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How Good Policies and Business Ethics Enhance Good Quality of Life The Selected Works of Alex C Michalos 1st Edition Alex C. Michalos (Auth.)
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Alex C. Michalos
123
Alex C. Michalos
University of Northern British Columbia
Prince George, BC
Canada
Most of the previously published papers in this set of four volumes (and most of my
books) appeared in a publication of Springer, Kluwer, Reidel, or Nijhoff, a chain of
publishers that I have had the opportunity to work with since the 1960s. Since the
original source of each paper in the collection is given on its first page in this
collection, there is no need to repeat all these sources and express my thanks for
permission to reprint them in each occurrence. I am happy to express here my
gratitude for the lot and for the many years of our pleasant and productive work
together.
In each of the volumes in this set, I will acknowledge permission to reprint each
of the previously published papers appearing in scholarly journals, books, or
newspapers apart from the chain of publishers listed above. In this second volume,
I would like to thank John Wiley and Sons Ltd. for Chap. 1. Michalos, A.C. (1997).
Social sciences and business ethics. In P.H. Werhane & R.E. Freeman (Eds.).
Encyclopedic Dictionary of Business Ethics, (pp. 595–597). Oxford: Blackwell;
Elsevier Pub. for Chap. 2. Michalos, A.C. (2012). Business ethics and the quality of
life. In R. Chadwick (Ed.). Encyclopedia of Applied Ethics, (pp. 361–364).
Amsterdam: Elsevier; Pearson Canada for Chap. 6. Michalos, A.C. (2005). The
loyal agent’s argument. In D.C. Poff (Ed.). Business Ethics in Canada, 4th ed.
(pp. 200–206). Toronto: Pearson Canada; Pearson Canada for Chap. 7. Michalos,
A.C. (2005). Moral responsibility in business. In D.C. Poff (Ed.). Business Ethics in
Canada, 4th ed. (pp. 30–46). Toronto: Pearson Canada; University of Illinois Press
for Chap. 8. Michalos, A.C. (1988). A case for a progressive annual net wealth tax.
Public Affairs Quarterly, 2: 105–140; New York Academy of Sciences for Chap. 9.
Michalos, A.C. (1989). Militarism and the quality of life. Annals of the New York
Academy of Sciences, 577: 216–230; newspapers Globe and Mail, Prince George
Citizen, and Guelph Mercury for several letters in Chap. 22. Michalos, A.C.
In the Appendix of each volume, I included some photographs and pictures to
provide a somewhat different kind of historical context to my narrative. What I have
been able to contribute over the past 50 years or so has been influenced by many
more people than I have been able to picture here, but when I reflect on what I have
ix
x Acknowledgements
done, most of the people pictured here are very much a part of the story. Most of the
photographs and pictures are from my family albums, but some have come from
friends and a couple newspapers. I would like to express my thanks to the following
for allowing me to reprint their items: Wolfgang Glatzer for photographs in How
Good Policies and Business Ethics Enhance Good Quality of Life, numbered v2.1
(short for photo #1, volume 2), in Development of the Quality of Life Theory and
its Instruments (v3.3, v3.5, and v3.6), and in Connecting the Quality of Life Theory
to Health, Well-Being and Education (v4.1); to Ferran Casas for photographs v2.6,
v3.1, v3.2 and v3.4; to Filomena Maggino for v4.4, v4.5 and v4.6; to Anna L.D.
Lau and Robert A. Cummins for v4.3, v4.8 and v4.9, to Valerie Moller for v3.7 and
v3.8; to Joanna Kit-Chun Lam for v3.11; to Daniel T.L. Shek for v4.2; to the
Cleveland Plain Dealer for Philosophical Foundations of Quality of Life (v1.4),
and to the Detroit Free Press for v1.7.
Contents
xi
xii Contents
xvii
xviii Overview of the “The Selected Works of Alex C. Michalos”
Biographical Notes
The central aim of this set of volumes is to describe and explain the context and
connections among a subset of papers and books produced over the past 50 years.
Rather than a mere reproduction of work already published, this will be an attempt
to disclose the productive processes in their various historic contexts that led to the
various research projects and publications. In Michalos (2003), I published a col-
lection called Essays on the Quality of Life containing 20 articles focused on the
quality of life, 3 of which appear in other volumes of this set because they seemed
to be so central to the array of issues in the 70 articles in these volumes. For
completeness, I mention articles from the earlier collection and books that are
directly relevant to the themes in these volumes.
Some years ago (these days, it seems that most things begin with “some years
ago,” unfortunately), in a debate about the existence of God, a member of the
audience put the question to us “Why would God want to watch re-runs?”. The
question made sense from the point of view of one of the debaters, since God was
supposed to know everything that is going to happen before it happens. As the
atheist in the debate, I could only say that I have no idea why, although a lot of
people seem to enjoy them.
While I also enjoy some reruns, I would not find much joy in rebinding some old
papers for a new audience. I do, however, find the idea of describing the historical
context in which similar research questions more or less simultaneously appeared to
people in diverse parts of the globe and were addressed first individually and then
collectively. Here, the historical context includes some of my own biographical
material. This is offered as a kind of second-best effort substituting for an autobi-
ography that I have never had the courage to write, notwithstanding having thought
about it many times.
My father ended his formal education in the sixth grade, and my mother ended
hers in the eighth grade. As far as I have been able to discern, in 1917, when he was
about 17, my father, Charles K. Michalos, emigrated from the island of Chios,
xxiii
xxiv Introduction to “Selected Works of Alex C. Michalos”
Greece, to work in the steel mills of Gary, Indiana. He arrived with a pocket-sized
Greek–English dictionary, learned to speak English with a heavy Greek accent,
moved from the mills to driving a Nabisco bread and pastry truck for another
17 years, bought a small hamburger joint, then a somewhat bigger one and finally
something more like a diner on Euclid Avenue in Cleveland, Ohio. Its claim to
fame was the fact that many of the Cleveland Browns ate there, which was quite a
big deal in 1947 when the Browns were the All American Football Conference
champions and I was one of their biggest junior high school fans. My father died in
January 1951, at about 51. We were never sure, because he was never sure, how old
he was. I was daddy’s boy, and his loss was a great loss to me.
My mother, Josephine Pucci, was born in Akron, Ohio, one of eight children of
immigrants from Palermo, Sicily. She worked at the May Company Department
store, sang in the chorus of the Cleveland Opera Company, married my father in
1931, produced my brother in 1932 and me in 1935, and provided the mom part of
our mom and pop diner. Unlike my dad, she was not a particularly happy person,
but she lived to be 93 years of age, dying in June 1998. Like my dad, and the rest of
us I guess, she did the best she could with what she had.
I was generally an above average but not outstanding primary and secondary
school student. In secondary school and the first half of university, I was more
interested in sports and girls than scholarship, though I enjoyed mathematics and
history. I went to what was then Western Reserve University (now Case-Western
Reserve University) in 1953, majoring in history with minors in philosophy and
religion. When I read Plato’s Republic, I felt as if he was talking directly to me. It
had never occurred to me to ask what a good life might be, but the more I thought
about it, the more I had to think about it.
I grew up in a very mixed religious family. The story my mother told was that
her family were Catholics until the local priest did something that led my grand-
father to tell him to go to hell and he took the whole gene pool into a more friendly
Baptist church. My father seemed to practice the religion of washing his car on
Sundays, but he thought his sons had to be baptized Greek Orthodox in order to
preserve something or other that was important to him. So, we were. However,
because our house was one block away from a small Quaker church, my brother,
Chuck Michalos, and I were sent off together as soon as we were old enough to find
our way there and back. I have a gold medal showing that I accumulated three years
of Sundays without missing Quaker Sunday school.
Given this background, when I began to think seriously about a good life,
I thought I should make my peace with God if there were one. So, besides studying
philosophy, I studied the history of religions. Then, I went to graduate school at the
University of Chicago. Because I was what one would have called a doubter,
I wanted to study religion in a school of believers, assuming that if anyone could
convince me that I was wrong, they could. At least they would be inclined to try.
So, in 1957, I enrolled in the Divinity School, which seemed to have the most
diverse faculty, including visiting experts in Buddhism, which especially interested
me.
Introduction to “Selected Works of Alex C. Michalos” xxv
I also married in the summer of 1957, a marriage that lasted about 23 years and
produced Cyndi (1960), Ted (1961), and Stephanie (1963). In 1985, I married the
love of my life, Deborah Poff, a lucky break for both of us at the time and ever
since.
While studying the history of religions, I took courses in philosophy and it
seemed to me that philosophers had more precise and decisive methods of pursuing
the truth than theologians. The University of Chicago had a wonderfully flexible
approach to higher education, allowing students to pursue more than one degree at a
time. To get a bachelor of divinity degree, a student was required to pass 7 com-
prehensive examinations and have a year internship in some relevant field of
practice. I took some courses designed to prepare one to take the examinations and
some courses in philosophy that I found interesting. At the 1961 convocation,
I received a B.D. and an M.A. in philosophy and then proceeded to pursue a Ph.D.
in philosophy of science. I completed the latter in 1965 with a dissertation on a
dispute between Rudolf Carnap and Karl Popper on the nature and use of proba-
bility theory in the assessment of scientific theories (Michalos 1971).
Many of the most salient and important features of the following 50 years of
research and other activities may be regarded as relatively natural developments
of these earlier initiatives. In a memorable essay on the best teacher he ever had,
Keyfitz (2003) said that scholars should replace the metaphor of providing building
blocks for a relatively durable corporate body of knowledge with that of providing
biodegradable nutrition out of which new knowledge would grow. In a sense,
today’s nutrient is tomorrow’s fertilizer. What I did until 1965 provided the
ingredients for what followed, just as the latter will feed what comes afterward.
Most importantly, I think my general approach has been informed by a pragmatic
and philosophic interest in a holistic, comprehensive understanding of any partic-
ular object of investigation. I will try to explain this approach in the next few
paragraphs.
Broadly speaking, there are two ways to define “philosophy.” From a functional
point of view, philosophy may be identified as critical thinking about anything at
all, from asphalt to zebras. From a content point of view, philosophy may be
identified as a body of knowledge answering three questions: What is it? What good
is it? and How do you know?
Answering the question ‘What is it?’ gives one a discussion of the nature or
being of something. In short, it gives one an ontology, a word derived from the
Greek “on,” meaning nature or being, and logos, meaning discourse (among other
things). Descriptions of the nature of things, ontologies, have at least two aspects.
Everything has, after all, a form, structure, morphology, or anatomy on the one
hand and a function, activity, or physiology on the other. A duck, smile, or football
game, for example, can be described at a minimum by describing their structural
parts and how the parts function. What Isaac Newton might have referred to as
natural philosophy and we now would call natural science is close to what
philosophers would call ontology.
Answering the question ‘What good is it?’ gives one a discussion of the value,
worth, or goodness in some sense of something. In short, it gives one an axiology,
xxvi Introduction to “Selected Works of Alex C. Michalos”
a word derived from the Greek “axios” meaning worthy or valuable, and logos. Of
the variety of kinds of value that may be described, it is most useful to distinguish
intrinsic from instrumental value. Intrinsic value refers to the worth or goodness of
a thing in itself, its value as an end in itself rather than as a means to something else.
Instrumental value refers to the worth or goodness of a thing as a means to
something else, not as a thing in itself. Standard examples include things like eating
an apple or throwing a ball at a target having instrumental value insofar as the
former produces nutrition and the latter scores points, which in this context have
intrinsic value.
Since practically anything might be a useful means to something else for
someone in some circumstances for some purposes, practically anything can have
instrumental value. However, some people believe that all alleged sorts of intrinsic
value may be reduced to a single one. For example, they would argue that the
nutrition obtained from eating an apple is really only instrumentally valuable as a
means to good health, which is itself instrumentally valuable for a life of pleasure,
happiness, or satisfaction. Those who believe that there is finally only one intrin-
sically valuable thing such as pleasure, happiness, or satisfaction may be called
monists with respect to the ultimate nature (ontological status) of value, while those
who believe that there are many intrinsically valuable things may be called
pluralists.
For a monist, then, it may be said that ontologically distinct things such as
music, cheese, and justice have different degrees of some sort of values such as
pleasure, happiness, or satisfaction, while for a pluralist, such ontologically distinct
things have ontologically distinct values (music value, cheese value, and justice
value) regardless of how much pleasure, happiness, or satisfaction these things
produce. From an ontological point of view, then, a monist would have a numer-
ically smaller number of ontologically distinct things in his or her world (e.g.,
music, cheese, justice, and some degree of pleasure, happiness, or satisfaction
generated by the other three), while a pluralist’s world would have music, cheese,
and justice plus music value, cheese value, and justice value.
For a monist, the task of measuring the total value of something, a person, event,
object, attitude, belief, proposition, action, or life itself, is in principle straightfor-
ward. One simply needs to measure the degree of intrinsic value generated by that
thing in terms of or operationalized as pleasure, happiness, or satisfaction. For
pluralists, the task of measuring the total value of something is not at all
straightforward because there may be no way to compare ontologically distinct
values such as the value of music versus the value of cheese or justice. There does
not appear to be any common measure, scale, or instrument available to answer
questions such as “How much is music worth compared to the value of justice or
cheese?” or “What is the value of this piece of music in terms of the value of justice
or cheese?”
Given the severe comparability problems faced by all value pluralists, it is not
surprising that the most frequently studied theories of economists and decision
theorists, namely preference theory, choice theory, utility theory, and game theory,
and one of the most popular ethical theories studied by philosophers, utilitarianism,
Introduction to “Selected Works of Alex C. Michalos” xxvii
assume value monism of some sort. As we will see in many of the papers in this
collection and many more cited in those papers, scholars have invented a great
variety of methods for living in and managing a world apparently containing a
plurality of values. In particular, I will describe my own efforts over about 50 years,
which have been interesting but largely unsuccessful.
Answering the question ‘How do you know?’ gives a discussion of one’s
knowledge of something. In short, it gives one an epistemology, a word derived
from the Greek “episteme” meaning knowledge and logos, hence a theory of
knowledge. Strictly speaking, one ought, prudentially and morally, to have a fairly
clear answer to the epistemological question before one attempts to answer the
ontological and axiological questions. Since a philosopher aims to obtain a body of
knowledge about the nature and value of things to be used in the practice of living a
good life, a patently necessary condition of achieving that aim is clarity with respect
to knowledge itself and its production. That is why the earliest essays in these
4 volumes concern epistemological issues.
All of the papers in this set of volumes are arranged partly in chronological order
and partly by their logical connections. Each volume has its own major themes, and
within those themes, articles have been selected and arranged to provide some idea
of the time at which they appeared and its relation to my own and others’ research
agendas around that time.
Following this introduction, the first two articles in this volume provide bridges
from the social sciences to business ethics and from the latter to the quality of life.
Among several ways of revealing the impact of social sciences on business ethics,
in Chap. 1, it is reported that the 1992 Journal Citation Reports of the Social
Sciences Citation Index shows that “only one (8%) of the 12 journals that are listed
as citing JOBE [the Journal of Business Ethics] in 1992, 1991, and 1990 was not a
social science journal…[and] every one of the 48 journals cited by authors in JOBE
was a social science journal.”
About a third of the 151 articles published in JOBE in 1994 used some sort of
consequentialist moral theory. Generally speaking, advocates of such theories
typically hold that one ought to try to act so that one’s actions tend to impartially
improve the happiness, well-being, utility, welfare, or quality of life of those
affected by the actions. As explained in Michalos (2015), ideas about the nature of
well-being, happiness, and so on have been contested since roughly the eighth
century BCE. What creates a set of critical issues that must be resolved by any
consequentialist measuring the quality of life is the fact that they begin with the
qualification, all things considered, but there is no generally agreed upon criteria for
determining exactly which things, in what period, in what way, by whom, and
many other things. Chapter 2 lists many of the critical issues, effectively showing
xxviii Introduction to “Selected Works of Alex C. Michalos”
why many business ethicists and quality-of-life researchers face similar problems
and should draw on each other’s resources. A more robust account and illustration
of the role played by different explications of the critical issues may be found in
Michalos (2008).
In Chap. 3, I describe “the rudiments of a system of cost accounting to be used in
the evaluation of the costs” of decision making. Aspects of this system are incor-
porated into the comprehensive set of explications in Michalos (1978). Most
importantly, a thorough accounting for all potential costs and benefits of a decision
or decision procedure reveals the essential contribution of moral considerations to
any plausible measure of efficiency. This, in Chap. 4, provides the inescapable
conceptual link between rationality as a kind of efficiency and morality, a link that
the well-known praxiologists Tadeusz Kotarbinski and Henryk Skolimowski denied
or rejected.
Having disclosed the logically necessary connection between rationality as a
kind of efficiency and morality, there was a need to show that Herbert Simon’s
notion of satisficing rationality was as deficient as the more frequently employed
notion of maximizing rationality. In Chap. 5 and more fully in Michalos (1978),
I show that the satisficers ask too little and the maximizers ask too much for a
workable concept of rationality, and I sketch a notion of consensual rationality that
is a reasonable blend of morality and efficiency. I still think I made a compelling
case for a somewhat novel foundation for economics and other decision sciences,
although I am not aware of anyone else who felt compelled by it.
When we founded the Journal of Business Ethics in 1982, the field hardly
existed. People often quipped “Isn’t that an oxymoron, a contradiction in terms?”
They still do, though not quite as often, but probably with as much justification. The
Volkswagen scandal is only months away now. Michalos and Poff (2012) reviewed
the first 30 years of publishing JOBE, reprinted 33 of its most frequently cited
articles, and provided short assessments of the impact of the journal by over
100 scholars in the field. Chapters 7 and 8 are relatively early attempts to dispose of
frequently used unsound arguments against business ethics, against the field and
even more disturbing, and against the very idea of introducing ethical considera-
tions into the assessment of business practice. In Chap. 6, I analyze what I call
“the Loyal Agent’s Argument,” which is based on the assumption that it is morally
acceptable to perform immoral and even illegal acts designed in the interest of or to
prove one’s loyalty to someone else, a person, company, or country, for example.
This is one of 14 arguments considered briefly in Chap. 7. Others erroneously
purport to show, for example, that introducing ethical considerations into business
practices would undermine Adam Smith’s invisible hand, violate certain rights, be
beyond one’s competence, decrease efficiency, increase government control, and
undermine moral pluralism.
Chapter 8 contains an analysis of the case for “the introduction of a progressive
annual net wealth tax in Canada.” I present 19 arguments in favor of such a tax and
try to show that 31 arguments against such a tax are unsound. As this paragraph is
being written (December 2015), no political party in Canada is advocating such a
tax, although in the 1970s I helped get the policy adopted by the New Democratic
Introduction to “Selected Works of Alex C. Michalos” xxix
of Guelph-Wellington in the first two elections and in Prince George Peace River in
the third. I lost in all three elections, winning 20% of the vote in 1988, 5% in 1993,
and 9% in 1997. In the 1988 election, the main issue was the Canada–US Free
Trade Agreement (FTA), and in the 1993 election, it was the North American Free
Trade Agreement (NAFTA), involving Canada, the USA, and Mexico. New
Democrats opposed the FTA and NAFTA, but a Conservative majority government
passed the FTA in 1988 and a Liberal majority passed the NAFTA in 1994.
I presented briefs to the Sub-Committee on International Trade of the Standing
Committee on External Affairs and International Trade in the House of Commons
in December 1992 and to the Ontario Cabinet Committee on North American Free
Trade in April 1993. Chapter 12 is a copy of my Ontario Brief, in which I tried to
explain why I and my party opposed many of the salient controversial provisions
of the NAFTA. According to its proponents, the jewel of the agreement was sup-
posed to be the Dispute Settlement Provisions that were intended to make some sort
of level-playing field for the three countries. I addressed these provisions in my
brief and later in my book Trade Barriers to the Public Good: Free Trade and
Environmental Protection (2008).
Specifically, in Michalos (2008, p. 346), I concluded,
I began with the question: In the NAFTA dispute settlement involving [the fuel additive]
MMT, were the broader community interests of most people in Canada served better or
worse than the relatively narrower commercial trade interests of investors? My attempt to
answer that question was complicated by the initiation of the AIT [Agreement on Internal
Trade] dispute settlement. However, the answer to the basic question is that broader
community interests, as assessed and defended by the Government of Canada, were crushed
in favor of the narrower trade interests of the Ethyl Corporation and the petroleum industry,
defended in one arena by the Ethyl Corporation and in the other by the Government of
Alberta with the support of Saskatchewan and Québec.
Regarding these so-called free trade deals, it should always be remembered that
these deals are designed with a bias in favor of commercial interests over all others.
So once a dispute is moved to adjudication by a trade panel, any case for other
interests such as environmental protection, human, or community rights will be
significantly handicapped and probably fail.
In Chap. 13, written in the second half of the 1990s, I looked into the future and
recommended some issues that seemed to me to warrant more attention from
business ethicists and practitioners. These included the role and impact of labor
unions on the ethical culture of business, social dumping (companies dumping their
products on foreign markets at prices in those markets lower than the costs of
production in order to drive out competitors), international finance and Third-World
debt, tobacco promotion, arms trade, wealth concentration and its taxation, pollu-
tion and resource depletion, international trading blocks, and quasi-cabals of CEOs
of transnational corporations. Reflecting on this list 20 years later, it looks as if I
mainly projected my own primary interests on the field, hoping if not assuming, that
others would take up explorations that I had begun. It is fair to say that most
of these issues are being actively investigated, whether or not anyone noticed my
initiatives.
Introduction to “Selected Works of Alex C. Michalos” xxxi
recently claimed that the great global financial crisis of 2008 was driven in part by
economists’ commitment to the “efficient market hypothesis” (Turner 2016), a
hypothesis I roundly criticized in Chap. 16 and Michalos (1997).
The article reprinted as Chap. 17 expresses some worries I had and still have that
“there is such a diversity of opinion about so many fundamental issues that most
ethical appraisals, especially in committees, are probably very shallow and barely
warranted.” Like most academics, I spent a lot of time working in committees and
I think this paper was probably a result of an overload of unpleasant experiences.
I tried to bring some order to the pluralistic axiological world that most of us are
working in. In its intent, the effort was a bit like the more formal Science Court
procedures that I wrote about twenty years earlier in 1980 (see Philosophical
Foundations of Quality of Life.) and Diener’s (2005) effort to bring some conceptual
order to the field of well-being and ill-being studies. While the views expressed in
this chapter are uncharacteristically pessimistic for me, they do reveal some genuine
concerns that are still relevant.
Chapter 18 is based on a 2004 submission to the B.C. Citizen’s Assembly that
was formed to hold consultations with British Columbians leading to a referendum
in May 2005 on a new electoral system. The proposed single transferable vote
(STV) system required at least 60% support of voters for passage and it received
58%. I added my voice to the opposition of STV. In the federal election of October
2015, the winning Liberal Party promised to introduce a new electoral system in
time for the next federal election. Since some sort of STV system is already being
talked about as a live option, it seems worthwhile to include my observations here.
A version of Chap. 19 was presented at the World Business Ethics Forum held at
Hong Kong Baptist University in November 2006. I reviewed several examples of
ancient writers who addressed issues of business ethics over two thousand years
ago. The most interesting problems were discussed by the great lawyer and
statesman, and sometimes friend of Julius Caesar, Marcus Tulius Cicero (106-43
BCE). Most importantly, Cicero was the first writer in antiquity to present and
demolish the business case for business ethics. He “clearly saw that if morally right
actions are finally only warranted by their financial profitability then they could be
undermined and over-ridden by immoral actions whenever the latter promised
greater profitability.” I have much more to say about the business case in Chap. 21.
In 2007, Robert Reich, the former US Secretary of Labor in the Clinton
Administration, published a book called Supercapitalism: The Transformation of
Business, Democracy and Everyday Life in which, among other things, he tried to
show that and why business ethicists are largely engaged in relatively unproductive
exercises. In his view, the interests of such people would be better served “if they
undertook the hard work of engagement in democratic political processes leading to
legislation that would force corporations to pursue the public interest as well as their
own.” In Chap. 20, I describe what I call Reich’s Monster of Supercapitalism,
analyze his arguments for believing that the Monster is inherently stronger than
democracy and democratic practices, and finally demonstrate that his “under-
standing of democracy and democratic process are flawed” as well as “his under-
standing of CSR [corporate social responsibility] and its relation to the law.”
Another random document with
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Leonia, 414
Lepeta, 405
Lepetella, 405
Lepetidae, radula, 227
Lepidomenia, 404;
radula, 229
Leptachatina, 327
Leptaena, 500, 501, 502, 503, 505;
stratigraphical distribution, 507, 508
Leptaxis, 441
Leptinaria, 357, 358, 442
Leptochiton, 403
Leptoconchus, 75, 423
Leptoloma, 348, 351
Lepton, 453;
parasitic, 77;
commensal, 80;
mantle-edge, 175, 178
Leptoplax, 403
Leptopoma, 316, 319, 338, 414
Leptoteuthis, 390
Leptothyra, 409
Leroya, 331
Leucochila, 442
Leucochloridium, 61
Leucochroa, 292, 295, 441
Leuconia, 439
Leucotaenia, 335, 359, 441
Leucozonia, 64, 424, 424
Levantina, 295
Libania, 295
Libera, 327, 441;
egg-laying, 128
Libitina, 451
Licina, 414
Life, duration of, in snails, 39
Ligament, 271
Liguus, 349, 351, 442
Lima, 178, 179, 450;
habits, 63
Limacidae, radula, 232
Limacina, 59, 249, 436, 436
Limapontia, 429, 432;
breathing, 152
Limax, 245, 440;
food, 31, 179;
variation, 86;
pulmonary orifice, 160;
shell, 175;
jaw, 211;
radula, 217;
distribution, 285, 324;
L. agrestis, eats May flies, 31;
arborum, slime, 30;
food, 31;
flavus, food, 33, 36;
habits, 35, 36;
gagates, 279, 358;
maximus, 32, 161;
eats raw beef, 32;
cannibalism, 32;
sexual union, 128;
smell, 193 f.
Limea, 450
Limicolaria, 329–332, 443
Limnaea, 439;
self-impregnation, 44;
development and variation, 84, 92, 93;
size affected by volume of water, 94;
eggs, 124;
sexual union, 134;
jaw, 211;
radula, 217, 235;
L. auricularia, 24;
glutinosa, sudden appearance, 46;
Hookeri, 25;
involuta, 82, 278, 287;
peregra, 10, 180;
burial, 27;
food, 34, 37;
variation, 85;
distribution, 282;
palustris, distribution, 282;
stagnalis, food, 34, 37;
variation, 85, 95;
circum-oral lobes, 131;
generative organs, 414;
breathing, 161;
nervous system, 204;
distribution, 282;
truncatula, parasite, 61;
distribution, 282
Limnocardium, 455
Limnotrochus, 332, 415
Limopsis, 448
Limpet-shaped shells, 244
Limpets as food for birds, 56;
rats, 57;
birds and rats caught by, 57;
as bait, 118
Lingula, 464, 467, 468, 471, 472, 473, 475, 477, 478, 487;
habits, 483, 484;
distribution, 485;
fossil, 493, 494, 503;
stratigraphical distribution, 506, 508, 510, 511
Lingulella, 493, 503;
stratigraphical distribution, 506, 508, 511
Lingulepis, 503, 511
Lingulidae, 485, 487, 496, 503, 508
Linnarssonia, 504;
stratigraphical distribution, 506, 508
Lintricula, 426
Liobaikalia, 290
Liomesus, 424
Lioplax, 340, 416
Liostoma, 424
Liostracus, 442
Liotia, 408
Liparus, 324, 359, 441
Lissoceras, 399
Lithasia, 340, 417
Lithidion, 414
Lithocardium, 455
Lithodomus, 449
Lithoglyphus, 294, 296, 297, 415
Lithopoma, 409
Lithotis, 302, 443
Litiopa, 30, 361, 415
Littorina, 413;
living out of water, 20;
radula, 20, 215;
habits, 50;
protective coloration, 69;
egg-laying, 126;
hybrid union, 130;
monstrosity, 251, 252;
operculum, 269;
erosion, 276;
L. littorea, in America, 374;
obtusata, generative organs, 135;
rudis, 150;
Prof. Herdman’s experiments on, 151 n.
Littorinida, 415
Lituites, 247, 395
Liver, 239;
liver-fluke, 61
Livinhacea, 333, 359, 441
Livona, 408;
radula, 226;
operculum, 268
Lloyd, W. A., on Nassa, 193
Lobiger, 432
Lobites, 397
Loligo, 378–389;
glands, 136;
modified arm, 139;
eye, 183;
radula, 236;
club, 381;
L. punctata, egg-laying, 127;
vulgaris, larva, 133
Loligopsis, 391
Loliguncula, 390
Loliolus, 390
Lomanotus, 433
Lophocercus, 432
Lorica, 403
Lowe, E. J., on growth of shell, 40
Loxonema, 417
Lucapina, 406
Lucapinella, 406
Lucerna, 441
Lucidella, 348–351, 410
Lucina, 270, 452
Lucinopsis, 454
Lung, 151, 160
Lunulicardium, 455
Lutetia, 452
Lutraria, 446, 456
Lychnus, 442
Lyonsia, 458
Lyonsiella, 458;
branchiae, 168
Lyra, stratigraphical distribution, 507
Lyria, 425
Lyrodesma, 447
Lysinoe, 441
Lytoceras, 398
Maackia, 290
Macgillivrayia, 133
Machomya, 458
Maclurea, 410
Macroceramus, 343–353, 442
Macroceras, 440
Macrochilus, 417
Macrochlamys, 296, 299, 301 f., 310, 316–322, 440
Macrocyclis, 358, 359, 442
Macron, 424
Macroön, 441
Macroscaphites, 247, 399, 399
Macroschisma, 265, 406
Mactra, 271, 446, 454
Macularia, 285, 291, 292 f., 441
Magas, 506;
stratigraphical distribution, 507, 508
Magellania, 500
Magilus, 75, 423
Mainwaringia, 302
Malaptera, 418
Malea, 419
Malletia, 447
Malleus, 449
Mangilia, 426
Mantle, 172 f., 173;
lobes of, 177
Margarita, 408;
radula, 225
Marginella, 425;
radula, 221
Mariaella, 314, 338, 440
Marionia, 433
Marmorostoma, 409
Marrat, F. P., views on variation, 82
Marsenia, 133
Marsenina, 411
Martesia, 305, 457
Mastigoteuthis, 390
Mastus, 296, 442
Matheronia, 455
Mathilda, 250, 417
Maugeria, 403
Mazzalina, 424
Megalatractus, 424
Megalodontidae, 451
Megalomastoma, 344, 414
Megalomphalus, 416
Megaspira, 358, 442
Megatebennus, 406
Megerlia, distribution, 486, 487
Meladomus, 249, 328, 331, 416
Melampus, 18, 199, 250, 439, 439
Melanatria, 336
Melania, 276, 417, 417;
distribution, 285, 292 f., 316 f., 324, 336
Melaniella, 442
Melaniidae, origin, 17
Melanism in Mollusca, 85
Melanopsis, 417;
distribution, 285, 291, 292 f., 323, 326
Melantho, 340, 416
Melapium, 424
Meleagrina, 449
Melia, 348
Melibe, 432
Melongena, 424;
radula, 220;
stomach, 238
Merica, 426
Merista, 505, 508
Meroe, 454
Merope, 327
Mesalia, 417
Mesembrinus, 356, 442
Mesodesma, 454
Mesodon, 340, 441
Mesomphix, 340, 440
Mesorhytis, 377
Meta, 423
Metula, 424
Meyeria, 424
Miamira, 434
Microcystis, 323, 324, 327, 338, 440
Microgaza, 408
Micromelania, 12, 297
Microphysa, protective habits, 70
Microplax, 403
Micropyrgus, 415
Microvoluta, 425
Middendorffia, 403
Milneria, 451
Mimicry, 66
Minolia, 408
Mitra, 425;
radula, 221
Mitrella, 423
Mitreola, 425
Mitrularia, 248, 412
Modiola, 446, 449;
habits, 64;
genital orifice, 242
Modiolarca, 449
Modiolaria, 449;
habits, 78
Modiolopsis, 452
Modulus, 417
Monilia, 408
Monkey devouring oysters, 59
Monoceros, 423
Monocondylaea, 452
Monodacna, 12, 297, 455
Monodonta, 408, 408;
tentaculae, 178
Monogonopora, 134, 140
Monomerella, 496, 504
Monopleura, 456
Monotis, 449
Monotocardia, 9, 170, 411
Monstrosities, 250
Montacuta, 452;
M. ferruginosa, commensal, 80;
substriata, parasitic, 77
Mopalia, 403
Moquin-Tandon, on breathing of Limnaeidae, 162;
on smell, 193 f.
Moreletia, 440
Morio, 420
Mormus, 356, 442
Moseley, H. N., on eyes of Chiton, 187 f.
Moussonia, 327
Mouth, 209
Mucronalia, 422
Mucus, use of, 63
Mulinia, 272
Mülleria, 344, 452
Mumiola, 422
Murchisonia, 265, 407
Murchisoniella, 422
Murex, 423;
attacks Arca, 60;
use of spines, 64;
egg-capsules, 124;
eye, 182;
radula, 220;
shell, 256
Musical sounds, 50
Mussels, cultivation of, 115;
as bait, 116;
poisonous, 117;
on Great Eastern, 116
Mutela, 294, 328, 331, 336, 452
Mutyca, 425
Mya, 271, 275, 446, 456;
stylet, 240;
M. arenaria, variation, 84
Myacea, 456
Myalina, 449
Mycetopus, 307, 316, 344, 452
Myochama, 458
Myodora, 458
Myophoria, 448
Myopsidae, 389
Myrina, 449
Myristica, 424
Mytilacea, 448
Mytilimeria, 458
Mytilops, 452
Mytilopsis, 14
Mytilus, 258, 449;
gill filaments, 166, 285;
M. edulis, 14, 165;
attached to crabs, 48, 78;
pierced by Purpura, 60;
Bideford Bridge and, 117;
rate of growth, 258;
stylet, 240
Myxostoma, 414
Nacella, 405
Naiadina, 449
Nanina, 278, 300 f., 335, 440;
radula, 217, 232
Napaeus, 296–299, 316, 442
Naranio, 454
Narica, 412
Nassa, 423;
egg-capsules, 126;
sense of smell, 193
Nassodonta, 423
Nassopsis, 332
Natica, 246, 263, 411;
spawn, 126;
operculum, 268
Naticopsis, 409
‘Native’ oysters, 106
Nausitora, 15
Nautiloidea, 393
Nautilus, 254, 392, 395;
modified arms, 140;
eye, 183;
nervous system, 206;
radula, 236;
kidneys, 242
Navicella, 267, 268, 324, 327, 410;
origin, 17
Navicula, 358, 442
Navicula (Diatom), cause of greening in oysters, 108
Nectoteuthis, 389
Neda, 431
Nematurella, 12, 297
Nembrotha, 434
Neobolus, 504
Neobuccinum, 424
Neocyclotus, 357, 358
Neomenia, 8, 133, 216, 228, 404, 404;
breathing organs, 154;
nervous system, 203
Neothauma, 332
Neotremata, 511
Neptunea, 252, 262, 423;
egg-capsules, 126;
capture, 193;
monstrosity, 251
Nerinea, 417
Nerita, 17, 410;
N. polita used as money, 97
Neritidae, 260, 410;
radula, 226
Neritina, 256, 410;
origin, 16, 17, 21;
egg-laying, 128;
eye, 181;
distribution, 285, 291 f., 324, 327;
N. fluviatilis, habitat, 12, 25
Neritoma, 410
Neritopsis, 409;
radula, 226;
operculum, 269
Nervous system, 201 f.
Nesiotis, 357, 442
New Zealanders, use of shells, 99
Nicida, 413
Ninella, 409
Niphonia, 408
Niso, 422
Nitidella, 423
Nodulus, 415
Notarchus, 431
Nothus, 358, 442
Notobranchaea, 438
Notodoris, 434
Notoplax, 403
Novaculina, 305
Nucula, 254, 269, 273, 447
Nuculidae, otocyst, 197;
foot, 201
Nuculina, 448
Nudibranchiata, 432;
defined, 10;
protective and warning colours, 71 f.;
breathing organs, 159
Nummulina, 295
Nuttallina, 403