH započela rat protiv HVO-a i Hrvata kako bi onemogućila provedbu Vance-Owenova plana, odnosno smanjila
teritorij predviđen za hrvatsku provinciju (za rat protiv srpskih snaga u BiH početkom 1993. još nije bila spremna), svjedoči već citirana izjava
vojnog čelnika ARBiH, generala Rasima Delića iz veljače 1994., da je “HVO eliminisan sa područja Jablanice, Konjica, Fojnice, Kaknja, Zenice,
Travnika i Bugojna. Znači, kompletna jedna pokrajina po Vens-Owenovom planu sa centralom u Travniku”.

Owen-Stoltenberg peace plan, August, 1993

The Croat province is smaller in comparison to the Vance-Owen plan. This was a reflection of the situation on the ground which had changed
since January, 1993. The ARBiH had conquered parts of central Bosnia controlled by the HVO and expelled the Croats from the territory. Gen-
eral Rasim Delić, Commander of the ARBiH Main Staff confirmed, in February, 199, that the ARBiH started the Muslim-Croat conflict so as to
prevent the implementation of the Vance-Owen plan and reduce the size of the Croatian province (the ARBiH was not ready, at that point in
time, to take on the Serb forces in BiH): “The HVO has been eliminated from the areas of Jablanica, Konjic, Fojnica, Kakanj, Zenica, Travnik and
Bugojno. A whole region, according to the Vance-Owen Peace Plan, with its center in Travnik.”

599

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 Zemljovidi • Maps

Siječanj STANJE: SIJECANJ

~\ce
January 1993.GODINE

TUMAC

\
D VRS

D ABiH
DonjiVa~~

D HVO

~ PRAVAC DJELOVANJA
___,/ ABiH
H
MJESTO SUKOBA

~ DOVODENJE NOVIH
11.y" POSTROJBI A BiH

VAL'.N IJE
PROMETNICE

Ožujak - travanj
M
STANJE: OZUJAK - TRAVANJ
March - April 1993.GODINE

Jajce

TUMAC

D
D
VRS

D ABiH

*
D HVO

~ PRAVAC DJELOVANJA
___,/ AB1H
C
MJESTO SU KOBA

VAZ:N IJE
PROMETN IC E

Lipanj STANJE: LIPANJ

June 1993.GODINE
D
Jajce

TUMAC

D VRS
R
D ABiH

*
D HVO

~ PRAVAC DJELOVAN JA
___,/ AB1H

MJESTO SUKOBA

VAZNIJE
PROMETN ICE

Središnja Bosna, 1993.

Central Bosnia, 1993.

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 Zemljovidi • Maps

Srpanj

~~
STANJE: SRPANJ
July 1993.GODINE

TUMAC

D VRS

D ABiH

*
D HVO

:::!::>
H
PRAVAC OJELOVANJA
AB1H

MJESTO SUKOBA

VAZNIJE
PROMETNICE
M
Rujan STANJE: RUJAN
September 1993.GODINE

Jajce

TUMAC
D
D VRS

D ABiH

*
HVO

:::!::> PRAVAC DJELOVANJA

ABiH
C
MJESTO SUKOBA
Tomislavgra<l

VA.i:N IJE
PROMETNICE

Listopad STANJE: LISTOPAD

October 1993.GODINE
D
Jajce

TUMAC

D VRS
R
D ABiH

*
HVO

~ PRAVAC DJ ELOVANJA
__.--y AB1H

MJESTO SUKDBA

VAZNIJE
PROMETNICE

Središnja Bosna, 1993.

Central Bosnia, 1993.

601

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 Zemljovidi • Maps

Studeni STANJE: STUDENI

November 1993. GODINE

TUMAC

D VRS

D ABiH
H
D HVO

~ BROJ RASELJEN IH
~ HRVATA
- - VA Z.NI JE PROMETNICE
M
Središnja Bosna, 1993.
Central Bosnia, 1993.

MOSTAR: SITUACIJA MOSTAR: SITUACIJA

PRIJE 30. LIPNJA 1993. POSLIJE 30. LIPNJA 1993.
D
4, BATALJUN
C
D
,·
R
HVO
ABiH
VRS
D HVO
D ABiH
D VRS

Mostar, prije 30. lipnja 1993. Mostar, poslije 30. lipnja 1993.
Mostar, before June 30, 1993. Mostar, after June 30, 1993.

602

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 Zemljovidi • Maps

WASHINGTONSKI SPORAZUM, 1994.

(Podrucja dogovorena u Becu, svibanj 1994.)
H
M
TUMAC
Granice opCina

Granice Zupanija
1 Unsko - sanska zupanija
- Muslimani 2 Posavska zupanija
3 Tuzlansko - zvorniC:ka Zupanija
- Srbi 4 Zenicko - dobojska zupanija
D
5 Gorazdanska zupanija
6 Srednjobosanska zupanija
- Hrvati
7 Srednjohercegovacka zupanija
~ PomijeSani Muslimani i Hrvati 8 Zapadnohercegovacka zupanija
9 Sarajevo

Washingtonski sporazum, ožujak 1994.

The Washington Agreement, March 1994.
C
.
c:.hv~
• v..,4:4;,
• Ku />i'>J • Kop romlc,
• z,w..

. .·~
P:.e<i Op•tv ~ !<I< •
D
Fl o•tflJ •

>w
R
Okupirano područje u RH (označeno crvenom bojom) i Preostala okupirana područja RH (označena crvenom bo-
BiH krajem 1992. godine. jom) i RBiH potkraj listopada 1995., uoči početka pregov-
ora u Daytonu.
Serb occupied areas of the Republic of Croatia (marked
red) and Bosnia and Herzegovina in late 1992. Serb occupied areas of the Republic of Croatia (marked
red) and Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina in late Octo-
ber 1995, on the eve of the negotiations in Dayton.

603

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 Zemljovidi • Maps

H
M
D
C
D
Polozaji HVO
Polozaji ABiH
Polozaji VRS
R
prostor pod nadzorom 41. mtbr
ad 10. 5. do 30.6.1993. g.

prostor pod nadzorom ABiH

ad 1.7.1993. do kraja sukoba

Mostar, svibanj 1993. – veljača 1994.

Mostar, May 1993 – February 1994.

604

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H
M
D
C
D
R
Plan operacije ARBiH Neretva na širem području Mostara, rujan 1993.
ARBiH plan for Operation Neretva in the wider Mostar area, September 1993.

605

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 Zemljovidi • Maps

H
M
D
C
D
R
Raspored ARBiH i HVO-a u dolini Vrbasa prema podacima 3. korpusa ARBiH, prosinac 1992. – siječanj 1993.
Positions of ARBiH and HVO in the Vrbas Valley according to III ARBiH Corps’s documents, December 1992 – January 1993.

606

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 Zemljovidi • Maps

H
M
D
C
D
R
Obostrani raspored HVO-a i ARBiH u Hercegovini u srpnju 1993.
Positions of ARBiH and HVO in Herzegovina, July 1993.

607

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Travnicka 987
Franko pan 1.035
J. Francetic 533
N. S. Zrinski 1.942
S. Tomasevic 1.635
Viteska 2.238
Ban Jelacic 3.028
Kotromanovic 458
Bobovac 1.331
Usorska 2.158
111.xp 3.115
Kralj Tvrtko 1.710
H
M
D
Livanjska 2.248
Tomislavgrad 2.500
Posuska 1.286
Rama i Vakuf 2.000
Jajce 500
Kupres 200
C
D
br S. Radie 1.600
br Grude 1.200
br M. H. Ci kola 960
br Prva 3.400
br Druga 2.161
brTreca 1.277
br Citlucka 670
R
prof. postr. 1.240
VP+ATG 2.160

SVEUKUPNO: 14.668

I• ~ $;

Brojno stanje i crta obrane HVO-a krajem ljeta 1993.

The numerical strength and defense line of the HVO, August – September 1993.

608

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 Zemljovidi • Maps

H
M
D
C
D
R
Obostrani raspored snaga u Bugojnu uoči napada ARBiH na HVO, srpanj 1993.
Positions of ARBiH and HVO in Bugojno on the eve of the ARBiH attack on the HVO, July 1993.

609

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 Zemljovidi • Maps

H
M
D
C
D
R
Uskoplje (Gornji Vakuf), kolovoz 1993.
Uskoplje (Gornji Vakuf), August 1993.

610

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H
M
D
C
D
R
Zamisao operacije ARBiH Neretva na području Uskoplja i Rame, rujan 1993.
ARBiH plan for Operation Neretva in the Uskoplje and Rama areas, September 1993.

611

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 Zemljovidi • Maps

H
M
ARBiH protjeruje Hrvate iz Konjica, ožujak i travanj 1993.
D
Expulsion of Croats by the ARBiH from Konjic, March – April 1993.
C
D
R
Vareš, lipanj – studeni 1993.
Vareš, June – November 1993.

612

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 Zemljovidi • Maps

H
M
Kiseljak, Kreševo i Fojnica, lipanj – rujan 1993.
D
Kiseljak, Kreševo i Fojnica, June – September 1993.
C
D
R
Kiseljak, Kreševo i Fojnica, listopad 1993. – ožujak 1994.
Kiseljak, Kreševo i Fojnica, October 1993 – March 1994.

613

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 Zemljovidi • Maps

H
M
D
C
D
R
Tešanj, Žepče, Zavidovići, Maglaj, crte obrane 1993. - 1994.
Tešanj, Žepče, Zavidovići, Maglaj; defense lines 1993 - 1994.

614

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 Zemljovidi • Maps

H
M
D
C
D
R
Raspored snaga u Kaknju uoči napada ARBiH na HVO, travanj 1993.
Positions of ARBiH and HVO in Kakanj on the eve of the ARBiH attack on the HVO, April 1993.

615

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 Kazalo imena • Name Index

Kazalo imena
Name Index
H
Abdić Fikret, 77, 289, 376, 379, 380, 382, 383, 397 Božović Đorđe Giška, 95
Adžić Blagoje, 162, 174 Brkić Miljenko, 76
Agotić Imra, 100 Broz Josip Tito, 29, 52
Ahrens Geert, 468 Budimir Božo, 126
Ahtisaari Marrti, 544 Budimir Živko, 126
Alagić Adnan, 399 Bulatović Momir, 55, 174
M
Alagić Mehmed, 143 Carrington Peter, 55, 439
Albright Madeleine, 562 Carter Jimmy, 386
Allcock B. John, 489 Chirac Jacques, 86
Andrić Miro, 315 Clinton William, 86
Antičević Boris, 514 Cokić Jevrem, 192
Antonetti Jean-Claude, 432 Cot Jean, 64
D
Arlović Mato, 496, 497 Crnjac Miljenko, 126, 234
Avramović Života, 91, 163 Cutileiro José, 84, 538, 539
Babić Milan, 43, 69, 70, 75, 391 Čaja Ivica, 389
Bagarić Ivan, 494 Čečura Draženko, 514
Bajić Ljubomir, 163 Čeleketić Milan, 109, 132, 133, 379, 388, 392
C
Bajramović Ismet Ćelo, 228 Černi Josip, 141
Baker James, 53 Černomirdin Viktor, 86
Basarac Ivan, 126 Červenko Zvonimir, 101, 126, 406
Bebić Luka, 100 Češnjaj Izidor, 126
Bell Martin, 522 Čulo Branko, 494
Beljo Marinko, 309 Ćibo Safet, 304, 530
D
Bernard Janvier, 64 Ćorić Valentin, 506
Bilajac Rifat, 540 Damjanović Ante, 494
Biočić Mihovil, 515 Dečak Đuro, 121, 125
Bjegović Đorđe, 70 Dedaković Mile Jastreb, 106
Blaškić Tihomir, 111, 135, 141, 259, 325, 328, 333, 337, Delalić Ramiz Ćelo, 142, 143
R
344, 400, 557 Delalić Zejnil, 254
Blažanović Jovo, 264 Delić Rasim, 118, 142, 293, 295, 342, 365, 368, 400, 433,
Blažević Stjepan, 264 486, 531, 532, 541
Boban Mate, 76, 83, 292, 293, 429, 505, 509-511, 534, Doko Jerko, 509
543, 545, 548 Dragičević Drago, 141
Bobetko Janko, 62, 101, 121, 124-126, 134, 232, 234, Dudaković Atif, 409
237, 249, 251, 259, 262, 530 Duncan Alaister, 552
Boljkovac Josip, 160 Džakula Veljko, 71, 389
Boras Franjo, 77, 294 Džanko Luka, 126, 192, 316
Boutros Boutros Ghali, 68, 391, 422 Džiho Šefkija, 539

616

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 Kazalo imena • Name Index

Đapić Ante, 105 Ivandić Pejo, 515

Đodan Šime, 100 Ivandić Stipo, 515
Đorđević Slobodan, 129 Ivkanec Nikola, 389
Đujić Ilija, 108 Izetbegović Alija, 62, 76, 77, 83–86, 219, 226, 253, 289,
Eagleburger Lawrence, 52 292–294, 353, 365, 382, 399, 400, 402, 425, 440, 484,
Efendić Hasan, 117, 509 487, 488, 507–510, 512, 517, 523, 529–531, 535–539,
Erdelja Boris, 197 541–546, 548, 551, 558, 560, 563
Filipović Filip, 141, 259, 265 Izetbegović Bakir, 563
Filipović Muhamed, 504, 536 Jaganjac Jasmin, 268, 294
Gabričević Veselko, 126 Jandrić Jadranko, 114
H
Gaillard Jean Jacques, 468 Jelić Zlatan Mijo, 315
Galbraith Peter, 468 Jerzečić Miroslav, 126
Galić Stanislav, 264 Jović Borisav, 56, 148, 155, 159, 162, 174, 175, 218
Ganić Ejup, 77 Jović Josip, 157, 218
Garić Milan, 514 Jukić Vlado, 105
Garić Sanja, 514 Jurić Anica, 515
M
Ghasemia Saeed, 553 Jurić Dragan, 515
Glasnović Željko, 141, 234 Jurić Juro, 515
Golem Frane Vinko, 53 Jurić Ljubomir, 515
Gonzalez Felipe, 86 Jurić Stjepan, 515
Gorinšek Karl, 215 Jurjević Zvonimir, 92
Gotovina Ante, 126, 182, 235, 237, 441 Kadijević Veljko, 90, 149, 153, 155, 156, 162, 163,
D
Granić Mate, 432 173–175, 198, 218, 438, 489
Grebenar Augustina, 514 Kadrić Muhidin, 264
Grebenar Velimir, 514 Kaić Žarko, 197
Gregurić Franjo, 38, 60 Kandić Mile, 91, 93
Grubišić Božidar, 91 Karadžić Radovan, 76, 77, 115, 403, 404, 429, 534
Gušić Novica, 539 Karnavas G. Michael, 559, 564
C
Gušić Salko, 142 Kerestedžijanc Leonid, 468
Hadžić Goran, 70, 75, 391 Kinčl Miroslav Igla, 182
Hadžihasanović Enver, 260, 291, 302, 551 Klein Jacques Paul, 69
Hadžihusejnović Rusmir, 531 Kljujić Stjepan, 76, 77, 537
Hadžiosmanović Ismet, 522 Kohl Helmut, 58, 86
D
Halilović Sefer,118, 142, 143, 304, 320, 430, 431, 510, Kolšek Konrad, 91, 163
519, 528, 535, 546, 547, 549 Koljević Nikola, 536
Hamad Ali, 551 Kordić Dario, 76, 553, 557
Hannay David, 562 Kostić Branko, 174
Harambašić Stevo, 389 Kovačević Savo, 236
R
Harris Robin, 556, 564 Kraljević Baja, 136, 138
Hebrang Andrija, 443 Kraljević Blaž, 114
Herrick Richard, 557, 558 Kraljević Darko, 114, 292, 324
Hodge Carol, 518 Križanović Sanja, 514
Holbrooke Richard, 412, 413 Krpina Drago, 432
Holman Mladen, 114 Krstičević Živko, 197
Hrkać Mario Ćikota, 137, 307 Kubura Amir, 551
Ivan Pavao II, 60 Kučan Milan, 53
Ivandić Ana, 515 Kukanjac Milutin, 93
Ivandić Milan, 515 Lang Slobodan, 494

617

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 Kazalo imena • Name Index

La Presle de Bertrand, 64 429, 430, 433, 487, 489, 535, 536

Lasić Miljenko, 135, 248, 315 Milovanović Manojlo, 403, 416
Lauš Dragun, 515 Miljavac Pavao, 126
Lauš Fabijan, 515 Mladić Ratko, 115, 283, 402, 404, 410
Lauš Ivo, 515 Morillon Philippe, 219, 339, 510
Lauš Miroslav, 515 Mrkšić Mile, 109, 129, 133, 392, 404-406
Lauš Sarafina, 515 Mršić Zdravko, 53
Lederer Gordan, 197 Muslimović Fikret, 365, 511
Leho Fatima, 539 Nazor Ante, 561
Lendo Refik, 270 Ninković Živomir, 116
H
Letica Sveto, 237 Norac Mirko, 126
Letić Stanko, 379 Novaković Mile, 109, 130, 133
Lončar Budimir, 56 Novoselić Zdravko, 148
Lozančić Ivo, 272 Obradović Nedjeljko, 141, 315
Lucić Josip, 125 Orić Naser, 396
Lučić Ivica, 496, 501 Oručević Safet, 539, 540
M
Ljubičić Paško, 259 Owen David, 84, 504, 505, 544, 545
Major John, 86 Panić Života, 91
Maksić Radoslav, 108 Paradžik Ante, 105
Manolić Josip, 36, 38, 39, 60 Paraga Dobroslav, 105, 106, 114, 292
Marčetić Augustin, 522 Pašalić Arif, 248, 268, 294, 296, 431, 524, 526, 527,
Marčetić Ivan, 522 531, 547
D
Marčetić Jela, 522 Pašalić Ivić, 405
Mareković Marijan, 126, 409 Pavlović Ludvig, 198
Marić Velimir, 228 Pelivan Jure, 77
Marijan Davor, 25, 493, 528, 561 Perinović Davor, 76
Marinov Ante, 192 Petković Milivoj, 111, 139, 141, 294, 298, 506, 510
Marinović Nojko, 126, 191 Pinter Nika, 551, 564
C
Markač Mladen, 100 Plavšić Biljana, 77
Marković Ante, 29, 51-53, 475 Poljak Drago, 135, 248
Martić Milan, 43, 70, 72, 74, 107, 379, 388, 392, 402, 410 Praljak Slobodan, 25, 111, 139, 238, 245, 268, 294, 357,
Marx Karl, 96 506, 551, 556, 558, 559
Massud Khalid, 551, 552 Prazina Jusuf Juka, 138, 228, 313
D
Matacotta Cordella Alfredo, 468 Primorac Stanko - Ćane, 114
Mateša Zlatko, 60 Primorac Ivan, 315
Matić Stanko, 112 Prkačin Ante, 268
Matković Risto, 70 Prlić Jadranko, 83, 395, 432, 496, 506, 512, 520, 550,
Matuzović Đuro, 136 553, 556, 557, 559
R
Merdan Džemal, 519 Purić Ivan, 141
Mesić Stjepan, 36, 38, 54, 60, 152, 165, 475 Pušić Berislav, 506
Mikanović Mato, 522 Rački Antun, 126
Mikanović Pera, 522 Rajić Božo, 295, 524, 542
Mikanović Slavko, 522 Rajić Ivica, 343, 344
Mikelić Borislav, 70, 74, 391 Rajić Zvonko, 300
Mikšić Josip, 121 Raković Mirko, 129
Mikulić Ante, 111 Ramljak Dragan, 514
Milošević Slobodan, 15, 31, 32, 55, 56, 70, 74, 86, 152, Rašković Jovan, 43, 44
156, 160, 162, 174, 175, 218, 381, 391, 392, 402, 405, Ražnatović Željko Arkan, 95, 223

618

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 Kazalo imena • Name Index

Reljić Smiljan, 405 Šoljić Niko, 515

Roso Ante, 111, 139, 141, 235, 237, 365 Špegelj Martin, 61, 100, 151, 153-155, 206–208,
Rozga Rozario, 121 429, 430
Rožič Marjan, 163 Šušak Gojko, 60, 292, 405, 413, 432, 530, 542, 544,
Rudolf Davorin, 53 547, 559
Ružinovski Mile, 192 Thatcher Margaret, 556, 564
Satish Nambiar, 64 Thebault Jean Pierre, 510
Sekulić Milisav, 174 Tole Žarko, 139, 234, 259, 262, 360
Shrader R. Charles, 301, 325, 326, 517, 548, 557, 564 Tomljanović Damir - Gavran, 182
Silajdžić Haris, 400 Tomšić Josip, 121, 126
H
Skender Zvonimir, 139 Tonković Ivan, 121
Skoko Iko, 494 Topalović Mušan Caco, 142, 143
Skračić Luka, 197 Torbica Milan, 108, 130
Slivar Stjepan, 121 Totić Živko, 324, 329, 518
Soldo Ilija, 515 Tuđman Franjo, 34, 36, 39, 48, 53, 57, 59, 60, 62, 68,
Soldo Pero, 515 72, 73, 85, 86, 121, 148, 151, 208, 232, 292, 294, 365,
M
Spirkovski Aleksandar, 91 382, 391, 398–400, 404, 405, 407, 412, 413, 422, 425,
Stambolić Ivan, 31 429, 430, 432, 433, 437, 487-489, 505, 510, 512, 513,
Stanković Branko, 193 529, 530–532, 543–546, 548, 553, 554, 557, 560
Starešina Višnja, 550 Tuđman Miroslav, 409, 501, 504, 530
Stefanović Božidar, 92 Tunuković Tihomir, 197
Stepinac Alojzije, 60 Tus Anton, 101, 124
D
Stewart (pukovnik), 518 Urban Pavo, 197
Stipčić Rudi, 126 Valentić Nikica, 60
Stipetić Petar, 121, 126, 405 Valjan Velimir, 494
Stojak Ivica, 270 Vance Cyrus, 56, 63, 70, 84, 292, 545
Stojanović Vladimir, 91 Viduka Mate, 126
Stojić Bruno, 506, 546, 547 Vlaić Ante, 495
C
Stoltenberg Thorvald, 84, 505 Vlašić Ferdo, 494
Strugar Pavle, 93, 192 Voltaire François Marie Arouet, 559, 564
Stupar Milorad, 132 Vrbanac Vinko, 125
Šaćirbej Muhamed, 560 Vukojević Ivan, 515
Šadić Hazim, 342 Vukušić Herman, 494
D
Šantić Vlado, 112 Wahlgren Lars-Eric, 64
Šarinić Hrvoje, 60 Zadro Franjo, 256
Šarlija Daidža Mate (Nijaz Batlak), 61, 62, 192, 253, 543 Zečević Anto, 522
Šejtanić Esad, 539 Zečević Ivo, 522
Šeparović Zvonimir, 53 Zečević Kata, 522
R
Šešelj Vojislav, 95 Zečević Manda, 522
Šiber Stjepan, 294 Zečević Mirko, 522
Šiljeg Željko, 135, 139 Zečević Stjepan, 522
Šimović Božan, 251 Zečević Zdravko, 70
Škare Ožbolt Vesna, 405 Zelić Slavko, 229, 353
Šolaja Ljubica, 43 Zimmermann Warren, 52, 487, 537
Šoljić Ivo, 515 Zorica Bruno Zulu, 259
Šoljić Kata, 515 Zubak Krešimir, 83, 386, 395, 400
Šoljić Mato, 515
Šoljić Mijo, 515

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 Zemljovidi • Maps
Zemljovidi
Maps
- 28 (str./page): Socijalistička Federativna Republika
Jugoslavija (SFRJ) / Socialist Federative Republic of
H
Yugoslavia (SFRY)
- 68: Zemljovid snaga UN-a s ucrtanim UNPA i tzv. ru-
žičastim zonama / Map showing the deployment of
UN forces, the UNPAs and the so-called “pink zones”
M
- 95: Plan napada JNA na RH, 1991. / JNA Strategic
Offensive Plan, 1991
- 212: Okupirano područje RH – UNPA područja 1992.-
1995. / The Occupied parts of Croatia – UNPA zones
1992-1995
- 275: Bosanska Posavina, travanj – lipanj 1992. /
D
April – June 1992
- 281: Bosanska Posavina, kolovoz 1992. – siječanj
1993. / August 1992 – January
- 303: Središnja Bosna, dolina Lašve krajem travnja
C
1993. / Central Bosnia, Lašva Valley, end of April 1993
- 369: Središnja Bosna, dolina Lašve nakon borbi u
travnju i lipnju 1993. / Central Bosnia, Lašva Valley,
after the figthing in April and June, 1993
- 490: Daytonski sporazum, 21. studenoga 1995. /
The Dayton Agreement, November 21, 1995
- 503: Zemljovid Vance-Owenova plana unutarnje
podjele BiH na 9 provincija i posebno područje Sara-
jeva / Map showing the internal division of BiH into
9 provinces and the district of Sarajevo as proposed
by the Vance-Owen plan
- 590: Narodnosni sastav SFRJ, 1991. / Ethnic Compo-
sition in the former Yugoslavia, 1991
- 590: Plan napadne operacije JNA, rujan – listopad
1991 / JNA Strategic Offensive Plan, September -
October 1991
- 591: Operacija Bljesak, svibanj 1995. /
Operation Flash, May 1995
620
Domovinski rat 04-02-2020 Knjiga 1.indd 620
- 592: Operacija Oluja, kolovoz 1995. /
Operation Storm, August 1995
- 593: Zapadna Bosna, rujan – listopad 1995. (ope-
racije Maestral i Južni potez) / Western Bosnia,
September – October 1995 (Operations Maestral
and Južni potez)
- 593: BiH, 20. listopada 1995. / Bosnia and Herzegovi-
na, October 20, 1995
- 593: Općine BiH, 1991. / The Municipalities of Bosnia
and Herzegovina, 1991
- 594: Narodnosni sastav BiH / Ethnic Composition of BiH
- 595: Srpske autonomne oblasti u BiH (SAO), 1991. /
Bosnian Serb Autonomous Areas (SAO), 1991
- 595: Operativne zone HVO-a / Armed Forces of Her-
zeg Bosna Operational Zones, August 1992
- 596: Općine sa apsolutnom ili relativnom većinom
Hrvata / Municipalities with a Relative or Absolute
Croat Majority
- 596: Hrvatska zajednica Herceg-Bosna i Bosanska
Posavina, 1991 / The Croatian Communities of Her-
ceg-Bosna and Bosanska Posavina, 1991.
D
- 597: Banovina Hrvatska, 1939., i Hrvatske zajedni-
ce, 1991. / The Banovina, 1939 and Croatian Com-
munities, 1991;
izvor /source: ICTY – IT-04-74, P09276
- 597: Banovina Hrvatska, 1939. (prikaz općina u BiH
R
koje je obuhvatila) / The Banovina 1939 (showing
BiH municipalities)
- 598: Vance-Owenov mirovni plan, siječanj 1993. /
The Vance-Owen Peace Plan, January 1993;
izvor /source: ICTY – IT-04-74, P09276
- 598: Promijenjeni Vance-Owenov mirovni plan, ožu-
jak 1993. / Altered Map of Vance-Owen Peace Plan,
March 1993
4.2.2020. 18:38:45
 Zemljovidi • Maps

- 599: Cutileirov mirovni plan, ožujak 1992.) /
The Cutileiro Peace Plan, March 1992.;
izvor /source: ICTY – IT-04-74, P09276
- 599: Owen-Stoltenbergov mirovni plan, kolovoz 1993. /
The Owen-Stoltenberg Peace Plan, August 1993;
izvor /source: ICTY – IT-04-74, P09276
- 600: Središnja Bosna, 1993. - siječanj; ožujak – travanj;
lipanj / Central Bosnia, 1993 - January; March – April;
June
H
- 601: Središnja Bosna, 1993. – srpanj ; rujan ; listopad /
Central Bosnia, 1993 – July; September; October
- 602: Središnja Bosna, 1993. – studeni /
Central Bosnia, 1993 – November
M
- 602: Mostar, prije 30. lipnja 1993. / Mostar, before
June 30, 1993
- 602: Mostar, poslije 30. lipnja 1993. / Mostar, after
June 30, 1993
- 608: Brojno stanje i crta obrane HVO-a krajem ljeta
1993. / The numerical strength and defense line of
the HVO, August – September 1993
- 609: Obostrani raspored u Bugojnu uoči napada AR-
BiH na HVO, srpanj 1993. / Positions of ARBiH and
HVO in Bugojno on the eve of the ARBiH attack on
the HVO, July 1993.
- 610: Uskoplje (Gornji Vakuf ), kolovoz 1993. /
August 3, 1993
- 611: Zamisao operacije ARBiH Neretva na području
Uskoplja i Rame, rujan 1993. / ARBiH plan for Oper-
ation Neretva in the Uskoplje and Rama areas, Sep-
tember 1993
- 612: ARBiH protjeruje Hrvate iz Konjica, ožujak i tra-
vanj 1993. / Expulsion of Croats by the ARBiH from
Konjic, March – April 1993
- 612: Vareš, lipanj – studeni 1993. / June – November 1993

- 603: Washingtonski sporazum, ožujak 1994. / - 613: Kiseljak, Kreševo i Fojnica, lipanj – rujan 1993. /
D
The Washington Agreement, March 1994 June – September 1993
- 603: Okupirano područje u RH i BiH krajem 1992. / - 613: Kiseljak, Kreševo i Fojnica, listopad 1993. – ožu-
Serb occupied areas of the Republic of Croatia and jak 1994. / October 1993 – March 1994
Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina in late 1992
- 614: Tešanj, Žepče, Zavidovići, crte obrane 1993.-1994. /
C
- 603: Preostala okupirana područja u RH i BiH krajem Tešanj, Žepče, Zavidovići; defense lines 1993 - 1994
listopada 1995., uoči početka pregovora u Daytonu /
Serb occupied areas of the Republic of Croatia and - 615: Raspored snaga u Kaknju uoči napada ARBiH
Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina in late October na HVO, travanj 1993. / Positions of ARBiH and HVO
1995, on the eve of the negotiations in Dayton in Kakanj on the eve of the ARBiH attack on the HVO,
April 1993.
D
- 604: Mostar: svibanj 1993. – veljača 1994. /
Mostar: May 1993 – February 1994
- 605: Plan operacije ARBiH Neretva na širem područ-
ju Mostara, rujan 1993. / ARBiH plan for Operation
Neretva in the wider Mostar area, September 1993
R
- 606: Raspored ARBiH i HVO u dolini Vrbasa prema
podacima 3. korpusa ARBiH, prosinac 1992. – sije-
čanj 1993. / Positions of ARBiH and HVO in the Vrbas
Valley according to III ARBiH Corps’s documents, De-
cember 1992 – January 1993
- 607: Obostrani raspored HVO-a i ARBiH u Hercego-
vini u srpnju 1993. / Positions of ARBiH and HVO in
Herzegovina, July 1993

621

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 Zemljovidi • Maps

Izvori za zemljovide i autori zemljovida

Sources and Map authors

H
- str. / page: 594-599 – Prlic et al Court Binder (ICTY – IT-04-74, P09276)
- str. / page: 598, 600-603 - Jadranko Prlić, Prilozi za povijest Hrvatske Republike Herceg Bosne, II-III, Mostar-Zagreb,
2017; zemljovide izradio / maps prepared by Dario Šakić, mag.
- str. / page: 28, 95, 275, 281, 590, 592, 593 - Balkan Battlegrounds: A Military History of the Yugoslav Conflict, 1990-1995,
M
Volume I, Central Intelligence Agency, Office of Russian and European Analysis, Washington, DC 20505, May 2002
- str. / page: 591: Rajko Rakić – Branko Dubravica, Kratak pregled vojnih djelovanja u Domovinskom ratu, 1991.-1995.,
MORH – OSRH, Hrvatsko vojno učilište, Zagreb 2009., 142.
- str. / page: 303, 369, 590, 612-615 - Davor Marijan, Rat Hrvata i Muslimana u BiH od 1992. do 1994., Zagreb,
2018.; zemljovide izradio / maps prepared by Tomislav Kovačić.
D
- str. / page: 68, 490, 503; zemljovide priredio / maps prepared by Marin Sabolović.
C
D
R

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© Udruga Hrvatska zvona
Hrvatski memorijalno-dokumentacijski centar Domovinskog rata

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